 RESTRICTED  
  
G/STR/M/35  
 
1 October 2019  
(19-6343) Page: 1/8 
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG 
HELD ON 16 JULY 2019  
CHAIR: KRISTIAN HENK  (AUSTRIA)  
1   ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  ................................ ................................ ........................  1 
2   REVIEW OF NEW AN D FULL NOTIFICATIONS  SUBMITTED BY MEMBER S .....................  1 
3   REVIEW OF NOTIFI CATIONS PREVIOUSLY R EVIEWED BY THE WORKI NG PARTY  ........  4 
4   CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERP RISES BY BRAZIL ........  6 
5   CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY THE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 6 
6   CONTINUED NON -NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES BY  
THE UNITED ARAB EMIR ATES  ................................ ................................ ..........................  7 
7   DISCUSSION REGAR DING A VICE -CHAIRPER SON FOR THE WORKING PARTY ON  
STATE TRADING ENTERP RISES  ................................ ................................ ........................  8 
8   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  8 
9   DATE OF FOLLOWIN G MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..................  8 
 
1  ADOPTION OF THE AGEN DA 
1.  The Chair  referred to the proposed agenda contained in WTO/AIR/STR/11, circulated on 
5 July 2019. Nothing was raised under Other Business.  
2.  The Working Party adopted  the agenda.  
2  REVIEW OF NEW AND FU LL NOTIFICATIONS SUB MITTED BY MEMBERS  
3.  The Chair  recalled that, acco rding to paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Working Party was tasked with 
reviewing the notifications and counter -notifications submitted by Members on their State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs). As recommended by the Working Party (G/STR/8) and agreed by the Council for 
Trade in Goods on 22 June 2012, these new and full notifications were now presented every 
two years.  
4.  The last call for new and full notifications cover ing the years 2016 and 2017 was contained in 
document G/STR/N/17. This document provided that the deadline for new and full notifications 
covering this period was 30 June 2018. At this meeting the Working Party would take up notifications 
circulated since the previous meeting on 19 October 2018.  
5.  The Chair suggested that the Working Party review the notifications in the same way as in 
previous meetings, focusing on two main elements, i.e.: (i) whether the notification responded 
adequately to the information  requested in the Questionnaire (G/STR/3/Rev.1); and (ii) whether 
more information was required in order to permit, in  the language of paragraph 2 of the 
Understanding, "a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the 
effect of their operations on international trade".  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  6.  The Chair recalled that, as provided in the Working Party's 1995 Report (G/L/35), Members 
wishing to raise questions on a notification under review were to present them in writing to the 
notifying delegatio n and to the Secretariat three weeks before the meeting. Responses were also to 
be presented in writing well in advance of the meeting. The Chair also reminded any Members asking 
questions not already posed in writing that, if they wished to receive a writ ten response, they would 
have to follow up by submitting their questions in writing to the Member concerned, with a copy to 
the Secretariat for circulation.  
7.  No questions were posed regarding the notifications of Chile (G/STR/N/17/CHL) , Costa Rica 
(G/STR/N /17/CRI), Georgia (G/STR/N/16/GEO and G/STR/N/17/GEO), Honduras 
(G/STR/N/16/HND and G/STR/N/17/HND), Mauritius (G/STR/N/17/MUS), the Republic of 
Moldova  (G/STR/N/17/MDA), Montenegro  (G/STR/N/17/MNE), Samoa (G/STR/N/14/WSM, 
G/STR/N/15/WSM , G/STR/N/16/WSM and G/STR/N/17/WSM), Chinese Taipei 
(G/STR/N/16/TPKM/ Corr.1 and G/STR/N/17/TPKM),  and Zambia (G/STR/N/15/ZMB and 
G/STR/ N/17/ZMB).  
8.  Regarding the notifications of Samoa , the United States  wished to thank Samoa for those 
notifications, which w ere Samoa's first and covered every year since accession. The United States 
welcomed Samoa's transparency on STEs and the fact that Samoa's notifications covered every year 
since its accession .  
9.  Regarding the notification of India  (G/STR/N/15/IND ), Canada  explained that as the largest 
supplier of pulses to India, it had been negatively affected by measures put in place by India to limit 
imports of pulses, which extended India's quantitative restrictions on the importation of dry peas. 
India had not provided  the legal basis for those quantitative restrictions, and Canada was concerned 
about India not fulfilling its transparency obligations in that regard.  Canada's understanding was 
that India's STEs were playing a significant role in the implementation of tho se quantitative 
restrictions. India's STEs were responsible for the procurement, disposal, import and export of 
pulses. The questions Canada had posed during the previous meeting of the Working Party were still 
lacking a written answer from India. Therefor e, when Canada reviewed India's most recent 
notification, it resubmitted its questions (G/STR/Q1/IND/19) based on the information in that 
notification.  
10.  Australia  had submitted written  questions to India in April 2019 (STR/Q1/IND/20), as well as in 
the context of previous meetings of the Working Party, and looked forward to receiving responses 
from India. Australia, with a number of other Members, was concerned about the trade restricti ve 
measures imposed by India on the importation of pulses to manage overproduction, farmer welfare 
and domestic price stability. Australia had clearly expressed its concern that the measures were 
having a detrimental impact on the global pulses industry. A ustralia had also expressed serious 
concern with similar measures imposed by India on other commodities, notably sugar, which had 
led to significant surpluses and had led the Government of India to mandate exports of sugar. 
Australia wished to receive Indi a's assurances that its STEs did not have scope to  procure or dispose 
of pulses in a manner contrary to Members' obligations regarding STEs, in law or in effect. Most 
Notably, Australia wished to receive assurances from India that its STEs did not have any  policy 
options that could distort trade, including India's exports or imports or the broader global pulses 
market (while noting at the same time that India's quantitative restrictions on pulses were already 
distorting trade). Australia would continue to c losely monitor India's measures and  management of 
pulses, in this and other relevant WTO bodies.  
11.  The United States  thanked  India for its notification (G/STR/N/15/IND)  and had a number of 
comments. First, as a systemic matter, the United States noted that India's notification covered the 
"15" series, meaning it was for 2012 -2014. The United States asked India when it would provide 
notifications covering the period between 2014 to 2018, i.e. the "16" and "17" series. Second, the 
United States noted that Stat e entities such as the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India 
(MMTC), Projects and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd (PEC Limited), State Trading Corporation 
(STC), and State Trading Corporation Limited (STCL) were no longer being notified as ha ving special 
privileges in the import of maize and milk products. The United States asked India to explain the 
reasons for this. The United States also understood that, from 2012 to 2017, MMTC, PEC Limited 
and STC Limited exported approximately 6 million m etric tons of wheat and rice from the Food 
Corporation of India (FCI) on behalf of the Government of India. For each entity, the United States 
asked India to explain the reasons for not notifying it as an STE with special privileges in the export 
of wheat and rice. Finally, the United States noted that the National Dairy Development Board G/STR/M/35  
 
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  (NDDB) and the National Cooperative Dairy Federation (NCDF) were no longer being notified as 
STEs, but that the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Foreign Trade Po licy for 2015 -2020 
still listed them as STEs, and asked India to explain the discrepancy.  
12.  The European Union  expressed its appreciation for  India's efforts to notify its STEs . India's 
notification listed a substantial number of agricultural exporting STEs, which are subject to the 
commitments of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.1 In particular, paragraph  20 
of that Ministerial Decision requires Members to  ensure that agricultural STEs do not operate in a 
manner that circumvents any other disciplines contained in the same Decision. Agricultural exporting 
STEs should also be notified to the Committee on Agriculture, within the framework of the yearly 
export competition questionnaire. The European Union asked why it had not notified its agricultural 
exporting STEs through that questionnaire. The European Union also invited India to explain how its 
agricultural exporting STEs ensured compliance with the Nairobi  Ministerial Decision on Export 
Competition, in particular as regards commitments not to grant export subsidies. Further, for each 
of the notified agricultural STEs, the European Union asked India to indicate the quantities and value 
of the exported goods by product, and whether any of these exports originated from public 
stockholding programs, whether directly or indirectly, and, if so, the products and quantities in 
question.  
13.  India began by addressing the questions submitted in writing. In response to Can ada's first 
question, India stated that no STE in India had any import or export privileges related to pulses. In 
response to Canada's second question, India explained that the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Marketing Federation of India Ltd (NAFED) was  an autonomous entity; some of the stocks of pulses 
procured by NAFED were disposed of through e -auctions to the open market, and some were offered 
to India's states, for utilization under various welfare schemes of the central and state governments, 
to provide a protein -rich diet to the targeted beneficiaries at affordable rates. NAFED did not export 
the pulses that it procures.  
14.  In response to Australia's first question, India stated that  none of the S TEs were granted any 
special rights or privileges for t he import or export of pulses during the relevant period. In response 
to Australia's second question, none of the STEs exported any domestically procured pulses. In 
response to Australia's third question, these STEs disposed of pulses in the open market th rough e -
auctions or institutional sales in accordance with guidelines laid out by the Government of India. In 
addition, some of their stocks were offered to India's states for utilization under various welfare 
schemes of the central or state governments, t o provide a protein -rich diet to the targeted 
beneficiaries at affordable rates.  
15.  India noted that the European Union had sent it a written question by email some days earlier, 
concerning the export competition questionnaire. I ndia had responded to a simil ar question during 
the 91st meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, and invited the European Union to refer to that 
response (AG -IMS ID 91072), which stated that under footnote  17 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision 
on Export Competition , developing count ry Members have the flexibility of responding to the export 
competition q uestionnaire after 2020 . India asked the European Union to send any further oral 
questions in writing.  
16.  Turning to the oral questions from the United States, the representative of Indi a noted that 
they were raised without prior notice and asked the United States to send them in writing, so that 
she could convey them to capital.  
17.  The Working Party took note  of the notifications, questions and answers, and statements made.  
18.  The Chair drew the attention of delegations to the room document containing an updated Status 
of Notifications,2 and noted that just for the period 2016 -2017, for which notifications had been due 
by June 2018, the Working Party had received notifications from only 36 Mem bers. This meant that 
the vast majority of Members had failed to notify. The Chair stressed the importance of transparency 
for the benefit of all Members, and the central role of transparency in the Working Party. He therefore 
urged Members to work with th eir capitals to improve their notification record, and invited Members 
to consult the Secretariat if they had questions.  
 
1 WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/980.  
2 Room document RD/STR/29.  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  19.  The United States  expressed appreciation for the Chair's statement encouraging Members to 
make the required notifications and noted th at a number of Members had either failed to make any 
notification or had not done so for some time. According to the latest data circulated by the 
Secretariat, 54 Members had not made a notification in the last ten years, and only 36 of 
136 Members had mad e the requisite notification for the most recent cycle, despite having a biennial 
requirement to do so. That continued to be the lowest level of compliance the Working  Party had 
ever seen, the previous being 45 notifications in 1996. Transparency was an im portant requirement 
for all WTO Members and notifications and counter -notifications were sometimes the only way that 
other Members could be properly informed of certain Members' activities in a given area. Low levels 
of compliance undermined the transparen cy function of the Working Party. The United States also 
noted that much of the information to be provided in the context of STE notifications had been 
provided and discussed in the Trade Policy Review process, in the WTO Committee on Agriculture, 
or had b een otherwise provided to the WTO. Therefore, if it only required updating information 
already provided, the notification process did not need to be cumbersome. The non -notification issue 
was a serious problem for the Working  Party and required some type o f action. The United States 
would support any initiative to be taken by the Chair or the Secretariat in this regard. The United 
States encouraged Members to think creatively as to how to improve compliance with notification 
requirements. On 8 -9 July 2019, the Council for Trade in Goods had had a lengthy discussion of a 
US proposal (JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2) that sought to enhance transparency and encourage better 
compliance with notification requirements in all WTO Committees. The United States and the co -
sponsors of the proposal – Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Chinese Taipei – had revised the proposal to encourage better compliance with 
existing obligations through various incentives and administrative measure s. The proposal did not 
change the balance of Members' obligations, or the notification obligations. Instead, it addressed 
deficiencies and gaps in notifications and transparency, to improve the functioning and operation of 
all WTO Agreements, including in  this Working Party. The United States would welcome additional 
Member support for the proposal and would be pleased to discuss the proposal in greater detail.  
20.  The Working Party took note  of the statement made.  
3  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATI ONS PREVIOUSLY REVIE WED BY THE WORKING PARTY  
21.  The Chair  noted that this item concerned the review of notifications previously reviewed by the 
Working Party. Delegations had asked that the Working Party revert to three notifications.  
22.  Regarding the notification of New Zealand  (G/ST R/N/17/NZL), Chile and the European Union 
had posed questions which were reflected in documents G/STR/Q1/NZL/18 and G/STR/Q1/NZL/1 9, 
respectively. New Zealand had provided written answers (G/STR/Q1/NZL/20 and 
G/STR/Q1/NZL/21), and Chile had posed a follow -up written question (G/STR/Q1/NZL/22).  
23.  Chile thanked  New Zealand for the answers provided so far and looked forward to receiving 
New Zealand's answers to its follow -up question (G/STR/Q1/NZL/22).  
24.  The European Union  supported Chile's question and looked fo rward to New Zealand's response. 
More specifically, the European Union had a question for New Zealand regarding Zespri Group 
Limited (Zespri), which New Zealand had notified as an STE to the Working Party, and as an 
agricultural exporting STE to the Commit tee on Agriculture within the framework of the export 
competition questionnaire, in line with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition. As an 
agricultural exporting STE, Zespri was subject to that Ministerial Decision, and in particular to it s 
paragraph 20. The European Union stated that the export monopoly rights granted to Zespri by 
New Zealand allowed it to provide its kiwi fruit nursery stock free of charge to growers outside 
New Zealand, which was a circumvention of the Nairobi commitment banning export subsidies. This 
issue was discussed during several previous meetings, in particular in the Committee on Agriculture,  
where the European Union had asked New Zealand how it intended  to bring itself into compliance 
with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition. The European Union considered that the 
response provided by New Zealand – namely, that the provision of nursery stock free of charge to 
growers outside New Zealan d was not a subsidy – was not satisfactory, because the provision of 
production material free of charge, where that material normally has a price, is a subsidy. The 
European Union continued to believe that New Zealand was in breach of the Nairobi Ministeri al 
Decision on Export Competition and invited New Zealand to bring itself into compliance with that 
Ministerial Decision.  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  25.  New Zealand  thanked Chile and the European Union for their questions. In answer to Chile's 
written question (G/STR/Q1/NZL/22), New Ze aland  said that given Zespri's automatic but not 
exclusive right to export kiwi fruit from New Zealand to markets other than Australia, the Kiwifruit 
Export Regulations of 1999 required Zespri not to unjustifiably discriminate among suppliers and 
potential  suppliers in respect of (a) a decision on whether to purchase kiwi fruit, or (b) the terms of 
the purchase contract. New Zealand explained that those regulations set out that discrimination (or 
the extent of discrimination) was justifiable if it was on co mmercial grounds. The regulations applied 
to Zespri in New Zealand, as that was the only market where Zespri had an automatic but not 
exclusive right to export kiwi fruit to markets other than Australia. The regulations did not prevent 
Zespri from engaging  in business activities beyond the purchase of New Zealand -grown kiwi fruit for 
export, marketing of New Zealand -grown kiwi fruit, market development for New Zealand -grown 
kiwi fruit, and kiwi fruit research and development, provided such activities were l ow risk to the 
interests of New Zealand kiwi fruit growers, or New Zealand kiwi fruit growers had approved the 
activity. Therefore, any such decision by Zespri to engage in non -core activities, including activities 
in third countries, remained solely comme rcial. The global trade in horticulture – and in kiwi fruit, 
as an element of that trade – was determined by supply and demand, and Zespri's success in export 
markets was a result of its commercial decisions. It was also clear that Zespri's marketing of ki wi 
fruit in export markets increased consumer awareness and demand for kiwi fruit generally, which 
benefited global kiwi fruit exporters.  
26.  New Zealand  further stated that Kiwifruit New Zealand, the independent regulator, was 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the non -discrimination rules. The automatic, but not 
exclusive right already described did not extend to Zespri's commercial operations beyond the export 
and marketing of kiwi fruit from New Zealand. Further, it did not make Zespri a governm ent-owned 
entity. Zespri was a private company, owned by growers and former growers. The New Zealand 
Government had no equity shares in Zespri, and no role in its governance or management. 
New Zealand's regulations relating to the export of kiwi fruit from  New Zealand were fully compliant 
with New Zealand's WTO obligations, and the Government of New Zealand had made Zespri aware 
of those obligations, including the obligations relating to STEs arising from the Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision on Export Competiti on.  
27.  Regarding the question posed orally at the meeting by the European Union, New Zealand noted 
that indeed the question had been discussed before. There was no export monopoly, or automatic 
or exclusive rights, for the export of kiwi fruit nursery stock.  Any company that owned plant variety 
rights could export to wherever it wished, on the terms of its choice. European Union companies 
with investments in New Zealand also owned plant variety rights for kiwi fruit varieties in 
New Zealand and, like Zespri, they were free to choose whether and on what terms to use those 
plant variety rights, for export or on the domestic market. New Zealand would be happy to follow -
up with a written answer, if the European Union could send its question in writing.  
28.  Regarding the notification s of Viet Nam (G/STR/N/15/VNM  and G/STR/N/16/VNM), the Chair 
recalled that the United  States had made  a counter -notification (G/STR/Q1/VNM/4 ) and that 
Viet Nam had responded in documents G/STR/Q1/VNM/5 and G/STR/Q1/VNM/5/Corr.1. The 
United  States had provided responses and posed follow -up questions to  Viet Nam 
(G/STR/Q1/VNM/6).  
29.  The United States  noted that it had sent written responses in October 2018 to Viet Nam's 
responses to the United States' questions. The United States continued to lo ok forward to responses 
from Viet Nam. If any revisions to Viet Nam's notifications became necessary as a result of 
Viet Nam's review of the United States responses, the United States also looked forward to 
Viet Nam's revised notifications.  
30.  Viet Nam  thanke d the  United States for its responses and for its statement today. Viet Nam 
attached great importance to transparency and had made great efforts to provide its notifications, 
despite capacity constraints. Viet Nam had carefully responded to the United Stat es' counter -
notification (G/STR/Q1/VNM/4) and believed that its notification  (G/STR/Q1/VNM/5) also explained 
further points raised by the United States in its more recent responses. However, Viet Nam 
recognized that there might be different ways to interpr et its response and would, therefore, 
welcome an opportunity to discuss the matter bilaterally with the United States after the meeting of 
the Working Party, to clarify the issues.  
31.  The Working Party took note  of the statement s made.  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  4  CONTINUED NON-NOTIFICATION OF STATE TRADING ENTERP RISES BY BRAZIL  
32.  The United States  expressed its strong interest in ensuring that WTO Members comply with 
their notification obligations in the Working Party and referred, in particular, to paragraph 4 of the 
Understa nding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. The United States recalled that, in 1996, Brazil had submitted its first notification to the 
Working Party, notifying ten entities as STEs, with statistical inf ormation provided in 1997. It did not 
provide any further notification until 2016, when it notified that it did not maintain any STEs falling 
under the working definition of paragraph 1 of the Understanding, while providing no explanation 
for the change. I n 2018, Brazil repeated its nil notification, again providing no explanation for the 
change from its 1996 notification. The United States carried out its own research and found that 
publicly available information indicated that there appeared to be a numbe r of entities that Brazil 
had failed to identify as STEs. The United States had raised the issue with Brazil in September and 
October 2018 and in consultations in March 2019. Although the issue was not yet resolved, the 
United States appreciated Brazil's g ood faith efforts to engage in these processes and continued to 
hope the issue could be solved through bilateral discussion. If not, the United States might need to 
file a counter -notification.  
33.  Brazil  responded that its notifications of 2016 and 2018 refle cted the profound market -oriented 
reforms that Brazil had undertaken during two decades. They were the result of a judicial process 
of analysis of Brazil's existing domestic legislation and of the impact of Brazil's STEs on the national 
economy and on fore ign trade. This analysis had concluded that no Brazilian entity met the working 
definition in paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Brazil remained open to dialogue and wa s willing to provide 
further clarification on the activities of Brazilian companies if necessary. Nevertheless, Brazil asked 
the United States to submit concrete elements to justify its claims relating to the enterprises referred 
to by the United States, o r relating to any other Brazilian companies.  
34.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
5  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFI CATION OF STATE TRAD ING ENTERPRISES BY T HE 
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
35.  The United States  regretted that this was the ninth consecutive meeting at which this topic was 
on the agenda and the seventh year that this issue had been raised in the Working Party. Russia 
had made an effort to meet its transparency commitments in other WTO bodies, but the 
United  States regretted that this effort was being resisted in this Working Party. Russia had missed 
four consecutive notification cycles, or eight years, as indicated in the most recent Status of 
Notification s,3 and had  not fulfilled a single STE noti fication obligation since joining the WTO. 
Transparency was an important WTO requirement, which Russia had agreed to abide by when it 
joined the WTO, and served an important function for all WTO Members, to better understand and 
evaluate a Member's STE ope rations and its compliance with relevant WTO obligations. That having 
been said, the United States welcomed the statements made by Russia at the October 2016 meeting 
of the Working Party, acknowledging that companies had been granted the exclusive right to  export 
liquefied natural gas and would, therefore, be notified. In addition, the United States understood 
that Russia was planning to notify JSC United Grain Company as an STE, and welcomed this. At the 
previous meeting of the Working Party, in October 20 18, Russia had stated that the notification 
would be made by the end of 2018. Given these and other past indications by Russia that a 
notification was coming, the United States asked Russia to update the Working Party as to when its 
notification would be s ubmitted to it for review, and also as to whether the upcoming notification 
would provide all of the required information for the missing years (i.e., the past eight years), as 
well as the most recent period.  
36.  The European Union  reiterated its concern about  the lack of STE notifications by the Russian 
Federation. During previous meetings of the Working Party, as well as in the framework of the 
Russian Federation's Trade Policy Review, Members had received information on the basis of which 
the European Union understood that the Russian Federation granted exclusive rights to several 
companies, pursuant to the Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 14 July 2014 
No. 1277-r and Government Regulation No. 2001 -r of 9 October 2014. At the previous meeti ng of 
this Working Party held in October  2018, the  Russian Federation had explained that the preparation 
 
3 Room document RD/STR/29.  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  of the notification was "in its final stage". The European Union regretted that Russia had not yet 
fulfilled its notification obligations and urged Rus sia to transform its repeated announcements into 
concrete action.  
37.  Ukraine  echoed the concerns expressed by the United States and European Union about the 
Russian Federation's continued non -notification of its STEs. It reiterated its concern about this 
longstanding issue, as well as the importance of the requirement for transparency, in particular with 
regard to STEs. Given the more than seven years that had elapsed since the accession of the Russian 
Federation to the WTO, and the occurrence of the fourth no tification period since its accession, 
Ukraine invited the Russian Federation to comply with its notification obligations under 
paragraph  4(a) of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and paragraph  1 
of the Understanding on the In terpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994.  
38.  The Russian Federation  thanked the  United States, the European Union, and Ukraine for their 
continued interest in the issue and informed Members that it continued to work with  the Minister of 
Finance and the respective enterprises to move forward with the issue. The Russian Federation had 
done a great deal of preparatory work but needed more time for internal coordination and 
consultation with the parties concerned. The Russian  Federation reiterated that it acted in 
compliance with its WTO commitments and that its goal was to submit a complete and exhaustive 
notification to Members, which it would do once its work on it was complete. In respect of JSC United 
Grain Company, the R ussian Federation did not concede that it fell under the working definition of 
STEs set forth in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, and therefore did not consider it subject to notifi cation obligations.  
39.  The United States  asked why the Russian Federation had modified its position on JSC United 
Grain Company being an STE, given that it had previously indicated that it was an STE.  
40.  The Russia n Federation  asked the United States to engage on this issue bilaterally.  
41.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
6  CONTINUED NON -NOTIFI CATION OF STATE TRAD ING ENTERPRISES BY T HE UNITED 
ARAB EMIRATES  
42.  The United States  regretted that this was the sixth consecutive meeting at which this topic was 
on the agenda of the Working Party. As it had stated during the Working Party meetings of 
October  2016, May and November 2017, and May and October 2018, the United States had 
enquired, during the Trade Policy Review of the United Arab Emirates of June 2016, as to the status 
of its STE notifications, since the United Arab Emirates had not submitted any STE notification since 
1996. The United Arab Emirates had responded that it did  not consider making STE notifications a 
priority, and that making those notifications was a challenge because of the definition of STEs and 
the federal structure of the Government of the United Arab Emirates. The United States continued 
to be concerned ab out that response, because the United Arab Emirates was giving the impression 
that it did not place much value on its transparency obligations. Furthermore, having a federal 
government itself and 50 state governments, the United States did not find the str ucture of 
government of the United Arab Emirates a particularly compelling reason not to notify. As to the 
definition of STEs, the United States continued to urge the United  Arab Emirates to seek technical 
assistance from the Secretariat to understand the provisions of Article  XVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Further, if that was of help, given that the United States too 
had a federal system of government, the United States would be willing to supplement any 
assistance from the Secre tariat and work with the United Arab Emirates on a technical level to help 
it meet this important notification obligation.  
43.  The United Arab Emirates  wished to confirm that it attached great importance to the 
enhancement of transparency, in general, and to c ompliance with notification obligations and 
procedures, in particular. The United Arab Emirates had had an interesting bilateral discussion with 
the United States that morning and had confirmed that it was taking the matter seriously. It had 
forwarded the concerns of the United States to capital and would keep the United States and all 
Members informed of any progress in that regard.  G/STR/M/35  
 
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  44.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made.  
7  DISCUSSION REGARDING  A VICE -CHAIRPERSON FOR THE WORKING PART Y ON STATE 
TRADING ENTERPRISES  
45.  The United States  noted that the meeting scheduled for April 2019 had not taken place because 
the Council for Trade in Goods had not yet agreed on the appointment of new officers, the former 
Chair person  was not available, and the Working  Party does not have a vice -chairperson.  The 
United  States therefore proposed taking measures to avoid this happening in the future, such as 
having a vice -chairperson or an interim chair person .  
46.  As there were no other statements on this agenda item, the Chair indicated that he would 
convey to the Chairperson of the Council for Trade in Goods the interest expressed in allowing the 
Working Party to have a vice -chairperson.  
47.  The Working Party took note  of the statements made and of the course of action proposed  by 
the Chair.  
8  OTHER BUSINESS  
48.  The Working Party took note  that no issue had been raised under Other Business.  
9  DATE OF FOLLOWING ME ETING  
49.  The Chair  recalled the Working Party's practice of holding its autumn meetings either 
immediately before or immediately after the week during which the Committees on Anti -Dumping 
Practices, on Safeguards and on Subsidies and Countervailing measures hold their autumn meetings. 
Given that those meetings were tentatively scheduled for the week of 18 November 2019, the Chair 
proposed to schedule the following meeting of the Working Party on 25 November 2019 .  
50.  The United States  proposed that the Working Party consider scheduling the meeting the week 
before the week of 18 November 2019, rather than the week after.  
51.  The Chair  asked whether any Member had any objections to holding the meeting on 
15 November 2019. No objections were raised.  
52.  The Chair therefore tentatively scheduled the following meeting for 15 November 2019.  
53.  The meeting was adjourned . 
 
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