 RESTRICTED  
  
JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
27 July 2023 
(23-5121) Page: 1/8 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE AFRICAN GROUP  AND PAKISTAN  
Revision  
The following communication, dated 25 July  2023, is being circulated at the request of the delegation 
of Cameroon on behalf of the African Group  and Pakistan , for consideration by Members.  
 
_______________  
 
 
1. Total trade -distorting Amber Box support was USD 62.49 billion in 2018. In addition, USD 6.4 
billion of Blue Box Subsidies (as provided under Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture) 
(AoA)) and USD 265.49 billion of Green Box Subsidies (as provided under Annex 2 of the AoA) 
were given by WTO Members in 2018 .  
2. While developing countries1 are allowed a product -specific de minimis  support of 10% of the 
value of production (V oP), and developed Members are allowed a product -specific de mini mis 
support of 5% of V oP, many developed Members have used the extra Fina l Bound Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (FBAMS) entitlements under Article 6.3, Blue Box and the Green Box 
in excess of 5% of V oP, respectively , including on product -specific support, giving them 
significant extent of additional policy space to subsidize their agricultural production 
disproportionate to the size of their agricultural sector as indicated by the V oP.  
3. There is growing analyses that show that in addition to the FBAMS entitlements which are 
acknowledged to be trade  distorting, the use of Blue Box and of direct payments under the 
Green Box subsidies ( paragraph s 5-13 of Annex 2 under the AoA) have most often been trade  
distorting. It is also important to note that Article 6.3 allows fixed additional FBAMS entitlements 
which, even if not full y utilized, allow a potential policy space to support the agriculture sector 
in a trade -distorting manner.  
4. Noting the evidence as described under the sections below on AMS Entitlements, Blue Box and 
the Green Box, and in continuation of the African Group 's Proposal of 2021 ( JOB/AG/203 ) before 
MC12, the African Group is tabling the draft Ministerial Decision below to deliver needed 
disciplines on domestic support specified under Article 6.3, Article 6.5, and Annex 2 of the AoA.  
5. Noting that food insecurity is multifaceted and Domestic Support for Food Security Purposes is 
part of the solution especially the pro duct specific de minimis  support being the only policy 
space that could be used in situations where a Member faces severe food crisis or emergency 
situation.  
FINAL BOUND AMS ENTITLEMENTS  
6. Only 32 (counting the EU as 1) Members enjoy FBAMS entitlements total ling USD 174.37 billion 
(2018 current USD) above the de minimis levels. About half of these are developed country 
 
1 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing Member " includes least -developed 
Member.  JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  Members accounting for 88.81% of total FBAMS entitlements2 while the developing country 
Members account for the residual 11.19%. The remainin g 104 developing3 country Members 
have zero FBAMS entitlements.  
7. Current Total AMS (CTAMS) to USD 33.64 billion was given in 20184 over and above the de 
minimis  limits, implying these were used from the additional FBAMS entitlements. The US gave 
USD 15.98 billion as CTAMS in 2020 -2021, thus utili zing 83.67% of its USD 19 billion 
entitlement. The EU gave EUR 5.33 billion as CTAMS and therefore utili zed 7.36% of it s 
USD 85.47 billion entitlement in 2020 -21. Norway utili zed 89.8% of its USD 1.4 billion 
entitlement and Switzerland 33.75% of its USD 4.35 billion entitlement in 2021, while Canada 
used 16.91% of its entitlement of USD 3.3 billion. All these utili zation r ates have increased since 
2018. Japan used 4.67% of its USD 35.98 billion entitlement in 2019 -20.5 
8. The CTAMS was 48.8% of V oP6 for Iceland, 31.32% of V oP for Norway, 12.80% of V oP for 
Switzerland and 3.54% of V oP for the US in 2018. Therefore , the utili zation of the entitlements 
has enabled these countries to use much greater additional policy space in comparison to the 
size of their agriculture sector. In many cases these are way above the product -specific plus 
non product -specific de minimis  limit of 10 % applicable to developed countries. If the full FBAMS 
entitlement is taken as a percentage of VoP, it comes to 42.80%, 40.21%, 34.35%, 18.53%, 
6.76% and 5.17% for Japan, Switzerland, Norway, EU, Canada and the US, respectively , (2018 
VoP)7 which means the entitlements offer a potential and available policy space to use trade -
distorting domestic support again disproportionate to the size of the sector as indicated by V oP. 
9. The distribution of FBAMS entitlements is highly skewed even among the entitl ement holders 
as six WTO Members account for 87.58% of total FBAMS entitlements in 2018. The E U accounts 
for 49% (USD 85.47 billion), Japan 20.64% (USD 35.98 billion), US 10.96% (USD 19.1 billion), 
Russian Federation 2.52% (USD 4.4 billion), Switzerland 2. 49% (USD 4.35 billion) and Canada 
1.9% (USD 3.3 billion) of such FBAMS entitlements in 2018 .8  
10. These additional entitlements add two types of bias to product -specific AMS;  
(a) First, these additional entitlements allow for any amount and proportion of the tot al 
entitlement to be focused on any product, therefore leading to large concentration in 
single products. For example, in 2013, the US focused 23% of its product -specific AMS 
on dairy, 22% on corn and 12% on livestock; the EU focused 39% of its product -specific 
AMS on butter, 16% on SMP and 29% on common wheat; and Canada focused 65% of 
its total product -specific AMS on milk alone .9 In recent years, dairy in particular has 
received very high shares of total CTAMS, going as high as 98.56 % in Canada (CAD 717  
million, 2018), 84.82 % in Switzerland (CHF 381.8 million, 2021), 57.18 % in Norway 
(NOK 5.88 billion, 2021), 56.2 % in EU (EUR 3 billion, 2019 -20). Japan devoted 88.4 % 
of its total CTAMS to beef and veal in 2019 -20 (JPY 163.9 billion) while the US devoted 
30.93% of CTAMS to corn (USD 4.95 billion, 2020 -21).10 
(b) Second, the above allows any product to receive AMS far above the size or need of the 
sector as indicated by its  VoP and above the de minimis levels that other countries are 
restricted to. As an illustrative example, the US ' use of FBAMS (above de minimis ) has 
ranged between 5.08% of V oP for soybeans (USD 2.3 billion) to as high as 56.2 % of 
VoP in the case of sugar (USD 1.78 billion). Important products such as wheat (13.14% 
of VoP, USD 1.23 billion), millet (18.91% of V oP, USD 20.24 million), cotton (18.49% 
of VoP, USD 1 billion), and tobacco  (18.21% of V oP, USD 142.88 million) all showed 
 
2 JOB/AG/219 , "Update to Canada 's Analytical Tool on Domestic Supports ", 23 September  2021. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Quoted figu res in this paragraph are from Sengupta, Ranja (2023): "Extra AMS Entitlements continue 
to confer additional policy space for developed countries ", Briefing Paper, Third World Network, April.  
5 All FB entitlement figures are in USD 2018 rates.  
6 Iceland do es not account for de minimis so CTAMS figures may be an overestimate of the actual.  
7 Sengupta, Ranja: "Extra AMS Entitlements continue to confer additional policy space for developed 
countries ", Briefing Paper, Third World Network, April  2023.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Sengupta, Ranja: "Extra AMS Entitlements continue to confer additional policy space for developed 
countries ", Briefing Paper, Third World Network, April  2023.  JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  high shares of V oP. The EU 's FBAMS use (above de minimis ) on common wheat was 
9.4% (EUR 1.96 billion in 2019 -20). Japan 's FBAMS use (above de minimis ) amounted 
to 27.6% of V oP on sugar (JPY 19 billion) and 20.8% of V oP on beef and veal (JPY  163.9 
billion). Switzerland 's FBAMS use (above de minimis ) amounted to a massive 285% of 
VoP in case of wool (CHF 0.57 million). In Norway, use of FBAMS ranged between 
21.94 % for sheep (NOK 241 million) to 89.36 % for oilseeds (NOK 66.13 million) while 
milk received 61.2% of V oP. 
11. Therefore, the FBAMS entitlements not only allow higher absolute amounts of domestic support 
to be given by the Members enjoying such entitlements compared to other Members but also 
allow much higher flexibility and policy space in assigning the support to spe cific products. 
According to UNCTAD (2021)11 "efforts to revive agricultural reform processes at the WTO 
should prioritize a substantial reduction in the massive levels of trade -distorting domestic 
support in developed countries as a prerequisite for furth er discussions on tariff liberalization ".  
DE MINIMIS  
12. It is clear that domestic support, including Amber Box support, is a necessary policy tool to 
meet the needs of the agriculture sector and domestic food security as is evident by developed 
countries ' extensive use of such support during COVID -19. An OECD paper (2020) shows that 
among policy measures to agriculture during the early period of the COVID -19 pandemic, "54% 
of measures undertaken by governments in OECD countries focused on the three categor ies of 
support (agriculture and food support, general support and food assistance and consumer 
support measures), including the largest proportion on agriculture and food support (35%), 
while 58% of measures undertaken by emerging economies were in the non -support categories 
of measures (sector wide and institutional, information and co -ordination, trade and product 
flows and labour measures), including the largest proportion of measures (26%) in the trade 
and product flow category ".12 However policy space, in addition to financial constraints, remains 
a major constraint for developing countries to meet the needs of their agriculture sector. On 
the other hand, the FBAMS entitlements allows most developed countries to use Amber Box 
suppor t extensively in times of crises.  
13. At least during a crisis, policy space on de minimis  needs to be expanded for developing 
countries who need to support their agricultural production and livelihoods through the easiest 
forms of domestic support including the use of market price support for strengthening the 
operation of the public food distribution programmes and non -exempt direct payments. 
According to UNCTAD (2021) "with the threat of food shortages and rising levels of hunger 
caused by the COVID -19 crisis, the survival of billions of people also requires strong public 
distribution systems. Expanding policy space and South -South coordination could ensure the 
flexibility needed by countries in procuring and distributing food, especially at times of crisis ".13  
 
BLUE BOX  
14. The use of Blue Box subsidies under Article 6.5 of the AoA stands at USD 6297 Million (2018) .14 
The E U, Japan, Norway, and Iceland have been the most consistent users of the Blue Box while 
the US has used it in single years. Among developing countries China has used the Blue Box 
consistently since 2016 up to 2020 .15 It is important to note that the Blue Box allows more 
policy space compared to the de minimis , and also allows both Amber Box and Blue Box 
subsidies to be simultaneously  given to any product thus further expanding policy space to give 
subsidies to particular products in an unlimited manner. The EU, for example, has used both 
types of support for sugar beet, seeds, dairy - milk and milk products, sheep and goat meat, 
 
11 UNCTAD (2021): "Reforming the international trading system for recovery, resilience and inclusive 
development ", https://unctad.org/publication/reforming -international -trading -system -recovery -resilien ce-and-
inclusive -development . 
12 OECD (2021): "Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2021: Addressing the Challenges Facing 
Food Systems ", https://doi.org/10.1787/2 d810e01 -en. 
13 UNCTAD (2021): "Reforming the international trading system for recovery, resilience and inclusive 
development ", https://unctad.org/publication/reforming -international -trading -system -recovery -resilience -and-
inclusive -development . 
14 JOB/AG/219 , "Update to Canada’s Analytical Tool on Domestic Supports ", 23 September  2021. 
15 JOB/AG/ 240, "The State of Play: Analysis of Domestic Support Trends in the 10 largest Agricultural 
Traders ", Subm ission by Canada, 23 March  2023. JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  tobac co, beef, dairy, sheep and goat meat, olive oils, fruit and vegetables in 2016 (Sharma et 
al. 2020) .16 
 
15. While the Blue Box was meant to be "production limiting " and therefore not trade  distorting, it 
is not clear whether Article 6.5 (a) and its sub -conditio ns under 6.5 (a)(i-iii) has ensured that 
such measures be should "production limiting ". An UNCTAD (2003)17 paper indicated that Blue 
Box measure is aimed to limit surplus production. However, as Sharma et al. (2020)18 shows, 
Members are actually not require d to reduce the area or production for a Blue Box measure, 
but just show that the payment is on "limited " production. This makes the Blue Box measures 
potentially trade  distorting.  
 
16. It is also important to note that the Blue Box was meant as a tool to enable Member countries 
shift their trade -distorting subsidies under the Amber Box to the non -trade -distorting Green 
Box. Given 28 years have passed since the AoA was signed, member Stat es which have made 
use of Article 6.5 since 1995 have had sufficient opportunity to fulfil that objective.  
 
GREEN BOX  
17. An increasing body of theoretical and empirical evidence19 shows that large amounts of Green 
Box support as specified under Annex 2 of th e AoA given by developed countries under 
paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA are not in reality decoupled from production, and have 
created distortions in global trade and often undercut producers in developing and least -
developed countries. The channels  through which the decoupled payments under the Green Box 
can affect production include risk effects, land price effects, credit effects, labour participation 
effects, and expectations effects.  
18. In particular, a  2007 research paper by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)20 India shows that Green Box  subsidies offered by developed countries 
are production enhancing and trade distortive and can impact global markets, and a reduction 
can b enefit developing countries in several ways; by increasing production in specific countries 
including in net food -importing countries as well as globally; increasing their self -sufficiency; 
increase exports, employment and wages across developing countries  leading to poverty 
alleviation .21 
19. Further, a 2016 paper by the Commonwealth Secretariat22 shows that such subsidies have 
helped the US and the EU increase their total factor productivity by 3.9% and 4.6% and 
technical efficiency by 2.5% and 4.8% , respectively. There has also been significant box shifting 
between from the Amber Box or Aggregate  Measure of Support (AMS) to the Green Box or 
Annex 2 support so as to allow such support to be given without limit.  
  
 
16 Sharma, S. K., Dobhal, A., Agrawal, S., Das, A., (2020): Demystifying Blue Box Support to 
Agriculture under the WTO: Implications for Developing Countries. Working Paper No. 62, CWS/WP/200/62. 
Centre for WTO Studies, Delh i. 
17 UNCTAD (2003): An Analysis of the Agricultural Domestic Support Under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture: The Blue Box, Document No. UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2003/6 . 
18 Sharma, S. K., Dobhal, A., Agrawal, S., Das, A., (2020): Demystifying Blue Box Suppo rt to Agriculture 
under the WTO: Implications for Developing Countries. Working Paper No. 62, CWS/WP/200/62. Centre for WTO 
Studies, Delhi . 
19 This includes among others Bakhshi and W. Kerr 2009 "The Green Box? An Acreage Response 
Approach ", CATPRN Working Paper, May; Mary (2012) Mary, S. (2012), "Assessing the Impacts of Pillar 1 and 
2 Subsidies on TFP in French Crop Farms ", Journal of Agricultural Economics; Key and Roberts (2009) Key, N., 
M. J. Roberts, and E. O'Donoghue (2006), "Risk and  Farm Operator labor Supply ". Applied Economics 38:573 -
586; Breustedt and Habermann (2011) Breustedt, G. and Habermann, H. (2011). The Incidence of EU Per -
Hectare Payments on Farmland Rental Rates: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of German Farm -Level Data. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 62(1):225 -243; Ciaian and Kancs (2012) Ciaian Pavel, Kancs d 'Artis (2012). 
"The Capitalization of Area Payments into Farmland Rents: Micro Evidence from the New EU member States ". 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics  60(4): 517 –40. 
20 "Green Box Subsidies: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment ", by UNCTAD India Team, May 2007 . 
21 Page 53, ibid . 
22 Banga, Rashmi (2016): "Impact of Green Box Subsidies on Agricultural Productivity, Production and 
International Trade ", Inte rnational Trade Working Paper, No. 2016/13, Commonwealth Secretariat . JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  20. Though the data available for recent years is sporadic, Annex 2 or Green Box subsidies given in 
2020 by the US was USD 188.73 billion, an d by China USD 182.05 billion, while India gave 
USD .3 billion and Japan USD 23.42 billion , and the latest figure notified by the EU was 
USD 76.98 billion in 2019 .23 Direct payments accounted for 87.87% of total Green Box 
payments for the EU (2019), 2.56% for the US (2020), 28.4% for Japan, 38.1% for China, and 
25.38% for India. Further Norway and Switzerland gave USD 1 billion and USD 3 billion of 
Green Box subsidies , respectively , in 2021, out of which 85.76% and 69.8% were direct 
payments .24, 25 
21. A recent analysis26 of data provided by Canada27 in 2020 shows that 28 WTO Members provided 
total Annex 2 support above USD 100 million in 2016, the latest year in which the maximum 
number of Members has reported. Looking at average of 2016 -2018 data (exclud ing missing 
notifications), direct payments covering paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 constitute above 30% of 
total Annex 2 support for 12 out of these 28 WTO Members while this share is between 10 - 20% 
for another 5 WTO Members. The highest share of direct paym ents was for the EU at 88.61% 
followed by Norway at 88.01%.  
22. Total Annex 2 support exceeds 5% of the annual value of production (V oP) for 12 of these 
28 Members (16 Members overall) and exceeds 10% of annual V oP for 9 (11 overall) out of the 
12. Just direct  payments alone exceed 5% of the annual V oP for six of these 28 Members, and 
exceeds 10% of V oP for three Members, namely the EU, Norway and Switzerland. It is important 
to note that developed countries get a total of 10% of V oP as product -specific and non  product -
specific de minimis  allowance. Moreover, most of such support has gone to very large farmers 
or companies in developed countries such as the US or the EU .28 
23. Therefore, domestic support specified under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA must be 
disciplined in order to minimize their trade -distorting impacts. Further, the historical bases on 
which these payments are made must be fixed and unchanging. The use of such subsidies must 
also be limited to producers who really need such subsidies, and  therefore only to those who 
account for low levels of income, landholding and production.  
 
23 JOB/AG/ 240, "The State of Play: Analysi s of Domestic Support Trends in the 10 largest Agricultural 
Traders ", Submission by Canada, 23 March  2023.  
24 G/AG/N/CHE/122 , Notification by Switzerland on domestic support commitments (Table DS:1 and the 
relevant supporting tables), 24 January 2023. Converted to USD using exchange rate data from International 
Financial Statistics (IMF) . 
25 G/AG/N/NOR/122 , Notification by Norway on domestic support commitments (Table DS:1 and the 
relevant supporting ta bles), 21 December 2022. Converted to USD using exchange rate data from International 
Financial Statistics (IMF) . 
26 Sengupta, Ranja: "WTO Green Box Subsidies: Recent Trends and lessons going forward ", Briefing 
Paper, Third World Network, July 2021 
https://twn.my/title2/briefing_papers/twn/Green%20Box%20TWNBP%20Jul%202021%20Ranja.pdf . 
27 Update to Canada 's Analytical Tool on  Domestic Supports, JOB/AG/190 , 7 December 2020 . 
28 https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri -business/one -in-five-of-the-top-recipients -of-eu-
farm-subsidies -in-britain -are-billionaires -35880934.html , https://www.iatp.org/news/mega -farms -
government -agencies -and-the-rich-get-bulk-of-federal -farm-aid-ap-survey -shows . JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  DISCIPLINES ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
DRAFT MINISTERIAL DECISION OF THE 13TH MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF  
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO), GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  
The Ministerial Conference , 
 
• Having regard to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization;  
• Recogni zing that domestic supp ort disciplines under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) need to 
be reviewed and redesigned in a fair and equitable manner while preserving and integrating 
special and differential treatment;  
• Acknowledging  also that such an exercise must include identific ation and redress of the existing 
elements of inequity as well the gaps in the existing rules that allow trade -distorting domestic 
support to continue;  
• Acknowledging  that some Members have enjoyed additional policy flexibility in their domestic 
support all owances through the extra Final Bound Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBAMS)  
entitlements under paragraph 6.3 of the AoA which has allowed them not only higher total 
subsidies but has also allowed them to concentrate these in any product without the product -
specific de minimis  limits that other Members are obliged to meet;  
• Recogni zing that Blue Box su bsidies under paragraph 6.5 of the AoA are most often not decoupled 
from production and that the Blue Box was meant to be an interim tool to shift subsidies from 
the Amber Box to the Green Box. Further Blue Box support allows users to give additional 
subsidies in comparison to the size of the agriculture sector as indicated by the value of 
production (V oP) and therefore must be curtailed;  
• Noting with concern  that large amounts of Green Box support given by some Members as direct 
payments  under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA are not decoupled from production; are 
often much higher in comparison to the size of the agriculture sector as indicated by the V oP, 
and, have in turn created distortions in global trade and impacted producers in developing and 
least-developed countries;  
 
Decides  that the relevant provisions of the AoA shall be understood and applied as provided for 
below.  
 
FINAL BOUND AMS ENTITLEMENTS  
[ALT 1 (1 (a) to 1(d) 
1(a) All Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels; (i) either 
accounting for a share of 10% or above in all Members ' total FBAMS entitlements, or (ii) 
accounting for 8% of global exports of WTO Members averaged over the last five years in that 
produc t shall cap their product -specific AMS for each agricultural product at their de minimis  
level within a period of two calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
1(b) All other Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  shall cap 
their product -specific AMS for each agricultural product at their de minimis  level within a 
period of three calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
1(c) In addition, all Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applied de minimis  levels  shall 
cap their non product -specific AMS at their de minimis  level within a period of five calendar 
years from the date of this Decision.  JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  1(d) {Alt 1:  Developing country Members1 with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applicable de 
minimis  levels covered under parag raphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) above shall have double the time 
period specified in paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) to cap their relevant AMS at the de minimis  
level.}  
{Alt 2: Developing country Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applicable de 
minimis  levels covered under paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) above shall have double the time 
period specified in paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c)  to cap their relevant AMS at 50% of its 
average value in the last five calendar years as notified to the WTO.} ] 
 
[ALT 2 (1 (a) to 1(d)) 
1(a) All Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  shall cap their 
product -specific AMS at their de minimis  level in respect of each agricultural product where 
the product -specific support has exceeded 25% of the VoP as notified to the WTO any time 
within the last five calendar years, within a period of two calendar years from the date of this 
Decision.  
1(b) All other Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding applic able de minimis  levels  shall cap 
their product -specific AMS at their de minimis  level in respect of all other agricultural products 
within a period of three calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
1(c) In addition, all Members with FBAMS entitlement s exceeding applicable de minimis  levels  shall 
cap their non product -specific AMS at their de minimis  level within a period of five calendar 
years from the date of this Decision.  
1(d) {Alt 1: Developing country Members with FBAMS entitlements exceeding app licable de 
minimis  levels covered under paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) above shall have double the time 
period specified in paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) to cap their relevant AMS at the de minimis  
level.}  
{Alt 2: Developing country Members with FBAMS ent itlements exceeding applicable de 
minimis  levels covered under paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c)  above shall have double the time 
period specified in paragraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) to cap their relevant AMS at [50]% of its 
average value in the last five calen dar years as notified to the WTO.} ] 
 
DE MINIMIS  
2(a) Notwithstanding paragraphs 1(a) to 1(d) above, any developing country Member experiencing 
a severe food crisis may have recourse to a product specific de minimis  that can exceed 10 % 
of VoP but not more than (10+X%) of V oP for a period of three calendar yea rs from the year 
when the crisis has begun as assessed by the affected Member or until the end of the crisis 
as assessed by the affected Member, whichever is longer. This option is available for food 
products where the affected developing country accounts for less than 1% of global exports. 
An eligible Member may use this option as soon as it has assessed that a severe food crisis 
has begun in accordance with paragraph 2(b).  
 
2(b) A "severe food crisis " shall be understood to have occurred when for the foo d product in 
question;  
(i) the domestic net availability falls below 80 % of the Olympic average of the five years 
preceding the year when the affected Member assesses a severe food crisis has begun, 
or  
(ii) the total public and private domestic expenditure exceeds 130 % of the Olympic 
average of the five years preceding the year wh en the affected Member assesses a 
severe food crisis has begun, or  
 
1 For greater certainty for the purposes of this Decision, "developing Member " includes least -developed 
Member.  JOB/AG/242/Rev.1  
 
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  (iii) the domestic average price exceeds 130 % of the Olympic average of the five years 
preceding the year when the affected Member assesses a severe food crisis has begun.  
 
NOTIFICATION  
2(c) Members using paragraph 2(a) above shall file their annual domestic support (DS:1) 
notifications for the relevant years. In addition , such Members shall also file a notification on 
meeting the conditions specified under paragraph 2(b) above within the first c alendar year of 
exceeding the de minimis  limit. 
 
BLUE BOX  
3(a) Direct payments in any year under production -limiting programmes for a specific product as 
allowed under the terms of Article 6.5 of the AoA by a Member which has used such subsidies 
between 19 95 and the date of this Decision may not exceed 2.5% of the Olympic Average of 
preceding five years V oP of that product.  
3(b) For Members which have not used such subsidies between 1995 and the date of this Decision 
but use it in the future, the provision under paragraph 3 (a) will be applicable after a period of 
20 years from the date of this Decision.  
 
NOTIFICATION  
3(c) Any Memb er which uses the Blue Box shall file annual notifications as required under the 
provisions of the AoA.  
 
GREEN BOX  
4(a) Total domestic support specified under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA shall be capped 
at 5% of the annual VoP within a period of three calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
4(b) When paragraph 8 of Annex 2 of the AoA is used in certain year(s), total domestic support 
specified under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA shall be capped at 5% of the average 
VoP of the preceding five -year period excluding the highest and the lowest entry, within a 
period of three calendar years from the date of this Decision.  
4(c) Support specified under paragraphs  5-13 of Annex 2 of the AoA may be given without limit to 
farmers with low levels of income, landholding, factor use and production in developing and 
least-developed Members.   
4(d) The base periods for programmes under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA  shall be 
defined, fixed and unchanging.    
 
NOTIFICATION  
4(e) The base periods for programmes under paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA shall be 
notified to the Committee on Agriculture within a period of one calendar year from the date of 
this Decision , along with a list of the products eligible for each programme notified under 
paragraphs 5 -13 of Annex 2 of the AoA which is to be updated within one calendar year of 
any change.  
 
__________  