{"content":[{"text":"1 \n The Logic of \n Electoral Authoritarianism","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.094429,"width":0.569861,"height":0.13695999999999997}},{"text":"Andreas Schedler","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.258457,"width":0.26201399999999997,"height":0.024888999999999994}},{"text":"1 \n 2 \n 3 \n 4 \n 5 \n 6 \n 7 \n 8 \n 9 \n 10 \n 11 \n 12 \n 13 \n 14 \n 15 \n 16 \n 17 \n 18 \n 19 \n 20 \n 21 \n 22 \n 23 \n 24 \n 25 \n 26 \n 27 \n 28 \n 29","bbox":{"left":0.083333,"top":0.376309,"width":0.023148000000000002,"height":0.535756}},{"text":"A specter is haunting the developing world—the specter of electoral author- \n itarianism. The good thing is that scaring off specters is an easy assignment, \n in particular for those who fail to believe in scary metaphysical creatures. \n The bad thing is that the specter is a metaphor, while electoral authoritari- \n anism is a reality.1 A large number of political regimes in the contemporary \n world, ranging from Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe, from Russia to Singapore, \n from Belarus to Cameroon, from Egypt to Malaysia, have established the \n institutional facades of democracy, including regular multiparty elections \n for the chief executive, in order to conceal (and reproduce) harsh realities \n of authoritarian governance. Although in historical perspective the authori- \n tarian use of elections is nothing new, contemporary electoral authoritarian \n regimes take the time-honored practice of electoral manipulation to new \n heights. \n This book contains original comparative research into the conflictive \n interaction between rulers and opposition parties in the central arena of strug- \n gle under electoral authoritarianism—the electoral battlefield. This introduc- \n tory chapter addresses three analytical core issues with which the emergent \n comparative study of electoral authoritarian regimes is grappling: the concept \n of electoral authoritarianism, its observation and measurement, and its en- \n dogenous dynamic. The first section, on conceptual issues, explains how stu- \n dents of comparative democratization have responded to the proliferation of \n political regimes that couple formal democratic institutions (multiparty elec- \n tions) with authoritarian practices. In addition, it offers and justifies a formal \n definition of electoral authoritarian regimes that looks at both constitutional \n properties and democratic qualities of electoral processes. The second sec- \n tion, on issues of measurement, discusses a fundamental methodological \n problem: in electoral authoritarian regimes, official election results are the \n combined outcome of two unknown and unobservable variables—popular","bbox":{"left":0.138889,"top":0.376309,"width":0.722847,"height":0.517237}},{"text":"1","bbox":{"left":0.493566,"top":0.923071,"width":0.012869999999999993,"height":0.017854999999999954}}],"images_bbox":[],"images_bbox_not_text_overlap":[]}