   
  
G/AG/W/227  
 
29 Novem ber 2022  
(22-8875) Page: 1/9 
Committee on Agriculture    
 
 
TREATMENT OF LDCS AND NFIDCS UNDER WTO AGRICULTURE RULES  
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
1.1.  At the Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Conference, Ministers adopted a Declaration2 on the 
Emergency Response to Food Insecurity. Paragraph  8 of the Declaration mandates a work 
programme to be elaborated under the auspices of the Committee on Agriculture to examine ways 
for the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effect s of the Reform Programme on 
Least -Developed and Net Food -Importing Developing Countries ( Marrakesh Decision ) to be made 
more effective and operational and to, inter alia , consider the needs of LDCs and NFIDCs to increase 
their resilience in responding to acute food instability  by considering the best possible use of 
flexibilities to bolster their agricultural production and enhance their domestic food security as 
needed in an emergency . The Committee considered the issue of the elaboration of work programme 
at its June and September 2022 meetings. The Secretariat was req uested at those meetings to 
prepare  a compilation of flexibilities available to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and 
Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs) under the existing WTO agriculture rules. 
The present note has accordingly been prepared t o assist the discussions on the mandated work 
programme.  
1.2.  The note takes into account the discussion3 in June and September Committee meetings as 
well as the specific written submissions4 and suggestions made thus far in connection with the work 
programme . The note also acknowledges the latest Secretariat compilation on "Special and 
Differen tial Treatment Provisions in  WTO Agreements and Decisions" in WT/COMTD/W/258. It also 
refers to some existing rules, though strictly not in the nature of S&D provisions , which may be 
deemed to have an important bearing on issues which have been raised in the discussions on 
the work programme. The note uses the following definition of LDCs and NFIDCs:  
Definition of LDCs and WTO NFIDCs  
LDCs:  Least -developed countries which have been designated as such by the Economic and Social 
Council of the United  Nations, as indicated in paragraph 1(a) of the Decision of the Committee on 
Agriculture relating to the establishment of the list of NFIDC in G/A G/3.  
NFIDCs:  Paragraph 1 (b) of G/AG/3 establishes the process and criteria for inclusion of a 
developing country Member in the list as follows: "any developing country Member of the WTO 
which was a net importer of basic foodstuffs in any three years of the most recen t five-year period 
for which data are available and which notifies the Committee of its decision to be listed as a Net 
Food-Importing Developing Country for the purposes of the Decision." Interested developing 
country Members are required to submit a reque st for inclusion in the list of NFIDCs along with 
relevant statistical data. The Committee has accordingly established a list of NFIDCs and reviews 
that list at its regular March meetings. The latest list can be found under G/AG/5/Rev.11.  
 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to 
the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO . The document incorporates Members' 
comments on the previous version in RD/AG/94 as reflected in paragraphs 1.1, 1.6 and 1.15(d) of this document.  
2 WT/MIN(22)/28 - WT/L/1139.  
3 G/AG/R/102 and G/AG/R/103 (to be is sued).  
4 G/AG/W/223 and G/AG/W/224.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  MARRAKESH DECIS ION 
1.3.  The Marrakesh Decision establishes some specific mechanisms to ensure that the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agricultural reform programme " does not adversely affect the 
availability of food aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provi de assistance in meeting the 
food needs of developing countries, especially least -developed and net food -importing developing 
countries ". Under paragraph 3 of the Decision, Ministers agreed:  
i. to review the level of food aid established periodically by the C ommittee on Food Aid 
under the Food Aid Convention 1986 and to initiate negotiations in the appropriate 
forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate 
needs of developing countries during the reform programme;  
ii. to adopt  guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of basic foodstuffs is 
provided to least -developed and net food -importing developing countries in fully grant 
form and/or on appropriate concessional terms in line with Article  IV of the Food Aid 
Conventi on 1986;  
iii. to give full consideration in the context of their aid programmes to requests for the 
provision of technical and financial assistance to least -developed and net food -importing 
developing countries to improve their agricultural productivity and inf rastructure.  
1.4.  Paragraph 4 of the Marrakesh Decision includes Members' agreement "to ensure that any 
agreement relating to agricultural export credits makes appropriate provision for differential 
treatment in favour of least -developed and net food -importing developing countries" . 
1.5.  Article 16 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) sets out that developed country Members 
shall take such action as is provided for within the framework of the Marrakesh Decision. 
Simultaneously, the Committee on Agriculture has been mandated to monitor the follow -up to the 
Decision, as appropriate.5 
1.6.  The Committee on Agriculture adopted a Decision6 for the establishment of the list of NFIDCs, 
established a notification requirement7 (called Table NF:1) for donor Members to report actions taken 
within the framework of the Decision , and provided in its working procedures8 for a dedicated annual 
discussion at November meetings to monitor actions taken within the framework of the Decision on 
the basis, inter alia , of Members' Table NF:1 notifications9. The Secretariat background notes in the 
G/AG/W/42/ series provide detailed information on the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision. 
These notes include information on 'technical and financial assistance' within the  framework of the 
implementation of the Marrakesh Decision, including based on a summary of Members' Table NF:1 
notifications.  
EXPORT COMPETITION  
1.7.  The provisions of the Marrakesh Decision and the specific mechanisms established therein have 
a strong and exp licit bearing on the WTO agriculture rules under the export competition pillar. This 
section accordingly looks at the existing rules in this pillar specifically from the point of view of their 
relevance to LDCs and NFIDCs and the elements of the Marrakesh Decision.  
 
5 Article 16.2 of the AoA refers.  
6 G/AG/3.  
7 Pages 33 -34 of G/AG/2.  
8 Paragraph 18 of G/AG/1.  
9 Record of Members' annual Table NF:1 notifications may be consulted in documents in the G/AG/GEN/86/ 
series.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  1.8.  Lower rate of reduction and time -limited exemption from export subsidy 
commitments : Developing country Members applied a lowe r10 rate of reduction while inscribing 
their export subsidy reduction commitments in Section II of Part IV of their schedules. Among 
the NFIDCs11, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the only Member who had such reduction 
commitments and had accordingly u sed this flexibility in scheduling its export subsidy reduction 
commitments in the Uruguay Round. Additionally, pursuant to Article 9.4 of the AoA, developing 
country Members, during the implementation period, were not required to undertake commitments 
in respect of export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 9.1 provided that these 
are not applied in a manner that would circumvent reduction commitments. Among the NFIDCs, 
Barbados, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Tunisia have reported the invocation of 
Article  9.4 whereas none of the LDCs have notified recourse to Article 9.4.  
1.9.  Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition : At MC -10 in December  2015, 
Ministers adopted a Decision12 on Export Competition. The decision provi ded for the elimination of 
export subsidy entitlements and established disciplines on other export measures with equivalent 
effect. Paragraph 3 of the Nairobi Decision reaffirms the commitments under the Marrakesh Decision 
and its review by the Ministerial  Conference and monitoring by the Committee on Agriculture:  
"Nor can anything in this Decision be construed to diminish in any way the existing 
commitments contained in the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision of April 1994 on Measures 
Concerning the Possible N egative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least -developed 
and Net Food -importing Developing Countries and the Ministerial Decision of 
14 November 2001 on Implementation -related Issues and Concerns13 on, inter alia, 
commitment levels of food aid, provision  of food aid by donors, technical and financial 
assistance in the context of aid programmes to improve agricultural productivity and 
infrastructure, and financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs. 
Nor could it be understood to alter the regular review of these decisions by the 
Ministerial Conference and monitoring by the Committee on Agriculture."  
1.10.  Eliminat ion of  export subsidy entitlements ; longer timeframe  for developing 
Members : Under the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, deve loping Members were offered 
longer timeframe to eliminate export subsidy entitlements. While these entitlements stood 
eliminated immediately as of the date of the Nairobi Decision (i.e. 19 December 2015) for developed 
country Members, developing country Me mbers were required to do so by the end of 2018.14 For 
some select products, both developed and developing Members got an extra time15 to eliminate 
export subsidy entitlements. As stated above in paragraph 1.8, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
being the on ly NFIDC Member with export subsidy entitlements in its Uruguay Round Schedule 
benefitted from this flexibility in terms of a longer period to eliminate those entitlements.16 It may 
also be noted that long -before the Decision was adopted at MC -10 to elimin ate export subsidy 
entitlements, the actual use of these entitlements for the provision of export subsidies had 
significantly declined. This has especially been the case for export subsidies for basic food stuffs like 
grains, oilseeds or vegetable oils whe re the actual use of such subsidies had been virtually negligible 
at the time of the adoption of the Nairobi Decision.  
1.11.  Extended recourse to Article 9.4 : The Nairobi Decision on Export Competition also 
provided that developing country Members shall continu e to benefit from the provisions of Article  9.4 
of the AoA until the end of 2023. The timeline was agreed to be longer for LDCs, and NFIDCs listed 
in G/AG/5/Rev.10; these Members could benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 until the end 
 
10 Two-thirds  of the generally -required reduction of 36% and 24% in budgetary outlay and quantity 
commitment levels respectively during a longer period of 10 years.  
11 LDCs were exempt from undertaking reduction commitments, including under the export competition 
pillar. 
12 WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
13 Document WT/MIN(01)/17.  
14 There was an accelerated timeframe for implementing commitments for cotton, as per paragraph  12 
of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
15 Until the end of 2020 for developed Members who agreed to eliminate as of 1 January 2016 all export 
subsidies on products destined for LDCs, and end of 2022 for developing Members. Footnotes 4 and 5 of 
WT/MIN( 15)/45 - WT/L/ 980 refer.  
16 Among Members with export subsidy entitlements at the time of the adoption of the Nairobi Export 
Competition Decision, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the only remaining Member who is yet to circulate its 
modified export subsidy Schedule pursuant to that Decision.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  of 2030. As st ated above in paragraph 1.8, a number of NFIDCs Members have reported recourse 
to Article 9.4 in their annual Table ES:1 notifications.  
1.12.  Disciplines on export financing support : The Nairobi Decision on Export competition 
includes disciplines on export credits, export credit guarantees and insurance programmes ("export 
financing support"). The Decision requires that the provision of export financing support shall be in 
conformity with the "terms and condition" covering maximum repayment terms17 and 
self-financing18. Under the S&D provisions, exporting developing country Members, including LDCs 
and NFIDCs, had been provided with additional time to implement the maximum repayment ter m of 
18 months.19 LDCs and NFIDCs listed in G/AG/5/Rev.10 are accorded differential and more 
favourable treatment in respect of their imports or acquisition of basic foodstuffs; Paragraph  17 of 
the Decision in such cases provides for additional allowance in maximum repayme nts terms:  
"Notwithstanding the terms of paragraphs 15(a) and 16 above, least -developed and net food -
importing developing countries listed in G/AG/5/Rev.10 shall be accorded differential and 
more favourable treatment comprising allowance for a repayment t erm in respect of them 
of between 36 and 54 months, for the acquisition of basic foodstuffs.20 Should one of these 
Members face exceptional circumstances which still preclude financing normal levels of 
commercial imports of basic foodstuffs and/or in acces sing loans granted by multilateral 
and/or regional financial institutions within these timeframes, it shall have an extension of 
such a time -frame. The standard monitoring and surveillance provisions, as resulting from this 
Decision, shall apply to these c ases.21" 
1.13.  Disciplines on international food aid:  The Nairobi Decision on Export Competition contains 
disciplines to meet the objective of preventing or minimizing commercial displacement and 
simultaneously reaffirms Members' " commitment to maintain an adequ ate level of international food 
aid, to take account of the interests of food aid recipients and to ensure that the disciplines contained 
hereafter do not unintentionally impede the delivery of food aid provided to deal with emergency 
situations "22. The De cision also acknowledges the role of recipient governments in decision -making 
on international food aid.23 There are some provisions on international food aid in the AoA and the 
Nairobi Decision specifically related to LDCs/NFIDCs and the Marrakesh Decisio n: 
a. Article  10.4 of the AoA and Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Marrakesh Decision seek to ensure 
that international food aid provided, especially to LDCs and NFIDCs, should, to the 
extent possible, be in fully grant form. The Nairobi Decision on Export Competition  now 
requires donor Members to ensure that all international food aid is in fully grant form.24  
b. Paragraph  27 of the Nairobi Decision seeks to limit instances of monetization of 
international food aid "for the purpose of transport and delivery of the food assistan ce" 
while simultaneously allows its use "to redress short and/or long  term food deficit 
requirements or insufficient agricultural production situations which give rise to chronic 
hunger and malnutrition in least -developed and net food-importing developing 
countries.25" 
c. Paragraph  32 of the Nairobi Decision include a review provision and provides that 
"Members agree to review the provisions on international food aid contained in the 
preceding paragraphs within the regular Committee o n Agriculture monitoring of the 
implementation of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision of April 1994 on Measures 
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least -developed 
and net food -importing developing countries".  
 
17 Paragraph 15 (a) of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
18 Paragraph 15 (b) of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
19 Paragraph 16 of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
20 Belize, the Plurinational State  of Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Papua New 
Guinea and Suriname s hall also have access to this provision.  
21 In the event that Cuba is a recipient Member in this situation, the time -frame can be greater than 
54 months and any such monitoring and surveillance shall not apply without the prior express consent of Cuba.  
22 Paragraph 22 of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
23 Paragraph 31 of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980.  
24 Paragraph 23(b) of WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980 . 
25 Belize, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, Nicaragua, Papua New 
Guinea and Suriname shall also have access to this provision.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  1.14.  Transparency of  global food aid shipments: WTO Members report information on food 
aid in their ES and NF notifications, and later also as a part of their response to the export subsidy 
questionnaire (ECQ) forming part of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. This i nformation 
does not however permit the Secretariat to produce a comparable year -wise data series on global 
food aid shipments. Secretariat in its background notes in the G/AG/W/42/ series prepared for the 
annual monitoring of the Marrakesh Decision had reg ularly included year -wise data until 2014 on 
food aid shipment quantities, including by recipients (e.g. LDCs, NFIDCs), based on 
the WFP International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS). The WFP has since discontinued 
the INTERFAIS and the collection of global food aid flow data.26 Reporting by the parties to the 
successive Food Aid Conventions had been another source of data on global food aid shipment  
quantities; under the latest Food Assistance Convention (FAC), 2013, the annual food assistance 
comm itments , as well as  the reporting  on them  by the FAC Parties , is primarily in monetary (rather 
than quantity) terms. In the absence of reliable data on global food aid quantities, it may not be 
feasible to accurately examine trends in global food aid deliv eries.  
DOMESTIC SUPPORT  
1.15.  There are S&D provisions in the domestic support rules in the AoA  and decisions 
offering flexibilities to both LDCs and NFIDCs:  
a. Article 6.2 states: " In accordance with the Mid -Term Review Agreement that 
government measures of assist ance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage 
agricultural and rural development are an integral part of the development programmes 
of developing countries, investment subsidies which are generally available to 
agriculture in developing country Members an d agricultural input subsidies generally 
available to low -income or resource -poor producers in developing country Members 
shall be exempt from domestic support reduction commitments that would otherwise 
be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic sup port to producers in developing 
country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops. 
Domestic support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be 
included in a Member's calculation of its Current Total AM S." There are several 
developing country Members who have reported recourse to Article  6.2 exemption in 
their domestic support notifications. Among the LDCs , the users include Bangladesh, 
Burundi, Chad, the Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Togo 
and Zambia. Among the NFIDC s, the users include Barbados, Botswana, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Jordan, Maldives,  Mauritius, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Tunisia.  
b. In relation to the calculation of Current Total AMS, Article 6.4 (b) says: " For developing 
country Members, the de minimis percentage under this paragraph shall be 
10 per cent". Bangladesh is the only LDC which has thus far notified support falling 
under "AMS" and claimed de minimis . Among NFIDC s, the following Members reported 
to have used the de minimis  exemption in the calculation of Current AMS: Barbados, 
Dominican R epublic, Jordan, Mauritius, Pakistan, Peru and Tunisia.  
c. There are four Members in the NFIDC list who have Total AMS reduction commitments 
in the Schedule (and hence benefitted during the assumption of those commitments 
from lesser reduction percentage in B ase Total AMS and a longer transition period)27: 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and  Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  
d. For public stockholding programmes for food security purposes (PSH) and domestic food 
aid in Annex 2 of the AoA, footnote 5 states: "For the purposes of paragraph  3 of this 
Annex, governmental stockholding programmes for food security purposes in 
developin g countries whose operation is transparent and conducted in accordance with 
officially published objective criteria or guidelines shall be considered to be in conformity 
with the provisions of this paragraph, including programmes under which stocks of 
foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and released at administered prices, 
provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the external reference 
 
26 Since the discontinuation of INTERFAIS, the FAO has been exploring to develop a food aid data 
collection system to monitor and report on global food aid transactions.  
27 Article 15.2 of the AoA refers.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  price is accounted for in the AMS." Similarly, under footnote 5 &6: "For the purposes of 
paragraphs  3 and  4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at subsidized prices with 
the objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor in developing 
countries on a regular basis at reasonable prices shall be considered to be in confo rmity 
with the provisions of this paragraph." Support under PSH programmes entailing 
acquisition of stocks at administered price should normally be reported in two distinct 
supporting tables of the relevant Member's domestic support notification: Supporting 
Table DS:1 (Green Box) and Supporting Table  DS:5 (market price support). Under the 
agreed domestic support notification requirements and formats in G/AG/2, however, 
there is no prescribed product -specificity in reporting Green Box support in the 
Supporting Table DS:1 making it difficult to link PSH support in Supporting Table DS:1 
to product -specific price support that is expected to be reported in Supporting Table 
DS:5. Even for Supporting Table DS:5 in such cases, there is no mand atory guidance 
in G/AG/2 to attribute the notified market price support to PSH programme. In the 
absence of explicit cross -reference across two relevant supporting tables (1 and 5) by 
notifying developing Members,  finding beneficiary LDC and NFIDC Members in terms of 
their actual recourse to these flexibilities is, therefore, challenging. Factually, among 
the LDC Members , Nepal and Zambia have reported PSH  support under the Green Box 
whereas Botswana, Namibia and Pakistan have similarly reported PSH support  under 
the Green Box from among the NFIDC s. As regards the provision of domestic food aid, 
Afghanistan, Madagascar, Mali and Nepal among the LDC Members have reported 
support in their domestic support notifications under paragraph 4 of Annex 2. Similarly, 
among the NFIDCs , the list of Members having notified recourse to paragraph 4 of 
Green Box include Cuba, El Salvador, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic of. Footnote 5 and footnote 5 & 6 of Annex2 leave open the 
possibility  of public stocks being used for the provision of domestic food aid. However, 
this may be verified only based on a notifying Member so reporting in its Supporting 
Table DS:1.28 
1.16.  Under  the Bali PSH Interim Mechanism ,29 developing country Members' compliance with 
domestic support obligations in relation to support to traditional staple food crops under 
PSH programmes, existing as of 7 December 2013, shall not be challenged under the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism provided the conditions under the Bali Interim Me chanism are met. None of 
LDC or NFIDC Members has thus far invoked the PSH Interim Mechanism.  
1.17.  Under the agreed notification requirements and formats in G/AG/2 , "least-developed 
Members should submit Supporting Tables DS:1 to DS:3 every two years " (all othe r Members are 
required to submit Table DS:1 notification annually ).30 LDCs generally submit their Table  DS:1 
notifications every other year.  
1.18.  While the access to the Green Box under Annex 2 of the AoA is uniformly applicable to all 
Members (except the S&D element stated above), Ministers at Bali recognized " the contribution that 
General Services programmes can make to rural development, food security and poverty alleviation, 
particularly in developing countries ." In the Decision  on General Services31 adopted at Bali, 
Ministers elaborated on the non -exhaustive list of General Service support programmes  in 
paragraph  2 of Annex 2 to, inter alia , include: " i) land rehabilitation; ii) soil conservation and 
resource management; iii) drought management and f lood control; iv) rural employment 
programmes; v) issuance of property titles; and vi) farmer settlement programmes in order to 
promote rural development and poverty alleviation ". Several LDCs and NFIDCs routinely report 
General Services support (Green Box ) in their domestic support notifications. At least in one case, 
an NFIDC Member (El Salvador32) reported support for "soil conservation and resource management" 
 
28 Among LDCs and NFIDCs, only in the case of Sri Lanka, there was a common product (wheat flour) 
reported in the Supporting Table DS:1 (Green Box) under the PSH programme and simultaneously it being 
provided as domestic foo d aid under subsidized conditions. The notification doesn't, however, explicitly say that 
subsidized wheat flour provided as domestic food aid originated in PSH stocks. G/AG/N/LKA/2 refers.  
29 WT/MIN(13)/38 - WT/L/913 and WT/L/939 refer.  
30 The notification  compliance document by the Secretariat in the G/AG/GEN/86/ series and call and 
reminders for notifications by the Central Registry of Notification (CRN) also take this into account.   
31 WT/MIN(13)/37 -WT/L/912 . 
32 Refer, for example, to G/AG/N/SLV/58.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  and " drought management and flood control" under General services based on the guidance in the  
Bali Decision.  
MARKET ACCESS  
1.19.  Based on the Uruguay Round agricultural modalities33, developing Members assumed tariff 
reduction commitments in their schedules by availing of specific S&D flexibilities, including in the 
form of lesser reduction rates and a ssuming ceiling bindings  in respect of the then unbound 
tariff lines rather than undertaking tariffication, and implemented those reduction commitments over 
a longer period of time; LDCs were exempt from undertaking reduction commitments. Because of 
not un dertaking tariffication to convert non -tariff border measures into ordinary customs duties, the 
concerned developing Members could not reserve the rights to use special agricultural 
safeguards  (SSG) on such products. Some developing Members, including thos e who used the ceiling 
binding for some eligible products, also undertook tariffication for some other products and 
negotiated the SSG rights in their schedules. The list of developing country Members with SSG rights 
also includes NFIDC s: Barbados, Botswan a, El Salvador, Eswatini, Morocco, Namibia and Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic of.34  
1.20.  Notwithstanding the requirements under Article 4.2 of the AoA, developing country Members 
Under Annex 5, Section B, had the possibility to defer tariffication  generally for a period of 
10 years in respect of a primary agricultural product that is the predo minant staple in its traditional 
diet. This special treatment flexibility was availed by  two developing Members in the Uruguay Round, 
neither of which was an LDC or NFIDC.  
1.21.  At the Ninth Session of the Ministerial Conference in December 2013 at Bali, Ministe rs adopted 
a Decision on tariff quota administration35. An underfill mechanism36 has also been established 
under the Decision to deal with cases where quota administration is believed to be contributing to 
lower fill rates or under -fill. The final stage of  the Underfill mechanism contains an S&D element 
whereby developing importing Members, rather than being immediately obliged to change the 
TRQ administration method to either first -come first -served at customs (FCFS) or an automatic 
unconditional license o n demand system , may choose an alternative TRQ administration method or 
maintain the current method  and close an underfill matter by demonstrating a prescribed increase 
in the fill rate over a minimum of two years. I f after the two years the prescribed inc rease in the fill 
rate has not been achieved, the concerned developing Member would be subject to the standard 
requirement (i.e. change the TRQ administration method to either first -come first -served at 
customs  (FCFS) or an automatic unconditional license on demand system ), if so requested by 
interested exporting Member(s); i f no request is made, the concern shall be marked as "closed" .37 
No LDC  Member has scheduled TRQ commitments whereas Barbados, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Morocco, and Bolivarian R epublic of Venezuela among NFIDC Members  have 
TRQ commitments in their schedule.  
1.22.  Under the Nairobi Decision on cotton38, Ministers agreed that developed country  Members, 
and developing country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so , shall grant , to the 
extent provided for in  their respective preferential trade arrangements39 duty free and quota free 
market access for cotton and cotton related products40 originating from LDCs as from 
1 January  2016.41 
 
33 MTN.GNG/MA/W/24 . 
34 Barbados is the only Member in this list to have notified recourse to SSG.  
35 WT/MIN(13)/39 -WT/L/914.  
36 In Annex A to the Bali TRQ Decision.  
37 This was agreed as a part of the review of the operation of the Bali TRQ Decision in March 2022. 
WT/L/1132 refers.  
38 WT/MIN(15)/46 -WT/L/981 . 
39 In this regard, China declares itself in a position to do so to the extent provided for in its preferential 
trade arrangements and political commitments.  
40 As included in the  list annexed to th e Decision and cove red by Annex 1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
41 Paragraphs 2 to 4 of WT/MIN(15)/46 - WT/L/981.  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  EXPORT RESTRICTIONS  
1.23.  Article 12.1 of the AoA  provides that a Member instituting any new export prohibition or 
restriction on foodstuffs in accordance with Article  XI:2(a) of GATT 1994 shall give due consideration 
to the effects of such measures on importing Members' food security, giv e advance notice in writing, 
consult, upon request, with any other Member having a substantial interest as an importer with 
respect to any matter related to the measure in question, and provide, upon request, necessary 
information to that importing Member.  This, while strictly not an S&D provision, may also serve LDCs 
and NFIDC Members' food security interests in view of their dependence on world market for a large 
share of their food consumption.  
1.24.  Article 12.2 of the AoA  is an S&D provision which exempts de veloping Members from 
transparency obligations under Article 12.1 unless that developing Member is a net -food exporter of 
the specific foodstuff concerned. Among LDC and NFIDC Members, only Myanmar notified42 its export 
restriction on rice in 2020.  
  
 
42 G/AG/N/MYN/21 (and Add.1).  G/AG/W/227  
 
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  ANNEX  
Provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, Ministerial Decisions, Committee's decisions, 
and other documents referred to in the background note  
1. Agreement on Agriculture: Article 4.2, Article 6.2, Article 6.4 (b), Article 9.4, Article  10.4, 
Article 12,  Article 15.2, Article 16, Annex 2, and Annex 5.  
2. Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on 
Least -Developed and Net Food -Importing Developing Countries.  
3. Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN(15)/45 – WT/L/980).  
4. Bali Ministerial Decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (WT/MIN/(13)/38 
– WT/L/913) and General Council Decision (WT/L/939)  
5. Understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration provisions of agricultural p roducts, as 
defined in Article 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (WT/MIN(13)/39 – WT/L/914)  
6. Notification requirements and formats adopted by the Committee on Agriculture (G/AG/2).  
7. Decision by the Committee on Agriculture relating to the establishment  of a list of WTO Net 
Food-Importing Developing Countries (G/AG/3).  
8. WTO list of Net Food -Importing Developing Countries within the framework of the Marrakesh 
Decision (G/AG/5 series. Latest list contained in G/AG/5/Rev.11 dated 24 September 2020 ). 
9. Bali Ministerial Decision on General Services (WT/MIN(13)/37 – WT/L/912).  
10. General Council Decision on the Review of the Operation of the Bali Decision on 
TRQ Administration (WT/L/1132)  
11. Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Cotton (WT/MIN(15)/46 – WT/L/98 1). 
12. Uruguay Round agricultural modalities - Note by the Chairman (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24).  
 
 
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