RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/274
G/SCM/W/284
19February 1996
ORGANIZATION(96-0610)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES TOQUESTIONS POSED BYHONG KONG1CONCERNING THE
NOTIFICATIONS OFCOLOMBIAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS2
Thefollowing communication, dated 19January 1996, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofColombia.
_______________
1. Domestic legalstatus oftheA-DAgreement
1.1 What isthelegalstatus oftheWTO A-DAgreement inColombia? Does ithavetheforce
oflaw? Ifaprovision ofthedomestic legislation isinconflict withtheAgreement, which will
takeprecedence?
TheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement wasincorporated inColombian legislation bymeans of
Law170of1994; consequently, intheevent ofaconflict between Decree 299of1995 andthe
A-DAgreement, thelatter would takeprecedence byvirtue ofitsstatus asahigher enactment.
1.2 AreColombian A-Dofficials required, legally orotherwise, toabide bytheA-DAgreement
intheconduct ofA-Dproceedings, ortoconsult theA-DAgreement, forexample onthe
interpretation ofdomestic legislation?
Theauthorities responsible foranti-dumping investigations arelegally required toabide by
theA-DAgreement, because itisnowpartofdomestic legislation.
2. Judicial review procedures
What judicial review procedures hasColombia putinplace inobservance ofitsobligations
under Article 13oftheWTO A-DAgreement?
Seethetableonthenextpage.
1G/ADP/W/228-G/SCM/W/238.
2G/ADP/N/1/COL/1-G/SCM/N/1/COL/1.G/ADP/W/274
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Judicial Review ofDecisions
Decision Type of
Administrative ActRemedy Authority
Initiation ofthe
investigationINCOMEXResolutionActionforannulment1Administrative Court, first
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount involved.
Council ofState, second
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Preliminary
decision/provision
aldutiesINCOMEXResolutionActionforannulment1Administrative Court, first
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Council ofState, second
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Close of
investigation and
definitive dutiesResolutionMinistryof
Foreign TradeActionforannulment1Administrative Court, first
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Council ofState, second
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Review of
definitive dutiesResolutionMinistryof
Foreign TradeActionforannulment1Administrative Court, first
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
Council ofState, second
orsoleinstance depending
ontheamount.
1Bymeans ofanorder issued on14May 1994, theCouncil ofState indicated that, exceptionally, in
cases involving infringement ofspecific rights, anaction forannulment would beadmissible andtherightwould
berestored. Insuch cases, iftheamount involved wasdeminimis ,theAdministrative Court would have
jurisdiction; otherwise, thecasewould beheard bytheCourt atfirstinstance andbytheCouncil ofState at
second instance.
3. Implementation ofPanel Reports
What isColombia 'spolicy andlawfortheimplementation ofWTO Panel Reports?
Pursuant totheadoption oftheWTO Agreement, Colombia recognized thebinding nature
ofDSBdecisions bymeans ofLaw170of1994. There arenoadditional regulations concerning the
manner ofimplementing suchdecisions.G/ADP/W/274
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4. Anti-circumvention
Article 24oftheDecree provides thatthescope ofadefinitive dutyinforce onimported
products mayextend toparts andcomponents forassembly inColombia onestablishment ofcertain
conditions.
TheWTO A-DAgreement does notcontain anyanti-circumvention provisions. The
Ministerial Conference atMarrakesh adopted adecision torefer theproblem ofcircumvention
ofA-Dmeasures totheCommittee onAnti-Dumping Practices established under theWTO
A-DAgreement forresolution.
4.1 Under Article 24,does itrequire full-fledged investigations onaproduct pursuant to
procedures prescribed intheWTO A-DAgreement andproof ofdumping, injury andcausal link
before anyanti-dumping duties canbeimposed ontheparts andcomponents inquestion? Would
theColombian authorities explain why imported parts andcomponents forassembly are
automatically included within thescope ofanti-dumping duties inforce? How would Colombia
reconcile thisArticle withitsobligations under theWTO A-DAgreement?
Inaccordance withArticle 24ofDecree 299of1994, therehastobeaninvestigation inwhich
thenecessary evidence isestablished fortheimposition ofthemeasure, asdescribed inthesame.
Asregards thewayinwhich Colombia reconciles thisArticle withitsobligations under the
Agreement, please seethefollowing reply.
4.2 DoesColombia anticipate amendment orrepeal ofthisArticle inthelightofitsobligations
under theWTO A-DAgreement?
Colombia considers itdesirable tohaveuniform rules tocontrol avoidance ofanti-dumping
measures, and,itistherefore looking totheCommittee tobegin work onthissubject. Inthemeantime,
however, Colombia considers thatitisnecessary toapply Article 24ofDecree 299inorder toensure
theeffectiveness oftheanti-dumping measures adopted.
5. Final determination ofliability andrefund
Article 9.3oftheWTO A-DAgreement provides thattheanti-dumping dutyshall not
exceed themargin ofdumping. Articles 9.3.1-9.3.3 setouttheprocedures andrequirements for
refunds, withseparate consideration given toassessment ofanti-dumping duties onretrospective
andprospective basis.
Itisnotapparent thatthenotified legislation hasprovided forprocedures andrequirements
forfinal determination ofliability andrefund when themargin ofdumping haschanged.
IstheColombian assessment ofanti-dumping duties carried outonaretrospective or
prospective basis? What aretheprocedures andrequirements forfinaldetermination ofliability
andrefund when themargin ofdumping haschanged? Howwould Colombia ensure compliance
withitsobligations under Article 9.3oftheWTO A-DAgreement?
Anti-dumping duties areimposed onaprospective basis, thatistosayfollowing theissue of
theAdministrative Actimposing theduties, unless there areoccurrences ofmassive imports or
non-fulfilment ofstatements ofintent thathavebeenaccepted (price undertakings), inwhich caseduties
maybeapplied retroactively.G/ADP/W/274
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Article 9.3oftheA-DAgreement isapplicable inColombia, andforthatreason regulations
arebeing devised which setouttheprocedures andrequirements forthedetermination offinalliability
andrefund ofduties where appropriate. Aspreviously mentioned, theA-DAgreement isimplemented
because ithasbeenincorporated indomestic legislation through Law170of1994.
6. Cumulation ofimports forassessment
Article 16provides thatimports from more than twocountries subject toinvestigation
maybecumulated forthepurpose ofassessing thevolume andimpact onthedomestic industry.
Subject tocertain conditions, Article 3.3oftheWTO A-DAgreement permits cumulation
ofimports from more than onecountry inassessing injury ifsuchimports aresimultaneously
subject toanti-dumping investigations.
6.1 Could imports from onlytwocountries becumulated?
Yes,provided always thatthereiscompliance withtherequirements ofArticle 3.3oftheA-D
Agreement.
6.2 Could imports from countries subject toA-Dinvestigation becumulated withimports
from countries subject tocountervailing investigation forthepurpose ofassessing thevolume
andimpact onthedomestic industry?
No,because theinvestigations havetotally different purposes.
7. Comparison methodology
Article 10oftheDecree provides thatnormally thecomparison between thenormal value
andtheexport prices maybemade onthebasis ofweighted averages. If,during thereview period,
thenormal value andtheexport prices vary orexceptional circumstances arise, themargin of
dumping maybecalculated bytheweighted average normal value andthevarious export prices
oronatransaction-to-transaction basis.
Article 2.4.2 oftheWTO A-DAgreement provides that,forthedetermination ofdumping
margins, aweighted average normal value may becompared toprices ofindividual export
transactions onlyifapattern ofexport prices which differ significantly among different purchasers,
regions ortimeperiods isfound and"ifanexplanation isprovided whysuchdifferences cannot
betaken intoaccount appropriately bytheuseofaweighted average-to-weighted average or
transaction-to-transaction comparison".
Would Colombia explain howArticle 10oftheDecree would implement itsobligations
under Article 2.4.2 oftheAgreement toresort toweighted-average-to-individual transaction
comparison onlyinnarrow circumstances defined therein? How would Colombia discharge its
obligation under Article 2.4.2 oftheWTO A-DAgreement which requires theinvestigating
authorities toprovide anexplanation fordeparture from thespecified methods ofcomparison?
Forpurposes ofcomparison between themarket value andtheexport price, Colombia will
apply Article 2.4.2 oftheA-DAgreement because ithasbeenincorporated inColombian legislation
byLaw170of1994.G/ADP/W/274
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8. Sales below cost
Article 5oftheDecree provides thatsales made atalossorbelow costshall beignored
inestablishing thenormal value intheordinary course oftrade ifsuchsaleshavebeenmade within
aperiod between sixmonths andoneyearandinmore than20percentofallsales.
Article 2.2.1 oftheAgreement provides thatprices which arebelow perunitcosts atthe
timeofsalebutabove weighted average perunitcosts fortheperiod ofinvestigation shall be
considered toprovide forrecovery ofcostswithin areasonable period oftimeandtherefore cannot
bedisregarded indetermining normal value.
How would Colombia interpret sales made atalossorbelow costunder Article 5ofthe
Decree, inthelightofitsobligations under Article 2.2.1 oftheAgreement? Howwould Colombia
ensure satisfactory implementation ofitsobligations under Article 2.2.1 apparently without
codifying theprovision tothefullest extent?
TheapplicationofArticle5ofDecree299isconsistentwithArticle2.2.1oftheA-DAgreement;
consequently, iftheprices thatarebelow perunitcostsatthetimeofsalearelower thantheweighted
average perunitcosts fortheperiod ofinvestigation, suchprices arenotconsidered toprovide for
recovery ofcosts within areasonable period oftime.
Colombia hasfully codified thisprovision inLaw170of1994. Inthisway, itensures
compliance withitsobligations inthisrespect.
9. Voluntary price undertakings
Itappears thattheDecree does notprovide foracceptance ofsatisfactory voluntary
undertakings inlieuofimposition ofprovisional measures orA-Dduties envisaged inArticle 8
oftheAgreement.
DoesColombiaacceptsatisfactoryvoluntaryundertakingsinlieuofimpositionofprovisional
measures orA-Dduties envisaged inArticle 8oftheAgreement? Ifso,what isthedomestic legal
basis?
Yes, theyareaccepted inaccordance withArticle 8oftheA-DAgreement, which was
incorporated inColombian legislation bymeans ofLaw170of1994. Suchundertakings areknown
asstatements ofintent andtheprocedure concerning them islaiddown inArticles 17and18of
Decree 299of1994.
10. Omissions
TheWTO A-DAgreement contains many improvements overtheTokyo Round A-DCode.
Weexpect WTO Members would unequivocally reflect these improvements intheir national
legislation. Although most ofthem arereflected inColombian A-Dlegislation, specific statutory
provisions forsome ofthem appear nottobefound ortheprovisions maynotbeadequate. Some
examples areasfollows:
- Start-up costs (Article 2.2.1);
- costs based onactual records (Article 2.2.1.1);G/ADP/W/274
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- factors fordetermination ofmaterial injury (Article 3.7);
- notification tothegovernment oftheexporting country concerned (Article 5.5);
- sampling techniques (Article 6.10);
- newcomer review (Article 9.5)
- duration ofreview investigations (Article 11.4);
- public notice requirements (Article 12);
- procedures foron-the-spot investigation (Annex I);
- procedures regarding useofbestinformation available (Annex II)
Ifthere arenospecific statutory provisions, howwould Colombia ensure itsauthorities
would follow strictly therelevant provisions oftheWTO A-DAgreement onthese issues? How
would Colombia reconcile itsobligations under theWTO A-DAgreement onthese issues with
thelackofspecific statutory provisions?
Colombia hasincorporated theWTO A-DAgreement initsdomestic legislation bymeans of
Law170of1994. Consequently, compliance withtheprovisions itcontains ismandatory, thusensuring
compatibility withcommitments entered intounder theAgreement.