 RESTRICTED  
  
G/STR/M/41  
 
22 December 2022  
(22-9723) Page: 1/11 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises  Original: English  
 
 
WORKING PARTY ON STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES  
MINUTES OF THE MEETING  
HELD ON 21 OCTOBER 2022  
CHAIR: AGUSTÍN NAVARRO DE VICENTE -GELLA (SPAIN)  
1.  The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (the "Working Party") held a regular meeting on 
21 October 2022, in person as well as virtually via Interprefy.  
2.  Under Other Business, the Chair indicated that he would briefly update the Working Party  
regardin g the discussions in the General Council and the Council on Trade in Goods on 
(1) WTO reform and (2) the response to the COVID -19 pandemic and preparation for future 
pandemics. The United States indicated that under Other Business it wished to raise an ite m 
regarding the Illustrative List of Relationship Between Government and State Trading Enterprises 
and the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These Enterprises.1 Chinese Taipei indicated that under 
Other Business it wished to provide an update regarding its notification for the 2020 -2021 period.  
3.  The Working Party adopted  the following agenda (the proposed agenda had been circulated in 
WTO/AIR/STR/17  on 10 October 2022).  
1   REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  .................  1 
2   REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE WORKING PARTY  .... 4 
3   CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 7 
4   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 9 
5   ANNUAL REPORT  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 10 
6   DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..... 10 
 
1  REVIEW OF NEW AND FULL NOTIFICATIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS  
4.  The Chair recalled that, according to paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Understanding), the 
Working  Party was tasked with reviewing the notifications and counter -notificati ons submitted by 
Members on their state trading enterprises (STEs).  
5.  For the review of the new and full notifications of STEs submitted by Members, the Chair 
suggested that the Working Party conduct the review in the same way as at previous meetings, 
focusi ng on: (i) whether the notification responded adequately to the information requested in the 
Questionnaire on STEs ( G/STR/3/Rev.1 ); and (ii) whether more information was required in order 
to permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the e ffect 
of their operations on international trade.  
 
1 G/STR/4 . G/STR/M/41  
 
- 2 - 
 
  6.  The Chair recalled that new and full notifications were now presented every two years. The most 
recent call for new and full notifications was contained in document G/STR/N/19 , and called for 
Members to submit notifications for the years 2020  and 2021 by 30  June 2022. The  Working  Party 
would take up notifications from 18 Members circulated since the previous meeting on 13 May  2022.  
7.  The Chair recalled that, as provided in the Working Party's 1995 Report ( G/L/35 ), Members 
wishing to raise questions on a notification under review were t o present them in writing to the 
notifying delegation and to the Secretariat at the latest three weeks before the meeting. The Chair 
also reminded Members asking questions not already sent in writing that, if they wished to receive 
a written response, they  would have to follow up by submitting their questions in writing to the 
Member concerned, with a copy to the Secretariat for circulation.  
8.  No questions were posed and no comments were made regarding the notifications of Cambodia  
(G/STR/N/19/KHM ), Canada  (G/STR/N/19/CAN ), Dominican Republic  (G/STR/N/19/DOM ), 
European Union  (G/STR/N/19/EU ), Georgia  (G/STR/N/19/GEO ), Honduras  (G/STR/N/19/HND ), 
Hong Kong, China  (G/STR/N/19/HKG ), Iceland  (G/STR/N/19/ISL ), Israel  (G/STR/N/19/ISR ), 
Japan  (G/STR/N/19/JPN ), Mali (G/STR/N/18/MLI  and G/STR/N/19/MLI) , Singapore  
(G/STR/N/19/SGP ), Ukraine  (G/STR/N/19/UKR ), United Kingdom  (G/STR/N/19/GBR ), and 
United States  (G/STR/N/19/USA ). 
9.  Regarding the notification of Brazil  (G/STR/N/19/BRA ), Brazil  indicated that it had undertaken 
an exhaustive review in preparing its STE notification for the 2020 -2021 period. Brazil maintains the 
view as reflected in its previous notifications2 that it maintains no STEs, with the possible exception 
of Companhia Nacional de Abaste cimento (Conab), which is listed in its most recent notification. 
Brazil stressed that despite having been notified, Conab does not have exclusive or special rights or 
privileges. Furthermore, Conab has not imported or exported any agricultural products si nce 1997, 
except in the context of providing assistance under the World Food Programme, which was duly 
notified to the WTO within the framework of the Agreement on Agriculture. Finally, Brazil emphasized 
that it had included Conab in its notification follo wing several productive discussions with interested 
Members, held both in this Committee and bilaterally, demonstrating Brazil's commitment to 
transparency at the WTO. Brazil indicated its willingness to address with interested Members any 
further concerns  with its notification.  
10.  Regarding the notification of New Zealand  (G/STR/N/19/NZL ), the European Union  thanked 
New Zealand and asked a number of questions. First, with respect to section III.C and the statistical 
information contained in the accompanying tables, the European Union asked New Zealand to 
provide more granul ar data, including volume and price, about its total quantity exported by country 
of destination including the split between the STE and the collaborative marketing arrangements for 
the last 5 years, and to indicate whether the quantity of kiwi fruit expor ted under the collaborative 
marketing regime had increased over the last 5 years. Second, with respect to section III.H and the 
statistical information contained in the accompanying tables, the European Union asked New Zealand 
to provide more information a bout the kiwi fruit market structure, and to elaborate on why the 
import figures were very low, despite the duty -free access for imported kiwi fruit. Third, the 
European Union noted that in its reply G/STR/Q1/NZL/20 , dated 18 October 2018, New Zealand had 
responded to a question fr om the European Union as follows:  
Given Zespri's regulated automatic, but not exclusive, right to export kiwifruit from 
New Zealand to markets other than Australia, the Kiwifruit Export Regulations 1999 
require that Zespri "must not unjustifiably discrimi nate among suppliers and potential 
suppliers in respect of – (a) a decision on whether to purchase kiwifruit; or (b) the terms 
of the purchase contract." The Regulations set out that "Discrimination (or the extent 
of the discrimination) is justifiable if i t is on commercial grounds".  
Kiwifruit New Zealand, the independent regulator, is responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement of non -discrimination rules.  
11.  Based on the above reply and the information contained in table II of the notification, the 
European Union asked New Zealand to provide more information on: (i) the other companies 
exporting kiwifruit; (ii) the main destination markets; (iii) the status of the other companies 
 
2 G/STR/N/16/BRA  and G/STR/N/17/BRA . G/STR/M/41  
 
- 3 - 
 
  exporting kiwi fruit (private, cooperative or state -owned); and (iv) those compa nies' average export 
prices.  
12.  New Zealand  thanked the European Union for its questions and indicated that it would provide 
responses and statistical information after consulting with its capital. New Zealand also recalled that 
it has previously indicated in  the Working Party and other fora and in bilateral consultations with the 
European Union that Zespri remained an entirely private and commercial entity and did not receive 
any special benefits or support from the New Zealand Government. As the European Uni on had 
noted, Zespri was established by statute under the Kiwi Food Industry Restructuring Act of 1999. 
That Act set out the current industry structure, which was regulated also under relevant kiwi fruit 
export regulations since 1999. Both the Kiwi Food In dustry Restructuring Act and the relevant 
regulations established Zespri with an automatic but not exclusive right to export New Zealand kiwi 
fruit, as the European Union had mentioned. The regulations also permitted other marketers to 
export kiwi fruit th rough marketing arrangements with Zespri. There was no other STE operating in 
New Zealand and Zespri remained compliant with Article XVII of the GATT 1994. Finally, 
New Zealand had also agreed as part of the New Zealand EU -FTA to incorporate of paragraphs 18 
to 21 of the WTO Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
13.  Regarding the notification of Thailand  (G/STR/N/19/THA), the European Union  thanked 
Thailand for its notification. The European Union noted that Thailand specified "nil" for exclusive or 
special rights or privileges enjoyed by Public Warehouse Organisation. The European Union 
requested Thailand to provide further information on w hether the Public Warehouse Organization 
had been designated as the sole importer of WTO in -quota palm/palm kernel oil and also for imports 
under the ASEAN Agreement on Trade in Goods. If this was the case, the European Union asked 
Thailand to explain furt her why it considered that the Public Warehouse Organisation did not enjoy 
exclusive or special rights. The European Union further requested Thailand to clarify if the Public 
Warehouse Organization was tasked with allocating quantities of in -quota imports of certain 
agricultural products and if so, how this had been carried out during the reporting period.  
14.  Thailand  indicated that it had not received the European Union's questions before the meeting 
but would respond in due course after consulting with rele vant agencies.  
15.   The Chair also recalled that Chinese Taipei had submitted document G/STR/N/19/TPKM/ Add.1  
on 20 October 2022, containing updated statistical information for imports and exports of rice in 
2021. While this document could not be reviewed at the current meeting, it would be reviewed at 
the next meeting of the Working Party.  
16.  The Chair drew th e attention of delegations to the document containing the Status of 
Notifications ( RD/STR/44 ). The Chair noted that the Status of Notifications showed that many 
Members were not fulfilling their notification obligations and that this prevented Members from 
enjoying the full benefit of transparency. The Chair, therefore, urged Memb ers that had not yet 
notified to do so, and to consult the Secretariat if they had any questions. The Chair also thanked 
Members that had notified.  
17.  Australia , Canada , the European Union , Japan , the United Kingdom  and the United  States  jointly 
expressed app reciation for the Chair's statement encouraging Members to make the required 
notifications, noting that a number of Members had either failed to make any notification or have 
not made any for some time. Referring to data circulated by the Secretariat, they  noted that 
56 Members had not made a notification in the last 10 years, and only  30 out of 136  Members had 
made the requisite notification for the most recent notification cycle. That was the lowest level of 
compliance the Working  Party had ever seen, the  previous being 45  notifications in 1996 and 2020. 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States stressed 
that transparency was an important requirement for all WTO Members and notifications and 
counter -notification s were sometimes the only way in which other Members could be properly 
informed of a Member's activities in a given area. Low levels of compliance undermined the 
transparency function of the Working Party. They also noted that much of the information to be  
provided in STE notifications had been provided and discussed in the Trade Policy Review process, 
in the WTO  Committee on Agriculture, in particular the yearly Export Competition Questionnaire, or 
had otherwise been provided to the WTO . Thus, Members coul d benefit from synergies in respect of 
information submitted through STE  notifications and the Committee on Agriculture reporting, which 
could contribute to greater transparency and reduce burdens for Members. Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States called on other Members to G/STR/M/41  
 
- 4 - 
 
  submit their regular STE notifications within the deadlines and to respond to other Members' 
questions in a substantive and timely manner. Moreover, Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States also indicated that they fully support any initiative 
that the Chair or the Secretariat might take regarding compliance with notification requirements.  
18.  Costa Rica  indicated that it fully supports the joint st atement made by Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United  States. Costa Rica expressed its shared 
interest in improving transparency within the WTO and indicated that it was prepared to work with 
other Members to ident ify practical solutions.  
19.  The Working Party took note  of the notifications, questions and answers and statements made.  
2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS PREVIOUSLY REVIEWED BY THE WORKING PARTY  
20.  The Chair recalled that delegations had requested that the Working Party revert to notifications 
from four Members. First, regarding the notification of Australia  contained in document 
G/STR/N/19/AUS , the Chair recalled that Australia had requested the Working Party to come back 
to its notifi cation so as to respond to questions asked orally by the European Union during the 
13 May 2022 meeting of the Working Party.3  
21.  Australia  thanked the European Union for its continuing interest in the New South Wales Rice 
Marketing Board (RMB). Regarding th e European Union's first question, Australia responded that the 
New South Wales RMB operated under the State of New South Wales Rice Marketing Act 1983. All 
rice produced in the state of NSW was vested in (i.e. ownership was transferred to) the New South 
Wales RMB. The RMB did not negotiate contracts for the sale of rice. All rice trading was conducted 
on behalf of the RMB by Authorised Buyers appointed by the RMB, and there was no restriction on 
the number of Authorised Buyer licenses that the RMB could is sue for the domestic market. 
Authorised Buyers were able to freely buy and sell rice grown in New South Wales on the domestic 
market in Australia. All sales contracts were entered into on a commercial basis at prevailing market 
prices. In addition, one of the objectives of the RMB was to ensure the best possible returns from 
rice sold outside Australia based on the quality differentials or attributes of Australian -grown rice. 
The RMB had appointed Ricegrowers Limited (trading as SunRice) as its sole exporte r. SunRice had 
no obligation to set a benchmark price and had not done so. Australian rice imports and exports 
were determined by market forces on a commercial basis. Export prices for Australian rice were 
determined by the market and were influenced by th e quality of the rice and prevailing world prices. 
According to Australia, the existence of the NSW RMB did not exclude other countries from exporting 
to and competing with domestically grown rice in the Australian market. There were no quotas or 
tariffs a pplied to rice imports into Australia.  
22.  Regarding the European Union's second question, Australia explained that enterprises of other 
contracting parties, including those from the European union, were able to compete to purchase 
Australian rice. As SunRice was the sole exporter of Australian Rice originating from New South 
Wales, all purchases of such rice would necessarily be made from SunRice, but this did not preclude 
international agents from purchasing from SunRice in international markets. Export price s for 
Australian rice were determined by the international market and were influenced by the quality of 
the rice and other factors affecting prevailing world prices. Australia also noted that the 
European  Union currently had a TRQ which limited imports of Australian rice products.  
23.  Regarding the European Union's third question, Australia indicated that the situation would 
remain the same as during the previous notification period. The New South Wales Government had 
commissioned an independent report to furth er investigate the Rice Vesting Review findings, conduct 
further consultation, provide recommendations on the appropriate government response to the 
Review and address key issues raised in the Review. This independent report was due back to the 
New South W ales Minister of Agriculture by 30 May 2023. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) had been appointed to conduct the independent report 
in line with the terms of reference available at https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/about -
us/legislation/list/rice -marketing/review/info -paper/2021 -rice-vesting -review . 
 
3 G/STR/M/40 , para. 20.  G/STR/M/41  
 
- 5 - 
 
  24.  Regarding the European Union's fourth quest ion, Australia answered that the New South Wales 
Government had made the decision to extend rice vesting for 5 years until 30 June 2027 under the 
Rice Marketing Act 1983, which established the RMB and the functions undertaken by the RMB.  
25.  Regarding the Euro pean Union's fifth question, Australia indicated that the decision to extend 
the New South Wales RMB was taken by the New South Wales Government, reflecting strong support 
from industry through consultation and as detailed in the Rice Vesting Review 2021. Alongside the 
extension of the rice vesting arrangements, the New South Wales Government has commissioned 
an independent report into the rice vesting arrangements as outlined in Australia's response to the 
European Union's third question, above.  
26.  Regarding the European Union's sixth question, Australia stated that it was a niche participant 
in the global rice market and, as such, was a price taker in the global rice market. Australia indicated 
that as a small exporter of mostly medium grain rice, Australia r epresented just over 1% of total 
global rice exports in non -drought affected production years. This very small share of global rice 
exports meant that Australia's rice exports – as traded by Ricegrowers Limited trading as SunRice, 
the holder of the Sole an d Exclusive Export License (SEEL) – had no influence over the world price 
of rice and had little -to-no trade -distorting effects. Australia explained that Australian rice was 
exported at a competitive international price that reflected global market conditi ons. As such, 
Australian rice exports were fully subject to market forces and competition from major exporters of 
similar rice varieties, such as the United States and China, and did not displace or impede exports 
of rice from other Members.  
27.  The European U nion thanked Australia for its detailed reply and indicated that it would carefully 
review those responses once they were in written form.  
28.  Regarding the notification of China  contained in document G/STR/N/18/CHN , the Chair recalled 
that the United States had requested that the Workin g Party revert to it.  
29.  The United States  indicated that it continued to find China's notification to be insufficient. The 
United States stated that throughout the notification, China had failed to provide any of the required 
information on import quantity, average import price, average representative domestic sale s price, 
mark-up, average procurement price, average export price, and – in some instances – national 
production, instead describing the information as "not available". The United States  questioned 
whether that information could not be available to China, noting that several entities in the 
notification were listed companies that had periodic reporting requirements and that some of the 
missing information was publicly available through other sources. The United States further  
emphasized that, given the role  the State plays in many of the products reported in the notification, 
China would likely have knowledge of information regarding national production. The United States 
requested that China review its notification and provide the information to the Working  Party for 
review. The United States added that China's notification was troublesome for systemic reasons, 
given the vital role of the transparency function of the Working Party and the WTO broadly. The 
United States pointed out that notifications sometime s offered the only means to learn about other 
Members' activity in a given area, and that all Members had committed to fulfilling their transparency 
obligations. Finally, the United States recalled China's statement at the 13 May 2022 meeting that 
China wo uld consult with capital before providing a reply to the United States and noted that it had 
not heard from China.  
30.  The European Union  thanked the United States for drawing attention to China's notification, 
which according to the European Union appeared in complete and did not provide the required 
information regarding import and export quantities, price and other elements. The European Union 
looked forward to China providing additional information in line with the notification requirements.  
31.  China  noted the United States' and the European Union's concerns about missing information 
in China's notification. China stated that it took seriously its commitments and obligations on 
notifications and transparency and was doing its utmost in verifying and providing th e required data 
and information. China also stressed that the prices applied by its STEs were arrived at through 
negotiations with customers in line with commercial considerations and market conceptions and thus 
it was difficult for government departments to collect pricing information. China also noted the 
United  States' contention that some of the missing information was publicly available through other 
sources and responded that it would be difficult for China to rely on public sources as a basis for G/STR/M/41  
 
- 6 - 
 
  official notifications. China concluded by noting that since the last meeting of the Working Party in 
May, it had communicated with relevant authorities, who were working seriously to respond to the 
United States' concerns and looked forward to improving its notifications in the futures.  
32.  In response to China's comments regarding pricing information, the United States pointed out 
that the information requested in the STE questionnaire is not on a per customer basis, but on an 
average basis, and that was somethi ng that should not be difficult for China to provide. The 
United  States noted that it did not itself provide information in its notifications on a per customer 
basis.  
33.  Regarding the notifications of India  contained in documents G/STR/N/15/IND  and 
G/STR/N/16/IND  – G/STR/N/17/IND , the Chair recalled that on 28  October  2019 the United  States 
had posed written questions to India on these notifications, which had been circulated as document 
G/STR/Q1/IND/21 . On 9 June 2021, India had submitted written responses to the United States' 
questions, which were circulated as document G/STR/Q1/IND/22 .  
34.  The United States  thanked India for its responses provided to date but also noted that responses 
to several questions remained substantively outstanding, as India stated that reviews and responses 
were still being prepared at the time of its June 2021 reply and that a full repl y would be provided 
once the review process was completed. The United States requested an update as to when finalized 
responses and an updated notification were expected.  
35.  The European Union  expressed concerns with India's notification, in particular regar ding the 
state-owned enterprise Vijaya Dairy located in the Indian state of Telangana. The European Union 
noted that, at the meeting of the Working Party on 15 October 20214, it had asked India questions 
regarding Vijaya Dairy. The European Union subseque ntly submitted those questions in writing in 
document G/STR/Q1/IND/24  on 5 April 2022. The European Union noted that it had also requested 
an update from India at the 13 May 2022 meeting of the Working Party as to when to a response 
could be expected. The European Union reiterated its questions.  
36.  India thanked the United States for their questions and interest in India's notifications, noting 
that it had received written questions from the United States the week before the meeting. India 
indicated that it was in the process of revie wing the notifications in conformity with India's Foreign 
Trade Policy 2021 –2026. As the process involved interactions with several stakeholders, the review 
had not been completed. India indicated it would determine whether a revised STE notification would  
be required as soon the review exercise was completed. India also thanked the European Union for 
its questions, indicated that it was consulting with capital and would share a response as soon as 
one was available.  
37.  The United States  thanked India for its  reply, noting however that the questions that remained 
outstanding related to India's notification covering the 2016 -2018 period. The United States 
questioned why it had not been possible to provide information that pertained to about five years 
earlier a nd encouraged India to provide its responses.  
38.  Regarding the notifications of Viet Nam  (G/STR/N/15/VNM – G/STR/N/16 /VNM ), the Chair 
recalled that the United  States had made a counter -notification, G/STR/Q1/VNM/4 , and that 
Viet Nam had responded in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/5  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/5/Corr.1 . 
The United  States had asked follow -up questions to Viet Nam in document G/STR/Q1/VNM/6 , and 
Viet Nam had responded to those questions in document G/STR/Q1/VNM/7 . In November 2020 the 
United States had posed further follow -up questions to Viet Nam in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  
and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 . Viet Nam had responded to these questions in document 
G/STR/Q1/VNM/9  received on 7 October 2021, and G/STR/Q1/VNM/10,  received on 
20 October  2022.  
39.  The United  States  thanked Viet Nam for its responses, recalling that in its response to 
Question  4 from documents G/STR/Q1/VNM /8 and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 ., Viet Nam had 
indicated that further verification was necessary before it could provide a response to one of the 
United States' questions5. In addition, the United States reiterated its concern originally expressed 
at the May 2022 m eeting that one of Viet  Nam's responses did not appear to answer the question 
 
4 G/STR/M/39 , para.22.  
5 Question 4 from documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 . G/STR/M/41  
 
- 7 - 
 
  being asked.6 The United States indicated that Viet Nam had consulted bilaterally with the 
United  States to understand the concern and thanked Viet Nam for that exchange. The Un ited States 
indicated that it looked forward to reviewing the responses provided by Viet Nam on 20 October  2022 
and would let Viet Nam know if it had any follow -up questions.  
40.  The Working Party took note  of the questions and answers and statements made.  
3  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
41.  The United  States  expressed regret that this was the fifteenth consecutive meeting at which the 
continued non -notification of STEs by the  Russian  Federation was on the agenda. H owever, the 
United States stated that as a result of the Russian Federation's premeditated and unprovoked war 
of aggression in Ukraine and the unspeakable horrors being inflicted on the people of Ukraine by the 
Russian Federation's military, the United Sta tes would not engage in "business as usual" for matters 
concerning the Russian Federation. The United States stated that the actions of the 
Russian  Federation were incompatible with the rules -based system that Members had built in the 
WTO and had worked to  improve. Therefore, the United States indicated that it would not make a 
fuller intervention and instead referred Members to its prior statements at the 20157, 20168, 20179, 
201810, 201911, 202012, 202113, and 202214 meetings of the Working Party.  
42.  The United Kingdom  stated that, in addition to the obligation to submit notifications on time, it 
is equally important that Members ensure that their notifications are complete. Otherwise, a Member 
cannot be considered to have fulfilled its obligation if the n otification lacks the detail required to 
assess potential trade effects. Therefore, the United Kingdom urged all Members to take all 
necessary steps to fulfil their transparency obligations in a complete and timely manner.  
43.  Canada  supported the statement m ade by the United States that it was not business as usual. 
Canada considered that  the Russia n Federation 's hostile act was not only an attack on Ukraine and 
its people but a blatant violation of international law and the rules -based international system. 
Without respect for the rule of law, neither the WTO nor the global economy would be able to function 
properly. Canada indicated that  the Russia n' Federation' s unprovoked attack had caused the greatest 
shock to global food and energy security in years and the consequences of  the Russia n Federation 's 
aggression extended well beyond Ukraine's borders and were as such a direct concern to Members. 
Canada condemned the Russia n Federation 's aggression in the strongest terms and called on the 
Russia n Federatio n to immediately cease all hostile actions against Ukraine.  
44.  The European Union  indicated that it would refrain from making statements, but it referred to 
its statement made at the previous meeting of the Working Party, including its statement on 
5 October 2021.15 The European Union also referred to its statements made previously regarding 
the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. The 
European Union condemned in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's unpro voked and 
unjustified military aggression in Ukraine, including horrific strikes that the Russian Federation had 
launched on Kiev and across Ukraine. The European Union stated that the indiscriminate targeting 
of civilians was a war crime and firmly condem ned and unequivocally rejected the illegal attempt at 
annexation by the Russian Federation of some regions of Ukraine. The European Union considered 
that the Russian Federation had blatantly violated the principles enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Na tions (UN Charter), calling on the Russian Federation immediately to end its acts of 
aggression, to withdraw its troops and to fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
independence within its internationally recognized borders. The Eu ropean Union indicated that it had 
adopted significant economic and trade sanctions against the Russian Federation, stood firmly by 
 
6 At the May 2022 meeting  of the Working Party, the United States referred to Question 7 from 
documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/8  and G/STR/Q1/VNM/8/Corr.1 . 
7 G/STR/M/27 , para. 27 and G/STR/M/28 , para. 37.  
8 G/STR/M/29 , paras. 73 and 74 and G/STR/M/30 , paras. 64 and 65.  
9 G/STR/M/31 , para. 36 and G/STR/M/32 , para. 28.  
10 G/STR/M/33 , para. 36 and G/STR/M/34 , para. 29.  
11 G/STR/M/35 , para. 35 and G/STR/M/36 , para. 27. 
12 G/STR/M/37 , para. 44. 
13 G/STR/M/38 , para. 31 and G/STR/M/39 , para. 28.  
14 G/STR/M/40 , para. 39.  
15 G/STR/M/39 , paras. 28 and 30.  G/STR/M/41  
 
- 8 - 
 
  Ukraine and its people, and remained firmly committed to supporting Ukraine in political, financial, 
military and humanitari an terms, in addition to supporting Ukraine with its reconstruction and winter 
preparedness.  
45.  Japan  agreed with statements made by other Members that the Russia n Federation's aggression 
against Ukraine clearly infringed upon Ukraine's sovereign and territor ial integrity and constituted a 
serious violation of the international law prohibiting use of force and a grave breach of the 
UN Charter. Japan refused to accept the unilateral change of the status quo through the use of force 
and condemned the actions in the strongest terms. Japan indicated that it stood in solidarity with 
Ukraine and its people and would continue to cooperate with the members of the international 
community toward improving the situation.  
46.  New Zealand  joined other Members in condemning in t he strongest possible terms  the 
Russia n Federation 's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine, recognizing the importance of 
upholding multilateral rules and the international system. New Zealand indicated that the Russian 
Federation's illegal invasion  was an act of aggression under international law and had already 
killed thousands, causing a humanitarian crisis and widespread suffering. New Zealand continued to 
convey support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and indicated that it st ood firmly 
against any steps that could risk a further escalation in the conflict. New Zealand also steadfastly 
supported the collective action taken by the international community and called on the Russian 
Federation to abide by its international obligati ons, cease its invasion of Ukraine, withdraw its troops, 
and enter into diplomatic negotiations as a pathway to resolve the conflict.  
47.  Korea  joined in condemning the Russian Federation's armed invasion of Ukraine, and the 
Russian Federation's annexation of four regions of Ukrainian territory, as a violation of international 
law and of the principles of the UN Charter. Korea urged that Ukraine's sovereignty, territoriality, 
and independence should be respected.  
48.  Australia  indicated that it continued to condem n in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's 
illegal, unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Australia emphasized that the 
Russian  Federation's actions were a continuing violation of international law and the fundamental 
international norms o n which organizations, such as the WTO, were based. Australia reiterated that 
it stood in solidarity with the people of Ukraine.  
49.  In addition to its previous comments on upholding multilateral rules, the United Kingdom  
expressed support for the statements o f other Members. As Members meet to discuss the global 
rules-based system, the United Kingdom stated that Members cannot sit by and ignore the egregious 
violations of international law and the UN charter committed by the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine.  The United Kingdom stated that the Russian Federation's illegal annexation of regions of 
Ukraine constitutes a new low in  the Russia n Federation 's blatant flouting of international law, which 
should be unreservedly condemned as an outrageous and illegal a ct. The United Kingdom considered 
that what was happening in Ukraine mattered to the work of the WTO and to everyone as the 
Russia n Federation 's actions would prolong the impact on the global economy, have global 
consequences and jeopardize prospects for p eace. Along with the rest of the international 
community, the United Kingdom called on the Russian Federation to stop its attack on the Ukrainian 
people and withdraw from Ukraine, to restore regional and global stability.  
50.  The Russian Federation  considered Members' statements as unsubstantiated accusations 
against the Russian Federation, reiterating its position that the WTO is not the right platform to raise 
issues which are outside its scope and outside the mandate of the Working Party. The 
Russian Federation thanked the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom for 
raising questions regarding the status of its notifications and informed the Working Party that the 
Russian  Federation remained committed to its WTO obligations. Howev er, the Russian Federation 
indicated that it would not provide a response or update on the status of its notifications due to 
statements that were made, which demonstrated Members' intentions to misuse the platform of the 
Working Party to further their pol itical interests, instead of discussing the actual process of 
notification by the Russian Federation that was mentioned in the agenda item. The Russian 
Federation believed that, by doing so, Members were not only showing a lack of respect for WTO 
principle s and rules of procedure, but also to the other Members of the Working Party. The 
Russian  Federation further indicated that, while willing to discuss the status of its STE notification 
with all interested delegations and provide answers to any questions ab out the current state of 
process, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom had today showed neither G/STR/M/41  
 
- 9 - 
 
  interest nor readiness to interact with the Russian Federation on any issues. The Russian Federation 
stated that it respected all the WT O notification procedures and would gladly continue the dialogue 
on the matter with all those delegations, once they were in a position to cooperate.  
51.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
4  OTHER BUSINESS  
52.  The Chair reported to Members that he has been following the discussions in the General Council 
and the Council on Trade in Goods concerning the topic of WTO reform and the response to the 
pandemic and preparation for future pandemics.  
53.  The Chair reported that in a recent meeting of the General Council various delegations had 
indicated as a possible area of work the improvement of the functioning of the bodies of the WTO. 
In his concluding remarks, the Chair of the General Council had indicated that, in parallel with  the 
formal and informal discussions taking place in the General Council, each subsidiary body should be 
tasked with determining what had already been done and exploring ways to improve its day -to-day 
functioning to better fulfil its respective mandate. In  a similar vein, the Chair of the Council for Trade 
in Goods had convened an informal meeting with Members on 14 October 2022 to report on his 
consultations on issues related to the implementation of MC12. At that meeting, the Chair had made 
two concrete a nd immediate suggestions to prepare future discussions. The first suggestion was to 
ask the Chairs of the 14 subsidiary bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods to report on the concrete 
steps taken in recent years to improve the bodies' work. The second s uggestion was to organize a 
briefing to better understand the digital tools in use by various WTO bodies, for example, the use of 
electronic agendas, the database on trade concerns and the e -Ping portal, and to see whether the 
use of these tools could be e xtended and improved in the context of the modernization of the 
Secretariat that was launched by the Director -General. The Chair of the Council on Trade in Goods 
subsequently informed the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of his meeting with Members and aske d 
the Chairs to prepare a factual report, under their own responsibility, on the functioning of each 
body and the measures adopted to date by each body to facilitate its day -to-day functioning.  
54.  The Chair indicated that he would prepare a draft report and that it was his intention to circulate 
it to Members of the Working Party for their comments, before transmitting it to the Chair of the 
Council for Trade in Goods. The Chair noted that the first step was limited to reporting on the current 
functioning of the Working Party and measures already taken by the Working Party, and at the same 
time he noted that his door was open to any Member wishing to discuss with him their specific ideas 
about improving the operation of the Working Party.  
55.  The Chair also noted that the Chair of the Council for Trade in Goods requested the 14 subsidiary 
bodies to submit a report on the work that had been carried out by each of the WTO bodies regarding 
their response to the COVID -19 pandemic. The Chair informed Members that he int ended to respond 
that there was nothing relevant to report from the Working Group on this topic.  
56.  The United States  took the floor to inform the Working Party of a project it intended to undertake 
before the next meeting to address what it considered to be a serious problem with non -notification 
by Members. In discussing with some Members, the United States understood that part of the 
problem was not knowing what an STE was, and a concern that the definition by itself did not provide 
sufficient guidance as t o what had to be notified. The United States recalled that the Working Party 
had previously tried to provide guidance to Members through the Illustrative List of Relationship 
Between Government and State Trading Enterprises and the Kinds of Activities Enga ged in by These 
Enterprises.16 Unfortunately, that document had not been updated since 1999. Therefore, the 
United  States indicated that it intended to review all Members' notifications since that document had 
been created, with the purpose of updating the  document based on a review of Members' 
notifications. The United States indicated that it was not proposing to revise the Understanding or 
provide an interpretation of the existing definition. Rather, the aim was to update the guidance this 
Working Party had already created. The United States hoped to complete its review of Members' 
notifications before the next meeting of the Working Party so that the Secretariat could circulate the 
document to Members in advance in case Members wished to consult on it. T he United States might 
 
16 G/STR/4 . G/STR/M/41  
 
- 10 - 
 
  also request that an informal meeting be convened to review the proposed edits, deferring to 
Members on whether such a meeting would be worthwhile.  
57.  The Chair took note  of the United States' statement. The Chair indicated that the pro ject could 
prove useful, although it probably could not be mentioned in the upcoming report that would be 
submitted to the Chair of the Council for Trade in Goods, as that report was intended to take stock 
of what had already been in the Working Party.  
58.  Lastly, Chinese Taipei  informed the Working Party that an addendum to its notification for the 
2020-2021 period was circulated the day prior to the meeting. Chinese Taipei explained that 
statistics on the exports and imports of rice for 2021 were not initially included in its n otification 
because those figures were subject to audit by the relevant state -trading agencies at the time when 
the notification had been submitted. However, Chinese Taipei circulated the trade statistics to the 
Working Party as soon as the audit was compl eted and considers the addendum was an integral part 
of its notification for the 2020 -2021 period.  
59.  The Working Party took note  of Chinese Taipei's statement.  
5  ANNUAL REPORT  
60.  The Chair noted that paragraph 5 of the Understanding instructed the Working Party t o report 
annually to the Council for Trade in Goods. At its meeting of 30 October 2012, the Working Party 
had agreed to separate the draft annual report and the status of notifications into two separate 
documents. The draft annual report had been circulate d as room document RD/STR/46  and the 
status of notifications as document RD/STR/44,  both on 10 October 2022.  
61.  The Chair proposed to include in the annual report language reflecting that, at the October 2022 
meeting, the Chair made a statement on the ongoing consultations in the General Council and the 
Council for Trade in Goods r egarding WTO reform and improving the functioning of the WTO 
Committees.  
62.  The United States  requested that the draft annual report be modified to reflect the other items 
covered under "Other Business" at the 21 October 2022 meeting.  
63.  The Working Party cons idered text to reflect the item raised by the United States under "Other 
Business" on the Illustrative List. China  asked that the text not describe the initiative of the 
United  States as intended to provide "guidance" to Members preparing their notificatio ns, because 
that would require agreement of all Members. The United States agreed.  
64.  The Chair proposed that the third item raised under "Other Business", namely Chinese Taipei's 
addendum to its notification for the 2020 -2021 period, did not need to be menti oned in the 
Annual  Report under Other Business because new notifications by Members are already addressed 
under Item 2 of the Annual Report and Chinese Taipei's notification was already mentioned therein. 
The Chair additionally noted that the Working Party  would consider Chinese Taipei's addendum to 
its notification for the 2020 -2021 period at the following meeting. Chinese Taipei  agreed to the 
Chair's suggestion.  
65.  With these adjustments, the Working Party adopted  its 2022 annual report, accompanied by 
the status of notifications.  
6  DATE OF THE FOLLOWING MEETING  
66.  The Chair recalled the Working Party's practice of holding its regular meetings either 
immediately before or immediately after the week during which the Comm ittees on 
Anti-Dumping  Practices, on Safeguards and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures hold their 
regular meetings. Given that, the Chair proposed to schedule the following meeting of the 
Working  Party for 28 April 2022.  G/STR/M/41  
 
- 11 - 
 
  67.  No objections were raised.  
68.  The meeting was adjourned . 
 
__________  