Collectivity, evil and the dynamics of moral value
The paper aims at making explicit and question the dominant conception that morality is a matter of values and valuation. This conception is usually taken as the self-evident frame of analysis, both in ethical theorizing and in everyday life and also in most discussions of ethics in medical contexts (e.g. in debates about 'values-based practice'). We argue that the dominant conception is deeply flawed insofar as it implies a repression of the fundamental importance of I-you relationships. As a consequence of this repression, what are commonly taken to be 'personal' and even 'individualist' moral outlooks are, in fact, merely the reverse side of collective norms and values, just as 'particularism' in ethics is not a real alternative to 'universalism', but rather both are variations on the same repressive theme. In showing this, we also outline the sense in which the moral relationship between an 'I' and a 'you' has an altogether different 'grammar' or sense.