   
  
WT/DS493/RPT*  
 
8 April 2020  
(20-2744) Page: 1/29 
  Original: English  
 
UKRAINE – ANTI -DUMPI NG MEASURES ON AMMON IUM NITRATE  
ARB-2019-1 
Arbitration  
under Article  21.3(c) of the  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures  
Governing the Settlement of Disputes  
 
Award of the Arbitrator  
Ricardo Ramírez -Hernández  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________  
* NOTE CONCERNING DOCUMENT SYMBOL: As of 13 April 2017, for ease of reference, awards of 
arbitrators under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU bear the symbol WT/DS[number]/ RPT. WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  7 
 ARGUMENTS OF THE PA RTIES  ................................ ................................ .....................  8 
 REASONABLE PERIOD O F TIME  ................................ ................................ ...................  8 
3.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  8 
3.2   Mandate of the arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU  ................................ ..............  8 
3.3   Measures to be brought into conformity  ................................ ................................ ....... 10 
3.4   Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  ................................  12 
3.4.1   Means of implementatio n ................................ ................................ ........................  13 
3.4.1.1    Administrative means under the Law against Dumped Imports  ................................ .. 13 
3.4.1.2    Legislative changes  ................................ ................................ .............................  16 
3.4.2   Steps of the implementation process  ................................ ................................ ........  17 
3.4.3   Particular circumstances  ................................ ................................ .........................  21 
3.4.4   Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  23 
 AWARD  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  23 
ANNEX A  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  24 
ANNEX B  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  27 
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  ABBREVIATIONS USED I N THIS AWARD  
Abbreviation  Description  
Anti-Dumping Agreement  Agreement on Implementation of Article  VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994  
Appellate  Body Report  Appellate  Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium 
Nitrate , WT/DS493 /AB/R and  Add.1  
Draft Law against Dumped 
Imports   Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports" to  replace 
the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against 
Dumped Imports" (22  December  1998)  
DSB Dispute Settlement Body  
DSU Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  
EuroChem  JSC MCC EuroChem  
GATT  1994 General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
Gazprom  JSC Gazprom  
ICIT Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade  
Law against Dumped Imports  Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped 
Imports" (22  December  1998)  
Ministry  Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine 
(formerly the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine)  
Panel  Report Panel  Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate , 
WT/DS493/R , Add.1 and Corr.1  
UN United Nations  
Ukrainian Safeguard Law  Law of Ukraine  on the application of safeguard measures on imports to 
Ukraine  
VRU  Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine  
WTO World Trade Organization  
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  EXHIBITS CITED IN TH IS AWARD  
Exhibit No.  Short title  Long title  
Exhibit RUS -1b Law against Dumped 
Imports  Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against 
Dumped Imports" (22  December  1998)  
Exhibit RUS -2b 2010 amendment  ICIT, Decision implementing court orders regarding EuroChem 
(25 October  2010)   
Exhibit RUS -6  ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on import of 
passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and 
export (10  September  2015)  
Exhibit RUS -8  Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law 
against Dumped Imports  
Exhibit RUS -10  WTO Statistics on Initiation of Dumping, Countervailing and 
Safeguard Investigations  
Exhibit RUS -12b  ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti -dumping measures on 
imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia 
(18 February 2017)  
Exhibit RUS -13b  ICIT, Notice on the resumption of anti -dumping measures on 
imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in 
Russia (20  May 2017)  
Exhibit RUS -14b  Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in Case 
No. 826/7760/17 (18  December  2019)  
Exhibit RUS -20b  Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus SARS -CoV-2 
(17 March  2020)  
Exhibit RUS -21b  Ministry, Notice regarding submission of information  
(27 March  2020)  
Exhibit RUS -22b  Ministry, Press release, "The Ministry for Development of 
Economy, T rade and Agriculture of Ukraine  informs about the 
specifics of conducting trade investigations during the period of 
quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev" 
(17 March 2020)  
Exhibit UKR -2  Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23  July 2001 o n the 
measures that may be taken by the Community following a 
report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
concerning anti -dumping and anti -subsidy matters  
Exhibit UKR -5  Statistics on duration of reviews of anti -dumping measures  
Exhibit  UKR-6  United Nations News , "Human cost of Ukraine conflict is 
growing, Security Council told " (16 July 2019)  
Exhibit UKR -7  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights , Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine , 
16 August to 15  November  2019 
Exhibit UKR -8  United Nations General Assembly resolution 74/17, Problem of 
the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 
the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black 
Sea and the Sea of Azov  (9 December  2019)  
Exhibit UKR -10 Draft Law against 
Dumped Imports  Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports" 
to replace the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National 
Producer against Dumped Imports"  (22 December  1998)  
Exhibit UKR -13  Laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 
IX convocation co ncerning the emergency situation in Ukraine , 
until 14  February  2020  
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  CASES CITED IN THIS AWARD  
Short title  Full case title and citation  
Argentina – Hides and Leather 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS155/10 , 31 August  2001, DSR 2001:XII, 
p. 6013 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded  
Tyres – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS332/16 , 
29 August 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p.  8581 
Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS114/13 , 
18 August 2000, DSR 2002:I, p.  3 
China – GOES (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, China – Countervailing and Anti -Dumping Duties 
on Grain Oriented Flat -Rolled Electrical Steel from the United  States  – 
Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS414/12 , 3 May 2013, 
DSR 2013:IV, p.  1495 
Colombia – Ports of Entry 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Indicative Pr ices and Restrictions on 
Ports of Entry – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS366/13 , 2 October  2009, DSR 2009:IX, p.  3819 
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation 
of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS461/13 , 15 November  2016 
EC – Chicken Cuts 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European  Communities  – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS269/13 , WT/DS286/15 , 20 February  2006 
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European  Communities  – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS265/33 , 
WT/DS266/33 , WT/DS283/14 , 28 October  2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11581  
EC – Hormones 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European  Communities  – Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS26/15 , WT/DS48/13 , 29 May 1998, DSR 1998:V, p.  1833 
EC – Tariff Preferences 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, European  Communities  – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries  – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS246/14 , 20 September  2004, DSR 
2004:IX, p.  4313 
Indonesia – Autos 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS54/ 15, WT/DS55/14 , WT/DS59/13 , WT/DS64/12 , 
7 December  1998, DSR 1998:IX, p.  4029 
Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic 
Random Access Memories from Korea – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of 
the DSU , WT/DS336/16 , 5 May 2008, DSR 2008:XX, p.  8553 
Peru – Agricultural Products 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS457/15 , 16 December  2015, DSR 2015:XI, p.  5845 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit , 
WT/DS512/R  and Add.1, adopted 26  April 2019 
Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate  Appellate  Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium 
Nitrate , WT/DS493/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 30  September  2019 
Ukraine – Ammonium Nit rate Panel  Report , Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate , 
WT/DS493/R , Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 30  September  2019, as upheld 
by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS493/AB/R  
Ukraine – Passenger Cars  Panel  Report , Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain 
Passenger Cars , WT/DS468/R  and Add.1, adopted 20  July 2015, 
DSR 2015:VI, p.  3117 
US – 1916 A ct 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – 
Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS136/11 , WT/DS162/14 , 
28 February  2001, DSR 2001:V, p.  2017 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  Short title  Full case title and citation  
US – Anti-Dumping 
Methodologies (China) 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Certain Methodologies and Their 
Application to Anti -Dumping Proceedings Involving China  – Arbitration 
under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS471/RPT , 19 January  2018 
US – COOL (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements  – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS384/24 , WT/DS386/23 , 4 December  2012, DSR 2012:XIII, p.  7173 
US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS437/16 , 9 October  2015, DSR 2015:XI, p.  5775 
US – Gambling 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Measures Affecting the Cross -
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS285/13 , 19 August  2005, 
DSR 2005:XXIII, p.  11639  
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) (Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS217/14 , WT/DS234/22 , 13 June 2003, DSR 2003:I II, p. 1163 
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Sunset Reviews of Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS268/12 , 7 June 2005, DSR 2005:XXIII, 
p. 11619  
US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) 
(Article 21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Shrimp from Viet  Nam – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the 
DSU, WT/DS429/12 , 15 December  2015, DSR 2015:XI, p.  5811  
US – Stainless Steel ( Mexico) 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Final Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico – Arbitration under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , 
WT/DS344/15 , 31 October  2008, DSR 2008:XX, p.  8619 
US – Washing Machines 
(Article  21.3(c))  Award of the Arbitrator, United  States  – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea – Arbitration under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU , WT/DS464/RPT , 13 April 2017, DSR 2017:VIII, 
p. 4309 
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
AWARD OF THE ARBITRA TOR 
 
 
Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Ammonium Nitrate  
 
Parties:  
 
Russian Federation  
Ukraine  
 ARB-2019-1 
 
Arbitrator:  
 
Ricardo Ramírez -Hernández  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  On 30  September  2019, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the Appellate  Body 
Report1 and the Panel  Report2 in Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate . This 
dispute concerns certain anti -dumping measures imposed by Ukraine on imports of ammonium 
nitrate from the Russian Federation (Russia).3 The Panel and the Appellate  Body found the measures 
at issue to be inconsistent with various provisions of the Ag reement on Implementation of Article  VI 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti -Dumping Agreement).  
1.2.  At the meeting of the DSB held on 28  October  2019, Ukraine indicated its intention to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB  in this dispute and stated that it would need 
a reasonable period of time in which to do so.4 By letter dated 21 November  2019, Russia informed 
the DSB that  Russia and Ukraine had entered into consultations regarding the reasonable period of 
time for impl ementation pursuant to Article  21.3(b) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), but that these consultations had not resulted in an 
agreement . Russia therefore requested that the reasonable period of time be determined through 
binding arbitration pursuant to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.5  
1.3.  By letter dated 2  December  2019, Russia informed the Director -General of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that consultations with Ukraine had not led to mutual agreement on an 
arbitrator. Russia therefore requested the Director -General to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to 
footnote 12 to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.6  
1.4.  After consulting with the parties, the Director -General appointed me as the Arbitrator on 
11 December 2019.7 On 12 December  2019, I informed the parties of my acceptance of the 
appointment as Arbitrator and transmitted to them a Working Schedule identifying the dates for the 
filing of the parties' written submissions and the date of the hearing.8 
1.5.  On 13  December  2019, Ukraine sent a letter requesting that the due date for its written 
submission be extended and that the hearing be postponed. Ukraine identified several reasons for 
its request. Ukraine pointed to official holidays in Ukraine in late December  2019 and early 
January  2020 as well as to preparation work for the 50th annual meeting of the World Economic 
Forum to be held in Davos, Switzerland, on 21 -24 January  2020.  
 
1 WT/DS493/AB/R and Add.1.  
2 WT/DS493/R, Add.1  and Corr.1 . 
3 WT/DS493/10.  
4 WT/DSB/M/436, para.  2.3.  
5 WT/DS493/11.  
6 WT/DS493/12.  
7 WT/DS493/12.  
8 Considering the end of the year period, the Working Schedule of 12  December  2019 indicated that the 
written submission of Ukraine should be filed on 9 January 2020, the written submission of Russia should be 
filed on 23  January  2020, and the hearing would be held on 6 February 2020.  
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  1.6.  On 16  December  2019, I invited Russia to comment on Ukraine's letter. On 17  Decembe r 2019, 
Russia sent a letter stating that the reasons given by Ukraine did not justify the requested extension. 
Nevertheless, given the winter holidays and for the purposes of constructive engagement in this 
arbitration, Russia indicated that it would agre e that the date for Ukraine's written submission be 
moved to 23  January  2020, the date for Russia's written submission be moved to 6  February 2020, 
and the date of the hearing be moved to 27 or 28  February  2020.   
1.7.  Having taken account of Ukraine's request a nd Russia's comments, on 18  December  2019, 
I sent a revised Working Schedule to the parties. In accordance with this revised Working Schedule, 
Ukraine filed its written submission on 23  January  2020, Russia filed its written submission on 
6 February 20209, and the hearing was held on 20  February  2020.  
1.8.  By letter dated 25 March  2020, I informed the parties that the award would be circulated no 
later than 31 March  2020. I also informed the parties that, given access restrictions to the 
WTO premises in light of developments related to the COVID -19 virus, circulation would be made by 
electronic means only . The parties did not object to circulation by electronic means. On 
26 March  2020, Ukraine se nt a letter requesting me to take into account, in my determ ination  of the 
reasonable period of time,  Ukraine's recent measures in response to  the COVID -19 virus, as they 
may significantly affect implementation in this dispute. The next day, I  invited Russia to comment 
on Ukraine's request. By letter dated  30 March  2020, Russia express ed its solidarity with the 
countries affected by the COVID -19 virus . Russia, however,  stated  that it was unclear that Ukraine's 
recent measures would affect implementation. On 31 March  2020, I informed the parties that the 
circulation of the award would be delayed in order to allow me to consider properly Ukraine's request 
as well as Russia's comments. By letter dated 7 April 2020, I informed the parties that the award 
would be circulated by electronic means no later than 8 April 2020.10  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  
2.1.  Annexes A and B to this Award contain the executive summaries of the parties' submissions. 
Certain details of the parties' arguments are further described below, insofar as they are relevant to 
the analysis.  
REASONABLE PERIOD OF  TIME  
3.1  Introduction  
3.1.  I have been appointed by the Director -General, at the request of Russia, to determine the 
reasonable period of time for Ukraine to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in 
Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate .  
3.2.  In this section, I begin by setting out the mandate of an arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) of the 
DSU. I then identify the specific measures that Ukraine is required to bring into conformity with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Finally, I ex amine the factors affecting the determination 
of the reasonable period of time in this dispute, including the means of implementation, the relevant 
steps in the implementation process, as well as the particular circumstance  that Ukraine has asked 
me to tak e into account in reaching my determination.  
3.2  Mandate of the arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU  
3.3.  Article  21.3 of the DSU provides that "[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with the 
recommendations and rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which 
 
9 On 7 February 2020, Russia filed a revised written submission to correct the paragraph numbering and 
to include page numbering. By letter of 11 February 2020, given that certain footnotes had been inadvertently 
omitted in Russ ia's submission, I invited Russia to refile its written submission with these footnotes included, 
subject to Ukraine's comments. Accordingly, on 12 February 2020, Russia filed a revised written submission to 
include the missing footnotes. By letter of 14  February  2020, Ukraine confirmed that it had no objection.  
10 Ukraine and Russia agreed by email of 16  December  2019 and at the hearing, respectively, that an 
award not made within 90 days after the adoption of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB wou ld be 
deemed to be an award of the arbitrator for the purposes of Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.  WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  to do so." Where the reasonable period of time is determined through binding arbitration pursuant 
to Article  21.3(c), that provision stipulates that:  
[A] guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable p eriod of time to 
implement panel or Appellate  Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months 
from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate  Body report. However, that time may 
be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances.11  
3.4.  Pursua nt to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU, my mandate in this arbitration is therefore  to determine 
the "reasonable period of time" within which Ukraine must comply with the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB in this dispute.  
3.5.  Article  21.3(c) establishes as a g uideline that such period should not exceed 15  months and 
recognizes that, "depending upon the particular circumstances", the period "may be shorter or 
longer". Other provisions of the DSU further shed light on the mandate of an arbitrator. Article  21.1 
of the DSU states the general principle that "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings 
of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all 
Members." The second sentence  of Article  21.3 of the DSU provi des that a reasonable period of time 
for implementation shall be available only if it is "impracticable to comply immediately" with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB . The reasonable period of time for implementation should 
therefore, in principle,  be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing 
Member12 that will enable it to achieve effective implementation of the recommendations and rulings  
of the DSB .13 Moreover, as previous arbitrators have highlighted, the implementin g Member is to 
utilize all of the flexibilities available within its legal system in implementing the relevant 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.14 
3.6.  In determining the reasonable period of time, the means of imple mentation available to the 
Member concerned is a relevant factor. Previous awards under Article  21.3(c) have indicated that 
the implementing Member has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of implementation 
that it deems most appropriate.15 The imp lementing Member's discretion, however, does not amount 
to "an unfettered right" to choose any means of implementation.16 Rather, the proposed 
implementing action must "fall[] within the range of permissible actions that can be taken in order 
to implement t he DSB's recommendations and rulings ".17 In particular, the means of implementation 
chosen must be apt in form, nature, and content to bring the Member into compliance with its 
WTO obligations.18 Thus, the chosen method of implementation must be capable of bringing the 
Member into compliance with its WTO  obligations within a reasonable period of time, in accordance 
 
11 Fn omitted.  
12 Awards of the Arbitrators, EC – Hormones (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  26; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  25; China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; US – Countervailing Measures (China) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; Peru – Agricultural Products ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4.  
13 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  53. 
14 Awards of t he Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  3.51-3.53; US – Shrimp II 
(Viet Nam) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; 
China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4; US – Stainless St eel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  42;  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  25;  
US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  64 and 74; Peru – Agricultural Products 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4. An implementing Member is not, however, expected to utilize "extraordinary 
procedures" to bring its measure into compliance, and implementation must be effected in a transparent and 
efﬁcient manner that affords due process to all inte rested parties. ( Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.46; US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  51;  
Japan  – DRAMs (Korea)  (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  51; US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam)  (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.36;  
US – Washing Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.9) 
15 Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  27; EC – Export Subsidies 
on Sugar (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69. See also Awards of the Arbitrat ors, US – Countervailing Measures (China) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4; Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  48. 
16 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69. 
17 Awards of the Arbitrators,  US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  42;  
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  48; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 27. 
18 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.3(c)), para.  3.4; US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.2; Colombia – Ports of 
Entry (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  64; US – Washing Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.8. 
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  with the guideline contained in Article  21.3(c).19 Previous awards have indicated th at, inasmuch as 
they elaborate on those aspects of the measure at issue that were found to breach WTO obligations, 
the findings by the Panel in the underlying dispute offer guidance for determining whether the 
proposed implementing measures are apt to achi eve compliance, as well as how long is reasonably 
needed to do so.20 Previous awards have also indicated that, if the action that the implementing 
Member proposes to take seeks to achieve objectives unrelated to the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB , or forms part of a wider reform of that Member's municipal law, then these considerations 
cannot justify a longer implementation period.21  
3.7.  At the same time, the mandate of an arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) is limited to determining 
the period of time within which it would be reasonable to expect implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB to occur. Determining when  the implementing Member 
must comply with the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB may require some consideration of 
how the Member proposes to do so.22 The mandate of an arbitrator, however, does not involve a 
determination of the consistency with the covered agreements of the measure that the Member 
envisage s to adopt in order to comply.23  
3.8.  Finally, with regard to the burden of proof, it is well established that the implementing Member 
bears the overall burden to prove that the time  period requested for implementation constitutes a 
"reasonable period of time".24 The longer the propose d period of implementation, the greater this 
burden will be.25 However, this does not "absolve" the complaining Member of its duty to provide 
evidence supporting why it disagrees with the period of time proposed by the implementing M ember, 
and to substantiate its view that a shorter period of time for implementation is reasonable.26  
3.3  Measures to be brought into conformity  
3.9.  The dispute underlying this arbitration concerns certain anti -dumping measures imposed by 
Ukraine on ammonium nitra te from Russia. Following an anti -dumping investigation conducted by 
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, now the Ministry for Development of 
Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine (Ministry), duties were originally imposed by Ukra ine's 
Intergovernmental Commission on International Trade (ICIT) through its decision of 21  May 2008 
(2008 original decision). Russian producer JSC MCC EuroChem (EuroChem) successfully challenged 
the 2008 original decision before domestic courts in Ukraine , following which ICIT issued an 
amendment (2010 amendment) to the 2008 original decision (as amended, 2008 amended 
decision). Subsequently, following interim and expiry reviews, ICIT issued a decision 
(2014  extension decision) imposing anti -dumping duties  at modified rates, including with respect to 
EuroChem.27 
3.10.  At the hearing, the parties agreed that the scope of Ukraine's implementation obligations in 
this dispute relate s to the findings made by the Panel and  the Appellate  Body that are set forth in 
 
19 Awards of the Arbitr ators,  China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69; Peru – Agricultural Products ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; US – Countervailing Measures (C hina) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.6.  
20 Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  3.5 and 3.39 -3.40.  
21 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  3.36 and 3.41;  
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  64 and 85; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article  21.3(c)) , 
para. 69; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  31. 
22 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – COOL (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  68; Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c) ), para.  26; Peru – Agricultural Products ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.6.  
23 Awards of the Arbitrators, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  27; US – Countervailing 
Measures (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.4; Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.3(c) ), para.  3.6;  
US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.8. 
24 Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.6;  
China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents  (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  47;  
US – 1916 Act (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  33; EC – Tariff Preferences (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  26; US – Washing 
Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.10; US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.11.  
25 Awards of the Arbitrators, China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; Canada – Pharmaceutical 
Patents (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  47; Peru – Agricultural Products ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.8. 
26 Awards of the Arbitrators, Colombia – Ports of Ent ry (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  67; US – Washing 
Machines (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.10; US – Anti-Dumping Methodologies (China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para. 3.11.  
27 Panel  Report, paras.  2.1-2.2; Appellate  Body Report, para.  1.2.  
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  paragraphs 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5 of the Panel  Report  and paragraphs 7.1 through 7.8 of the 
Appellate  Body Report.28  
3.11.  In ruling on the claims raised by Russia against the measures at issue, the Panel found  that 
Ukraine acted inconsistently  with:  
a. Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by: (i)  failing to exclude EuroChem from the 
scope of the original anti -dumping measures, specifically the 2008 amended decision; 
(ii) imposing a 0% anti -dumping duty on EuroChem through the 2010 amendment,  
instead of excluding it from the scope of the anti -dumping duty order; and (iii)  including 
EuroChem within the scope of the  interim and expiry  review determinations, and imposing 
anti-dumping duties on it through the 2014 extension decision29;  
b. Article  2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by rejecting the gas cost that the 
investigated Russian producers reported in their records when constructing normal value 
in the interim and expiry reviews without providing an adequate basis under the 
second  condition in the first sentence of Article  2.2.1.130;  
c. Article  2.2 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by using a cost for gas that did not reflect the 
cost of the product under consideration "in the country of origin" when constructing normal 
value in the interim and expir y reviews31;  
d. Article  2.2.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by relying on costs that were calculated 
inconsistently with Article  2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement when conducting its 
ordinary -course -of-trade test in the interim and expiry reviews32;  
e. Articles  11.2-11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by relying on dumping margins 
calculated inconsistently with Articles  2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 of the Anti -Dumping 
Agreement to make its likelihood -of-dumping determinations in the interim and expiry 
reviews33; and  
f. Article  6.9 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement by failing to: (i)  disclose the essential facts 
underlying its price effects analysis and dumping determinations; and (ii)  give interested 
parties sufficient time to comment on its disclosure in the interim and expiry reviews.34 
3.12.  The Panel's findings under Article  5.8 as well as those under Articles 2.2, 2.2.1, and 2.2.1.1 
were upheld by the Appellate  Body35, and  Ukraine did not appeal the Panel's findings under 
Articles  6.9 and 11.2 -11.3. Accordingly, Ukraine's  implementation obligations in this dispute pertain 
to: (i)  the non -termination of the investigation against EuroChem, as reflected in the 2008 amended 
decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision; (ii)  dumping and 
likelihood -of-dumping de terminations in the interim and expiry reviews, as reflected in the 
2014 extension decision; and (iii)  the disclosure of essential facts in these interim and expiry 
reviews.36 
 
28 Parties' responses to question ing at the hearing; Russia's submission, paras.  39-42; 
Ukraine's  submission, paras.  15 and 17.  
29 Panel  Report, para.  8.3.a. The Panel stated that the obligation under the second sentence of 
Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement to immediately terminat e the investigation applies because 
EuroChem had a de minimis  dumping margin. (Ibid., para.  7.151)  
30 Panel  Report, para.  8.2.a.  
31 Panel  Report, para.  8.2.b.  
32 Panel  Report, para.  8.2.c.  
33 Panel  Report, para.  8.2.d.  
34 Panel  Report, para.  8.5.a-b.  
35 Appellate  Body Report, paras.  7.4 and 7.6 -7.8.  
36 At the hearing, the parties agreed with this description of the scope of Ukraine's implementation 
obligations.  
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  3.4  Factors affecting the determination of the reasonable period of time  
3.13.  Ukraine cons iders that I should determine that 27 months is a reasonable period of time for 
Ukraine to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.37 Ukraine argues 
that this period is necessary given that implementation requires Ukraine to: (i ) adopt  first a "general 
legislative framework" to allow Ukrainian investigating authorities38 to initiate and conduct review 
investigations for the purpose of complying with recommendations and rulings  of the DSB ; and 
(ii) subsequently conduct a n administrative review to amend the anti -dumping measures at issue.39 
Ukraine also ar gues that it is currently facing a situation of "emergency in international relations" 
and that this is a relevant particular circumstance "affect [ing] daily life, disturb [ing] the economy 
and [leading]  to extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward 
actions".40  
3.14.  Russia objects to Ukraine's proposal for a reasonable period of time of 27 months, stating 
that it "exceeds the standard of 'promp t compliance'"  embodied in Article  21.1 of the DSU .41 
Specifically, Russia questions the need to make legislative changes  or conduct an administrative  
review to address the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.42 Russia contends 
that no rea sonable period of time should be granted to implement the recommendations and rulings 
of the DSB pertaining  to Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, and that Ukraine should have 
been reasonably able to implement the remaining recommendations and rulings of the DSB through 
a decision by ICIT within two months.43 Even if legislative changes and/or an administrative review 
were necessary  to implement the recom mendations and rulings  of the DSB (quod non ), Russia 
maintains that Ukraine has failed to meet its burden of proof in requesting a reasonable period of 
time of 27  months.44  
3.15.  At the outset , I observe  that Russia distinguishes between: (i)  the recommendations  and 
rulings of the DSB pertaining to Article  5.8; and (ii)  the remaining recommendations and rulings  of 
the DSB .45 With respect to Ukraine's implementation obligations under Article  5.8, Russia stated at 
the hearing that immediate compliance is not "impracticable " within the meaning of Article  21.3 of 
the DSU , and Ukraine should therefore not be granted a reasonable period of time for this aspect of 
its implementation obligations.  Russia also emphasized that the second sentence of Article  5.8 
requires  the immediate  termination of an investigation .46 
3.16.  As indicated above, pursuant to Article  21.3(c) of the DSU, my mandate in this arbitration is 
to determine the reasonable period of time within which Ukraine must comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.47 In my view, my mandate does not extend 
to determining whether "it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and 
rulings" under the second sentence of Article  21.3 of the DSU. Moreover, in singling out the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB pertaining to Article  5.8, Russia is essentially requesting 
me to consider separately what might be the reasonable period of time for Ukraine's remaining  
implementation obligations. In US – Gambling , the arbitrator su ggested  that he might not be limited , 
under Article  21.3(c)  to determining one reasonable period of time , but had difficulty accepting that 
it may be possible to determine two separate reasonable periods of time with respect to  the same 
measure.48 In the current dispute, all of Ukraine's  implementation obligations pertain to a single set 
of measures forming part of  the same anti -dumping proceeding, namely, the 2008  amended 
decision, the 2010 amendment, and the 2014 extension decision. In particular, the 2014  extension 
decision is at the heart of all the recommendations and rulings  of the DSB .49 I have difficulty 
accepting that I should distinguish between the various recommendations and rulings of the 
 
37 Ukraine's submission, paras.  3 and 177.  
38 In this Award, I use the term "Ukrainian investi gating authorities" to refer to ICIT and/or the Ministry.  
39 Ukraine's submission, paras.  2 and 28 -31. 
40 Ukraine's submission, para.  127.  
41 Russia's submission, para.  7. 
42 Russia's submission, paras.  7, 53, and 58.  
43 Russia's submission, paras.  7-8, 119, a nd 164.  
44 Russia's submission, paras.  153 and 160.  
45 Russia's submission, paras.  29-30, 115, 119, and 164.  
46 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing. See also Russia's submission, paras.  30, 119, 
and 164.  
47 See para.  3.4.  above.  
48 Award of the Arbi trator,  US – Gambling ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  41.  
49 See paras.  3.11.   3.12.  above.  WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
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  DSB pertaining to the same measure  for the purpose of my determination . In light of the 
circumstances of this dispute, I  consider it appropriate to determine one reasona ble period of time 
with respect to all of Ukraine's  implementation obligations.   
3.17.  With this consideration in mind, I turn to my analysis of the reasonable period of time for 
Ukraine to implement  all the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute . Below, I first 
address the means of implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB at issue, before 
considering the relevant steps in the implementation process. Finally, I examine the particular 
circumstance alleged by Ukraine to be relevant to  my determination.  
3.4.1   Means of implementation  
3.18.  The parties disagree  on whether legislative changes and an administrative review are 
necessary to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute, and whether 
any additional time that such changes and review may entail should be taken into account in 
determin ing the reasonable period of time . Ukraine takes the view  that implementation should be 
undertaken through  legislative changes, followed by an administrative review of the anti -dumping 
measures at issue.50 Russia in turn contends  that ICIT can amend or term inate the anti -dumping 
measures at issue under the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped 
Imports" (22  December  1998) ( Law against Dumped Imports ), without legislative changes or an  
administrative review.51  
 
3.19.  As indicated abov e, Ukraine has a measure of discretion in choosing the means of 
implementation that it deems most appropriate. However, t hat discretion is not unfettered, and the 
chosen method of implementation must be capable of bringing Ukraine into compliance with its 
WTO obligations within a reasonable period of time.52 A key determinant of the reasonable period of 
time for implementation is the nature of the implementing action that is to be taken.53 A combination 
of legislative  and administrative  action s, like the ones proposed by Ukraine, will inevitably require 
more time than implementation that can be achieved by administrative means. Below, I consider 
available administrative means for implementation under the Law against Dumped Imports as well 
as Ukraine's prop osed legislative changes.  
3.4.1.1   Administrative means  under the Law against Dumped Imports   
3.20.  I begin my analysis  with Russia's argument that Article  5.6 of the Law against Dumped 
Imports allows ICIT to take a summary decision, inter alia , on the application of anti -dumping 
measures , and that neither an administrative review nor legislative changes are thus required for 
the purpose of implementation in this dispute .54 In that regard, Russia relies on prior decisions made 
by ICIT that did not require an administrative review.55  
3.21.  Article  5.6 of the Law against Dumped Imports lists, in general terms, the decisions that ICIT 
may take.56 This provision does  not specify the steps that need to be completed before ICIT can 
 
50 Ukraine's submission, para.  31.  
51 Russia's submission, para.  52. Russia argues that where the recommendations and rulings of the DSB 
can be implemented in a more expedited manner through specific administrative means, the reasonable period 
of time should be set by reference to these admin istrative means. (Ibid., paras.  26-27) 
52 See paras.  3.5.  3.6.  above. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures 
(China) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69; Peru – Agricultural Produc ts (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3.  
53 Award of the Arbitrator,  US – Gambling ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  35.  
54 Russia's submission, paras.  58 and 115.  
55 Russia's submission, paras.  49-52 (referring to IC IT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on 
import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10  September  2015) 
(Exhibit  RUS-6)), paras.  54-55 (referring to ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti -dumping measures on imp orts 
of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS -12b); ICIT, Notice on the 
resumption of anti -dumping measures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in 
Russia (20  May 2017) (Exhibit RU S-13b)), para.  115 and fn  110 thereto (referring to ICIT, Decision 
implementing court orders regarding EuroChem (25  October  2010)  (2010 amendment ) (Exhibit RUS -2b)). In 
this Award, exhibit numbers that are followed by the letter "b" refer to the English ve rsion of the relevant 
document.  
56 Article  5.6 of the Law against Dumped Imports reads:  
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  make such decisions; such steps and other requirements are set out in various other provisions of 
the Law against Dumped Imports. I therefore consider Article  5.6 of the Law against Dumped 
Imports , on its own, to be of limited guidance in determining whether the anti -dumping measures 
at issue could be amended simply through a decision by ICIT or whether an administrative review 
is warranted for the purpose of implementation in this dispute.  
3.22.  Moreover, the ICIT decisions on which Russia relies do not appear to be  relevant to this 
dispute. First, Russia refers to a decision of 2015 made by ICIT under the La w of Ukraine on the 
application of safeguard measures on imports to Ukraine (Ukrainian Safeguard Law) to implement 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in Ukraine – Passenger Cars .57 As Ukraine explained, 
that decision was based on a specific provisio n of Ukraine's Safeguard Law, which empowers ICIT to 
repeal or review safeguard measures if certain circumstances are met.58 While Russia states that 
the Ukrainian Safeguard Law and the Law against Dumped Imports bear certain similarities59, Russia 
has not p ointed to a corresponding provision in the Law against Dumped Imports that would allow 
ICIT to amend the anti -dumping measures at issue in this dispute without conducting an 
administrative review. In this respect, I am mindful of the fact that, as acknowle dged by the parties 
at the hearing, implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB will require excluding 
EuroChem from the scope of the anti -dumping measures, calculating dumping margins, and 
complying with certain disclosure obligations.60 Second , Russia refers to two decisions of 2017, 
whereby ICIT suspended and subsequently resumed anti -dumping measures.61 Those decisions were 
based on Article  28.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports62, which deals with the collection of 
anti-dumping duties and sets  out the circumstances in which anti -dumping measures may be 
suspended and resumed by a decision of ICIT.63 There is nothing in the language of this provision 
to suggest that it could form the basis for ICIT to exclude EuroChem, calculate dumping margins, o r 
comply with disclosure obligations. Finally, Russia refers to the 2010 amendment, whereby 
ICIT imposed a 0% duty on EuroChem.64 I understand that this decision was made following 
domestic court decisions concluding that there was an absence of dumping by EuroChem in the 
original investigation.65 Ukraine explained that, pursuant to Article  129 of its constitution, such court 
decisions are legally binding and are to be enforced by the State, which is why setting the 
 
At meetings of the Commission the following decisions shall be taken:  
1) the initiation of an anti -dumping investigation;  
2) the positive or negative conclusions regard ing the existence of dumping and the methods they 
give the ability to determine the dumping margin;  
3) positive or negative conclusions about the damage and its size;  
4) to determine the causal link between dumped imports and injury;  
5) the application of anti-dumping measures;  
6) on other issues within the powers provided by this Law.  
(Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" (22  December  1998) ( Law 
against Dumped Imports) (Exhibit  RUS-1b), Article  5.6) 
57 Russia's sub mission, paras.  49-52 (referring to ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures on 
import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10  September  2015) 
(Exhibit  RUS-6)). 
58 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hea ring; ICIT, Decision on cancellation of special measures 
on import of passenger cars into Ukraine regardless of country of origin and export (10  September  2015) 
(Exhibit RUS -6); Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law against Dumped Imports 
(Exhibit  RUS-8), Article  19 of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law.  
59 Russia's submission, para.  51 (referring to Comparison of the Ukrainian Safeguard Law with the Law 
against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -8)).  
60 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing.  
61 Russia's submission, paras.  54-55 (referring to ICIT, Notice on suspension of anti -dumping measures 
on imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS -12b); ICIT, 
Notice on the resumption of anti -dumping meas ures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers 
originating in Russia (20  May 2017) (Exhibit RUS -13b)). Russia highlights that the Supreme Court of Ukraine 
upheld the decision of ICIT of 20  May 2017, noting, by reference to Article  5.6 of the Law against Dumped 
Imports, that ICIT "has the authority to amend the adopted decisions". (Russia's submission, para.  57 (quoting 
Decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine in Case No. 826/7760/17 (18  December  2019) (Exhibit RUS -14b))  
62 ICIT, Notice on suspe nsion of anti -dumping measures on imports of certain nitrogen fertilizers 
originating in Russia (18 February 2017) (Exhibit RUS -12b); ICIT, Notice on the resumption of anti -dumping 
measures on imports into Ukraine of certain nitrogen fertilizers originatin g in Russia (20  May 2017) 
(Exhibit  RUS-13b).  
63 Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -1b), Article  28.3.  
64 Russia's submission, para.  115 and fn  110 thereto (referring to 2010 amendment (Exhibit RUS -2b)).  
65 Panel  Report, para.  7.147.  
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  anti-dumping duty to 0% for EuroChem could be achieved through an ICIT decision.66 Russia did 
not offer a response or point to a similar provision concerning the recommendations and rulings  of 
the DSB . For all these reasons, I am not convinced  by Russia's argument  that implementation in this 
dispute  can be achieved through a decision by ICIT, without Ukrainian investigating authorities 
conducting an interim review.  
3.23.  Now, I turn to Ukraine's  allegation that there is no legal basis for Ukrainian investigating 
authorities to review  the anti -dumping measures at issue for the purpose of implementing the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB under  the Law against Dumped Imports. According to 
Ukraine,  under the Law against Dumped Imports, an interim  review  cannot : (i) be initiated ex officio 
by the Ministry; (ii)  be initiated on the basis  that anti -dumping measures were found to be 
WTO-inconsistent; and (iii)  focus on examining compliance with the recommendations and rulings  
of the DSB .67 In light of the parties' submission and responses  to questioning at the hearing, Ukrain e 
has not shown that its  investigating authorities could not reasonably review  the anti -dumping 
measures at issue to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB under its current  Law 
against Dumped Imports.  
3.24.  In that regard, I observe that,  pursuant to Article  20.1 of the Law against Dumped Imports , 
an administrative review can be initiated at the request of "an executive authority in the country of 
import".68 Ukraine has not put forward a definition of the term "executive authority" under its 
domestic legislation. Ukraine asserts only that the Ministry is not  an executive authority of Ukraine  
for the purposes of  that provision  and that an interim  review  cannot be initiated at the request of 
the Ministry . Yet Ukraine has not advanced any reasons for or evidence  in support of  this assertion . 
At the hearing, Ukraine merely  stated , without  providing  any supporting evidence,  that the past 
practice  of Ukrainian investigating authorit ies has been to consider that the Ministry is not an 
executive authority  for the purposes of Article  20.1 of the Law against Dumped Imports .69 Ukraine 
has not explained why any such past practice , if established,  would necessarily prevent the  same 
entity that conducts anti-dumping  investigation s and reviews from requesting the initiation of the 
administrative review necessary for implementation or, for that matter,  prevent another executive 
authority of Ukraine from making such a request.   
3.25.  Moreover, pursuant to  Article  20.2 of the Law against Dumped Imports, an interim review is 
initiated provided there is sufficient evidence that  the continued imposition of the anti -dumping 
duties is no longer necessary to offset dumping .70 Pursuant to Article  20.3 of th at Law, once an 
interim review is initiated , the Ministry shall "in particular" examine  "whether the circumstances 
relating to dumping and injury have changed significantly".71 Ukraine argue d that, at this stage, it 
is unclear whether the continued imposition of the anti -dumping duties is no longer necessary to 
offset dumping  within the meaning of Article  20.2 and whether the circumstances relating to 
dumping changed significantly  within the meanin g of Article  20.3. This is because, according to 
Ukraine, until dumping margin s are recalculat ed, Ukrainian investigating authorities  cannot  know 
whether and t he extent  to which  there is a change in dumping margins .72 I observe that some of 
Ukraine's implementation obligations directly concern  its dumping calculations in the 2014 extension 
decision  and necessarily require Ukraine to recalculate dumping margins.73 Ukraine's implementation 
obligations also involve excluding EuroChem from  the scope of  the anti -dumping measures at issue 
 
66 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
67 Ukraine's submission, para.  37. I understand that Ukraine has taken st eps to amend the Law against 
Dumped Imports. The Draft Law of Ukraine "On Protection against Dumped Imports" to replace the Law of 
Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" (22  December  1998)  (Draft Law  
against Dumped Imports)  contains a new Article  122 addressing specifically compliance with recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB . (Draft Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit UKR -10), Article  122)) At the time of the 
hearing in this arbitration, the Draft Law against Dumped Impor ts had gone through the first stages of 
Ukraine's legislative process . (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing; submission, paras.  106, 157, 
and 161) I also understand that a previous version of the Draft Law against Dumped Imports was submitted  to 
Ukraine's Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU),  in 2018, but that, following parliamentary 
elections in July 2019 and the dissolution of the VRU, it was removed from consideration by the VRU. 
(Ukraine's submission, paras.  154-155) 
68 Ukraine' s submission, para.  33. See also Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -1b), Article  20.1.  
69 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
70 Ukraine's submission, para.  34. See also Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -1b), Article  20.2.  
71 Law ag ainst Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -1b), Article  20.3. See also Ukraine's submission, para.  36.  
72 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
73 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing. See also paras.  3.11.  3.12.   above.  
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  because E uroChem, one of the two main investigated Russian producers involved in the interim and 
expiry reviews,  was found to have a de minimis dumping margin74, something that is already 
establi shed at this stage.  The continuation of anti -dumping measures is thus at the heart of Ukraine's 
implementation obligations. In light of these considerations and w ithout any further explanation by 
Ukraine, I am not convinced that the circumstances of this d ispute  would not justify  the initiation of 
an interim review under Article  20.2 of the Law against Dumped Imports. I am also not convinced 
that, once initiated,  the Ministry could not  focus this interim review on implementing the 
recommendations and rulings  of the DSB under Article  20.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports . 
Ukraine has not explained why new d umping margin  calculation s and the exclusion of EuroChem 
would not  qualify as a s ignificant change in circumstances relating to dumping  under that provision . 
I am not convinced by the general proposition that findings of inconsistency with Article  2 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement could not qualify as a "circumstance[] relating to dumpin g" that merits 
review. In any event , Article  20.3 directs the Ministry to examine "in particular" significant changes 
in circumstances relating to dumping . This suggests to me that the Ministry is free to examine other 
relevant aspects as part of an interi m review .75  
3.26.  In light of the foregoing , Ukraine has not shown that, i n the circumstances of this dispute, 
Ukraine could not reasonably initiate and conduct an administrative review of the anti -dumping 
measures at issue  for the purposes of implementation  under the  Law against Dumped Imports .  
 
3.4.1.2   Legislative changes  
3.27.  Given  the considerations above , the issue of  the time needed for Ukraine's proposed 
legislative changes  is moot. Ukraine enjoys a certain discretion in choosing  the means and method 
of implementation. However, that discretion is not unfettered, and the chosen method of 
implementation must be capable of bringing Ukraine into compliance with its WTO  obligations within 
a reasonable period of time.76 In that regard, I  recall that the reasonable period of time should be 
the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing Member, and the 
implementing Member should utilize all flexibilities available within its legal system in implementing 
the relevan t recommendations and rulings of the DSB in the shortest period of time possible.77 While 
I recognize that the legislative and administrative means of implementation proposed by Ukraine 
fall within th e range of permissible means that are capable of achievin g the implementation of the 
recommendations and rulings  of the DSB , I consider that legislative action is not indispensably 
required to achieve compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute. 
This is because  Ukraine has not show n that  it could not review the anti -dumping measures at issue 
under its current  Law against Dumped Imports.  It is not my task as Arbitrator acting pursuant to 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU to decide which method or type of measure should be chosen by an 
implementing Member for the purpose of implementation. However, it does fall within my mandate 
to assess what would be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the implementing 
Member for effective implementation of the recommendations and r ulings of the DSB. In the 
particular circumstances of this case, given that Ukraine has not shown that implementation cannot 
be reasonably achieved through administrative means  under the Law against Dumped Imports , I do 
not believe that my determination of  the reasonable period of time needs to account for additional  
legislative actions , as Ukraine proposes .78  
3.28.  I note Ukraine's argument  that its situation is akin to that of the European  Union  in EC – Bed 
Linen . Ukraine states  that the reasonable period of ti me in that case allowed the  European  Union  to 
modify  its legal framework to include  specifically  the possibility to review anti -dumping measures to 
 
74 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing. See also pa ras. 3.11.  3.12.   above.  
75 Ukraine has not o ffered another reading of Article  20.3 of the Law against Dumped Imports. 
(Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)  
76 See para.  3.6.  above. See also Awards of the Arbitrators, US – Countervailing Measures (China) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3; China – GOES (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.2; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69; Peru – Agricultural Products ( Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.5; US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  3.3.  
77 See para.  3.5.  above.  
78 In US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , the arbitrator acknowledged the generally accepted principle that 
administrative means are faster than legislative means, and decided that the reasonable period of time would 
be determined based exclusively on  available administrative means, in accordance with the principle that the 
reasonable period of time should be the shortest possible time period within the legal system of the 
implementing Member. (Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Ar ticle 21.3(c)) , para.  53) 
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  implement recommendations and rulings  of the DSB , before reviewing the anti -dumping measures 
at issue.79 Since Ukrainian  legislation does not set out a procedure aimed specifically at bringing 
anti-dumping measures into conformity with recommendations and rulings  of the DSB , drawing on 
the process es for implementation in EC – Bed Linen , Ukraine contends that its general legislative 
framework has to be amended before it can initiate an administrative review .80 Ukraine stresses 
that, like the European  Union  in EC – Bed Linen , this is the first time its anti -dumping measures 
have been found  to be inconsistent with the Anti -Dumping Agreement.81 I observe that t he 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in that dispute did not apply to Ukraine. Rather, they 
concerned a measure taken by another WTO Member, and implementation was undertaken in a 
different legal system. Crucially, the reasonable period of time in that dispute was agreed upon by 
the parties and the means for implementation and the associated timeframes for implementation 
were not considered by an arbitrator under Article  21.3(c) of t he DSU. Therefore , I am of the view 
that the means for implementation adopted by the European  Union  in that dispute are of limited 
relevance  to my determination in this arbitration.  
3.29.  For these reasons , I consider that  my determination of the reasonable period of time should 
not account for the  legislative changes that Ukraine proposes to undertake. In these circumstances, 
I turn to the period of time within which Ukraine's  administrative process for implementation  must 
be completed.  
3.4.2   Steps of the implementation process  
3.30.  Turning to the steps of the implementation process relevant to this arbitration, Ukraine 
contends that it will need approximately 12 months to complete the administrative review of the 
anti-dumping measure s at issue.82 According to Ukraine, this time is  to be allocated as 
follows:  15 days for the Ministry to prepare a proposal; 10 days for ICIT to consider this proposal 
and initiate the review; 30 days for interested parties to be notified and submit comment s; 100  days 
to prepare and issue questionnaires, allow time for interested parties to respond, and for the Ministry 
to analyse the responses; 20 or 40 days to conduct verification visits, depending on whether they 
involve a domestic or a foreign company; 3 0 days to hold a hearing with interested parties and allow 
for written submissions; 90 days to draft the main facts and findings; and 35 days for the disclosure 
and final decision by ICIT.83 At the hearing, Ukraine agreed that the recommendations and ruling s 
of the DSB pertaining to Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement require Ukrain ian investigating 
authorities  to exclude EuroChem immediately from the scope of  the anti -dumping measures.84 
Ukraine thus referred to a "pointed partial interim review" focusing on dumping determinations and 
due process rights.85 
3.31.  Russia contests the amount of time that Ukraine claims i s require d to review the anti -dumping 
measures at issue. Russia argues that the  scope of the administrative review that Ukraine proposes 
to conduct will necessarily be limited and that a full -fledged review is not necessary for the purpose 
of implementation  in this dispute .86 In that regard, Russia states  that the figures necessary fo r 
calculating dumping margins are already on the investigation record, and that  Ukraine therefore 
does not need to collect any additional data.87 Russia adds that Ukraine's proposed timeframes do 
not reflect mandatory time periods under its domestic law . Instead , they  reflect  "general time 
 
79 Ukraine's submission, para.  49 (referring to Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23  July 2001 on 
the measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body concerning anti -dumping and anti -subsidy matters (Exhibit UKR -2)).  
80 Ukraine's submission, paras.  51-52. 
81 Ukraine's submission, paras.  48 and 52.  
82 Ukraine's submission, para.  174.  
83 Ukraine's submission, para.  174. Ukraine stated that these are the usual steps of an a dministrative 
review under the Law against Dumped Imports. (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)  
84 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
85 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
86 Russia's submission, paras.  160-161. 
87 Russia's submission, paras.  161 and 163 -164.  
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  periods that are relevant for original investigations ".88 In Russia's view, Ukraine should  have 
reasonably been able to complete its administrative review within two months.89  
3.32.  I begin by observing that 12  months is the maxi mum amount of time foreseen under Ukraine's 
domestic legislation for an interim review.90 It is also the time the interim and expiry reviews, in 
which WTO -inconsistent determinations were made, took to complete.91 In setting out the various 
steps of its administrative review  and corresponding timeframes , Ukraine refers to durations that 
are needed "in general", "normally", or "on average".92 At the hearing, however, Ukraine stated that 
its proposed timeframes do not reflect average durations, but are based  on the  fastest  full 
administrative review Ukrain ian investigating authorities  ever conducted under the Law against 
Dumped Imports, which took 11.5 months  to complete .93 Although Ukraine acknowledged  that 
certain steps could arguably be completed in somewha t shorter timeframes tha n the ones it 
proposed, Ukraine did not know whether an administrative review could , overall , be conducted in a 
more expeditious manner .94  
3.33.  I cannot accept that the time period in which Ukrainian investigating authorities have been 
able to conduct previous  full-fleshed  reviews is an appropriate measure of the time within which 
they should conduct an administrative review in this case. The 11.5-month review to which Ukraine  
refers was, by nature, distinct from a redetermination for the purpose of implementing  
recommendations and rulings  of the DSB . I also do not agree that the administrative review 
necessary for implementation w ould require  the same amo unt of time than the interim and expiry 
reviews in which WTO -inconsistent determinations were made. In my view, the  administrative  review 
to be conducted  will necessarily be much more limited in scope. In that regard, I note that Ukraine's 
implementation obligations pertain only to the non -termination of the investigation against 
EuroChem , dumping and likelihood -of-dumping determinations , and the disclosure  of essential 
facts.95 Crucially , it became clear at the hearing that : (i) EuroChem, one of the two main investigated 
Russian producers  involved in the interim and expiry reviews, will be excluded from the  scope of the  
anti-dumping measures at issue , such that no new determination will need to be made for 
EuroChem; (ii)  new analysis  will be limited to recalculating normal value  for the remaining 
investigated Russian producer s, without considering afresh the export price or the injury analysis ; 
and (i ii) some data relevant to  these  normal value calculations are already on the record.96 Ukraine 
specifically recognized  that Ukrainian investigating authorities will not need to make a new injury 
determination, recalculate the export price, or deal with public interest concerns. Ukraine also 
acknowledged  that some data are already on the inv estigation record to calculate normal value.97 
3.34.  In considering the time that is reasonably necessary to conduct the requisite administrative 
review in this dispute, I note that Ukraine has not argued or provided  evidence that , under  Ukrainian 
law, all the steps and timeframes it has put forward  are mandatory . In this regard, I  understand 
that the Ministry is not  necessarily  required to issue new questionnaires, conduct verification visits, 
or hold a hearing in the context of administrative reviews.98  
 
88 Russia's submission, para.  162. Russia refers to the Award of the Arbitrator in Japan – DRAMs (Korea)  
as having clarified that " reliance on time periods used in original investigations seems inappropriate , because 
the implementing Member 'is only required to conduct a re -determination to implement a limited number of 
DSB rulings of inconsistency'." (Ibid., para.  160 (quoting Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) 
(Article  21.3(c)) , para.  48)) 
89 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
90 Pursuant to Article  18.4 of the Law against Dumped Imports, "[t]he review of the anti -dumping 
measures shall take place as soon as possible and shall end asas [ sic] a rule, not later than 12 months afte r 
the date of such review." (Law against Dumped Imports (Exhibit RUS -1b)) Ukraine acknowledged as much. 
(Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing)  
91 Statistics on duration of reviews of anti -dumping measures (Exhibit UKR -5). 
92 Ukraine's submission, paras.  79, 82, 85, 89, 92, 94, 96, and 103.  
93 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing. Statistics provided by Ukraine show that the time 
needed to complete an interim review ranged from 11.5 months to 2 years. (Statistics on duration of reviews 
of anti -dumping measures (Exhibit UKR -5)) 
94 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
95 See paras.  3.11.   3.12.  above.  
96 Parties' responses to questioning at the hearing.  
97 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
98 Parties' responses to questioning at the  hearing.  
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  3.35.  Yet, I am not convinced by Russia's argument that Ukraine simply needs to reconsider existing 
evidence on the investigation record for the purpose of recalculating normal value , and thus does 
not need to complete all of the usual steps of an administrative  review .99 According to Russia,  to 
implement the recommendations and rulings  of the DSB , Ukraine is , inter alia , required to construct 
normal value using  the production costs of the investigated Russian producers as reported in their 
records, instead of using a surrogate cost for gas . Russia emphasi zed that these reported costs are 
already on the investigation record.100 Ukraine in turn pointed to paragraph 7.90 of the Panel  Report  
and footnote 159 thereto, as providing room for Ukraine to consider additional  information and  
evidence, instead of engaging in a mathematical exercise of constructing normal value using 
production costs as reported in the records of the investigated Russian producers.101 
3.36.  As the Appellate  Body observed, in paragraph 7.90 of the Panel  Report  and footnote  159 
thereto, the Panel made several important factual findings  underpinning  its analysis under  Article  2 
of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. While Ukrainian investigating authorities had found that 
JSC Gazprom (Gazprom), a Russian supplier of gas, sells gas in the domestic Russian market below 
cost, t he Panel found that no determination was made that Gazprom was the gas supplier of the 
investigated Russian producers or that Gazprom's prices affected o ther gas suppliers' prices.102 In 
light of these findings, the Appellate  Body agreed with the Panel that Gazprom's  below -cost prices 
did not constitute a sufficient factual basis for the Ukrainian investigating authorities to conclude 
that the records of the  investigated Russian producers did not reasonably reflect the costs associated 
with the production and sale of ammonium nitrate  under the second condition of the first sentence 
of Article  2.2.1.1  of the Anti -Dumping Agreement . The Appellate  Body ultimatel y upheld the Panel's 
finding that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article  2.2.1.1 because Ukrainian investigating 
authorities did not provide an adequate basis under the second condition in the first sentence of that 
provision to reject the gas cost that  the investigated Russian producers reported in their records  
when constructing normal value .103  
3.37.  Given the Panel and Appellate  Body findings at issue, I do not exclude that the Ministry could  
collect additional information and data concerning relevant gas suppliers to construct  normal value. 
Implementation in this dispute might therefore not be as straightforward as Russia suggests , and  
I consider that  my determination should account some time for the Ministry to issue questionnaire s 
and to collect and consider additional information and data . Moreover, bearing in mind the nature of 
the implementation that Ukraine proposes to undertake, and mindful that  investigated exporters 
and producers benefit from the opportunity to defend their interests in hearings and through the 
process of verification, I would be reluctant to determine any period of time for implementation that 
would foreclose the possibility t hat such procedural steps could be taken if and when warranted.  
That being said, given the limited scope of Ukraine's administrative review discussed above, the 
time allocated for these steps should be reasonably reduced  as compared to Ukraine's proposed 
timeframes . 
3.38.  Ukraine argues that some of the time periods that will apply to the specific steps that it 
considers necessary for implementation are based on important due process and transparency 
obligations arising under the Anti -Dumping Agreement , including , for example: giving "all interested 
parties … a full opportunity for the defence of their interests"; providing " opportunities for all 
interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be 
presented and rebuttal a rguments offered"; providing "timely opportunities" for interested parties 
to see information relevant to their cases and to prepare presentations based on that information; 
 
99 Russia's submission, paras.  87-89, 161, and 164; responses to questioning at the hearing.  
100 Russia's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
101 Ukraine also emphasized that the production costs at issue concern gas prices, which it sees as a  
complex and key aspect of this anti -dumping proceeding, potentially involving related parties. (Ukraine's 
responses to questioning at the hearing)  
102 Appellate  Body Report, para.  6.103 (referring to Panel  Report, para.  7.90 and fn  159 thereto). The 
Appella te Body highlighted "a key element of the Panel's analysis, namely, that while [Ukrainian investigating 
authorities] determined that Gazprom sells gas below cost, [they] did not make such a determination with 
respect to the actual gas suppliers of the two investigated Russian producers at issue, as [Ukrainian 
investigating authorities] did not inquire who supplied these producers with gas". (Ibid., para.  6.106)  
103 Appellate  Body Report, para.  7.6. The Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article  2.2.1.1 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, as upheld by the Appellate  Body, in turn, was key to the findings of inconsistency 
with Articles  2.2, 2.2.1, and 11.2 -11.3 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement. (Panel  Report, paras.  7.101, 7.114, 
and 7.131; Appellate  Body Report, para s. 7.7-7.8) 
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  and giving public notice s of final determinations  detailing the "findings and conc lusions reached on 
all issues of fact and law considered material" .104 I see some merit in these arguments advanced by 
Ukraine . Indeed, even if some steps and  time periods are not required by law, they may nonetheless 
be useful in ensuring that  implementatio n is effected in a transparent and efficient manner, fully 
respecting due process for  all parties involved.105 At the same time, I  consider that due process 
concerns must be balanced with the principle of prompt compliance reflected in Article  21.1 of the 
DSU.106 To that end, all flexibilities within the legal system of an implementing Member must be 
employed in the implementation process.107 In this case, while it has referred to  due process 
obligations, Ukraine has not explained how the timeframes associated with the various steps of its 
proposed administrative review reflect the use of flexibilit ies within its legal system. It seems to me 
that, given the limited scope of the administrative review at issue, Ukraine  has available to it a 
considerable degree of flexibility to conduct that administrative review in a shorter period of time 
than it proposes, as evidenced by the absence of mandatory timeframes in relation to the majority 
of the component steps of Ukraine's proposed review.  
3.39.  In light of all of the con siderations above, Ukraine has not satisfied its burden of proving that 
12 months is the shortest period of time possible within its legal system to complete the 
administrative review at issue. I am of the view that Ukraine could complete this administrati ve 
review in reasonably less time. Relevant considerations include the required immediate exclusion of 
EuroChem and the fact that this administrative review will essentially focus on calculating normal 
value for the remaining investigated Russian producers  and ensuring that certain disclosure 
obligations are met.108 Given the limited scope of the administrative review at issue, I am not 
convinced that conducting it in a shorter period of time than Ukraine proposes would, in the 
circumstances of this dispute, infringe upon due process rights. At the same time, I believe that the 
review to be undertaken in this dispute will require more than the two months proposed by Russia. 
I indeed find it highly doubtful that a period of two months would allow Ukrainian inve stigating 
authorities to complete all the necessary steps for an administrative review. In that regard, I note 
that the component steps of Ukraine's proposed administrative review would seem to be sequential 
steps that cannot be conducted in parallel.109  
3.40.  A few days before the circulation of this Award , by letter dated 26  March  2020, Ukraine 
requested me to take into account  Ukraine's recent measures in response to the COVID -19 virus, as 
they may significantly affect  implementation  in this dispute . Ukraine re ferred to the 30 -day 
emergency situation regime introduced across Ukraine on 2 5 March 2020, specifically  pointing to 
quarantine measures, the suspension of all commercial international passenger services to and from 
Ukraine, the closing of all non -essential services, and t he ban  on gatherings of more  than 
10 individuals . Ukraine indicated that , depending on how the situation evolves , these measures 
might be prolonged  beyond 30 days .110 By letter dated  30 March  2020, Russia expressed its 
solidarity with the countries affected by the COVID -19 virus. Russia stated, however, that it was 
unclear how Ukraine's recent measures  would  affect the Ministry's ability to conduct administrative 
reviews  in short timeframes . Russia emphasized that , as per  the Ministry itself, investigations would 
not be terminat ed or suspend ed. Russia also emphasized that, while the Ministry introduced  certain 
mitigating measures dealing  with on-site verifications  and interactions with interested parties  in 
 
104 Ukraine's submission, para.  168 (quoting Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 12 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement).  
105 In that regard, I observe that Ukraine was found to have acted inconsistently with Article  6.9 of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement in the interim and expiry reviews leading up to the 2014 extension decision because 
Ukrainian investigating authorities had failed to give interested parties sufficient time to comment on its 
disclosure.  
106 In determining that balance, the arbitrator in Japan – DRAMs (Kor ea) noted that considerable 
opportunity had already been afforded to interested parties to participate in the original investigation. The 
arbitrator thus considered it appropriate to provide a shorter time to such interested parties in the context of 
an investigation that was far more limited in scope and had been initiated to implement the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB. ( Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  51) 
107 See para.  3.5.  above.  
108 I also recall that, pursuant to the second sentence of Article  5.8 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, 
"[t]here shall be immediate termination [of an investigation] in cases where the authorities determine that the 
margin of dumping is de minimis ". The language " immediate  termination", which applies to EuroChem in this 
dispute, is not wit hout relevance to my determination of the reasonable period of time. (emphasis added)  
109 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
110 Letter from Ukraine dated 26  March  2020.  
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  response to the recent developments in Ukraine pertaining to the COVID -19 virus , investigations 
were otherwise to be conducted "as usual ".111  
3.41.  Ukraine has not explained in detail the extent to which  its recent measures to address  the 
COVID -19 virus affect its investigating authorities' ability to review the anti -dumping measures at 
issue in this dispute . At the same time, I am aware  of the seriou sness of  Ukraine's recent measures, 
which were put in place as part of an emergency situation regime in response to a pandemic . The 
types of measures described by Ukraine may affect many aspects of a country 's operation . Although  
investigations are not sus pended,  the documents put on the record by Russia confirm that Ukraine's 
recent measures affect the conduct of trade -defence investigations and that certain  necessary 
adjustments are being made by the Ministry . For example, I understand that Ukraine's meas ures to 
prevent the spread of the COVID -19 virus affect the ability of interested parties to access materials 
of investigations, and that the Ministry has thus introduced remote access to certain information . 
The Ministry is also organi zing hearings remotely , instead of holding face -to-face meetings . 
Moreover , as a result of the COVID -19 virus,  on-site verifications are cancelled, which may lead to  
extending the deadlines for interested parties to provide answers to questionnaires .112 While I s ee 
merit in Russia's argument that the COVID -19 pandemic is not "an overwhelming excuse for failures 
to comply with the WTO obligations"113, I cannot, in  my determination of the reasonable period of 
time in this dispute , turn a blind eye to the recent develo pments in Ukraine  and the rest of the world 
relating  to the  COVID -19 pandemic  that affect the work of Ukrainian investigating authorities .114 My 
determination also needs to take into account  the recent developments in Ukraine relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic .  
3.4.3   Particular circumstances  
3.42.  Ukraine submits that, as recogni zed by the Panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit , it is currently  
in a situation of "emergency in international relations ", which co nstitutes a particular circumstance 
that I should take into account in determining the reasonable period of time.115 According to Ukraine, 
this situation has existed since 2014 .116 Since then, Ukraine  has been  prioritiz ing urgent legislative 
and regulatory act ions to protect its territory and population, and maintain its law and public order 
internally, resulting in  other initiatives experienc ing significant delays.117 Ukraine emphasizes  that 
this particular circumstance "affects daily life, disturbs the economy and continues to lead to 
extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward actions" .118 
Consequently, Ukraine requests me to determine that a period of six months be added to the 
reasonable period of time that I would otherwise determine .119 This additional time is to be allocated 
 
111 Letter from Russia dated 30  March  2020 (referring to Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus 
SARS -CoV-2 (17  March  2020) (Exhibit RUS -20b); Ministry, Notice regarding submission of information 
(27 March  2020) (Exhibit  RUS-21b); Ministry, Press release, "The Ministry for Development of Economy, Trade 
and Agriculture of Ukraine  informs about the specifics of conducting trade investigations during the period of 
quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev" (17  March 2020) ( Exhibit RUS -22b)).  These exhibits were 
attached to Russia's letter of 30  March  2020, and Ukraine did n ot object to these new exhibits.  
112 Ministry, Notice regarding coronavirus SARS -CoV-2 (17  March  2020) (Exhibit RUS -20b); Ministry, 
Notice regarding submission of information (27  March  2020) (Exhibit RUS -21b); Ministry, Press release, "The 
Ministry for Deve lopment of Economy, Trade and Agriculture of Ukraine  informs about the specifics of 
conducting trade investigations during the period of quarantine measures in Ukraine and the city of Kiev" 
(17 March 2020) ( Exhibit RUS -22b).  
113 Letter from Russia dated 30  March  2020.  
114 In its letter dated 30  March  2020, Russia also stated that it was unclear how Ukraine's recent 
measures would affect Ukraine's legislative process. Above, I considered that my determination of the 
reasonable period of time should not account  for the legislative changes that Ukraine proposes to undertake. 
I therefore do not consider it necessary to address further Russia's arguments pertaining to Ukraine's 
COVID -19 measures as they relate to Ukraine's legislative process.  
115 Ukraine's submissio n, para.  121 (quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para.  7.123). 
Ukraine also identifies the need to amend the Law against Dumped Imports and review the anti -dumping 
measures at issue as a particular circumstance. (Ibid., para.  120) I have ad dressed this circumstance above.  
116 Ukraine's submission, para.  121. 
117 Ukraine's submission, paras.  134-135 and 137.  
118 Ukraine's submission, para.  127.  
119 Ukraine's submission, para.  137. In support of its request, Ukraine refers to previous awards under 
Article  21.3(c) of the DSU as having recognized "other, considerably less disruptive 'particular circumstances' 
…, such as natural disasters or severe econ omic and financial problems". (Ukraine's submission, para.  128. 
See also paras.  129-133 (referring to Awards of the Arbitrators, Peru – Agricultural Products (Article  21.3(c)) , 
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  as follows: three  months to complete its legislative process and three months to review the 
anti-dumping measures at issue.120 
3.43.  Russia  responds that Ukraine attempts to "impermissibly expand[] the scope of [the 
particular ] circumstances" under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU.121 Russia  argues in this respect that  the 
particular circumstances are those "within the legal system of the implementin g Member" that "make 
it 'impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB '".122 
To Russia,  factors such as the state of international relations, the political situation between 
Members, or priorities and workload of impleme nting authorities  are irrelevant in this context .123 At 
the hearing,  Russia nevertheless acknowledged  that a situation of "emergency in international 
relations " may qualify as a particular circumstance within the meaning of Article  21.3(c) .124 In any 
event , Russia contends that "the allegations made by U kraine have no impact whatsoever on the 
capacity of Ukraine to adopt laws and conduct investigations."125 Specifica lly, Russia points out  that, 
although the situation identified by Ukraine allegedly materialised in 2014 , Ukrai nian investigating 
authorities  initiated more anti -dumping investigations in 2015 -2019 than in 2010 -2014.126 Russia 
also observes that, in 2015 , ICIT implemented the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in 
Ukraine – Passenger Cars  within two months.127 
3.44.  I do not, in principle, rule out th e possibility that a situation of "emergency in international 
relations " may qualify as a particular circumstance and may thus  be relevant to my determination 
of the reasonable period of time.128 I recogni ze that such a situation may affect a Member's capacity 
to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. I recall , howeve r, that Ukraine bears 
the overall burden of proving that the period of time requested for implementation constitutes a 
reasonable period of time .129 In my view, Ukraine has not sufficiently substantiated that there is a 
situation of "emergency in internation al relations " that affects the reasonable period of time for 
implementation  in this dispute .130  
3.45.  Ukraine has not clarified, in its written submission or during the course of the hearing, how 
or to what extent the period of time needed for implementation woul d be affected by the alleged 
situation of " emergency in international relations ". Nor has Ukraine explained how it devises 
six months as the additional period of time needed in response to the impact entailed by the alleged 
situation , or how it devises the  three additional months specifically requested to review the 
anti-dumping measures at issue .131 Ukraine has not submitted any evidence in support of its 
allegation that the situation of "emergency in international relations " would result in delays in the 
 
para. 3.45; Indonesia – Autos (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  24; Argentina – Hides an d Leather (Article  21.3(c)) , 
para. 51) 
120 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
121 Russia's submission, para.  32. 
122 Russia's submission, para.  34 (quoting Article  21.3 of the DSU).  
123 Russia's submission, para.  36.  
124 Russia's responses to ques tioning at the hearing.  
125 Russia's submission, para.  131. 
126 Russia's submission, para.  141 (referring to WTO Statistics on Initiation of Dumping, Countervailing 
and Safeguard Investigations (Exhibit RUS -10)).  
127 Russia's submission, para.  132 (referring t o Communication from Ukraine, Ukraine – Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars , WT/DS468/10 of 8 October 2015).  
128 Both parties agreed that a situation of "emergency in international relations" may qualify as a 
particular circumstance withi n the meaning of Article  21.3(c) of the DSU. (Parties' responses to questioning at 
the hearing)  
129 See para.  3.8.  above.  
130 In Peru – Agricultural Products , the arbitrator did not exclude that a natural disaster may constitute a 
particular circumstance under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU. The relevant issue i n that arbitration was how and to 
what extent Peru's activities to address and mitigate the effects of an anticipated natural disaster affected the 
period of time for implementation. (Award of the Arbitrator, Peru – Agricultural Products  (Article  21.3(c)) 
para. 3.45)  
131 Ukraine referred to the additional period of time of six months granted by the arbitrator in 
Indonesia  – Autos  as a benchmark. (Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing) In that case, the 
arbitrator considered that Indonesia is a dev eloping country in a dire economic and financial situation. 
(Award  of the Arbitrator, Indonesia  – Autos (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  24)) The additional period of time awarded 
in that case is of limited relevance to my determination. That dispute did not conce rn Ukraine, but another 
WTO Member. Moreover, the arbitrator was guided by Article  21.2 of the DSU, which provides that " [p]articular 
attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members". (Ibid. (quoting 
Article  21.2 o f the DSU))  
 WT/DS493 /RPT 
 
- 23 - 
 
  conduct of anti -dumping investigations. At the hearing, Ukr aine merely asserted, without more,  that 
the Ministry ha s to devote manpower to urgent border issues, and therefore  cannot focus on 
anti-dumping proceedings .132 The exhibits reli ed on by Ukraine in the context of its "particular 
circumstances"  arguments comprise: (i) a 2019 news item by the United Nations (UN) ; (ii) a 2019 
report by the  UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ; (iii)  UN General Assembly 
Resolution 74/17  of 9 December  2019; and (iv)  a table listing 16 laws adopted in 2019 by Ukraine 's 
Parliament .133 None of these exhibits speak s to the alleged delays in anti -dumping investigations.134 
3.46.  For these reasons , I do not consider that there is a particular circumstance relevant to my 
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementati on in this dispute.   
3.4.4   Conclusion 
3.47.  In sum, Ukraine has not satisfied its burden of showing that 12 months is the shortest period 
of time possible within its legal syste m to complete the  administrative review of the anti -dumping 
measures at issue  or that there  is a particular circumstance relevant to my determination of the 
reasonable period of time  in this dispute . Given the limited scope of the contemplated administrati ve 
review , which will focus on calculating normal value and complying with certain disclosu re 
requirements , 12 months is more than is reasonably needed for implementation  in this dispute . In 
reaching this conclusion, I am  also mindful of the recent developments in Ukraine relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic .  
4  AWARD  
4.1.  In light of the foregoing consid erations, the "reasonable period of time" for Ukraine to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute is 11 months and 15 days , 
from 30  September  2019, that is, from the date on which the DSB adopted the Panel and 
Appellate  Body Reports in this dispute. The reasonable period of time for implementation will expire 
on 15 September  2020.  
Signed in the original this 7th  day of April 2020 by:  
 
________________________  
Ricard o Ramírez -Hernández  
Arbitrator  
 
 
 
 
132 Ukraine's responses to questioning at the hearing.  
133 United Nations News, "Human cost of Ukraine conflict is growing, Security Council told" 
(16 July 2019) (Exhibit  UKR-6); Office of the United Na tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, Re port on 
the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15  November  2019 (Exhibit UKR -7); United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 74/17, Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea a nd 
the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (9  December  2019)  
(Exhibit UKR -8); Laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of IX convocation concerning the emergency 
situation in Ukraine,  until 14  February  2020 (Exhibit UKR -13). Exhibit UKR -13 was dist ributed by Ukraine at the 
hearing, and Russia did not object to this new exhibit.  
134 Moreover, as Ukraine acknowledged, any delays resulting from the situation of "emergency in 
international relations" it claims t o have existed since 2014 are, at least to a  certain extent, already accounted 
for in its statistics on the duration of administrative reviews completed since 2014, which formed the basis for 
the requested 12 months for reviewing the anti -dumping measures at issue. (Ukraine's responses to 
questioning at the hearing. See also Statistics on duration of reviews of anti -dumping measures (Exhibit 
UKR-5)) 
WT/DS493/RPT 
 
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ANNEX A  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF  UKRAINE'S SUBMISSIO N 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1. The Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') adopted the recommendations and rulings of the Panel 
and the Appellate  Body in Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate (DS  493) at its 
meeting of 30 September  2019. Immediately thereafter, a t the DSB meeting of 28  October  2019, 
Ukraine informed the DSB that it intended to implement the DSB's recommendati ons and rulings, 
but that it would need a reasonable period of time to do so.  
2. This is the first time Ukrainian anti -dumping measures have been found to be inconsistent 
with law of the World Trade Organization ('WTO') by the DSB. Consequently, Ukrainian leg islation 
does not currently set out a procedure aimed specifically at bringing anti -dumping measures into 
conformity with DSB 's recommendations and rulings. Therefore, the implementation process in this 
case will require two phases. First, Ukraine will hav e to adopt the required legislative framework to 
initiate and conduct a review of anti -dumping measures. More specifically, Ukraine will have to revise 
the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" of 
22 December  1998 N o. 330-XIV and adopt an updated version of it ( Draft Law of Ukraine "On 
Protection against Dumped Imports" as further referred ' Draft Law against Dumped Imports'). In a 
second phase, Ukraine will conduct a review of the anti -dumping measures at issue. Ukra ine will not 
be able to start this second phase until its legislation has been amended.  
3. Ukraine intends to completely implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings as promptly 
as it can but anticipates that this will require no less than 27 months in tot al. 
2. FIRST STEP: ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT LAW AGAINST DUMPED IMPORTS  
4. In order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this case, as a first step, 
Ukraine will have to adopt the Draft Law against Dumped Imports, as currently the Law of Ukraine  
"On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped Imports" of 22 December  1998 No.  330-XIV 
does not foresee the possibility for a review proceeding of anti -dumping measures to be initiated as 
a way of complying with the DSB's recommendations and  rulings.  
5. Indeed, under the Law of Ukraine "On Protection of the National Producer against Dumped 
Imports" of 22 December  1998 No.  330-XIV: 
• There is no possibility for the Ministry to initiate a review proceeding of anti -dumping 
measures ex officio on the  basis of the DSB's recommendations and rulings  or without a 
preliminary request in this regard;  
• There is no possibility to initiate such a review based specifically on the fact that certain 
anti-dumping measures have been found to be inconsistent with Uk raine's obligations 
under WTO law; and  
• Once a review has been initiated, there is no possibility for the Ministry to focus its 
examination on compliance of the anti -dumping measures concerned with the 
implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings  in a specific case, as it is 
mandated by law to examine (i) whether the circumstances relating to dumping and injury 
have substantially changed and (ii)  whether the anti -dumping measures have had the 
desired effect, namely, the prevention of injury.  
6. In the Draft Law against Dumped Imports, provisions were therefore added in order to allow 
an interim review procedure: (i)  to be initiated ex officio  by the Ministry; (ii)  specifically as way of 
complying with DSB 's recommendations and rulings; and (iii)  to allow the Ministry to focus on 
bringing the anti -dumping measures concerned into compliance with such recommendations and 
rulings.  
7. In early 2018, the Draft Law against Dumped Imports was submitted for review to t he 
Parliament of Ukraine. However, because of parliamentary elections in July 2019, the Parliament WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
- 25 - 
 
  was dissolved before the end of its 5 -year term and before the Draft Law against Dumped Imports 
could be adopted. According to Ukraine's domestic legislation , all draft laws that were not adopted 
in the first reading by a previous convocation of the Parliament must be removed from consideration 
of the newly elected Parliament. Therefore, in order to be officially adopted, the Draft Law against 
Dumped Imports m ust go through the approval procedure again.  
8. As can be seen from the table below, in order for all the mandatory procedural steps for the 
adoption of the Draft Law against Dumped Imports  to be completed, Ukraine will need a period of 
9 months in total.  
Procedural step  Time needed  
Legislative initiative  Completed  
Drafting by the Ministry  Will be completed by the end of January 2020  
Approval by other relevant Ministries and interested 
government services  1 month  Public consultations and submission to relevant 
associations for comments  
Legal expertise by the Ministry of Justice  10 days  
Review and approval by the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  1 month  
Review and adoption by the Parliament of Ukraine  5 months (Exhibit 4)  
Signature by President and official publication  15 days  
Entry into force  30 days  
3. SECOND STEP: REVIEW OF THE ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES AT ISSUE  
9. Once Ukraine's legislative framework has been amended in order to allow an interim review 
proceeding of anti -dumping measures to be initiated with the specific aim of complying with the 
DSB's recommendations and  rulings, the anti -dumping measures at issue will have to be reviewed 
in order to bring them into conformity with WTO law.  
10. Such a review is a very thorough procedure and, in accordance with national legislation, it 
requires several mandatory procedural steps to be followed. As can be seen from the t able below, 
in order for all these procedural steps required for the review of anti -dumping measures to be 
completed, Ukraine will need 12 months in total.  
Procedural step  Time needed  
Preparation of proposals by the Ministry  15 days  
Consideration of the Ministry's proposals and decision to 
initiate by the ICIT  10 days  
Interested parties are notified and may submit comments  30 days  
Questionnaire replies are sent out and answers are 
provided and analysed by the Ministry  100 days  
Verification visits  20 days for a domestic company and 40 days 
for a foreign company  
Hearing and written submissions  30 days  
Drafting main facts and findings  90 days  
Disclosure and final decision  35 days  
4. PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE: EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
11. A particular circumstance that should be taken into account by the Arbitrator in this specific 
case, is the fact that Ukraine is currently in a situation qualified by the Panel in  Russia  – Traffic in 
Transit as an "emergency in international relations " within the meaning of Article  XXI (b) of WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
- 26 - 
 
  the GATT.1 According to the Panel in that case, such a situation allows WTO Members to " depart 
from their GATT and WTO obligations ".2 
12. This particular circumstance  affects daily life, disturbs the economy and continues to lead to 
extraordinary and unexpected delays in what normally should be straightforward actions. Concretely, 
the above -specified actions and time frames are those that operate as a rule in a 'normal ' situation, 
i.e. under ordinary conditions. Because, however, life is no longer normal since the uninvited 
disruptions started, this continuing emergency should be taken into account when determining a 
realistic time frame under surreal circumstances.  
13. More specifically, since Ukraine needs to focus on issuing emergency laws and regulations to 
respond to the situation of " emergency in international relations " that currently exists in its territory, 
other regulatory or legislative initiatives will experience  significant delays. Consequently, a specific 
flexibility of at least six additional  months should be added over and above  the reasonable period of 
time that would otherwise be determined, absent these crippling and highly particular circumstances 
from whi ch Ukraine has been severely suffering during the last years.  
5. CONCLUSION  
14. In summary, in order to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings, the two following 
steps will have to be completed:  
• First, the Draft Law against Dumped Imports will need to be adopted in order to enable a 
review of anti -dumping measures to be initiated on the basis of the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings; and  
• Secondly, a review of the anti -dumping duties will have to be conducted in accordance 
with domestic mandatory procedure and taking into account the ruling of the Panel and 
the Appellate  Body in this case.  
15. Ukraine's reasonable and realistic estimate is that it will take no less than 9 months to adopt 
the Draft Law against Dumped Imports and that it will take an additional 12 months to conduct a 
review of the anti -dumping duties at issue.  
16. Therefore, Ukraine respectfully requests that the Arbitrator determine that 21  (= 9 + 12) 
months is a reasonable period of time in  which to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings 
under Article  21.3(c) of the DSU, had there been no particular circumstances present, as explained 
above. Because of the current armed conflict in Ukraine, recognized by WTO as situation of 
"emergen cy in international relations" that currently still exists in its territory, an additional 6 months 
should be added to this period of time. In sum, the total reasonable period of time in this case should 
therefore be determined at 27  months  (= 21 + 6). 
 
1 Panel  Report, Russia  – Traffic in Transit (DS  512), para. 7.123.  
2 Panel  Report, Russia  – Traffic in Transit (DS  512), para. 7.79.  WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
- 27 - 
 
ANNEX B  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF  RUSSIA'S SUBMISSION  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. On 30  September  2019, the DSB adopted its recommendations and rulings to bring 
Ukraine's  anti-dumping measures on Russian ammonium nitrate in c onformity with the ADA.1 While 
Ukraine announced its intention to comply with these recommendations and rulings, the 
Russian  Federation considers that the timetable it proposed to do so cannot be considered as 
representative of a RPT within the meaning of Article  21.3 of the DSU.   
2. In particular, the Russian Federation considers that (i)  Ukraine unduly seeks to limit the role 
of the arbitrator, (ii)  no RPT should be afforded to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings relating to Article  5.8 of the ADA, (iii)  the DSB's recom mendations and rulings can be 
implemented in a shorter period of time, without legislative changes or review and (iv)  no particular 
circumstance justifies the extension of the RPT.  
II. UKRAINE UNDULY SEEKS TO LIMIT THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR  
3. The Russian Fe deration considers that the role of the arbitrator is not limited to validating the 
timetable proposed by the implementing Member.  
4. Where necessary, in order to ensure "prompt compliance" within the meaning of Article  21.1 
of the DSU, the Arbitrator must e stablish the RPT as the shortest period of time possible within the 
legal system of the implementing Member, using all flexibility and discretion available within its 
system and taking into account the particular circumstances of the case.2  
5. An implementing Member does not have an unfettered discretion when determining their 
means of implementation.3 Arbitrators can consider such means of implementation as a relevant 
factor.4 In particular, Arbitrators can review whether the implementing action f alls within the range 
of permissible actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB recommendations and 
rulings.5 Similarly, Arbitrators can set the RPT by reference to available administrative means, if 
such way of implementation should be favore d in order to comply promptly with the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings in accordance with Article  21 of the DSU.6 
6. In any case, the implementing Member bears the burden of proving that the period it requests 
is the shortest possible within its legal syste m7 and that the steps it proposes are required under its 
domestic laws to implement the recommendations and rulings.8  
7. The Russian Federation therefore requests the Arbitrator to consider that a RPT should only 
be granted if permitted, without taking accou nt of unnecessary legislative changes or reviews, based 
on the shortest period possible within Ukraine's legal system.  
III. NO RPT SHOULD BE AFFORDED FOR ARTICLE  5.8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS  
8. The Panel and Appellate  Body Reports make clear that the only  way to comply with Article  5.8 
of the ADA is to immediately  exclude EuroChem from the scope of the anti -dumping measures and 
 
1 Dispute Settlement Body, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate , Appellate  Body 
Report and Panel  Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, 3 October 2019, WT/DS493/10.  
2 See inter alia  Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Su gar (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  61. 
3 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  56. 
4 See inter alia Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  26.  
5 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Shrimp II (Viet  Nam) (A rticle 21.3(c)) , para.  3.3. See also Awards of the 
Arbitrator, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  69 and EC – Chicken Cuts (Article  21.3(c)) , 
para. 55. 
6 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  53. See also Award of 
the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  48 and 52.  
7 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  44. 
8 Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Chicken Cuts (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  56. 
 WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
- 28 - 
 
  from the scope of any subsequent review. It is established in the WTO jurisprudence and undisputed 
by Ukraine that there is no oth er way to comply with Article  5.8 of the ADA. There is no other 
permissible range of actions that can be taken in order to implement the DSB recommendations and 
rulings and immediate compliance is practicable.  
9. The exclusion of EuroChem from the scope of th e anti -dumping measures and from the scope 
of any subsequent review  only requires a decision by ICIT, pursuant to Article  5(6) of the Ukrainian 
Dumping Law. Ukraine should therefore immediately comply with the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings relating to Article  5.8 of the ADA.  
10. If necessary, the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings could be done in 
two steps, with the immediate exclusion of EuroChem, as a first step, and the implementation within 
a RPT of the remaining DSB's recommendati ons and rulings, as a second step.9 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND RULINGS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SHORTEST 
 PERIOD OF TIME, WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES  
11. First, the Russian Federation considers it is unnecessary to amend the Ukrainian Dumping 
Law to implement  the DSB's recommendations and rulings. Implementation can already be done, 
without a review, under the existing provisions of the Ukrainian Dumping Law. Moreover, the 
Ukrainian Dumping Law includes provisions similar to those relied on in the Ukrainian Safeguard Law 
to implement within two months – without any legislative change or review – the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings in dispute Ukraine – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain 
Passenger Cars (DS468).  
12. Thus, the RPT should not include the time needed to implement any legislative change or 
conduct reviews and the RPT should have been two months from the adoption of the Panel and 
Appellate  Body Reports, similar to what was done in DS468.  
13. Second , assuming legislative changes would be needed ( quod non ), the timetable submitted 
by Ukraine for any legislative change is excessive. Ukraine nowhere explains how the "general" 
delays to which it refers w ould be mandatory, nor why such delays could not be shortened using all 
flexibility available within its legal system. In any event, the Russian Federation notes that average 
delays cannot be used as a benchmark when setting the RPT.10 To the contrary, the 
Russian  Federation considers that, insofar as only a single Article  would be added to the Ukrainian 
Dumping Law, any delay relating to the adoption of such amendment should be minimal.  
14. Third , Russia considers that the DSB's recommendations and rulings can be implemented in 
full without necessarily conducting a review, as illustrated by the past practice of the Ukrainian 
authorities confirmed by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.  
15. However, even if a review was to be conducted ( quod non ), the Russian Federation disa grees 
that Ukraine should conduct a comprehensive 12 -months review to implement the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings. Past arbitrators have emphasized that any review to implement 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings should not amount to a de novo review  and that, using all 
flexibility available within their legal system, implementing Members can be expected to conduct 
these reviews in a shorter period of time as compared to time periods used in original 
investigations.11 This position is not affected by t he alleged need to respect due process rights in 
the context of the review implementing the DSB's recommendations and rulings.12 
16. In light of the limited DSB's recommendations and rulings that must be complied with and the 
fact that Ukraine already has in it s possession all the information it needs, and to the extent none 
of the delays raised by Ukraine are mandatory, the proposed 12 -month period cannot be accepted 
for the conduct of the review.  
 
9 Award of the Arbitrator, US – Gambling (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  41. See also Award of the Arbitrator, 
Colombia – Ports of Entry (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  108. 
10 Award of the Arbitrator, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (Article  21.3(c)) , para.  71. 
11 Award of the Arbitrator,  Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  38, 47 and 48.  
12 Award or the Arbitrator, Japan – DRAMs (Korea) (Article  21.3(c)) , paras.  49-51. WT/DS4 93/RPT 
 
- 29 - 
 
  V. NO PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFIES THE EXTENSION OF THE RPT   
17. Ukraine wrongfully attempts to refer to the "emergency in international relations" identified in 
the Panel  Report  in Russia – Traffic in Transit (DS 512). In referring to this dispute, Ukraine errs 
legally and factually. Any considerations relating to th is dispute are irrelevant to the resolution of 
the present arbitration proceedings. In addition, an analysis of available facts shows that Ukraine 
has not incurred any delay when discussing and adopting laws or conducting trade defense 
investigations.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
18. The Russian Federation considers that no RPT can be granted to implement the 
DSB's  recommendations and rulings in relation to Article  5.8 of the ADA. Ukraine should therefore 
take an immediate decision to exclude EuroChem from the scope of its anti-dumping measure and 
any subsequent review thereof.  
19. With respect to obligations under Articles 2.2.1.1, 2.2, 2.2.1, 11.2, 11.3 and 6.9 of the ADA, 
Ukraine should implement the DSB's rulings and recommendations in a RPT, corresponding to the 
shortest p eriod possible, using all flexibilities available. However, this requires neither legislative 
change, nor reviews and particularly nor full -fledged reviews. The Russian Federation considers that 
a decision to implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings  could have been adopted within 
two months.  
 
__________  