RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/COMTD/W/5
9June1995
ORGANIZATION(95-1531)
Committee onTrade andDevelopment
Second Session
28June 1995
URUGUAY ROUND COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN
BYDEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS
Note bytheSecretariat
1. InaccordancewiththeworkprogrammeoftheCommitteeonTradeandDevelopment,Members
willreview "theimpact oftheresults oftheUruguay Round ondeveloping country Members, in
particular ontheleast-developed country Members" atitsSecond Session. Incarrying outthisreview,
atleastthreepossible approaches present themselves. First, there could beaquantitative assessment1
oftheimpact, second, thespecial provisions which apply todeveloping countries could beidentified
andanalyzed2,andthird, theimplications ofthecommitments undertaken bydeveloping country
Members, andinparticular theleast-developed country Members, could bereviewed. Thepurpose
ofthepresent noteistocomplement thework already presented byreviewing theimpact ofthe
obligations undertaken bydeveloping country Members3.
2. Inwhatfollows, adistinction hasbeendrawn between commitments where allimplementation
requirements areatthedomestic levelandthose withaninternational content. Theintention ofthis
noteistopresent whatisrequired toimplement thecommitments inananalytical manner byclassifying
themaccording totheirnature. Thecoverage isnotcomprehensive; anumber ofexamples havebeen
identified inorder toindicate thenature andextent ofobligations involved under eachheading. It
should beemphasized thatthisisnotalegaldocument. Thepicture thatquickly emerges isthatthe
impact oftheUruguay Round ondeveloping country Members willbesignificant interms ofthe
commitments theyhaveundertaken andtheimplementation requirements associated withthem. Italso
indicates thebreadth ofcommitments undertaken bydeveloping country Members andtheextent to
which theyareincreasing theirparticipation inthemultilateral trading system.
Commitments withaDomestic Content
3. There hasbeenawidening anddeepening inthecommitments undertaken bydeveloping country
Members asaresult oftheUruguay Round bothinterms ofspecific trade measures tobeadopted
1See"The Results oftheUruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations -Market Access forGoods
andServices: Overview oftheResults", COMTD/W/512, 10November 1994.
2See"ADescription oftheProvisions Relating toDeveloping Countries intheUruguay Round Agreements,
Legal Instruments andMinisterial Decisions", COMTD/W/510, 2November 1994.
3Thisdocument isinturncomplemented bythemore detailed WT/COMTD/W/6 andAdd. 1,alsoprepared
fortheSecond Session oftheCommittee onTrade andDevelopment.WT/COMTD/W/5
Page2
(andthetimelimits within which theyshould betaken), andtheconduct oftrade policy generally.
Atthedomestic level, thiswillrequire eachMember tointensify themonitoring andcoordination of
various aspects oftradepolicy formulated bynational orsub-national institutions. Thissection addresses
those commitments thathaveonlyadomestic content.
(i) Trade measures
4. Some commitments undertaken bydeveloping country Members require specific government
action fortheirimplementation.4Themostvisible relate tothose found innational schedules5,where
Members arerequired:
- toimplementtariffconcessionsandtariffquotasandreducedomesticsupportandexport
subsidies foragricultural products;
- toimplement tariff andnon-tariff concessions forindustrial products; and,
- toimplement specific commitments forservices.
5. Besidesthesehighlyvisiblecountry-specificcommitments,awiderangeofgeneralcommitments
included inthevarious legalinstruments willalsorequire government action. Examples include the
phasing outoftrademeasures asprovided forintheAgreement onTextiles andClothing, theAgreement
onSafeguards ortheAgreement onTrade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS); orthedetermination
oforigin ofagood.
(ii) Trade policy monitoring
6. Notallcommitments undertaken intheUruguay Round require positive action perseby
Members, butrather acontinuous monitoring andsurveillance oftheconsistency ofmeasures with
obligations. Surveillance requirements interms ofdomestic coordination -which hasoften been
considered adifficult exercise incountries lacking thenecessary mechanisms forinformation exchange
andcontrol -havegreatly increased withtheextension ofmultilateral disciplines toareas usually dealt
withbyentities different thanthose traditionally engaged intrade policy making (e.g.services).
7. Oneexample oftrade policy monitoring includes therequirement thatMembers ensure that,
during thetransition period, theinconsistency ofthose trade-related investment measures which are
tobeprogressively phased outarenotincreased (Article 5:4and5:5oftheTRIMS Agreement). A
further example derives from theAnti-Dumping Agreement: upon receipt ofawritten application
from thedomestic industry toinitiate investigations, theinvestigating authorities aretocontrol the
accuracy andadequacy oftheevidence provided (Article 5:3).
(iii) Domestic Legislation andRegulations
8. Members oftheWorld Trade Organization (WTO) areobliged toensure theconformity of
theirdomestic legislation andregulations withtherequirements oftheUruguay Round legalinstruments.
Therequirements inthisrespect willprimarily depend on(i)thenature oftherelationship between
4Theapproach adopted inthisnoteistoinclude under thisheading those measures thatbearontrade or
directly related matters only. Thus, changes indomestic legislation ortheestablishment offocal points, for
example, have broader implications. These have been included under other headings.
5Itisimportant tonotethatnotallcommitments included intheschedules require action -forexample,
binding oftariffs without their reduction.WT/COMTD/W/5
Page3
domestic lawandinternational lawintheMember country; (ii)theextent towhich existing lawsand
regulations areinconformity withGATT/WTO rules; and,(iii)whether thespecific Agreement or
obligation isofamandatory ornon-mandatory nature.
9. Inthose Members where thejudicial system issuchthatinternational treaties oragreements
become partofdomestic lawsfollowing ratification, work involved insuchaconformity exercise will
beminimal, astheinternational obligations takeprecedence overdomestic laws(whether consistent
ornotwiththeinternational treaties). Inother Members, lawsrequiring amendment willneedtobe
identified andthenecessary steps taken tobring domestic lawsintoconformity.
10. Whether newrulesaremandatory ornon-mandatory isimportant inassessing theirimplications
fordeveloping country Members, particularly withrespect totiming. Ifthelegalinstruments areof
amandatory nature, domestic legislation andregulations willneedtoconform totheAgreements at
thetimeofjoining theWTO. Fornon-mandatory legalinstruments conformity ofdomestic legislation
isrequired onlyinthose cases where theMember concerned decides toinvoke itsspecific rights. For
example, theWTO Agreement (inparticular thetermination oftheProtocol ofProvisional Application)
andtheAgreements onAgriculture, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) andCustoms
Valuationareofamandatorynature.Ontheotherhand,theAgreementsonAnti-Dumping,Preshipment
Inspection, Import Licensing, andthepartoncountervailing measures intheAgreement onSubsidies
andCountervailing Measures areofanon-mandatory nature.
(iv) Institutional andAdministrative Framework
11. Toimplement some requirements intheUruguay Round Agreements through appropriate
procedures mayrequire establishment oradaptation ofaWTO Member 'sinstitutional andadministrative
framework. Basically, theUruguay Round legalinstruments callupon WTO Members toensure the
operation ofthreetypes ofdomestic institutions -appeal authority, focalpoints andspecialized entities.
(a) Appeal authority
12. AnumberofUruguayRoundAgreementsrequiretheprovisionofcomplaint,appealandremedy
procedures.6Thiscaninvolve either expanding thepowers ofexisting judicial, arbitral oradministrative
structures, ortheestablishment ofnewtribunals/procedures.7TheUruguay Round legalinstruments
donotinallcases require theindependence ofsuchanappeal authority; thisisnormally onlynecessary
when thedetermination orpolicy decision tobereviewed directly affects thetrade interests ofother
Members. Examples ofthelatter include theAgreement onAnti-Dumping (Article 13),theAgreement
6Only inafewinstances isitspecified thatprocedures areestablished notonlytoreview complaints, but
alsototakeaction when acomplaint isjustified. That is,theAgreement ontheApplication ofSanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), (Annex C:1(i)), theAgreement onTechnical Barriers toTrade (Article 5:2:8),
andtheGeneral Agreement onTrade inServices (Article VI:2).
7Asanexample, theTRIPS Agreement requires thatMembers allow ajudicial authority toenforce therules
andreview final administrative decisions (with theexception ofacquittals incriminal cases), butthere isno
obligation toputinplace aspecial judicial system fortheenforcement ofintellectual property rights distinct from
thatfortheenforcement oflawingeneral; norto"prioritize" theenforcement ofintellectual property rights
vis-à-vis theenforcement oflawingeneral. While appeal authorities areusually tobeestablished atthedomestic
level, inafewcases, Members aretoensure thattheyexist outside their domestic jurisdiction. Forexample,
theAgreement onPreshipment Inspection, (Article 2.21) requires thatdeveloping country Members using the
services ofpreshipment inspection entities ensure thatpreshipment inspection entities establish procedures to
receive,considerandrenderdecisionsconcerninggrievancesraisedbyexporters,inaccordancewithsomespecific
guidelines.WT/COMTD/W/5
Page4
onRules ofOrigin (Articles 2:(j)and3:(h), Annex II:(f)), ortheAgreement onSubsidies and
Countervailing Measures (Article 23). TheGeneral Agreement onTrade inServices, Article VI:2,
isanintermediate case, where, although independence isnotrequired, Members aretoensure that
theprocedures infactprovide foranobjective andimpartial review. Further, insome cases, such
asunder theAgreement onCustoms Valuation (Article 11),more thanonelevel ofappeal is
contemplated; thefirstbeing anauthority within thecustoms administration oranindependent body,
withthehigher levelbeing ajudicial authority.
(b) Specialized entities
13. Inanumber oflegalinstruments Members arerequired toestablish specialized entities. More
burdensome thanallocating aspecific tasktoanofficial -oragroup ofofficials -isthetraining of
personnel required toestablish theentity. Thistaskisfurther complicated bythefactthat,insome
cases, acertain margin ofdiscretionary power mayberetained bytheentity. Probably themostcomplex
examples aretheinvestigating authorities required bytheAgreements onAnti-Dumping, Subsidies
andCountervailing Measures andSafeguards. Other entities mayhavealesscomplex task,suchas
theobligation tohaveasingle central authority responsible fortheimplementation, atthenational
level, oftheprovisions concerning notification procedures.
(c) Focal points
14. Requirements tocreate focal points arenormally aimed attheprovision ofinformation soas
tofacilitate trade; theyarepartofthegeneral objective ofincreasing transparency, astraditionally
pursued within themultilateral trading system. Theobjective ofsuchprovisions istoincrease public
knowledge oftrade regulations andprocedures, bothintechnically complex areas8andinthenew
Agreements suchasGATS andTRIPS.9While thefocal points resulting from theUruguay Round
Agreements arealmost exclusively directed tousebyother Members andforeign entities,10from a
practical point ofview, theywillalsobeasource ofinformation fordomestic users. They mayalso
beusedtoimplement other transparency commitments, suchasnotification requirements (seebelow
(i)International Transparency).
(v) Public notice
15. Therequirement togivepublic notice, orpublish information ontrade policy matters isan
additional component ofthegeneral transparency principle. Thegeneral obligation ofArticle Xof
theGATT 1994hasbeenreinforced andsupplemented byspecific requirements inindividual Uruguay
Round Agreements.11Inmany cases, thisrequires arevision oftheinformation published inofficial
8Forexample, theSPSAgreement (Annex B,paragraphs 3and4)andtheTBT Agreement (Article 10).
9Inatleastonecase(GATS,ArticleIV:2),theestablishmentofcontactpointsismandatoryonlyfordeveloped
country Members, withthestated aimoffacilitating theaccess totheir markets bydeveloping country service
suppliers.
10Forexample, theEnquiry Points contemplated bytheSPSAgreement aimprimarily atanswering all
reasonablequestionsfrominterestedMembers.Similarly,theAgreemen tonPreshipmentInspection(Article2.7)
callsonMembers toensure thatthepreshipment inspection offices maintained bypreshipment inspection entities
serve asinformation points onallelements necessary fortheexporters tocomply withinspection requirements.
11Article X:1oftheGATT 1994 provides: "Laws, regulations, judicial decisions andadministrative rulings
ofgeneral application, made effective byanycontracting party, pertaining totheclassification orthevaluation
(continued...)WT/COMTD/W/5
Page5
gazettestoincludedetailson,forexample,rulesoforigin,technicalstandards,sanitaryandphytosanitary
regulations, orservices measures. Further, some cases -suchasprovided forintheTBTAgreement
(Articles 2:9and5:6)-publication isalsorequired fordraft regulations (Article Xonlyrequires
publication oncetheregulation isfinalized). Article IIIoftheGATS issimilar toArticle Xofthe
GATT; italsocallsforprompt publication, meaning thatatthelatest therelevant regulations areto
bepublished upon entry intoforce oftheregulation.
16. Attention willalsoneed tobedevoted toensuring thetimely publication ofinformation.
ArticleXmakesreferenceonlytopromptpublication.12However,inmanyUruguayRoundAgreements,
notonlythepublication ofameasure prior toitsentry intoforce isrequired, butalsothetimeperiod
between publication andentry intoforce (orvice-versa) isspecified. Examples canbefound inthe
Agreement onRules ofOrigin (Article 5:2)andintheTBT Agreement (Articles 2:12and5:9).
Developing country Members maywellhavetoadopt anadhocprocedure forpublication which could
supplement periodic publication ofregulations.
Commitments withanExternal Content
(i) Notification Requirements13
17. Transparency attheinternational levelwasoneofthefundamental GATT 1947principles and
hasbeenfurther strengthened inanumber ofUruguay Round legalinstruments. Therequirements
toincrease transparency areusually perceived ofasbeing ofaprocedural -rather thanasubstantive -
nature; theirfulfilment willnevertheless beessential toensure asmooth functioning oftheWTO
multilateral trading system.14
18. Developing country Members havefrequently indicated theirconcern regarding theincrease
intheworkload ofgovernment officials duetothenotification requirements ofanumber ofUruguay
Round legalinstruments. Notonlyhasthenumber ofnotification requirements increased significantly
(ifcompared topastaverage levels), butsohastheircomplexity.15Ofrelevance hereistheestablishment
11(...continued)
ofproducts forcustoms purposes, ortorates ofduty, taxes orother charges, ortorequirements, restrictions
orprohibitions onimports orexports oronthetransfer ofpayments therefor, oraffecting theirsale,distribution,
transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing orother use,shallbepublished
promptly ...agreements affecting international trade policy which areinforce between thegovernment ora
governmentalagencyofanycontractingpartyandthegovernmentorgovernmentalagencyofanyothercontracting
party shall alsobepublished" (emphasis added).
12SeeDS17/R, adopted on18February 1992, 39S/27, para.5.34, where itisstated that"Article Ximposed
requirementsrelatingtothepromptpublicationoftraderegulationsbutthatthisprovisiondidnotrequirecontracting
parties to...publish trade regulations inadvance oftheir entry intoforce".
13While theGATS hasageneral provision oncounter-notification (Article III:5), suchabroad provision
does notexist intheareaofgoods.
14Some contracting parties havestated thatboththeGATT 1947 andtheTokyo Round Codes suffered from
shortcomings inthisrespect. See,forexample, MTN.GNG/NG14/W/20 (22March 1988), Section I.A.and
MTN.GNG/NG14/W/39 (31January 1990), para.2.
15SeeWT.COMTD/M/1 (15May 1995), para.19. Toassist, inparticular, developing country Members
todefine theimpact ofnotification requirements, alistofnotification obligations wasprovided bytheSecretariat
indocument WT/COMTD/W/1.WT/COMTD/W/5
Page6
bytheCouncil forTrade inGoods, atitsmeeting of20February 1995, oftheWorking Group on
Notification Obligations andProcedures, which willcarry outareview ofexisting obligations "with
aviewtosimplifying, standardizing andconsolidating these obligations tothegreatest extent aswell
astoimproving compliance withthese obligations", andmake recommendations within twoyears.
Bythen,however, domestic mechanisms fornotifying should already beinplace. Their establishment
willrequire considerable work topromote theexchange ofinformation between different Ministries
andspecialized institutions aswellastocoordinate thetransmission ofnotifications totheWTO.
19. Some Agreements require theprovision ofinformation covered byneither publication nor
notification requirements. Therequirement could beeither ageneral obligation oranobligation to
befulfilled upon arequest emanating fromgovernments and/or fromother economic agents, usually
inother Member countries. Forexample, withrespect toinvestigations orreviews intheAgreement
onAnti-Dumping (Articles 6:1:2 and6:1:3), Members arerequired tomake available tointerested
parties theevidence received and,upon request, toprovide thefulltextofthewritten application for
investigations tobeinitiated. IntheGATS, Members arerequired tocooperate insupplying information
withrespect tobusiness practices ofservice suppliers (Article IX:2). Theprovision ofassistance can
alsobeclassified under thisheading, asitgenerally involves thesupply ofinformation. Forexample,
intheAgreement onAnti-Dumping (Article 6:13), Members aretoprovide assistance withrespect
tothesupply ofinformation by,inparticular, small companies.
(ii) Consultations withother Members
20. Therighttoconsult, andtheobligation todothesame, isoneofthepillars oftheGATT/WTO
system. Consultation normally takesplace uponrequest byaninterested Member. Consultations may
takeoneoftwoforms: those ofaspecific nature provided forinspecific articles ofdifferent agreements,
andthose ofawider nature inthecontext ofWTO dispute settlement. Inthislatter case, themain
impact fordeveloping country Members relates totheextension oftheGATT dispute settlement rules
tonon-traditional areas (i.e.mainly services andintellectual property rights). Requirements for
consultations ofaspecific nature nowextend toawiderange ofspecific areas dealtwithinindividual
Uruguay Round Agreements. Forexample, intheAgreement onAgriculture alone, Members shall
consult: ontheconditions ofapplication ofthespecial safeguard action uponrequest fromanyinterested
Member(Article5:7);onexportprohibitionsorrestrictionstobeapplieduponrequestwithanyMember
having asubstantial interest asanimporter (Article 12:1(b); annually intheCommittee onAgriculture
withrespect toMembers 'participation inthenormal growth ofworld trade inagricultural products
within theframework oftheircommitments onexport subsidies (Article 18:5); and,atthetimeof
tariffication following thetermination ofspecial treatment, consult onadjustments tobemade tothe
levelofatariff equivalent upon request (Attachment toAnnex 5,paragraph 7).
(iii) Invocation ofrights
21. Some Uruguay Round legal instruments foresee exceptions orspecial provisions (normally
granted todeveloping country orleast-developed country Members), tobeavailable onlyuponrequest.
Members arethusrequired toindividually invoke aright; thatis,toexpress theirdesire (normally
through notification totherespective body) tobeabletobenefit from suchaprovision.16Given the
factthatnotalladvantages aregranted automatically, developing country Members needtobeaware
16Thus,forexample,adevelopingcountryMemberhastorequestfordelayperiodstobegranted,orextended,
withrespecttotheapplicationofspecificprovisionsoftheAgreemen tsonSPS,TBT,CustomsValuation,Subsidies
andCountervailing Measures andTRIPS. Requests arenecessary toreceive technical assistance, tobeableto
consult withMembers onspecific issues, ortohave certain rules applied differently according toreservations
made (Agreement onCustoms Valuation).WT/COMTD/W/5
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ofboththeavailable options andofthetiming oftheaction required. Again, thiswillimply having
aneffective internal surveillance mechanism.
(iv) Rule-making negotiations
22. Some Uruguay Round Agreements create obligations forMembers toparticipate inmultilateral
negotiations, inthecontext ofareview oftheAgreement itself, such asintheAgreements on
Agriculture, onTRIPS oronTRIMS. Further negotiations arealsoforeseen withrespect tospecific
elements insome individual Agreements. IntheGATS, negotiations areforeseen, forexample, for
subsidies, safeguards, government procurement andfurther trade liberalization. IntheAgreement
onRules ofOrigin, further negotiations onharmonization ofrulesoforigin fornon-preferential trade
areforeseen. IntheTBTAgreement, themutual recognition oftheconformity assessment procedures
ofMembers areyettobeagreed upon.
Conclusion
23. Thefactthatsomany areas fornegotiation arealready inscribed intheWTO agenda forthe
coming months andyears (under theprinciples andguidelines ofeachAgreement) means thatthetime
available forthepreparatory work fornegotiators willbeshort andthatthework willtakeplace in
specific bodies. Participation inthework oftheWTO inGeneva willbecome acontinuing exercise
forallMembers, including thedeveloping countries. Follow-up incapitals willrequire aconsiderable
strengthening ofsome Geneva-based delegations ofdeveloping countries, andcontinuous coordination
between delegations andcapitals, andamong allconcerned authorities within eachdeveloping country
Member.