{"content":[{"text":"Brexit and the Common Law Constitution","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.055996,"width":0.7716930000000001,"height":0.030418999999999995}},{"text":"Regulating for Globalization \n 21/11/2018","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.121992,"width":0.323453,"height":0.03624699999999999}},{"text":"Gordon Anthony (Queen’s University Belfast)","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.175001,"width":0.37463799999999997,"height":0.015209}},{"text":"Please refer to this post as: Gordon Anthony, ‘Brexit and the Common Law Constitution’, Regulating \n for Globalization, 21/11/2018, \n http://regulatingforglobalization.com/2018/11/21/brexit-and-the-common-law-constitution/","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.206973,"width":0.833856,"height":0.04988500000000004}},{"text":"Please ﬁnd below the journal abstract of “Brexit and the Common Law Constitution” \n by Gordon Anthony published in European Public Law Issue 4, Volume 24, 2018 edited by Patrick \n Birkinshaw.","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.310616,"width":0.809052,"height":0.049885999999999986}},{"text":"This article considers the implications that Brexit holds for the UK’s ‘common law constitution’ – the \n body of principles and norms that the courts have developed in case law on EU membership, \n fundamental rights, and devolution. Focusing on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller, it argues that \n Brexit may have paradoxical eﬀects within the case law. These start with the fact that the Supreme \n Court rationalized EU withdrawal in terms of Parliamentary sovereignty, but did so in a manner that \n casts doubt on the utility of distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ law. However, it is in the \n context of rights and devolution that the Supreme Court’s reliance on Parliamentary sovereignty as \n UK law’s ‘rule of recognition’ is most problematic, and the article notes a number of tensions in the \n law. In relation to rights, these are a result of an apparent retreat from a line of case law that had \n previously indicated that the courts might impose substantive limits on the powers of the \n Westminster Parliament. The tensions around devolution are a result of the subordinate role that the \n rule of recognition accords to the devolved institutions and its inability to accommodate any \n conception of ‘divided sovereignty’.","bbox":{"left":0.071429,"top":0.409236,"width":0.8425670000000001,"height":0.22326200000000002}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}