PREPARATORY COMMITTEE PC/SCTE/W/6
FOR THE 17November 1994
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(94-2453)
SUB-COMMITTEE ONTRADE AND ENVIRONMENT Original: English
NGO OBSERVATION OFTHE WORK OFTHE COMMITTEE
ONTRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
Submission bytheUnited States
1. TheUnited States believes thatitisessential tothework oftheCommittee onTrade and
Environment thattheCommittee maintain ahighlevelofcredibility throughout itsproceedings.
Accordingly, itisimportant thattheSub-Committee incorporate, from theoutset ofits
proceedings, sound principles oftransparency initsprocedures. Those sound principles include
allowing interested non-governmental bodies1(NGO 's)whose work isrelevant tothework ofthe
Committee toobserve itsproceedings.
2. Themajority ofthenations thataresignatories totheWTO Agreement havealready
recognized theimportant, constructive rolethatcanbeplayed byNGOs byproviding forsuch
transparency inother contexts.
- Article 71oftheUnited Nations Charter firstestablished thelegitimacy ofan
NGO presence ininternational activities. Through Agenda 21,theUnited Nations
Conference ontheEnvironment andDevelopment builtontheCharter 'searly
directive. Chapter 27ofAgenda 21urged thesignatories tostrengthen theroleof
NGOs andinvite them totakepartintheformulation ofpolicies andinthe
implementation ofdevelopment programmes.
- Chapter 38ofAgenda 21called upon allinter-governmental organizations tomove
towards designing openandeffective means toachieve cooperation andinteraction
withNGOs. Theimportance ofNGO work regarding theAgenda 21
implementation process wasnoted, andthesignatories agreed thatNGOs should
haveaccess toanyUnited Nations reports andinformation.
- TheUruguay Round Final Actsimilarly recognizes thevalue andlegitimacy of
consultation andcooperation withtheNGO community inArticle V(2), which
states thattheGeneral Council maymake appropriate arrangements for
consultation andcooperation withrelevant NGOs.
3. NGOs haveobserved theproceedings oftheUnited Nations andother international
organizations formany years. Many organizations within theUnited Nations family (including
1Suchnongovernmental bodies would include groups representing environmental, developmental andbusiness
interests.PC/SCTE/W/6
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UNEP, UNDP, UNECE andothers) havetaken proactive steps toaddress theinvolvement of
NGOs.
- TheWorld Bank'scurrent Directive onDisclosure ofInformation creates a
presumption infavour ofdisclosure, outside andwithin theBank, intheabsence
ofacompelling reason nottodisclose. Ithasalsoestablished anInspection Panel
toensure thattheBank'srules arebeing followed. TheWorld Bank experience
shows thatbroad external consultations enhance thequality oftheBank's
operations.
- Inaddition totheWorld Bank, theEconomic andSocial Council (ECOSOC) has
granted consultative status totheNGOs from theearliest daysofthe
United Nations. NGOs observe theproceedings ofawiderange of
United Nations organizations, suchastheUnited Nations Environment Programme
andtheCommission onSustainable Development.
4. Other international bodies havealsoallowed NGOs toobserve andinsome instances
participate, some through amore structured approach. Forexample, intheOrganization for
Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD), input ischannelled through "advisory groups",
which represent specific interests. In1962, theOECD created theBusiness andIndustry
Advisory Committee (BIAC), andtheTrade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC). These groups
holdconsultative status withtheSecretariat andmeetannually withtheMinisterial Conference
Chair andtheSecretary-General. Astructured approach along these linesintheviewofsome
observers permits creative, productive input butnonetheless preserves thecountry-to-country
nature oftheorganization.
5. Itisappropriate andhelpful forNGOs toobserve theproceedings oftheCommittee on
Trade andEnvironment since itswork directly involves matters ofbroad public interest, andwill
receive much public attention. Theareas ofwork involve complex andsensitive issues onwhich
there isaneedforcontinued analysis andinformation. Intheareaofenvironment,
non-governmental bodies haveserved aparticularly useful roleasproviders anddisseminators of
suchinformation andexpertise. Many NGOs havebeenactive ininternational forafordecades
andhavecommitted great enthusiasm, aswellassubstantial talent andmoney, toeducating
lawmakers inenvironmental matters. Many oftheirefforts havebeencharacterized bothby
sophisticated identification ofandresearch onenvironmental issues andbyconsiderable assistance
tothegovernment agencies responsible forpolicy choices intherelevant areas.
6. Many nations haveexpressed reservations regarding NGO observation duetopotentially
unmanageable numbers orthepossibly disruptive nature ofhaving them asobservers. The
United States emphatically agrees thatpermitting NGOs toobserve theCommittee onTrade and
Environment proceedings must notbeallowed tointerfere withtheefficient operation ofthe
Committee onTrade andEnvironment. However, ways appropriate tothefunction ofthe
Committee onTrade andEnvironment canbefound toaddress these concerns. Forexample, a
limited number ofseatscould beallowed, withappropriate consideration given tobalance and
diversity. Options existforproductive communication withpractical logistical procedures.
7. TheCommittee onTrade andEnvironment should consider possible methods bywhich to
structure allowing NGOs toobserve. Drawing from theexperience ofother international
organizations, anappropriate structure canbedeveloped thatwould provide sufficient openness
without compromising theCommittee onTrade andEnvironment 'scountry-to-country dialogue
andwithout impeding productive deliberations.PC/SCTE/W/6
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8. TheCommittee onTrade andEnvironment mayalsowishtoconsider defining theNGO
rolewithclear guidelines onwhen observation would beappropriate. Practical reasons existfor
limiting NGO access tocertain Committee onTrade andEnvironment sessions. Noinstitution
could effectively conduct itsbusiness ifevery meeting were made available forpublic discussion.
Thespecific purposes andneeds ofnegotiations, forinstance, would likely preclude thepresence
ofNGO observers incertain aspects ofthenegotiating process. However, theinformation
relevant tomost meetings canbedisclosed without problems.
9. Non-transparent proceedings perpetuate a"fortress" image oftheGATT anddiminish
public confidence in,andsupport for,thework oftheWTO. Thisimage contributes to
misunderstanding andsuspicion ofthedeliberative processes oftheinternational trading system.
Insularity ofthedeliberative processes oftheWTO should notbeallowed toundermine its
progress, norshould openness compromise itseffectiveness. Itisimportant torecognize that
undue limitations onnon-governmental involvement canimpede theflowofideas andinformation
necessary forinformed policy andcantherefore complicate domestic trade liberalization agendas
andslowinternational efforts.
10. TheUnited States hasnodoubt thattheCommittee onTrade andEnvironment canand
should benefit from the"two-way street" thatresults from allowing observation ofitsproceedings
byinterested NGOs. Ifproperly structured, suchpractices could significantly advance the
deliberations ofthegroup andcontribute toanordered andopenconsideration ofthecomplex and
delicate issues thatconstitute itsmandate.