{"content":[{"text":"Neuronomics and Rationality","bbox":{"left":0.299765,"top":0.152523,"width":0.39761799999999997,"height":0.03143699999999999}},{"text":"Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe","bbox":{"left":0.352982,"top":0.203019,"width":0.29118299999999997,"height":0.01818900000000001}},{"text":"Abstract","bbox":{"left":0.462227,"top":0.276148,"width":0.07268800000000003,"height":0.019639000000000018}},{"text":"The assumption of rationality is both one of the most important and most con- \n troversial assumptions of modern economics. This article discusses what current \n experimental economic as well as neuroscience research tells us about the rela- \n tionship between rationality and the mechanisms of human decision-making. The \n article explores the meaning of rationality, with a discussion of the distinction \n between traditional constructivist rationality and more ecological concepts of ra- \n tionality. The article argues that ecological notions of rationality more accurately \n describe both human neural mechanisms as well as a wider variety of human be- \n havior than do constructivist notions of rationality.","bbox":{"left":0.181134,"top":0.347763,"width":0.634876,"height":0.16410699999999995}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}