{"content":[{"text":"inversed: initially, only the addressee knows which propositional alternative is true and the speaker has \n reasons to belief that the addressee qualifies as a source of knowledge. In a biased question (3), the \n knowledge asymmetry is weaker than in polarity questions because some (extralinguistic) support makes \n one of the polar alternatives seem more credible to the speaker. With an echo question (4), in particular \n when the speaker expresses indignation, the initial asymmetry is defined by opposing beliefs.","bbox":{"left":0.115686,"top":0.089455,"width":0.76852,"height":0.118834}},{"text":"(1)","bbox":{"left":0.145098,"top":0.226728,"width":0.020030999999999993,"height":0.017016000000000003}},{"text":"It is raining.","bbox":{"left":0.17451,"top":0.226728,"width":0.08571200000000001,"height":0.017016000000000003}},{"text":"[speaker knows p; addressee is presumably ignorant]","bbox":{"left":0.292157,"top":0.226728,"width":0.387487,"height":0.017016000000000003}},{"text":"(2)","bbox":{"left":0.145098,"top":0.262182,"width":0.020030999999999993,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"Is it raining?","bbox":{"left":0.17451,"top":0.262182,"width":0.08953099999999997,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"[speaker is ignorant; addressee presumably knows p]","bbox":{"left":0.292157,"top":0.262182,"width":0.3873000000000001,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"(3)","bbox":{"left":0.145098,"top":0.29794,"width":0.020030999999999993,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"It is raining?","bbox":{"left":0.17451,"top":0.29794,"width":0.08957199999999998,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"[speaker is biased; addressee presumably knows p]","bbox":{"left":0.292157,"top":0.29794,"width":0.37304800000000005,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"(4)","bbox":{"left":0.145098,"top":0.333394,"width":0.020030999999999993,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"It is RAINING?!","bbox":{"left":0.17451,"top":0.333394,"width":0.10772500000000002,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"[speaker responds -p after addressee claims p]","bbox":{"left":0.292157,"top":0.333394,"width":0.339917,"height":0.017015999999999976}},{"text":"Because the use conventions for the phenomena in (1) to (4) can be distinguished by the initial asymmetry \n between the speaker’s and the addressee’s knowledge, we assume that CG management needs to be \n modeled by individually monitoring both the current and the future ground of both interlocutors. We \n therefore follow the recent trend in CG modeling by assuming that it needs to include a dynamic aspect \n responsible for the possible back and forth between interlocutors and an interactional aspect. The latter \n requires CG to be conceived not only in terms of possible worlds in which p is believed to be true (Stalnaker \n 1978) but also by the individual stances of each interlocutor on what they regard as true. In Wiltschko and \n Heim (2016), we therefore propose the CG model in Figure 1 for an assertion like (1). This model includes \n a speaker ground, an addressee ground and a negotiation table (following Farkas and Bruce 2010). \n Crucially, before p can be added to the CG, the addressee needs to accept it (verbally or non-verbally). We \n hence include an anticipated second turn modeling this acceptance (following Clark and Brennan 1991).","bbox":{"left":0.115686,"top":0.368849,"width":0.768516,"height":0.271258}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}