   
  
TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
21 December 2023  
(23-8782) Page: 1/7 
Negotiating Group on Rules   
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES  
DRAFT DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES CONTRIBUTING TO OVERCAPACITY AND 
OVERFISHING, AND RELATED ELEMENTS  
CHAIR'S EXPLANATORY NOTE ACCOMPANYING TN/RL/W/277  
Addendum  
INTRODUCTION  
This addendum provides background, context, and explanations for the document "Draft disciplines 
on subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, and related elements", which I have 
circulated today in document TN/RL/W/277 . Given that this text r eflects the many discussions among 
Members during the latest Fish Week, I suggest we use th is document as  the new basis for our final 
push to conclude our negotiations in time for MC13.  
Members will recall that on 4 September 2023, I circulated the draft text in RD/TN/RL/174 as the 
starting point for our text -based work  this fall . The circulation of th at text was followed by extensive 
deliberations on its provisions  as well as on  Members'  textual suggestions regarding modifications 
to that text. While view s often diverged, many Members also came forward with bridging text and 
ideas. Then, on 1 December, I circulated document  RD/TN/RL/184  as an attempt at capturing some 
of your ideas on how to further develop Article A.1 and Article B , on the discipline and special and 
differential treatment, respectively .  
In formulating  the draft provisions contained in  document TN/RL/W/277 , I have drawn  on your  
feedback on document  RD/TN/RL/184  during the most recent fish week , as well as  your submissions 
and our deliberations  over the past several months . Many of the elements in this text will be familiar 
to you , as they have been a part of previous draft texts  and deliberations .  
This addendum is intended to assist Members understand the  specific content of the draft provisions 
in TN/RL/W/277. Overall , the text contains a core discipline on subsidies contributing to overcapacity 
and overfishing based on a two -tier hybrid approach ; a standalone discipline concerning subsidies 
contingent on  fishing or fishing -related activities outside the subsidizing Member's jurisdiction ; 
special and differential treatment provisions concerning the core discipline ; notification and 
transparency provisions ; and an open section with placeholders for any othe r provisions concerning 
overcapacity and overfishing. I have drafted these  provision s recognizing their varying levels of 
maturity , and taking into account Members' calls for more clarity on  the main disciplines with a view 
to subsequently deliberat e on special and differential treatment and other related issues. Ideally, we 
should be able to find the landing zones on these issues during the rest of our work in Geneva  so 
that Ministers will have a complete text  in time for  MC13 .  
As I have indicated befo re, the core discipline should lead to a meaningful reduction in subsidies 
contributing to overcapacity and overfishing not only through the statement of prohibition contained 
in the core discipline, but also through the rigorous Committee review procedure  that is as central 
to the working of the discipline as the prohibition itself . The draft core discipline and the special and 
differential treatment provisions taken together essentially would allocate Members into three  
groups , with varying  degree s of scr utiny applicable to the Members in each.  A broad overview of 
these groups is as follows : TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  • The first tier of the disciplines, which comprises the 20 largest providers of subsidies. These 
Members would be subject to the strictest scrutiny  – specifically , they w ould be required to 
demonstrate the fulfilment of the sustainability -based conditionality set out in 
Article  A.1.1( a) soon after a new subsidy is in effect, in addition to in their regular  
notification s of fisheries subsidies .  
• The s econd tier of the disciplines, which comprises all Members  not falling under 
Article  A.1.1(a) , except those that would be covered by the special and differential treatment 
provisions concerning least developed country ( LDC) Members and developing Members with 
a de minimis  share of global catch. To grant or maintain fisheries subsidies, the Members in 
the second tier would have to demonstrate the fulfilment of the sustainability -based 
conditionality set out in Article A.1.1(b ) in their regular notification s of fisheries subsidies.   
• The third group, which comprise s Members that would be excluded from the scope of the 
core prohibition by virtue of Articles B.1 and B.2.  These are LDC Members and developing 
Members with a global s hare of marine catch not greater than  0.8%.  Pursuant to footnote  13 
of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies , these Members would  only be required to provid e 
certain information in their notification s of fisheries subsidies every four years  and would 
not ne ed to demonstrate fulfilment of a  sustainability -based conditionality .  
Notably, the allocation of Members between the first and the second tiers is based on the level of 
subsidization , and therefore can change over time. That is , Members  might move between the first 
and second tier s depending on the levels of their subsidies vis-à-vis those of other Members. T he 
relevant sections below  provide more detail on  how various aspects of the core discipline would 
operate .  
DETAILED  EXPLANATION OF THE PROVIS IONS OF TN/RL/W/277  
1  ARTICLE A: SUBSIDIES CONTRIBUTING TO OVERCAPACITY AND OVERFISHING  
Article A.1, Article A.1.1, Article A.1.2, and Article A.1.3  
Article A.1 contains draft language for the core discipline on subsidies contributing to overcapacity  
and ove rfishing.  The core discipline continues to be based on the "hybrid approach" combining a 
statement of the prohibition and a list of presumptively prohibited fisheries subsidies, with a 
qualification to the prohibition based on sustainability elements. It i s well known that the aim and 
operation of the hybrid approach is to ensure that sustainability measures factor in as one important 
consideration when Members  grant  or maintain fisheries subsidies, and that decisions on 
subsidization likewise should factor  into sustainability considerations. In general terms, under the 
hybrid approach, t he subsidies and sustainability measures would be the subject of a demonstration 
that sustainability measures were in place for the fish stocks in respect of which the subsi dies were 
provided. This demonstration process would begin with notifications to the Committee on Fisheries 
Subsidies.  As explained below, the current text build s on the foundations of the hybrid approach 
contained in documents WT/MIN(21)/ W/5 ("W5") and WT/MIN(22)/W/20 (" W20"), along with the  
concept of a two-tiered sustainability -based conditionality as reflected in documents RD/TN/RL/174  
and RD/TN/RL/184 .  
Like the core discipline in the previous draft text s, Article A.1 combines a prohibition in the chapeau 
and an illustrative list of certain presumptively prohibited subsidies. In the discussions following the 
circulation of RD/TN/RL/174, the vast majority of Members support ed the approach of stating the 
prohibition and then having an illustrative list of types of subsidies presumed to contribute to 
overcapacity and overfishing. Several Members did, however, propose various modifications to the 
list of subsidies contained in Article A.1. Some proposed deletio n of certain items in the list, while 
some proposed the addition of items  to the list . Almost all Members that called for modifications to 
the list commented on the  item concerning income support, which is item (e) in the draft.  
Speaking on this item, numerous Members raised the concern  that a prohibition of such subsidies 
could pose limitations on providing assistance to the livelihood of low -income fishing communities, 
notably income support during closed fishing seasons . Given the degree of support that  this concern 
received among Members, the current draft retains  a qualification to item (e) in square brackets  
from document RD/TN/TL/184 . This qualification would exclude  income support from the scope of TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  the prohibition if such support were  provided for s ubsistence purposes during closed seasons. The 
qualification is bracketed given that some Members proposed alternative ways of addressing the 
underlying concern, e.g. , through the deletion of this item from the list , or through the operation of 
Article B.4 . Furthermore, s ome Members opposed the inclusion of the additional language, pointing 
to the illustrative nature of the list .  
The current text also includes an additional sentence in Article A.1 following the list of presumptively 
prohibited subsidies . This sentence  makes explicit that Members would have to consider the 
consequence of a subsidy on overcapacity and overfishing . This sentence is an affirmation of the 
well-known implicit objective of the hybrid approach to ensure that sustainability measures  factor in 
as one important consideration in the granting and maintaining of subsidies.  
The next element of the core discipline is Article A.1.1, which sets out the two -tiered sustainability 
conditionality as well as certain notification requirements thro ugh which the conditionality would be 
operationalized. While the text on RD/TN/RL/174 had the two -tiered sustainability -based  
conditionality in two different provisions, i.e. , Articles A.1.1 and A.1.2, the current draft restructures 
the two tiers into diff erent subparagraphs of the same provision, i.e. , Article A.1.1.  
The basis for determining the two tiers is the same as that used in RD/TN/RL/174, namely the annual 
aggregate value of fisheries subsidies. Following the circulation of RD/TN/RL/174, Members explored  
the merits and practicalities of a few other criteria for determining the two tiers, including subsidy 
intensity based on catch value, distant water fishing defined using FAO major fishing areas, and 
large-scale industrial fishing. Document RD/T N/RL/184 provided two options to determine the two 
tiers, which were discussed in detail during the Decemb er fish week. While several  Members 
indicated that they s aw potential in each of these bases for the determination of the two tiers, 
practical challenges associated with each  were also identified . Overall, most Members appeared to 
prefer  the aggregate valu e of subsidies as the basis for determining the two  tiers given that it would 
be more practica ble to implement. Hence, the current text would subject the largest subsidizers 
identified based on the annual aggregate level of subsidies to the stricter tier o f the sustainability -
based conditionality.  
The text in RD/TN/RL/174 did not indicate the source of subsidy data that would be used for this 
purpose and included a placeholder for the source , pending further discussions. In subsequent 
discussions, it becam e clear that Members see WTO notifications as the most reliable source of 
information on subsid y amounts . Thus, the  current text indicates that the amount of annual 
aggregate subsidies provided by each Member will be determined  based on its own WTO 
notific ations. The current text also substitutes the placeholder for the number of largest subsidizers 
in the first,  stricter tier , to refer to the  top 20 subsidizers. Given Members' concerns that at present, 
the data contained in the fisheries subsidies notifica tions submitted by Members to the Committee 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ( SCM Committee ) are neither comprehensive nor 
standardized , Article C.4 has been included in the draft text. This provision , as explained below, is 
intended to provide the  basis for creating a robust database on Members' annual aggregate subsid y 
amounts , which in turn would facilitate giving effect to  the two tiers in Article A.1.1.  
Furthermore, in order to operationalize this, Members might consider adding either to the di scipline 
in Article A.1.1 or in a footnote, a description of how the list of the 20 largest providers of fisheries 
subsidies would be established. One solution could be to circulate a document based on the notified 
information under Article C.4 within a specified timeframe. Members may also wish to consider how 
to ensure that non -notification by some Members would not disadvantage Member s that provide this 
information in terms of esta blishing the list of 20 largest providers of fisheries subsidies.   
The stricter of the two tiers is contained in Article A.1.1(a). This provision stipulates that a subsidy 
would not be inconsistent with Article A.1 if the subsidizing Member demonstrate d that measures 
were implemented that c ould reasonably be expected to ensure that the relevant fish stocks were 
at a biologically sustainable level. The provision also would require Members falling in this tier to 
make this demonstration no later than three m onths after a new subsidy program me came  into 
effect, and thereafter in its regular notifications of fisheries subsidies.  
Article A.1.1(b) sets out the second tier  of the discipline , which would be of general application and 
would apply in respect of Memb ers not among the top 20 largest subsidizers. This provision stipulates 
that a subsidy would not be inconsistent with Article A.1 if the subsidizing Member demonstrate s TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  through its regular notifications of fisheries subsidies that measures are implemented to maintain 
the relevant fish stocks at a biologically sustainable level. The requirements of Article A.1.1(b) differ 
from those of the stricter tier contained in Article A.1.1(a) in two ways.  
The first difference  is in the  sustainability -based conditiona lity contained in the two provisions. The 
sustainability -based conditionality  in Article A.1.1(b) is the same as that contained in Article 5.1.1 
of W20. On the other hand, t he sustainability -based conditionality in the stricter tier, i.e. , 
Article  A.1.1(a) , responds to the call by several Members that the sustainability -based conditionality 
applicable to the largest subsidizers should be tightened  further to discipline the largest subsidizers 
effectively. To this end, the phrase "to maintain " that appeared in W20 has been replaced in 
Article  A.1.1 (a) with " that can reasonably be expected to ensure " the relevant fish stocks at a 
biologically sustainable level. This language reflect s ideas emanating from the discussion of 
suggestions to replace  the language "to maintain" with "which maintain". In the discussion, several 
Members expressed the view that "which maintain" would be an impossible standard to meet , and 
as an alternative some Members suggest ed the language "can reasonably be expected to  ensure " 
as a stricter standard than "to maintain".  
The second difference  between the two tiers is in the periodicity of notifications  that Members would 
have to follow to fulfil the sustainability -based conditionality . The 20 largest subsidizers w ould be 
obliged to submit the notifications referred to in Article A.1.1(a) no later than three months after a 
new subsidy program came into effect as well as in their regular notifications of fisheries subsidies . 
The other  Members , pursuant to  Article A.1.1(b) , would have to submit the notifications referred to 
in that provision only in their regular notifications of fisheries subsidies.  
Article A.1.1(c) contains additional requirements concerning the notifications through which 
Members would invoke the sustainab ility-based conditionality. The notifications referred to in 
Article  A.1.1 would form the basis for evaluating  the consistency of subsid ies with the sustainability -
based conditionalit ies in Articles A.1.1(a) and A.1.1(b) . Accordingly, Article  A.1.1(c) would require 
such notifications to be sufficiently precise to enable that evaluation  to be made . This requirement 
is intended to place Members' notifications  at the centre of the demonstration of  their compliance 
with the disciplines. Article  A.1.1(c) als o speci fies certain information to be  include d in the 
notifications  referred to in Article s A.1.1(a) and A.1.1(b). Notably, Article  A.1.1(c) applies to 
Articles  A.1.1(a) and A.1.1(b) alike.  
Article A.1.2 of the draft operationalizes c ertain aspects of the  Committee review process of 
Members'  compliance with the sustainability -based conditionality . In particular, this provision allows 
other Members to pose questions and seek clarifications about the information referred to in 
Article  A.1.1 and establishes r ules for the subsidizing Members' responses. This provision is 
materially the same as Article A.1.3  of RD/TN/RL/174, with certain adjustments intended to replicate  
more closely  the language in Article  8.5 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies .  
Article A .1.3 reinforces  the core discipline by stipulating that non -notification or a notification 
manifestly inconsistent with Article A.1.1 would lead to the application of the prohibition in Article  A.1 
to the subsidy in question. The word "manifestly" has been  added to this provision to ensure that it 
does not capture inadvertent errors or omissions in the relevant notifications . 
Article A.1 retains certain other elements contained in footnotes to the Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies and reflected in previous d raft texts . First is footnote 1 to Article A.1 , which clarifies that 
this Article (the core disciplines on subsidies contributing to overcapacity) would not apply to 
subsidies to the extent they regard stocks that are overfished. This provision was contained in W20 
to indicate that such subsidies are dealt with under Article 4.3 of the Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies . Second is footnote 2 and 3 , which are identical to footnote 11 of the Agreement on 
Fisheries Subsidies  defining "biologically sustainable level". Third is footnote 4, which is identical to 
footnote  14 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies  defining shared stocks.  
Article A.2  
Article A.2 contains a prohibition on subsidies contingent on fishing  or fishing -related activities  
outside the subsidizing Member's jurisdiction. This provision is a standalone discipline,  and its 
drafting remains unchanged from  the counterpart provision of RD/TN/RL/ 174 except for an 
additional footnote , footnote 6 . The purpose of this f ootnote is to address  a concern of some TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  Members that their subsidies could be prohibited solely because the  maritime zone s under their 
jurisdiction do not have a definitively determine d EEZ . 
The draft retains  the placeholder  for Article A.2(b)  as our discussions show that Members  continue 
to hold different views as to whether and what kind of flexibility from such a prohibition might be 
appropriate, and how any such flexibility would operate. Some Members consider that flexibility from 
the prohibition in A.2(a) should be provided for non -collection from operators or vessels of 
government -to-government access fees, subject to sustainability requirements (as was the case in 
W20). Other M embers consider that such a prohibition should not be free -standing, but instead 
should be treated the same as any other subsidies listed in Article A.1, including (as was the case 
in W5) being eligible for the sustainability -based qualifications to the pr ohibition.  During recent 
discussions, proposals were submitted to provide flexibility for developing Members and to provide 
for more transparency.  Some Members consider that there should be no flexibility in respect of this 
prohibition.  
2  ARTICLE B: SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
Article B contains provisions on special and differe ntial treatment (SDT) for developing Members and 
LDC Members in relation to the draft disciplines on subsidies concerning overcapacity and 
overfishing. Given Members' overall po sitive reactions to the rearrangement of the provisions in this 
pillar as presented in document RD/TN/RL/184 , the SDT provisions in the present text reflect the 
same order . These SDT provisions largely reflect the corresponding provisions in documents 
RD/TN/RL/174 and RD/TN/RL/184 , given that many Members called for more clarity on the main 
disciplines in order to inform additional discussions on SDT . As such, the only significant 
amendments made to the  SDT provisions in Article B are those related to opera tionaliz ing the 
two-tier sustainability -based conditionality in Article s A.1.1 (a) and A.1.1 (b).  
Article B. 1 
Article B. 1 provides for SDT for LDC Members  and graduating LDC Members , and it largely reflects 
the counterpart provisions in documents RD/TN/RL/ 174 and RD/TN/RL/184 . The language " under 
the competence of a relevant RFMO/A " has been replaced with " under the competence of a n RFMO/A 
through which the Member has fishing rights"  to provide more clarity . 
Article B.2  
Article B.2 mirrors the language of the corresponding provisions in documents RD/TN/RL/174 and 
RD/TN/RL/184, exempting from th e disciplines in Article A.1 developing Members that fall below a 
de minimis threshold based on their share of global marine capture productio n. A footnote has been 
added to clarify that this provision also applies to graduated LDC Members that fall below this 
de minimis threshold after the expiry of the transition period referred to in Article B.1.  The brackets 
around [0.8] have been retained g iven the existing divergences among Members regarding the 
appropriate share of global marine capture production to use as the threshold .  
Article B.3  
The transition period in Article B.3 has been modified to reflect the new structure of the two -tier 
sustai nability -based conditionality . As before , Article B.3 would apply only to developing Members 
that are neither  LDCs nor below the de minimis  level of capture production . In addition,  the article 
would not apply to developing Members falling under Article B.6 . Furthermore , as was done in 
Article  B.1, the phrase "under the competence of a relevant RFMO/A" has been replaced with "under 
the competence of an RFMO/A through which the Member has fishing rights".   
Keeping in mind that some developing Members could fall within the first tier, Article B.3 (a) provides 
two transition periods. First, a developing Member falling under this provision would , without having 
to meet the sustainability -based conditionality, have a maximum of [X] years  after entry into force 
of the disciplines  to grant or maintain the subsidies referred to in Article A.1 within its exclusive 
economic zone and in the area and for species under the competence of an RFMO/A through which 
the Membe r has fishing rights . Second, a developing Member falling under this provision that would 
be amongst th e top 20 subsidizers would  have an additional maximum of [Y] years after the TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  [X] years , during which  it could apply Article A.1.1 (b) instead of Article A.1.1 (a) . Sub -
paragraphs  (b) and (c) remain largely unchanged from RD/TN/RL/184.  
Article B.4  
Although  Article B.4 has been the subject of numerous discussions, including  in dedicated sessions, 
Members' views still diverge on how best to identify the vulnerable fishing communities that the 
provision seeks to safeguard . During the latest discussions, Members noted that providing more 
clarity on the main disciplines could subsequently pro vide more clarity on the discussions regarding 
Article B.4 . As such, th e drafting of th is provision remain s largely unchanged from its counterpart in  
document RD/TN/RL/184 . However, I draw your attention to the bracketed [and][or] which reflect 
the latest discussion on this issue.  Similar to Article B.3, this provision would apply only to developing 
Members that are neither  LDCs nor below the de minimis  level of capture production. I n addition, i t 
would not apply to developing Members falling under Article B.6.  
Article B.5  
Article B.5 is identical to the counterpart provision in document RD/TN/RL/184 . It reflects the view 
that Members availing themselves of SDT provisions should nevertheless aim to provide subsidies 
in a sustainable manner, with a view to a voiding contributing to overcapacity and overfishing.  
Article B.6  
Article B.6 excludes certain developing Members from applying the SDT provisions , namely, 
Articles  B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 .  
While different criteria have been discussed in this regard , the present text reflects an idea that has 
been recently explored  – that is, identif ying Members based on how  far offshore their vessels conduct  
fishing  or fishing -related  activities. During those discussions , Members sought to articulate what 
they describe as far "distant water fishing ", while also seeking to avoid defining this term at the 
WTO. However, some Members continued to argue the merits of using  FAO Major Fishing Areas  as 
an indicator.  Previously, some Members had proposed fishing or fishing -related activit ies beyond the 
FAO Major Fishing Area adjacent to the natural coastline. For some Members, that would have meant 
that fishing and fishing -related activit ies very close  to their jurisdi ction would be captured.  By 
proposing to go one FAO Major Fishing Area further out, this can be avoided. This provision  thus 
refers to Members that conduct fishing or fishing -related activities "in any area further than one FAO 
Major Fishing Area beyond the one(s) adjacent to its natural coastline " and would exclude  those 
Member s from the scope of Articles B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4. Overall, this would mean that developing 
Members falling  under Article B.6 would apply Article A. 1.1 from the entry into force  of these 
disciplines .  
3  ARTICLE C: NOTIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY  
Article C sets forth notification and transparency provisions.  
Article C.1 clarifies that in addition to the specific notification obligations set out in these d isciplines, 
Members are required to comply with their notification obligations under Article  25 of the SCM  
Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. This provision is identical to its 
counterpart in document RD/TN/RL/ 174. It should be noted that Article C.1 would not affect the 
operation of footnote 13 in the Agreement on Fisheries Subsi dies, which provides that LDCs and 
developing Members with an annual share of the global volume of marine capture production not 
exceeding 0.8 per cent can notify certain specified information every four years , rather than every 
two years as is the case fo r other Members.  
Article C.2(a) pertains to the notification of information indicating the use of forced labour by vessels 
or operators. This provision is identical to its counterpart in RD/TN/RL/174 . Many Members consider 
that this issue should be dealt w ith outside the WTO , while other Members advocate strongly to 
retain this provision . 
Article C.2(b) pertains to information about government -to-government fisheries access agreements 
or arrangements. This provision is identical to its counterpart in RD/TN/ RL/174 . Although some TN/RL/W/277/Add.1  
 
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  Members consider that sub-item (iii) should be deleted , other Members not e that in addition to the 
obligation being "to the extent possible", this provision should be read together with Article 8.8 of 
the Agreement on Fisheries Subsid ies. 
Article C.3 provides for the notification of information concerning non-specific fuel subsidies. This 
provision is identical to its counterpart in RD/TN/RL/174 . Most Members having expressed views on 
this provision feel strongly that it should not be retained, while some  Members continue to support  
its inclusion . 
Article C.4 responds  to the recent call from several  Members that all Members should  submit 
comprehens ive information regarding their aggregate fisheries subsidies . This provision would be 
key to operationalizing the two tiers in Article A.1.1. It sets out two timelines for Members to submit 
information concerning the aggregate levels of their fisheries su bsidies. The first is for Members to 
submit this information no later than 90 days from the entry into force of these  disciplines. The idea 
behind this requirement is to ensure the operationalization of Article A.1.1 soon after the entry into 
force of the disciplines. The  second is that the reafter, Members would include  this information in 
their regular notification of fisheries subsidies. This would ensure that the allocation of Members in 
the two tiers is based on the latest data and would dynamically tak e into account any changes in 
the amount of subsidies provided by different Members.  
As requested by many Members, t his provision c ould be further  reinforced  by a Ministerial decision 
at MC13 instructing  Members to promptly provide information concerning the aggregate amount of 
their fisheries subsidies  to the WTO Secretariat .  
4  ARTICLE D: OTHER OVERCAPACITY AND OVERFISHING PROVISIONS  
Article  D provides space for insertion of other issues concerning subsidies contributing to 
overcapac ity and overfishing that are not addressed elsewhere.  
The one specific issue referred to in the placeholder in Article  D.1 is non -specific fuel subsidies . While 
some Members continue to advocate strongly for  a substantive provision on non -specific fuel 
subsidies , the majority of Members strongly disagree .  
Article D.2 provides space for other possible provisions that Members may wish to include.  Proposals 
that have been made include disclaimer language about references to the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea; a proposed title for these disciplines; amending footnote 2 of the Agreement 
on Fisheries Subsidies; and including a new footnote in that Agreement.  
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