RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/100
G/SCM/W/109
20October 1995
ORGANIZATION(95-3187)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES FROM CHILE CONCERNING QUESTIONS POSED
BYKOREA1CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION
OFCHILEAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS2
Thefollowing communication, dated 2October 1995, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofChile.
_______________
REPLY TOTHE GENERAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING LEGAL ASPECTS
Asindicated inthenotification byChile, thelegislation inforceconcerning anti-dumping duties
andcountervailing measures isLawNo.18.525 andtheregulations thereto. Itwasalsopointed out
thattheAnti-Dumping Agreement andtheAgreement onSubsidies areapplied withforce oflawin
Chile.
Thisstatement prompted delegations toinquire about thelegal situation produced bythe
co-existence ofinternal lawsandregulations andtheinternational agreement.
Inaccordance withArticle 32,paragraph 17,andArticle 50,paragraph 1,ofthePolitical
Constitution oftheRepublic ofChile, priortotheirratification international treaties mustbesubmitted
totheNational Congress forapproval inaccordance withtheprocedures applicable toalllegislation.
Inthecasewhich concerns us,bothhouses oftheChilean National Congress unanimously approved
theMarrakesh Agreement andtheannexes thereto, andtheirapproval wasofficially communicated
tothePresident on24November 1994. Once thisformality hadbeencomplied with, on26December
ofthesame yearthePresident oftheRepublic signed thecorresponding instrument ofratification,
which wasdeposited twodays laterwiththeDirector-General oftheContracting Parties tothe
1947 General Agreement onTariffs andTrade.
From thatdate,thePresident ordered thattheabove-mentioned agreements hadbinding legal
force asamatter ofNational Honour.
Subsequently, andforthepurpose offullyintegrating theagreements intodomestic legislation,
thePresident oftheRepublic issued Supreme Decree No.16oftheMinistry ofForeign Affairs, which
enacted intolawthe"Marrakesh Agreement Establishing theWorld Trade Organization together with
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theannexes indicated". TheDecree expressly provided that"they shallbeobserved andimplemented
inthesame wayaslegislation andpublished intheform established inLawNo.18.158".
Following completion oftheconstitutional review procedure bytheOffice ofthe
Comptroller-General oftheRepublic, theSupreme Decree waspublished intheOfficial Journal of
17May1995.
Itfollows fromtheabove that,inaccordance withtheconstitutional andstatutory provisions
inforce inChile, theAnti-Dumping Agreement andtheAgreement onSubsidies -together withthe
setofagreements which gotomake uptheFinal ActoftheUruguay Round -neither supplant nor
supplement national legislation, butform anintegral partofthelatter, withthestatus oflaws.
Indeed, while theagreements inquestion havethesamenormative status asthepurely domestic
legislation, theytakeprecedence overthelatter owing totheirgreater degree ofspeciality, andsince
theycover thesame subjects andwere enacted afterthedomestic legislation, theprinciple oftacit
derogation applies, alegal institution recognized inalllegal systems based onRoman Law. Asis
wellknown, thissituation arises when anewlawcontains provisions which cannot bereconciled with
those oftheearlier law. Itshould, however, beexplained thatthisdoesnotdetract fromthevalidity
ofthose provisions oftheformer lawwhich donotconflict withorcontradict thenewlaw(Articles 52
and53oftheCivil Code).
Bothinlegaltheory andinChilean positive law,anyprovision ofnational legislation which
appears tobeincompatible oratvariance withinternational agreements validly enacted intolawistacitly
overridden. Thishasbeenconfirmed repeatedly indecisions oftheSupreme Court ofJustice.
Notwithstanding alloftheabove, alawisbeing drawn upwhich, inaccordance withthese
agreements, specifically confirms thestructure, composition andfunctions oftheinvestigating authority,
thebody responsible forreviewing itsdecisions andthose rules ofprocedure notexplicitly covered
bytheagreements, andallofthisistobedonewithdueregard forthestructure ofouradministrative
procedures. Aregulatory decree isalsobeing drafted, which specifies allthose minor aspects of
procedure designed toguarantee transparency andtheprecise formalities tobecomplied withinthe
internal workings oftheCommission, aswellasthecalculation andadjustment procedures, sources
ofrelevant background information andother aspects intended tofacilitate access tothemachinery
forcorrection ofprice distortions envisaged intheabove-mentioned agreements.
Pending enactment ofthese provisions, theCommission hasagreed totheprecise anddetailed
application ofthewording oftheagreements concerned inthecontext oftheinvestigations itiscalled
upon tohandle. Inthose cases where theagreements donomore thandescribe ageneral framework
orstipulate criteria, theCommission hasagreed toapply theminthemanner mostconsistent withthe
setofrules theycontain, thereby keeping faithwiththeirgeneral spirit.
Lastly, mention should bemade ofChile'shistorical tradition withregard tothefulfilment
ofitsinternational commitments, aswellasoftheprovisions oftheVienna Convention ontheLaw
ofTreaties, Article 5ofwhich makes itspecifically applicable tothistypeofagreement, while Article 27
inparticular provides thataStatemaynotinvoke theprovisions ofitsinternal lawasjustification for
itsfailure toperform atreaty. Asaparty tothatConvention, Chile reiterates itsresolve toapply it
fullyandfaithfully; thisis,moreover, abasic principle ofChilean foreign policy.
Itcantherefore becategorically asserted inconclusion thattheMarrakesh Agreement andthe
annexes thereto arefullyincorporated inournational legislation andaretherefore inallrespects part
ofChilean law.