RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
ORGANIZATION 15November 1995
(95-3546)
Original: English Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES FROM KOREA CONCERNING QUESTIONS POSED CONCERNING
THE NOTIFICATION OFKOREAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS1
Thefollowing communication, dated 2October 1995, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofKorea.
_______________
Page
Opening Statement 5
Questions from Australia (G/ADP/W/5-G/SCM/W/13)
I. Anti-Dumping Measures
AU/A-1 7 AU/A-5 10
AU/A-2 30 AU/A-6 19
AU/A-3 21 AU/A-7 23
AU/A-4 9
II. Subsidies andCountervailing Measures
AU/S-1 36 AU/S-3 37
AU/S-2 37
Questions from Canada (G/ADP/W/26-G/SCM/W/33)
I. Anti-Dumping Measures
CA/A- 1 8 CA/A-21 10
CA/A- 2 13 CA/A-22 26
CA/A- 3 26 CA/A-23 30
1G/ADP/N/1/KOR +Suppl. 1-2andG/SCM/N/1/KOR +Suppl. 1-2G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
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CA/A- 4 11 CA/A-24 20
CA/A- 5 9 CA/A-25 20
CA/A- 6 9 CA/A-26 22
CA/A- 7 10 CA/A-27 21
CA/A- 8 27 CA/A-28 22
CA/A- 9 30 CA/A-29 7
CA/A-10 12 CA/A-30 23
CA/A-11 29 CA/A-31 31
CA/A-12 13 CA/A-32 19
CA/A-13 15 CA/A-33 23
CA/A-14 17 CA/A-34 24
CA/A-15 17 CA/A-35 26
CA/A-16 18 CA/A-36 27
CA/A-17 18 CA/A-37 31
CA/A-18 18
CA/A-19 19
CA/A-20 25
II. Subsidies andCountervailing Measures
CA/S-1 35 CA/S-4 36
CA/S-2 35 CA/S-5 36
CA/S-3 36
Questions from theEuropean Communities
I. Anti-Dumping Measures (G/ADP/W/12)
EU/A-1 8 EU/A-4 16
EU/A-2 12 EU/A-5 17
EU/A-3 15 EU/A-6 24G/ADP/W/74
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II. Subsidies andCountervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/19)
EU/S-1(KCA Art.13) 32 EU/S-6(KED Art.4-10) 34
EU/S-2(KED Art.4-20) 37 EU/S-7(KED Art.4-10) 34
EU/S-3(KED Art.4-3) 38 EU/S-8(KED Art.4-11) 34
EU/S-4(KED Art.4-8) 34 EU/S-9(KED Art.4-12) 35
EU/S-5(KED Art.4-8) 33
Questions from Hong Kong
I. Initial Questions (G/ADP/W/36-G/SCM/W/44)
HK/1 7 HK/6 22
HK/2 21 HK/7 26
HK/3 8 HK/8 27
HK/4 20 HK/9 31
HK/5 20
II. OralQuestions (G/ADP/W/61-G/SCM/W/70) 39
Questions from Turkey (G/ADP/W/42-G/SCM/W/50)
TK/1 20
TK/2 23
Questions from theUnited States
I. Initial Questions (G/ADP/W/15-G/SCM/W/22)
US/1 11 US/21 32
US/2 12 US/22 22
US/3 12 US/23 16
US/4 28 US/24 17
US/5 12 US/25 16
US/6 13 US/26 17
US/7 29 US/27 17
US/8 13 US/28 17
US/9 29 US/29 19G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
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US/10 29 US/30 25
US/11 28 US/31 25
US/12 28 US/32 30
US/13 13 US/33 38
US/14 29 US/34 19
US/15 37 US/35 8
US/16 16 US/36 24
US/17 20 US/37 24
US/18 23
US/19 22
US/20 21
II. Supplementary Questions (G/ADP/W/15/Suppl.1-G/SCM/W/22/Suppl.1)
US/38 14 US/46 10
US/39 14 US/47 11
US/40 14 US/48 38
US/41 15 US/49 32
US/42 15 US/50 17
US/43 33 US/51 18
US/44 27 US/52 8
US/45 32
III. OralQuestions (G/ADP/W/49-G/SCM/W/58)
US/1 39 US/4 40
US/2 39 US/5 41
US/3 39
Acronyms
AD AgreementonImplementationofArticleVIoftheGATT1994(WTOAnti-DumpingAgreement)
SCM Agreement onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
KCA Customs Act,Republic ofKorea
KED Enforcement Decree ofCustoms Act,Republic ofKorea (Presidential Decree)
KMO Ordinance ofthePrime Ministry ofCustoms Act,Republic ofKorea (alsoreferred toasthe
Regulation oftheCustoms Act)G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
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Opening Statement
I. Introduction
Iwould liketobriefly outline Korea 'santi-dumping andcountervailing legislation andits
operation inKorea, andthen, forthesakeofbrevity ofthereview, Iwillcover some common part
ofthequestions thatwillbedealtwithlaterindividually, withthehope thatitserves asacommon
answer tothese questions.
II. Relevant lawsandregulations andconcerned authorities
There arethreerelevant lawsandregulations related toanti-dumping andcountervailing duties:
Articles 10and13oftheCustoms Act,Articles 4-2through 4-15and4-20and4-21oftheEnforcement
Decree andEnforcement Regulations oftheCustoms Act. Thelasttwolegislations were issued by
wayofanOrdinance ofthePresident andPrime Minister respectively.
Anti-dumping measures including provisional andfinalmeasures andtheacceptance ofprice
undertakings aretaken bytheMinistry ofFinance andEconomy (MOFE) based ontheinvestigation
conducted bytheKorean Customs Administration (KCA) andtheKorean Trade Commission (KTC).
TheKCA isresponsible forconducting investigations ondumping andthefunctions oftheKTC is
toconduct investigation oninjury tothedomestic industry.
III. Implementation oftheURAnti-Dumping Code
Korea'sefforttoimplementtheURAnti-DumpingCodebeganimmediatelyaftertheintroduction
oftheDunkel Draft which acted asthefoundation forthebasic principles ofthenewAnti-Dumping
Code. On31December 1993, theCustoms Actwasamended sothatitcould more easily adopt the
results oftheURnegotiations andthePresidential Decree wasmodified toemulate theDunkel Draft.
On31December 1994, aftertheestablishment ofthenewAnti-Dumping Code, thePresidential Decree
andEnforcement Regulations oftheCustoms Actwereamended toimplement theWTO Anti-Dumping
Code.
IV. Domestic legaleffect oftheWTO Agreement
Under Article 6(11)oftheKorean Constitutional Law, aninternational treaty concluded and
promulgated under theprocedures prescribed byconstitutional lawhasadirect effect ontheKorean
judicial territory evenintheabsence ofdomestic implementation. TheWTO Agreement including
thenewAnti-Dumping Code hasbeensigned andpublicized andbecame effective inKorea asof
1January 1995, afteralltheprocedures, including approval bytheNational Congress, werecompleted.
Therefore, theoretically there isnoneedtoundertake implementation measures inorder tocomply
withtheWTO Agreement which prescribes thateachmember shallensure theconformity ofitslaws,
regulations andadministrative procedures withitsobligations asprovided intheannexed agreement.
However, Korea chose tolegislate implementation lawsandregulations inorder toclarify the
Korean anti-dumping proceedings forbothdomestic industries andforeign suppliers, andtoavoid any
interpretation problems which might occur inapplying thenewAnti-Dumping Code todomestic
proceedings directly. Even though theimplementation lawsattempted toaddress alloftheprovisions
ofthenewAnti-Dumping Code some parts were notincluded inthedomestic lawsandregulations
because theKorean authorities deemed itmore appropriate toapply them inpractice, rather than
legislation. Insuchcases, theabove mentioned principle established byconstitutional lawwillentitleG/ADP/W/74
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interested parties torequire therelevant authorities toapply thenewAnti-Dumping Code directly to
actual cases.
V. Overview oftheQuestions
Uptonow, Korea hasreceived around 130questions from sixMember countries, Canada,
Australia, theEC,Hong Kong andTurkey, intheorder inwhich thequestionnaires were received.
Roughly speaking, onefourth ofthetotalnumber ofquestions areoverlapping.
Ofthese, twoarguments areworthy ofnote:
1. Alarge partofthequestions arepointing outthatsome partsoftheURAnti-Dumping Code
arenotreflected andareasking howKorea ensures theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreement.
Asmentioned previously, some partsoftheURAnti-Dumping Code arereflected inabbreviated form
orreflected byexpressing suchpurport indomestic lawandregulations because application byactual
practice isdeemed more appropriate. However, unlike other countries adopting theprinciple thatthe
international agreement shallnothaveeffect domestically without domestic implementation, there is
noconcern fortherelevant Korean authorities torefuse toapply thenewrules oftheAnti-Dumping
Code duetothereasons mentioned above.
Allthenumerical standards, inparticular withrespect totheviability testfordomestic sales,
deminimis dumping margin, representation ofthedomestic industry, cumulative injury analysis, sales
below costs, etc.havebeentranslated intotherelevant lawsandregulations.
2. Many questions wereraised fromalackofunderstanding bysticking toaword translated in
English. forexample, theyarepointing outtheproblems oftheexpression oftherelevant articles
ofthedomestic lawsandregulations suchas"may", "inprinciple" etc.which could possibly mean
thediscretion oftheauthorities.
Traditionally, when thelawsregulating theactsoftheadministrative authority aremade, it
isourpractice tospecify theactsastherightoftheauthority rather thantheobligation. Sotheword
"may" actually means that"theauthority hastherightto"andtherefore, thesentence that"theMinistry
maydosomething" should readas"Something istobedonebytheMinistry".
Because ourlawisnotinterpreted togivetheauthorities akindofdiscretion simply bythe
word "may", iftheAgreement says"shall", ourlawisinterpreted as"shall", too.Inother words,
"may" inKorean hasamandating effect. Therefore, abiding bytheAgreement willnotposeany
difficulty onthepartoftheKorean Government.
VI. Concluding remarks
Eversince Korea introduced theanti-dumping andcountervailing dutysystem in1963, ithas
initiated 18cases ofinvestigation andactually imposed anti-dumping ononlysixitems. Thisrecord
coupled withthefactthatnocountervailing action hasyetbeen taken indicates thattheKorean
Government hastaken careful stepsinimplementing theanti-dumping andcountervailing dutysystem.
Korea willcontinue todoitsutmost tokeepthefullconformity totheAgreement.G/ADP/W/74
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Initial Questions andAnswers
AU/A-1 Will Korea ensure thatanydetermination made through applying "any utmost
information" assetoutinArticle 10(2) oftheCustoms Actwillbemade onthebasis ofthefacts
available inaccordance withArticle 6.8oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, andAnnex IIofthe
Agreement?
AD§6.8KCA §10(2)
CA/A-29 Article 4-11(9) and4-14(8) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actrefer to
determining anti-dumping measures onthebasis of"any" information available. DidtheKorean
Government mean "best" information available asisrequired byArticle 8.6oftheAgreement on
implementation ofArticle VI?
AD§8.6KED §4-11(9) §4-14(8)
HK/1 Article 6.8oftheWTO ADAgreement provides thatincases inwhich anyinterested party
refuses access to,orotherwise doesnotprovide, necessary information within areasonable period
orsignificantly impedes theinvestigation, preliminary andfinaldeterminations maybemade onthe
basisofthefactsavailable. Theprovisions for"bestinformation available" inAnnex IIoftheAgreement
shallbeobserved.
Article 8.6oftheAgreement states thatincaseofviolation ofundertakings, theauthorities
oftheimporting country maytake,under theAgreement inconformity withitsprovisions, expeditious
actions which mayconstitute immediate application ofprovisional measures using thebestinformation
available.
Article 10(2) oftheCustoms Actstates thatincases where theundertakings byexporters are
notfulfilled, orademand forthepresentation ofmaterials onthefulfilment oftheundertakings and
ademand toallow theverification ofthematerials presented isnotcomplied, anyutmost information
available shallapply inthedetermination ofdumping andmaterial injury, etc.
Article 4-11(10) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actstates thatiftheexporter refuses
tofulfiltheundertaking, theMinister ofFinance andEconomy maycontinue theanti-dumping measures
onthebasis ofanyinformation available.
Question: Would Korea clarify whether theterms "utmost information available" and"any
information available" willbeapplied inaccordance withtheprovisions of"bestinformation available"
asprovided intheWTO ADAgreement? Howwould theKorean legislation ensure compliance with
provisions inAnnex IIoftheWTO ADAgreement?
AD§6.8§8.6§Annex IIKCA §10(2) KED §4-11(10)
(ANSWER )Itisatranslationproblem.Theterm"utmostinformationavailable"and"anyinformation
available" inArt.4-11(10) ofDecree shallrefertothefactsavailable inaccordance withtheprovision
ofAnnex IIoftheAgreement. Onappearance, theymaybeinterpreted asdifferent. Butwestrictly
abide bytheAgreement inthecourse ofimplementation.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
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CA/A-1 Article 10(8) oftheCustoms Actdenotes cases where "theexpiry dateisdetermined
separately bytheordinance ofthePrime Minister". Could Korea explain thisreference andidentify
anycases where suchanexpiry datewould extend beyond thefiveyearsunset provision inArticle 11.3
oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§11.3KCA §10(8)
US/35 10(8) and4(8)oftheActprovide thatADandCVD orders andundertakings shallexpire after
fiveyears "except incases where theexpiry dateisdetermined separately bytheordinance". Can
theexpiry datedetermined intheorder belonger thanfiveyears"? Ifso,howisthisconsistent with
ADArt.11.3andSCM Art.21.3? Under what circumstances willtheexpiry datebedetermined
separately intheorder?
AD§11.3SCM §21.3KCA §10(8) KED §4(8)
(ANSWER )Theanti-dumping measures adopted byKorea havebeenimplemented through the
individual legislation ofanordinance ofthePrime Minister. Ineachcase, itstipulates subject, rate
andapplication period oftheADduty. Article 10(8) istaken tomean thattheapplication period of
suchmeasures isfiveyears, except incasewhere thelimitontheperiod ofapplication isdetermined
tobelessthanfiveyears bytheordinance ofthePrime Minister. Inallother cases, however, the
application period ofanti-dumping measures cannot exceed fiveyears according totheprovisions of
theAgreement.
_______________
EC/A-1 Itisnotclearfromthetextsavailable (inparticular Article 10(8) oftheCustoms Act,
page4ofthedocument) thatonlyareview having covered bothdumping andinjury willgenerate a
newfiveyearperiod ofapplication ofthemeasures. Isthisassumption, although inconsistent with
Article 11.3oftheWTO Code, correct?
AD§11.3KCA §10(8)
US/52 Under Article 10(8) oftheCustoms Actand4-14(1) oftheED,anorder willbeterminated
fiveyears afterthelaterof(i)thedateofimposition oftheorder or(ii)thedateofanyreview ofthe
order, including reviews thatdonotassess whether injury islikely torecur afterexpiration oftheorder.
Howisthisprovision consistent withADArticle 11.3andSCM Article 21.3, which provide thatan
anti-dumping orcountervailing dutyorder mustexpire fiveyears afterthedateofimposition ofthe
order unless therehasbeenasubsequent review which assesses whether expiration oftheorder would
belikely toleadtoacontinuation orrecurrence ofinjury?
AD§11.3SCM §21.3KCA §10(8) KED §4-14(1)
(ANSWER )Article 10(8) should bereadwiththerelevant articles intheDecree. Thisprovision
together withArt.4-14(1) oftheDecree means thatonlyareview having covered bothdumping an
injury willtrigger anewfive-year period ofapplication inaccordance withArt.11.3oftheAD
Agreement.
______________
HK/3 Article 4-2(1) states thatanyinterested party toadomestic industry suffering material injury
mayrequest theMinister ofFinance andEconomy toimpose anti-dumping dutyunder theconditions
asprescribed bytheordinance ofthePrime Minister.G/ADP/W/74
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Question: CanKorea elaborate whatarethose "conditions"? What does"theordinance of
thePrime Minister" referto?
KED §4-2(1)
(ANSWER )Conditions andtheordinance ofthePrime Minister refertotheEnforcement Regulation
asawhole.
_______________
CA/A-5 CouldKoreaclarifywhethertheprovisionsinArticle4-2(4)5.oftheEnforcementDecree
oftheCustoms Actismeant tofulfil therequirements under Article 5.2oftheAgreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI?Ifthisisthecase,willtherequirement for"Matters pertaining tomaterial
injury, etc.,ofthedomestic industry which havebeencaused bytheimportation ofsuchproducts"
bestrictly interpreted tomean evidence ofinjury, andofacausal linkbetween thedumping andinjury?
AD§5.2KED §4-2(4)5
(ANSWER )Yes. Asimple assertion thatthere wasamaterial injury, etc.isnotsufficient tomeet
therequirements ofthisprovision Art.4-2(4)5 oftheEnforcement Decree. Thisclause specifically
concerns withtheinjury aspect andthecausal relationship between theinjury anddumping asstated
byArt.4-2(4)5 oftheDecree, which stipulates "Matters pertaining tothematerial injury, etc.,ofthe
domestic industry which havebeencaused bytheimportation ofsuchproducts".
_______________
AU/A-4 Article 4-3(2) oftheEnforcement Decree provides onlythattheTrade Commission
mayreject anapplication thatisdeficient. Whyisthisnotmandatory asrequired byArticle 5ofthe
Anti-Dumping Agreement?
AD§5KED §4-3(2)
(ANSWER )Thediscussion of"may", "shall" hasbeencovered previously. Korea strictly abides
bytheAgreement.
Traditionally, when thelawsregulating theactsoftheadministrative authority aremade, it
isourpractice tospecify theactsastherightoftheauthority rather thananobligation. Sotheterm
"may" actually means thatthe"authority hastheright to"andtherefore, "theMinistry maydo
something" should bereadas"something istobedone bytheMinistry". Because ourlawisnot
interpreted togivetheauthorities adiscretion simply bytheword "may", iftheAgreement says"shall",
ourlawwillbeinterpreted as"shall", too.Inother words, "may" inKorean hasamandating effect.
Therefore, abiding bytheAgreement willnotposeanydifficulty onthepartoftheKorean Government.
______________
CA/A-6 Article 4-3(2)5 oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actmakes reference to
previousmeasurestoeliminateanyadverseeffect[ofdumping/dumpedgoods?]onthedomesticindustry.
Could Korea identify whatsuchmeasurers might beandhowtheywould beconsistent withArticle 18.1
oftheAgreement ontheImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§18.1KED §4-3(2)5
(ANSWER )Korea doesnothaveanyspecific situation inmind. Itcould refertothesituation where
imposition ofanADduty isnolonger necessary forsome reasons. NoADmeasure canbetaken
except inaccordance withtheprovisions ofADAgreement.G/ADP/W/74
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_______________
CA/A-21 Further totheQuestion oftransparency, could Korea clarify whether theKorean law
willnotetherequirement forthenotification ofinterested Members ofthereceipt bytheappropriate
Korean authority ofanapplication inaccordance withArticle 5.5oftheAgreement onImplementation
ofArticle VI?
AD§5.5KED §4-15(3)
(ANSWER )Yes. Therelevant provisions arestipulated in4-3(3) oftheDecree. Inaccordance
withtheDecree, thegovernment oftheexporting country concerned willbenotified oftheinitiation
ofaninvestigation.
_______________
CA/A-7 Article 4-4(1) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actmakes reference to
"concerned experts" whoparticipate inaninvestigation. Could Korea identify whosuchexperts might
beandwhether steps havebeen/are tobetaken toensure thatsuchexperts donotcome intocontact
withsensitive commercial information supplied byforeign governments andnon-governmental parties?
Should suchexperts come intocontact withsensitive commercial information supplied byforeign
governments andnon-governmental parties, whatstepshasKorea taken toensure thattheexperts respect
theconfidentiality ofsuchinformation?
KED §4-4(1)
(ANSWER )Toensure fairness andeffectiveness oftheinvestigations, weemploy experts inthe
investigation processes suchastheCPAs andlawyers whobearnorelationship withtheconcerned
parties. Toprotect confidential information submitted bytheinterested parties, Article 4-8(6) of
Presidential Decree prescribes thattheMinistry ofFinance andEconomy andother investigating
authoritiesshallnotuseanyacquiredinformationandmaterials,andfactsacknowledgedbytheinterested
parties withrespect toanti-dumping proceedings forpurposes other thantheproceedings. Moreover,
anyexperts participating intheinvestigation shall submit awritten memorandum nottodisclose
confidential information acquired bytheactivities. Furthermore, anyperson whoreveals confidential
matters acquired from theinvestigation shallprocedures shallbeliable forpunishment according to
actssuchastheLawyer ActandtheCertified Public Accountant Act.
_______________
AU/A-5 Why istermination ofaninvestigation notmandatory under Article 4-4(4) ofthe
Enforcement Decree when there isadetermination thateither themargin ofdumping isdeminimis
orthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible, asrequired under Article 5.8oftheAnti-Dumping
Agreement?
AD§5.8KED §4-4(4)
(ANSWER )Termination ofaninvestigation under 4-4(4) should beinterpreted asmandatory. We
strictly abide bytheAgreement.
______________
US/46 Article 4-4(4) oftheEDprovides thatMinister ofFinance andEconomy ("MOFE") "may"
suspend orterminate afinalinvestigation ifitisdetermined thatimports arenegligible, Article 4-3(2)
oftheEDprovides thattheKTC "may" reject ananti-dumping orcountervailing dutyapplication if
theimports arenegligible. How arethese provisions consistent withADArticle 5.8andSCMG/ADP/W/74
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Article 11.9, which provide thatinvestigating authorities mustreject ananti-dumping orcountervailing
dutyapplication orterminate aninvestigation ifimports arenegligible? Forexample, doesKorea
contemplate thatitwillleave investigations pending afteranegligibility determination withtheoption
ofresuming them iftheimports inquestion exceed 3percentatanypoint aftersuspension?
AD§5.8SCM §11.9KED §4-3(2) §4-4(4)
(ANSWER )Ifullyunderstand theconcerns which areexpressed inthisquestion. These provisions
arestillunder review. Korea willanswer inwriting.
Asweclarified inthemeeting, theWTO Agreement hasadirect effect ontheKorean
administration andtheoretically incasethearticles inadecree oraregulation areinconflict withthose
oftheAgreement, thearticles ofAgreement shallprevail. Thus, ourinvestigating authorities shall
reject anapplication foranti-dumping orcountervailing dutyorterminate aninvestigation ifimports
arenegligible.
_______________
CA/A-4
Article 4-2(2)2 oftheRegulation oftheCustoms Actwhich addresses deminimis volumes
doesnotappear toaccount forsituations ofsingle countries withdumped exports lessthan3percent
ofimport volume. Could Korea explain howthisisconsistent withArticle 5.8oftheAgreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI?
AD§5.8KMO §4-2(2)2
US/47 Korea'snegligibilityprovisionscanbeconstruedasrequiringthatthetotalvolumeofallcountries
under investigation mustbeconsidered negligible before termination oftheinvestigations isappropriate
and,insuchcircumstances, thatallongoing investigations beterminated. SeeArticle 4-4(4) ofthe
EDandArt.4-2(2) oftheCAR. Howarethese provisions consistent withthose ofADArt.3.3and
5.8andSCM Art.11.9and15.3which clearly indicate thataninvestigation withrespect toimports
from aparticular country must beterminated where imports from thatcountry arenegligible?
AD§3.3§5.8SCM §11.9§15.3KED §4-4(4) KMO §4-2(2)
(ANSWER )TheEnforcement Decree 4-4(4) andRegulation 4-2(2) stipulate thattheinjury will
bedetermined asnon-negligible when theimports from aparticular country which issuspected of
dumping exceed 3percentofthetotalimports ofthelikeproduct orwhen thetotalvolume ofimports
fromcountries thatindividually export lessthan3percentofthetotalimports exceeds 7percentof
imports ofthelikeproduct.
Iftheimports fromaparticular country arelessthan3percentofthetotalimports, thecountry
willbeexcluded from thecountries which aresubject toinvestigation. Ofcourse, theinvestigation
ontheother countries which exceed 3percentofthetotalimports willcontinue.
_______________
US/1 4-6(4) oftheDeclaration doesnotappear toprovide standard constructed export price("CEP")
deductions. Ifagood isimported byarelated importer andthensoldinidentical condition (i.e.not
further manufactured) whatprice willbeusedinthefairvalue comparison? SeeADArts. 2.3and
2.4.
AD§2.3§2.4KED §4-6(4)G/ADP/W/74
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(ANSWER )Itisthefirstnon-related resale price thatwillbeused. Forthefaircomparison, the
costs incurred between importation andresale andprofits accruing byresale willbededucted.
_______________
US/2 4-6(4) oftheDeclaration permits thedumping margin tobebased on"anyreasonable criteria"
whenever theproducts arenotsoldinthesame condition asimported. Inwhatcircumstances doyou
intend todepart fromyournormal dumping methodology? What "reasonable criteria" willbeapplied
insuchcircumstances? SeeADArts. 2.3and2.4.
AD§2.3§2.4KED §4-6(4)
(ANSWER )That isstated inArt.4-4(7) oftheRegulation andthisissimply anadoption of
corresponding paragraph inArticle 2.3oftheADAgreement thatexport price maybeconstructed
onsuchreasonable basisastheauthorities maydetermine iftheproducts arenotresold intheconditions
asimported orproducts arenotresold toanindependent buyer.
_______________
US/3 4-6(4) oftheDecree, readinconjunction with4-4(7) oftheRegulations, seems torequire
deduction ofallcostincurred between importation andresale and"reasonable profits" onlywhere
products arenotsoldinthesame condition asimported. Under whatconditions willdeductions be
made iftheproducts aresoldinthesame condition asimported?
KED §4-6(4) KMO §4-4(7)
(ANSWER )AsImentioned inprevious USquestions, deduction ofallcosts incurred between
importation andresale andprofit accruing willbeapplied forthefaircomparability ofprices.
_______________
CA/A-10 Article 4-6(5) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actnotes thatthenormal
value andthedumping price maybeadjusted while Article 4-4(9) implies thatsuchadjustments are
mandatory. Could Korea clarify whether suchadjustments willbemandatory consistent withArticle 2.4
oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§2.4KED §4-6(5) KMO §4-4(9)
EU/A-2 From Article 4-6(5) oftheEnforcement Decree (page 11ofthedocument), itappears
thatadjustments areoptional. Could Korean authorities precise inwhich cases theyintend toavoid
making suchadjustments andconfirm thatsuchanapproach willnotapply tocases where itislikely
thatthegranting ofadjustments would eliminate differences affecting thecomparability ofprices?
KED §4.6(5)
US/5 4-6(5) oftheDecree states thattheMinister "may" adjust normal value anddumping price
fordifferences thataffect "comparability ofprice". Under whatcircumstances willtheMinister exercise
hisdiscretion tomake adjustments forsuchitems astaxes, anddifferences inphysical characteristics,
etc.? How isthisprovision consistent withADArt.2.4?
AD§2.4KED §4-6(5)
(ANSWER )Korea willfollow Art.2.4oftheADAgreement
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page13
CA/A-2 Could Korea clarify, beyond theadjustments listed inArticle 4-6(comparison between
theNormal Value andtheDumping Price) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act,whether
there willbeadjustment fortreatment ofnon-recurring items andtreatment ofstart-up operations as
provided forinArticle 2.2.1.1. oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§2.2.1.1. KED §4-6
(ANSWER )Notspecifically mentioned inthelawandregulations (Art. 4-4(3) oftheregulation
onlystates that"theCV... shall betheamount ofthecosts incurred inthenormal production
process ..."). However, itistheintention oftheKorean Government tomake necessary adjustments
fornon-recurring items andstart-up operations forcalculation asprovided forinArt.2.2.1.1. of
GATT 94.Korea hasnocaseofthisexperience. However, Korea willfollow theADAgreement.
_______________
US/13 4-4(3) oftheRegulations states thatconstructed value shallinclude "theamount ofthecosts
incurred inthenormal production process inthecountry oforigin, plusSG&A andprofit. Howdoes
4-4(3) oftheRegulation account fornon-recurring costsbenefitting either future orcurrent production
andstart-up?
AD§2.2.1 KMO §4-4(3)
(ANSWER )Because there arenoexplicit provisions inourlegislation, Korea follows therelevant
provisions oftheADAgreement.
_______________
US/6 How doestheMinister determine whether adifference incosts affects thecomparability of
theprices?
KED §4-6(5)
(ANSWER )Idonotknow whether Iunderstand yourquestion well. However, when arelevant
interested party verifies apattern where acostdifference resulting from thedifference inphysical
characteristics causes aprice difference, Korea willmake necessary adjustments toaccount forthis
price difference.
_______________
US/8 "Conditions ofsale," asusedin4-6(5) oftheDecree isnotdefined. Does itinclude, e.g.,
packing andfreight?
KED §4-6(5)
(ANSWER )Conditions ofsalearereferred toagain inArt.4-4(11) oftheRegulation. Packing and
freight areconsidered aslongasaprice comparison isaffected bythem.
_______________
CA/A-12 Could Korea explain whyArticle 4.7oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act
(Determination ofMaterial injury, etc.)(p.11),inestablishing therequirement foracausal linkbetween
dumping andmaterial injury does notreflect theprovision inArticle 3.5oftheAgreement onG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page14
Implementation ofArticle VIthatstates: "The authorities shallalsoexamine anyknow factors other
thanthedumped imports which atthesame timeareinjuring thedomestic industry, andtheinjuries
caused bythese other factors must notbeattributed tothedumped imports"?
AD§3.5KED §4.7
(ANSWER )Inourinjury determination, ithasbeenourpractice toexamine anyknown injurious
factors other thandumped imports. Inanycase, Korea willfollow Art.3.5oftheADAgreement.
_______________
US/38 Article 4-7(1)4 oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act("ED") requires thattheKorean
Trade Commission ("KTC") assess whether imports have"lower [ed]prices or...prevent [ed]price
increases" forthedomestic industry. Howisthisconsistent withArticle 3.2oftheADandArticle 15.2
oftheSCM Agreement, bothofwhich require ananalysis ofwhether imports suppress ordepress prices
"toasignificant degree?"
AD§3.2SCM §15.2KED §4-7(1)4
(ANSWER )Since theADCode andtheSCM Code donotprovide definite guidance for"significant
degree", itwasdifficult fortheKorean Government toadopt itinthedomestic legislation. However,
theintention oftheADAgreement willbefullyobserved. Forexample, where material injury, etc.,
isdeemed tobeinsignificant theapplication willberejected inaccordance withArt.4-3(2)3 ofthe
Decree.
_______________
US/39 Article 4-7(2)3 oftheEDrequires thattheKTCconsider initsthreat analysis whether theprice
ofimports "islikely todecline, orprevent increase of,theprice" ofthedomestic likeproduct. How
isthisprovision consistent withADArticle 3.7(iii)andSCM Article 15.7(iv) which require ananalysis
ofwhether imports willhavea"significant depressing orsuppressing effect ondomestic prices...?"
AD§3.7(iii) SCM §15.7(iv) KED §4-7(2)3
(ANSWER )Iunderstand thisquestion as:towhatextent Korea consider thepricechange significant
enough toconsider initsthreat analysis. Forthereference ofouradherence totheAgreement, I'd
liketoindicate thatthedetermination ofinjury threat islimited onlywhen theinjury isclearly foreseen
andimminent inaccordance withArt.4.7(2) oftheDecree.
_______________
US/40 InArticle 4-7(2)3 oftheED,theKTC isdirected toassess whether there isalikelihood of
anincrease indemand formore imports. How isthisprovision consistent withADArticle 3.7(iii)
andSCM Article 15.7(iv) which require thattheinvestigating authorities analyse whether theprices
ofimports would leadtoincreased demand forimports?
AD§3.7(iii) SCM §15.7(iv) KED §4-7(2)3
(ANSWER )Art.4-7(2)3 isthedirect adoption ofArt.3.7(iii) oftheADAgreement. There is
slight difference ofexpression duetotranslation. Nomatter howitisinterpreted when thereisdifference
between theADAgreement andtheRegulation, theprovisions oftheAgreement willprevail.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page15
US/41 Article4-7(2)2oftheEDauthorizestheKTCtoconsiderinititsthreatanalysiswhetherincreases
inproduction capacity "may result inanincrease indumping". Howisthisprovision consistent with
ADArticle 3.7(ii) andSCM Article 15.7(iii) which require thattheauthorities analyse whether increased
oravailable production capacity indicates the"likelihood ofsubstantially increased [dumped/subsidized]
exports" tothecountry inquestion?
AD§3.7(ii) SCM §15.7(iii) KED §4-7(2)2
(ANSWER )TheKTC analyse whether increased oravailable production capacity indicates the
likelihood ofsubstantially increased exports tothecountry inquestion inaccordance withtheAD
Agreement.
_______________
US/42 Article 4-7(2)2 doesnotrequire theKTC totakeintoaccount the"availability ofother export
markets" when determining whether additional production capacity poses athreat tothedomestic
industry. Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwould Korea ensure theconformity ofitspractice
withADArticle 3.7(ii) andSCM Article 15.7(iii) which require thattheauthorities takeintoaccount
theavailability ofotherexport markets when assessing whether athreat isposed byavailable production
capacity?
AD3.7§(ii)SCM §15.7(iii) KED §4-7(2)2
(ANSWER )Article 4-7(2)2 oftheDecree intends toconsider allrelevant factors notlimiting to
availability ofother export markets. Theavailability ofother export markets willbetaken intoaccount
asrequired bytheADAgreement.
_______________
CA/A-13 CanKorea clarify whether Article 4-8oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act
(Request fortheCooperation ofInterested Parties onMaterials) ismeant toaddress theprovisions
inArticle 6oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?Ifso,whyinparagraph 1isthelanguage
apparently discretionary, i.e.,"Ifitisdeemed necessary" andnotmandatory asintheAgreement?
AD§6KED §4-8
(ANSWER )ThisArticle means thatifitisdeemed necessary, theauthority concerned mayask
necessaryinformationtonon-relatedpartieswhodon'thaveobligationtosubmitinformation.Ofcourse,
theauthorities should askrelevant information toallinterested parties asstated inArt.6.1oftheAD
Agreement.
_______________
EU/A-3 From Article 4-8(3) oftheEnforcement Decree (page 13ofthedocument), itappears
thatanon-confidential summary mayberequested, while theCode leaves nodiscretion andclearly
states thatauthorities shallrequire suchsummaries. Isthisassumption, although inconsistent with
Article 6.5.1. oftheWTO Code, correct?
AD§6.5.1. KED §4-8(3)
(ANSWER )Thisquestion issimilar tothediscussion of"May" and"Shall". Ithink ithasbeen
covered previously.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page16
US/16 4-8(3) oftheDecree requires thatpublic summaries ofconfidential information beprovided.
What requirements arethereconcerning thelevelofdetail which mustbeprovided inapublic summary
orconcerning when apublic summary doesnothavetobesupplied? SeeADArt.6.5.1 andSCM
Art.12.4.1
AD§6.5.1 SCM §12.41 KED §4-8(3)
(ANSWER )Public summaries ofconfidential information should besubmitted andthesummaries
arerequired tobeinsufficient detail topermit areasonable understanding ofthesubstance ofthe
information submitted inconfidence asrequired inArt.6.5.1 oftheADAgreement. Thecases where
public summary ofconfidential information doesnothavetobeprovided willbevarious depending
onsituations. Therefore, Korea thinks itisnotappropriate toprovide every situation thatpublic
summary doesnothavetobesupplied intheDecree orRegulation.
_______________
EU/A-4 Could Korean authorities explain themeaning ofArticle 4-8(5) oftheEnforcement
Decree (page 13ofthedocument) insofarasitrefers todifficulties toconduct aninvestigation?
KED §4-8(5)
(ANSWER )Itrefers tothesituation inwhich interested parties donotcooperate withtheauthorities
such thattheconduct oftheinvestigation issubstantially impeded. (incomplete response, later
submission, etc.)
_______________
US/23 4-8(5) oftheDecree permits adetermination onthebasisofthefactsavailable if"itisdifficult
toconduct theinvestigation". What consideration isgiven totherespondents 'levelofcooperation?
How isthisconsistent withADArt.6.8,which provides thatfactsavailable maybeusedwhere an
interested party refuses ordoesnotprovide access tonecessary information within areasonable period
oftime, orsignificantly impedes theinvestigation?
AD§6.8KED §4-8(5)
(ANSWER )Thisprovisionintendstoaddressthesituationinwhichtheinvestigationbecomesdifficult
duetorefusal tocooperate forverification ofinformation submitted orsome other reasons suchas
insufficient cooperation, which isclearly expressed inthesame paragraph.
_______________
US/25 4-8(5) oftheDecree doesnotappear tolimittheuseofadverse information onlytocases where
aparty hasnotbeencooperative. Under whatcircumstances willyoubaseadetermination onadverse
information? Intheabsence ofaspecific provision, howwillKorea ensure theconformity ofitspractice
withADAnnex II,5?
ADANNEX II,5.KED §4-8(5)
(ANSWER )Thecases thatKorea usesFAare:When anincomplete response issubmitted; When
theresponse issubmitted beyond thedesignated deadline without arequest fordelaying thesubmission
fromtherespondent; When interested parties subject toinvestigation actually hinder theprocessing
ofinvestigation. Inanycase, Annex II(5)oftheADAgreement willbefollowed.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page17
US/24 4-8(6) oftheDecree doesnotappear torequire consideration ofanyofthefactors listed in
ADAnnex II,suchastherequirement ofparagraph 2thattheauthorities consider the"reasonable
ability oftheinterested party torespond". Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwould Korea
ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreement?
ADANNEX II,6.KED §4-8(6)
US/26 4-8(5) oftheDecree doesnotappear toprovide respondents withanopportunity tocorrect
deficient submissions, asrequired byAnnex II,6oftheADAgreement. Does Korea require orallow
respondents tocorrect deficient information? Intheabsence ofaspecific provision, howwould Korea
ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheADAgreement?
ANNEX II,6KED §4-8(5)
US/27 4-8(5) oftheDecree doesnotrequire theMinister togivereasons forrejecting information,
asrequired byADAnnex II,6.Intheabsence ofaspecific provision, howwillKorea ensure the
conformity ofitspractice withtheADAgreement?
ADANNEX II,6KED §4-8(5)
US/28 4-8(5) oftheDecree doesnotrequire theMinister tousespecial circumspection inemploying
secondary information or,where practicable, check theinformation against independent sources of
information, asrequired Annex II,7oftheADAgreement. Intheabsence ofaspecific provision,
howwillKorea ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheADAgreement?
ADANNEX II.7KED §4-8(5)
(ANSWER )USquestions 24,26,27,28belong tothecasewhere there arenocorresponding
provisions indomestic legislation. AsImentioned earlier, theprovisions ofADAgreement willprevail.
_______________
CA/A-14 Further toArticle 4-8,could Korea explain thejustification fortheprovision in
paragraph 7granting access tomaterials, otherthanthose materials treated asconfidential, byinterested
parties "unless thereisaparticular reason fordenying therequest". What reasons areenvisioned that
could leadtosuchadenial, andhowwould theybereconciled withArticle 6.1.2 oftheAgreement
onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§6.1.2 KED §4-8
EU/A-5 Article 4-8(7) oftheEnforcement Decree (page 14ofthedocument) provides that"a
particular reason" mayjustify thedecision torefuse access tonon-confidential information. Could
Korean authorities bemore explicit onthisissueandexplain whatkindofextraordinary reason could
justify sucharestriction totherights ofdefense?
KED §4-8(7)
US/50 Article 4-8(7) oftheEDstates thatMOFE, KTC andKCA "shall" grant therequest ofany
interested party foraccess tonon-confidential material submitted byother parties orusedbythe
authorities, butthattheKorean authorities areauthorized todeny arequest if"there isaparticular
reason" fordoing so.How isthisexception consistent withtheADArticle 6andSCM Article 12
which require theprovision ofallnon-confidential information tointerested parties?
AD§6SCM §12KED §4-8(7)
(ANSWER )Theinvestigating authorities mayreject theconcerned parties 'access tothenon-
confidential materials inacasesuchasfollows, butnotlimiting tothiscase. -Ifitisobvious that
thepurpose oftherequest forthematerials istoimpede theinvestigation procedures.G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page18
_______________
CA/A-15 Further toArticle 4-8,could Korea explain theapparently discretionary language in
paragraph 8,"theinvestigating authority maygivehimanopportunity tostatehisopinions..." How
isthisreconciled withArticle 6.2oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§6.2KED §4-8(8)
US/51 Article 4-8(8) oftheEDprovides thattheKorean authorities "may" giveaparty anopportunity
tostateitsopinion through apublic hearing. Howisthisconsistent withtheADArt.6.2andSCM
Art.12.2which provide thatallinterested parties inananti-dumping proceeding havetheright, on
request, toexpress theirviews andrebut other parties arguments atahearing?
AD§6.2SCM §12.2KED §4-8(8)
(ANSWER )Korean authorities, mayprovide, onitsowninitiative evenwithout anyrequest of
interested parties anopportunity forthem tostatetheiropinions through apublic hearing. Andthe
request ofinterested parties topresent theiropinions willbeaccepted inaccordance withArt.6.2of
theADAgreement inanycase.
_______________
CA/A-16 Article 4-8(9) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actmakes reference to,inter
alia,theheadofabankdealing withforeign exchange, another agency oraninterested organization
thatdeems imported products tobedumped. Could Korea identify what orwhosuchbodies are,
theirspecific functions respecting theinvestigation ofallegedly dumped goods and/or theenforcement
ofinjury findings andwhether eachsuchbodyhasbeennotified totheCommittee inaccordance with
Article 16.5oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI.
AD§16.5KED §4-8(9)
(ANSWER )Thefunctions ofsuchbodies asforeign exchange bank, otheragency thantheauthorities
aresimply toprovide information which isnecessary forinitiation ofaninvestigation tocompetent
authorities. Since these bodies arenotresponsible toinitiate andconduct investigations referred in
Art.5oftheADAgreement, theyarenotregarded asdirectly involved ininvestigation. Therefore,
Korea didnotnotify theirnames totheCommittee.
_______________
CA/A-17 Could Korea clarify theintent oftheprovisions ofArticle 4-9(Imposition oftheanti-
dumping duty), thatitwilldetermine separate dumping margins forindividual exporters except, inter
alia,"those forwhom itisdifficult toconduct aninvestigation ortoverify thematerials forother
reasons". What arethereasons andcircumstances thatcould cause suchdifficulty?
KED §4-9(1)
CA/A-18 Article 4-9(1) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actmakes reference tovarious
reasons whyasoleanti-dumping dutyrateorbaseimport price maybedetermined. Could Korea
explain the"orother reasons" justification forsuchadetermination andprovide examples?
KED §4-9(1)
(ANSWER )Itrefers tothesituation when interested parties donotcooperate withtheauthorities
suchthattheconduct oftheinvestigation issubstantially impeded. Theexamples aresubstantial delayG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page19
inthesubmission ofrequested information, andinsufficient cooperation inorimpediment ofanon-the-
spotinvestigation.
_______________
CA/A-32 Article4-9(3)oftheEnforcementDecreeoftheCustomsActappearstoaddressexpedited
reviews. Could Korea identify where inthelegislation theprohibition against thecollection ofduties
during anexpedited review ascontemplated byArticle 9.5oftheAgreement onImplementation of
Article VIexists?
AD§9.5KED §4-9(3)
US/34 Neither 4-9(3) oftheDecree nor4-6(3) oftheRegulation states thatduties willnotbelevied
during newshipper reviews. Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwillKorea ensure the
conformity ofitspractice withADArt.9.5,shipper 'simports while thereview isbeing conducted.
Explain theprocess ofcollecting ornotcollecting duties during anewshippers review.
AD§9.5KED §4-9(3) KMO §4-6(3)
(ANSWER )Inthecaseofanexpedited review, theprovision oftheAgreement isapplied andthe
imposition ofananti-dumping dutyisprohibited during theexpedited review process.
_______________
CA/A-19 Could Korea explain Article 4-9(4) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act
and,more specifically, whyimport-related expenses aretobeadded toanormal value?
KED §4-9(4)
(ANSWER )AstheCustoms value ofKorea isbased onthec.i.f. level ofprice, import related
expenses mean costsincurred forreaching thec.i.f.levelofpricefromthenormal value intheexporting
country.
_______________
AU/A-6 Article 4-9oftheEnforcement Decree refers totheuseof"abaseimport price". What
isthisandhowisitjustified under theAnti-Dumping Agreement?
KED §4-9
US/29 4-9(1) oftheDecree provides for"asoleanti-dumping dutyrateorabaseimport price" to
beimposed onanexporter whofailstopresent materials, orwithrespect towhom itisdifficult to
conduct aninvestigation, orwhose information isdifficult toverify. HowwilltheMinister establish
thisrateorprice?
KED §4-9(1)
(ANSWER )Theanti-dumping dutymaybeimposed either byananti-dumping dutyrateorthrough
establishing thebaseimport price. Inthelatter case, thedutyimposed isthemargin between thebase
import price andtheactual c.i.f. import price declared bytheimporter. Thebaseimport price is
determined byadding ordinary expenses (such asfreight, insurance fee,storage charge, orsales
commission incurred fromexportation), tothenormal value oftheproduct subject totheinvestigation
inKorea. Inanycase,theactual amount oftheanti-dumping dutyshallbelower thanthefinaldumping
margin.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
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Page20
CA/A-24 Given thefourandsixmonth timeframes referred toinparagraph 2ofArticle 4-10
(Application ofProvisional Measure) (p.16) arebasically thesame initial timeperiods required by
Article 7.4oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI,doesthereference inparagraph 3,
allowing forprolongation oftheapplication period ofprovisional measures "inaccordance withthe
international agreement" mean thesixandninemonth timeperiods asstated inArticle 7.4?
AD§7.4KED §4-10(2)
(ANSWER )Theanswer isyes.
_______________
HK/4 Under Article 4-10(3) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act,theMinistry ofFinance
andEconomy mayprolong theapplication period oftheprovisional measures inaccordance withthe
international agreement, ifitisdeemed necessary.
Question: Onthe"international agreement", isitreferring totheWTO ADAgreement, Article 7.4
inparticular?Forthephrase"deemednecessary":wouldKoreaclarifywhatwouldbetheconsiderations
oftheMinistry ofFinance andEconomy?
AD§7.4KED §4-10(3)
(ANSWER )Yes. International agreement inthisArticle refers totheWTO ADAgreement. If
theMinister ofFinance andEconomy, inthecourse ofaninvestigation, determines whether aduty
lower thanthemargin ofdumping would besufficient toremove injury, hemayextend theapplication
period oftheprovisional measure beyond fourmonths andsixmonths, respectively.
_______________
CA/A-25 Article 4-10(4) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actappears torequire the
security inrespect ofprovisional duties toexceed theamount oftheprovisional anti-dumping duty.
Could Korea reconcile thiswith theexplicit requirement inArticle 7.2oftheAgreement on
implementation ofArticle VIprohibiting securities inexcess ofprovisional liabilities?
AD§7.2KED §4-10(4)
US/17 Section 4-10(4) oftheDecree states thatthedutydeposit fortheperiod during which provisional
measures areapplied mustexceed theamount oftheprovisional anti-dumping duty. Isthisatranslation
error? Ifnot,howisthisprovision consistent withADArt.7.2?Please explain howthedutydeposit
ratewillbedetermined.
AD§7.2KED §4-10(4)
HK/5 Article 7.2oftheWTO ADAgreement provides thatprovisional measures maytaketheform
ofasecurity equal totheamount oftheanti-dumping dutyprovisionally estimated, being notgreater
thantheprovisionally estimated margin ofdumping. Article 4-10(4) oftheEnforcement Decree of
theCustoms Acthowever states thatthesecurity shallbeprovided invalue exceeding theamount
equivalent theprovisional anti-dumping duty.
Question: Itseems thatthisArticle contradicts therequirement oftheWTO ADAgreement.
Would Korea provide anexplanation forthis?
AD§7.2KED §4-10(4)
TK/1 Howdoestheprovision ofArticle 4-10(4) oftheDecree ofKorean Legislation comply with
theparagraph 2ofArticle 7oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VIofGATT 1994?G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page21
(ANSWER )Itisatranslation problem. Theword"exceeding" should bechanged to"notlessthan".
Thelevelofsecurity shallbenormally equal totheamount oftheprovisional ADduty. However,
ifasecurity isdeposited intheform ofother assetofwhich future value isuncertain, higher value
ofsecurity could beasked tosavethevalue. However, itcannotbegreater thanthedumping margin
asstated inArt. 7.2 ofthe AD Agreement (see G/ADP/N/1/KOR/1/Corr.1 and
G/SCM/N/1/KOR/1/Corr.1)
_______________
AU/A-3 Canundertakings require exporters toreduce thequantity exported rather thantaking
theform ofeither revising prices orceasing exports totheareainquestion atdumped prices (see
Article 10(3) oftheCustoms Act,Article 4-11(2) oftheEnforcement Decree, andArticle 4-7ofthe
Regulation)? Howwould thesebejustified under Article 8oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement? Inaddition
isthereprovision toensure thatpriceincreases under undertakings willnotbehigher thanisnecessary
toeliminate themargin ofdumping?
AD§8KCA §10(3) KED §4-11(2) KMO §4-7
CA/A-27 Article 4-11(2) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms ActandArticle 4-7ofthe
Regulation oftheCustoms Actcontemplates absolute quantitative restrictions aspartofanundertaking.
Could Korea reconcile thisapparent contradiction withArticle 8oftheAgreement onimplementation
ofArticle VIwhich limits undertaking measures toeliminate thedumping orstopping theexport of
subject goods atdumped prices butprovides noauthority foraquantitative restriction?
AD§8.1KED §4-11(2) KMO §4-7
HK/2 Article 8.1oftheWTO ADAgreement provides thatproceedings maybesuspended or
terminated without theimposition ofprovisional measures oranti-dumping duties upon receipt of
satisfactory voluntary undertakings from anyexporter torevise itsprices ortocease exports tothe
areainquestion atdumped prices sothattheauthorities aresatisfied thattheinjurious effect ofthe
dumping iseliminated.
Article 10(3) oftheCustoms Actstates thattheexporter ortheMinister ofFinance andEconomy
mayofferorsuggest undertakings torevise theprice ortocease orreduce exports sothattheinjury
caused bythedumping could beeliminated.
Question: Would Korea clarify whether theprovision onundertakings asprovided forunder
Article 10(3) oftheCustoms Actmeans "undertakings tocease orreduce exports atdumped prices?"
Would Korea advise ifthere isanydifference between thetwoarticles inproviding forundertakings?
AD§8.1KCA §10(3)
US/20 4-11(2) oftheDecree provides forundertakings based onquantitative restrictions. How is
thisconsistent withADArt.8.1?
AD§8.1KED §4-11(2)
(ANSWER )Thedifference between thetwoprovisions onundertakings isthatArticle 10(3) ofthe
Customs Actincludes reduction ofexports. Theobjective ofADistoeliminate theinjurious effect
ofdumping tothedomestic industry. Wethink thatreducing exports canachieve thisobjective and
islessrestrictive thanstopping theexports. Therefore, solongastheexporter soagrees, reduction
ofexports willbeusedasoneofthealternative waysofundertaking. Price increase under undertaking
willbeuptothelevelofdumping byArticle 8.1oftheADAgreement.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page22
US/19 What limitation isthere under 4-11(2) oftheDecree ontheamount ofaprice increase which
mayberequired inanundertaking?
KED §4-11(2)
(ANSWER )Art.4-7(1)1 oftheRegulation states thattheundertaking byanexporter willinclude
theprice increase totheextent thatinjury caused bydumping imports could beeliminated.
_______________
CA/A-26 Could Korea advise where inKorean lawistheprohibition ontheacceptance of
undertaking untilaftertheaffirmative preliminary determination ofdumping andinjury consistent with
Article 8.2oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§8.2KED §4-11(6)
(ANSWER )Itisprescribed inArt.4-11(6) oftheDecree.
_______________
US/22 4-11(8) oftheDecree gives theMinister discretion nottorefund provisional duties afteran
investigation issuspended, ifacontinued investigation results inanaffirmative finding ofdumping
andmaterial injury. Under what circumstances willprovisional duties notberefunded after an
undertaking isaccepted? 4-11(10) oftheDecree provides thattheMinister "may" nullify theundertaking
ifnomaterial injury isfound inacontinued investigation under 10(4) oftheAct.Howisthisconsistent
withADArt.8.4,which states thatundertakings shall"automatically lapse" ifthere isanegative
determination ofdumping orinjury?
AD§8.4KCA §10(4) KED §4-11(8) (11)
(ANSWER )Inprinciple, when theundertaking isaccepted, theinvestigations areterminated
immediately andtheprovisional dutypaidbytheimporters isrefunded. Ifanegative determination
ofdumping orinjury ismade, theundertaking automatically lapses. However, theexporter canrequest
tocontinue theinvestigations while accepting theundertaking. If,asaresult ofsuchinvestigations,
itisascertained thatthere exists material injury, etc.,theprovisional ant-dumping dutypaidmaynot
berefunded.
_______________
CA/A-28 Article4-11(10)oftheEnforcementDecreeoftheCustomsActnotesthat,intheabsence
ofinjury, ordumping, theMinister ofFinance andEconomy "may" nullify theeffect oftheAgreement
onimplementation ofArticle VIwhere, insuchasituation, "theundertaking shallautomatically lapse"?
AD§8.4KED §4-11(10)
(ANSWER )Incases where thedecision ofno-dumping ornon-injury results from theadoption
ofundertaking, theundertaking doesn 'thavetobenullified, asprescribed intheDecree 4-11(10)
andArt.8-4oftheAgreement.
_______________
HK/6 According tosub-paragraph 4ofArticle 4-12(1), retroactive anti-dumping dutymaybeimposed
onotherproducts imported during suchaperiod asdetermined bytheMinister ofFinance andEconomy
under theconditions asprescribed bytheinternational agreement.G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page23
Question: What arethe"other products"? What conditions intheinternational agreement
isitreferring to?
KED §4-12(1)4
TK/2 Please, explain theprovision ofArticle 4-12(1)4 ofDecree ofKorean Legislation
§KED 4-12(1)4
(ANSWER )Theprovisions forretroactive imposition intheKorean Customs Lawhave been
introduced inorder tomaintain itsconsistency withtheWTO Agreement Article 4-12(1)4 hasbeen
established togranttheautomatic application oftheWTO Agreement onthecondition thattheprovisions
forpreventing circumvention aremade attheWTO level. Accordingly, theapplication ofthisarticle
isreserved since theWTO Agreements onpreventing acircumvention havenotyetbeenmade.
_______________
US/18 4-12(1)2 oftheDecree concerning critical circumstances would permit imposition ofretroactive
duties onimports which occurred 30dayspriortoinitiation. Howisthisconsistent withADArt.10.8,
which prohibits retroactive application ofduties onimports entered forconsumption priortoinitiation?
Explain howyoudetermine whatperiod willbecovered bythecritical circumstances finding.
AD§10.8KED §4-12(1)2
(ANSWER )Art.4-12(1)2 oftheDecree states thatADandCVD duties maybeimposed onimported
products retroactively notmore than90daysprior tothedateofapplication ofprovisional measures.
Inanyway, wedonotimpose duties prior totheinitiation oftheinvestigation.
_______________
CA/A-33 Article 4-14(1) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actnotesthat,among others,
"thecompetent Minister incharge oftheindustry concerned" mayfilearequest forreview. Could
Korea explain theroleofanysuch"competent Ministers" inthereview process andanyother aspects
ofthelaws implementing Korea 'srights andobligations inaccordance with theAgreement on
Implementation ofArticle VIoftheGATT 1994.
KED §4-14(1) AD§5-1,§5-5
(ANSWER )Thecompetent Minister incharge oftheconcerned industry mayrequest forareview.
TheMinister doesnotplayanyfurther roleduring thereview process; heonlymaintains authority
topetition theinvestigation, toprovide information andtorequest forareview.
______________
AU/A-7 What legislative provisions doesKorea haveforjusticial Review asrequired under
Article 13oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement?
AD§13
CA/A-30 CouldKoreaclarify,beyondtheadministrativereviewproceduredetailedinArticle4-14
oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act(p.19-20), whether Korean lawwillallow forjudicial,
arbitral oradministrative review consistent withArticle 13oftheAgreement onImplementation of
Article Vand,consistent withArticle 13,whether theagency responsible forthereview willbe
independent oftheoriginal investigating authority.
AD§13KED §4-14G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page24
US/37 Canyouclarify whether independent judicial review isavailable inKorea forADandCVD
determinations? Ifso,please specify theprovisions inyourlawwhich mandate judicial review and
describe thetypes ofdeterminations thataresubject tojudicial review. What isthestandard ofreview
applied inthejudicial review process foreachtypeofreview applied inthejudicial review process
foreachtypeofdetermination? What aretheprocedures forseeking judicial review ofeachtypeof
determination?
(ANSWER )WehaveindependentreviewproceduresincludingapetitiontotheNationalTaxTribunal
according toArt.38oftheCustoms Act. Thepetitioner canalsobring thecasetothecourts.
- Asuperior administrative body hastheauthority tosupervise subordinate office and
judge whether anactbytheoffice isaninfringement ofthelaw.
- Independent reviews corresponding tothejudicial reviews bythecourt areconducted
byanindependent body oftheAdministration (theNational TaxTribunal).
- Final judgement ontheillegality ofadministrative actions aremade bythecourt.
Judgement ontheillegality ortheunconstitutionality ofanordinance cannot bemade bythe
Administrative Body. Theformer willbemade bytheSupreme Court andthelatter willbemade
bytheConstitutional Court.
_______________
CA/A-34 Article 4-14(2) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actnotes thatarequest
forreview "shall bemade sixmonths before theanti-dumping dutyortheundertaking expires". Could
Korea explain whoorwhatagency "shall" make sucharequest. Isitcorrect tointerpret theKorean
lawtomean that,evenwhere there isnorequest from domestic producers, importers orexporters,
theKorean authorities willstillberequired toreview afinding prior toitsfiveyearexpiration date?
KED §4-14(2)
(ANSWER )Itistheinterested party andconcerned minister whocanmake request forreview.
Korean authorities areabletoreview incasewhen itisdeemed necessary forthecontinued imposition
oftheduty. Therefore, theMinister 'sreview isnotacondition precedent tothetermination oforder
orundertaking.
_______________
US/36 Does theMinister conduct anytypeofreview prior toterminating anorder orundertaking
under 10(8) oftheAct?
KCA §10(8)
(ANSWER )Anadministrative review asprovided inArt.4-14(1) oftheDecree should beconducted
ifrequested bytheinterested parties orcanbeconducted bytheowninitiative oftheMinister ofMOFE.
Therefore, theMinister 'sreview isnotacondition precedent tothetermination oforder orundertaking.
_______________
EU/A-6 From Article 4-14(2) oftheEnforcement Decree (page 20ofthedocument), itappears
thatrequests forinterim reviews areadmissible atthelatest sixmonths before theexpiry dateofthe
measures concerned. Does thismean thatevenincases where averyshort review could permit toG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page25
confirm thatadutyshould immediately berepealed, interested parties willhavetowaitfortheexpiry,
sixmonths later?
KED §4-14(2)
(ANSWER )Thistypeofreview inquestion hastobeperformed carefully andhence, itwillusually
takesome time. Article 11.4oftheAgreement allows upto12months fortheconclusion ofthereview.
Inlightofthenewprovision Art.11.3which requires thetermination ofthedefinitive ADdutyafter
fiveyears inmost cases, wefeelthatthelastchance forsucharequest should begiven atleastsix
months prior totheexpiry dateoftheADdutyisnotunreasonable from anadministrative point of
view. Furthermore, wecanhardly imagine anycases where abriefreview canconfirm thatananti-
dumping dutyshould berepealed.
_______________
US/30 Areeachofthethree types ofadministrative review under section 4-14(1) oftheDecree
mandatory uponrequest, orcantheMinister determine, under 4-14(4) oftheDecree, thatsuchreviews
arenotnecessary? What factors andinformation willtheMinister consider under 14-4inmaking a
determination whether areview wasnecessary? How isthisconsistent withADArticle 9.3,which
saysthatareview "shall" takeplace?
AD§9.3KED §4-14(1), §4-14(4)
US/31 Areannual reviews mandatory pursuant to4-14(3)oftheDecree regardless ofwhether there
isarequest forareview? Thisprovision saysboththattheMinister mayconduct andshallconduct
suchareview. IftheMinister doesnothavediscretion, howisthisconsistent withADArt.9.3which
saysthatareview "shall" takeplace?
AD§9.3KED §4-14(3)
(ANSWER )Whenareviewisrequestedbytheinterestedparties,theMinistershalldeterminewhether
therequest iswarranted ornot.Iftherequest isproven tobewarranted, theMinister shallinitiate
thereview.
"Annual review" inthesecond partofArt.4-12(3) oftheDecree wasnottranslated exactly.
Itmeansanannualexaminationforthedecisionofinitiatingthereview(seeG/ADP/N/1/KOR/1/Corr.1).
_______________
CA/A-20 ItisnotclearfromtheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms ActWhether Korea intends
tomeet some ofthetransparency requirements oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI.
Could Korea clarify whether itwillprovide orotherwise make available thefulltextofacomplaint
toallinterested parties asprovided forinArticle 6.1.3 andwhether authorities willadvise allinterested
parties oftheessential factsunder consideration prior tothefinaldetermination asprovided forin
Article 6.9?
AD§6.1.3 §6.9KED §4-15
(ANSWER )TheKorean Government willmake theADinvestigation process transparent asrequired
byvarious provisions oftheAgreement. Art.4-15oftheDecree clearly states thattheMinister of
Finance andEconomy andtheinvestigating authorities shallnotify allinterested parties ofthedetails
oftheinvestigation inprogress upon written request orbyitsowninitiative.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page26
CA/A-22 CouldKoreaidentifywhereintheKoreanlawaretherequirementsreflectingthepositive
obligations forpublic notice andthecontents ofsuchnotices asdescribed inArticle 12oftheAgreement
ontheImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§12KED §4-3(3) §4-15
(ANSWER )Corresponding articles canbefound inArt.4-3(3)oftheDecree (Notification of
initiation ofADproceeding andimposition ofADduty) andArt.4-15oftheDecree (Obligation for
public notice totheinterested parties, etc.)
_______________
CA/A-35 Article 4-15(1) and(2)oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actbothreferto
"Interested parties". However, interested parties would necessarily differ between those notified at
theimposition ofprovisional ordefinitive measures under Article 4-15(1)1 (domestic Korean producers,
importers, exporters, governments ofthecountries ofexport, etc.)andtherejection oftherequest
foraninvestigation under Article 4-15(2)1 (domestic Korean producers andthegovernments ofthe
countries ofexport). Could Korea identify themeaning of"interested parties" forpurposes ofthe
dumping laws?
KED §4-15
(ANSWER )Interested parties include theexporters anddomestic andforeign producers whohave
direct orindirect interest inanti-dumping processes andtheywillbedecided foreachspecific measure.
Theprovisions ofArt6.11oftheADAgreement regarding interested parties willbefullyobserved.
_______________
CA/A-3 Article 4-2oftheRegulation oftheCustoms Actnotes that,forpurposes ofsampling,
statistically valid samples "will beusedinprinciple". Could Korea identify what other sampling
methodologies would beusedinaninvestigation?
KMO §4-2(1)
(ANSWER )Thesentence which saysthat"statistically validsample willbeusedinprinciple" means
thatwhenever available, onlystatistically validsample willbeused. Itdoesnotmean thatthestatistically
invalid methodologies would beusedwhen avalid method isavailable.
_______________
HK/7 According toArticle 4-2(2) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Act,domestic industry
means thedomestic production industry thataccounts foralloramajor portion ofthetotaldomestic
production oftheproducts thatarethesame inkindandquality andtheproducts similar withthose
imported ataprice thatislower thanthenormal value.
Article 4(1)oftheRegulation oftheCustoms Actdefines thattheterm"product same inkind
andquality" means aproduct thatisidentical inallrespects, including physical characteristics, quality,
recognition bytheusers, etc.(including products altered insignificantly inappearance) totheimported
product andtheterm"similar product" means aproduct which, although nottheproduct same inkind
andquality, canbesubstituted fortheimported product duetoanidentical function anddueto
characteristics andconstituent parts thataresimilar tosuchimported product.
Article 4.1oftheWTO ADAgreement states thattheterm "domestic industry" shall be
interpreted asreferring tothedomestic producers asawhole ofthelikeproducts ortothose ofthemG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page27
whose collective output oftheproducts constitutes amajor proportion ofthetotaldomestic production
ofthose products.
Article2.6oftheWTOADAgreementstipulatesthattheterm"likeproduct"shallbeinterpreted
tomean aproduct which isidentical, i.e.alikeinallrespects totheproduct under consideration, or
intheabsence ofsuch aproduct, another product which although notalike inallrespects, has
characteristics closely resembling those oftheproduct under consideration.
Comment: IntheKorean ADlegislation, thedefinition of"similar product" doesnotfollow
thedefinition of"likeproduct" intheWTO ADAgreement. Thismayaffect theconstituents ofthe
domestic industry.
Question: Would Korea provide more precise information onhowaproduct willberegarded
assubstitute foranimported product? Would Korea explain anydifference between "like product"
and"similar product"?
AD§2.6KED §4-2(2) KMO §4(1)
(ANSWER )Theconcept of"product same inkindandquality" combined with"similar product"
inArt.4-2(2) oftheDecree constitutes theconcept of"like product" intheAnti-Dumping Code.
_______________
CA/A-36 CouldKoreaidentifywhereinitslegislationisthepositiveobligationoftheinvestigating
authorities toverify thesupport forarequest foraninvestigation consistent withArticle 5.4ofthe
Agreement ontheImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§5.4KED §4-3(3) KMO §4-2(3)
(ANSWER )Itisprovided inArticle 4-2(3) oftheRegulation.
_______________
HK/8 Sub-para.2ofArticle4-4(1)andArticle4-4(6)oftheRegulationmakereferencetoArticle3-6(1)
oftheDecree. However, Article 3-6(1) oftheDecree isnotavailable inthenotified document. Could
Korea provide further details about thisArticle?
CA/A-8 Article4-4(6)oftheRegulationoftheCustomsActmakesreferencetoanArticle3-6(1).
Could Korea explain whatandwhere thisArticle is?
KED §3-6(1), KMO §4-4(6)
US/44 Article 4(2)oftheEDand4-4(6) oftheCustoms ActRegulations ("CAR") indicate thatthe
ordinance ofthePrime Minister andArticle 3-6(1) oftheCAR willdefine whatproducers arerelated
parties forpurposes ofthematerial injury analysis. Neither theordinance norArticle 3-6(1) were
notified. Please provide therelevant provisions ofKorean law.
KED §3-6(1) §4(2) KMO §4-4(6)G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page28
(ANSWER )Article 3-6(1) ofKED isasfollows:
Article 3-6(Scope ofSpecial Relations) (1)Theterm"special relations asprescribed bythePresidential
Decree between buyer andseller" inArticle 9-3(3)4 oftheActincludes cases falling under anyofthe
following subparagraphs:
1. Where thebuyer andseller areexecutive officers ormanagers inbusiness witheachother.
2. Where thebuyer andseller arepartners inbusiness.
3. Where thebuyer andseller areemployer andemployee.
4. Where anyperson directly orindirectly owns, controls orholds 5percentormore ofthe
outstanding voting stock orshares ofbothofthebuyer andseller.
5. Where onesideamong thebuyer andseller directly orindirectly controls theother side.
6. Where thebuyer andseller aredirectly orindirectly controlled byathirdperson.
7. Where thebuyer andseller arerelatives falling under anyofsubparagraphs 1to8ofArticle 20
oftheEnforcement Decree oftheBasic National TaxAct.
_______________
US/11 4-4(1) oftheRegulations provides thatbelow-cost saleswillbeexcluded from normal value
when theyrepresent 20percentofmore ofhome market sales, andthehome market sales, excluding
those below cost, cannot provide fortherecovery ofcosts within areasonable period oftime. In
comparison, ADArt.2.2.1 provides that"prices which arebelow costsatthetimeofsale[but]above
weighted-average costs fortheperiod ofinvestigation, "shall beconsidered toprovide forrecovery
ofcosts within areasonable period oftime". Is4-4(1) oftheRegulations meant todefine "Recovery
ofCost" differently thanADArt.2.2.1? Ifso,willKorea alsoapply thedefinition of"recovery of
costs" found inADArt.2.2.1?
AD§2.2.1 KMO §4-4(1)
(ANSWER )Because there arenoexplicit provisions inourlegislation, Korea apply therelevant
provisions oftheADAgreement.
_______________
US/12 How doesKorea define theextended period oftimewithin which itwilldetermine whether
sales below costhave been made? How does Korea define the"reasonable period oftime" for
determining recovery ofcosts? (SeeADArt.2.2.1)
AD§2.2.1
(ANSWER )Korea hasnodefinition oftheextended period oftime. However, inthecases that
wehavenocorresponding provisions indomestic lawandregulation westrictly abide bytheAgreement.
Because theperiod maydiffer according tothecharacteristics oftheproduct orindustry, Korea did
notdefine whatconstitutes asa"reasonable period oftime".
_______________
US/4 Under 4-4(3) oftheRegulations, "reasonable profits" isnotdefined, andcould refertoprofits
whichhavenotactuallybeenmade.Howwill"reasonableprofits"bedetermined?Howisthisconsistent
withADArt.2.4,which refers to"profits accruing"?
AD§2.4KMO §4-4(3)G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page29
(ANSWER )Korea hasnoprovisions which define "reasonable profits". However, anyprofits made
inthedomestic market ofthecountry oforigin aredetermined suchthattheyareconsistent with
Art.2.2.2(iii) oftheADAgreement. Iftheprofit presented bytherelevant interested party cannot
beverified byaninvestigating authority, itisthendetermined bytheprofit normally realized from
thesaleofproducts ofthesame general category inthedomestic market ofthecountry oforigin.
_______________
US/14 4-6(1) oftheDecree and4-4(3) oftheRegulations provide that"theamount ofprofits shall
notexceed theprofits normally realized onthesalesofproducts ofthesame general category inthe
domestic market ofthecountry oforigin". Howisthisprovision consistent withADArt.2.2.2 which
states apreference foractual datapertaining totheproducer under investigation?
AD§2.2.2 KED §4-6(1) KMO §4-4(3)
(ANSWER )Ifactual datapertaining toproduction exists, we'llusethisfirst. Iftheprofits measured
byactual dataexceeds theprofits normally realized onthesalesofproducts ofthesamegeneral category
inthedomestic market ofthecountry oforigin, Korea willaccept thelatter according toArt.4-4(3)
oftheRegulation.
_______________
CA/A-11 Article4-4(8)oftheRegulationoftheCustomsActnotesthatthenormalvalue-dumping
pricecomparison shall"inprinciple, bemade bymeans ofaweighted average ofvolume andprices".
Could Korea explain what other methods ofcomparison would beusedandthecriteria fortheuse
ofsuchmethods?
KMO §4-4(8)
US/9 4-4(8) oftheRegulations states thatthecomparison ofthenormal value andthedumping price,
"shall, inprinciple, bemade bymeans ofaweighted average ofvolume andprices". What does"in
principle" mean? Does Korea compare theaverage priceinKorea totheaverage priceintheexporting
country? What exceptions tothisprocedure arethere?
KMO §4-4(8)
(ANSWER )Thisshows thataweighted-average method isusedaslongaspossible. Under the
situation where aweighted-average method cannotbeused, atransaction-to-transaction basis canbe
usedaccording tothecontext ofArt.2.4.2 oftheADAgreement.
_______________
US/10 Does 4-4(8) oftheRegulations apply inbothinvestigations andadministrative reviews?
KMO §4-4(8)
(ANSWER )Yes.
_______________
US/7 4-4(10)oftheRegulations provides thatadjustments tonormal value anddumping pricemay
beadjusted fordifferences inquantities onlywhere there is"massive" production orsales. Smaller
quantities could affect price comparability, requiring anadjustment under ADArt.2.4.Howisthis
provision consistent withADArt.2.4?
AD§2.4KMO §4-4(10)G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page30
(ANSWER )Asofyet,Korea doesnotstipulate numerical criteria ofmassive production orsales.
However, iftherelevant interested party provides evidence thatthefactor ofquantity affected price,
itwillbetaken intoaccount when considering price comparability.
_______________
CA/A-9 Theprovisions inArticle 4-6oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actarefurther
clarified inArticle 4.4(3) oftheRegulation oftheCustoms Act(p.25),however, itisstillnotclear
from these provisions whatmethod willbeusedtodetermine thegeneral, selling andadministrative
costsandtheprofits. Could Korea clarify whether itintends tobaseitsmethodology ontheprovisions
ofArticle 2.2.2 oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VI?
AD§2.2.2 KED §4-6KMO §4-4(3)
(ANSWER )Basically, these costs willbedetermined onthebasis ofthose actually incurred and
realized amounts. However, when suchamount cannotbedetermined onthisbasis, Korea willfollow
Art.2.2.2 oftheADAgreement.
_______________
US/32 Under 4-6(3) oftheRegulation, when cananewshipper request anaccelerated review following
imposition oftheduties andhowlongwillittaketocomplete thereviews?
KMO §4-6(3)
(ANSWER )Theinvestigation ofthenewexporter isconducted onamore accelerated basis.
However, theinvestigation period isnotexplicitly specified. Anewexporter 'sapplication foran
investigation canbeaccepted anytimebecause there arenoexplicit provisions ofthetimelimitfor
suchapplication.
_______________
AU/A-2 WillKoreaensurethattherequirementsoftheAnti-DumpingAgreementunderArticle6
(Evidence) andArticle 12(Public Notice andExplanation ofDeterminations) arecomplied with?
AD§6.1-§6.14§12.1-§12.3
(ANSWER )Thecontents ofArticles 6and12aretaken intoaccount inArticles 4-3,4-8 and4-15
oftheDecree. Those provisions oftheADAgreement thatwedonothavecorresponding provisions
willberespected.
_______________
CA/A-23 Could Korea clarify whether industrial usersorconsumer organizations willbeallowed
toprovide relevant information inaninvestigation, asrequired byArticle 6.12oftheAgreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI?
(ANSWER )There arenospecific provisions indomestic legislation. Therefore, Article 6.12of
theADAgreement willbefollowed.
_______________G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page31
CA/A-31 Inthecaseofaninjury review, canKorea clarify whether therules ofevidence will
bethesame asintheoriginal investigation, asspecified inArticle 11.4 oftheAgreement on
Implementation ofArticle VI?
AD§11.4
(ANSWER )Because there arenoseparate provisions oftherulesofevidence forreview, therules
ofevidence forthereview willbethesame asintheoriginal investigation.
_______________
CA/A-37 Does Korea intend toinclude provisions initslegislation toimplement DSB panel
decisions, andifnot,whatwillbethelegalbasis fortheadoption ofaDSBpanel decision?
AD§17
(ANSWER )Asamember ofWTO, Korea willensure conformity ofitspractice withtheAD
Agreement; aninternational Agreement hasthesame effects asthedomestic law.
_______________
HK/9 Keyissues intheWTO ADAgreement which arefound silent intheKorean ADlegislation.
Article 1oftheWTO ADAgreement stipulates thatananti-dumping measure shallbeapplied only
under thecircumstances provided forinArticle IVofGATT 1994andpursuant toinvestigations initiated
andconducted inaccordance withtheprovisions oftheAgreement.
Article 18.1oftheWTO ADAgreement states thatnospecific action against dumping ofexports
from another Member canbetaken except inaccordance withtheprovisions ofGATT 1994, as
interpreted bytheAgreement. TheKorean legislation issilent onanumber ofKeyissues onwhich
therearespecific provision intheWTO ADAgreement. Thismayleadtoapplication ofanti-dumping
measures notinaccordance withtheprovisions oftheWTO ADAgreement, which would constitute
violation ofArticles 1and18.1oftheWTO ADAgreement:
(I) Time-limit forcompleting questionnaires
Article 6.1.1 oftheWTO ADAgreement provides thatexporters shallbegiven atleast30
daysforreplytoquestionnairesinananti-dumpinginvestigation.Therearenosuchprovisions,however,
intheKorean Customs Actanditssub-regulations.
(II) Industrial users andrepresentative consumer organizations
Article 6.12oftheWTO ADAgreement provides opportunities forindustrial users and
representative consumer organizations toprovide information which isrelevant totheinvestigation
regardingdumping,injuryandcausality.TheKoreanCustomsActanditssub-regulationsdonotprovide
suchprovisions.
(III) On-site investigation
Annex IoftheWTO ADAgreement setsoutsome specific procedures forcarrying outon-site
investigations. Such procedures, however, arenotspecified intheKorean Customs Actanditssub-
regulations.G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page32
Question: Would Korea confirm thatitwould observe therelevant provisions oftheWTO
ADAgreement onthese issues? Does Korea haveanyintentions toenact newprovisions onthese
issues inconformity withtheWTO ADAgreement?
AD§6.1.1 §6.1.2 §18.1KED §3-6(1) KMO §4-4(1) §4-4(6)
(ANSWER )While there isnoexplicit provision indomestic legislation, wewillabide bythe
provisions oftheAgreement.
_______________
US/45 Thenotified materials donotcontain aprovision authorizing aregional industry analysis, as
provided byADArticle 4.1(ii) andSCM Article 16.2 Does theKTCintend tousearegional industry
analysis initsinjury determinations? Ifso,whatarethecriteria tobeusedintheanalysis andhow
aretheyconsistent withtheAgreements?
AD§4.1(ii) SCM §16.2
(ANSWER )Duetothesmall scaleoftheKorean market, wedonotusearegional industry analysis
ininjury determination.
_______________
US/49 Thenotified documents donotcontain aprovision expressly giving allinterested parties the
right tosubmit allevidence theyfeelisrelevant totheinvestigation. Intheabsence ofanexplicit
provision, howwould Korea ensure theconformity ofitspractice withADArticle 6.1andSCM
Art.12.1which require thatallinterested parties begiven "ample opportunity topresent inwriting
allevidence which theyconsider relevant" totheinvestigation?
AD§6.1SCM §12.1
(ANSWER )IntheKorean Customs legislation, there isnoarticle which explicitly stipulates that
allinterested parties shallbegiven therighttosubmit evidence which theyconsider asrelevant tothe
investigation. Since there arenoprovisions corresponding tothose oftheAgreement, theprovisions
intheAgreement areapplied.
_______________
US/21 13(3)oftheActallowsundertakingsbasedon,interalia,pledgesbyexporterstoceaseexporting.
Isthisapplicable tobothdumping andcountervailing dutycases? Howisthisconsistent withSCM
Article 18.1(ii)?
KCA §13(3) SCM §18.1(ii)
(ANSWER )Theprovision onthepledges byexporters tocease exporting isapplicable tobothanti-
dumping andcountervailing dutycases. Wenotethatnothing hasbeensaidabout avoluntary pledge
byexporters tocease exports. Therefore, Idonotbelieve Article 13(3) oftheActisinconsistent with
SCM Article 18.1(ii).
_______________
EU/S-1 WithregardtoKorea'scountervailingdutylegislation,notifiedon15March1995under
Article 32(6) oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement (DOC G/SCM/N/1/KOR/1), theEuropean Community
hasthefollowing questions:G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page33
1. TheCustoms Act
Article 13(Countervailing Duty)
(5) Itisnotclear whatthetext"The provisions ofArticle 10(5) to(8)shallbeapplied mutatis
mutandis tothecases asreferred toinparagraphs (1)to(4)"means, e.g.,whatprovisions doArticle 10
contain?
KDA §13(5)
(ANSWER )Thetextmeans thattheprocess oftheinvestigation todetermine theexistence, degree,
etc.ofasubsidy andtheimposition ofthecountervailing dutyaresubject totheprovisions in
Article 10(5) to(8)which describe theprocess ofinvestigation along withtheimposition oftheanti-
dumping duty.
Theprovisions ofArticle 10prescribe in:
paragraph 5:thatthegoods which aresubject totheanti-dumping dutyandprovisional measures
shallbethose thathavebeenimported aftersuchmeasures aretaken.
paragraph 6:therefund andliquidation oftheprovisional anti-dumping duty.
paragraph 7:thereview oftheimposition oftheanti-dumping dutyorundertaking.
paragraph 8:thattheeffective duration ofananti-dumping dutyshallnotexceed fiveyears.
Those articles arecontained intheKorean notification ofsubsidy legislation (which isdistributed
asG/SCM/N/1/KOR/1).
_______________
EU/S-5 Thecustoms collector, theheadofabank dealing withforeign exchanges services,
another agency concerned, oraninterested organization cannotify theMinister ofFinance andEconomy
thatimported products arebeing dumped intheirview. Article 4-21provides thatthisprovision shall
mutatis mutandis apply totheinvestigation andimposition ofacountervailing duty, asprescribed in
Article 13oftheAct. Does thismean thattheauthorities canstartaninvestigation andimpose a
countervailing dutywithout acomplaint ofthedomestic industry suffering material injury?
KED §4-2(1), §4-8(9), SCM §11.6
(ANSWER )Yes,theKorean Customs Actprovides thattheauthorities caninitiate aninvestigation
andimpose acountervailing dutyexofficio without acomplaint ofthedomestic industry suffering from
thematerial injury asstated inArticle 11.6ofSCM Agreement.
_______________
US/43 Thenotified documents donotrequire theKTCtoconsider the"nature ofthesubsidy inquestion
andthetrade effects likely toarisetherefrom" asafactor initsthreat analysis. Intheabsence ofan
explicit provision, howwould Korea ensure theconformity ofitspractice withSCM Article 15.7,
which requires thattheinvestigating authorities doso?
KED §4-7(2), SCM §15.7G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page34
(ANSWER )Iwould likeyoutorefertoparagraph 2(6)ofArticle 4-21oftheEnforcement Decree.
Itstipulates thatwhen theapplication fortheimposition ofcountervailing dutyisfiled, therelevant
evidentiary documents forthecontents ofthesubsidies andtheconsequent markdown effect ofthe
export price arerequired tobeattached.
_______________
EU/S-4 Article 4-8(Request fortheCo-operation ofInterested Parties ontheMaterials, etc.)(7)
Anydocumentary evidence presented under Article 4-2(4) shallbedisclosed toaninterested party upon
request. TheKorean notification doeshowever, notcontain Article 4-2(4),whatkindofdocumentary
evidence istherefore meant here?
KED §4-8(7), §4-2(4)
(ANSWER )Article 4-2(4) isincluded intheKorean notification ofanti-dumping legislation,
G/ADP/N/1/KOR/1
_______________
EU/S-6 Article 4-10(Application ofProvisional Measures) (2)Article 17(4)SCM provides
thattheapplication ofaprovisional dutyshallbelimited toasshort aperiod aspossible, notexceeding
fourmonths. Theprovisions intheKorean Enforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actprovide alsothat
aprovisional measure shallnotexceed fourmonths. However, uponrequest ofanexporter representing
asignificant percentage oftradeinvolved, theapplication period maybeextended tosixmonths. This
extension would apparently notbeconsistent withArticle 17(4)oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement.
Has"asignificant percentage oftrade" beendefined andunder which conditions istheapplication
extended?
KED §4-10(2), SCM §17.4, AD§7.4
(ANSWER )ThisArticle isfortheinterest ofexporters. However, forthose cases where itisnot
consistent withtheWTO Agreement, theSCM Code willprevail asmentioned earlier.
_______________
EU/S-7 Likewise, theMinister ofFinance andEconomy mayprolong theapplication period
oftheprovisional measures "inaccordance withtheinternational agreement" ifitisdeemed necessary.
IstheSCM meant here? Ifso,canKorea elaborate onthis,i.e.,when canthefourmonths initsview
beextended?
KED §4-10(3), SCM §17.4, AD§7.4
(ANSWER )Same asanswer toEU/S-6.
Yes,itrefers totheSCM Agreement. Asfarastherearenoprovisions regarding theextension
ofprovisional measure intheSCM Agreement, thisprovision isnotapplicable.
_______________
EU/S-8 Article 4-11(Undertakings toRevise thePrice, toCease Exporting, etc.)
(2) When theexporter agrees torevise itsprices immediately, ortheexport isceased within a
maximum period ofsixmonths, orthequantity ofexport isreduced toacertain level, theMinister
ofFinance andEconomy mayaccept suchundertakings. Inthecaseofceasing exports, thequantityG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page35
oftheproducts exported between thedateoftheundertakings andthedateofthecessation maynot
exceed "such alevel astheMinister ofFinance deems proper". TheWTO Subsidies Agreement
prescribes inArticle 18(1) (b)inthecaseofaprice undertaking aprice increase, nothigher than
necessarytoeliminatetheamountofthesubsidy.DoesKoreaapplyaninjurythresholdandconsequently
alesser-duty rule?
KED §4-11(2),AD§8.1,SCM §18.1
(ANSWER )Whether thelesser-duty rulecanbeapplied ornotisdecided casebycasethrough
theconsideration oftheprinciples oftheWTO Agreement.
______________
EU/S-9 Article 4-12(Retroactive Imposition oftheAnti-Dumping Duty)
(1) Insection 4ofthisparagraph itisstated thatanti-dumping duties canbelieved retroactive to
"other products imported during suchaperiod asdetermined bytheMinister ofFinance andEconomy
under theconditions asprescribed bytheinternational agreement". Article 4-21provides thattheterm
"anti-dumping duty" usedinArticle 4-12shallmean "countervailing duty". Please, elaborate onthe
kindofproducts thataremeant here, istheinternational agreement mentioned theAnti-Dumping
Agreement?
KED §4-12(1)4, AD§10.2, §10.6, §8.6,SCM §20.2, §20.6, §18.6,
(ANSWER )Theinternational agreement related tocountervailing dutymeans theWTO SCM
Agreement. Article 4-12(1)4 isprovided toimplement therelated provisions ofSCM Agreement
regarding retroactivity.
_______________
CA/S-1 TheAgreement defines asubsidy tobeabenefit conferred by(a)afinancial contribution
byagovernment or(b)anyform ofincome orprice support inthesense ofArticle XVIofGATT
1994. TheAgreement includes anexhaustive listofwhatconstitutes afinancial contribution. Does
Korea consider income orprice supports inthesense ofArticle XVIofGATT 1994 tobesubsidies?
Does Korea intend toinclude theexhaustive listoffinancial contributions deemed tobesubsidies in
itslawsorregulations?
KED §4-20(1) SCM §1.1
(ANSWER )Korea considers income orprice supports inthesense ofArticle XVIofGATT 1994
tobesubsidies, andtheprovision oftheWTO Agreement about theexhaustive listoffinancial
contributions alsohasthesame force andeffect asadomestic law.
_______________
CA/S-2 TheAgreement provides forthree classes ofsubsidies --actionable, non-actionable,
andprohibited. Indefining theseclasses, onlyspecific subsidies arecountervailable. HowdoesKorea
provide forthese three classes ofsubsidies initslegislation andregulations? Istheprohibition of
subsidies governed byother laws orregulations? Areallsubsidies, regardless ofspecificity,
countervailable?
KED §4-20(1), SCM §3,§5,§8
(ANSWER )TheWTO Agreement considers onlyspecific subsidies tobecountervailable. Therefore
forthepurpose ofcountervailing measures, among various kinds ofsubsidies, weprovide foronlyG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page36
specific subsidies inourlegislation. TheCustoms Actisjustrelated tothecountervailing measures
against theimports ofsubsidies products from foreign countries. Andthere isnocertain lawor
regulation which covers thesubsidies ingeneral. Onlythose subsidies ofspecificity iscountervailable
inaccordance withtheSCM Agreement andtheCustoms Law. However, inaccordance withtheWTO
Agreement Korea doesnotconsider subsidies forresearch, regional development, andenvironmental
requirements which meettherelevant requirements intheSCM Agreement.
_______________
AU/S-1 HowwillKoreaensureconsistencywithregardtothetreatmentofspecificnon-actionable
subsidies which comply withAnnex 2oftheAgriculture Agreement?
KED §4-20, SCM §5.1,Agri§13
(ANSWER )Webelievethatthecountervailingdutiesshouldnotbeimposedonthesubsidiesaccepted
bytheAgriculture Agreement asnon-actionable subsidies, eveniftheyarespecific.
_______________
CA/S-4 Article 2oftheAgreement setsoutthecriteria fordetermining thespecificity ofa
subsidy. Inconsidering thespecificity ofasubsidy, Article 5oftheOrdinance ofthePrime Ministry
setsoutcases inwhich itisdeemed thatspecificity exists, inaccordance toArticle 2.1(a) ofthe
Agreement. However, Article 2.1(b), which specifies basis where specificity shallnotexist(dejure
test)arenotreflected. TheAgreement alsorequires thatspecificity (defacto test)arenotreflected.
TheAgreement alsorequires specificity tobesubstantiated onthebasis ofpositive evidence. Will
Korea clarify whether thedejureanddefactotestsofspecificity under Article 2.1(b) and2.1(c) will
beapplied indetermining specificity ofasubsidy? HowwillKorea ensure thatthedetermination of
specificity isbased onpositive evidence?
KED §4-20(2), SCM §2.1,§2.4
(ANSWER )AsArticle 5paragraph 2.4oftheDecree provides indetermining thespecificity of
asubsidy, weapply theprovisions ofaninternational treaty, WTO SCM Agreement. Therefore, the
dejureanddefacto testsofspecificity arealsoapplied indetermining specificity ofasubsidy. In
addition, astheWTO SCM Agreement hasthefullforceandeffect asadomestic law,itisaself-evident
obligation thatthedetermination ofspecificity bebased onpositive evidence.
_______________
CA/S-3 TheAgreementprovidescleardefinitionsofsubsidiesforresearch,regionaldevelopment
andenvironmental requirements which willbenon-actionable. Korea 'slawdeems thatthese arenot
tobeconsidered subsidies. Does Korea intend toissue regulations which willprovide more details
defining these three areas?
KED §5(1), SCM §8.2
(ANSWER )Korea considers subsidies forresearch, regional development andenvironmental
requirements which havespecificity nottobecountervailable asfarastheinternational treaties, WTO
SCM Agreement recognize. Therefore, wefollow thecriteria stipulated intheWTO Agreement.
_______________
CA/S-5 Article 4(2)oftheOrdinance ofthePrime Ministry deems subsidies granted toaspecific
subsidy. Does thismean aspecific areawithin thejurisdiction ofthegranting authority?G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page37
KMO §5(2)4, SCM §2.2
(ANSWER )Itisunderstood thatyouaskabout theterms ofspecificity andspecific areabecause
these terms arenotdefined explicitly intheKorean Customs Law. Inthiscaseofspecific area,
specificity isdetermined inprinciple within thejurisdiction ofthegranting authority.
_______________
AU/S-2 Thelegislation doesnotdefine theconcept ofspecificity indetail. Inparticular what
ismeant by"specific area" inparagraph 3ofArticle 5(2)oftheOrdinance, i.e.isthisaspecific area
under thejurisdiction ofthegranting authority, orsimply anareawithin theterritory oftheMember?
Ontheotherhand, istheintent toensure general consistency withtheSubsidies Agreement onspecificity
through KMO §5(2)3, §5(2)4, SCM §2.2
(ANSWER )Same asquestion 5from Canada.
_______________
US/15 5-2oftheOrdinance makes noreference to"objective criteria". HowwillKorea conduct the
specificity analysis when thegranting ofthesubsidy isbased on"objective criteria", asspecified in
Art.2.1(b) oftheSCM?
KMO §5(2), SCM §2.1(b)
(ANSWER )Incaseswhere theKorean Customs Lawhasnoexplicit provisions concerning amatter,
wewillabide bytherules oftheWTO Agreement.
_______________
AU/S-3 Paragraph 4ofArticle 5(3)includes thepurchase ofservices, which isnotcovered
under Article 1.1(a)(iii)oftheSubsidies Agreement. HowwillKorea ensure consistency withthe
Subsidies Agreement inthisregard?
KMO §5(3)4, SCM §1.1(a)(iii)
(ANSWER )Ifweinterpret thisprovision literally, itappears thatKorea intends toinclude the
purchase ofservices. However, there isnopossibility thatthepurchase ofservices willberegarded
asakindofsubsidy.
_______________
EU/S-2 TheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms ActArticle 4-20(Subsidies etc.)(3)The
calculation oftheamount ofasubsidy interms oftheactual benefit totherecipient isbased onsuch
methods asprescribed bytheOrdinance ofthePrime Ministry. Article 5(3)(4) oftheOrdinance provides
inthecaseoftheprovision ofpurchase ofgoods andservices, thatthisshallbetheamount equal to
thedifference between suchaprice andtheirmarket price. Article 14(d)SCM however, provides
thattheprovision ofgoods orservices orpurchase ofgoods byagovernment shallnotbeconsidered
asconferring abenefit unless theprovision ismade lessthanadequate remuneration, which isdetermined
inrelation toprevailing market conditions. CantheKorean authorities please explain whytheyapply
adifferent approach andwhether theycanassure compliance withArticle 14(d)SCM?
KMO §5(3)4, SCM §14(d)G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page38
(ANSWER )TheWTO Agreement provides thattheadequate remuneration shallbedetermined
inrelation toprevailing market conditions. However, theprevailing market conditions consisting of
price, quality, quantity, marketability, transportation ofgoods andservices andother factors willbe
referred toasaprice. Therefore, ourapproach isnotinconsistent withtheWTO SCM Agreement.
_______________
US/48 (48)Art.5-2(2) oftheCAR doesnotrequire thatacountervailing dutyinvestigation covering
imports fromadeveloping country beterminated iftheimports fromthatcountry account forlessthan
4percentoftotalimports (unless) imports from allsuchcountries account formore than9percent
oftotalimports). HowwillKorea determine which countries itwilltreatas"developing countries"
forCVD purposes? Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwould Korea ensure theconformity
ofitspractice withArt.27.10 (b)oftheSCM Agreement?
KMO §5-2(2), SCM §11.9, §27.10
(ANSWER )Although thereisnoexplicit provision incustoms lawsandregulations forthedefinition
orclassification of"developing countries", thegeneral practice established inWTO willbeapplied
inKorea.
_______________
US/33 WillKorea conduct newshipper inCVD cases?
SCM §19.3
(ANSWER )Although there isnoexplicit provision about newshippers inCVD cases, theyshall
beentitled toanexpedited review according tothelatter partsofArticle 19.3oftheSCM Agreement.
_______________
EU/S-3 Article 4-3(Initiation oftheInvestigation onSubsidization andMaterial Injury) (1)
Theinitiation ofaninvestigation isdetermined bytheTrade Commission. Article 4-21provided that
thisprovision shallmutatis mutandis apply totheinvestigation andimposition ofacountervailing duty,
asprescribed inArticle 13oftheAct. However, noreference ismade toconsultations asprovided
inArticle 13(1) SCM before theinitiation ofanyinvestigation. AretheMembers, theproducts of
which aresubject toaninvestigation, consulted atanyother stage before initiating aninvestigation?
SCM §13
(ANSWER )Although thereisnoexplicit provision about mutual consultation, under theprovisions
oftheWTO SCM Agreement, thecountry which hasinterest intheproduct thatissubject toan
investigation maybeinvited forconsultation forthepurpose ofseeking amutually agreed solution
atanystage before theinitiation oftheinvestigation.G/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page39
OralQuestions andAnswers
US/1 Thedelegate fromKorea indicated thattheadministrators ofKorea 'sADandCVD lawscould
consult theADandSCM Agreements todetermine whether theiractions wereinaccordance withtheir
obligations under theAgreements.
(i) What authority under Korean lawwould allow this?
(ii) Could theadministrators determine whether Korean lawwasinconsistent withthe
Agreements?
(iii) Ifyesto(ii),issuchadetermination reviewable byaKorean Court?
(ANSWER )Because theagreement which wasconcluded andpromulgated under theprocedures
prescribed bytheconstitutional lawhasadirect effect asthedomestic lawhasontheKorean judicial
territory (Article 6oftheConstitutional Law), thequestion ofwhether ornottheaction isagainst the
Agreement isdetermined inthesame procedures asinthecaseofdomestic laws.
- Independent reviews corresponding tothejudicial reviews bythecourt areconducted
byanindependent body oftheAdministration (theNational TaxTribunal).
- Final judgement ontheillegality ofadministrative actions aremade bythecourt.
Judgement ontheillegality ortheunconstitutionality ofanordinance cannot bemade bythe
Administrative Body. Theformer willbemade bytheSupreme Court andthelatter willbemade
bytheConstitutionalCourt.However,beforeenacted,thelegalityortheconstitutionalityofanordinance
willbeverified bytheLegislative Office.
_______________
US/2 Concerning Article 4-8(7) oftheEnforcement Decree (ED) (page 14G/ADP/N/1/KOR/1),
under whatcircumstances would theMinister denyarequest foraccess tonon-confidential information?
Thedelegate ofKorea indicated thattheMinister maydeny therequest ifitwould impede the
investigation. How isthisconsistent withtheADAgreement?
(ANSWER )Wehavestated clearly intheanswer tothisquestion thattheMinister mayrefuse the
request, inthecasewhere itisapparent thattherequest fortheinformation isintended toimpede the
investigation procedure.
Ifitisclearthattherequester makes arequest foraccess tonon-confidential information with
amalignant intention andtheinvestigation procedure would beprocrastinated andtheparties concerned
would beseriously injured, theinvestigating authorities maywellhavetheauthority todenytherequest.
Wedon'tthink itisagainst theAgreement.
_______________
US/3 Concerning Article 4-9oftheED(pages 14-15 G/ADP/N/1/KOR/1), whatisthe"base import
price" andhowisitcalculated? Under whatcircumstances willthebaseimport price beusedinstead
ofananti-dumping dutytooffset themargin ofdumping, seeArticle 4-9(1), andhowwould thisbe
consistent withtheADAgreement?
(ANSWER )Thebaseimport price isnotusedinstead ofananti-dumping duty. Itisusedasaway
ofimposing ananti-dumping duty. Theanti-dumping dutymaybeimposed either byananti-dumpingG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page40
dutyrateorthrough establishing thebaseimport price. Inthelattercase,thedutyimposed isthemargin
between thebaseimport price andtheactual c.i.f. import price declared bytheimporter. Thebase
import priceisdetermined byadding ordinary expenses (such asfreight, insurance fee,storage charge,
orsales commission incurred from exportation) tothenormal value oftheproduct subject to
investigation inKorea. Inanycase, theactual amount oftheanti-dumping dutyshallbelower than
thefinaldumping margin.
______________
US/4 Concerning Article 4-14(1) oftheED(page 19G/ADP/N/1/KOR/1):
(i) Canproducers/exporters request thatareview beinitiated under Article 4-14(1)1? Ifso,what
procedures mustexporters/producers follow torequest suchareview? What types ofinformation must
exporters/producers include intheirrequest forareview under Article 4-14(1)1? What factors will
theMinister consider ininitiating areview under Article 4-14(1)1? What factors willtheMinister
consider indeciding whether theorder should bemodified under Article 4-14(1)1? CantheMinister
decide toterminate theorder under Article 4-14(1)1?
(ii) Canproducers/exporters request thatareview beinitiated under Article 4-14(1)2? Ifso,what
procedures must exporters/producers follow torequest suchanreview? What types ofinformation
mustexporters/producers include intheirrequest forareview under Article 4-14(1)2? What factors
willtheMinister consider ininitiating areview under Article 4-14(1)2? What factors willtheMinister
consider indeciding towhether theorder should bemodified under Article 4-14(1)2? CantheMinister
decide toterminate theorder under Article 4-14(1)2?
(iii) Canproducers/exporters request thatareview beinitiated under Article 4-14(1)3? Ifso,what
procedures mustexporters/producers follow torequest suchareview? What types ofinformation must
exporters/producers include intheir request forconsideration ininitiating areview under
Article 4-14(1)3? What factors willtheMinister consider indeciding towhether theorder should be
modified under Article 4-14(1)3? CantheMinister decide toterminate theorder under Article 4-14(1)3?
(ANSWER )Following answer isapplied tothequestions 4.1,4.2,4.3together.
Theprocedure ofreview isverysimilar tothatoftheoriginal investigation. Theprocedure
isasfollows:
- TheMinister ofMOFE mayreview theanti-dumping dutyifhedeems itto
benecessary ortheparties concerned makes arequest forit.
- Ifthereview isconducted byarequest oftheparties concerned, theparties
concerned needtosubmit arequest first. Thecontents oftherequest should besimilar
tothatoftherequest fortheinvestigation concerning theimposition ofanti-dumping
duty.
- Whether thereview willbeinitiated ornotisdependent onthebasis ofthe
opinions oftheinvestigating authorities. Thefactsthatareunder consideration inthe
determination oftheinitiation aresimilar tothose considered inthedetermination of
theoriginal investigation fortheimposition oftheanti-dumping duty.
- Whetherthecontentsoftheimpositionoftheanti-dumpingdutyistobechanged
ornotisdetermined onthebasisoftheresults oftheinvestigations bytheinvestigatingG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page41
authorities andthefactswhich areconsidered inthedetermination should besimilar
tothose oftheoriginal determination fortheimposition oftheanti-dumping duty.
- When itisdetermined thattheimposition oftheanti-dumping dutyisnot
necessary asaresult oftheinvestigation, theMinster ofMOFE mayreject the
imposition oftheanti-dumping dutyorterminate theinvestigation.
- When therequest forareview ismade under Art.4-14(1)3, theMinister shall
decide whether ornottheanti-dumping dutyisimposed inexcess oftheactual dumping
margin, butcannot terminate theimposition oftheduty.
_______________
US/5 Arethere anyprocedures other thanthose listed inArticle 4-14(1) bywhich aKorean anti-
dumping orcountervailing dutyorder canbeterminated?
(ANSWER )None
______________
Hong Kong Article 4-2(2) oftheEnforcement Decree oftheCustoms Actdefines thedomestic
industryas"thedomesticproductionindustrythataccountsforalloramajorportionofthetotaldomestic
production oftheproducts thatarethesame inkindandquality andtheproducts similar withthose
imported atapricethatislower thanthenormal value" (ourunderlining). Thedefinitions oftheterms
"product same inkindandquality" and"similar product" aregiven inArticle 4(1)oftheRegulation
oftheCustoms Act.
Article 4.1oftheWTO ADAgreement defines "domestic industry" as"thedomestic producers
asawhole ofthelikeproducts ortothose ofthemwhose collective output oftheproducts constitutes
amajor proportion ofthetotaldomestic production ofthose products...". Theterm"likeproducts"
isdefined inArticle 2.6astomean "aproduct which isidentical, i.e.alikeinallrespects totheproduct
under consideration, orintheabsence ofsuchaproduct, another product which, although notalike
inallrespects, hascharacteristics closely resembling those oftheproduct under consideration" (our
underlining).
TheWTO ADAgreement therefore isclear thatsimilar products (i.e.products which have
characteristics closely resembling those oftheproducts which arethesubject ofinvestigation) will
beusedtodefine domestic industry onlyifidentical products arenotproduced domestically inthe
importing Member. TheKorean legislation seems topermit, bylumping "product same inkindand
quality" and"similar product" together inthedefinition ofdomestic industry, theinclusion of"similar
product" todefine thedomestic industry eventhough there isproduction of"product same inkind
andquality" inKorea.
Wewould appreciate clarification from theKorean authorities astohowArticle 4-2(2) is
consistent withArticle 4.1andArticle 2.6oftheWTO ADAgreement.
(ANSWER )Itisatranslation problem. Article 4-2(2) should bereadasfollows:
"With regard totheapplication oftheprovisions ofArticle 10(1)oftheAct,thedomestic
industry means thatthedomestic production industry thataccounts foralloramajor portion ofthe
totaldomestic production oftheproducts thatarethesame inkindandquality ortheproducts similarG/ADP/W/74
G/SCM/W/83
Page42
withthose imported ataprice thatislower thanthenormal value..." (seeG/ADP/N/1/KOR/1/Corr.2
andG/SCM/N/1/KOR/1/Corr.2).