RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/99
G/SCM/W/108
19October 1995
ORGANIZATION(95-3169)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES TOQUESTIONS POSED BYTHE UNITED STATES1CONCERNING
THE NOTIFICATION OFCHILEAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS2
Thefollowing communication, dated 2October 1995, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofChile.
_______________
REPLIES TOTHE QUESTIONS POSED BYTHE UNITED STATES CONCERNING
THE NOTIFICATION OFTHE GOVERNMENT OFCHILE
Replies tothegeneral questions
2. With reference toquestion No.2,thepublication bytheNational Commission toInvestigate
theExistence ofDistortions inthePrice ofImported Goods doesnothave anylegal status. This
publication wasdesigned tobeusedasameans ofreleasing information andonlyprovides ageneral
descriptionofthematterswithintheCommission'spowers,itstasks,structureandtheconditionsrequired
forittoadopt adecision intended toremedy adistortion.
Attheoutset, twogeneral considerations should beborne inmind. First, Chile wasnota
signatory totheTokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code; however, in1992 Chilean lawprovided the
Distortions Commission withthepossibility ofrecommending anti-dumping measures.
Secondly, asaresult oflittleexperience inthisarea,Chile hasonlyapplied threeanti-dumping
measures todate. Further toinvestigations initiated prior to1January 1995, onlytwoofthem are
currently inforce. Theanti-dumping duties applied haveranged from7percentto10percent,which
demonstrates therestraint andthecaution withwhich these matters areapproached.
Finally, itshould bepointed outthatunder ourlawthese measures, since theyhave a
self-terminating clause, canonlybeapplied foramaximum ofoneyearandthereisnoneedforformal
steps tobetaken bytheadministration.
1G/ADP/W/1-G/SCM/W/9 +Supp.1.
2G/ADP/N/1/CHL/1-G/SCM/N/1/CHL/1.G/ADP/W/99
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Determination oftheexistence ofdumping
3. TheDistortions Commission isguided inthese matters bythegeneral criteria setoutin
Articles 2.3and2.4oftheAgreement, which aresupplemented bythepowers oftheNational Customs
Service, theDirector ofwhich isamember oftheCommission.
4. Itshould benoted thattheprovisions oftheA-DAgreement haveonlybeenrecently applied,
since Chile wasnotasignatory totheTokyo Round Code. Consequently, A-DArticle 2.5hasbeen
applicable since theimplementation ofthese Agreements. Inanyevent, itshould bepointed outthat,
todate, thistypeofsituation hasnotarisen.
5,6,and7. Itmust bereiterated thattheGuidelines areonlyadocument describing thetasks,
structure andconditions required fortheCommittee toadopt adecision intended toremedy adistortion.
Thisdocument wasdrafted before theAgreements entered intoforce. Article 2.4isapplicable asfar
asafaircomparison between theexport price andthenormal value isconcerned.
8. Chile utilizes themethodology inArticle 2.4.1 toconvert currency, when thefaircomparison
between theexport price andthenormal price sorequires.
9. Evenbefore thesenewagreements cameintoforce, Chile applied theArticle 2.2criteria, which
arenowlawandareusedtodetermine when salesofthelikeproduct inthedomestic market ofthe
exporting country aremade intheordinary course oftrade.
10. Chile relies onArticle 2.2.1.1.
11. Chile follows thecriteria setoutinArticle 2.2.2 oftheA-DAgreement.
12. Chile follows theprovisions ofArticle 2.1.1 inorder toexclude salesbelow cost.
13. Article 2.4.2 oftheAgreement isthenorm inthismatter inChile. Accordingly, theexistence
ofmargins ofdumping during theinvestigation stage willnormally beestablished onthebasis ofa
comparison ofaweighted average normal value withaweighted average ofprices ofallcomparable
export transactions orbyacomparison ofnormal value andexport prices onatransaction-to-transaction
basis. Inthecases investigated todate,thismargin hasbeenestablished onthebasisofthefirsttest.
14. Thissituation hasonlyarisen once, when alikeproduct imported from amarket economy
country andsupplied tothedomestic market wasanalysed. Webelieve thatthisisacriterion which
willberetained inthefuture.
Subsidies
Attheoutset, twogeneral considerations should beborne inmind. First, Chile wasasignatory
totheTokyo Round “Subsidies Code”from January 1981.
Secondly, since thatdateonlysixcountervailing duties havebeenapplied. Nosuchmeasure
iscurrently being applied.
Finally, itshould bepointed outthatunder ourlawthese measures, since theyhave a
self-terminating clause, canonlybeapplied foramaximum ofoneyear, andthereisnoneedforformal
steps tobetaken bytheadministration.G/ADP/W/99
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15and16. Thedefinitions andother matters laiddown intheAgreement onSubsidies and
Countervailing Measures constitute theChilean lawfrom thedateoftheirenactment.
17. WithoutprejudicetothespecificnatureofArticle19.4oftheSCMAgreement,whichiscurrently
mandatory inourlaw,Decree No.575already provided inrespect ofallmeasures thatcould beapplied
thattheycould notexceed “themargin ofprice distortion ”reviewed.
18. Asregards Question 18,itshould bepointed outthatthe“minimum customs values ”arenot
asubstitute forcountervailing duties. Theamount ofcountervailing dutyisgoverned byArticle 19.4.
19. Chilean lawdoesnot,atpresent, haveanyexplicit rules concerning thismatter. However,
while newruleswhich areconsistent withSCM Article 1.1arebeing considered, wewillstrictly comply
withSCM Article 14.
20. Chilean lawhasalready adopted thedefinitions oftheSCM Agreement anditisnotintended
tomake further changes inthisarea. Without prejudice totheforegoing, theCommission must, in
thecourse oftheinvestigation, identify thenature ofthesubsidy inquestion. Inanyevent,
non-actionable subsidies cannot besubject tocountervailing duties.
Procedures
21. Under thepresent rules, since17May1995, priortoinitiating aninvestigation, theCommission
willreview thedegree ofrepresentativeness inaccordance withArticles 5.4and11.4oftherespective
Agreements. Thisis,infact,whattheCommittee isdoing atpresent.
22and26. While thenewregulations indicating theduration oftheprocedure andtheperiod
prescribed forthatprocedure arebeing enacted, theCommission willensure thatitobserves the
obligationnottoimposeprovisionalmeasuressoonerthan60daysfromtheinitiationoftheinvestigation.
23. Thistime-limit willbespecified intheregulations under consideration. Particular carewill
betaken toensure thatproper advance notice isgiven prior toinitiating dumping investigations or
holding consultations prior toinitiating subsidy investigations. Inbothcases thetime-limits involved
willbesuchasareconsidered sufficient tosatisfy theobligations prescribed.
24. Notification ismade through notices intheDiario Oficial andbyletters addressed tothe
exporters known atthetimeofinitiating theinvestigation, importers, other producers, consumers of
theproduct under investigation, andtradeassociations where appropriate. Prior toinitiating asubsidy
investigation, theCommission contacts thegovernment ofthecountry oforigin oftheproduct which
isthesubject ofthecomplaint inorder toallow anopportunity forholding thenecessary prior
consultations.
25. Theregulations (Decree No.575)which governed subsidy anddumping investigations
specifically provided forthese matters; since 17May1995 themore detailed rules contained inA-D
Article 6.5andSCM Article 12.3areapplied.
27. Onthebasisofavailableinformation,theCommissionmayimmediatelyterminateaninvestigation
atanytimewhere itdecides thatitcannot findthataprice distortion exists orthatsuchadistortion
doesnotcause orthreaten serious injury todomestic industry. Accordingly, theCommission willalso
terminate aninvestigation where itfindsthatthemargins ofdumping aredeminimis orthatthevolume
ofdumped imports ortheinjury isnegligible.G/ADP/W/99
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28. SincethesedefinitionsandconceptsareexpresslysetoutintheAgreements,theyareaccordingly
partofcurrent Chilean law.
29. Noreply. Chile doesnothaveadefined policy inthisarea.
30. Provisionalmeasurestrytopreventseriousinjury;ourregulationsdonotprovideforretroactive
provisional measures.
31. There arenoplans toapply thisoption intheChilean regulations.
32. Aswehaveindicated previously, theGuidelines areonlyareference. Itmustbeemphasized
thattheChilean regulations provide foraform inwhich theinterested parties must provide the
information needed forsubmitting theircomplaint.
ThroughouttheinvestigationtheTechnicalSecretariatoftheCommissionmayrequestadditional
information from theparties.
33and34. Theprovisions referred tointhese questions areinforce inChile andaretherefore
currently applied.
35. Annex IIoftheAnti-Dumping Agreement ispartofChilean law. TheChilean regulations
provide anopportunity, bothduring theinvestigation andthereafter, tosupply additional information
orcorrect information already provided.
36and37. AnnexIIoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementispartofChileanlaw.Duringtheinvestigation
theTechnical Secretariat oftheCommission usesinformation supplied bytheinterested parties and
gathers information from allrelevant andavailable sources inorder toensure thattheresult ofthe
investigation isobjective andtransparent.
38and39. Article 18,referred tointhequestion, itself states thattheCommission maymake
thisrecommendation “when inpossession ofinformation forsodoing ”.Itaddsthatinorder todo
so,theCommission must heartheviews oftheinterested parties.
40. Article 9.3.2 needs tobeimplemented inorder tosatisfy theobligations thereunder andthis
isthesubject ofthedraftlegislation under consideration.
41. Thenotified Chilean regulations donotprovide forthistypeofinvestigation. However, as
provided forintheagreements, Chile isobliged toadopt thenecessary regulations andcarry outsuch
investigations.
42. Where there isdoubt astotheorigin ofmerchandise thecustoms authorities areauthorized
tomake anon-the-spot physical assessment and/or request acertificate oforigin.
Judicial review
Questions 43-46
Atpresent,therearenojudicial,arbitraloradministrativetribunalsorproceduresforthespecific
purpose ofjudicial review ofadministrative actions relating tofinaldeterminations oncountervailing
duties andanti-dumping measures. However, exceptionally ontwooccasions interested parties have
made useofaconstitutional remedy known asthe“remedy ofprotection ”which maybetaken byanyG/ADP/W/99
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natural orlegal person, whether Chilean orforeign, whoconsiders hisconstitutional safeguards to
havebeeninfringed ortobethreatened. Chile willeither havetosetupaspecial system forjudicial
review, which maybeofthiskind, oraseparate administrative orarbitral tribunal inaccordance with
thenewprovisions oftherespective agreements.
Determination ofinjury
48. Under Chilean lawinjury maybeactual (existing) orimminent (threatened). Inbothcases
itmust beserious.
49. Asregards “benefits ”,seethedefinition inArticle 3.4oftheA-DAgreement.
Questions 50to59
Inallthese questions inwhich reference ismade totheGuidelines oftheDistortions
Commission (50to59),itmustberecalled thatthisdocument isdesigned tobeusedasameans of
releasing information andonlyprovides ageneral description ofthematters within theCommission 's
powers, itstasks, structure andtheconditions required forittoadopt adecision intended toremedy
adistortion.
ThedeterminationofinjuryorthreatofinjuryisbasedontherelevantArticlesoftheAgreements
onImplementation ofArticle VIandonSubsidies andCountervailing Measures (Article 3oftheA-D
Agreement andArticle 15oftheSCM Agreement).
Thefactors considered inorder todetermine, asobjectively aspossible, theexistence orthe
threat ofinjury arethose setforthintheagreements andinclude, actual andpotential decline insales,
profits ("benefits"), output, market share ofimports andthedomestic industry, productivity, return
oninvestments, orutilization ofcapacity, factors affecting domestic prices, themagnitude ofthemargin
ofdistortion (dumping orsubsidy), inventories, employment andother factors which giveanoverall
viewofthestateofthesector.
Inanalysing thecausal linkbetween dumping orsubsidies andactual orthreatened injury,
statistical tools andeconometric analyses areusedtoassess themateriality ofthefactors giving rise
tothesituation faced bydomestic industry. Clearly, these toolsdonotalways provide alltheanswers
buttheyenable theCommission togetitsdecisions intofocus.
Likewise, statistical information isnotalways available andtherefore itisnotalways possible
tousethesame techniques andstandards. Insuchcases theCommission hastobeflexible, butthe
degree offlexibility islimited bytheobligations ofChile under thevarious WTO Agreements and
fromtheregulations currently being drafted, aswellasbytheChilean legalprinciples which supplement
theforegoing (such asfundamental rights guaranteed bytheConstitution).
60. Thedefinition of“interested party”isthatcontained intheAgreements, seeA-DArticle 6.11
andSCM Article 12.9. Thistermisdefined widely toinclude, forexample, industrial users ofthe
products under investigation, thusensuring abroad participation intheinvestigation.
61. Parties areentitled toseeallnon-confidential information inaccordance withA-DArticle 6.4
andSCM Article 12.3.G/ADP/W/99
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62. Thenotified Lawstates thatbefore resolving anymatter submitted toit,theCommission
must receive interested parties whosorequest forthepurpose ofhearing theirsubmissions. Inthe
regulations under consideration, provision ismade forprocedures toimplement theobligation toinform
allinterested parties oftheessential factsinaccordance withA-DArticle 6.9andSCM Article 12.8,
inforce inChile since 17May1995.
63. Theprovisions ofA-DArticle 12.2.2 andSCM Article 22.5areinforce inChile andtherefore
apply incountervailing-duty andanti-dumping investigations. Thepublic records oftheCommission
contain, interalia,adetailed report oftheinvestigation, thesubmissions oftheinterested parties, as
wellasthereasoning ofthemembers oftheCommission andthegrounds fortheirdecisions. Finally,
itincludes therecommendation made bytheCommission tothePresident oftheRepublic.
64. Chilean lawprovides forcumulation asprescribed byA-DArticle 3.3andSCM Article 15.3.G/ADP/W/99
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REPLIES FROM CHILE TOTHE FOUR QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
SENT INTHE COMMUNICATION DATED 27JULY 1995
Reply No.1
Without prejudice totheappropriate ratification, under Chilean lawatreaty which isduly
concluded bytheExecutive andapproved bytheNational Congress andforwhich theformalities of
promulgation andpublication aresatisfied isincorporated intothedomestic legalorder withthestatus
ofaLaw.
Article 32,No.17,oftheChilean Constitution states thatthePresident oftheRepublic has
special powers “toconduct foreign policy withregard toother countries andinternational bodies and
carry outnegotiations; toconclude, signandratify suchtreaties asheshallconsider tobeintheinterests
ofChile andwhich must thereafter besubmitted forapproval byParliament inaccordance with
Article 50,No.1".
Article 50oftheConstitution provides thatParliament hassolepower: “(1)Toapprove or
reject those international treaties thatthePresident oftheRepublic submits toitprior toratification
thereof. Inapproving atreaty, thesame formalities shallbeobserved asforanational Law. Unless
matters which aretheproper subject ofstatute areinvolved, themeasures thatthePresident ofthe
Republic takesortheagreements thatheenters intoforthepurpose offulfilling anexisting treaty shall
notrequire further approval byParliament ”.
Theincorporation oftreaties intodomestic lawwiththestatus ofLaws isclear from the
constitutional rulesreferred toabove. Thisisalsoconfirmed bylegaldoctrine andmany decided cases.
Since under theChilean legalorder atreaty becomes Law,andistherefore mandatory, itmustbeapplied
bythecourts andtheadministrative authorities, subject towhatwillbestated further oninrelation
toself-executing provisions.
Forapproval byCongress, atreaty mustbesubjected tothesameformalities asanyLaw. Under
Article 63oftheConstitution aminimum number ofvotes isrequired forapproving aLaw: amajority
ofvotes actually castbymembers ofeachHouse. However, where atreaty amends orrepeals provisions
which areinthenature ofconstitutional organic Law, avoteinfavour ofsuchamendment orrepeal
must beobtained from 4/7ths oftheactive members ofparliament andsenators, andinthecaseof
aLawpassed byqualified majority, theabsolute majority ofactive members ofparliament andsenators.
Foratreaty approved byParliament tobeincorporated intoChilean law,ithastobeenacted
bySupreme Decree signed bythePresident oftheRepublic andtheappropriate Minister orMinisters
ofState, andmust undergo aconstitutional review bytheOffice oftheComptroller General ofthe
Republic andbepublished intheOfficial Gazette.
Atreatymayhavedirectlyapplicableorself-executingprovisionswhichareautomaticallybinding
ontheStateandconfer rights onindividuals. Atreaty mayalsocontain provisions which require legal
oradministrative regulations (anexecutive decree orregulation) tobeenacted before theycanbeapplied
inChile. Thereason fortheforegoing isthatinmany provisions ofatreaty, theparties undertake
orareobliged tocarry outcertain actsortakecertain measures. Inorder todetermine whether or
nottheprovisions ofatreaty areself-executing, itisprimarily necessary toanalyse itscontents and
thewayinwhich itisworded. Whether theregulations which havetobepassed arestatutory or
administrative innature depends ontheparticular caseinquestion: legislating forasanction [penalty]
orsetting upapublic body willrequire aLawtobepassed (Article 60oftheConstitution).G/ADP/W/99
G/SCM/W/108
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Ontheother hand, theprovisions ofatreaty maybeapplied byadministrative measures, either
bypassing aregulation, oramere decree, orinstructions, passed bythePresident oftheRepublic
inperformance oftheregulatory powers conferred onhimbyArticle 32.8oftheConstitution.
When atreaty, which ranks asaLaw, isincorporated intotheChilean legalsystem, itimplicitly
repeals anyexisting regulations which conflict withit,asprovided forinArticle 52oftheCivil Code.
Implicit repeal occurs “where thenewLawcontains provisions which cannot bereconciled withthe
previous Law”.However, Article 53provides thatinthecaseof“implicit repeal, totheextent that
theprevious Lawdoesnotconflict withtheprovisions ofthenewLaw, theprevious Lawshallremain
inforce eventhough thatLawdeals withthesame subject-matter asthenewLaw”.Thisisconfirmed
bothbycase-law andlegaldoctrine.
Ashasalready beenstated, thedomestic implementation ofatreaty willdepend onthenature
oftheobligation contained inthespecific provisions ofthetreaty. Accordingly, theobligation toset
upaprocedure forjudicial review isamatter forstatute. Article 60oftheConstitution, which indicates
whatmatters should begoverned bystatute, should beborne inmind inthisrespect.
Aside fromreiterating thattheWTO Agreements haveforce oflawinChile, itshould benoted
thattheGovernmentisdrawing-upadraftLawwhichmakesappropriateamendmentstoLawNo.18,525.
ThatdraftLawspecifically defines thestructure, composition andpowers ofthebody reviewing the
decisions oftheinvestigatory authority inaccordance withtheAgreements anddefines those rules
ofprocedure which arenotlaiddown intheAgreements. Theforegoing willhavetobedone in
accordance withChilean administrative procedures.
Aregulation isalsobeing drafted which laysdown allthose minor aspects ofprocedure to
befollowed, ensures transparency andtheprecise manner inwhich themethods ofcalculation,
adjustments andsources ofrelevant information within thescope oftheCommission (investigatory
authority) aretobecarried outandanyother matters which enable easier access tothemechanisms
under theAgreements.
On17May1995, Supreme Decree No.16oftheMinistry ofForeign Relations waspublished
intheOfficial Gazette inorder toenact the“Marrakesh Agreement ”establishing theWorld Trade
Organization,togetherwiththeAgreementsannexedthereto,whichinclude,inparticular,theAgreement
onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994andtheAgreement
onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures.
The“Marrakesh Agreement ”isaninternational treaty, signed andratified bytheRepublic
ofChile. However, foraninternational treaty tohaveforce oflawinChile, inaddition tosignature
andratification itmust bedulyincorporated intoChilean domestic law.
Supreme Decree No.16enacting the“Marrakesh Agreement ”thisprovides thattheAgreements
contained therein mustbefulfilled andimplemented asaLaw. Asfromthetimeofpublication ofthe
above-mentioned treaty intheOfficial Journal, thattreaty repeals theprovisions ofLawNo.18,525
totheextent thatthere isanyincomparability between thetextoftheLawandthatofthetreaty. All
matters notdealtwithbytheAgreements areunderstood toremain inforce.
Itmust bepointed outthatsome oftheprovisions oftheAgreement onImplementation of
Article VIoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994 andtheAgreement onSubsidies and
Countervailing Measures needtobeimplemented bytheappropriate enactments, bothstatutory and
regulatory.G/ADP/W/99
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Reply No.2
Where, subsequent totheAgreements, aLawisenacted which contains ruleswhich diverge
fromthoseintheAgreements,suchinconsistencymustberesolvedonthebasisoftherulesandprinciples
ofstatutory interpretation intheCivil Code, which arebinding onallrulesoflaw.Ingeneral, where
there aretwoenactments withthesame standing inthelegalhierarchy (treaty andLaw), dealing with
thesame matters, thelaterenactment willrepeal theearlier one. Such repeal maybeeither explicit
orimplicit. Theprinciple ofthespecific nature ofprovisions mustalsobeconsidered. Thisprinciple
isfound inArticles 4and13oftheCivil Code andmeans inpractice thattheprovisions ofaLaw
concerning specific matters willtakeprecedence overthegeneral provisions ofthesameLaworanother
Lawwhere those provisions conflict.
Notwithstanding theforegoing, some mention should bemade ofthestance taken bylegal
doctrine onthissubject. Legal doctrine maintains, andthisissupported bytheVienna Convention
onTreaty Law, thatthefirstruleofconstruction, when faced withaconflict between atreaty anda
subsequent Law, istoattempt toreconcile theprovisions ofthetreaty withthose oftheLawwhich
islaterintime. Where thisisnotpossible, thetreaty must, indomestic law,takeprecedence over
thesubsequent Law. Thissupports therulethatatreaty cannot beunilaterally amended because, being
acollective juridical act,ittakes precedence overaLaw, which isaunilateral juridical act.
Intheadministrative case-law oftheComptroller General oftheRepublic, inthecontext of
exemption schemes, there aredecisions totheeffect thattheprovisions ofthevarious international
treaties inquestion takeprecedence overtheChilean lawinthisareainaccordance withthetestset
outintheforegoing paragraph.
Reply No.3
Article 38oftheConstitution empowers anyperson whoconsiders thathisorherrights have
beeninfringed bytheadministration oftheState oritsbodies orthemunicipal authorities, toapply
tothecourts designated bystatute forthispurpose, without prejudice totheliability ofthecivilservants
whocaused theinjury. Infact,however, there isnogeneral procedure implementing thisright.
Ontheother hand, there arespecial procedures foradministrative litigation inmany matters
which provide forthecourts hearing applications challenging decisions oftheadministration inthe
fields oftaxation, customs, health, etc.
Furthermore, Article 19.14 oftheConstitution guarantees thatevery person hastherightof
petition before anyauthority whatsoever. Inaddition, Article 9ofConstitutional Organic Law
No.18,575 concerning thegeneral foundations oftheStateadministration, laysdown thatinrelation
toalladministrative actsthere isalways animplicit righttomake anapplication forreconsideration
tothesame authority against whom thecomplaint ismade. There maythenbearightofappeal where
thelawsoprovides.
Byinvoking theforegoing mechanisms, aparty mayapply either tothejudicial ortothe
administrative authorities foralaworaprovision ofaninternational treaty toberepealed orenforced,
depending onitssubject-matter.
Likewise, apart from theabove-mentioned remedy ofprotection, which safeguards certain
individual rights from arbitrary andunlawful actsoromissions, under LawNo.18,971 theChilean
legalsystem provides foraspecial economic amparo application tothecourts where there hasbeenG/ADP/W/99
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anarbitrary discrimination onthepartofState bodies intheperformance oftheeconomic activities
setforth inArticle 19.21 oftheConstitution.
Asageneral rule,itisnotnecessary touseorexhaust administrative proceedings priortofiling
anapplication before thecourts, savewhere theLawsoprovides, asinthecaseofcomplaints against
thedecisions ofmunicipal authorities.
Theonlybinding administrative case-law isthatoftheComptroller General oftheRepublic.
Thedecisions oftheComptroller General oftheRepublic bindtheadministration asawhole inthe
cases towhich theyrefer, buttheycanbereviewed byhim.
Judicial decisions onlytakeeffect inrelation totheparticular casewhich theydecide andonly
affect theparties totheproceedings.
Reply No.4
Ashasbeenpreviously mentioned, theGovernment ofChile isconsidering amendments to
theprovisions ofLawNo.18,525 inthelightoftheAgreements oftheWorld Trade Organization.
Thenewlegislation willhavetobecompatible withtheAgreements.