{"content":[{"text":"Timing of Belief as a Key to Cross-Linguistic Variation in Common Ground \n Management","bbox":{"left":0.161456,"top":0.089326,"width":0.676825,"height":0.04327299999999999}},{"text":"Johannes M. Heim \n Newcastle University \n johannes.heim@newcastle.ac.uk","bbox":{"left":0.161845,"top":0.147998,"width":0.262506,"height":0.055465000000000014}},{"text":"Martina E. Wiltschko \n ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra \n martina.wiltschko@icrea.cat","bbox":{"left":0.575082,"top":0.147998,"width":0.26349100000000003,"height":0.055465000000000014}},{"text":"ABSTRACT: In this paper we introduce the notion of Timing of Belief (ToB) as a relevant factor of variation \n in common ground (CG) management in sentence-peripheral particles across different languages. CG \n management traces the epistemic development of mutual beliefs between speaker and addressee. \n Evidence for the relevance of ToB comes from a small-scale acceptability study which tested the relevance \n of ToB for particles in English, German, and Spanish. While these languages all possess grammaticalized \n structures to encode different types of knowledge asymmetries between speaker and addressee, they \n vary with respect to the sensitivity or encoding of ToB. The inclusion of ToB into CG management suggests \n that models which focus on the dynamic character of CG development require further expansion. We hope \n that the fine-graded differences in CG management reported here serve to inspire an engagement with \n the notion of ToB and the variation we find across languages and dialects.","bbox":{"left":0.115686,"top":0.218546,"width":0.7686250000000001,"height":0.245804}},{"text":"Key words: common ground, timing of belief, reason to believe, sentence-peripheral particles, storyboards","bbox":{"left":0.115686,"top":0.482788,"width":0.76848,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"1 Background: common ground management starts with a knowledge asymmetry \n The notion of common ground (Stalnaker 1978, henceforth: CG) has undergone several revisions over the \n last few years to reflect the dynamic and interactional process it takes to expand the CG. The notion has \n become more interactional because the speaker can at best propose for a belief to be added to the CG. \n Grounding a belief, however, is a mutual act (Groenendijk and Roelofsen 2009; Farkas and Bruce 2010; \n Stalnaker 2014; Wiltschko and Heim 2016). It is also a dynamic act because it often involves more than \n one speech act for a belief to be grounded (Clark and Brennan 1991; Bavelas et al. 2012; Malamud and \n Stephenson 2014). Hence, grounding a belief is a complex process. The beginning of an act of grounding \n can be defined as a knowledge asymmetry between speaker and addressee (Heim 2019b; Osa 2020): For \n a belief to be proposed as an addition to the CG, the proposing speaker must qualify as a credible source \n (Gunlogson 2008). The role of the addressee is to decide on whether they agree to believe the new \n proposition to be added (Stalnaker 2002). The default case of an assertion is therefore that the speaker \n has evidence for the truth of a proposition which is hitherto unknown to the addressee. It is necessary to \n monitor both the speaker’s and the addressee’s ground independently to understand the variation in use \n conventions of different discourse phenomena. Consider the examples in (1) to (4). For an assertion (1) to \n be used, the speaker has to know more than the addressee. With a polarity question (2), this scenario is","bbox":{"left":0.115686,"top":0.523755,"width":0.7685600000000001,"height":0.40059500000000003}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}