{"content":[{"text":"No. 03-3928","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.074045,"width":0.09911799999999998,"height":0.020212000000000008}},{"text":"Pickering v. Gonzales","bbox":{"left":0.285,"top":0.075515,"width":0.17284,"height":0.018500000000000003}},{"text":"Page 2","bbox":{"left":0.82951,"top":0.074045,"width":0.05283900000000008,"height":0.020212000000000008}},{"text":"Petitioner is a native and citizen of Canada. On November 6, 1980, he was indicted in \n Ontario, Canada, for the unlawful possession of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (“LSD”). He pled \n guilty. His sentence required him to pay a fine of $300.00 (Canadian) or, in default of payment, to \n serve 30 days in custody. \n In 1991, Petitioner entered the United States as a non-immigrant, intra-company transferee. \n His wife and their two children followed him as derivative non-immigrants. In 1992, the \n Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)1 approved a Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) \n filed on behalf of Petitioner’s wife by her employer. Mrs. Pickering later applied for adjustment of \n status based on the approved I-140, and Petitioner and their children filed derivative adjustment of \n status applications based on their relationship to Mrs. Pickering. On June 17, 1993, the INS \n approved Mrs. Pickering and the children's adjustment of status applications, making them lawful \n permanent residents. \n On February 28, 1996, Petitioner received a pardon of his LSD conviction. Notwithstanding \n the pardon, his attempt to adjust his status was denied. On May 7, 1997, Petitioner filed a notice of \n appeal, with the Canadian court, seeking to have that conviction quashed. In a judgment dated \n June 20, 1997, the Canadian court quashed the Petitioner’s 1980 conviction for unlawful possession \n of LSD. On August 21, 1998, the Petitioner’s application for adjustment of status was again denied \n and removal proceedings were initiated, with the Immigration Judge finding the Petitioner to be \n removable on the basis of his LSD conviction. In his decision, the Immigration Judge declined to \n give effect to the Canadian court’s order quashing the conviction, concluding that the court’s action \n was solely for rehabilitative purposes, entered in order to avoid adverse immigration consequences \n and to allow the Petitioner to live permanently in the United States. The Petitioner appealed the \n Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA, and the BIA issued a published opinion denying \n Petitioner’s appeal. Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003). \n The BIA had jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), to review the decision of the \n Immigration Judge who ordered Petitioner’s removal. The BIA decision is a final agency decision. \n 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1. The Petitioner’s Petition for Review was filed in a timely manner pursuant to \n 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). This Court has jurisdiction to review the BIA decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \n § 1252(a). \n We review questions of law raised in removal proceedings de novo. Huicochea-Gomez v. \n INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). However, in order to reverse a BIA factual determination, \n the evidence must compel a contrary conclusion. Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2001). \n Pickering first argues that the BIA’s decision fails as a matter of law. However, a review \n of that decision and the applicable case law reveals that the BIA correctly interpreted the law by \n holding that, when a court vacates an alien’s conviction for reasons solely related to rehabilitation \n or to avoid adverse immigration hardships, rather than on the basis of a procedural or substantive \n defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated for immigration \n purposes. Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003). This interpretation of the law \n is consistent with that of other circuits and with our own interpretation. A conviction vacated for \n rehabilitative or immigration reasons remains valid for immigration purposes, while one vacated \n because of procedural or substantive infirmities does not.2 See Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432 (6th Cir.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.128136,"width":0.7650079999999999,"height":0.6876369999999999}},{"text":"1The \n functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service have been transferred to the Department of \n Homeland Security, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. \n 2A \n conviction is vacated for rehabilitative purposes where state law provides a means for the trial court to \n enable a Defendant to avoid certain continuing effects under state law from that conviction. See Murillo-Espinoza v. \n INS, 261 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 1999).","bbox":{"left":0.117646,"top":0.843045,"width":0.764826,"height":0.08942899999999998}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}