RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/DSB/M/5
4July1995
ORGANIZATION(95-1822)
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY
31MAY 1995
MINUTES OFMEETING
Held intheCentre William Rappard
on31May1995
Chairman: Mr.Donald Kenyon (Australia)
Subjects discussed: Page
1. United States -Standards forreformulated andconventional gasoline 1
- Request byBrazil fortheestablishment ofapanel 1
2. United States 'autoandautoparts issues: USunilateral measures 3
- Statement byJapan 3
3. Japan'sautomotive barriers andrestrictive practices 9
- Statement bytheUnited States 9
4. Indicative listofgovernmental andnon-governmental panelists 11
- Administration oftheindicative list 11
5. Standing Appellate Body 12
- Statement bytheChairman 12
6. EEC -French regulations concerning thetrade description ofscallops 13
7. Communications under theDSU 13
- Announcement bytheChairman 13
8. Time-periods under theDSU andother covered agreements 14
- Announcement bytheChairman 14
1. United States -Standards forreformulated andconventional gasoline
- Request byBrazil fortheestablishment ofapanel (WT/DS4/2)
TheChairman recalled thatatits10April meeting theDispute Settlement Body (DSB) had
established apanel inaccordance withtherequest byVenezuela contained indocument WT/DS2/2.
Atthatmeeting Brazil hadindicated itsintention toenter intoconsultations withtheUnited StatesWT/DSB/M/5
Page2
concerning thissubject.1Therequest forconsultations byBrazil hadbeencirculated indocument
WT/DS4/1 on12April 1995. Subsequently Brazil hadrequested theestablishment ofapanel in
WT/DS4/2. Hehadbeen informed thatpursuant toArticle 9oftheDSU inrespect tomultiple
complainants allparties hadagreed thatforpractical reasons thismatter beexamined bythesamePanel
already established attherequest ofVenezuela on10April 1995. Parties hadalsoagreed thatthe
dateoftheconstitution ofthepanel specified indocument WT/DS2/3, namely 28April 1995, would
remain unchanged. Duetotheadditional taskgiven totheinitial panel heproposed thattheterms of
reference agreed on28April 1995andcontained indocument WT/DS2/3 could readasfollows: "To
examine, inthelightoftherelevant provisions ofthecovered agreements citedbyVenezuela indocument
WT/DS2/2 andbyBrazil indocument WT/DS4/2, thematters referred totheDSBbyVenezuela and
Brazil inthose documents andtomake such findings aswillassist theDSB inmaking the
recommendations oringiving therulings provided forinthose agreements." Finally, herecalled that
Article 9.2oftheDSUrequired inthiscontext, that"therights which theparties tothedispute would
haveenjoyed hadseparate panels examined thecomplaints areinnowayimpaired."
Therepresentative ofBrazil saidthatasindicated bytheChairman, Brazil hadinformed the
DSBatitsmeeting on10April 1995ofitsintention toenter intoconsultations withtheUnited States
concerning thestandards forreformulated andconventional gasoline adopted bytheUSEnvironmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in1993. Brazil believed thattheabove-mentioned "Gasoline Regulation"
wasinconsistent withtheUnited States 'obligations under theGATT 1994 andtheAgreement on
Technical Barriers toTrade (TBT). Consultations heldon1May 1995 hadfailed toproduce a
satisfactory solution tothismatter. Brazil wastherefore requesting theestablishment ofapanel in
accordance withArticle XXIII:2 oftheGATT 1994, Article 14oftheTBTAgreement andArticles
4and6oftheDSU.
Thesettlement ofthisdispute wasimportant inmany ways. Thiswas,asallknew, oneof
thefirstcases presented tothedispute settlement mechanism which hadbeenagreed under theUruguay
Round anddesigned toestablish arule-oriented multilateral trading system. Twobasicprinciples were
involved inthisdispute: (i)them.f.n clause contained inArticle IoftheGeneral Agreement; and
(ii)thenational treatment obligation contained inArticle IIIoftheGeneral Agreement andinArticle
2oftheTBTAgreement. Therefore, thisprocedure would haveabearing notonlyontheMembers
directly affected bythe"Gasoline Regulation" butonallthose whowerecommitted tothemaintenance
andstrengthening ofthemultilateral trading system. HisGovernment wasaware thatthisdispute might
alsohavedomestic environmental implications intheUnited States. Therefore, hewished tomake
itclearthathisGovernment didnotquestion theenvironmental objectives ormerits ofthe"Gasoline
Regulation" buttheconformity oftheinstruments usedbytheUnited States toachieve those objectives
withtheWTOAgreement.InBrazil'sviewsuchinstrumentsshouldalwayscomplywiththeinternational
obligations andshould notadversely affect tradewithWTO Members. Brazil believed thatthe"Gasoline
Regulation" established less-favourable conditions toimported fuelsthantogasoline produced inthe
United States. Theapplication ofthe"Gasoline Regulation" hadhadanadverse effect onexports of
suchproduct from Brazil, therefore, nullifying andimpairing itsrights under theWTO Agreement.
According totheUnited States 'statistics, since theenforcement ofthe"Gasoline Regulation" exports
ofBrazilian gasoline totheUnited States haddeclined fromsome fivehundred barrels, valued atalmost
US$8 million dollars inthefirsttwomonths of1994, tozerointhesame months of1995. Brazil was
therefore seeking toredress thissituation through themultilateral mechanism inaccordance withthe
WTO rules.
Therepresentative oftheUnited States confirmed thatconsultations withBrazil ontheabove-
mentioned subject hadfailed tosettle thisdispute andthatunder thecircumstances theUnited States
1WT/DSB/M/3 .WT/DSB/M/5
Page3
concurred withBrazil 'srequest fortheestablishment ofapanel. Healsoconfirmed thattheUnited
States hadnoobjection tothereformulation oftheterms ofreference asreadoutbytheChairman.
Therepresentatives ofCanada, theEuropean Communities andNorway saidthattheywished
toreserve theirthird-party rights inthisdispute.
Therepresentative ofVenezuela confirmed thathiscountry agreed totheterms ofreference
readoutbytheChairman andthatthedatefortheconstitution ofapanel -28April 1995 -would be
maintained. Hesaidthatarguments concerning thisdispute hadalready beenputforward onmany
occasions byVenezuela andtherefore hedidnotwishtoreiterate them atthepresent meeting.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements andagreed withtherequest byBrazil
fortheestablishment ofapanel, andthatasprovided forinArticle 9.2oftheDSUinrespect ofmultiple
complainants, thePanel established on10April 1995toexamine thecomplaints byVenezuela should
alsoexamine thecomplaints byBrazil referred totheDispute Settlement Body indocument WT/DS4/2,
andagreed totheterms ofreference readoutbytheChairman.
2. United States 'autoandautoparts issues: USunilateral measures
- Statement byJapan
TheChairman saidthatthisitemwasontheAgenda attherequest ofdelegation ofJapan and
invited therepresentative ofthatdelegation tointroduce thisitem.
Therepresentative ofJapan2saidthattheUnited States continued toinsist ontheexpansion
andrenewal oftheparts purchasing planbytheJapanese automobile manufacturers, andonsetting
atarget forthenumber offoreign vehicle dealers. Thiswasthereason fortheimpasse inthebilateral
negotiations. Japan could never agree toanumerical targets approach orgovernment intervention
inprivate business activities. Japan brought thiscasetotheWTO following theunilateral measures
announced bytheUnited States. Although thenewly established WTO wasalready laden withdifferent
matters, there wasnochoice buttobring thiscasetoitsince thiscaseimpinged onbasic principles
ofinternational tradeembodied intheWTO Agreement. Japan hadfullconfidence intheWTO where
trade disputes could behandled inanimpartial andde-politicized manner.
With regard tothelegalarguments Japan believed thatthewithholding ofliquidation which
wasannounced on16May1995, combined withtheannouncement oftheproposed imposition of100
percentduties wasdiscriminatory andtherefore violated Article IofGATT 1994. Theimposition
of100percentdutiesbytheUnitedStates,ifimplemented,wouldalsoviolateArticleI.Thisimposition
exceeded United States 'bound tariff rateonautomobiles of2.5percent,andifimplemented, would
therefore violate Article II.Thewithholding ofliquidation inthiscasealsofunctioned asadefacto
restriction ontrade, andwasinviolation ofArticle XI.Since thisrestriction applied onlytoJapan,
itwasdiscriminatory andthusviolated Article XIII. Theaffirmative determination made on10May
under Section 301,thecurrent withholding ofliquidation andtheproposed imposition oftariffs also
violated Article 23oftheDispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which specifically prohibited such
unilateral actions. Inaddition, thewithholding ofliquidation inthiscasewasnullifying andimpairing
ofthebenefit accruing toJapan from the2.5percentbound tariff rateonautomobiles under
Article XXIII:1(b). There hadbeenreasonable expectations thattheUStariffs onautomobiles would
besetat2.5percent. Thewithholding ofliquidation andthethreat of100percenttariffs undermined
these expectations anddisrupted thecompetitive relationships inluxury carmarkets. Japan believed
2Thefullstatement byJapan wascirculated inWT/DSB/COM/1.WT/DSB/M/5
Page4
thatthiswasa"case ofurgency". ThetwoMembers should startconsultations assoonaspossible,
before thesituation worsened withtheimplementation ofadditional retaliatory measures. Thecurrent
WTO violations should beredressed immediately. Ifthissituation could notberesolved quickly, the
dealer networks handling Japanese luxury carswould beadversely affected andbeforced tofire
employees andfacebankruptcy. Many might notsurvive. Without prompt action, theUnited States '
actions would bring about unrecoverable damage. IftheWTO could notquickly resolve thisdispute
involving clear violation ofrules, itscredibility would beendangered.
Theamount oftheunilateral punitive tariff measure hadbeenbased onthealleged unfairness
oftheJapanese market, butnobasis hadbeenprovided foritsalleged US$5.9billion damages. The
United States hadanobligation toexplain andjustify these figures toJapan andtotheparties affected
bythemeasures. Thislackoftransparency could never beoverlooked. Japan believed thiscaseshould
beconsidered asa"case ofurgency". Therequest forurgency ought tobepursued andJapan reserved
allrights tothiseffect. Even inanormal case, theconsultations hadtobegin within 30daysafter
thereceipt oftherequest forconsultation, i.e.,notlaterthan15June1995. Japan alsobelieved that
theconsultations should beheldinGeneva.
Itwasencouraging thattheUnited States hadnotasked fornumerical targets initsstatement
made intheCouncil forTrade inGoods on29May. Inthepast,however, thesenior USofficial had
made similar comments, butthenthesame official hadsaidthatrequesting afuture number ofdealers
handling foreign automobiles wasnotanumerical target. Japan hoped thatthistimethestatement
bytheUnited States wasnottherhetoric heard several times inthepast. Japan requested theUnited
States toclarify itspolicy change anditsdecision tostoprequesting theexpansion andrenewal ofparts
purchasing plans, andatarget forthenumber offoreign vehicle dealers. Thispolicy change would
make iteasier forJapan andtheUnited States toreach aconclusion onthismatter. Although theUnited
States claimed thattheunilateral measures hadnotyetbeenimplemented, thewithholding oftariff
liquidation hadalready beenimplemented asof20May1995, andithadbeenannounced withjust
afour-day notice before itsactual implementation. TheUnited States should haveknown thatittook
about twoweeks, ontheaverage, forocean shipments toarrive from Japan, andthisannouncement
would therefore affect shipments already underway. Japanese automobile companies hadbeenforced
tochange thedestination ofautomobiles already onboard, andtostopshipments ofcarswhich were
about tobeshipped. Sofar,thisdamage alone hadamounted to¥9.2billion (approximately
US$108million). Moreover, thecompanies alsohadtodecide tostoptheproduction ofluxury
automobiles forexport totheUSmarket worth ¥8.1billion (approximately US$93million).
Therepresentative oftheUnited States3saidthathisGovernment hadaccepted Japan'srequest
forconsultations, although theirtimeandplace stillhadtobeagreed upon. TheUnited States had
proposed tomeeton20June1995soasnottointerfere withtheG7meeting inHalifax. IfJapan would
reject thisdateanalternative datewould beproposed forconsideration. TheUnited States strongly
disagreed thattheissueraised wasacaseofurgency andother Members should alsoconsider thisissue
keeping inmind theimplications forthefuture. Although the1979 Understanding Regarding
Notification,Consultation,DisputeSettlementandSurveillance(BISD26S/210),GATTdisputesettlement
customary practice andtheApril 1989 rules (BISD36S/61) included special time-frames incases of
urgency, nopanel report hadbeenissued under these procedures. Japan'srequest didnotmeetthe
traditional concept ofurgency assetoutintheDSU andtheApril 1989 rules since thelatter stated
thatcasesofurgencyincludedperishablegoodsonroute,andtheDSUsimplynotedthatcasesofurgency
might include thoserelating toperishable goods. Perishable goods werenotthesubject matter ofJapan's
request. Indeed, Japan'sarguments indicated thaturgent procedures should notbeapplied inthiscase.
AstheUnited States hadnoted intheCouncil forTrade inGoods, Japan'srequest wasbased onactions
3Thefullstatement bytheUnited States wascirculated inWT/DSB/COM/2.WT/DSB/M/5
Page5
thathadnotyetbeentaken. TheUShadnotimposed increased tariffs onimports ofcertain carsfrom
Japan andithadnotdetermined thatJapan hadviolated itsobligations under theWTO Agreement.
Itwascertainly possible toreach amutually acceptable solution ontheseissues thatunderlay theactions
byJapan andtheUnited States. Invocation oftheurgency provisions would drastically shorten the
timeforconsultations andthecomplaining party could request establishment ofapanel ifconsultations
were tofailtosettle thedispute within 30daysafterreceipt oftherequest forconsultations.4Such
apanel would havetoissue itsreport within three months.5
TheDSUclearly indicated thatmutually agreed solutions weretobepreferred. Thetighttime-
frame oftheurgency procedures certainly diminished thelikelihood thattheparties would reach a
mutually agreed solution prior totheissuance ofareport. Japan hadargued thatconsidering "the
possible consequences fortheworld trading system", thismatter wasurgent. Assuming thatthisdispute
involved unusual systemic issues, thisshould bethetypeofcaseinwhich theparties should havethe
timeandopportunity topresent theirrespective cases toapanel andtheAppellate Body forcareful
consideration rather thanaprocess thatrequired: (i)multiple submissions andmeetings withtheparties
tothedispute; (ii)consideration ofthearguments anddrafting areport bythepanel; (iii)submitting
thatreport forinterim review andcomment; (iv)possible additional meetings andrevisions and(v)
circulation ofafinalreport totakeplace within a90dayperiod. TheGATT experience withexpedited
consideration ofadispute under the1966 procedures6hadnotbeenapositive one. Thepanels and
theparties todisputes which followed these procedures hadhaddifficulties meeting thedeadlines and
producing areport thatinspired theconfidence andnecessary support toachieve implementation of
panel recommendations. TheDSU procedures incases ofurgency wereevenmore complex thanthe
1966procedures andtheneedforconfidence inthenewdispute settlement system wasevenmore vital.
Japan hadalsoargued thatthiscasewasurgent because ithadanadverse effect onitsindustries. This
wasnotanunusual condition inthecontext ofarequest forconsultations ortheestablishment ofa
panel. Japan argued thatthemagnitude oftheproposed measure distinguished itfromother disputes.
This, however, should notbeacriterion indetermining whether amatter wasurgent. Putting adollar
(oryen)value ondisputes asameans todetermine whether thematter wasurgent, could inherently
discriminate against smaller industries andeconomies. Acceptance oftheJapanese arguments asto
whatconstituted anurgent matter would mean thatanydispute ofanyeconomic orsystemic importance
could besubject totheextremely tighttime-frames provided forconsideration ofthese cases. This
would likely overwhelm theWTO dispute settlement system. Thenewaccepted rules ondispute
settlement procedures hadforthefirsttimeestablished deadlines forcompleting procedures. Whether
"standard" time-frames, particularly attheendoftheprocess, would prove workable hadstilltobe
determined. Thiswasnotthetimetoimpose thestringent timeconstraints ofan"urgent" case.
Therepresentative ofCanada saidthatthisdispute sentastrong message thatthere wasan
unfinishedtradeagendaandthatnegotiationstoproviderealimprovementsinmarketaccessopportunities
forrealcompetition within domestic markets needed tobeengaged without delay. Members hadworked
hardtoconstruct arules-based system andanimproved dispute settlement system. Threats andcounter-
threats andworse still,implementation ofpunitive trade measures which wereinconsistent withthe
WTO ruleswereputting atriskthesystem onwhich Members hadworked sohardtoconstruct. Parties
tothedispute wereurged toavoid measures inconsistent withtheWTO rules. Ifthisissue could not
beresolved through consultations, theparties should fullycomply withandusetheWTO rules and
itsdispute settlement system.
4DSU Article 4:8.
5DSU Article 12:8.
6Procedures under Article XXIII -Decision of5April 1966 (BISD14S/18).WT/DSB/M/5
Page6
Therepresentative ofHong Kong saidthatalthough Hong Kong didnothaveadirect trade
interest inthisdispute, ithadaconsiderable interest inhelping toensure thattheiroverall commercial
relations remained fundamentally sound sincetheUnited States andJapan wereveryimportant trading
partners ofHong Kong. Traditionally, Hong Kong hadbeenastrong supporter oftherules-based
multilateral trading system, andtherefore hadaveryclose interest inthismatter. Theorigins ofthis
dispute werecomplex anddeep. Bothsidesseemed toharbour asense ofinjustice. Ifabilateral solution
could notbefound quickly bothsidesshould follow theappropriate WTO procedures. Atthemeeting
oftheCouncil forTrade inGoods on29May, theUnited States hadcommitted itselftousetheWTO
tosettle matters which werewithin itsscope. Thishadbeenareassuring andwelcome statement which
hadalsoimplied thatintheviewoftheUnited States therewereaspects ofthisdispute which felloutside
thescope oftheWTO. These aspects needed tobeidentified sothatMembers could haveamore
complete picture ofthedispute. Theaction taken bytheUnited States under Section 301ofitsdomestic
legislation wasdesigned toaddress those aspects ofthecaseapparently falling outside thescope of
theWTO. However theproposed redress, i.e.,raising tariffs, seemed toaffect thebalance ofrights
andobligations ofMembers under theWTO. Thisseemed inconsistent withtheWTO andonewondered
whysuchanapproach hadbeenchosen. Byallaccounts trade hadalready beensignificantly affected
bytheUnited States 'decision towithhold liquidation ofduties onimports ofcertain Japanese cars
asof20May. Thequestion waswhether action which hadsuchadirect effect ontrade should have
beentaken before anyconsideration thereof intheWTO. IftheUnited States wasnotyetinaposition
todealwithquestions likethese inthemultilateral forum, thedispute should besubject tobilateral
consultations. Itwasvitally important forthecredibility oftheneworganisation thattherulessetout
intheDSU were adhered to.
Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities, reiterating points made atthemeeting of
Council forTrade inGoods on29May7saidthatthisissue wasappropriate tobedealt withinthe
DSB. Since theDSBandtheGeneral Council hadthesame membership, adecision could betaken
jointly withtheagreement oftheChairman oftheGeneral Council thatthisissue should notbetaken
upagain intheGeneral Council unless, ofcourse, newelements came upbefore thebeginning ofthe
afternoon. Thisissueshould bedealtwithinadispassionate andobjective manner andinsuchaway
thatitdidnotevolve intoatradewar.Asolution should befound onafriendly basisassoonaspossible.
Suchabilateral solution hadtobefullytransparent andnon-discriminatory. TheJapanese market was
stillgoverned bycertain practices, rulesandregulations, andmultiple provisions which made access
tothatmarket difficult. Although progress hadbeenmade intheareaofderegulation, thematter should
betaken evenfurther. Themethods adopted bytheUnited States hadtobedisapproved without any
reservation.AnnouncingmeasuresunilaterallytakenwasagainsttheUnderstandingondisputesettlement
regardless ofthetradeeffects which werealready evident. NoMember should bebothjudge andparty
toanydispute anddecide foritself thatithadsuffered aprejudice, andtheamount representing the
injury suffered. NoMember wasauthorized totakemeasures tocompensate foranyofthisalleged
injury orprejudice. Itwasforthatreason thatthismatter should bedealtwithrapidly.8
Therepresentative ofBrazil noted thatthedispute between Japan andtheUnited States had
attracted enormous attention ininternational public opinion. Itwasbringing totheforefront tensions
deriving fromeconomic globalization ofaninternational system inaframework ofundefined polarities.
Insuchasystem, achoice hadtobemade between following apaththatwould reinforce alogic of
convergence, i.e.increased trade relations, constructive andprogressive integration ofdifferent parts
oftheworld, orcopewithalogicoffragmentation, i.e.,protectionism, unrestricted escalation oftrade
sanctions, andmanaged tradeflows. Trading partners involved inthisdispute would havetotaketheir
7SeeG/C/M/3,
8Seealsorelated statement attheGeneral Council meeting on31May, item10(WT/GC/M/4).WT/DSB/M/5
Page7
responsibilities and,withtheWTO 'sassistance, taketherightdecisions regarding atleastthreeaspects.
First, theestablishment oftheWTO hadbeenaclearoption fortrade disputes tobesolved ina"rule-
oriented" multilateral framework. Thetextandspirit oftheUruguay Round results hadmade itclear
thatunilateral sanctions didnothaveaplace inasystem ofinternational cooperation andallMembers
should actaccordingly. InthebestGATT tradition, anappeal forconciliation between theparties
involved would bepresented and,failing conciliation, theissueshould bebrought totheWTO. Second,
transparency wasacornerstone principle ofthemultilateral trading system. Anysolution tothedispute,
including abilaterally negotiated one,should bemade crystal clear totheinternational community
toensure thatsolutions incompatible withthemultilateral rules thatmight affect third parties were
notarrived at.Third, thesmall import penetration intheautomotive sector inJapan, despite therelevant
arguments byJapan concerning itsmarket opening interms oftraditional trade policy instruments,
wascalling forMembers 'attention andmight suggest thatarenewed international discussion might
havetobeinitiated onmarket access andcompetitive opportunities.
Therepresentative ofTurkey saidthathiscountry 'smainconcern wastheproper functioning
ofthemultilateral trading system. Threats ofunilateral measures bytheUnited States undermined
thecredibility oftheWTO. Ontheother hand, Japan hadbeenrequested topursue itscommitment
todomestic deregulation ondifferent occasions inGATT andWTO. Toachieve suchatarget therules
ofthemultilateral trading system hadtobeobserved andanexpeditious resolution ofthisconflict had
tobesought intheframework ofWTO rules.
Therepresentative ofSwitzerland noted thatthematters inscribed under items 2and3ofthe
Agenda hadalready beenconsidered bytheCouncil forTrade inGoods. Atthattimehisdelegation
hadnottaken thefloorinorder toavoid repeating thesamearguments inseveral different fora. Without
underestimating therôlewhich could beplayed bythedifferent WTO bodies intheconciliation process,
hiscountry would express itsviews intheDSBonly. Likeother Members, Switzerland wished that
thisdispute beresolved satisfactorily. While itwelcomed thefactthattheparties hadexpressed the
intention tohaverecourse totheWTO dispute settlement mechanism, itwashowever concerned that
thedispute involved major trading partners andwasrelated tooneofthemostsensitive sectors from
theviewpoint ofthemultilateral legalsystem. Hiscountry hoped thatthisdispute could beresolved
through bilateral consultations provided forintheWTO mechanism. Ifconsultations failed theparties
should invoke theDSU. Therefore, theUnited States andJapan should findasolution asrapidly as
possible within theframework ofthenewWTO provisions. Suchasolution should exclude anyform
ofbilateral agreement contrary totheWTO provisions, oranagreement which would bedetrimental
tointerests ofathirdparty. Switzerland supported allefforts aimed atfinding arapid solution tothis
dispute inthelightoftheWTO provisions. Otherwise thecredibility andfunctioning ofthenewWTO
would beseriously endangered.
Therepresentative ofNorway saidthatitwasintheinterest ofallMembers thatthisdispute
beresolved inamanner which sustained theintegrity oftheWTO dispute settlement mechanism. The
United States andJapan --twoofthemajor world trading partners --hadaspecific responsibility in
theinternational trading system anditsdispute settlement mechanism. Thisdispute should betreated
under thenewandstrengthened WTO dispute settlement system which waswellequipped todealwith
virtually alltrade disputes. Itwasimportant tomake useofallthemeans available under theWTO
dispute settlement mechanism, including thegood offices oftheDirector-General andhismediation.
Unilateral measures would notbecompatible withtheDSUrulesandprocedures. However, theUnited
States andJapan hadaresponsibility forfinding bilateral amicable solutions based onnon-discrimination
andtransparency. Norway supported thestatement made bytheDirector-General earlier thismonth
thatwhatwasnowatstake wasnotthefunctioning oftheWTO, butthecredibility oftheengagements
freely entered intobythetwoparties.WT/DSB/M/5
Page8
TherepresentativeofAustralianotedthatJapanandtheUnitedStatesweremajortradingpartners
ofAustralia andhiscountry wasinterested inthesmooth development oftrade between thetwo.
Australia hadastrong commercial trade interest intheJapanese carmarket, inparticular inthe
automobile sector imports aswellasincoal, steel, iron-ore andother minerals usedasinputs bythe
Japanese autoindustry. Japan hadbeenaleading market fortheseexports fromAustralia. Hiscountry
hadtherefore astrong commercial interest inanon-discriminatory trade liberalization inJapan's
automobile sector andwished toencourage afaster paceoftrade liberalization inthissector inaway
thatwould leadtogenuine trade expansion rather thantrade diversion. Thistrade liberalization also
needed tobeworked outstrictly inaccordance withthem.f.n. principle. Unilateral trade sanctions
which werenotinconformity withtheWTO Agreement, including itsdispute settlement rules, could
notbesupported. Trade disputes should beresolved within theagreed WTO rules. Thiswascentral
tothecredibility andviability ofthemultilateral trading system, especially fordisputes involving such
major trading partners astheUnited States andJapan. Australia supported Japan'srequest for
consultationsconcerningtheUSannouncementof16Mayforeshadowingpossibleimpositionofunilateral
tariff increases on28Juneagainst arange ofJapanese motor vehicles. Since theUnited States had
agreed toconsult, hiscountry hoped thatbothparties would come toagreement onthetimeandplace
oftheconsultations, andthatthismatter would beresolved asquickly aspossible.
Therepresentative ofIndia recalled thatinhisstatement made atthemeeting oftheCouncil
forTrade inGoods on29Mayhehadpointed outthatthisdispute wasimportant notonlybecause
twomajor trading entities were involved butalsobecause oftheserious implications ithadforthe
multilateral trading system. LikeHong Kong, India hadalways beenconcerned withanyform of
unilateralism andthedamage thatsuchunilateral action might cause tothemultilateral trading system.
Major trading nations should notresort tounilateral trademeasures butshould rather usemultilaterally
agreed provisions andprocedures available under theWTO Agreement. Japan hadrequested
consultationswiththeUnitedStatespursuanttoArticle4oftheDSUandtheUnitedStateshadresponded
tothisrequest. Asapreliminary assessment Articles IandIIofGATT 1994 andArticle 23ofthe
DSU wererelevant. These Articles werethemostfundamental provisions oftheWTO Agreements
andtheyshould notbeviolated inanymanner. Inparticular, Article 23:2(a) specified that"Members
shallnotmake adetermination totheeffect thataviolation hasoccurred, thatbenefits havebeennullified
orimpaired ...except through recourse tothedispute settlement inaccordance withtherules and
procedures" oftheDSU. TheUnited States hadclearly stated thatsuchadetermination hadnottaken
place. Anyother allegation probably arose from misinformation bythepress, butthesituation had
beenclarified bytheUnited States. Japan andtheUnited States wereconfident ofreaching abilateral
solution during theconsultation process, andbothdelegations wanted todepoliticize theissue andto
holdconsultations inaprofessional andcalmmanner. Therefore, bothcountries should meaningfully
engage themselves intheseconsultations andtrytofindamutually satisfactory solution fullyconsistent
withboththeletter andspirit oftheWTO Agreements.
Therepresentative ofIndonesia, speaking onbehalf ofASEAN countries, reiterated theviews
expressed intheCouncil forTrade inGoods on29May. Thedispute wasimportant andhadattracted
international attention because itinvolved twomajor economic powers. ASEAN 'sinterest inthiscase
layprimarily intheneedtoensure thatthefundamental principles ofmultilateralism werepreserved.
ASEAN attached greatimportance totheWTO 'sobjectives ofresolving disputes through multilateral
framework. However, itwashoped thatbothparties would initially beabletofindamutually agreed
solution through bilateral consultations. Failing that,bothparties should bring thedispute totheWTO
forasolution. Recourse tounilateral actions toachieve tradepolicy objectives wasclearly inviolation
oftheWTO Agreement. Atthesame time, theASEAN Members shared theUnited States 'concerns
overthemarket access inJapan. Therefore ASEAN welcomed thepolitical willonthepartofboth
governments toresolve thisissue.WT/DSB/M/5
Page9
Therepresentative ofPakistan saidthatthisissueimpinged onthefunctioning andcredibility
ofthemultilateral trading system. Twoofthelargest trading nations andoneofthelargest sectors
ofinternationaltradewereinvolvedanddrewworld'sattention.TheWTOdisputesettlementmechanism
hadbeenattheveryheartofthemultilateral trading system. Itsstrengthening hadbeenhailed asperhaps
thesingle mostsignificant outcome oftheUruguay Round andwaspainfully andpainstakingly achieved
through longyears ofdiscussions andnegotiations. Themain feature ofthestrengthened dispute
settlement mechanism hadbeenthecommitment byMembers toseekresolution ofdisputes through
recourse totheDSU. Recourse toanyunilateral action would thusruncounter totheletter andspirit
oftheDSU. Both Members involved intheissue should doeverything possible toabide bytheir
commitment andtoseekresolution totheirproblems within theWTO framework byusing therules
andprocedures ofthemultilateral trading system.
TheChairman saidthatalthough noformal decisions hadtobetaken onthismatter atthepresent
meeting, hebelieved thatitwashighly satisfactory thatJapan andtheUnited States werebringing this
dispute totheWTO. During theUruguay Round negotiations Members hadcarefully worked onand
designed anewdispute settlement system thatwould befair,effective andimpartial. Thesystem was
nowcapable ofeffectively handling themostdifficult andpolitically sensitive disputes between WTO
Members. Most speakers haddrawn attention totheveryimportant trade andsystemic issues which
would needtobedealtwithinrelation tothisdispute. Withregard totheprocess, Japan hadrequested
Article XXIIconsultations withtheUnited States inGeneva, which hadbeencustomary forconsultations
atanearly date. Itwasexpected thatthedefinitive response from theUnited States would befully
inaccordance withboththespirit andtheletter oftheDSU. Indications given bytheUnited States
were encouraging.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements.
3. Japan'sautomotive barriers andrestrictive practices
- Statement bytheUnited States
TheChairman saidthatthisitemwasontheAgenda ofthepresent meeting attherequest of
theUnited States andinvited therepresentative ofthatdelegation tointroduce thisitem.
Therepresentative oftheUnited States saidthathiscountry believed thattheDispute Settlement
Body (DSB) wastheappropriate forum todiscuss boththeUnited States 'complaint against Japan and
Japan'scomplaintagainsttheUnitedStates.TheEuropeanCommunitiesandotherMembershadalready
emphasized thispoint speaking under theprevious itemoftheAgenda. IfJapan andother Members
wereprepared toconcentrate discussion ofthisissue andlike-issues intheDSBtheywould findthe
United States tobecooperative. Atthemeeting oftheCouncil forTrade inGoods on29Maythe
United States hadindicated itsintention tobring adispute settlement action against Japan because of
theconditionswhichprevailedinJapan'smarketwherepoliciesandpracticeshadbarredeffectivemarket
access fortheproducts under discussion foraverylongtime. Itwasnotunderstandable whytheUS
producers ofthese products could beglobally competitive andenjoy largesalesinother markets while
being unable toenter intoJapan'smarket. TheUnited States believed thatanti-competitive actions
andbarriers tomarket entry hadadversely affected USefforts tosellnewautos, auto-parts andparts
fortheaftermarket inJapan'smarket. Inbilateral negotiations withJapan andthrough upcoming
WTO dispute settlement action theUnited States would beasking Japan toadopt pro-competitive policies
andtoderegulate itsmarket. Itwould beseeking access forallcompetitive foreign firms intoJapan's
market, notaguaranteed market share fortheUnited States. TheUnited States wasseeking market
opportunities forcompetitive products from itandfrom anyother country andwasasking Japan to
ensure thatitsmarket operated inatransparent andgenuinely competitive manner. Theeffects ofJapan's
practices wereclear. Itsmarket didnotreflect market forces thathadbeenpresent foryears inother
markets. Atthepresent meeting under theprevious Agenda itemthisobservation wasnotmade onlyWT/DSB/M/5
Page10
bytheUnited States, butalsobymany other delegations thathadcommented ontheclosed nature of
Japan'smarket. TheUnited States would beelaborating onthese practices after finalizing its
consultations withJapan.
TherepresentativeofJapansaidthathisdelegationhadlistenedtovariousstatementsbycountries
concerned withJapan'smarket situation. However Japan would haveopportunities totalkabout its
market situation atalaterstage. Atthepresent meeting heonlywished topresent limited dataconcerning
theproduct under discussion. Thenumber ofautomobiles imported from abroad hadincreased by
nearly 42percentinthefirstfourmonths fromJanuary toApril 1995compared withthecorresponding
period of1994. Forexample, thenumber ofChrysler 'sCherokee 'simported intoJapan hadincreased
tentimes between 1992and1994, whereas thetotalautomobile market inJapan hadbeendiminished
by8percentforthecorresponding period. Chrysler hadresponded totheJapanese consumers 'taste
byintroducing theright-hand-drive model.
Therepresentative ofCanada saidthathiscountry hadamajor interest inthisissueandbelieved
thataction wasrequired toprovide realimprovement inaccess toJapan'smarkets, including for
automobiles andautomotive parts. While Canada acknowledged andwelcomed efforts announced by
Japan toliberalize andderegulate itsmarkets -thesubject ofconsiderable debate andexamination during
Japan'srecent trade policy review -thefactremained thatserious market barriers anddiscriminatory
restrictions continued toexist. InCanada 'sviewthestatus quowasclearly unacceptable. Should this
issue beresolved through negotiations Canada would beseeking assurances fromtheparties thatthe
results werefullyconsistent withtheWTO rules, transparent andonanm.f.n. basis, notonlyinthe
language oftheagreement oftheparties butalsoinitsimplementation. Iftheissuecould notberesolved
bilaterally, Canada would urgetheparties tocomply with, andusetheWTO dispute settlement system.
Therepresentative ofKorea, referring toAgenda items 2and3,saidthatKorea hadconsistently
opposed theuseofunilateral punitive trademeasures. Itbelieved thatsuchaction ranagainst thevery
"raison-d 'être"ofthemultilateral trading system. Korea 'sconcerns about unilateralism intradepolicy
wasespecially acute atpresent given thatthestrengthened dispute settlement system oftheWTO was
barely inplace. Atthesame time, however, Korea understood thattheexistence ofaprolonged
imbalance inbilateral trade andthefrustration arising therefrom didnotprovide asustainable basis
forsoundtraderelations.Apartfromitslegaljustification,suchanimbalanceposedtremendouspolitical
andrealeconomicproblemstothegovernmentsconcernedandriskedendangeringtheconceptoffairness
under theexisting multilateral trading system. Itwastheresponsibility oftheMember concerned to
explore viable remedies, andtoaddress thisproblem byanypossible means. Members should work
together toprevent thecredibility oftheWTO frombeing heldhostage bythishighly politicized dispute
andshould actquickly indelivering aclearandunanimous message fromtheglobal tradecommunity
bycalling upon thedisputing parties toprudently acttogether inresolving theirdifferences.
Therepresentative ofJapan noted thattheUnited States hadalready indicated under item2
oftheAgenda thatadiscussion onthismatter should notbetaken upbytheGeneral Council. However,
thereason whyJapan hadsought totakeupthisissue therein wasthattheGeneral Council wasthe
highest body oftheWTO except fortheMinisterial Conference. Itwastherefore proper toregister
thismatter which hadpotentially serious consequences forthemultilateral trading system. Japan could
agree nottotakeupthismatter intheGeneral Council provided thattheGeneral Council would take
noteofthestatements made inboththeCouncil forTrade inGoods andtheDispute Settlement Body.
Theresolution ofthismatter would havesignificant implications forthefuture oftheWTO andhe
urged allMembers tofollow thismatter closely. Inthisrespect hehadheard encouraging signs in
thepastfewdays. Heexpressed hisappreciation toMembers fortheirsupport. With regard tothe
openness ortheaccessibility ofJapan'smarket, there hadbeen apersistent tendency orrather a
perception inthepast,thatsince aproduct didnotsellwellinJapan, themarket wasclosed. Heurged
allMembers tolookclosely atfactsandfigures andtobasetheirjudgement solely onthem. ThewholeWT/DSB/M/5
Page11
question oftheopenness ofJapan'smarket wasbased on,atbest,acertain experience ofthe1960's
andeventually the1970's.Atthattime, ofcourse, onecould notsaythatJapan'smarket wasopen;
rather itwasclosed. However, Japan hadalways suffered atrade imbalance. Japan'sautoindustry
hadbecome verycompetitive afterithadbeencompletely exposed tocompetition fromabroad. Without
suchexposure theJapanese industry would nothavebeensocompetitive. Hewasconfident that
Members would finditpossible toassert correctly thenature ofJapan'smarket.
TheChairman confirmed thattheGeneral Council wasmeeting astheDispute Settlement Body
according toArticle IV:3oftheWTO Agreements which stated that"theGeneral Council shallconvene
asappropriatetodischargetheresponsibilitiesoftheDisputeSettlementBodyprovidedforintheDispute
Settlement Understanding. TheDispute Settlement Body mayhaveitsownChairman andshallestablish
suchrulesofprocedure asitdeems necessary forthefulfilment ofthose responsibilities." Soinstrictly
constitutional terms, thisbody wastheGeneral Council inoneofitsother manifestations.
Mr.Kesavapany, speaking astheChairman oftheGeneral Council, saidthatitwastruethat
theDispute Settlement Body wasanother manifestation oftheGeneral Council. Therefore, hispersonal
viewwasthatonedidnotneedtobring upthismatter intheGeneral Council. Hewould therefore
follow Japan'ssuggestion thattheGeneral Council takenoteofthestatements made intheDispute
Settlement Body aswellasintheCouncil forTrade inGoods.
Therepresentative ofArgentina saidthathisdelegation 'sintention wastoagree withthe
Chairman oftheGeneral Council. However, theheadofhisdelegation would onlymake thestatement
concerning thismatter atthemeeting oftheGeneral Council scheduled forthatafternoon.9
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements.
4. Indicative listofgovernmental andnon-governmental panelists
- Administration oftheindicative list(WT/DSB/W/6)
TheChairman recalled thatpursuant toArticle 8.4oftheDSU theSecretariat shallmaintain
anindicative listofgovernmental andnon-governmental individuals. Hereiterated thatMembers should
submit nominations totheindicative listbymid-June 1995sothattheindicative listwould beformally
constituted bythattime. Thelistcould bemodified atanytimebyproposing newnames which would
thenbeapproved byDSB. With regard totheGATT roster ofgovernmental andnon-governmental
panelists established on30November 1984, heinvited Members toreview thenames contained therein
before 31July1995. Theupdated roster would beincluded intheindicative listwhich would have
already beenconstituted bymid-June 1995.
Heinformed theDSBthat,atitsmeeting on24May, theTRIPS Council hadconsidered the
question astowhether there wasanyneedforaction onitsparttohelpinensuring thatthecentral
indicative listofpanelists included persons withsuitable knowledge ofintellectual property matters.
Ithadnotbeenthought necessary ordesirable foraseparate listtobeestablished intheTRIPS area,
similar tothatforeseen intheareaoftrade inservices. However, theTRIPS Council hadagreed to
drawtotheattention ofMembers thedesirability ofensuring thatthenominations theymade ofpotential
panelists tobeplaced onthecentral indicative listinclude persons withexperience ofintellectual property
matters viewed from atrade orcommercial perspective. Hesuggested thattheindicative listwhich
would beconstituted inmid-June 1995 should contain, when appropriate, panelists withexperience
ofintellectual property matters viewed from atrade orcommercial perspective.
9Seealsothestatements made attheGeneral Council Meeting on31May (WT/GC/M/3).WT/DSB/M/5
Page12
Hefurther recalled thaton14March, theUnited States hadsubmitted anon-paper concerning
theindicative listwhich hadbeendiscussed bytheDSBininformal consultations on15and24March,
aswellasattheDSBmeeting on29March. Hethendrewattention todocument WT/DSB/W/6 which
contained some proposals fortheadministration oftheindicative listbased onthediscussions and
comments from delegations andproposed thattheDSBapprove thedocument contained therein.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteoftheinformation provided bytheChairman and
approved theproposals fortheadministration oftheindicative listofpanelists.
5. Standing Appellate Body
- Statement bytheChairman
TheChairman recalled thatattheDSBmeeting on25April 1995 hehadinvited individual
delegations tomake theirviews known tothe"Committee ofSix"concerning twoquestions: (i)which
ofthesuggested names onthelistofsuggested appointees totheAppellate Body -apartofcourse from
individual delegations 'ownsuggestions -would theyconsider themostappropriate appointees tothe
Appellate Body; and(ii)why, against theguidelines setoutinArticle 17oftheDSU andPC/IPL/13,
delegations considered these persons themostappropriate appointees totheAppellate Body. Hewas
pleased toreport thatbetween 3-12May1995, fifty-four separate delegations hadprovided theirviews
tothe"Committee ofSix"onthesekey-questions comprising bothdeveloped anddeveloping countries
withabroad regional spread. Theindividual delegations which hadcome todiscuss these issues with
membersofthe"CommitteeofSix"hadobviouslythoughtcarefullyabouttheapplicationoftheselection
guidelines tothelistofthirty-two persons suggested asappointees totheAppellate Body. Thespirit
inwhich individual delegations hadapproached theseconsultations haddemonstrated thattheintrinsic
quality andintegrity ofindividual appointees totheAppellate Body remained uppermost inthepriorities
ofdelegations. Asaresult ofthisinitial process, the"Committee ofSix"nowhadaverygood idea
oftheexpectations ofthecollectivity oftheWTO about thecomposition oftheAppellate Body. In
particular, consultations hadindicated widespread views thatallindividual appointees, whether persons
having principally legalortradepolicy expertise (including GATT/WTO experience), hadtohavesome
demonstrated expertise inallthree aspects oftheagreed guidelines, namely law,international trade
andthesubject matters oftheWTO Agreement. Forappointees whowereprimarily legalpractitioners,
acombination ofacademic, public lawandarbitration experience hadbeenjudged bymostdelegations
tobethemost useful. Inthisregard, many hadalsoreferred totheneedforappointees tobeable
towrite theirownlegalopinions. Many delegations believed thatthestrength ofAppellate Body would
lieinitsdiversity ofrepresentation reflecting: (i)regional, developed anddeveloping country balance;
(ii)adequate representation fromregions andcountries whowereactive participants inthetrading system
including smaller aswellaslarger countries; (iii)different legalsystems, ongrounds thatthecredibility
andauthority oftheAppellate Body hadbeacceptable toall.Following thisinitial consultation phase,
the"CommitteeofSix"wasnowmeetingandtalkingwithallofthesuggestedappointeestotheAppellate
Body. Thisprocess hadbegun on16Mayanditwould endon9June. Inthiscontext, the"Committee
ofSix"wasexploring keyissues suchasbothprofessional qualifications andavailability, through a
serious ofquestions based ontheguidelines intheDSUandPC/IPL/13, aswellasontheexpectations
expressedbyindividualdelegationsintheinitialconsultationprocessbetween3-12May1995.Following
thissecond phase, the"Committee ofSix"would aimatcompleting itsmandate andfollowing further
consultations, itwould bring aproposal onappointments totheDSBduring thecourse ofthemonth
ofJune.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatement.
Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities thanked theChairman fortheprogress report
concerning theselection ofcandidates fortheAppellate Body andthe"Committee ofSix"forthewayWT/DSB/M/5
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theyhadapproached thistask. Efforts hadbeenmade totakeintoconsideration theprinciples and
priorities which theCommunity hadwished tobeincluded andreflected intheAppellate Body, i.e.,
thehighest possible qualifications, reasonable balance etc.Thishadnotbeenaneasyprocess and
therefore theCommunity appreciated themanner inwhich the"Committee ofSix"washandling it.
Thenewphase which the"Committee ofSix"hadstarted, i.e.,meeting thecandidates, wasavery
reasonable oneandthefactthatthese consultations would endon9Junewasalsopositive, because
ithadnotnecessarily beensoeasytogetthirty-two candidates tocome toGeneva insuchashortperiod
oftime. Given theimportance theCommunity attached totheestablishment ofanAppellate Body,
hewished tomake surethatthedeadline indicated bytheChairman waspreserved andthatevery effort
would bemade toensure that,attheverylatest, thismatter would besolved inthecourse ofthemonth
ofJuneandthatonewould notgobeyond theestablished time-table.
TheChairman thanked theCommunity foritsstatement andsaidthathealsohoped thatthe
process ofselection ofcandidates fortheAppellate Body would becompleted inthecourse ofthemonth
ofJune.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements.
6. EEC -French regulations concerning thetrade description ofscallops (WT/DS7/1)
Therepresentative ofCanada, speaking under "Other Business", drewattention toitsrequest,
dated 19May1995, forconsultations withtheEuropean Communities concerning theFrench Order
of22March 1993 andsubsequent amendments laying down theofficial names andtrade description
ofpectinidae (scallops). Thisrequest hadbeennotified totheDispute Settlement Body, theCouncil
forTrade inGoods, andtheCommittee onTechnical Barriers toTrade onthesame day. Therequest
forconsultations contained inWT/DS7/1 hadbeencirculated on24May1995. Healsoinformed the
DSBthaton23May1995theCommunity hadindicated thatitcould agree toholdsuchconsultations.10
Therepresentative ofPerusaidthathiscountry hadalsoindicated itsinterest inthismatter
toCanada andhadsubsequently made itsinterest known totheEuropean Communities. Peruwished
toparticipate intheconsultations requested byCanada. Aformal request would besubmitted shortly
totheSecretariat.11
Therepresentative ofChile saidthathiscountry hadaninterest inensuring access totheFrench
market forChilean scallops andwould, therefore, alsoliketoparticipate intheconsultations requested
byCanada.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements.
7. Communications under theDSU
- Announcement bytheChairman
TheChairman, speaking "under Other Business", saidthatinanumber ofcasescommunications
bydelegations under theDSUoranyother covered agreements hadbeensentdirectly totheChairman
oftheDSU. Heproposed thatforreasons ofefficiency suchcommunications should always besent
10WT/DS7/2.
11Therequest byPerutoparticipate intheconsultations requested byCanada hassubsequently beenissued indocument
WT/DS7/5.WT/DSB/M/5
Page14
totheWTO Secretariat withacopytotheDSBChairman. Healsoinvited Members tocontact the
Council Division intheWTO Secretariat, toinform itthatacommunication wasbeing sent. This
would enable anexpeditious processing andcirculation ofcommunications.
Therepresentative ofCanada saidthatsince timing wasasensitive factor formany
communications, heunderstood theChairman 'sproposal tobethat,ifMembers hadacommunication
tomake totheDSBChairman, theyshould address ittotheWTO toavoid anyconfusion astowhen
acommunication wassent. Acopywould besenttotheDSBChairman forhisinformation.
TheChairman confirmed thatthepurpose ofthisproposal wastoavoid anyunnecessary delays
ormix-up astowhen acommunication wassent. Canada 'sclarification wasasensible one,thatwhere
there wasarequirement under theDSU thatacommunication beaddressed totheDSBChairman,
itshould besoaddressed butsenttotheWTO Secretariat withacopytotheDSBChairman.
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthestatements andagreed totheproposal readout
bytheChairman.
8. Time-periods under theDSU andother covered agreements
- Announcement bytheChairman
TheChairman recalled thatatinformal consultations heldon24March hehadannounced his
intention toconduct consultations ontheissue oftermination oftime-periods under theDSU andthe
other covered agreements when suchtime-periods fellonanon-working day,i.e.,onaweek-end or
holiday. Forinstance under Article 16oftheDSU, aMember may"within 60daysafterthedate
ofcirculation ofapanel report" notify theDSBofitsdecision toappeal. Ifthe60thdayofthistime-
period fellonanon-working dayitwasnotclear whether thetime-period should bereduced tothe
previous working dayorextended tothenextworking day.Thiswasoneofthose issues thatMembers
hadalready dealt withininformal consultations. Inthisconnection, herecalled thatMembers had
already discussed cases wherein aprecise understanding forparticular obligations specified intheDSU
should bethedateofreceipt andother cases wherein therewassome uncertainty astowhatdateshould
beconsidered asthedateofissuance. Thiswasanother ofthose issues thatMembers needed toresolve
because oftheveryprecise timing within which theywereworking intheDSU. Therefore, Members
would soonbeinformed oftheconvening ofconsultations onthismatter
TheDispute Settlement Body tooknoteofthisinformation.