   
  
G/AG/GEN/230  
 
24 November 2023  
(23-7958) Page: 1/7 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
107TH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
27-29 NOVEMBER 2023  
ANNUAL MONITORING OF THE FOLLOW -UP TO THE MARRAKESH MINISTERIAL DECISION  
Submission by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)  
The following submission, dated 23 November  2023, is being circulated at the request of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  
 
_______________  
 
 
1  BACKGROUND  
1.1.  The latest edition of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the W orld1 (SOFI) report , 
released in July, informed that the prevalence of global hunger (PoU) had stayed relatively 
unchanged from 2021 to 2022 but was still higher than the pre -COVID -19 figure. It was estimated 
that between 691 million and 783 million peopl e suffered from  chronic hunger in 2022 . Considering 
the midrange (735  million), 122  million more people faced hunger in 2022 than in 2019, before the 
COVID -19 pandemic . 
1.2.  The report estimates that almost 600 million people will be chronically undernourished in 2030, 
making it a challenge to reach the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of eradicating 
hunger. This is 119 million more than if the pandemic and war in Ukraine had not occurred, and 
23 million more people than if the war had not happened.  
1.3.  The SOFI report also showed that following an increase from 2019 to 2020, the global 
prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity2 remained the same for the second year in a row, 
far beyond pre -COVID -19 pandemic levels. In 2022, an estimated 29.6% of the population 
(2.4 billion people) were moderately or severely food insecure, 391 million more people than 
in 2019.  
1.4.  Finally, the joint report Hunger Hotspots - FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: 
November 2023 to April 2024 Outlook,3 also released in early November 2023, warns that acute 
food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 18 hunger hotspots – comprising 22  countries or 
territories including two regional clusters – during the outlook period from November 2023 to 
April 2024.  
1.5.  In this regard, four net food -importing countries (NFIDCs), namely Burkina Faso, Mali, 
South  Sudan and the Sudan, are hotspots of the highest concern. Palestine was added to the list of 
countries/ territories of highest concern  due to the severe esc alation of conflict in October 2023.  
 
1 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. 
Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural –urban continuum. Rome, 
FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en .  
2 The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale (FIES) is an estimate of the percentage of a country 's population that faces difficulties in 
accessing enough safe and nutritious food fo r normal growth and development and an active and healthy life.  
3 WFP and FAO. 2023. Hunger Hotspots. FAO –WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: 
November  2023 to April 2024 Outlook. Rome. https://doi.org /10.4060/cc8419en .  G/AG/GEN/230  
 
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  These hotspots have populations that are either already facing critical levels of starvation 
(Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) or at risk of deteriorating to this state (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase  4). 
These countries/territori es need the most urgent attention.  
1.6.  Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, 
all of which are NFIDCs, and the Syrian Arab Republic are identified as hotspots of extreme concern, 
as they have a high numbe r of people facing or projected to be facing critical levels of acute food 
insecurity, along with intensifying drivers that are likely to worsen the life -threatening conditions 
further.  
2  FOOD PRICES: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Global food prices  
2.1.  The FAO Food Price Index (FFPI)  averaged 120.6 points in October 2023, down 
0.7 points  (0.5%) from September, continuing the downward trend and standing 
14.8 points  (10.9 %) below its corresponding value a year ago (Figure 1 – left). The slight drop in 
October r eflects declines in the price indices for sugar, cereals, vegetable oils and meat, while the 
index for dairy products rebounded.  
2.2.  With respect to individual commodities (Figure 1 – right), the FAO Cereal Price Index averaged 
125.0 points in October, down 1.3 points (1.0%) from September and as much as 27.3  points 
(17.9%) from its value a year ago. International wheat prices fell by 1.9% in October. By contrast, 
international prices of coarse grains firmed marginally, increasing by 0.6% month -on-month.  Among 
other coarse grains, world sorghum prices rose in October, while barley prices fell. International rice 
prices dropped by 2.0% month -on-month in October, weighed by generally passive global import 
demand. The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index averaged 1 20.0 points in October, down 0.9  points 
(0.7%) from September, marking the third successive monthly decline and standing 31.3  points 
(20.7%) below its value one year ago. The FAO Dairy Price Index averaged 111.3 points in October, 
up 2.4 points (2.2%) from  September, following nine months of consecutive declines, but still down 
28.0 points (20.1%) from its value one year ago. The FAO Meat Price Index averaged 112.9  points 
in October, down slightly (0.7 points, or 0.6%) from September, marking the fourth con secutive 
monthly decline, and standing 3.9 points (3.4%) below its value a year ago. Finally, the FAO Sugar 
Price Index averaged 159.2 points in October, down 3.5 points (2.2%) from September  after two 
consecutive monthly increases. International sugar quo tations remained, however, 50.6  points 
(46.6 %) above their levels in the same month last year.  
Figure 1. FAO Food Price Index (left) and Price Indices for commodity groups (right)  
  
Source : FAO. 2023. Food Price Index . https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ .  
G/AG/GEN/230  
 
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  2.2  Food inflation in NFIDCs4  
2.3.  One measure for capturing general movements in domestic prices is the consumer price 
index  (CPI). The food component of the CPI (FCPI) gauges the changes in the prices of food products. 
Among net food -importing developing countries , the FCPI  increased up to a peak  of 3.3% in 
April 2022 (Figure 2). Soon after, however, it began a downward t rend throughout the rest of the 
year, except for September and October 2022. Food inflation accelerated in January and 
February  2023, before falling steadily in the following four months up to June 2023, then rising to 
2.1% in July 2023, concomitant with a n uptick in international crude oil prices.   
2.4.  Food inflation among NFIDCs has been significantly higher and more volatile than among 
high-income countries. This larger level of volatility mostly reflects the higher dependence of NFIDCs 
on world food markets , with increased exposure to international food price fluctuations. Inflation 
spillovers from high -income countries can also occur following changes in monetary policy to address 
elevated domestic inflation. This is mainly the case for the United States, w here higher interest rates 
lead to an appreciation of the US dollar, the main trading currency, with respect to the currency of 
the NFIDCs, which in turn raises their domestic inflation .  
Figure 2. Monthly percentage change in FCPI  
 
Note:  Based on available data, the analysis covers 32 out of the 78 countries in the group of NFIDCs. 
High-income countries include Canada, the Euro area, Japan and the United States.  
Source : FAO. 2023. Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets. Food Outlook,  November 2023.  
Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc8589en .  
2.3  Domestic food prices in NFIDCs  
2.5.  According to the Food Price Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin5, published in 
November  2023, i n most countries monitored by FAO, domestic staple food prices were in 
October  2023 at higher levels year on year, mostly due to rising production and distribution costs , 
hampering households ' access to food, a ccording to FAO 's most recent analysis.  
2.6.  Regarding  sub-Saharan Africa , prices of key cereal staples are generally well above their 
year-earlier levels; however there has been a slowdown in price growth since the mid -year point. A 
key factor underlying the elevated prices is currency weakness vis -à-vis the United States dollar, 
which has driven up production and distribution costs, reflecting increased energy prices, and limited 
 
4 FAO. 2023. Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets. Food Outlook, November 2023. 
Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc8589en .  
5 FAO. 2023. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Bulletin: November 2023. Rome. 
https://www.fao.org/3/cc8660en/cc8660en.pdf .  
G/AG/GEN/230  
 
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  the transmission of falling international food prices . Weather -related production declines, part icularly 
in several East African and Southern African countries, further contributed to the price upswings 
in 2023. Looking ahead, inclement weather patterns, due to the prevailing El Ni ño event, are an 
upside risk to food prices in 2024, largely linked to  dry conditions and its potential impact on 
domestic production.  
2.7.  Among Far East Asia , domestic prices of rice showed mixed trends in October 2023, while 
those of wheat flour were stable or declining . However, notably  in Pakistan, retail prices of wheat 
flour, the country 's main food staple, were at near -record levels in October 2023, following steep 
hikes between April 2022 and May 2023, due to a tight supply situation and high production and 
transport costs, amid a significant depreciation of the national  currency. In Myanmar, prices of a 
widely consumed rice variety (emata) were near -record highs in late 2023, principally underpinned 
by tight availabilities reflecting low domestic harvests in 2022 and 2023.  
2.8.  As for Central America and the Caribbean , price s of food had increased pronouncedly in 
Haiti in 2023, reflecting the challenging macroeconomic conditions, including a weak currency, and 
the effects of civil insecurity.  
3  CEREAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND6 
3.1.  FAO has maintained its forecast for world cereal  production  in 2023 at 2 ,819 million tonnes, 
still representing a 0.9 % (26 million tonnes) increase compared to the previous year 's outturn  
(Table  1). Global wheat production in 2023 is forecast at 785.1 million tonnes, virtually unchanged 
from last month a nd 2.2 % (18 million tonnes) lower than last year 's level. Global coarse grain 
production is pegged at 1 ,510 million tonnes in 2023, unchanged month on month and remaining 
2.7% (38.8 million tonnes) above last year 's outturn. Turning to 2024, winter wheat p lantings are 
underway across the northern hemisphere and area growth is expected to be limited, reflecting 
softer crop prices this year.  FAO's forecast of world rice production in 2023/24 now stands at 
523.9  million tonnes, up 0.8 % from the 2022/23 estimat e and 850 ,000 tonnes higher than 
previously reported.  
3.2.  World cereal  utilization  in 2023/24 is forecast to reach 2 ,810.4 million tonnes, up 6.7 million 
tonnes since the October report and 1.0 % higher than in 2022/23. The forecast for total wheat 
utilization  in 2023/24 has been scaled up 6.3 million tonnes this month. Despite a 1 -million -tonne 
downward revision this month, global utilization of coarse grains is still set to expand in 2023/24 by 
1.2% to 1,499 million tonnes. The forecast for world rice utiliza tion in 2023/24 has been raised by 
1.5 million tonnes since October to 522.0 million tonnes. Nevertheless, the revised level continues 
to suggest that world rice total use could stagnate at the 2022/23 somewhat reduced level, as 
forecast cuts in the feed u ses largely offset an increase in the food use component.  
3.3.  The forecast for world cereal  stocks  by the close of seasons in 2024 has been lowered by 
2.9 million tonnes since October, to 881 million tonnes, but still points to a 2.6 % increase above 
opening le vels. Based on the latest stock and utilization forecasts, the 2023/24 world cereals 
stocks -to-use ratio stands at 30.7 %, marginally above the 30.5 % in 2022/23, which is a comfortable 
supply situation from a historical perspective. Following this month 's downward revision, global 
wheat stocks are now expected to remain close to their opening levels, at 315 million tonnes. The 
forecast for global coars e grain inventories has been lifted this month by 1.0 million tonnes to 
367 million tonnes, up 5.9 % from their opening levels.  
3.4.  FAO's forecast for global  trade  in cereals in 2023/24 has been raised by 3.0 million tonnes 
since October to 469 million tonnes,  still heading for a 1.6 % contraction from 2022/23. Both global 
coarse grain and wheat trade are forecast to contract in 2023/24, by 2.8 % and 1.8 %, respectively, 
from their 2022/23 levels. International trade in rice in 2024 (January -December) is seen in t he 
order of 52.8 million tonnes, little changed from the October forecast and close to the 2023 reduced 
level.  
 
6 This section is based on the November 2023 FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief available at 
https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/fao -cereal -supply -and-demand -brief/en .  G/AG/GEN/230  
 
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  Table 1. Global cereal market at a glance  
  2019/20  2020/21  2021/22  2022/23  2023/24 
(forecast)  
Production (million tonnes)  2,711.1  2,782.5  2,812.0  2,793.3  2,819.3  
Utilization (million tonnes)  2,708.0  2,764.3  2,799.3  2,781.8  2,810.4  
Trade (million tonnes)   439.9   482.2   482.0   476.9   469.2  
Ending stocks (million tonnes)  832.1  840.2  858.3  858.4  881.1  
World stocks -to-use ratio %   30.1  30.0  30.9  30.5  30.7 
Source : FAO (2023) . 
4  CROP PRODUCTION PROSPECTS IN NFIDC S7 
4.1.  According to the latest FAO's estimates , aggregate cereal production among  net food -importing 
developing countries  in 2023 is expected to be above  the five -year average  and the outturn in 2022.  
4.2.  In Northern Africa , drought conditions curbed harvests in 2023, where cereal production is 
forecast to be below the five -year average in 2023. Looking ahead, for the 2024 crops, rainfall 
amounts early in the season (October) were very limited, with almost no rainfall reported in major 
rainfed cropping areas of central Morocco and parts of Tunisia. In early September  2023, two major 
natural disasters struck the subregion  - an earthquake in southern Morocco and a dam collapse due 
to a heavy flooding in north ‑eastern Libya, resulting in a significant loss of li ves and material 
damages. However, while detrimental to livelihood opportunities, the national cereal production is 
unlikely to be affected.  
4.3.  In Sub-Saharan Africa , aggregate cereal production in 2023 among  NFIDCs is estimated to 
be above its five -year average. A decrease in production is estimated in Southern Africa, and  
prospects of a poor rainy season is particularly worrisome for crop production in 2024, underpinned 
by unfavourable El  Niño conditions. Mostly conducive rainfall conditions across West Africa are also 
foreseen to result in above -average harvests  in 2023. Cereal production in East Africa is seen dipping 
below average levels due to less -than-favourable weather conditions.  Finally, in Central Africa, 
conflicts and displacements constrain agricultural production , forecast to remain in 2023 at the levels 
of the five -year average.  
4.4.  In Asia, cereal production is forecast to be well above the fiv e-year average. Preliminary data 
points to a significant increase in cereal production in Pakistan and Bangladesh, mainly reflecting 
large plantings due  to strong demand by the feed industry , as well as record high domestic prices 
of wheat in Pakistan. In contrast, in Myanmar the paddy production is forecast below -average levels.  
4.5.  In Latin American and the Caribbean , aggregate cereal  production among the NIFDCs 
in 2023 is expected  at an above -average level . Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru are 
expect ed to increase their production with respect to their five -year averages. However, production 
in Haiti is estimated at a below  average level due to constrained availability of agricultural inputs 
and generally poor weather conditions.  
5  FOOD IMPORT BILL OF NFIDCS  
5.1.  The global food import bill (FIB) is forecast to reach USD 2 trillion in 2023, marking  a 1.8 % 
increase (USD 35.3 billion) over the previous record, which was attained in 2022  (Figure 3).8 
Although  a new absolute high, the speed of expansion is anticipated to slow down significantly 
relative to 2022 and 2021, when growth rates reached 11 % and 18 %, respectively. The anticipated 
increase in the 2023 bills reflects a combination of prices and volumes changes, with an additional 
 
7 This section is based on information provided in the Crop Prospects and Food Situation Report, 
November edition ( https://www.fao.org/3/cc8566en/cc8566en.pdf ), modified to comply with the WTO List of 
Net Food -Importing Developing Countries. Regional groups are based on the UN M49 Code list.  
8 FAO. 2023.  Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets. Food Outlook, November 2023. 
Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc8589en .  G/AG/GEN/230  
 
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  USD 21.1 billion stemming from higher volumes and USD 19.6 billion from higher international 
prices.9  
5.2.  In contrast to the overall trend, the NFIDCs will see their food import bills contract by 4.6%. 
This decline in the FIB reflects both an effect of prices and  volumes . 
5.3.  A reduction in import quantities – despite declining world prices  – suggests that additional 
factors are impeding the ability  of these countries to access international food markets . For instance, 
the strengthening of the US dollar, the main  trading currency, with respect to the currencies of the  
NFIDC has negatively impacted their purchasing  power. Other factors that reduce the ability to pay 
for food  imports include limited  financial resources, mounting debt levels, high freight costs  and 
insurance premiums, contractions in domestic economic  activity and falling foreign exchange 
reserves.  
Figure 3. World import bills of total food and food products (USD billion)  
 
Source : FAO. 2023. Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets. Food Outlook, November 2023. 
Rome. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc8589en .  
6  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  AND FAO'S ROLE  
6.1.  Many NFIDCs are facing significant  challenges , rising vulnerability an d likely leading to higher 
levels of food insecurity. Therefore , it is essential that Members and development agencies continue 
to support vulnerable countries and groups through actions aiming at supporting  access to food. 
Trade is crucial, as it  can help stirring productivity  and incomes, and benefit  consumers.  
6.2.  It is necessary  to improve market transparency  by offering critical, up-to-date and objective 
data and information. In this regard, the Agricultural Market Information system (AMIS), an 
inter-agency platform  housed at FAO, conducts assessments and analyses  and produces short-term 
market outlooks, for wheat, maize, rice and soybeans, enhancing food market transparency and 
policy response for food security. Moreover, FAO's Global Information  and Early Warning System on 
Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) conducts regular market situation and food security assessments and 
issues alerts and warnings on impending food crises  to national and international decision makers, 
with the objective to guide tim ely and proper interventions and reinforce resilience to shocks.  
6.3.  Trade facilitation  measures are  also an increasingly crucial lever to make trade work best for 
NFIDCs . Streamlining sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures at the border and improving 
coord ination between national customs and SPS authorities are both practical steps that have 
enormous potential to facilitate countries' involvement in food trade.  
6.4.  NFIDCs have considerable catch -up potential due to challenges  in reaching key target markets. 
Consequently, addressing  policy and physical limitations  (such as insufficient marketing and 
 
9 There is also a negative "mixed effect " of USD  5.4 billion in the overall change in the global FIB, which 
explains the difference between the overall increase and the sum of the price and volume effect.  
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  trade infrastructure) is essential for both exporting and importing countries to avoid domestic supply 
disruptions, enhance food availability, and stabilize local markets and prices. Improvement of  market 
and trade -related infrastructure, including digital  marketing platforms, is hence necessary to 
motivate private investment in agriculture and value chains.  
 
 
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