 
  RESTRICTED  
WORLD TRADE  WT/CTE/M/6  
 17 January 1996  
ORGANIZATION  
 (96-0156)  
 
Committee on Trade and Environment  
 
 
 
 
 
 REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 14 DECEMBER 1995  
 
 Note by the Secretariat  
 
 
1. The Committee on Trade and Environment met on 14 December 1995 under the chairmanship 
of Ambassador Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau of Argentina.  The agenda contained in WT O/AIR/212 was 
adopted.  
 
2. The Chairman announced informal con sultations were continuing on the Committee's draft rules 
of procedure (WT/CTE/W/13).  
 
3. It was agreed  to invite the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to participate on 
an ad hoc  basis as an observer at formal an d informal meetings of the Committee where issues related to 
Item 3 would be discussed and the Committee might benefit from input by the ISO, in view of the ISO's 
directly relevant work related to Item 3.  In order to provide a better basis to consider the  requests for 
observer status from the World Customs Organization and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, the Secretariat was asked to obtain more information from these organizations on their 
interest in the Committee's work.  
 
Schedule  of work  
 
4. The schedule of future Committee meetings was revised.   
 
5. The next meeting (26 -29 February) will be conducted as follows:  Items 1 and 5 will be taken up 
in plenary on 26 February.  An informa l joint meeting with the TBT Committee will be held on 27 
February.  The Chairman welcomed Canada's offer to make a presentation on its eco -labelling scheme 
at that meeting, and invited other Members to follow Canada's lead in that regard.  On 28 February,  the 
Committee will take up Items 3 and 9.  An informal meeting on Items 1, 3, 5 and 9 will be held on 29 
February.   
 
6. The following meeting will be held from 25 -27 March to address Items 6 and 8.   
 
7. The Chairman will hold informal consultations from 20 -24 May on Items 2 and 4 and to evaluate 
the Committee's progress, and begin the process of pre paring a work programme through to Singapore.  
This will be followed by a formal meeting from 28 -30 May.   
 
8. In response to the United States ' request for clarification as to whether proposals on other Items 
could be raised during  the informal meeting on 29 February, the Chairman said that flexibility should be 
used.  In response to Egypt's  question as to when an informal meeting on Item 7 would be held, the 
Chairman said, as had been agreed at the last meeting, any such informal m eeting would be held back -to-WT/CTE/M/6  
Page 2 
 
 back with the formal meeting at which that Item was being addressed.  Any requests to deal with an Item 
in the informal meeting would be taken up with flexibility.   
 
9. The delegations of Australia  and the European Communities  agreed on the need for flexibility 
in informal meetings and considered that it was up to delegations to raise those issues which they 
considered appropriate.  The delegation of Egypt, speaking on behalf of the African Group , reserv ed the 
right to take up Item 7 in an informal meeting in 1996.  
 
Item 4  
 
The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade  measures used 
for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements  which have 
significant trade effects  
 
10. The representative of Hong Kong  supported the establishment of environmental enquiry points 
to supplement current WTO notification mechanisms and those in MEAs, but felt that the ir scope should 
be defined.  Further action other than enquiry points was needed to address whether and where gaps in 
transparency existed.  Given the relevance of transparency to other Items, an information base should 
be set up to deal with all measures taken for environmental purposes which were not currently covered 
by WTO notification mechanisms.  The list of potential gaps in transparency provisions drawn up in the 
Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (EMIT) was a useful reference 
(WT/CTE/W/5), but some gaps on that list had been filled by WTO notification provisions (e.g. 
measures relating to subsidies) and others could be made more specific (e.g. GATT Article III measures).  
A distinction should be made between coverage gaps and co mpliance gaps;  the latter were a matter of 
enforcement, which was a general WTO issue rather than one for the Committee's attention.  An 
information base could apply to gaps in the coverage of environment -related trade measures, which would 
be identified when Item 4 was discussed in May 1996.  Parallel or earlier action was warranted under 
Items 1, 3 and 6, where gaps existed.   
 
11. Hong Kong was flexible on the organization of an information base and did not intend to make 
a specif ic proposal at this time.  It could be built on notifications and take the form of an open -ended 
inventory system which would be developed gradually.  There should be flexible guidelines on the 
information to be provided, which could include:  nature/type/ title of measure;  purpose of measure;  
product coverage;  relevant WTO or MEA provisions;  a description of how the measure operated;  
and comments on trade effects.  Enquiry points worked on a largely bilateral, request -response basis, 
whereas an informa tion base provided multilateral transparency.  
 
12. The representative of Chile  said transparency avoided trade distortions and instilled confidence 
in the trading system.  Analysis should aim at identifying gaps in coverage of WTO pr ovisions, specifically 
packaging, labelling, recycling and waste handling measures.  
 
13. The representative of Switzerland  said issues connected with the establishment of environmental 
enquiry points were the role of a new enquiry p oint and the development of administrative measures.  
Potential gaps in transparency existed for eco -labelling, packaging and waste handling measures, intra -
federal and private sector measures, taxes, subsidies and re -use.  Transparency was a horizontal is sue 
which was linked to the issue of technical barriers to trade.  Switzerland supported Canada's proposal 
that the TBT Agreement's Code of Good Practice should apply to voluntary eco -labelling programmes.  
Given that there were nearly 200 different WTO no tification formats, he asked how new obligations 
would add to transparency.  The more numerous the notifications, the greater the risks of escaping such 
obligations.  Although the role of enquiry points was closely defined in the TBT and SPS Agreements, 
many uncertainties remained in their operation.  The enquiry points in the TBT and SPS Agreements 
should be examined in view of Canada's proposal and to avoid duplication.   
          WT/CTE/M/6  
         Page  3 
 
 14. The representative of the United States  said that given current WTO notification requirements, 
particularly GATT Article X, it was difficult to imagine that gaps existed, especially for trade measures 
under Item 1.  As had been realized after these requirements had entered into force, transpare ncy was 
not without cost.  He asked whether measures should be singled out for added transparency based on 
the policy purpose, rather than the nature of the measure;  the cost of establishing them;  and whether 
they would duplicate enquiry points under the  TBT and SPS Agreements.  WTO transparency 
provisions were based on the type of measure and not the policy purpose, which arose in the case of 
exceptions.  Given that the trade implications of an environmental tax were not greater than those of a 
tax to ra ise revenue, the United States felt it was not appropriate to single out environmental measures for 
special transparency.  He said a significant commitment of resources had been required to create enquiry 
points under the TBT and SPS Agreements.  Whereas t he TBT and SPS Agreements set out precise 
functions for enquiry points based on substantive obligations and the measures they covered were clearly 
defined, this was not the case for the concept of environmental measures.  The United States did not feel 
the Committee should attempt to define the latter and Members who were interested in creating new 
enquiry points should explain their purpose.  It should not become a mechanism to perform research 
projects on how other Members dealt with environmental issues as this would be a burden.   
 
15. The representative of Norway  said WTO transparency ensured discipline of the rules mainly 
through notification procedures;  environment -related transparency requirements should not be more 
onerous th an those in other areas of policymaking that affected trade.  Discussions so far had centred on 
whether the trade and environment linkages were adequately covered by WTO rules and whether 
additions or modifications to these rules were necessary.  As a tran sparency exercise was connected to 
compliance with rules that were already in place, he inquired as to whether it should be tied to establishing 
substantive WTO disciplines, or in its own right to provide information upon which to base an evaluation 
of whe ther rules or their modification were needed.  Transparency discussions in May 1996 should focus 
on whether and where gaps existed and make a case -by-case analysis of each type of measure.  Based on 
the Committee and the TBT Committee's analysis of eco -labelling, packaging and waste -handling 
measures, the focus should be on those areas where gaps existed.  Since environmental measures were 
partly covered by enquiry points in the TBT and SPS Agreements, they could be supplemented by a code 
of conduct for pri vate, voluntary eco -labelling programmes, similar to the TBT Agreement's Code of 
Good Practice.  Norway felt Article XX measures should be notified.  He noted environmental enquiry 
points would address the purpose of the measure and not the nature of the m easure.  He supported 
Switzerland's comment that the role of enquiry points would need to be clarified, starting with a review of 
the list of gaps in WT/CTE/W/5.  Transparency obligations should be linked to specific areas, such as 
eco-labelling, since cur rent WTO obligations were satisfactory, i.e. GATT Article X and the 1979 
Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.  
 
16. The representative of Japan  said the WTO contained comprehensive notifica tion mechanisms 
in the TBT and SPS Agreements;  any environment -related trade -restrictive measures that were not yet 
covered needed to be identified.  The use of environmental measures, such as eco -labelling, packaging 
or recycling requirements, should be based on fair, reasonable and scientifically -based criteria.  Japan 
was concerned that the WTO did not have the competence to cover voluntary schemes.  Although it was 
difficult to unify eco -labelling standards, which reflected the views of government bodi es and private 
entities on trade and environment, the Committee should pursue their harmonization as much as 
possible, while ensuring that eco -labelling and other environmental measures did not go against national 
treatment and MFN, nor served to disguise protectionism.  The establishment of environmental enquiry 
points within a government or a government -designated body, based on the unified format of the TBT 
and SPS Agreements, could provide importing countries with information on eco -labelling programmes , 
including private, or non -governmental voluntary programmes.  In this regard, Japan encouraged the on -
going cooperation and information exchange among eco -labelling executing bodies.   
 
17. The representative of the European Commun ities referred to his delegation's proposal in April 
1995 for a case -by-case approach which would review environmental measures covered under Items 1 
and 3.  This would require a significant amount of work and might not yield concrete results by WT/CTE/M/6  
Page 4 
 
 December 1 996.  In order to improve the efficiency of work with other WTO Bodies, the results of the 
Working Party on Notification Procedures should be incorporated and the results of the Committee's 
discussions on this issue should be transmitted to it.  Under Item  1, the issue was whether MEA -related 
trade measures should be notified to the WTO, which might duplicate notification mechanisms in MEAs.  
However, notifications covered under MEAs did not always reach non -parties.  The Committee should 
clarify whether su ch measures were already subject to WTO transparency provisions.  Any related trade 
measure which was not subject to WTO transparency provisions should be subject to at least ex post  
publication and notification under GATT Article X and the 1979 Understand ing.  In view of the broad 
formulation of these two mechanisms, all measures covered by trade agreements, including import bans 
and quantitative restrictions, should be covered.  By clarifying the transparency provisions in multilateral 
agreements, the Wor king Party on Notification Procedures' work should enable the Committee to better 
assess the implementation of multilateral transparency provisions and whether environmental measures 
were sufficiently covered.   
 
18. He recalled his delegation's statement at the October 1995 meeting, which considered that eco -
labelling programmes were only partially covered by the TBT Agreement, inasmuch as the criteria which 
applied to production and processing methods (PPMs) did not affect the chara cteristics of the product 
and, therefore, were not covered by it.  Since this was not sufficient to permit a satisfactory solution, two 
options had been suggested:  (i) full coverage of the TBT Agreement for eco -labelling;  or (ii) the 
establishment of a s pecific instrument for eco -labelling, such as the TBT Agreement's Code of Good 
Practice.  The results of the joint informal meeting with the TBT Committee should be considered 
before continuing discussions.  The transparency of environmental taxes and char ges was a substantive 
issue and dealing with them differently from other types of taxes was not justified.  Also, some taxes often 
were related to several objectives at the same time.  Regarding packaging, deposit refund and waste 
handling measures, there had not yet been an indepth analysis of these schemes to assess their trade 
impact and whether they were covered by the TBT Agreement or other WTO provisions.  The 
Secretariat could carry out such a study for, inter alia ,  deposit refund and recycling meas ures.  An 
alternative to environmental enquiry points would be to extend the competence of enquiry points under 
the TBT and SPS Agreements.  Given the horizontal nature of environmental measures, and the 
vagueness of the definition of the term environment , the risk of juxtaposing the competence of enquiry 
points and the confusion on the part of users should be considered.  If the coverage of existing enquiry 
points was extended, this should not result in extending the area of application to other provisions  of the 
TBT and SPS Agreements.  
 
19. The representative of Malaysia, on behalf of ASEAN , said the Committee should address the list 
of potential gaps in transparency (WT/CTE/W/5) in order to progress.  In this regard, ASEAN 
welcomed Hong  Kong's suggestions as transparency furthered an understanding of the issue and 
permitted an assessment of  compliance.  Concerning the United States' comment on the costs involved, 
existing resources should be utilized as it would be difficult to put into place mechanisms which would 
entail administrative burdens or additional financial expenditures.  A transp arency mechanism was 
necessary and environmental enquiry points, with clearly specified guidelines, would further transparency 
and supplement exiting WTO notification mechanisms.   
 
20. The representative of India  said Hong Kong's su ggestion should be discussed in detail, as it sought 
further transparency for environment -related trade measures and trade -related environmental measures 
that had significant trade effects.  Given that the list of potential gaps in transparency provisions 
(WT/CTE/W/5) did not take into account the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and progress in the 
TBT Committee, it was time to build on this work and, with the Secretariat's help, take stock of how gaps 
had been addressed.  Transparency was related to Items 1 and 3(b).  India felt if progress was made on 
the establishment and functioning of environmental enquiry points, developing country exporters could 
better address transparency requirements for trade measures included in MEAs and environmental 
product req uirements, including standards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling.  
India felt there was a need for further transparency and strengthening disciplines in this area.  
          WT/CTE/M/6  
         Page  5 
 
 21. The representative of Canada  recalle d his delegation's statement at the April 1995 meeting that 
eco-labelling was covered by the TBT Agreement.  
 
22. The representative of New Zealand  said a focused examination would permit a decision on which 
transparency gaps existed and the extent to which the establishment of environmental enquiry points 
would address these gaps.  He supported the suggestion that the list of potential gaps identified by the 
EMIT Group be reviewed, now that the Uruguay Round notification procedures we re in place and to 
focus work in this area.  
 
23. The representative of Korea  said current WTO provisions were not sufficiently transparent for 
environment -related trade measures.  He supported Hong Kong's statement and noted the rele vance of 
transparency to Items 1, 3 and 6.  He noted Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement, which permitted the 
omission of Article 2.9 obligations in cases of urgent problems of, inter alia , health or environmental 
protection.  Korea felt that transparency pr ovisions were prejudiced by Article 2.10, which lacked 
appropriate steps for ex ante  transparency.  The scope of technical regulations subject to notification 
should also include any measures that had potential trade effects.  Article 2.9 criteria, concern ing what 
constituted significant trade effects  of technical regulations, were open to arbitrary interpretation and 
should be studied.  Environmental product requirements, such as packaging and labelling, could give rise 
to direct or indirect barriers for e xporting countries with lower environmental standards.  Therefore, a 
new mechanism, such as an advance notice system  could be considered for the prior notification of new 
environment -related trade measures, which would allow Members to take up the necessar y consultations.  
The joint discussions with the TBT Committee in February 1996 should examine environmental 
requirements with significant trade effects which were enforced by local or non -governmental bodies and 
central government bodies and were not mand atory for WTO notification;  Korea felt these measures 
should be notified, at least on a voluntary basis, as they were trade barriers.   
 
24. The representative of Brazil  recalled his delegation's proposal for environmental enquiry p oints 
to provide information on environment -related trade measures and trade -related environmental 
measures, including those not subject to WTO notification requirements.  An environmental enquiry 
point should go a step further than those in the TBT and SP S Agreements to provide information on 
environmental measures, such as environmental taxes, and waste handling measures.  Given compliance 
problems, information on notified measures, such as quotas, licensing or prohibitions, should also be 
included.  Alth ough, in principle, eco -taxes did not discriminate between domestic and foreign 
producers, exemptions and different tax levels could penalize similar imported products;  unjustifiably 
discriminate among foreign suppliers;  and, in the absence of internatio nally-accepted, scientifically -based 
criteria, be construed with a protectionist objective or be designed for domestic environmental problems.  
An enquiry point should also inform exporters of the benefits of environmental measures, such as 
information on government incentives for consumption of certain products (in absolute terms relative to 
other penalized products), government procurement regulations that gave a preference to products that 
fulfilled voluntary environmental standards and non -governmental programmes for environmentally -
friendly products.  Enquiry points could provide information on technical assistance for developing 
countries.  Hong Kong's suggestion should be developed to determine whether its implementation would 
require new disciplines.  
 
25. The representative of Australia  said transparency would be an issue in the Committee and the 
TBT Committee's examination of the TBT Agreement's applicability to eco -labelling.  There was scope 
for work on other environmental me asures, including packaging and waste handling requirements, to 
clarify whether, and the extent to which, they were covered by WTO transparency provisions.  Although 
environmental enquiry points had received support, he had concerns about the precedent of establishing 
a mechanism that covered a measure's policy purpose, rather than its characteristics.  A clearer 
understanding was required of which measures caused concern and were not covered by the TBT and 
SPS Agreements.  The focus should be on ensuring c ompliance with current provisions rather than on 
developing new mechanisms.  After work on eco -labelling had been advanced and taking into account WT/CTE/M/6  
Page 6 
 
 work in the Working Party on Notification Procedures, the adequacy of current WTO provisions could 
be assesse d. 
 
26. The Chairman  said the issue was whether environmental enquiry points were justified for areas 
not covered by WTO Agreements.  Several delegations considered gaps in transparency existed for 
which environmental enquiry points were necessary.  Others had said there should not be a proliferation 
of enquiry points or additional transparency mechanisms.  The United States had mentioned budgetary 
justifications for this and others had referred to the need to avoid creating additiona l administrative 
burdens.  He proposed the Secretariat review the list of potential gaps in transparency provisions in 
WT/CTE/W/5.  As Hong Kong and Brazil had noted, since this list had been drawn up in February 
1993, it included a number of elements whic h had been resolved by the Uruguay Round and excluded 
others which had been identified in the Committee's discussions.  The February 1996 joint meeting with 
the TBT Committee would enable the Committee to consider these issues under Item 3, including the 
issues linked to eco -labelling, such as non -product related PPMs, recycling standards, and waste handling 
requirements.   
 
27. The representative of Mexico  supported the Chairman's proposal for a review of the list of 
potential gaps, however, was concerned this could imply interpreting the coverage of environmental 
measures by certain WTO Agreements, particularly eco -labelling.  A list of gaps could only be a basis 
for discussion as, even if no coverage gaps were identified, this might not be sufficient with respect to 
transparency.  Referring to handling requirements, as long as measures were applied as technical 
regulations or standards, there were no gaps.   
 
28. The representative of Argentina  said a review of potential gaps should occur after the February 
1996 meeting, when it would have been established whether the TBT Agreement covered all the issues 
under Item 3 or whether additio nal disciplines were required.  If these were covered by current 
disciplines then it would have to be determined whether additional transparency was necessary.   
 
29. It was agreed  that the Secretariat would revise the list of potential gaps in transparency provisions 
in WT/CTE/W/5 for the May 1996 meeting.  
 
Item 7  
 
The issue of the export of domestically prohibited goods  
 
30. The representative of Egypt, on b ehalf of the African Group , introduced Nigeria's proposal on 
domestically prohibited goods (DPGs) (WT/CTE/W/14).  She said work on this issue had continued 
since the 1991 draft Decision on Products Banned or Severely Restricted in the Domestic Market.  
Discussions were ripe for action and informal consultations were needed to pave the way for a consensus 
decision on DPGs at Singapore.  She said it was relevant to discuss DPGs in the WTO framework as:  
(i) there was no international agreement, other than the  1991 draft Decision, that dealt with domestically 
prohibited consumer products; (ii) the WTO was a mechanism of rights and obligations with wide 
membership and apt to impose binding obligations on both exporting and importing countries;  (iii) the 
WTO sho uld fill gaps in existing international mechanisms.  The Committee's work could draw on past 
experiences, especially if they had acquired international legality and had a broad, geographically -diverse 
membership.  At this stage, the African Group's aim was  not to establish an agreement or convention, 
but to agree on multilaterally -defined WTO rules and disciplines to deal with trade in DPGs.  Building 
on GATT work on DPGs, these disciplines should be WTO -consistent, i.e. non -discriminatory, least -
trade rest rictive and primarily aimed at increasing transparency, without leading to the extraterritorial 
application of national measures, and cover the export of products which were banned or severely 
restricted in the domestic market.  Special emphasis should be placed on pharmaceuticals, consumer 
goods, chemicals, cosmetics, and foodstuffs.  The WTO could cover:  (i) products not permitted to be 
sold in the domestic market because approval for sale had not been obtained or had expired (e.g. 
pharmaceutical and pro cessed agricultural products);  and (ii) plants and capital goods for which the          WT/CTE/M/6  
         Page  7 
 
 exporting country only permitted their use in manufacturing processes subject to strict security rules due 
to a risk to public health or safety.  Products categories should be distinguished and their legal regimes 
identified to avoid duplication.  Product coverage would have to be worked out with the involvement of 
other competent agencies, which would be agreed upon by consensus, such as WHO, FAO, UNCTAD, 
or UNEP.  UNCTAD's emp irical work on DPGs should be considered in determining the coverage and 
sufficiency of current instruments.  
 
31. At a minimum, DPG -related disciplines should aim at transparency through a notification system 
with clear guidelines an d binding obligations, including full compensation and liability coverage, as well 
as specific interim measures for exported goods which were prohibited or severely restricted for domestic 
use and for which no equivalent action had been taken for exports.  The minimum request was to 
examine whether exporting countries should apply domestic measures to their exports.  Hence, 
notification procedures and guidelines were important to notify domestic legislation which banned or 
restricted a product, stating the reasons why such products constituted a danger to human, animal, plant 
life or health.  Also, exporting countries should establish enquiry points to provide, on request, 
information on notified products.  Technical assistance would help developing countrie s strengthen their 
risk assessment capabilities, allow them to make informed decisions about imports and develop national 
means to control DPG trade.  Importing countries should be able to make decisions based on clear 
information on the reasons for the pr ohibition or severe restriction of goods in the domestic market and 
the effects on present and future generations.  The WTO should not be solely responsible for technical 
assistance.  She proposed a trust fund or the use of UNDP or extra budgetary resource s, since additional 
financial resources, as well as technical assistance was needed.  The WTO should cooperate with other 
organizations to put together a programme to develop national means to control DPG trade in developing 
countries.  The Council for Tra de in Goods could be entrusted with monitoring and reviewing a DPG 
decision.  
 
32. The representative of the United States  welcomed Nigeria's proposal as it was helpful for 
Members to provide the Committee with their ideas, outlining perceived problems and possible solutions.  
Nigeria's proposal suggested that a DPG agreement apply, inter alia , to chemicals and dangerous wastes, 
which seemed contradictory as these substances were covered by the London Guidelines (and on -going 
negotiati ons on a binding Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Convention) and the Basel Convention and 
work should not duplicate areas covered by other international instruments.  Work was also on -going on 
expired pharmaceuticals and consumer products.  While capacity bui lding was important, the United 
States had concerns about the scope of technical assistance as this did not fall within WTO -competence 
and was covered by related agreements, such as the London Guidelines and the Basel Convention, which 
had the competence a nd technical expertise.  Moreover, it was premature to discuss institutional aspects 
such as calling for the Council for Trade in Goods to monitor and review the implementation of a DPG 
agreement.  Although Egypt had provided a partial response, he asked f or further clarification of what 
was meant by "at a minimum" an agreement should provide for improved transparency through a 
notification system, in order to understand which disciplines were being sought.  Also, clarification was 
requested as to why there  was a need for an instrument extending beyond what was already dealt with by 
current WTO provisions or in other fora.  For instance, many restrictions on consumer goods which 
were technical regulations were covered by the TBT Agreement, and restrictions o n foodstuffs could fall 
under the TBT or SPS Agreements.  Referring to Egypt's statement, he inquired as to what was meant 
by compensation, liability and interim measures in the proposed agreement.  If this was to be a 
transparency instrument which include d notification, he asked whether and on what basis compensation 
would be required if a country failed to notify.  
 
33. The representative of Japan  said Nigeria's proposal provided a guideline for further work on 
DPGs.  To overcome dif ficulties in controlling DPGs, which were mainly due to a lack of information 
and technical knowledge, developing countries should cooperate with DPG exporters and develop an 
effective notification mechanism.  Appropriate technical assistance required info rmation on the 
problems encountered by DPG importers, as well as the obstacles to establishing notification 
mechanisms.  The WTO role should be to fill any gaps in coverage of DPGs by related existing MEAs, WT/CTE/M/6  
Page 8 
 
 such as the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protoc ol, and the London Guidelines, in order to strengthen 
and avoid duplicating their work.  Once this had been completed, if necessary, the Committee could 
consider any reform of WTO notification procedures.  The definition of DPGs in the 1991 draft 
Decision should be reconsidered, as products which were banned on the domestic market could present 
other problems;  for instance, a second hand vehicle which did not meet a newly -introduced domestic gas 
emission regulation had not been categorised as a DPG in the 1991 draft Decision, but it could have a 
negative effect on environment and safety in the importing market.  If a DPG agreement was established, 
attention should be given to discussions on Item 1 and should ensure WTO -consistency.  If an importing 
country adopted a trade -restrictive measure on a DPG to protect animal or plant life within its territory, 
this could be justified by GATT Article XX(b).  However, the issue of whether countries were allowed 
to take measures to restrict their DPG exports to protec t the environment beyond their territory should 
be considered.  An examination of whether it was appropriate to take measures which were not covered 
by GATT Article XX was necessary.  
 
34. The representative of Korea  said the converging views on this issue were:  (i) the WTO should 
compliment and avoid duplicating current mechanisms in other fora;  (ii) disciplines on trade in DPGs 
should be non -discriminatory, and least -trade restrictive, and not allow the extraterri torial application of 
the exporting country's national measures;  (iii) WTO disciplines should increase transparency through 
a notification mechanism;  and (iv) technical assistance should be provided to build capacity in importing 
countries.  The primary task was to define the scope of product coverage, including input from relevant 
organizations and the WTO role for any potential gaps should be identified.  Most DPGs, such as toxic 
chemicals, hazardous wastes and pharmaceuticals, were already controlled b y other international 
instruments.  Korea preferred a stricter scope of coverage, in order to avoid unnecessary disputes and to 
strengthen WTO disciplines, taking into account:  (i) the scope of existing mechanisms for hazardous 
wastes, toxic chemicals and  dangerous goods, which were not precisely defined and for which there were 
practical and technical problems in controlling trade.  In the Basel Convention, Parties had the right to 
define hazardous wastes, and the list of controlled wastes had not been fu lly codified under the 
Harmonized System.  The Basel Convention's Technical Working Group was defining hazard 
characteristics by applying  de minimus  criteria;   (ii)  related international instruments were not always 
legally binding as some were drafted as guidelines or codes of conduct.  Although the 1991 draft Decision 
had shortcomings, if a consensus emerged to use it as the basis for discussion, Korea would not object.  
However, the focus should be on the contents of the draft Decision and not on modalit ies, such as whether 
it should take the form of a decision.  Given the amount of work which was needed to reach an 
agreement, Korea did not feel that the Committee would be in a position to present results by Singapore.  
 
35. The repr esentative of the European Communities  thanked the delegations of Nigeria and Egypt 
(on behalf of the African Group), for their proposal, which enabled objectives to be better defined for 
Singapore.  The WTO role should be to fill any gaps by acting as a safety net , which had been proposed 
by his delegation in February 1995.  He said Nigeria's proposal was a step towards defining the scope of 
coverage.  Concerning the coverage of an agreement to products that were not within WTO -competence, 
i.e. cosmetics, food additives and consumer goods, which did not necessarily have an environmental 
impact, an indication should be given of the practices with which importing countries would need to deal.  
Progress should take into account gaps in international instrument s, the PIC Convention's coverage, and 
work on Items  1 and 4.  The European Commission intended to organise seminars in 1996 on the 
possible risks posed by toxic chemicals and substances, and provide financial assistance to UNITAR's 
work on defining risk ev aluation of hazardous substances in developing countries.  Also, he noted a 
report on the July 1995 Conference on Hazardous Wastes was available from the Secretariat.  He shared 
the doubts expressed by the United States concerning compensation and liabilit y in the DPG context.  
 
36. The representative of Morocco  said WT/CTE/W/6 provided an exhaustive list of international 
instruments concerning trade in DPGs.  He supported the statement of Egypt, on behalf of the African 
Group, and sai d the 1991 draft Decision should be revised in light of relevant international developments 
and should not contradict WTO rules on non -discrimination.  International legal instruments on DPGs 
should be harmonized, and WTO provisions, particularly Article X X(b), the TRIPs and SPS          WT/CTE/M/6  
         Page  9 
 
 Agreements, should not be separated from other agreements such as the Basel Convention, Montreal 
Protocol and the Biodiversity Convention.  In this regard, he recalled Decisions II/12 and III/1 of the 
Basel Convention, which banned the export of hazardous wastes from OECD to non -OECD countries, 
and that an Ad hoc  Group of Experts was redefining the list of hazardous wastes.  Also, a decision had 
been taken under the Biodiversity Convention to draft a bio -safety protocol by 1998 on the transfer and 
use of genetically -modified organisms, and a workshop would be held  to identify and harmonize common 
points in the Biodiversity Convention with other relevant agreements.  Countries which exported DPGs 
should respect the concept of prior informed consent and the concerns of developing countries in 
accordance with Chapter  19 of Agenda 21.  
 
37. The representative of India  referred to his previous statements on DPGs and supported the 
points made by Egypt, on behalf of the African Group.  Work on DPGs should not overlap with the 
activities of other fora,  which could be used as an input, specifically when considering product coverage.  
Discussion of the scope, rules and disciplines to deal with DPG trade should build on the 1991 draft 
Decision.  
 
38. The representative of New Zealand  said the process of identifying gaps in transparency should 
continue.  Nigeria's proposal endorsed the view that any disciplines on DPGs should complement 
relevant international instruments and the notification procedures they contained, as well as propose d 
amendments to them and future instruments, such as the PIC Convention.  If gaps were identified, then 
it would have to be determined whether this was a matter for the Committee.  Given that the Secretariat 
did not have the necessary expertise to identify  gaps, he supported Egypt's comment that WHO, 
UNCTAD and other relevant organisations should be involved in the definition of product coverage.  
New Zealand endorsed Nigeria's proposal that any DPG disciplines should be non -discriminatory, least -
trade -restrictive and increase transparency, without leading to the extraterritorial application of national 
measures.  He asked for clarification of how the extraterritorial aspect would affect the proposed 
disciplines and what was meant by "at a minimum" WTO disci plines should aim at increasing 
transparency.  He understood from Egypt's intervention that the importing country should determine 
which products it imported based on knowledge of whether they were prohibited in the exporting country.  
He asked what was re quired beyond transparency to enable countries to make informed decisions.  
 
39. The representative of Mexico  said Nigeria's proposal was a step to identifying possible further 
WTO action, such as notification, and technical assistanc e for DPGs.  The first step was to clarify the 
coverage of DPGs.  Although the Committee had considered information on the London Guidelines 
and the Basel Convention, other fora's work should be explored for which information was lacking (i.e. 
for pharmace uticals and consumer goods).  
 
40. The representative of Cuba  supported Nigeria's proposal, presented by the African Group, and 
said it should be the starting point for further work.  
 
41. The representative of Canada  recalled the position of her delegation at the February 1995 
meeting.  Canada considered the DPG issue might be of decreasing importance.  The Basel 
Convention, the London Guidelines and the negotiations in 1996 to develop a legally -binding instrumen t 
for the application of the PIC in banned and severely restricted chemicals were developments since DPGs 
had been discussed in the GATT in 1991.  Canada had reviewed Nigeria's proposal on DPGs and was 
sympathetic to its concerns to protect public health a nd the environment.  Moreover, Canada did not 
allow the export of chemicals prohibited for use in Canada for environmental or health reasons.  She 
supported further analytical work on potential gaps in the coverage of DPGs by UNCTAD, such as that 
proposed at the November 1995 meeting of UNCTAD's Ad hoc  Working Group on trade, environment 
and development, as this would help to inform the Committee's discussions.  Canada supported assisting 
developing countries to establish effective domestic inspection and c ontrol procedures, rather than 
developing new WTO disciplines.  As proper enforcement of domestic standards and technical 
regulations played a large part in addressing DPGs, increased technical assistance might be a solution.  
However, assistance to nation al administrations should not serve to promote trade -restrictive measures.  WT/CTE/M/6  
Page 10 
 
  
42. A DPG decision should cover trade between developing countries, as well as trade between 
developed countries, where regulatory requirements, combined wit h liability considerations, might 
preclude the sale of products in the home market.  Given that companies manufactured products for 
different national standards, exports occurred in compliance with the requirements of the export market.  
For example, Canad ian automobile manufacturers produced vehicles to both Canadian and US 
specifications and certain Canadian standards were more stringent than US standards, such as for child 
restraint requirements, daylight running lights and bumpers.  The US required airb ags, which Canada 
did not given the higher use of safety belts.  Although US emission standards were higher than Canadian, 
the automotive industry was integrated and Canada did not regulate what product to what standard was 
produced where.  It was the manu fact+urer's responsibility to meet the standards where the product was 
sold and not the government's role to enforce, extraterritorialy, another country's standards.  Also, she 
noted the administrative burden that a notification scheme could create.  Given  that cosmetics, foodstuffs 
and pharmaceuticals did not easily fall into the DPG category and did not, per se , pose an environmental 
risk, these issues might need to be referred to other fora which had a clearer mandate in this area.  
Canada shared the con cerns expressed by the United States and the European Communities on 
compensation and liability.  
 
43. The representative of Switzerland  supported Nigeria's proposal and said work on DPGs should 
address potential gaps in coverage.  He  asked for clarification of the scope of coverage of an agreement 
on DPGs.  Also, importing countries' practical problems would be a useful basis for further work.   
 
44. The representative of Norway  said gaps in coverage between MEA s and the WTO needed to be 
identified to arrive at substantive conclusions in the area of DPGs.  He supported Canada's statement 
that potential gaps were diminishing as DPG -related instruments were developed and more countries 
acceded to them.  The role of  related MEAs should be strengthened.  He said Nigeria's proposal noted 
DPG product categories, such as pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, cosmetics and foodstuff, which were 
not related to the environment.  The handling of DPGs was also linked to the capabi lity of importing 
countries to effectively control imports of hazardous goods in accordance with the current trade rules.  
As Japan had mentioned, such trade measures were justified under Article XX.  He said WTO technical 
assistance could contribute to a solution to the DPG issue.   
 
45. The representative of Hong Kong  said product coverage should be clarified before any DPG 
disciplines were developed and he understood that re -exports had not been included in Nigeria's 
proposal.  
 
46. The representative of Malaysia, on behalf of ASEAN , supported Nigeria's proposal and Egypt's 
statement, on behalf of the African Group, and said duplication of related international instruments 
should be avoided, the extraterritoria l aspect should not become a means for protectionism and technical 
assistance should be considered.  
 
47. The representative of Egypt  addressed the comments concerning Nigeria's proposal and future 
work on DPGs.  She felt WTO -competence extended to the DPG area.  In response to the European 
Communities' comment that the DPG issue was an important item for Singapore, she said this was th e 
purpose of Nigeria's proposal and it could be strengthened or weakened depending on further 
information.  The African Group had a flexible position as to the basis for further work and the 1991 
draft Decision could be drawn on if necessary.  A step -by-step approach was preferable.  An objective 
for Singapore on DPGs was to identify current notification procedures and potential gaps in their 
coverage.  Although the African Group hoped to have a comprehensive agreement on DPGs which 
would entail some compen sation and liability, this was not linked to notification and transparency and 
could be taken up outside the WTO.  In response to New Zealand's question as to what was being sought 
in addition to information, she said building capacity to control DPGs in d eveloping countries was needed, 
such as training customs officers, as well as information and additional financing, and further WTO 
disciplines.           WT/CTE/M/6  
         Page  11 
 
  
48. The observer from UNCTAD  said copies of the report from the November 1995 meeting o f the 
UNCTAD Ad hoc Working Group of experts on trade, environment and development, at which Canada 
had requested an examination of the coverage of DPG -related instruments, were available.   
 
49. The Chairman  said the DPG issue was e volving rapidly in the multilateral system with the 
negotiation of new international instruments, which limited the issue for the WTO in terms of product 
coverage.  Although this did not mean the issue would no longer require attention, the Committee would  
have to identify the scope of products for which potential gaps existed.  Reference had been made to 
product categories which went beyond those that had an environmental impact and which, consequently, 
did not fall within the Committee's mandate.  As such , it would need to be determined if discussions 
should include such products.  Several delegations had emphasized the need to extend technical 
assistance to countries which decided to restrict DPG imports and the Secretariat could be requested to 
channel t his assistance.  Based on Nigeria's proposal, work could begin on DPGs when Item 7 was re -
examined in February  1996.     
 
Item 3  
 
The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:  
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purpos es;  and (b) requirements for environmental purposes 
relating to products, including standards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling  
   
50. The representative of the United States  said there should be full tra nsparency, which entailed the 
range of obligations in the TBT Agreement on notice and comment, on:  (i) the design of eco -labelling 
programmes, their statutory or regulatory basis and procedures for input from interested parties;  (ii) the 
selection of pro ducts being considered for an eco -label;   
(iii) the life -cycle assessments used to develop criteria;  (iv) draft criteria for new or revised product 
groups;  and (v) documentation on how the criteria were to be implemented.   
 
51. The representative of Hong Kong  referred to the relevance of his statement under Item 4 to 
Items 1 and 3.   