RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
14November 1995
ORGANIZATION(95-3525)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
REPLIES FROM VENEZUELA CONCERNING QUESTIONS POSED BY
THE UNITED STATES1CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION
OFVENEZUELAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS2
Thefollowingcommunication,dated18July1995,hasbeenreceivedfromthePermanentMission
ofVenezuela.
_______________
GENERAL
1. Implementation oftheAgreements
Isitplanned tointroduce further instruments toimplement theWTO ADand
SCM Agreements?
Asalready reported, itisnottechnically necessary toadopt anyspecial provisions (whether
throughotherlaws,regulations,decreesoradministrativeorders)inordertoimplementtherequirements
oftheWTO Agreements. Asindicated, afterapproval bytheCongress, ratification bythePresident
andsubsequent publication intheOfficial Gazette oftheRepublic ofVenezuela, theWTO Agreements
formpartofVenezuelan national lawandareapplied inpreference toanypre-existing provisions which
mayconflict withthem.
There arespecial provisions intheAgreements which would required theadoption ofspecial
provisions. Thisisthecasewithregard totheprovisions ofArticle 13oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement
andArticle 23oftheAgreement onSubsidies which refertotheneedtomaintain mechanisms forthe
review ofadministrative decisions forwhich independent authorities areresponsible. However, such
provisions werealready present intheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law(andother specific lawssuch
astheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedure andtheBasic LawoftheSupreme Court ofJustice)
andarestillinforce.
Despite theabove, theGovernment oftheRepublic ofVenezuela iscurrently drawing updraft
regulations toreplace thecurrent Regulations under theLawonUnfair Foreign Trade Practices and
todevelop therulesstemming fromtheWTO Agreements relating toanti-dumping andcountervailing
measures. Asindicated, these amendments arenottechnically necessary fortheimplementation of
theWTO Agreements, because theAgreements formpartofVenezuelan legislation and,inaddition,
1G/ADP/W/28-G/SCM/W/35.
2G/ADP/N/1/VEN/1-G/SCM/N/1/VEN/1.G/ADP/W/59
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havehigher legal status thananyregulation. However, through these amendments theuseofthe
provisions currently included invarious lawscould befacilitated andthetechnical andmethodological
aspects ofinvestigations improved.
Theprocess ofreforming theRegulations would takeatleastsixmonths. Inanycase, inthe
firsthalfof1996 wehopetobeinaposition tonotify theCommittees ofthefinaldecision regarding
thechanges intheRegulations under theAnti-Dumping Law.
ANTI-DUMPING
2. Price comparison
Article 8oftheAnti-Dumping Law provides that normal value (NV) shall bea
weighted-average, but that the export price shall becompared with NV ona
transaction-to-transaction basis iftheuseofweighted averages "materially affects" thefindings
oftheinvestigation. What determines whether theuseofweighted-average NV"materially affects"
theoutcome oftheinvestigation? Todetermine whether thefindings ofaninvestigation are
materially affected, does theCommission calculate thedumping margin using both a
weighted-average NVandonatransaction-to-transaction basis? How much ofavariance is
considered material? Would Venezuela usethesame methodology ininvestigations andreviews?
Notwithstanding theprovisions ofArticle 8oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, the
Commission 'spractice hastended towards thecomparison ofweighted-averages ofthenormal value
withweighted-averages oftheprices ofexport transactions. TheCommission 'spractice willcontinue
tobeguided bythiscriterion (comparing weighted-averages withweighted-averages orindividual prices
withindividual prices), inaccordance withtheprovisions ofArticle 2.4.2 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement, apart from theexceptions provided fortherein (i.e.ifapattern ofexport prices istobe
found which differs significantly among different purchasers, regions ortime-periods, orifitisshown
thatsuch differences could notbetaken intoaccount appropriately bytheuseofaweighted
average-to-weighted average ortransaction-to-transaction comparison). TheCommission willconsider
thattheuseofweighted-averages maymaterially affect theoutcome ofaninvestigation onlyifitfinds
thatthereisapattern ofexport prices which differs significantly, inaccordance withtheabove provision.
TheCommission willusethesame methodology bothforinvestigations andforreviews.
Inthefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, theprice comparison
methodology should beclarified.
3. Useofprice samples
How istheuseof"prices thatmost frequently occur" assamples (Article 8.3ofthe
Anti-Dumping Law) consistent with theuseof"statistically valid" sampling techniques (AD
Article 6.10)?
Asinformed, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable foranti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Forthispurpose, asitwillbe
necessary tousesampling todetermine prices (where thereisalargenumber ofexporters, producers,
importers ortypes ofproduct), theCommission willusetherules contained inArticle 6.10ofthe
Anti-Dumping Agreement. These ruleswould beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
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4. Below-cost sales: Time-period
Article 14oftheRegulations provides thatbelow-cost saleswillbedisregarded when they
havebeenmade "over aperiod ofnotlessthansixmonths normore than18months inquantities
exceeding 80percentoftotalsales". What isthepurpose ofthe18-month limit? Would below-cost
sales, ifoccurring over aperiod greater than 18months, beused inthedumping margin
calculation?
Thetime-period (ofmore thansixmonths andlessthan18months) provided forinArticle 14
oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations isconsistent withnote4toArticle 2.2.1 oftheWTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement (anextended period oftime, normally oneyear, andinnocaselessthan
sixmonths). However, thefuture amendment oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations could
change thelimitonthisperiod, tooneyear. Whilst thecurrent Regulations areinforce, theCommission
mayuse,forthedumping margins calculation, below-cost salesoccurring overaperiod greater than
18months.
5. Below-cost sales: Amount ofsales
What isthepurpose ofthe"exceeding 80percentoftotalsales" limit? WillVenezuela
usebelow-cost sales, iftheydonotexceed 80percentoftotal sales byvolume, beused ina
dumping margin calculation?
Thelimitestablishing thatbelow-cost salesmustexceed 80percentoftotalsales, provided
forinArticle 14oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, isconsistent -andinfactmore than
exceeds -note5toArticle 2.2.1 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (inaccordance withwhich
itissufficient forbelow-cost salestorepresent 20percentofthevolume soldinthetransactions under
consideration). However, thefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations could
changethecurrentlimittothe20percentprovidedforintheAgreement.WhilstthecurrentRegulations
areinforce, theCommission could use,forthecalculation ofdumping margins, below-cost saleswhich
donotexceed 80percentoftotalsalesbyvolume.
6. Profit margins inDecision 283
Article 6(b)ofDecision 283provides that"Asageneral rule, theaddition forprofit shall
notexceed theprofit normally realized onsalesofproducts ofthesame category inthedomestic
market ofthecountry oforigin". How isthisprovision consistent withADArticle 2.2.2 which
states apreference foractual datapertaining totheproducer under investigation?
Aswasnotified atthetime, Decision 283oftheCommission oftheCartagena Agreement forms
partofVenezuelan legislation relating toanti-dumping orcountervailing measures, since Venezuela
isamember oftheAndean Pact.
TheCartagena Agreement isanintegration agreement covered bytheexception inArticle XXIV
ofGATT 1994 oncustoms unions andfree-trade areas. Decision 283applies fundamentally totrade
between Member countries oftheAndean Pact. Theexceptions areincluded inparagraphs (c)and
(d)ofArticle 2oftheDecision. However, theprovisions relating toimports fromthirdcountries would
notingeneral beapplicable, interaliabecause theprocess ofconsolidation ofacustoms union for
theAndean subregion hasadvanced slowly, sothatinpractice onlythose referring tointra-Andean
trade would remain.G/ADP/W/59
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Inanycase, theVenezuelan Government istaking thenecessary steps topropose, within the
Andean Group, arevision ofDecision 283soastoadapt itfullytotheundertakings made byMember
countries oftheCartagena Agreement inthecontext oftheWTO Agreements. Until thishappens,
theGovernment oftheRepublic ofVenezuela expresses itscomplete willingness toholdconsultations
withWTO Member countries which might consider themselves tobeaffected bytheimplementation
ofanti-dumping orcountervailing measures based ontheAndean rules contained inDecision 283.
However, withregard tothespecific point raised bythequestion, itshould bepointed out
thatArticle 2.2.2 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement laysdown alistofdifferent waystocalculate
SG&A andprofit margins. Although theArticle expresses apreference fortheuseofactual data
pertaining totheproducer under investigation, innowaydoesitprohibit (butrather explicitly provides
for)thepossibility contained inArticle 6(b)ofDecision 283.Decision 283doesnotestablish thenormal
method ofcalculating thereasonable profit margin, butrather provides thatsuchacalculation cannot
exceed theprofit normally realized onsalesofproducts ofthesame category inthedomestic market
ofthecountry oforigin.
7. Production costs based onconstructed value
Article 12oftheRegulations provides that, where theinformation provided bythe
respondent isnotreliable, production costs andprofit maybecalculated based oncosts ofother
producers/exporters. Ifthatinformation isinsufficient, constructed value maybecalculated based
on"sales ofother goods bytheexporter orother manufacturers within thesame economic sector
inthecountry oforigin orofexport, oronanyother reasonable basis determined bythe
Commission".Howisthecalculation(ofproductioncostsbasedonothermanufacturers'production
costs) consistent with ADArticle 2.2.1.1? (Article 2.2.2 provides onlyfortheuseofother
manufacturers 'SG&A andprofit, nottheproduction costs.)
Asalready reported, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, where itis
necessary tocalculate production costs, information fromtheexporter orproducer under investigation
willnormally beused, asprovided forinArticle 2.2.1.1 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
However, itshould beclarified thattheAgreement establishes thatthisistheformofcalculation which
shall "normally" beused, sothatitisclear thatthisisnottheonlyform allowed. Furthermore,
Article 2.2.1.1 states thattheinformation fromtheexporter orproducer under investigation shallbe
used"provided thatsuchrecords areinaccordance withthegenerally accepted accounting principles
oftheexporting country andreasonably reflect thecosts associated withtheproduction andsaleof
theproduct under consideration". Where thisisnotthecase, theCommission mayconsider thatthe
information provided isnotreliable, whereupon itmayestimate theproduction costsbased onthedata
ofother producers/exporters.
Thefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations mayhelptoclarify this
point.
8. Below-cost sales
Article 13oftheRegulations provides that,when home-market salesarebelow production
cost, normal value maybebased onanyofthefollowing methods: (a)other HMsales above
cost; (b)third country sales; (c)CV; or,(d)anadjusted HMprice which eliminates losses and
provides forareasonable margin ofprofit. Under what circumstances would option (c)differ
from option (d)? How isoption (d)consistent withADArticle 2.2.2?G/ADP/W/59
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Article 13oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations doesprovide that,where home-market
salesarebelow production costs, theCommission mayconsider thatsuchsaleshavenotoccurred in
theordinary course oftrade andmaycalculate thenormal value inaccordance withthemethod it
considers themost appropriate from amongst those listed inthequestion.
Asinformed theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, where home-market sales
arebelow production costs, themethods provided forintheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations
would beusedonlyinsofarastheyareconsistent withtheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. Infact,
these methods neednotnecessarily beincompatible withtheAnti-Dumping Agreement.
Thecalculation provided forinoption (d)isequivalent tothatinoption (c)andmaytherefore
becarried outinaccordance withtheguidelines provided inArticle 2.2.2 oftheAnti-Dumping
Agreement.ThetwooptionswouldbemergedinthefutureamendmentoftheVenezuelanAnti-Dumping
Regulations.
9. Centrally-planned economies
Does Article 8oftheRegulations apply tocentrally-planned economies oristheprovision
inArticle 10oftheRegulations anexception tothegeneral framework specifically provided for
centrally-planned economies?
Article 8oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations provides theconditions which must
befulfilled byexport market transactions (ormarket oforigin, asthecasemaybe),forwhich they
maybeconsidered asbeing intheordinary course oftrade (andusedindetermining normal value).
Similarly, Article 2.1oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that,inorder forthehome price
toberelevant asanormal value, itmust haveoccurred intheordinary course oftrade.
Article10oftheVenezuelanAnti-DumpingRegulationsprovidesfurtherdetailsonthecalculation
methods tobeapplied forthedetermination ofnormal value where, inaccordance withtherules of
Article 8,thesaleshavenotoccurred intheordinary ornormal course oftrade. Thus, inthisrespect,
thelastparagraph ofArticle 10provides thecalculation method tobeused forcountries with
centrally-planned economies.
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
10. Definition ofsubsidy: Financial contribution
Under Article 2.2(sic)oftheAnti-Dumping Law3,a"financial contribution" subsidy is
simply onetypeofsubsidy. Incomparison, under SCM Article 1.1,"financial contribution" is
aprerequisite forafinding thatasubsidy exists. Intheabsence ofaspecific definition ofsubsidy
thatincludes theconcept of"financial contribution", howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity
ofitspractice withtheAgreement?
Asinformed, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofimports from
WTO Member countries, theCommission willonlyconsider subsidies tobethose practices falling
within thedefinition ofArticle 1oftheWTO Agreement onSubsidies, i.e.where afinancial contribution
3Thereference should betoArticle 2(13)oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
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byagovernment orsome other form ofincome orprice support, inaccordance withArticle XVIof
GATT 1994.
Thefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations would include adefinition
ofsubsidies adapted totheWTO Agreements.
11. Defacto specificity
Article 2(13) oftheAnti-Dumping LawandArticle 39oftheRegulations incorporate the
required specificity ofsubsidies. Article 39(3) appears toprovide thatasubsidy maybedefacto
specific where, despite the"general nature" ofthelegislation, theadministering authority has
developedpracticeswhichmanifestlyconferadvantagesonspecificenterprises,groupsofenterprises
orindustries rather thanothers which would alsobeentitled tothesubsidy. Thisprovision does
not,however, identify criteria tobeapplied inmaking such determinations (assetforth in
SCM Article 2.1(c)). Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwillVenezuela ensure the
conformity ofitspractice withtheAgreement?
Asinformed, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumpling
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofimports from
WTO Member countries, theCommission willconsider thatsubsidies provided foringeneral laws
aredefacto specific onlytaking intoaccount thecriteria listed inSCM Article 2.1(c). Tothisend,
itwillconsider whether thesubsidy isusedforalimited number ofcertain enterprises, orwhether
itspredominant useisforcertain enterprises, orwhether disproportionately largeamounts ofsubsidies
havebeengranted tocertain enterprises, andfinally inwhatmanner thegranting authority hasexercised
itsdiscretionary powers indeciding whether togrant asubsidy.
These criteria would beincorporated inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.
12. Defacto specificity: Economic diversification
IntheVenezuelan Law there isnoprovision referring tothefactors contained in
SCM Article 2.1(c) relating toeconomic diversification inthegranting country, norwithregard
tothelength oftimeduring which theprogramme ofsubsidies hasbeen inoperation. Inthe
absence ofsuchaprovision, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractices withthe
Agreements?
WTO SCM Article 2.1(c) indeed contains aprovision inaccordance withwhich, when deciding
whether anapparently general subsidy isdefacto specific (considering thefactors referred tointhe
previous answer), theauthority shalltakeintoaccount: (a)theextent ofdiversification ofeconomic
activities inthegranting country; and,(b)theperiod oftimeduring which theprogramme ofsubsidies
inquestion hasbeeninoperation. Neither theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawnoritsRegulations
contain anyreference inthisrespect.
However, asinformed, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecase
ofimportsfromWTOMembercountries,theCommission,inconsideringwhetheranapparentlygeneral
subsidy isdefactospecific, willtakeintoaccount theaspects referred toinArticle 2.1(c) oftheWTO
Subsidies Agreement, relating totheextent ofeconomic diversification andtheperiod oftimeduring
which theprogramme ofsubsidies hasbeeninoperation. Thiscriterion would beincorporated inthe
future amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
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13. Regional specificity
IntheVenezuelan lawthere isnoregional specificity provision, ascontemplated in
Article 2.2oftheSCM Agreement. Intheabsence ofaspecific provision, howwillVenezuela
ensure theconformity ofitspractices withtheAgreements?
Article 2.2oftheWTO SCM Agreement doesindeed contain aprovision under which subsidies
limited todesignated geographical regions, within thejurisdiction ofthegranting authority, shallbe
considered asspecific. Neither theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawnortheRegulations contain any
specific reference inthisrespect.
However, thegeneral definition ofspecificity contained inArticle 2(13) ofthe
Venezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandArticle 39oftheRegulations areapplicable tospecific subsidies
bygeographical region. Inthisrespect, theprovisions relating tocountervailing measures contained
inVenezuelan legislation would beperfectly applicable tospecific subsidies limited toenterprises located
inadesignated region, apart from theexception provided forinArticle 8.2(b) (which refers tothe
"green light" subsidies todisadvantaged regions). Thespecific caseofregional subsidies could be
incorporated inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
14. Calculation oftheamount ofsubsidies
SCM Article 19.4states thatsubsidization should becalculated interms oftheamount
ofthesubsidy perunitofthe"subsidized andexported product" andthattheamount of
countervailing duties should notexceed theamount ofthesubsidy. Foritspart, Article 41of
theAnti-Dumping Regulations provides thatboth thenature ofthesubsidy anditsimpact on
prices ofthesubsidized goodbeconsidered. Howisconsidering thenature ofthesubsidy consistent
withSCM Article 19.4?
Asprovided forinArticle 41oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, theCommission 's
review ofsubsidies indeed includes acomprehensive study oftheirnature andtheirimpact onprices
ofthesubsidized good. However, inthefinalanalysis, under Article 10oftheAnti-Dumping Law
themostimportant thing istodetermine theamount ofthesubsidy perunitofthesubsidized product
being imported. Inaccordance withArticle 16ofthesame Anti-Dumping Law(which provides that
countervailing duties shall never exceed theamount ofsubsidies), suchdetermination enables the
maximum amount ofcountervailing duties, ifany,tobeestimated. Suchprovisions arefullyconsistent
withArticle 19.4oftheWTO Agreement onSubsidies.
15. Non-actionable subsidies
TheSCM Agreement provides thatnon-actionable orgreen-light subsidies arenot
countervailable. Thelegislation notified byVenezuela does notinclude anexemption for
non-actionable subsidies. How willVenezuela apply theprovision onnon-actionable subsidies
which fallwithin SCM Article 8.2orAnnex 2totheAgreement onAgriculture?
Evenbefore theconclusion oftheUruguay Round, theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawqualified
subsidies which werenotspecific asnon-actionable. Thisisoneofthecases currently provided for
inArticle 8oftheWTO SCM Agreement.
With regard tothetwospecific cases referred tointhequestion (those provided forin
WTO SCM Article 8.2andinAnnex 2totheAgreement onAgriculture), since bothAgreements -
theAgreement onSubsidies andtheAgreement onAgriculture -form partoftheAnnexes totheG/ADP/W/59
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Marrakesh Agreement, bothremain covered bythespecial LawofApproval adopted bytheCongress
oftheRepublic. Thus, theCommission willnotapply countervailing measures against subsidies which,
inaccordance withsuchprovisions, areconsidered asnon-actionable. Similarly, theCommission will
actwith"duerestraint" inrelation totheother subsidies provided forinArticle 13oftheAgreement
onAgriculture.
Inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations thesituation regarding
non-actionable subsidies would beclarified inaccordance withVenezuela 'sinternational undertakings.
PROCEDURES
16. Standing forfiling applications
Arethecriteria contained inArticle 14oftheAnti-Dumping LawandArticle 47ofthe
Regulations intended tobethreshold requirements forbringing apetition ordotheyonlyapply
toinjury? Iftheyapply onlytoinjury, what aretherequirements andprocedures fordetermining
whether apetition isfiledonbehalf ofthedomestic industry, asrequired byADArticle 5.4and
SCM Article 11.4?
TodatetheCommission hasbeenusing thecriteria contained inArticle 14oftheAnti-Dumping
LawandArticle 47oftheRegulations, notonlyfordetermining injury, butalsofordetermining standing
forfiling applications fortheinitiation ofinvestigations. Thus, theCommission hasbeenapplying
thestandard setoutinArticle 47oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations, namely 30percentofdomestic
production ofthelikegood (which isstronger thanthestandard setoutintheWTO Agreements).
However,theArticleoftheRegulationsdoes,exceptionally,ifthespecialcircumstancesoftheproduction
structure inquestion sowarrant, allow theCommission touseasabenchmark alower percentage,
which maynotbelessthan20percent(alower percentage taken tobeamended to25percentunder
theWTO Agreement).
Asinformed, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, theCommission isverifying
thatapplications fortheinitiation ofinvestigations onsubsidies arefiledbyaproducer ornumber of
producers representing atleast25percentofthedomestic industry, inaccordance withArticle 11.4
oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Theprovisions relating tostanding forfiling applications toinitiate investigations would be
included inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
17. Degree ofsupport foranapplication
HowdoesVenezuela determine thatatleast50percentofthedomestic producers support
thepetition when some ofthedomestic industry oppose apetition consistent withADArticle 5.4
andSCM Article 11.4?
NeithertheVenezuelanAnti-DumpingLawnortheRegulationsincludeanyprovisionconcerning
theneedtoverify therelative degree ofsupport fortheapplication bydomestic producers. However,
asinformed, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures
initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofimports fromWTO Member countries -
andinaccordance withtherequirements ofArticles 5.4and11.4oftheWTO Anti-Dumping and
Subsidies Agreements, respectively, -theCommission, intheevent ofanyopposition toanapplication
filedbydomestic producers, willverify whether there isadegree ofsupport ofmore thanhalfoftheG/ADP/W/59
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domestic industry expressing either itssupport fororopposition totheapplication (andnot,as
erroneously suggested inthequestion, whether more thanhalfofdomestic producers support the
application).
Therequirement ofverification ofthedegree ofsupport foranapplication would beincluded
inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
18. Justification forfiling applications
Ifthecriterion contained inArticle 47oftheRegulations applies toapplications, under
what circumstances would theCommission accept anapplication filedbylessthan25percent
ofthedomestic industry? How would thisbeconsistent withtherequirements ofArticles 5.4
oftheADAgreement and11.4oftheSCM Agreement, which require atleast25percentsupport?
Thisquestion hasalready beenanswered inthereply toquestion 16.
19. Notifications toandconsultations withgovernments
HowdoesVenezuela comply withtheobligations ofArticle 5.5oftheADAgreement and
Article 13.1oftheSCM Agreement?
Article 5.5oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement contains therequirement tonotify the
government oftheexporting country concerned before theinitiation ofaninvestigation. Article 13.1
oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement provides therequirement toinvite, before theinitiation ofan
investigation, Member countries whose products maybesubject toinvestigation forconsultations with
theaimofclarifying thesituation andarriving atamutually-agreed solution.
Despite thefactthatneither theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawnortheRegulations contain
thisrequirement, before formally initiating investigations theCommission hastraditionally notified
thegovernments ofthecountries affected through theirdiplomatic missions inVenezuela. Asinformed,
theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after
1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofimports from WTO Member countries -andin
accordance withtherequirements ofArticles 5.5and13.1 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping andSubsidies
Agreements, respectively -before theinitiation ofaninvestigation theCommission willnotify the
government oftheexporting country concerned (inthecaseofanti-dumping investigations) andwill
invite thegovernment oftheMember country whose products willbesubject toinvestigation for
consultations withtheaimofclarifying thesituation andarriving atamutually-agreed solution (inthe
caseofinvestigations relating tosubsidies).
Theobligations concerning notifications andconsultations, prior totheinitiation ofan
investigation would beexplicitly included inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations.
20. Notification oftheinitiation ofinvestigations
HowdoesVenezuela comply withtheratification requirements (sic)4concerning initiation
ofinvestigations found inADArticles 6.1.3 and12.9(sic)5andSCM Article 22.1?
4Notification.
5WTO ADArticle 12.1.G/ADP/W/59
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Articles 6.1.3 and12.1 oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 22.1 ofthe
WTO Subsidies Agreement contain therequirement tonotify thegovernments ofexporting countries,
aswellasother interested parties, regarding theinitiation ofanti-dumping orsubsidies investigations.
Inaccordance withArticle 42oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandArticle 69ofthe
Regulations, thedecision toinitiate aninvestigation isnotified bytheCommission notonlytoapplicants
andimporters butalsotoallother interested parties known atthetime, including other domestic
producers oflikegoods, producers andexporters ofthegoods under investigation andthegovernments
ofexporting countries through theirdiplomatic missions inVenezuela. Thenotification includes a
copy oftheinitiation resolution which contains thefundamental elements oftheapplication andthe
views oftheCommission.
Furthermore, thedecisions toinitiate investigations (inthesame wayastheCommission 's
other decisions inthecourse oftheinvestigations) arepublished intheOfficial Gazette oftheRepublic
ofVenezuela. Applicants arerequired topublish anannouncement containing anextract oftheinitiation
decision intwonewspapers withwidenational circulation, asindicated bytheCommission. Allthe
notifications make express reference tothepossibility forallinterested parties toappear before the
Commission topresent alltheirarguments andevidence.
Inaccordance withArticle 44oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, theapplicant, importers,
exporters andother interested parties havefullaccess totheinformation contained intherecord of
eachcase,except where thishasbeendeclared confidential. Thus, inaccordance withADArticle 6.1.3
andSCM Article 12.1.3, inthecourse oftheinvestigation exporters andother interested parties will
beprovided notonlywiththecomplete textofthewritten application filed, butalsowiththeother
elements making uptherecord ofthecase.
21. Non-confidential summaries
InVenezuelan legislation there isnodefinition ofnon-confidential summaries, such as
thatincluded inArticle 6.5.1 oftheADAgreement. Isitplanned toinclude suchadefinition
inthefuture? Article 48oftheAnti-Dumping Lawrequires thatanon-confidential summary
oftheconfidentialinformationbeprovided.Whatrequirementsarethereconcerningthesufficiency
ofthesummaries? Intheabsence ofspecific provisions, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity
ofitspractices withADArticle 5.4andSCM Article 11.4(sic)5?
Article 48oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawdoesindeed require thattheparty submitting
information andrequesting itsconfidential treatment should alsosubmit anon-confidential summary
thereof or,inspecial cases, explain whysuch information cannot besummarized. Neither the
Anti-DumpingLawnortheRegulationsincluderulesfordeterminingwhetheranon-confidentialsummary
issufficient.
However,asinformed,theWTOAgreementsaredirectlyapplicabletoanti-dumpingorsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving
imports from aWTO Member country, theCommission willapply therules contained in
WTO ADArticle 6.5.1 andSCM Article 12.4.1 which require thatnon-confidential summaries shall
besufficientlydetailedtopermitareasonableunderstandingofthesubstanceoftheinformationsubmitted
inconfidence.
5ThequestionbearsnorelationtoArticles5.4oftheWTOAnti-DumpingAgreemen tand11.4oftheSubsidies
Agreement. Thereference should betoADArticle 6.5.1 andSCM Article 12.4.1.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page11
Therulesreferring tothesufficiency ofnon-confidential summaries would beexplicitly included
inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
22. Impossibility ofsubmitting non-confidential summaries
InVenezuelan Lawthere isnolimitoninstances inwhich nopublic summary isrequired
dueto"exceptional circumstances", asrequired byADArticle 6.5.1 andSCM Article 12.4.1.
Intheabsence ofspecific provisions, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice
withtheADandSCM Agreements?
Article 48oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawdoesnotlimitto"exceptional circumstances"
thecases inwhich aparty maynotsubmit anon-confidential summary ofconfidential information.
However, asinformed, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving
imports from aWTO Member country, theCommission willapply therules contained in
ADArticle 6.5.1 andSCM Article 12.4.1 which require thatnon-confidential summaries besubmitted,
except inexceptional circumstances.
Theexceptional nature ofthenon-submission ofnon-confidential summaries would beexpressly
clarified inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
23. Conclusion ofaninvestigation
Article 51oftheAnti-Dumping Law andArticle 73oftheRegulations permit the
Commission toissueitsfinaldetermination upto30daysaftertheconclusion oftheinvestigation.
Howisthisconsistent withADArticle 5.10andSCM Article 11.11, which require investigations
tobeconcluded within oneyear?
Article 51oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandArticle 73oftheRegulations provide
thatinvestigations shalllastforamaximum period ofoneyear. Article 51oftheLawaddsthatthe
Commission mayissue itsdecision within 30daysfollowing theconclusion ofaninvestigation. In
thisrespect, noneofthese provisions contradicts ADArticle 5.10andSCM Article 11.11. Contrary
towhat isasserted inthequestion, theabove Articles infactprovide onlythat"except inspecial
circumstances, aninvestigation shallbeconcluded within oneyear,andinnocasemorethan18months,
afteritsinitiation".
Inanycase, asinformed, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure
involving imports fromaWTO Member country, theCommission willtakedueaccount oftherules
relating tomaximum duration ofinvestigations contained inADArticle 5.10andSCM Article 11.11.
These rules could beexplicitly included inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations.
24. Provisional measures
Forhowmany daysfollowing theinitiation ofaninvestigation mayprovisional measures
beapplied? What isthetime-limit provided inArticle 60oftheBasic LawonAdministrative
Procedure? Ifprovisional measures maybeimposed lessthan60days after initiation, howis
thisconsistent withArticles 7.3oftheADAgreement and17.3oftheSCM Agreement?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page12
Asinformed, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving
imports from aWTO Member country, inaccordance withADArticle 7andSCM Article 17the
Commission maynotapply provisional measures unless theconditions provided forintheseprovisions
havebeenfulfilled:
(a) Atleast60dayshavepassed since theinitiation oftheinvestigation, apublic notice
hasbeengiven tothateffect andinterested parties havebeennotified andgiven the
opportunity tosubmit theirarguments andevidence;
(b) apreliminary investigation hasbeencarried outandpriordetermination oftheexistence
ofdumping orsubsidies andinjury tothedomestic industry hasbeenmade; and
(c) itisconsidered necessary toimpose measures toprevent injury from occurring, or
continuing tooccur, tothedomestic industry inthecourse oftheinvestigation.
Inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations theprovisions relating
totheimposition ofprovisional measures maybeclarified anditmaybeprovided thatsuchmeasures
shallonlybeapplied intheformindicated, i.e.thatprovisional measures shallnotbeapplied before
aperiod of60daysfrom thedateoftheinitiation oftheinvestigation haselapsed.
Finally, Article 79oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations provides thattheCommission
shalldecide whether toimpose theprovisional measures requested, within thetime-limit laiddown
inArticle 60oftheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedure, i.e.uptofourmonths (which maybe
extended, inspecial circumstances, byafurther twomonths), fromthedateofthedecision toinitiate
theinvestigation. Innowaydoesthiscontradict theprovisions oftheAgreements, inthatitsetsonly
alimit, amaximum period oftime, forthedecision. Conversely, theprovisions oftheAgreements
referred tosetaminimum period oftimefortheintroduction ofprovisional measures.
25. Extension ofprovisional duties
Under what circumstances willprovisional measures beextended forlonger than
fourmonths under Article 81oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations? How isthisconsistent with
ADArticle 7.4andSCM Article 17.4?
Asalready stated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving
imports from aWTO Member country, inaccordance withArticle 7.4oftheWTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement andArticle 17.4oftheSubsidies Agreement theCommission willonlyapply provisional
measures (duties) forabriefperiod, notexceeding fourmonths.
Inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations thispoint would be
clarified.
26. Extension ofprovisional duties :Serious presumption
What arethecriteria fordetermining "serious presumption" inorder toextend the
application ofprovisional measures under Article 81oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page13
Asstated inresponse totheprevious question, theCommission willonlyapply provisional
measures forabriefperiod, notexceeding fourmonths, andtherefore theprovision referring toserious
presumption would notbeapplicable.
Inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations thewording ofthis
provision could beimproved, soastomake itclearthattheprovisional measures willbeimposed in
amanner consistent withtheWTO Agreements.
27. Provisional measures: Suitability ofimposition
Article 79oftheRegulations seems tosaythatprovisional measures maybeapplied either:
(a)within thetime-limit laiddown inArticle 60oftheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedure,
or(b)subsequently when, inthecourse oftheinvestigation, additional evidence justifying such
duties isobtained. Under what conditions doesVenezuela impose provisional measures subject
tooption (b)above? Howisthisconsistent withADArticle 7andSCM Article 17,which establish
theprerequisites imposing provisional measures?
Asstatedinresponsetoquestion24,theWTOAgreementsaredirectlyapplicabletoanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure
involving imports from aWTO Member country, inaccordance with WTO ADArticle 7and
SCM Article 17theCommission willonlyapply provisional measures oncetheconditions provided
forinthefollowing provisions havebeenfulfilled:
(a) Atleast60dayshavepassed since theinitiation oftheinvestigation, apublic notice
hasbeengiven tothateffect andinterested parties havebeennotified andgiven the
opportunity tosubmit theirargument andevidence;
(b) apreliminary investigation hasbeenconducted andpriordetermination oftheexistence
ofdumping orsubsidies andofinjury tothedomestic hasbeenmade; and
(c) itisconsidered necessary toimpose measures toprevent injury from occurring, or
continuing tooccur, tothedomestic industry inthecourse oftheinvestigation.
Inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations theprovisions relating
totheimposition ofprovisional measures maybeclarified anditmaybeprovided thatsuchmeasures
shallonlybeapplied intheform indicated.
Finally, asalsoindicated, Article 79oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations provides
thattheCommission shalldecide whether toimpose theprovisional measures requested, within the
time-limit laiddown inArticle 60oftheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedure, i.e.uptofourmonths
(which maybeextended, inspecial circumstances, byafurther twomonths), from thedateofthe
decision toinitiate theinvestigation. Innowaydoesthiscontradict theAgreements, inthatitsets
onlyalimit, amaximum period oftime, forthedecision (except forthespecial caseinwhich,
subsequently inthecourse oftheinvestigation, additional evidence -which didnotpreviously exist -
arises justifying theimposition ofmeasures). Conversely, theprovisions oftheAgreements referred
tosetaminimum period oftimefortheintroduction ofprovisional measures.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page14
28. Anti-competitive effects ofprice undertakings
Bypermitting undertakings between importers anddomestic producers, Article 23ofthe
Lawseems tocreate ariskofprice fixing. HowdoesVenezuela prevent thedomestic andimporting
industries from engaging inanti-competitive behaviour behind theshield ofanundertaking?
Article23oftheVenezuelanAnti-DumpingLawindeedprovidesforthepossibilityofsuspending
orterminating aninvestigation where theCommission approves theagreement concluded between
importers anddomestic producers. Asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inthecase
ofaprocedure involving imports fromaWTO Member country, anyundertaking made should conform
totheprinciples laiddown inWTO ADArticle 8andSCM Article 18.These principles relating to
undertakings maybeincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
However, itshould bemade clear thatcurrent Venezuelan legislation contains aneffective
mechanism, notprovided forintheAgreements themselves, toprevent undertakings being turned into
ashield foranti-competitive behaviour bydomestic andimporting industries. Article 58ofthe
Venezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations authorizes theCommission, inallcases where theundertaking
submitted foritsconsideration entails arevision ofprices, torequest theopinion oftheInspectorate
forthePromotion andProtection ofFreeCompetition (thebody which investigates, prevents and
penalizes anti-competitive practices inVenezuela).
29. Price undertakings: Lesser price increase
Article 8.1oftheADAgreement provides thatprice increases "shall notbehigher than
necessary toeliminate themargin ofdumping" andthatitisdesirable forsuchincreases tobe
nohigher than needed toremove theinjury tothedomestic industry. Article 23oftheAnti-
Dumping Lawcontains neither ofthese qualifiers. Intheabsence ofaspecific provision tothis
effect, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Even before theconclusion oftheAgreements, Venezuelan legislation included theprinciple
ofthelesser dutyruleinArticle 16oftheAnti-Dumping Law. Thisrulecould beapplied inasimilar
manner toprice undertakings.
Inanycase, asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofananti-dumping
procedureinvolvingimportsfromaWTOMembercountry,anyundertakingprovidedforshouldconform
totheprinciples laiddown inWTO ADArticle 8andshould therefore apply thelesser pricecriterion.
Thisprinciple relating toundertakings could beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.
30. Undertakings: Affirmative preliminary determination
ADArticle 8.2andSCM Article 18.2preclude theseeking ofanundertaking prior to
anaffirmative preliminary determination ofdumping orsubsidization andtheinjury caused.
Intheabsence ofaspecific provision tothiseffect, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity
ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Article 23oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, indeed states onlythatundertakings may
beaccepted bytheCommission, "before taking afinaldecision ontheneedtoimpose thecorresponding
duties", butdoesnotprovide fortheneedforanaffirmative preliminary determination. However,G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page15
asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures
initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving imports from
aWTO Member country, anyundertaking provided forshould conform withtheprinciples laiddown
inWTO ADArticle 8andSCM Article 18.Inthisrespect, anaffirmative preliminary determination
regarding theexistence ofdumping orsubsidies andtheinjury caused would berequired. This
requirement forundertakings could beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.
31. Undertakings: Violation
Article 26oftheAnti-Dumping Law allows theCommission toapply duties after the
violation ofanundertaking "based onthefacts established atthetime theundertaking was
accepted". Describe howthisprovision inoperation isconsistent withADArticle 8.6andin
SCM Article 18.6which allow fortheapplication ofprovisional measures forgoods entered not
more than90days before thedecision toapply suchprovisional measures, butnottoimports
entered before theviolation oftheundertaking.
Contrary towhat isimplied inthequestion, thewording ofArticle 26oftheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Lawdoesnotrefertotheretroactive application ofthemeasures tobeimposed atthe
timewhen theviolation ofanundertaking isbeing determined. Thereference fromVenezuelan Law
which enables theCommission toimpose suchmeasures "based onthefactsestablished atthetime
theundertaking wasaccepted" concerns onlytheinformation which theCommission shallconsider
inestimating theamount ofduties. Inthisrespect, thewording oftheVenezuelan lawisfullyconsistent
andcompatible withWTO ADArticle 8.6andSCM Article 18.6, which authorize theauthorities to
act"using thebestinformation available".
With regard tothetemporary application ofsuchduties, asindicated, theWTO Agreements
aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after 1January 1995 in
Venezuela. Thus, inthecaseofaprocedure involving imports fromaWTO Member country, tocounter
anyviolation ofanundertaking themeasures would betaken inaccordance withtheprinciples laid
down inWTO ADArticle 8.6andinSCM Article 18.6. These principles could beincluded inthe
future amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
32. Ability torespond
Articles 25,26and45oftheLawand70oftheRegulations donotrequire theadministering
authorities toconsider thereasonable ability ofaninterested party torespond, asrequired by
ADAnnex II,2. Intheabsence ofexplicit provisions, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity
ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Therequirement contained inWTO ADAnnex II,2,thattheauthorities should consider the
reasonable ability oftheinterested party torespond, refers tothespecific caseinwhich theauthority
requests theinterested party toprovide itsresponse inaparticular medium (e.g.computer tape) or
computer language. Asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping or
subsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inprocedures involving imports
fromaWTO Member country, incases where theCommission requests theinterested party toprovide
itsresponse inaparticular medium orcomputer language, theprovisions ofADAnnex II,2shallduly
betaken intoaccount. Thisaspect could beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page16
Ingeneral, theCommission willapply Article 46oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawfor
decisions taken inaccordance withtheinformation available; thisconforms withWTO ADArticle 6.8
andSCM Article 12.7.
33. Bestinformation available
Article 46oftheLawdoesnotrequire theadministering authorities touseinformation
from another source onlywhere aparty hasnotbeencooperative, asrequired byADAnnex II,7,
anddoesnotrequire theadministering authorities tousespecial circumspection inemploying
secondary information and,where practicable, check theinformation against independent sources
ofinformation, asrequired byADArticle 6.8andAnnex II,7.Intheabsence ofexplicit provisions,
howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Contrary totheassumption made inthequestion, Article 46oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Lawdoesinfactlimitthepossibility fortheCommission touseother information available, if"aparty
orcountry refuses toprovide thenecessary information ordoesnotdosowithin thetime-limit fixed
bytheTechnical Secretariat orinanyother wayhinders theinvestigation". Thewording ofthe
Venezuelan lawisequivalent tothatcontained inWTO ADArticle 6.8andSCM Article 12.7which
refertocasesinwhich "anypartyrefuses access to,orotherwise doesnotprovide, necessary information
within areasonable period orsignificantly impedes theinvestigation". Such wording encompasses
whatADAnnex II,7calls"lack ofcooperation".
Although itistruethatVenezuelan lawdoesnotexplicitly contain theprinciples ofinterpretation
laiddown inADAnnex II,7,asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Thus, inprocedures involving
imports fromaWTO Member country, incases where theCommission adopts decisions onthebasis
oftheinformation available, dueaccount willbetaken ofADAnnex II,7.Thisaspect could beincluded
inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
34. Correction ofinformation notaccepted
Article 46oftheAnti-Dumping Lawdoesnotprovide respondents withanopportunity
tosubmit further explanations, where evidence orinformation submitted hasbeen rejected, as
required byADAnnex II,6,anddoesnotrequire theadministering authorities touseinformation
that, while notideal inallrespects, wassubmitted byaparty thathasacted tothebestofits
ability, asrequired byADArticle 6.8andAnnex II,5. Intheabsence ofexplicit provisions, how
willVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Although itistruethatVenezuelan lawdoesnotexplicitly contain theprinciples ofinterpretation
laiddown inADAnnex II,5and6,asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inprocedures
involving imports from aWTO Member country, incases where theCommission adopts decisions
onthebasis oftheinformation available, theprovisions ofADAnnex II,5and6willdulybetaken
intoaccount.
Forthispurpose, theCommission:
(a) Shall provide theparty which hassubmitted evidence orinformation thathasbeen
rejectedwiththeopportunitytosubmitfurtherexplanationswithinanappropriateperiod;
andG/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page17
(b) shallnotreject apriori information submitted byaparty acting tothebestofitsability,
evenwhere suchinformation isnotidealinallrespects.
Such aspects could beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations.
35. Requirement toconsider information
TheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandRegulations donotrequire theadministering
authorities totakeintoaccount inmaking determinations allinformation submitted byparties
thatisverifiable, timely submitted andabletobeused without undue difficulties, asrequired
byADAnnex II,3. Intheabsence ofexplicit provisions, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity
ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
While itistruethatVenezuelan lawdoesnotexplicitly contain theprinciples ofinterpretation
laiddown inADAnnex II,3,asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping
orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Inprocedures involving imports
fromaWTO Member country, theCommission willapply theprovisions ofADAnnex II,3. Thus,
inmaking determinations itwilltakeintoaccount allinformation thatisverifiable, presented byparties
inanappropriate manner sothatitmaybeusedintheinvestigation without undue difficulties, submitted
ingood timeand,where necessary, submitted inthemedium orcomputer language inwhich ithas
beenrequested.
This explicit provision could beincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.
36. Refunds
With regard torefund procedures, doesfourmonths allow sufficient timefor"therelevant
investigation andverification"? Isaverification conducted foreachreview?
Inprinciple, theVenezuelan authorities consider theperiod offourmonths tobesufficient
forinvestigation andverification inthecaseofrefund procedures foramounts paidinexcess, in
accordance with Article 56oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law. Inanycase, through the
supplementary application ofArticle 60oftheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedure, ifinexceptional
circumstances theperiod oftimeistooshort, anextension ofuptotwomore months maybegranted.
Allinformation submitted inthecourse ofanapplication forrefund ofexcess amounts paid
would besubject toverification.
37. Changed circumstances review
What isthedegree ofevidentiary showing which aparty must make under Article 55of
theAnti-Dumping Lawsoastoobtain achanged circumstances review?
Asprovided forinArticle 55oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, theevidentiary showing
bytherequesting party must enable ittobedemonstrated thatthere hasbeenasufficient change in
circumstances tojustify there-opening oftheprocedure. Theevidence mayrelate toanyoftheelements
ofthedetermination: dumping orsubsidies, injury tothedomestic industry orcausal relationship.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page18
38. Brief reviews fornewshippers
ADArticle 9.5requires members toprovide accelerated reviews tonewshippers. What
standards andprocedures doesVenezuela apply fornewshipper reviews? Intheabsence ofexplicit
provisions, howwould Venezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
Although Venezuelan lawdoesnotexplicitly contain anybriefprocedure fornewshippers,
asindicated, theWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures
initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inprocedures involving imports fromaWTO Member
country, theCommission willapply promptly procedures involving newshippers, asprovided forin
Article9.5oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement.Thesestandardsandprocedurescouldbeexplicitlyincluded
inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
39. Revocation ofmeasures
Arethe"sunset" provisions inArticle 57oftheAnti-Dumping Lawtheonlywayinwhich
anti-dumping orcountervailing dutyorders mayberevoked under Venezuela 'slaw? Ifnot,what
other measures forrevoking measures exist?
Inaddition tothesunset clause inArticle 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, the
anti-dumping orcountervailing measures mayberevoked byvarious means. Article 55ofthe
Anti-Dumping Lawprovides anyinterested party withtheopportunity torequest thataprocedure be
re-opened, where achange incircumstances hasoccurred. Article 56ofthesamelawallows importers
torequest thatdecisions bereviewed where theyconsider thattheyhavepaidmore thantheyshould.
Inallsuchcases thereviews mayleadtothemeasures adopted being revoked.
Similarly, aswillbeseeninquestion 42,Venezuelan legislation contains mechanisms for
administrative andjudicial review through which tooadopted measures mayberevoked orrepealed.
40. Extension ofduties
Under what circumstances willtheCommission decide toextend thefinalduties imposed
forafurther fiveyears? What factors andinformation would betaken intoaccount todetermine
whether injury orthreat ofinjury persists?
Inaccordance with Article 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, when thefinal
countervailing duties expire, theCommission mayextend thefinalduties imposed foruptoafurther
fiveyears. However, forthistooccur, theinterested party mustfileanapplication before theoriginal
duties expire, inwhich casetheCommission would openanewinvestigation, providing allinterested
partieswiththeopportunitytopresenttheirargumentsandevidence,withtheaimofdeterminingwhether
theexpiry oftheduties would onceagain giverisetoinjury orathreat ofinjury tothedomestic industry.
Article 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawisnotonlyconsistent withArticle 11.3of
theWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 21.3oftheAgreement onSubsidies, butinvarious
respects goesbeyond whatcould beagreed within theWTO. Firstly, theCommission canonlyextend
theduration oftheduties attherequest oftheinterested party andnotexofficio .Secondly, theduties
maybeextended onlyonce.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page19
41. Avoidance ofmeasures
Under Article 54oftheAnti-Dumping Law (sic)6,what criteria doestheCommission
consider todetermine iftheimport ofinputs orcomponents isforthepurpose ofavoiding
anti-dumping duties?
Inaccordance withArticle 54oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, anti-dumping
orcountervailing duties maybeimposed inthecaseofgoods imported intheform ofinputs or
components offinished goods subject tomeasures, where theCommission determines thattheimport
intheform orinputs orcomponents wascarried outwiththeaimofavoiding thesaidmeasures.
TheRegulationsdonotlaydownadditionalcriteriainthisrespect.SincetodatetheCommission
hasnotapplied thisrule, there isnospecific precedent either. However, asindicated, the
WTO Agreements aredirectly applicable totheanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after
1January 1995 inVenezuela. Inanti-dumping procedures involving imports from aWTO Member
country, theCommission willapply anti-circumvention mechanisms inamanner consistent withthe
Anti-Dumping Agreement. Some criteria inthisrespect could beincluded inthefuture amendments
totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
42. Judicial review
Thelegislation notified byVenezuela contains noexplicit provision forjudicial review
offinal administrative ADorCVD actions. Intheabsence ofexplicit provisions, howdoes
Venezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withArticle 13oftheADAgreement andArticle 23
oftheSCM Agreement, which require thateach Member provide forjudicial review ofsuch
actions? IfVenezuela doeshave explicit provisions, describe thetypes ofdeterminations that
aresubject tojudicial review. What isthestandard ofreview applied injudicial review process
foreachtypeofdetermination? What aretheprocedures forseeking judicial review ofeachtype
ofdetermination?
Under thegeneral lawsgoverning appeals against thedecisions ofbodies oftheVenezuelan
Public Administration (Basic LawonAdministrative Procedure andBasic LawoftheSupreme Court
ofJustice), theCommission 'sdecisions (andthoseofitsTechnical Secretariat) maybechallenged before
theFirst Administrative Court byanyperson whoconsiders thathissubjective rights orpersonal,
legitimate anddirect interests havebeenaffected. ThisCourt ismade upoffivejudges whotake
decisions collegially andhavewideranging powers toreview decisions adopted bybodies ofthePublic
Administration below ministerial rank. ThisCourt hasabroad reviewing standard which consists in
analysing whether thedecision adopted isconsistent withthelaw.Inthisrespect, applicants mayinvoke
bothformaldefects(lackofjurisdiction,proceduraldefectsandotherformaldefects),andalsosubstantive
defects (false assumption ormisuse ofpowers).
Optionally, theparties affected mayalso(iftheysodesire) request theCommission itself to
reconsider itsdecision, before appealing tothejudicial authorities. Inthecaseofdecisions taken by
theTechnical Secretariat, hierarchical remedy against these decisions must beexercised before the
Commission, before itispossible toexercise theremedy ofjudicial review.
InVenezuela judicial review islimited tofourcategories ofadministrative decisions: (a)final
decisions; (b)decisions which otherwise make thecontinuation oftheproceedings impossible;
6Article 54oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations.G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page20
(c)decisions which, without being final, mayhaveviolated aparty'srightofdefence; and(d)decisions
which, without being final, prejudge inadefinitive manner thesubstance ofacase. Inprinciple,
provisional decisions arenotsubject toindependent review (unless theyfallintooneoftheabove cases),
buttheymaybechallenged bycontesting afinaldecision.
INJURY
43. Elements ofInjury
Article 50oftheRegulations states that"itshallbedetermined thatthere ismaterial injury
tothedomestic industry producing likegoods when atleasttwoofthefollowing conditions are
met". Howdoesthiscomply withtherequirements ofArticles 3.1and3.2oftheADAgreement
andArticles 15.1and15.2oftheSCM Agreement thatprice effects, volume effects andimpact
ofthesubject imports allmust beconsidered?
Article 50oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations doesprovide that,forthepurpose
ofdetermining material injury, itissufficient fortheCommission todetermine thatatleasttwoof
thethree conditions laiddown aremet: significantly increased import volumes; price undercutting
byimports; andnegative impact onindicators from thedomestic industrial sector.
Aspreviously mentioned, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, atthepresent
time, under ADArticle 3andSCM Article 15,theCommission mustdetermine whether, asaresult
ofthedumping orthesubsidies, imports cause injury tothedomestic industry. Forthispurpose, the
specific elements ofArticle 50oftheRegulations arestillrelevant. However, thesefactors areexamined
asawhole, andoneorseveral ofthem cannot necessarily make foradecisive determination.
Forthisdetermination thejointanalysis oftheelements included inArticle 50oftheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations willcontinue tobeavalid guide fortheCommission. However, the
requirement toconduct anoverall analysis ofallaspects could beexplicitly included inthefuture
amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
44. Significant Volume ofImports: Increase
Paragraph (1)ofArticle 50oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations states thatimport volume
willbeconsidered significant when itrepresents atleast 5percentofthedomestic production
oflikegoods. How isthisprovision consistent with therequirements ofArticle 3.2ofthe
ADAgreement andArticle 15.2oftheSCM Agreement?
Article 50(1) oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations indeed provides that,inthedetermination of
injury itwillbeconsidered whether thevolume ofimports issignificant andhasincreased inabsolute
terms orrelative tothedomestic production oflikegoods. Thevolume ofimports willbeconsidered
significant when itrepresents atleast5percentofthedomestic production oflikegoods.
Thisprovision isequivalent totheprovisions ofArticle 3.2oftheWTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement andArticle 15.2oftheSCM Agreement, which statethat,inthedetermination ofinjury,
withregard tothevolume ofimports, itshallbeconsidered whether therehasbeenasignificant increase
inimports, either inabsolute terms orrelative toproduction orconsumption intheimporting country.
Thefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations could make thewording ofthese
provisions identical (andnolonger merely equivalent).G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page21
However, thequestion implies afurther point which needs tobeanswered, namely whether
theRuleinArticle 50(1) oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations, relating tosignificant volumes ofimports,
isconsistent withtheprovisions ofArticle 5.8oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 11.9of
theSCM Agreement. Inconsidering whether theruleisconsistent withtheWTO Agreements, itis
necessary todistinguish between thetwoAgreements, since theycontain different provisions.
(a) Anti-Dumping Agreement
Article5.8oftheWTOAnti-DumpingAgreementprovidesthatinvestigationsshallbeterminated
where itisdetermined thatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible. Contrary totheVenezuelan
Regulations, thesignificance ofthevolume ofimports isdetermined, notonthebasisofthedomestic
industry, butrather ofatleast3percentofimports ofthelikeproduct intheimporting country .As
informed theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, now, inaccordance withtheprovisions
ofthisArticle oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, theCommission willterminate investigations where
itfindsthatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible, i.e.accounts forlessthan3percentofimports
ofthelikeproduct inVenezuela.
(b) SCM Agreement
Similarly, Article 11.9oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement provides thatinvestigations shall
beterminated where itisdetermined thatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible. Unlike the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, theSCM Agreement doesnotestablish anyprecise volume forconsidering
whether imports ofsubsidized goods aresignificant. Thus, theprovision contained inArticle 50(1)
oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations goesfurther thantheAgreement andestablishes a
percentage fordetermining thesignificance ofimports, using thedomestic industry producing likegoods
asabenchmark.
45. Significant volume ofimports: Different percentages
Doestheprovision inArticle 50oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations mean thatimport volume
willnotbeconsidered significant when itdoesnotreach the5percentlevel?
Paragraph(1)ofArticle50oftheVenezuelanAnti-DumpingRegulationsallowstheCommission
tobaseitsdeterminations, inrelation tothesignificance ofimport volumes, onpercentages other than
the5percentlevelreferred to,"when, initsview, thecircumstances ofthecasesorequire".
Onecasewhere dumped orsubsidized imports might beconsidered significant bythe
Commission, inspiteofnotreaching alevelof5percentofthedomestic industry, would bewhere
suchimports constitute asignificant percentage ofthetotalvolume ofimports ofthelikegood in
Venezuela, asprovided forinArticle 5.8oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
46. Price effects
What isthemeaning ofthelanguage inparagraph (2)ofArticle 50oftheAnti-Dumping
Regulations concerning preventing price increases "which, ifsuchgoods hadnotbeenimported,
would haveoccurred inanatural andcompetitive manner"? Howisthiswording consistent with
therequirements provided forinArticle 3.2oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 15.2
oftheSCM Agreement?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page22
Article 50(2) oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations indeed provides thatinevaluating
theeffect ofdumped orsubsidized imports onprices, theCommission shallreview whether theimports
aresoldatprices considerably lower thanthose forlikegoods produced inthecountry, orhavethe
effect ofdepressing suchprices orpreventing increases inthem which, ifsuchgoods hadnotbeen
imported, would haveoccurred inanatural andcompetitive manner.
Fortheir part, Article 3.2oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 15.2 ofthe
SCM Agreement provide that"with regard totheeffect oftheimports onprices, theinvestigating
authorities shallconsider whether there hasbeenasignificant price undercutting bytheimports as
compared withthepriceofalikeproduct oftheimporting Member, orwhether theeffect ofsuchimports
isotherwise todepress prices toasignificant degree orprevent priceincreases, which otherwise would
haveoccurred, toasignificant degree".
Thewording oftheVenezuelan Regulations isfully consistent with thatused inthe
WTO Anti-Dumping andSCM Agreements. Moreover, theVenezuelan Regulations gofurther than
theAgreements because theylimittheanalysis ofunverified priceincreases tothose which would have
occurred "inanatural andcompetitive manner".
47. Elements ofinjury
What isthemeaning ofthelanguage used inparagraph (3)ofArticle 50ofthe
Anti-Dumping Regulations stating that "the Commission may determine which ofthe
aforementioned [impact] headings apply toaninvestigation"? Doesthismean thattheCommission
hasthediscretion todisregard certain ofthespecific impact factors inaparticular investigation?
Ifso,howisthisconsistent with therequirements ofArticle 3.4oftheADAgreement and
Article 15.4oftheSCM Agreement?
Article 50(3) oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations doesindeed provide that,inits
analysis forthedetermination ofinjury tothedomestic industry, theCommission musttakeintoaccount
thesituation ofdomestic producers inrelation tovarious headings which theRegulations themselves
enumerate. Thesame Article authorizes theCommission todetermine which oftheheadings having
todowiththeimpact ofdumped orsubsided imports ondomestic producers oflikeproducts apply
toaninvestigation.
Ontheother hand, Article 3.4oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 15.4ofthe
Agreement onSubsidies stipulate thattheexamination oftheimpact ofimports onthedomestic industry
shallinclude anevaluation ofallrelevant economic factors andindices having abearing onthestate
oftheindustry. These Articles alsocontain anon-exhaustive listoffactors thatmaybetaken into
account.
Thewording oftheVenezuelan Regulations isconsistent withthatoftheWTO Agreements.
Thelatter make itclearthatthelistoffactors serving todetermine theimpact onthedomestic industry
cannot beexhaustive andthatitwillbenecessary, ineachcase, toconsider those factors which are
relevant totheindustry concerned.
Withregard totheheadings notincluded among those listed intheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping
Regulations,ashasbeenstated,theWTOAgreementsaredirectlyapplicabletoanti-dumpingorsubsidies
procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Accordingly, inthecaseofinvestigations
involving imports fromWTO Member countries, theCommission willtakedueaccount ofthefactors
listed illustratively inArticle 3.4oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 15.4oftheG/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page23
Agreement onSubsidies, when examining theimpact ofimports onthedomestic industry. Those factors
willbeincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
48. Elements ofinjury: Margin ofdumping
There isnorequirement intheAnti-Dumping LawortheRegulations forconsideration
ofthemagnitude ofthedumping margin inmaking material injury determinations. Intheabsence
ofaspecific provision, howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withArticle 3.4
oftheADAgreement?
Asstated inthereplytotheprevious question, andaspreviously reported, theWTO Agreements
aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after 1January 1995 in
Venezuela. Accordingly, incases ofinvestigation involving imports fromWTO Member countries,
theCommission willdulytakeintoaccount thefactors mentioned intheillustrative listcontained in
Article 3.4oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 15.4oftheAgreement onSubsidies,
when examining theimpact ofimports onthedomestic industry, including those headings notlisted
intheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations (oneofwhich isindeed themargin ofdumping). Those
factors willbeincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
49. Threat ofinjury: Building upofinventories
Doesparagraph 5ofArticle 51oftheAnti-Dumping Regulations apply togoods imported
solely forre-export? How isthisprovision consistent withArticle 3.7(iv) oftheADAgreement
andArticle 15.7(v) oftheSCM Agreement, which merely require examination ofinventories of
theproduct being investigated?
Thecaseprovided forinparagraph 5ofArticle 51oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations
doesnotconcern goods imported forre-export, butrather inventories ofgoods builtupinVenezuela,
eveniftheyhavenotyetbeensoldthere. Thus, thisfactor isequivalent totheoneprovided forin
Article3.7(iv)oftheWTOAnti-DumpingAgreementandArticle15.7(v)oftheAgreementonSubsidies.
50. Presumption ofinjury
Article 11,Single Paragraph, oftheAnti-Dumping Lawstates thatinjury canbepresumed
forimports whose country oforigin doesnotrequire injury testsininvestigations ofVenezuelan
exports. Howisthisprovision consistent withArticles 1and3oftheADAgreement, which require
thatthere beadetermination ofinjury before anyanti-dumping measure isimposed?
Aspreviously reported, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Accordingly, the
Commission willnotimpose anti-dumping measures unless dumping, injury andacausal relationship
have been demonstrated toexist, inaccordance withtheprovisions oftheWTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
However, thisinnowaydetracts from thevalidity oftheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 11of
theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, which provides thatnoproof ofinjury willberequired andit
maybepresumed thatinjury exists, ifsuchproof ofinjury isnotrequired inthecountry ofexport
oroforigin, inasmuch astheAnti-Dumping Lawisapplicable:
(a) TotheWTO Member countries, insofarasitisnotinconsistent withtheWTO Agreements;
andG/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page24
(b) toother countries without reservation.
Asisindicated inthequestion, allWTO Member countries should prove theexistence ofinjury
before being abletoimpose anyanti-dumping measure. Accordingly, theonlycountries thatcould
becovered bythepossibility provided forintheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 11oftheVenezuelan
Anti-DumpingLawarethosecountrieswhichdonotapplytheinjurytest,i.e.thosethatarenotMembers
oftheWTO.
51. Cumulation ofimports: Simultaneous investigations
Article 12,Single Paragraph, oftheAnti-Dumping Lawstates thatsubject imports may
becumulated withimports from other countries thathavebeenthesubject ofinvestigation during
theyearprior tothedateofinitiation oftheinvestigation inquestion. Howisthisconsistent with
Article 3.3oftheADAgreement andArticle 15.3oftheSCM Agreement, which require that
cumulated imports be"simultaneously" subject toinvestigation?
There isindeed adiscrepancy between theprovisions oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law
andthose oftheWTO Agreements. However, aspreviously reported, theprovisions ofthe
WTO Agreements aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after
1January 1995inVenezuela. Thus, inthecaseofinvestigations involving imports fromWTO Member
countries, onlytheeffects ofimports from more thanonecountry willbeassessed cumulatively, in
amanner consistent withtherules contained intheAgreements. Those rules willbeincluded inthe
future amendments totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
52. Cumulation ofimports: Condition ofcompetition
Article 12,Single Paragraph, oftheAnti-Dumping Lawdoesnotcontain arequirement
thattheCommission examine conditions ofcompetition [between subject imports and]between
subjectimportsandthedomesticlikegoodsbeforedeterminingwhethertocumulatesubjectimports
from different countries. Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwillVenezuela ensure the
conformity ofitspractice with Article 3.3oftheADAgreement andArticle 15.3 ofthe
SCM Agreement?
ItistruethattheSingle Paragraph ofArticle 12oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawdoes
notcontain therequirement thattheCommission examine conditions ofcompetition between imported
products andthelikedomestic product before determining whether tocumulate imports fromdifferent
countries. However, aswasmentioned intheanswer totheprevious question, theWTO Agreements
aredirectly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after 1January 1995 in
Venezuela. Thus, inthecaseofinvestigations involving imports fromWTO Member countries, only
theeffects ofimports from various countries willbeassessed cumulatively, inamanner consistent
withtherules contained intheAgreements. Those rules willbeincluded inthefuture amendments
totheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
53. Material injury: Domestic industry
Article 47oftheAnti-Dumping Regulation, when readinconjunction withArticle 14of
theLaw, suggest thattheCommission could decide toimpose anti-dumping orcountervailing
duties based onadetermination ofmaterial injury orathreat ofinjury toaslittleas30percent
ofthedomestic industry. How isthisconsistent withtherequirements ofArticles 3.1,3.4and
4.1oftheADAgreement, andArticles 15.1, 15.4and16.1oftheSCM Agreement?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page25
Asstipulated inArticle 14oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, theCommission examines
theeffects ofimports ondomestic production oflikegoods. However, intheabsence ofopposition
byother domestic producers, theexistence ofpositive evidence ofmaterial injury (orofathreat of
material injury) to30percentofthedomestic industry would beconsidered sufficient foranaffirmative
determination.
Inspite oftheimplication contained inthequestion, Articles 3.1,3.4and4.1ofthe
WTOAnti-DumpingAgreementandArticles15.1,15.4and16.1oftheAgreementonSubsidiescontain
noexplicit rulesconcerning minimum percentages ofthedomestic industry inrespect ofwhich concrete
evidence ofdamage orthethreat ofdamage mustbeadduced asgrounds fortheimposition ofduties.
54. Producers excluded
Article14oftheAnti-DumpingLawandArticle48oftheRegulationsindicatethatexclusion
from thedomestic industry ofproducers whoareimporters orwhoareassociated withexporters
ofthemerchandise under investigation isautomatic. How isthisconsistent withfootnote 11to
Article 4.1oftheADAgreement andfootnote 48toArticle 16.1oftheSCM Agreement?
Itistruethat,under theterms ofArticle 14oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawandArticle 48
oftheRegulations, producers whoarethemselves importers orassociated withexporters oftheproduct
under investigation areautomatically excluded fromthedomestic industry. Contrary towhatisimplied
bythequestion, thisisfully consistent with theterms offootnote 11toArticle 4.1ofthe
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andfootnote 48toArticle 16.1oftheAgreement onSubsidies.
55. Reasons forprovisional measures
Theprovisions oftheAnti-Dumping Law andRegulations concerning imposition of
provisional measures (Articles 19,20,60and61oftheLawandArticles 53and78-82 ofthe
Regulations) donotappear torequire thattheCommission publish anexplanation ofitsdecision
toimpose provisional measures. How hasVenezuela implemented therequirement ofdetailed
explanation inpublic notices ofprovisional determinations, asrequired inArticle 12.2.1 ofthe
ADAgreement andArticle 22.4oftheSCM Agreement?
Itistruethatneither theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping LawnortheRegulations provide the
obligation fortheCommission togivereasons foritsprovisional decisions. Uptonow, however,
theCommission hascomplied withthisobligation togivereasons foritsprovisional decisions, inthe
textthereof, asrequired byArticle 53oftheAnti-Dumping Lawinrespect offinaldecisions.
Ashasbeenmentioned, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements aredirectly applicable to
anti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Accordingly, the
Commission willcontinue itstradition ofincluding detailed explanations inthetexts ofallits
determinations, including provisional ones. Thisrulewillbeincluded inthefuture amendments to
theVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations.
56. Reasons formeasures taken: Arguments oftheparties
Article 53oftheAnti-Dumping Lawconcerning theform andcontent offinal decisions
doesnotexpressly require thattheexplanation ofthedecision include thereason fortheacceptance
orrejection ofarguments made byexporters andimporters. Isthisconsistent withtherequirement
ofArticle 12.2.2. oftheADAgreement?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page26
ItistruethatArticle 53oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawdoesnotinclude theexpress
requirement thattheexplanation ofthedecision contain reasons fortheacceptance orrejection of
arguments presented bytheparties, including exporters andimporters. However, pursuant totheterms
ofreference contained inArticle 18paragraph 5oftheBasic LawonAdministrative Procedures, the
Commission always includes initsdecisions, whether definitive orprovisional, a"concise statement
ofthefacts, ofthereasons putforward andoftherelevant legalfoundations".
Contrarytowhatisimpliedinthequestion,Article12.2.2oftheWTOAnti-DumpingAgreement
doesnotcontain thisrequirement.
57. Access toinformation
Dointerested parties receive access tonon-confidential information submitted byother
interested parties pursuant toArticle 44oftheAnti-Dumping Law before theymust present
arguments totheTechnical Secretariat pursuant toArticle 45oftheLaw? Intheabsence ofan
explicit provision, howwould Venezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withArticle 6.4
oftheADAgreement andArticle 12.3oftheSCM Agreement?
Inaccordance withtheexpress provisions ofArticle 44oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law,
allinterested parties areindeed given fullaccess tonon-confidential information submitted bytheother
parties. Thisruleisapplicable fromthemoment theinvestigation isinitiated and,hence, before the
parties havetosubmit arguments totheTechnical Secretariat pursuant toArticle 45ofthesame Law.
58. Information onessential facts
Does Venezuelan lawcontain therequirement ofArticle 6.9oftheADAgreement and
Article 12.8oftheSCM Agreement thattheauthorities shall inform interested parties of"the
essential facts under consideration" before afinaldetermination ismade? There appears tobe
noprovision addressing thisissue, andArticle 44oftheAnti-Dumping Law addresses only
non-confidential information provided bytheparties. Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision,
howwillVenezuela ensure theconformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?
ItistruethattheVenezuelan lawdoesnotcontain therequirement ofArticle 6.9ofthe
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 12.8oftheAgreement onSubsidies thattheauthorities
shallinform interested parties of"theessential factsunder consideration" before afinaldetermination
ismade.
However,aspreviouslymentioned,theprovisionsoftheWTOAgreementsaredirectlyapplicable
toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995 inVenezuela. Accordingly,
inthecaseofinvestigations involving imports from WTO Member countries, theCommission will
ingood timeinform interested parties of"theessential facts under consideration", before afinal
determination ismade. Thisrulewillbeincluded inthefuture amendments totheVenezuelan
Anti-Dumping Regulations.
59. Negligible imports
Does Venezuelan lawcontain therequirement ofArticle 5.8oftheADAgreement and
Article 11.9oftheSCM Agreement thattheauthorities terminate investigations when imports
arenegligible? There would appear tobenoprovision addressing thisissue intheAnti-Dumping
LawortheRegulations. Intheabsence ofanexplicit provision, howwillVenezuela ensure the
conformity ofitspractice withtheAgreements?G/ADP/W/59
G/SCM/W/68
Page27
Thisquestion wasanswered earlier, under question 44.
Aswaspointed outinthatcontext, itwould benecessary todistinguish between the
WTOAnti-DumpingAgreementandtheAgreementonSubsidies,sincetheycontaindifferentprovisions.
(a) Anti-Dumping Agreement
Article5.8oftheWTOAnti-DumpingAgreementprovidesthatinvestigationsshallbeterminated
where itisdetermined thatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible. Contrary toArticle 50(1)
oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations, thesignificance ofthevolume ofimports isdetermined
notonthebasis ofthedomestic industry, butrather ofatleastthan3percentofimports ofthelike
product intheimporting country. Aspreviously stated, theprovisions oftheWTO Agreements are
directly applicable toanti-dumping orsubsidies procedures initiated after1January 1995inVenezuela.
Thus, now, inaccordance withtheprovisions ofthisArticle oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, the
Commission willterminate investigations where itfindsthatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible,
i.e.accounts forlessthan3percentofimports ofthelikeproduct inVenezuela.
(b) SCM Agreement
Similarly, Article 11.9oftheWTO Subsidies Agreement provides thatinvestigations shall
beterminated where itisdetermined thatthevolume ofdumped imports isnegligible. Unlike the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, theSCM Agreement doesnotestablish anyprecise volume forconsidering
whether imports ofsubsidized goods aresignificant. Thus, theprovision contained inArticle 50(1)
oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Regulations goesfurther thantheAgreement andestablishes a
percentage fordetermining thesignificance ofimports, using thedomestic industry producing likegoods
asabenchmark.
60. Extension ofdefinitive duties
UnderwhatconditionsmaytheCommissionextendanti-dumpingandcountervailingduties,
orundertakings,beyondthefive-yearmaximumperiod,pursuanttoArticle57oftheAnti-Dumping
Law? Howarethese conditions consistent withtheprovisions ofArticle 11oftheADAgreement
andArticle 21oftheSCM Agreement?
Thisquestion wasanswered earlier, under question 40.
Inaccordance withtheprovisions ofArticle 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Law, when
thedefinitive countervailing duties expire, theCommission mayextend thedefinitive duties imposed
foruptoafurther fiveyears. However, forthistooccur, theinterested party mustfileanapplication
before theoriginal duties expire, inwhich casetheCommission would open anewinvestigation,
providing allinterested parties withtheopportunity topresent theirarguments andevidence, withthe
aimofdetermining whether theexpiry oftheduties would onceagain giverisetoinjury orathreat
ofinjury tothedomestic industry.
Article 57oftheVenezuelan Anti-Dumping Lawisnotonlyconsistent withtheprovisions
ofArticle 11.3oftheWTO Anti-Dumping Agreement andArticle 21.3oftheAgreement onSubsidies
butinvarious respects goesbeyond whatcould beagreed within theWTO. Firstly, theCommission
canonlyextend theduration oftheduties attherequest oftheinterested party andnotexofficio .
Secondly, theduties maybeextended onlyonce.