RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/58
G/SCM/W/67
26September 1995
ORGANIZATION(95-2805)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES FROM VENEZUELA CONCERNING QUESTIONS POSED BY
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY1CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION
OFVENEZUELAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS2
Thefollowingcommunication,dated18July1995,hasbeenreceivedfromthePermanentMission
ofVenezuela.
________________
GENERAL
1. Order ofprecedence oflegislation
Please indicate thepurpose ofeachofthetextsnotified totheCommittee (Law Approving
theTreaty, Anti-Dumping Law, Anti-Dumping Regulations andDecision 283).
(a) TheLawofApproval,adoptedbyCongressandenactedbythePresidentoftheRepublic
inDecember 1994, includes thetextsoftheMarrakesh Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization andalltheagreements covered byitandtheannexes thereto.
Theonlythingexcepted fromthisLawaretheso-called Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
UndertheLawofApproval,thecommitmentsenteredintobytheRepublicofVenezuela
when itsigned theWTO Treaties areoperative andmandatory, bothexternally and
internally, andbothforprivate individuals andfortheauthorities.
(b) TheLawonUnfair Foreign Trade Practices 1992 (Anti-Dumping Law) contains
provisionsoninvestigationsconcerningtheapplicationofanti-dumpingorcountervailing
measures, establishes thebodyadministering thesemeasures andregulates themethods
andprocedures tobeapplied.
(c) TheRegulations under theLawonUnfair Foreign Trade Practices 1993 setoutthe
principles andtechnical aspects pertaining totheabove-mentioned law.
(d) Decision 283oftheCommission oftheCartagena Agreement regulates anti-dumping
andcountervailing mechanisms incasesrelating totradebetween themember countries
ofthisintegration agreement.
1G/ADP/W/44-G/SCM/W/52.
2G/ADP/N/1/VEN/1-G/SCM/N/1/VEN/1.G/ADP/W/58
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Inthecaseoftrade between Andean countries, Decision 283takes precedence overanyother
provision, because itrelates tocommunity rules inthecontext ofanintegration agreement.
TheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandtheRegulations thereto fullyapply toimports from
non-Member countries ofWTO. Inthecaseofimports from WTO Member countries, therules
contained intheWTO Agreements takeprecedence overanyother rules contained intheother texts
mentioned.
LIKE PRODUCTS
2. Likeproducts
Could theauthorities explain howArticle 6oftheRegulations(which defines the"like
product" inrelation totrade marks) andfootnote 46oftheSubsidies Agreement (which relates
tothecharacteristics oftheproduct) could berendered compatible?
Article 2.11oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawestablishes thebasic definition ofwhata
likegood istaken tomean. Thedefinition isfurther elaborated inArticles 2to4oftheRegulations
under theLaw. Thedefinition isbased onasetofcharacteristics pertaining tothecharacteristics of
theproduct. Inthisregard, theyareconsistent withthecriterion contained infootnote 46ofthe
WTO Subsidies Agreement.
Foritspart,Article 6oftheRegulations relates solely tocases inwhich, despite differences
intrademarks, thegoods willbedeemed likegoods.
DEFINITION OFSUBSIDIES
3. Mixed bodies
Forthepurposes ofArticle 39oftheRegulations, please supply thedefinition ofamixed
body.
Article 39oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations enumerates cases inwhich (forthe
purposes ofthedefinition ofasubsidy contained intheAnti-Dumping Law) itwillbeconsidered that
agovernment orpublic ormixed bodyconfers anadvantage onanenterprise orindustry. While no
caseofthistypehasarisen todate, forthepurposes ofdetermining subsidies, wewould takemixed
bodies tomean bodies inwhich aState(orStateenterprise) hasamajority equity holding orinsome
wayexercises control overtheirdecisions.
CALCULATION OFBENEFIT
4. Calculation ofbenefit
How inpractice would theamount ofthesubsidy becalculated inthelightoftheterms
ofArticle 41oftheRegulations? How willthebenefit beestimated inthecaseofcredits and
ofcredit guarantees? How willthebenefit becalculated inthecaseoftheprovision ofgoods
orservices orpurchase ofgoods?
Asestablished inArticle 41oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, theCommission 's
consideration ofthesubsidies includes acomprehensive examination oftheirnature andtheirimpact
ontheprices ofthesubsidized good. However, inthefinalanalysis, inkeeping withArticle 10ofG/ADP/W/58
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theAnti-Dumping Law, themost important thing istodetermine theamount ofsubsidy perunitof
subsidized product imported. Itisthisdetermination which, pursuant toArticle 16oftheAnti-Dumping
Law(which establishes thatcountervailing duties maynever exceed theamount ofthesubsidies) it
ispossible toestimate themaximum amount ofcountervailing duties, ifany.
Inthecaseofcredits andcredit guarantees, aswellastheprovision ofgoods orservices or
purchase ofgoods byagovernment (orapublic ormixed body), theamount ofthesubsidy willbe
calculated interms ofthebenefit totherecipient. Inconformity withArticle 14oftheWTO Subsidies
Agreement, theamount ofthesubsidy would consist ineachcaseofthedifference between therates
granted, ortheprices charged orpaid, bytheentity concerned, andthemarket ratesorprices forthe
same services orproducts (inother words, thebenefit totherecipient).
5. Period ofdistribution ofbenefits
CouldVenezuelaexplainhowaperiodof10yearswasestablishedasthebasisforcalculating
distribution ofbenefits, inthecaseofnon-recurrent subsidies, provided forinArticle 45ofthe
Regulations?
Article 45oftheRegulations establishes aperiod of10years forthecalculation ofthespread
ofbenefits inthecaseofnon-recurrent subsidies. AstheArticle indicates, itisonlyabenchmark
foramortization ordepreciation andmayvary"inconformity withgenerally accepted accounting
principles inthecountry inwhich thesubsidy isconferred".
V. GREEN SUBSIDIES AND NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES
6. Green subsidies andnon-actionable subsidies
HowwilltheVenezuelan authorities implement theprovisions ofArticle 8andfootnote 35
oftheSubsidies Agreement?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
willpaydueregard toexceptions covering non-actionable subsidies. Suchexceptions would beincluded
inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
CONSULTATIONS
7. Consultations
Venezuelan legislation makes noreference whatsoever toconsultations before theinitiation
ofanyinvestigation, asprovided forinArticle 13.1oftheSubsidies Agreement. Willsuch
consultations beheldbefore theinitiation ofaninvestigation oratlater stages?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping and
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
willpaydueregard totheobligation toholdconsultations withmember countries theproducts ofwhich
aresubject toinvestigation. Thisobligation would beexpressly included inthefuture amendment of
theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.G/ADP/W/58
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DEMINIMIS RULES
8. Deminimis rules
Aredeminimis rules provided forinVenezuelan legislation, asinArticle 11.9ofthe
Subsidies Agreement?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping and
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
willpaydueregard totheprovision contained inArticle 11.9oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement.
Accordingly, theCommission willpromptly terminate investigations ofsubsidies when itisfound that:
(a) There isnotsufficient evidence ofsubsidization orinjury tojustify proceeding further;
(b) theamount ofthesubsidy isdeminimis ;or
(c) thevolume ofimports isnegligible.
Theprovisions regarding thedeminimis rules would beexpressly included inthefuture
amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
STANDING
9. Standing tomake applications
Doyouconsider thatArticle 42oftheAnti-Dumping Lawisconsistent withArticle 11.4
oftheSubsidies Agreement, inregard totherequirement intheAgreement regarding 25percent
ofthedomestic industry?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping and
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
ischecking whether applications toinitiate subsidies investigations aremade byaproducer ornumber
ofproducers representing atleast25percentofdomestic industry, inaccordance withtheprovisions
ofArticle 11.4oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Infact,theCommission hasbeenapplying theevenmorestringent standard setoutinArticle 47
oftheAnti-DumpingRegulations,namely30percentofdomesticproductionofthelikegood.However,
under thisArticle, exceptionally, ifthespecial circumstances oftheproduction structure inquestion
sorequire, theCommission mayuseasabenchmark alower percentage, which maynotbelessthan
20percent(alower percentage regarded asamended to25percentunder theWTO Agreement).
Theprovisions onstanding inorder tomake applications toinitiate investigations would be
included inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
APPLICATIONS
10. Applications
Under Article 37oftheAnti-Dumping Law, "anynatural orlegalperson which produces
inVenezuela goods identical orsimilar tothose allegedly dumped orsubsidized maysubmit to
theTechnical Secretariat oftheCommission anapplication fortheinitiation ofthecorresponding
investigation". What willbedone toensure thatthisprovision iscompatible withtheterms of
Article 11.1andArticle 11.4oftheSubsidies Agreement?G/ADP/W/58
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Article 11.1oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement stipulates that,except inthecaseofinvestigations
initiated exofficio ,investigations ofsubsidies "shall beinitiated upon awritten application byoron
behalf ofthedomestic industry". Inthisrespect, theterms ofArticle 37oftheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Lawarefullycompatible withtherequirements oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Article 11.4oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement stipulates tworequirements forapplications
tobeconsidered asmade "byoronbehalf ofthedomestic industry":
(a) Iftheapplication issupported byproducers representing more than50percentofthe
domestic industry expressing either support fororopposition totheapplication; and
(b) iftheapplication issupported byproducers whoaccount foratleast25percentof
domestic production ofthelikegood.
Aswehavestated, withregard tothesecond point theCommission hasdemanded aneven
higher standard thantheonecontained inArticle 11.4oftheSubsidies Agreement. Inthelightof
theterms ofArticle 47oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations, theCommission hasfound thattheapplication
hasbeensubmitted byproducers whoaccount foratleast30percentofdomestic production ofthe
likegood.
Inanycase, asreported, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect,
theCommission ischecking whether applications toinitiate subsidies investigations meet thetwo
requirements setoutinArticle 11.4oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Asstated inthereply totheprevious question, theprovisions onapplications toinitiate
investigations would beincluded inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
11. Exofficio investigations
Under Article 38oftheAnti-Dumping Law, theCommission mayinitiate aninvestigation
exofficio .Willthe"special circumstances" referred toinArticle 11.6oftheSubsidies Agreement
betaken intoaccount?
Despite theprovisions ofArticle 38ofVenezuela 'sAnti-Dumping Law, theCommission has
always regarded exofficio initiation ofaninvestigation asexceptional. Indeed, todatetheCommission
hasnotinitiated anyinvestigation exofficio .
Inanyevent, asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect,
inconformity withtheprovisions ofArticle 11.6oftheSubsidies Agreement, theCommission will
onlyinitiate investigations exofficio inexceptional circumstances, when ithassufficient evidence of
theexistence ofasubsidy, injury tothedomestic industry andacausal link.
INVESTIGATION
12. Access tothetextoftheapplication
Thesingle paragraph ofArticle 42oftheAnti-Dumping Law contains noreference
whatsoever totheobligation under Article 12.1.3 oftheSubsidies Agreement toprovide thefull
textoftheapplication totheknown exporters. Willtheauthorities fulfil thisobligation?G/ADP/W/58
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Despite terms ofArticle 42oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandArticle 69ofthe
Regulations, thedecision toinitiate aninvestigation isnotified bytheCommission notonlytothe
applicants andimporters butalsotoallother interested parties known atthattime, including theother
domestic producers oflikegoods andtheproducers andexporters ofthegoods investigated. This
notification includes acopyoftheinitiation order, which contains thebasic matters pertaining tothe
application andtheCommission 'sconsiderations.
Inaddition, decisions toinitiate investigations (likeother decisions bytheCommission inthe
course ofinvestigations) arepublished intheOfficial Gazette oftheRepublic ofVenezuela. The
applicants arerequired topublish anotice containing anextract from theinitiation decision intwo
newspapers withalarge national circulation, specified bytheCommission. Allthese notifications
expressly mention theopportunity fortheinterested parties ofappearing before theCommission to
present theirallegations andevidence.
Pursuant toArticle 44oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, theapplicant, theimporters,
theexporters andother interested parties havefullaccess totheinformation contained inthefileon
eachcase, except information which hasbeendeclared confidential. Inthisrespect, inconformity
withArticle 12.1.3 oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement, inthecourse oftheinvestigation, theexporters
andother interested parties willbeprovided notonlywiththefulltextofthewritten application but
alsowithother elements forming partofthefileonthecase.
Theobligation toprovide information onthewritten application would beexpressly included
inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
13. Rules onevidence
TheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 45oftheAnti-Dumping Lawrefers torules onthenature
andevaluation ofevidence thatarecontained intheCode ofCivil Procedure. Could youexplain
what theconsequences ofthisreferral are? Does thisimply adeviation from therules contained
intheSubsidies Agreement? Ifso,onwhat points?
TheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 45oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawrefers totherules
onthenature andevaluation ofevidence thatarecontained intheCode ofCivilProcedure. Thisreferral
iswarranted because, neither theAnti-Dumping LawnortheRegulations northeAdministrative
Procedures Organizational Lawcontain detailed rules onthenature andevaluation ofevidence.
However, theCommission hasapplied these provisions onlyinsofarastheycontain rules
applicable tothenature ofCommission proceedings.
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
willpaydueregard toalltheprovisions oftheWTO Agreements onevidence, andinparticular the
terms ofArticle 12oftheSubsidies Agreements. Inother words, therules intheCode ofCivil
Procedure willbeusedonlyasasupplementary instrument forpoints notresolved byArticle 12of
theSubsidies Agreement inmatters pertaining toevidence.
14. Period forreplying toquestionnaires
Article 70oftheAnti-Dumping Regulation doesnotspecify theperiod forreplying to
questionnaires. How willthisperiod bedetermined?G/ADP/W/58
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Article 70oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulation doesnotinclude aspecified time-limit
fortheparties toreply tothequestionnaires; itsimply states thattheparties willreply tothe
questionnaires "within thetime-limit laiddown intheaforesaid documents". TheTechnical Secretariat
oftheCommission hastraditionally granted aperiod of30daysasfromreceipt ofthequestionnaires.
However, asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect,
theTechnical Secretariat oftheCommission willtakeaccount oftheterms ofArticle 12.1.1 ofthe
WTO Subsidies Agreement, granting aperiod ofatleast30daysfrom receipt ofthequestionnaires,
andwillpaydueregard toanyrequest foranextension ofthetime-limit.
Such rules would beincluded inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations.
15. Manifestly frivolous ormalicious applications
What would beconsidered manifestly frivolous ormalicious applications under theterms
ofArticle 59oftheAnti-Dumping Law?
Article 59oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawtriestoprevent applications foranti-dumping
orsubsidiesinvestigationsbeingmadeasatooltoattackimports.Inthisrespect,theAnti-DumpingLaw
goesfurther thantheWTO Agreements byimposing fines forcases inwhich aninvestigation is
terminated andtheapplication isregarded ashaving beenmanifestly frivolous ormalicious. Atthe
same time, theLawexpressly protects anyrights oftheparties concerned bytheinvestigation insuch
instances, sothattheycanbring civilproceedings against theapplicants.
Anydetermination astowhether anapplication wasmanifestly frivolous ormalicious willbe
made oncompletion oftheinvestigation andonthebasisofanexamination oftheinformation collected
inthecourse ofinvestigation. Frivolous ormalicious applications would beapplications submitted
fornoreason orforreasons other thantoseekprotection against injury caused bydumping practices
orsubsidies. Such malice orfrivolity would alsohavetobemanifest, inthatitisobvious from an
examination ofthecase.
INJURY
16. Reciprocity ofproof ofinjury
TheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 11oftheAnti-Dumping Lawestablishes thatproof of
injury willnotberequired andtheexistence ofinjury maybepresumed when suchproof ofinjury
isnotrequired inthecountry ofexport oroforigin. How would thisprovision becompatible
withArticle 17.1(b) oftheSubsidies Agreement?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
maynotimpose anycountervailing measure unless theexistence ofthesubsidy, theinjury andthe
causal linkhasbeendemonstrated, inaccordance withtheWTO Subsidies Agreement.
However, theprovision intheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 11oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Law, which establishes thatproof ofinjury willnotberequired andtheexistence ofinjury maybe
presumed when suchproof ofinjury isnotrequired inthecountry ofexport oroforigin isstillfully
operative. Thereason isthattheAnti-Dumping Lawapplies:G/ADP/W/58
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(a) ToWTO Member countries, totheextent thatitisnotinconsistent with the
Agreements; and
(b) toother countries, infull.
Asindicated inthequestion, allWTO member countries must prove injury before theycan
impose anycountervailing measure. Accordingly, theonlycountries falling under theprovisions of
Single Paragraph ofArticle 11oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawarecountries which donotgrant
suchproof ofinjury, inother words, countries which arenotmembers ofWTO.
17. Associated producers
Under theprovisions ofArticle 48oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations, what criterion will
beusedtodetermine whether producers areassociated? Willitbethesame criterion asmentioned
infootnote 48oftheSubsidies Agreement?
Article 48oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations laysdown that,forthepurposes of
determining injury orthreat ofinjury, producers associated withexporters willnotbeincluded among
domestic producers. Thiscomplies fully withtheterms ofArticle 16.1 oftheWTO Subsidies
Agreement.
Forthispurpose,thedefinitionofassociatedpersonsisincludedinArticle2.16oftheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Lawandisinconformity withfootnote 48oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement.
18. Growing domestic production
Howwillsignificant andsustained growth bedetermined forthepurposes oftheprovisions
ofthesingle paragraph ofArticle 48oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations ?
TheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 48oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations stipulates
that,when thedomestic production oflikegoods isnegligible, itmaybedetermined thatthere isno
injury orthreat ofinjury tothedomestic industry. Inthisconnection, under thesameArticle, production
shallbeconsidered negligible when (after thedeductions provided forinthesame Article), itaccounts
for5percentorlessoftheconsumption oflikegoods inthecountry.
Theexception withregard totheabove iswhen itisdemonstrated that,although negligible,
thedomestic industry hasexperienced asignificant andsustained growth overaperiod which allows
ittobereasonably inferred thatthere willbeasimilar growth trend inthefuture.
Insuchcases, todetermine whether itcanbeconsidered thatdomestic industry hasexperienced
significant andsustained growth overaperiod which allows ittobereasonably inferred thattherewill
beasimilar growth trend inthefuture, thelevels ofdomestic production willhavetobeexamined,
bothinabsolute terms andrelative tothevolume ofthedomestic market, andalsothesector 's
productivity performance during theperiod inquestion.
19. Import volumes/elements ofinjury
Article 50oftheRegulations establishes percentages todetermine whether theimports
aresignificant, butthenstates thatthese percentages canbechanged "ifthecircumstances of
thecasesorequire ".Please elaborate andexplain. Foritspart, Article 15oftheSubsidies
Agreement states thatnoonefactor byitself orseveral ofthem cannecessarily givedecisive
guidance, butthewhole situation should beconsidered. Isthisnotinconsistent withtheprovisions
ofArticle 50oftheRegulations totheeffect thattwofactors areenough?G/ADP/W/58
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A. Volume ofimports
TheWTO Subsides Agreement doesnotestablish anyprecise volume fordetermining whether
imports ofsubsidized goods aresignificant.
Inthisrespect, Article 50.1oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations goesfurther and
establishes apercentage todetermine thesignificance ofimports, taking asabenchmark thedomestic
production oflikegoods. ThisArticle specifies thatthevolume ofimports ofdumped orsubsidized
goods shallbeconsidered significant when itrepresents atleastfivepercent(5%) ofthedomestic
production oflikegoods. TheCommission maybaseitsdecisions ondifferent percentages when, in
itsview, thecircumstances ofthecasesorequire.
Aninstance inwhich theCommission could regard subsidized imports assignificant despite
thefactthattheydonotrepresent fivepercentofdomestic production would beiftheyconstituted
asizeable percentage ofthetotalvolume ofimports ofthelikeproduct intoVenezuela, asestablished
inArticle 5.8oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
B. Elements ofinjury
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, theCommission
willimpose nocountervailing measures without firstverifying, interaliatheexistence ofinjury or
threat ofinjury tothedomestic production oflikegoods.
Forthepurposes ofdetermining injury, inconformity with Article 15.7 oftheWTO
Subsidies Agreement, acomprehensive examination willbemade ofallrelevant factors, butnoone
byitself cangivedecisive guidance. However, asstated inthesame Article, theexistence of"the
totality ofthefactors considered mustleadtotheconclusion thatfurther subsidized exports areimminent
andthat,unless protective action istaken, material injury would occur".
Forthepurposes ofthisdetermination, anoverall examination ofthefactors included in
Article 50oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations willcontinue toprovide valid guidance for
theCommission.Nevertheless,theobligationtomakeanoverallanalysisofallaspectscouldbeincluded
inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
PROVISIONAL DUTIES
20. Notification ofdecisions
Article 60oftheAnti-Dumping Lawonlymentions theneed tonotify theimporter and
thecustoms authorities (about theapplication ofprovisional measures). Arethe(other) interested
parties alsoinformed andarethey given theopportunity tosubmit information andmake
comments, asprovided forinArticle 17.1oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement?
Despite theprovisions ofArticle 60oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, thedecision to
impose (ornottoimpose) provisional ordefinitive duties isnotified bytheCommission toallinterested
parties, including notonlytheapplicants andimporters, butalsotheother interested parties known,
suchastheother domestic producers oflikegoods andtheproducers andexporters ofthegoods
investigated. Thisnotification includes acopyofthedecision. Inaddition, decisions toimpose (or
nottoimpose) provisional orfinalmeasures arepublished intheOfficial Gazette oftheRepublic of
Venezuela.G/ADP/W/58
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Furthermore, asstated inthereply toQuestion 12,initiation decisions arealsonotified tothe
interested parties, telling them oftheirrighttosubmit information andallegations.
Theobligation tonotify theother interested parties, including theexporters, ofthemeasures
toimpose duties would beexpressly included inthe future amendment ofthe
Venezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
21. Minimum period fortheimposition ofprovisional duties
There doesnotappear tobeanymention oftheobligation towait60daysfrom thedate
oftheinitiation oftheinvestigation fortheimposition ofprovisional duties. HowwillVenezuela
ensure thatthisrequirement, setoutinArticle 17.3oftheSubsidies Agreement, berespected?
Asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Inthisrespect, inconformity with
Article 14.3oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement, noprovisional measures willbeapplied before 60days
haveelapsed from thedateofinitiation oftheinvestigation.
Thisrequirement would beincluded inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations.
22. Modification ofprovisional duties
Under Article 19oftheAnti-Dumping Law, theCommission canchange theamount of
theprovisional duties imposed. Onwhat criteria orbasis? Would theinterested parties have
theopportunity tosubmit comments inadvance? Would anadditional investigation benecessary?
Inthecourse ofaninvestigation, theCommission hasanopportunity toimpose provisional
countervailing duties. Suchduties areimposed forshort periods, which maynotexceed fourmonths.
Once theduties haveended andtheinvestigation hasnotbeencompleted, theCommission mayor
maynotchoose newprovisional duties. Ifitimposes newprovisional duties, theamount mayvary
interms ofthenew(andbetter) information available atthetime.
23. Extension ofprovisional duties
Article 81oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations permits anextension ofprovisional duties
foruptooneyear. How canthisbereconciled withArticles 17.4oftheSubsidies Agreement?
Inconformity withArticle 81oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations andArticle 17.4
oftheSubsidies Agreement, provisional duties maybeimposed onlyforashort period, which may
notexceed fourmonths. However, aslongastheinvestigation lastsandonthebasisofnewfindings,
newduties could beimposed, forsimilar periods, inorder toprevent injury todomestic production,
untilsuchtimeasthefinaldetermination ismade andopportunities areavailable tocollect more
conclusive information from alarger number ofparties.
UNDERTAKINGS
24. Undertakings
Article23oftheAnti-DumpingLawandArticle56oftheRegulationsdonotseemtorequire
apreliminary affirmative determination ofsubsidization andinjury. How doesthissquare with
therequirements of,forexample, Article 18.2oftheSubsidies Agreement?G/ADP/W/58
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Indeed,neitherArticle23oftheVenezuelanAnti-DumpingLawnorArticle56oftheRegulations
requires apreliminary affirmative determination ofsubsidization andconsequent injury. Thiswould
notbecompatible withtherequirements ofArticle 18.2oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement inthisregard.
However, asstated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies proceedings initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inthisrespect,
inconformity withtheWTO Subsidies Agreement, theCommission would notapprove voluntary
undertakings insubsidies proceedings without therequisite preliminary affirmative determination.
Thisrestriction ontheacceptance ofundertakings would beincluded inthefuture amendment
oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
TERMINATION
25. Extension ofduties
Under Article 57oftheAnti-Dumping Law, theCommission mayextend thedefinitive
duties forafurther fiveyears. What conditions arenecessary forsuchanextension? Would
theinterested parties have theopportunity tosubmit comments? Would anewinvestigation be
carried out?
Under Article 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, when thedefinitive countervailing
duties end,theCommission could extend thedefinitive duties imposed foruptofiveyears more. For
thispurpose, however, theinterested party mustsubmit anapplication before theexpiry oftheoriginal
duties. TheCommission would inthiscaseinitiate anewexamination, affording anopportunity to
allinterested parties tosubmit theirallegations andevidence, forthepurpose ofdetermining whether
expiry oftheduties would again leadtoinjury orthreat ofinjury tothedomestic industry.
Article 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawisnotonlyinconformity withArticle 21.3
oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement butinsome respects itgoesfurther thanwhatwasagreed inWTO.
First, theCommission would onlyextend theduration oftheduties uponapplication bytheinterested
party, andnotexofficio .Second, theduties maybeextended onlyonce.