{"content":[{"text":"Washington Lobbyists in the Core and on the Periphery","bbox":{"left":0.265764,"top":0.12165,"width":0.468476,"height":0.016779000000000002}},{"text":"Frank R. Baumgartner, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, frankb@unc.edu \n Timothy M. LaPira, James Madison University, lapiratm@jmu.edu \n Herschel F. Thomas III, University of Texas at Austin, herschelfthomas@gmail.com","bbox":{"left":0.167787,"top":0.169226,"width":0.6644180000000001,"height":0.051627000000000006}},{"text":"Abstract","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.256498,"width":0.072965,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"For decades, political scientists have had two divergent views on lobbyists in Washington. On","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.291347,"width":0.7378899999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"the one hand they focus on the privileged access of a few groups in balkanized issue niches, and","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.326195,"width":0.753598,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"on the other they observe highly inclusive lobbying campaigns where hundreds of lobbyists","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.361044,"width":0.71882,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"vigorously compete for policymakers’ attention.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.395892,"width":0.378434,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Not surprisingly, these disparate observations","bbox":{"left":0.505898,"top":0.395892,"width":0.35777000000000003,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"lead to contradictory conclusions about lobbying tactics, relations with relevant policymakers,","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.430741,"width":0.738329,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"and the nature of interest group influence.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.465589,"width":0.328314,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"In this paper we make a simple, yet novel, empirical","bbox":{"left":0.455765,"top":0.465589,"width":0.41000100000000006,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"observation: these disparate inferences about lobbying at the micro-level are not inconsistent","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.500438,"width":0.7268949999999998,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"when we uncover the structure of lobbyists’ interactions at the macro-level.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.535286,"width":0.5918509999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"That is, both views","bbox":{"left":0.719305,"top":0.535286,"width":0.149219,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"are correct, depending on the policy context.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.570135,"width":0.349518,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Using data from 293,631 Lobbying Disclosure Act","bbox":{"left":0.476984,"top":0.570135,"width":0.399178,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"(LDA) reports filed between 1998 and 2008—which consists of 2,077,404 observations of","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.604983,"width":0.7095750000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"35,826 individual lobbyists reporting lobbying activity in 78 issue areas—we reveal that the","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.639832,"width":0.721533,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Washington lobbying community has a fundamental and stable core-periphery structure. We","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.67468,"width":0.7307170000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"then document how the empirically derived core-periphery mapping is a superior way to","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.709529,"width":0.693668,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"differentiate bandwagon or issue niche policy domains.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.744377,"width":0.43398699999999996,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Paper prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Annual Meeting, \n Chicago, IL, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 2013.","bbox":{"left":0.17468,"top":0.848922,"width":0.650614,"height":0.03405200000000008}},{"text":"1","bbox":{"left":0.494902,"top":0.93771,"width":0.00980399999999998,"height":0.01677899999999999}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}