{"content":[{"text":"2","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.052701,"width":0.012869999999999993,"height":0.017854999999999996}},{"text":"Electoral Authoritarianism","bbox":{"left":0.180055,"top":0.054213,"width":0.2564350000000001,"height":0.016}},{"text":"30 \n 31 \n 32 \n 33 \n 34 \n 35 \n 36 \n 37 \n 38 \n 39 \n 40 \n 41 \n 42 \n 43 \n 44 \n 45 \n 46 \n 47 \n 48 \n 49 \n 50 \n 51 \n 52 \n 53 \n 54 \n 55 \n 56 \n 57 \n 58 \n 59 \n 60 \n 61 \n 62 \n 63 \n 64 \n 65 \n 66 \n 67 \n 68 \n 69 \n 70 \n 71 \n 72 \n 73","bbox":{"left":0.083333,"top":0.098531,"width":0.023148000000000002,"height":0.813534}},{"text":"preferences and authoritarian manipulation. We can resolve this observa- \n tional problem either by using the competitiveness of opposition parties as \n a proxy for authoritarian manipulation, or we may seek to gather extensive \n knowledge about the case at hand in order to reach a comprehensive judg- \n ment about the overall democratic quality of a given electoral process. The \n third section, on the endogenous dynamic of electoral authoritarianism, \n analyzes authoritarian elections as “creative” institutions that constitute a \n certain set of actors (citizens, opposition actors, and ruling parties), endow \n them with certain sets of strategies, and push them into a conflictive “nested \n game” in which the competition for votes within given rules takes place \n alongside the competitive struggle over the rules of the game.","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.098531,"width":0.7227549999999999,"height":0.202424}},{"text":"The Concept of Electoral Authoritarianism","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.338717,"width":0.4734719999999999,"height":0.01785500000000001}},{"text":"The early 1990s were a time of democratic optimism. South America had \n completed its journey to electoral democracy, the Soviet empire had disin- \n tegrated in relative peace, and sub-Saharan Africa was passing through an \n unprecedented series of multiparty elections. We were reading about the \n end of history, the triumph of democracy, and the liberal world order. Both \n academic and political observers, however, are trained to be skeptics. Few, \n if any, ever embraced teleological illusions about the expansion of democ- \n racy. If the world was ever to become overwhelmingly liberal, democratic, \n and peaceful, it would not happen at once, but in bits and pieces, ups and \n downs, and over the long run. From its very inception, the idea of global \n “waves” of democratization was accompanied by warnings against “reverse \n waves” of authoritarian regression. Waves come and go.2 \n Since the Portuguese Revolution of the Carnations in 1974, the politi- \n cal drama that marks the official starting point of the “third wave” of global \n democratization, the number of democratic regimes worldwide has roughly \n doubled. Although different counts yield different pictures, the overall trend \n is quite clear. For instance, the annual Freedom House report on political \n rights and civil liberties in the world identified forty-two “free” countries in \n the year 1974. Three decades later, in 2004, it judged eighty-nine countries \n to be free (out of a total of 118 countries it classified as “electoral democ- \n racies”).3 Without a doubt, these numbers are impressive. The breadth and \n resilience of the third wave of democratic expansion is without precedent in \n the history of the international system. However, today the flurry of opti- \n mism that accompanied the end of the Cold War has subsided. The resur- \n gence of ethnic violence in former communist countries and sub-Saharan \n Africa explains part of the new skepticism, as does the terror unleashed \n inside advanced democracies by the transnational crime syndicate Al- \n Qaida. Persisting realities of authoritarian rule explain the other part.","bbox":{"left":0.138887,"top":0.376309,"width":0.723012,"height":0.517237}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}