Context: Rescue operations involving sovereign debt have included temporarily moving bad or weak assets off the balance sheets of the weak member banks into the balance sheets of the European Central Bank. Such action is viewed as monetisation and can be seen as an inflationary threat, whereby the strong member countries of the ECB shoulder the burden of monetary expansion (and potential inflation) to save the weak member countries. Most central banks prefer to move weak assets off their balance sheets with some kind of agreement as to how the debt will continue to be serviced. This preference has typically led the ECB to argue that the weaker member countries must:

Question: What can be shuffeled around during a soverign debt crisis to mitigate the damage?
Answer: temporarily moving bad or weak assets

Question: Where do bad and weak assets get moved in times of soverign debt crisis?
Answer: the balance sheets of the European Central Bank

Question: What is shuffling around bad or weak debts from a weaker eurozone member to the ECB known as?
Answer: monetisation

Question: What is monetisation usually viewed as?
Answer: inflationary threat

Question: If the central banks can come to an agreement with the eurozone member about the continued repayment of the debt, what happens to the bad or weak debt?
Answer: move weak assets off their balance sheets

Question: What can never be shuffled around during a sovereign debt crisis to mitigate the damage?
Answer: Unanswerable

Question: Where do bad and weak assets become restricted in times of sovereign debt crisis?
Answer: Unanswerable

Question: What is shuffling around good or strong debts from a weaker eurozone member to the ECB known as?
Answer: Unanswerable

Question: What is monetisation rarely viewed as?
Answer: Unanswerable