{"content":[{"text":"The literature on interest group relations with government has long been conflicted because","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.091347,"width":0.717614,"height":0.016779000000000002}},{"text":"scholars and journalists alike have focused on two seemingly contradictory states of affairs: close","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.126195,"width":0.7639769999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"relations among small numbers of lobbyists and government insiders on obscure, technical issues","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.161044,"width":0.7629349999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"such as agriculture, transportation, and telecommunications regulation—i.e., those characterized","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.195892,"width":0.755161,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"by iron triangles, policy subsystems, and interest niches—and occasions where a large, diverse,","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.230741,"width":0.748154,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"and pluralistic set of interest groups engage policymakers on highly salient issues like the federal","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.265589,"width":0.761245,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"budget, taxes, and health care reform.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.300438,"width":0.295085,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"These very different observations of lobbying led","bbox":{"left":0.422536,"top":0.300438,"width":0.387713,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Baumgartner and Leech (1998) to emphasize the contradictory nature of much of the literature","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.335286,"width":0.7409939999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"on lobbying.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.370135,"width":0.09913,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Such internal contradictions and a lack of a common theoretical framework","bbox":{"left":0.22658,"top":0.370135,"width":0.591275,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"remains one of the most notable features of the literature (Hojnacki et al 2012).","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.404983,"width":0.62073,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Observers point to virtual feeding frenzies where thousands of lobbyists participate in","bbox":{"left":0.176471,"top":0.439832,"width":0.672488,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"high-profile issues like health care reform, which calls into question the existence of impregnable","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.47468,"width":0.764459,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"iron triangles.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.509529,"width":0.108904,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"Such instances can be traced to the rapid and steady growth of the interest group","bbox":{"left":0.236355,"top":0.509529,"width":0.6305170000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"system in Washington over many decades (Berry 1999). Though interest group scholars are","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.544377,"width":0.723109,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"concerned about this growth because it is not evident that all interests are represented equally","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.579226,"width":0.7317640000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"(Schlozman and Tierney 1983, Walker 1991, Baumgartner and Leech 2001, Baumgartner et al","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.614074,"width":0.7410129999999999,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"2009), Salisbury (1990) pointed out what he called the interest group paradox: as the overall","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.648923,"width":0.7236400000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"number of groups in Washington increases, each individual group’s ability to influence any","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.683771,"width":0.717141,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"single issue or policy domain will be diminished.","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.718619,"width":0.385569,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"With so much competition, individual groups","bbox":{"left":0.51303,"top":0.718619,"width":0.35615699999999995,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"struggle to prove to lawmakers that they can offer some tangible electoral benefits (Hansen","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.753468,"width":0.7148840000000001,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"1991). As a result, a “hollow core” where no single group or subset of elite groups dominate","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.788316,"width":0.729136,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"characterizes the Washington interest group system (Heinz et al 1993).","bbox":{"left":0.117647,"top":0.823165,"width":0.555337,"height":0.01677899999999999}},{"text":"2","bbox":{"left":0.494902,"top":0.93771,"width":0.00980399999999998,"height":0.01677899999999999}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}