RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/AG/NG/R/5
22 March 2001
(01-1389)
Committee on Agriculture
Special Session
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION
HELD ON 5-7 FEBRUARY 2001
Note by the Secretariat
1. As agreed by the General Council at its meeting of 7-8 February 2000 the negotiations under
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture on continui ng the reform process of agriculture trade were
conducted in a Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture (WT/GC/M/53 paragraph 3.28
refers).  The fifth such meeting took place on 5-7 February 2001 under the Chairmanship of
Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales of Peru.
2. The present report provides a detailed summary of the Committee's discussions on substantive
matters under the relevant agenda items and should be read in conjunction with the short factual
report to the General Council on the meeting as a whole by the Chairman (G/AG/NG/5, copy
attached).  Unless otherwise stated, all references to documents refer to the G/AG/NG/- series.
3. The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/1471 was adopted.
NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS
(a) European Communities Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal (NG/W/90)
4. The representative of the European Communities noted that many of the positions put forward
so far in the negotiations were aimed at exporters exporting more and importers importing less.  Suchpositions were irreconcilable and would not lead to results which would benefit all countries.  The
EC's proposal suggested that a broad general round of trade negotiations was necessary to facilitate
solutions on agriculture, and secondly that the agriculture negotiations had to be based on the
principles outlined in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  On market access the EC proposed
using the same type of formula as had been used in the Uruguay Round for tariff reductions,
improving the rules for tariff quota administration and that tariff reductions should result in real
access opportunities for products whose reputation was linked to their origin.  On export competition
he pointed out that the EC was prepared to negotiate reductions in export subsidies only if other
measures affecting export competition were also subjected to equivalent disciplines.  The current
structure of domestic support classifications should be maintained although further reductions inAmber Box commitments were possible.  Non-trade concerns would have to be addressed for a
successful reform process such as those linked to the multifunctional role of agriculture and concerns
related to food safety and the reasonable treatmen t of animals.  Regarding special and differential
treatment he pointed out that all Members, particularly developing country Members, should be able
to benefit from participation in world trade and the EC was committed to providing tariff free accessfor essentially all products from least-developed countries.  In addition, the EC was prepared to
consider ways to give greater security to preferences to developing countries and for flexibility in the
rules on internal support and, in some cases, to greater time to adapt to freer trade.  However, he
warned against the idea that developing countries should opt out of further agricultural trade
liberalization as trade, both imports and exports, increased wealth.  Increasing trade restrictions
between developing countries or between develope d and developing countries would only limit this
potential.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 2
5. MERCOSUR and its associated states along with  Pakistan, Australia, South Africa, Canada,
New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, the United States, Cost Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Guatemala, India, Sri Lanka and Namibia stated they had hoped to see more
progress although some of them noted that the proposal showed the EC were taking the negotiations
seriously.  In particular, they stated that the tariff reduction method proposed would not reduce tariff
peaks or escalation.  Along with Mexico, they noted that some of the concerns raised in the proposal,such as food safety, food quality, geographical indications and animal welfare, were not for the
agriculture negotiations. MERCOSUR noted that these measures often resulted in more restricted
market access and Canada stated that it could not agree to measures that would result in reducing
consumer choice.  MERCOSUR and its associated states along with New Zealand noted that the
objective set out in Article 20 was a fair and market orientated agricultural trading system which the
EC seemed to want to change by suggesting a balance was needed between trade and non-trade
concerns.  Canada and New Zealand stated that the negotiations should concentrate on the effects ofstate trading enterprises and that it did not want to see any increase in notifications, especially ones
that required confidential commercial information.
6. On behalf of MERCOSUR and its associated states (Chile and Bolivia) the representative of
Paraguay pointed out that MERCOSUR and the Cair ns Group had proposed the elimination of all
forms of export subsidies.  It also suggested that the EC's conditions concerning negotiations on theGreen Box and Blue Box were not acceptable.  Paraguay also felt that non-trade concerns applied to
all types of human activity, with the exception of animal welfare.  As for the Peace Clause, he stated
that this was not for negotiations as it was due to expire at the end of 2003.
7. Argentina (NG/W/108) asked the EC to clarify the suggested formula for tariff reductions as
it was not clear if the formula was the same as that used in the Uruguay Round or a formula of thesame kind. Argentina agreed that the rules on tariff quotas should be examined but it also wanted to
phase out tariff quotas by increasing their volume and reducing tariff rates.  The special safeguard had
been part of tariffication and was no longer needed, especially as it had been abused as seen in the
Committee on Agriculture.  It noted that the EC was not suggesting the elimination of export
subsidies all forms of which Argentina wanted eliminated.  On domestic support Argentina pointedout that the OECD had shown that over half of subsidies in developed countries were exempt from
reduction commitments.  This could mean that preserving the concept of the Green, Blue and Amber
Boxes meant reductions would apply to less than half the value of subsidies although it was noted that
the EC was proposing to address non-trade concerns in targeted, transparent and minimally trade-
distorting ways which could give a basis for negotiation.  However, it also noted that the proposalsought to keep the right to use export subsidies and the Amber and Blue Boxes all of which were
trade-distorting.
8. Pakistan noted the EC proposal stated that it needed a level playing field in export
competition and contrasted this with the proposals on domestic support which would continue to
allow some countries to have very high levels of s ubsidies.  Pakistan stated that the Green Box should
not be expanded to cater for animal welfare or other issues raised in the EC's proposal.  In fact the
debate in the November Special Session on the Note on Non-Trade Concerns (NG/W/36/Rev.1) had
shown that the non-trade concerns of developed and developing countries were very different.
Pakistan was also concerned by the mention in the proposal of the precautionary principle which it
felt could be used to implement very strict SPS measures.  It was also concerned by the section in the
proposal that dealt with special and differential treatment as the preferential access suggestions
seemed to be an attempt to create sub-groups of developing countries.  Such preferences should applyto all developing countries and should be made more stable and predictable by incorporating them
into Members' schedules.  Developing countries also had to be given sufficient flexibility in the Green
Box to address their food security and rural development needs.
9. Australia (NG/W/109), supported by Guatemala, noted the distortions caused by the Blue Box
which it wanted abolished.  It, too, wanted better disciplines agreed in the WTO on all forms of exportG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 3
supports and to see that food aid met the needs of recipient countries but it did not accept that
reductions in export subsidies had to be linked to these issues.  The Cairns Group had proposed the
elimination of all forms of export subsidies.  On non-trade concerns it agreed that such concerns
needed to be taken into account in the negotiations but they should be addressed in ways that were
compatible with liberalization and Australia noted the EC had said that non-trade concerns should be
addressed in transparent, targeted and minimally trade-distorting ways.  Australia supported therecognition given in the proposal to the specific needs of developing countries especially food
security and rural development and pointed out that the Cairns Group proposal had also suggested a
review of the Green Box and improved market access.
10. Guatemala (NG/W/113) added that Article 20 was the basis for the negotiations.  It also noted
the EC's proposal stated that non-trade concerns should be addressed in minimally trade-distorting
ways but wanted to know what was the definition of minimally trade distorting.  While the proposals
concerning special and differential treatment were welcomed, Guatemala stated that other elements ofthe proposal, particularly only reducing export subsidies, could cause problems and it pointed out that
special and differential treatment should give real market access.  Tariff reductions would help to
achieve this but it also required tackling tariff peaks and escalation and eliminating export subsidies
and other subsidies that assisted production.
11. South Africa noted that there appeared to be a contradiction in the proposal which stated that
the concept of the Blue Box had to be maintained but stressed the use of non trade-distorting methods
of support to address non-trade concerns.  South Af rica viewed the concept of  multifunctionality with
some scepticism as it seemed to be only an excuse for protectionism although it welcomed the
statement that targeted, transparent and minimally  trade-distorting methods of supports should be
used.  However, it also believed that if the total value of transfers to agriculture was not reduced theobjective of a fair and market oriented agriculture trading system would not be achieved.
12. Canada felt that market access reforms should benefit all by allowing more efficient producers
to participate but the Uruguay Round formula for tariff reductions would not achieve this as it would
not do reduce inequities in market access across different products and different countries.  Market
access improvement for products subject to tariff quotas would depend on the size of these quotas andin-quota tariffs but the EC proposal addressed only administration while Canada believed that quotas
also needed to be expanded and in-quota tariffs eliminated.  While Canada agreed that rules were
needed on export credits and that food aid should meet the needs of recipients rather than be used to
dispose of surpluses it did not agree with the proposals concerning single desk exporters and noted
that no justification had been given.  The EC proposal would do little to reduce support.  Canadawanted trade-distorting supports reduced to de minimis levels and the Green Box reviewed and did not
want to see it used to circumvent the rules on domestic support.  The goals listed under non-trade
concerns were shared by a number of Members and should be addressed using targeted, transparent
and minimally trade-distorting supports.
13. New Zealand noted that the EC had proposed that non-trade concerns should be addressed in
a targeted and transparent manner with minimal trade distortion.  Higher tariffs required greater
reductions and tariff quotas needed to be increased but neither issue was addressed in the proposal.The special safeguard should also be removed particularly because it did not require any test of
substantial injury.  The EC had proposed that export subsidies could be reduced but New Zealand
stated that all forms should be eliminated and proh ibited, that food aid should be in grant form and
should meet the needs of the recipients and not damage producers in the receiving country and that
export credits should be disciplined.  Domestic subsidies in agriculture remained excessive and soNew Zealand agreed that AMS levels had to be reduced although it also wanted to see an elaboration
of the proposal to rules and disciplines on the Amber Box and wanted the Blue Box abolished as it
was trade distorting.  On special and differential treatment New Zealand agreed with some of the
proposals such as increased market access and suggested that the idea of policy flexibility could be
explored in the negotiations.G/AG/NG/R/5
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14. The Philippines (NG/W/122) stated that the proposal would allow distortions to continue in
agricultural trade and would not lead to the establishment of a fair and market oriented agricultural
trading system.  While the Philippines agreed that export competition should cover all forms of export
supports and discussion was needed on export credit s, food aid and single desk exporters, it pointed
out that the EC proposal would not deliver a level playing field in agricultural trade, in particular,
because of its suggestions concerning domestic support.  The proposal appeared to give the GreenBox and the Blue Box the same status but one was clearly trade distorting while the other needed to
be reviewed to ensure it permitted only non-distorting supports.  It was noted that the proposal did say
that non-trade concerns should be addressed in transparent, targeted and minimally trade-distorting
ways.  While the proposal did suggest that trade preferences should be made stable and predictable,
the Philippines believed that they should be non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal as set out in the
enabling clause and as suggested in the ASEAN proposal.  It was also noted that the non-trade
concerns of developed and developing countries were very different and some issues like food
security and rural development could not be addressed using the Green Box alone and additional
mechanisms may be needed.
15. Malaysia (NG/W/118), supported by Indonesia, noted that the EC wanted to keep the Blue
Box but Malaysia believed this to be the most trade-distorting form of domestic support, furthermore,
the reduction of the AMS should be on a commodity basis.  While the Green Box could be revisited itwas concerned that some proposals to meet societal goals, such as animal welfare, could lead to
abuse.  In fact the review should be only to meet the concerns of developing countries and the criteria
should be to avoid any distortion of production or trade.  Malaysia agreed with the EC that export
credits needed to be disciplined and stated that the commitments set out in Article 10.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture should be met by the WTO and not negotiated elsewhere and then imposedon all WTO Members.  Malaysia was concerned with the conditionality in the EC proposal between
reductions in export subsidies and other forms of export support.  Export subsidies had to be
eliminated and rules applied to export credits.  Finally, Malaysia noted that the EC was committed to
negotiations on agriculture by Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture which did not mention a
general round of trade negotiations and so Malaysia did not accept that there could only be asubstantive outcome in such a round.
16. Indonesia (NG/W/115) added that it support ed the proposal that measures taken by
developing countries for rural areas, poverty alleviation and food security should be exempt from
reductions.  However, it was concerned that countries giving preferences should not impose
conditions on other countries and concerning the proposal to give least-developed countries duty-freeaccess for essentially all products it asked the EC to consider ASEAN's proposal on special and
differential treatment.
17. Thailand (NG/W/126) stated that it was disappointed that the proposal did not take account of
the need for substantive reform.  Agriculture trade was still protected and distorted and a lot of
progress was needed to achieve the long-term objective.  Thailand stated that while it agreed on the
need to develop rules on export credits in the WTO, and that food aid should be given only in grant
form, this should not be a precondition for negotiations on export subsidies all forms of which shouldbe eliminated and prohibited.  Blue Box measures are trade distorting but exempt from reform which
was one reason why trade-distorting subsidies had not been reduced by as much as had been expected.
The special safeguard should only be available to developing countries to assist them in their reform
efforts.  Overall, the aim of the reform process was to liberalize trade in agriculture which meant non-
trade concerns should be addressed through target ed, transparent and non trade-distorting measures.
For developing countries, special and differential treatment should exempt measures needed to
address food security and poverty alleviation and Thailand supported the "Everything but Arms"
initiative of the European Commission but it did not  want to see developing countries divided into
different classes.  The Peace Clause should be allowed to expire as it could not exist while markets
were still very distorted.  Finally, Thailand hoped to see the EC become not only one of the world'sbiggest exporters of agriculture products but also one of the world's biggest unsubsidized exporters.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 5
18. Colombia did not accept that Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture required a broad
round of trade negotiations to achieve reform.  While it accepted that the administration of tariff
quotas was important, this was not enough to guarantee improvements in market access opportunities
and tariff quotas needed to be increased and in-quota tariff rates reduced.  The special safeguard
should be kept only under special and differential treatment for developing countries.  Export
subsidies should be eliminated and could not be compared to export credits although Colombia agreedthat disciplines were needed but these disciplines should be developed in WTO and not in another
forum.  Colombia also agreed with the proposals for food aid as this should not affect domestic
production in the recipient countries.  The structure for domestic support in the Agreement on
Agriculture reflected developed countries' concerns and maintaining it would only perpetuate the
existing inequalities by leaving the Blue Box in existence and not reforming the Green Box.
Similarly, the Peace Clause should not be extended as it restricted the right to retaliate against trade-
distorting subsidies.  Colombia noted that the EC  was the biggest market in the world for products
from developing countries but pointed out that this market was not growing which contradicted the
Uruguay Round objective of improving market access, especially for tropical products.  Finally,
special and differential treatment should be reflected in measures that were really useful for
developing countries which meant increasing the de minimis  limits was not essential as most
developing countries did not have the resources to use this measure.
19. In making his preliminary comments, the representative of Mexico noted that it had already
stated its position concerning export competition and it did not agree to any conditionality being
attached to reductions.  The Green Box however, should be maintained as it provided a direction for
reform towards less trade distorting supports and it believed that developing countries should be able
to use measures that were exempt from reduction commitments in order to address their developmentneeds.  Mexico did not consider some of the issues outlined in the proposal as non-trade concerns to
be positive, particularly environmental measures as these were already covered by Annex 2, while
poverty alleviation and rural development corresponded to issues that should be covered by special
and differential treatment.  Mexico agreed with others' statements that non-trade concerns should be
addressed in ways that did not undermine trade liberalization.  Like special and differential treatment,preferential market access should be granted by developed countries to all developing countries
without discrimination.
20. The United States had hoped to see the EC propose the elimination of export subsidies and
substantial reductions in tariffs and protection.  It also felt that there was no need to duplicate work by
including issues dealt with elsewhere in the WTO or in other institutions such as the Food Aid
Convention.  In keeping with progressive reform  it was necessary to move beyond transitional
measures such as the Blue Box.  The United States agreed with the proposals on state trading
enterprises.
21. Costa Rica agreed with the statements made by  other members of the Cairns Group and noted
in particular that export subsidies and the Blue Box should be eliminated, that the Peace Clause
should not be renewed and the Green Box examined to ensure that it covered only non or minimally
trade-distorting subsidies.
22. On behalf of the Dominican Republic and Honduras, the representative of Honduras
(NG/W/129) stated that developing countries should not have to reduce tariffs unless trade distortions
were removed.  While agreeing that tariff quota administration had to be addressed it was also
suggested that tariffs, both within and outside tariff quotas, had to be reduced and tariff quotas should
be based on specific products.  The special safeguard should be reserved for developing countries.The objective of the negotiations should be the elimination of export subsidies although it was agreed
that disciplines were needed on export credits although these should be negotiated in the WTO.  The
existing disciplines on domestic support were not sufficient and all domestic supports should be
brought under a single heading which would improve the structure and lessen the administrative
burden on developing countries while developed c ountries would have to reduce their levels ofG/AG/NG/R/5
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support.  While non-trade concerns were legitimate for all countries they should not be used by
developed countries as an excuse for avoiding reform.  While the proposals on special and differential
treatment were noted it was felt that they did not offer enough scope for developing countries to
participate fully in international trade.  The concentration on preferences was considered to be
positive but it was felt that these should be broadened into commitments and reserved for developing
countries.  While developing and least-developed countries required real market access, developingcountries also needed the flexibility to protect themselves from subsidized exports and to recover
from natural disasters.
23. India (NG/W/114) stated that it was pleased to note those elements of the EC's proposal
concerning improvements in market access for developing countries while giving time to the most
vulnerable to adapt but was curious concerning the proposed categorization of developing countries.
India noted that in many areas the EC appeared to be trying to maintain the status quo or was offering,
for developing countries, only minimal improvements on the Uruguay Round.  It pointed out that theproposals on de minimis were not useful when compared with the very high levels of support provided
by developed countries that would continue to be exempt from de minimis  limits under the proposal.
While India accepted that the Green Box should be reviewed, this review should be aimed at
preventing circumvention or abuse of other domes tic support commitments or allowing countries to
transfer their support from other categories.  The Blue Box should be eliminated.  While tariff quotaadministration did need to be examined, and such an examination should ensure that small developing
country exporters were able to avail of tariff quotas, this was not enough.  India stated that the non-
trade concerns of developing countries could not be compared to those of developed countries and the
concept of multifunctionality and referred to its earlier comments on the paper on non-trade concerns
(see NG//R/4 paragraph 38 and NG/W/70).
24. Sri Lanka (NG/W/124) noted that it was partly due to preferences that it was the biggest
market for exports from developing countries and for all developing countries to benefit better market
access was needed.  However, time to adapt alone was not sufficient and definite and operational
special and differential treatment was also needed.  While Sri Lanka accepted that each country had
specific non-trade concerns it felt that developing country concerns on issues such as subsistencefarming, rural development and rural employment, which required special flexibility, and the EC
proposal in this regard was welcome.  However, overall, the proposal would not create a level playing
field.  Sri Lanka suggested that the EC consider the development box idea put forward in the proposal
by the group of developing countries (NG/W/13) in addition to its suggestions on special and
differential treatment.  In stating that developing countries with low tariffs should not be required toreduce their tariffs further, Sri Lanka stated that such a situation was permitted under Article XXVIII
bis on tariff negotiations. Sri Lanka agreed that food aid should be given in grant form and should not
damage local production while the Marrakesh Decision on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing
Developing Countries should be made operational by creating a fund for productivity and
infrastructure improvements.  In developing rules on export credits, special treatment should be given
for least developed and net food-importing developing countries as envisaged under paragraph 4 of
the NFIDC Decision.  Although Sri Lanka agreed that  geographical indicators should be developed, it
felt that the special agricultural safeguard should be available only to developing countries.
25. Namibia noted that the proposal offered to reduce tariffs, improve tariff quota administration
and reduce export subsidies but that it had some negative aspects as well as it would also allow some
of the inequities of the existing system to continue .  Namibia agreed that food aid should be given in
grant form and in ways that benefited the recipient countries but it felt that the criteria for such aidshould be drawn up before a list of recipient countries was drawn up.  On domestic support it noted
that the Amber and Blue Boxes were trade and production distorting and should be abolished,
especially as they were of no use to developing countries that could not afford to use them anyway.
For Namibia, non-trade concerns were food insecurity, unemployment and poverty and it contrasted
these with the list included in the proposal.  Measures should be developed that addressed thesedifferent sets of concerns in different ways.G/AG/NG/R/5
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26. A number of delegations welcomed and largely supported the EC's proposal including
Hungary (on behalf of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), Cyprus, Korea, Japan, Poland,
Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Norw ay, CARICOM, Swaziland, Fiji and Ma uritius that stated that all
Members should benefit from the reform process and that a balance was needed between trade and
non-trade concerns.
27. On behalf of Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the representative of Hungary
(NG/W/131) referred to the proposals by this group of countries (NG/W/56 and 57) and welcomed the
recognition for the unique challenges facing economies in transition and indicated the willingness to
take them into account when new disciplines and commitments were being worked out.  These
countries agreed that the starting-point for reductions in support and protection should be the bound
levels established in the Uruguay Round and with the tariff reduction method proposed by the EC andthe review of rules on tariff quota administration.  However, they also felt that flexibility should be
given to those countries that already had high levels of market opening or displayed extreme
vulnerability as a result of economic transformation.  They also wanted the right to use the special
safeguard especially as tariff reductions were being proposed.  The negotiations needed to address the
issues of geographical indications.  A comprehensive approach was needed for export competition asproposed by the EC.  The Green Box should be revised to give all Members feasible options to move
away from trade-distorting support.  However, to adequately address concerns related to economic
transition affected Members had no choice but to rely on support measures which were more than
minimally trade distorting.  Therefore, for certain types of support these Members wanted specific
temporary exemptions from reduction commitments and the de minimis  thresholds increased.  Thus
they were able to accept the EC proposal provided  it did not apply to economies in transition.  Rural
development was a very important non-trade concern to these countries although the measures used to
address this issue should be targeted, transparent and non-trade distorting.  Finally the Peace Clause
should remain in force.
28. Cyprus stated that it was well balanced and took account of both special and differential
treatment and the need to preserve the multifunctional character of agriculture, particularly
environmental degradation that resulted from land abandonment.
29. Mauritius (NG/W/119) stated that no country should be damaged as a result of the
negotiations.  This meant that the most fragile developing countries, especially small island
developing states, might need special treatment and time to adapt as they had limited scope foradjustment.  It agreed that the Uruguay Round appro ach to tariff reductions should be used again and
that higher protection may be needed to protect production in certain areas.  Similarly, Mauritius
supported the proposal that all forms of export support should be disciplined in a progressive manner
and food aid given in grant form and it stated that specific rules developed to cater for least-developed
and net food-importing developing countries.  Mauritius stated that trade instruments were needed to
address the non-trade concerns, in particular the environment and rural development.  Food safety was
especially important for net food-importing developing countries with limited means for inspection.In addition to the precautionary principle, Mauritius wanted minimum levels of food safety agreed
through the active participation of all countries in the standard setting organizations.  Preferences
were needed for agriculture in Mauritius and to continue to be of benefit development they needed to
be stable and predictable.  The special safeguard should be continued and rules needed for tariff quota
administration.  While Mauritius could agree that th e Green Box should be maintained it pointed out
that it was of little use as it did not have the funds to pay subsidies.
30. Korea (NG/W/117) stated that a review of the Green Box should ensure that it permitted
certain goals to be pursued.  Its views on non-trade concerns had already been expressed in November
and on special and differential treatment Korea shared the idea that flexibility should be provided to
enable developing countries to address non-trade concerns, food security, rural vitality and povertyG/AG/NG/R/5
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alleviation.  The special characteristics of agriculture should be recognized and the Peace Clause
continued.
31. Japan also agreed that the agriculture negotiations should take place in the context of a broad
round.  Fair and equitable rules were needed for agriculture that would permit the co-existence of
different forms of agriculture.  Japan felt that flexibility was needed on setting tariffs on specific
products and tariff quota administration and stated that the special safeguard had been part of thetariffication process which meant it should be retained.  All forms of export support needed to be
disciplines as did export restraints and taxes.  However, such disciplines on export credits should not
hinder food aid while a distinction had to be made between exporting and importing state trading
enterprises with exporting ones providing more data  than at present.  The current framework for
domestic support should be maintained and multifunctionality should not be undermined.  Japan
agreed with the suggestions on special and differen tial treatment concerning food security and the
de minimis  limits.
32. Poland (NG/W/128) supported the statements in the proposal that the negotiations should be
based on Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Poland agreed with the EC on its formula
approach to tariff reductions, and looked forward to a discussion on how to improve the operation of
tariff quotas.  It also agreed that all forms of export competition should be covered in the negotiations,
that the special safeguard should be maintained, that AMS commitments should be reduced frombound levels and that the Green and Blue Boxes should remain as these were vital for maintaining the
viability of rural areas.  Poland also stressed the importance of non-trade concerns should be included
in the negotiating process and included the envir onment, food safety, rural poverty, conservation and
animal welfare under this heading.  Under special and differential treatment the special needs of
fragile economies needed to be addressed.  The Peace Clause should be continued.
33. On behalf of the customs union of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the representative of
Switzerland stated that the proposal showed that the EC was prepared to make steps itself in the
direction of reform and offered a framework for the next stage of negotiations.  He noted that the EC
had similar views to Switzerland on agriculture.  The negotiations needed to take account of
developments since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  On market access Switzerland was stillundecided on the appropriate approach although modalities would be discussed in the next phase.  In
welcoming the discussion of non-trade concerns he noted the concerns expressed by some Members
but pointed out that political considerations had to be taken into account.  The question was really
how the Green Box could be used to address measures that would have no trade effect.  As for
geographical indicators and labelling, he stated that  these issues would have to be addressed as they
concerned agricultural products.  It was pointed out that the Blue Box could help the process of
reform away from trade distorting supports and getting rid of it would only make the process harder.
More information was sought from the EC concerning the suggestions on consolidation of trade
preferences.
34. Norway (NG/W/120) agreed that the negotiations on agriculture would be helped by taking
place in the context of a broader round.  Participation by developing countries and least-developed
countries in the multilateral trading system should be promoted through better market access as thiswas a vehicle for economic growth and helped poverty alleviation.  Flexibility in tariff reductions
were needed that allowed Members to take account of their specific situations.  In addition, the special
safeguard was also needed for protection from import surges or price falls.  On export competition,
Norway agreed that export credits should be covered by specific WTO rules and a discussion was
needed to consider how food aid could be provided  without restricting those in need and to take
account of the specific needs of net food-importing developing countries.  Norway also supported the
suggestion that variable aid for products destined for export required specific disciplines and the need
to preserve the Blue and Green Boxes.  The multifunctional role of agriculture needed to be
recognized.  Market access for products from least-developed countries had to be improved both inG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 9
terms of its predictability and in terms of product coverage, as a first step, by providing duty and
quota free access for essentially all products from such countries.
35. On behalf of CARICOM the representative of Jamaica stated the proposal appeared to address
the imbalances that existed in the existing Agreement on Agriculture.  Market access opportunities
were needed for all countries, including SIDS and small developing economies, and was pleased to
see the emphasis given to the need for time to ad apt and the importance of trade preferences.  He
noted the recognition by international institutions to the need to take the specific situations of small
economies into account.  While market access had to be improved this had to be done without
reducing market access for small countries.  CARICOM was concerned about the coherence in the
proposals concerning special and differential treatment and other elements of the proposal.  The
specific situation of some smaller countries required specific measures that could be catered for by
general rules. CARICOM noted that high tariffs and tariff escalation needed to be addressed and
developing countries needed assistance to produce high quality products.  While geographicalindications were important caution was needed in the way they would be treated.  The special
safeguard was proposed as being continued for developed countries but no mention was made of
making a similar mechanism available to developing countries.  CARICOM supported the proposal
that export subsidy rules should be extended to co ver export credits but suggested that some flexibility
should be given to developing countries.  In addition, food aid should be given in grant form and amechanism developed to enable net food-importing developing countries to use grants to buy food
from other developing countries.  On domestic suppor t he stated that the EC's proposal gave too much
flexibility for circumvention of commitments.  Therefore, stricter rules were needed which took
account of the needs of developing countries.  For non-trade concerns it was necessary to see what
instruments were being proposed.  CARICOM believed that some issues raised, such as animalwelfare, could in fact lead to reduced market access for developing countries.
36. Swaziland (NG/W/125) stated that it was particularly interested in the proposals on market
access as this affected the integration of developing countries into the global economy.  It was pleased
to see the proposals concerning least-developed countries but added that the results should not result
in any developing country being made worse off and noted the importance of ensuring stable andpredictable preferences given their importance to fragile developing countries' economies.  Swaziland
supported the proposal to exempt poverty alleviation measures and the other proposals to give
flexibility to developing countries and that non-trade concerns should be addressed in transparent,
targeted and minimally trade-distorting ways.
37. Fiji supported the statements made by Maurit ius, CARICOM and Swaziland and felt that the
proposal would help Fiji along with other small island developing states.  However, the flexibility
proposed would be difficult for these countries to use, furthermore, it was difficult to separate
production and trade from non-trade concerns and ways should be found to take them into account.
38. Malta agreed that a broad round was needed to achieve balanced results and it stressed the
importance of non-trade concerns to Maltese agriculture.  Malta supported the EC's approach to tariff
reductions, tariff quota administration and maintaining the special safeguard and the Peace Clause.
Agricultural production in specific areas needed protection and aid decoupled from price andproduction was needed to maintain agriculture in some less-favoured areas.  The Amber Box should
also be retained as it was needed to avoid production and price instability and maintain trade flows
with traditional trading partners.  For Malta, non-trad e concerns were a central part of the negotiations
and many non-marketed benefits provided by farmers had to be safeguarded.
39. The representative of the European Communities noted that many Members had accepted that
the EC was trying to make progress with the negotiations.  In trying to clarify some issues he noted
that although a broad round was not part of Article 20 the agriculture negotiations would be more
likely to make progress in that context.  Similarly, the negotiations needed to address issues of
concern to Members in order to make progress.  Although some Members had said the proposalG/AG/NG/R/5
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lacked ambition he pointed out that in negotiations neither the greatest ambitions nor the worst
anxieties would be realized.  In fact, it appeared from the statements that the proposal was not far
from the centre of Members' positions.  In commenting on some specific points he pointed out in
suggesting a repeat of the same type of formula for tariff reductions as that used in the Uruguay
Round had been an attempt to avoid making a proposal that others could not do and which had the
advantage of having been accepted in the past.  He also pointed out that the EC's earlier submissions
on the Blue Box had referred to work which showed it was less trade distorting than other forms of
production related support and that there were effectively limits to the subsidies that could be
provided as the Peace Clause only applied to Amber and Blue Box subsidies below the 1992 levels.
Furthermore, the proposal had said the EC wanted to retain the concept of the Blue Box which left
some flexibility for the negotiations.  He suggested that the effect of the abolition of export subsidies
on world trade would not be as great as some countri es appeared to believe.  On animal welfare he
pointed out that in the context of trade liberalization it was important that progress in this area was notlost.  He noted that tariffs were already very low on most products of exclusive interest to developing
countries which meant further reductions would have little effect while reducing other tariffs would
reduce tariff preferences.  The negotiations should ensure that tariffs were not increased for those
countries than currently benefited from preferences although general tariff reductions would reduce
the margin of preference.
(b)  Japan:  Negotiation Proposal by Japan  on WTO Agriculture Negotiations (NG/W/91)
40. In introducing its proposal, Japan (NG/W/116) noted it was the result of a long process
involving various stakeholders in Japan and consultations with a number of developing countries.
The basic principle underlying the proposal was the need to allow various types of agriculture to co-
exist. In Japan's view, the first step in the negotiations should be an examination of theimplementation of the Agreement on Agriculture based on Article 20(a) and (b).  Japan had
implemented its Uruguay Round agriculture commitments faithfully and was in the process of
domestic agricultural policy reform, including changes in price policy to better align supply and
demand for agricultural products.  It also believed that institutional issues should be addressed in the
negotiations before considering commitments on specific products.  Japan also stated that theagricultural negotiations should be conducted and concluded as part of a single undertaking in a
sufficiently broad-based Round.
41. A number of countries supported some aspects of Japan's proposal including the Czech
Republic, Korea, Mauritius, Norway, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.  The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Norway agreed that th e agricultural negotiations should be part of a
broader Round of trade negotiations.  Hungary noted that although there was no linkage in a strictly
legal sense between the agricultural negotiations and a new Round, in practice the depth of
agricultural reform depended on the scope for cross-sectoral trade-offs.   The Czech Republic, Korea,
Mauritius, Norway, Poland, and the Slovak Republic supported the suggestion in the proposal that the
various types of agricultural systems found in different countries should be allowed to continue to co-
exist. Poland endorsed the main elements of the proposal and expressed an interest in further
discussions of the proposed new safeguard for perishable products.  The Slovak Republic supportedmaintaining the current domestic support framework and negotiations towards well-balanced results
between importing and exporting countries.  Hungary (NG/W/132) highlighted the point made by
Japan concerning the diversity of agricultural production which should be better reflected in any new
reduction commitments and disciplines that was the case at present.  This did not mean fragmented
rules, which should be avoided, but that the rules should not reflect the needs of only a relativelysmall number of Members.
42. The Czech Republic (NG/W/134) endorsed the notion that the continuation of the reform
process in agriculture required support by the general public to produce meaningful and acceptable
results.  It was important that the role of non-trade concerns was recognized and concrete results were
needed in this regard.   The Czech Republic also supported, as reflected in the proposal by a numberG/AG/NG/R/5
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of countries with economies in transition (NG/W/57 ), the call for flexibility in the treatment of
sensitive products depending on countries' situations.  The idea of a new safeguard for seasonal and
perishable products could also be pursued.  While further reductions of subsidized exports were
required, the Czech Republic considered that the rules on subsidized export credits, state trading
export enterprises and food aid also needed to be strengthened.
43. The representative of Korea (NG/W/117) expressed support for many aspects of Japan's
proposal.  It, too, believed that developing countries should have a considerable degree of flexibility
in applying border protection and domestic supports and to develop measures to address food security.
In addition, the domestic support framework set out in the Agreement on Agriculture should be
maintained, with further reductions to be taken from the final bound AMS commitment levels.
Japan's suggestions regarding disciplines on export restraints should be further pursued and he agreed
with the view that involvement of the civil soci ety was needed to attract public support for the
negotiations.
44. Mauritius (NG/W/119) stated that, like Japan, it also pursued the objectives of achieving food
security and ensuring that agriculture was able to play its multifunctional role.  Mauritius did not
favour sector-specific reductions in tariff levels , including zero for zero.  Mauritius welcomed the
suggestions concerning income safety net programmes and payments for relief from natural disasters
given its particular vulnerability in this respect.  However, it, like many developing countries, wascurrently unable to use Annex 2 measures because of budgetary constraints which meant creative
solutions to find possible alternative instruments were needed.  Mauritius endorsed the idea of a
framework for international food stockholding as a complement to existing bilateral and multilateral
food aid schemes and added that existing food aid schemes needed to be strengthened in the short
term.
45. Norway (NG/W/120) agreed with Japan that countries with comparative disadvantages in
agriculture needed flexibility to supporting agriculture, including the possibility of production-based
measures, in order to be able to safeguard domestic non-trade concerns.  However, Norway did not
believe that export competition measures should be part of a long-term strategy to address non-trade
concerns.  Norway noted the sensitivity associated with increases in minimum access for keyagricultural products.
46. Israel's position was to support moderate reform steps.  In the view of Israel, improved market
access opportunities by the developed countries, special and differential treatment and regard to non-
trade concerns, were important elements to ensure a future for small scale agriculture.
47. Switzerland expressed appreciation for Japan's efforts in preparing this proposal and
contributing to a better understanding of Japan's position.  A number of elements in the proposal, for
instance concerning a new safeguard or export restraints, could usefully be pursued in the
negotiations.
48. The EC stated that Japan's proposal was an important contribution to the negotiations.  The
proposal pointed to a number of critical issues, including multifunctionality, which needed to be
addressed in order to allow the process of liberalization to continue.  Although the EC felt that some
of the criticism of the proposal was unjustified, it had sympathy for the concerns of some Membersabout Japan's efforts to increase self-sufficiency.  The EC could agree with the proposals concerning
the Blue Box, food safety and export subsidies but considered that, in addition, disciplines regarding
the abuse of food aid were required.
49. On behalf of CARICOM, the representative of St. Lucia welcomed Japan's proposal and
expressed sympathy for Japan's concerns.  A number of elements in the proposal merited furtherelaboration, including the concept of multifunctionality, although the CARICOM Members were
unwilling to adopt concepts or agreements developed in the OECD.   While CARICOM was pleasedG/AG/NG/R/5
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to note Japan's consideration for predicable tariffs of processed products, it had concerns regarding
the proposed new safeguard and the existing framework of domestic support.
50. Australia, Canada, Guatemala, MERCOSUR and its associated countries (Bolivia and Chile),
New Zealand, Malaysia, the United States, Colo mbia, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa, Ecuador, Thailand and Uruguay had serious
reservations regarding the proposal.  They point ed out that the agricultural negotiations were
mandated under the Uruguay Round Agreements and did not require a broad based round.
Furthermore, Brazil noted that Japan had not indicated in its proposal what it was prepared to offer in
exchange for linking the agricultural negotiations to a new Round.  Many of these countries also
stated that the proposal did not comply with the objective set out in Article 20 of the Agreement on
Agriculture of substantial and progressive reductions in support and protection.  Ecuador expressed
concern about the trade-distorting policy proposals , measures which had resulted and would further
enhance the disarray in world agriculture.
51. Guatemala, along with South Africa, the Philip pines, Pakistan and Indonesia noted that that
concept of multifunctionality had been strongly supported in the proposal and were concerned that
this could be used to justify protectionism.  The Philippines added that there was a risk that
multifunctionality would become a permanent and global feature taking the form of arbitrary
measures and thereby nullifying the advantages of special and differential treatment for developingcountries.  Guatemala stated that it was discouraged by the lack of commitment to reform in Japan's
proposal and believed that, given its economic stre ngth, Japan's arguments concerning food security
were not convincing.  The Philippines suggested that Japan reconsider its proposal, taking into
account its role as an industrial power, as well as the commitments in Article 20 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
52. Australia (NG/W/109) stated that Japan's proposal was a disappointing response to the call for
long-term reform in agriculture and raised questions concerning Japan's commitment to a new round
of trade negotiations.   It was felt that Japan was trying to block, or in some cases reverse, reform in
agriculture even though liberalization would improve global welfare.  Australia stated that other
Members with less interest in reform than the Cairns Group had submitted constructive proposalsrecognizing that while agricultural trade reform might be politically difficult it was of such
importance to many other Members that progress was essential and inevitable.  Australia expressed
the hope that Japan would show leadership in the WTO and engage seriously in the negotiations on
agriculture.
53. The representative of Canada stated that the proposal did not go far enough and more progress
was required to live up to the Uruguay Round commitment to continue the reform process.  Japan's
proposal for a selective product-by-product approach in negotiating tariffs and market access
commitments did not correspond to the objectives in Article 20.   With respect to domestic support,
Canada was open to discussing how countries could achieve their policy objectives in non
trade-distorting ways, while working towards reducing trade-distorting domestic support to de
minimis  levels.  Canada reminded Japan of the APEC leaders' unanimous call for the elimination of
agricultural export subsidies, not merely their reduction as proposed by Japan.  Canada disagreed withthe suggestion in Japan's proposal that exporting state trading enterprises had greater market impacts
than those that importing state trading enterprises and pointed out that this argument ignored the role
and mandate of particular state trading enterprises or the market in which they operated.
54. On behalf of MERCOSUR and its associated countries (Chile and Bolivia) the representative
of Paraguay, supported by Argentina (NG/W/108), Br azil, Chile and Uruguay, stated that certain
elements of the proposal were a step backwards from the Uruguay Round results.  These elements
included the new safeguard on perishable products, the apparent suggestion that Amber Box support
should increase and the defense of tariff escalation.  They disagreed with the suggestion that
agricultural trade liberalization meant that exporter s gained while importers lost.  Furthermore, theG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 13
suggestions by Japan that tariffs should reflect the differences in natural and economic conditions
among Members and that subsidies should bridge the gap between agricultural and industrial
production were contrary to the basic principles of the multilateral trading system.  It appeared that
the proposal ignored the interests of consumers.  It was disappointing that Japan, with its large
balance-of-trade surplus, should wish to increase self-sufficiency in agriculture by reducing imports.
Developing countries in particular depended on better market access to Japan and elsewhere to reducerural poverty and to halt migration into overcrowded cities.  It was suggested that Japan could adopt a
more constructive attitude to help improve market access opportunities in these negotiations.
55. The representative of New Zealand stated that it appeared as though Japan had yet to engage
in the negotiations in the spirit of Article 20 because the proposal did not aim at substantial
progressive reductions in support and protection.  It was disappointing that the proposal failed to
specify measures deemed necessary by Japan to take into account multifunctionality and non-trade
concerns and pointed out that there was no common understanding in the OECD on multifunctionalityas suggested in the proposal.  On food security,  New Zealand noted that better access to the Japanese
market would encourage production elsewhere and thereby significantly increase potential sources of
supply for Japan and stabilize world markets.   New Zealand wondered how Japan could claim to be
treated unfairly by the rules vis-à-vis  exporters, with tariffs on some products greater than 500 per
cent and in addition use special safeguard protection.   On the other hand, the suggestions concerningstrengthened disciplines on measures such as roll-over and per unit export subsidies, and export
restraints were useful.   New Zealand did not support the suggestion that consumer concerns (labelling
and food safety) should be part of the negotiations since they were covered by other WTO provisions,
nor did it support the proposal for a notification requirement for export state trading enterprises.
56. Malaysia (NG/W/118) noted that, while the proposal contained a number of interesting
suggestions including ways to make the concept of multifunctionality operational, overall it did not
contribute to agricultural reform and liberalization.  Malaysia noted the suggestions concerning export
competition but considered that disciplines on export credits must also be agreed within the WTO.
57. The United States welcomed Japan's efforts to participate in the negotiations but was
disappointed that the proposal did not cover reductions  of tariffs and trade-distorting support.  In fact
the proposal suggested higher barriers to trade in some cases, such as the suggestion that tariff quota
quantities be reduced and the application of the special agricultural safeguard be expanded.  Article 20
of the Agreement on Agriculture called for signifi cant reductions in support and protection and the
negotiations could not result in increased barriers to trade.  The United States suggested that Japan
might reconsider its proposal in the direction of the objectives set out in Article 20 for the core areasof market access, export competition, and dome stic support.  The United States supported the
proposals to address to the issues of disciplines on export restrictions, exporting state trading
enterprises, and trade in biotechnology products.
58. The representative of Colombia stated that he had serious concerns about the proposed new
safeguard for perishable products which would have particularly adverse effects on Colombia.   The
special safeguard, as a matter of principle, should be an element of special and differential treatment
for developing countries
59. On behalf of the Dominican Republic and Honduras the representative of the Dominican
Republic (NG/W/129) welcomed the elements in the proposal in favour of developing countries.
However, while food security was a legitimate concern, it should not serve as a pretext for developed
countries to use trade-distorting measures.  She stated that developing countries had not been able to
benefit from the Uruguay Round as expected and one of the most important steps to ensure realmarket access was the elimination of export subsidies.  The special safeguard should only be available
to developing countries as long as markets were distorted by developed countries.  With respect to
export restraints, the Dominican Republic and Honduras considered that the special and differential
treatment available to developing countries under Article 12.2 of the Agreement should be preserved.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 14
60. The representative of India (NG/W/114) agreed with Japan's proposition that it was important
to ensure a certain degree of self-sufficiency in domestic food production and that the negotiations
would need to provide adequate flexibility to developing countries to enable them to address their
specific problems.  However, in India's view the non-trade concerns of developing countries,
especially food security, were very different to those of developed countries.  India was also
concerned about the suggestion that the work in the OECD on disciplines on export credits should beincorporated into the WTO as it was not acceptable that decisions taken in that forum could be
imposed on WTO Members without consensus.  Concerning the suggestion on participation of civil
society he stated that it was up to Members to ta ke into account their views in developing their
positions.  Therefore, India did not support the proposal for giving  opportunities to NGOs to express
their views in the WTO negotiating forum.
61. Indonesia (NG/W/115) welcomed those aspects of the proposal that conc erning flexibility for
developing countries to address their food security needs, but it was disappointed that the proposal didnot offer better access opportunities for products of interest to developing countries.  Although
Indonesia recognized the need to discipline export restraints, it did not support the suggestion to bind
all exports taxes or to exempt certain export quotas from taxation.  Indonesia had applied export taxes
in the past and considered Article 12 of the Agreem ent to be satisfactory in this respect.  While
Indonesia shared the view that biotechnology promis ed to help solve the food problem in developing
countries, there were risks involved which were generally not recognized by the public.  Indonesia's
position was that labelling requirements should not be restricted by WTO rules.
62. Mexico considered the proposal for a new safeguard on seasonal and perishable products to
be inappropriate since Article XIX of GATT 1994 was available and noted that a similar proposal in
the Uruguay Round had not resulted in any specific provision.  Other issues, such as those concerningfood safety, should not form part of the agricultural negotiations.  Mexico stated that it hoped that
Japan's position would evolve in the course of the negotiations.
63. Pakistan welcomed those aspects of the proposal that sought to give flexibility for developing
countries to achieve a certain degree of self-sufficiency but it was difficult to accept this argument for
developed countries.  Concerning export credits and the work in the OECD on developing disciplineson export credits for agricultural products, Pakistan stated that it was not acceptable that the results
should be directly incorporated into the WTO.  Pakistan was also opposed to the continuation of the
special safeguard clause in its present form as long as it was unavailable to most developing countries.
It was also stated that maintaining the current fr amework of domestic support, as suggested by Japan,
could only be supported if it resulted in a levelling of the playing field.  Pakistan was also concernedwith the suggestion that the Gree n Box criteria should be relaxed as it believed that support in
developed countries should be limited.
64. While South Africa appreciated certain elements and shared Japan's concerns regarding food
security, it considered that the best way to improve global food security was by increasing production
in developing countries through less domestic subsidies in, and subsidized competition from,
developed countries.   South Africa expressed the hope that Japan would be able to make a major
contribution towards a level playing field in the agricultural trading system.
65. Thailand (NG/W/126) welcomed the suggestions in  the proposal concerning export restraints
but pointed out that any disciplines in this area would have to be based on reductions in tariff peaks
and the elimination of tariff escalation as these prevented developing countries from establishing food
processing industries.  Thailand saw no need for an additional safeguard mechanism for certain
products and was of the view that consumer concerns on food safety should be addressed under theSPS and TBT Agreements.
66. Uruguay stated that the proposal was seriously flawed and suggested that it should be
reconsidered by Japan.   It was also noted that Japan had benefited from the liberalization of trade inG/AG/NG/R/5
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industrial products where it had comparative advantag e but seemed unwilling to extend this principle
to agricultural products.  It was unfair not to offer better access to the Japanese market so that other
countries, in particular developing countries, could reap the benefits of their comparative advantage in
agriculture.
67. Japan (NG/W/116) thanked delegations that had shown an interest in its negotiating proposal
but it was disturbed to note that the comments of some delegations were based on misunderstandingsor distortions of their situation and overlooked the constructive elements in the proposal that were
aimed at achieving a fruitful outcome of the agricultural negotiations.  Japan's proposal was based on
the long-term objective of substantial and progressive reductions of support and protection as set out
in Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  While Japan remained firmly committed to the
mandate in Article 20, it had refrained from making reference to the issue of reductions since, in its
view, institutional issues should be dealt with before the discussion regarding modalities started.
(c) Canada:  WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – Domestic Support (NG/W/92)
68. Canada (NG/W/112) noted that the proposal set out two additional ideas to those already
contained in the Cairns Group proposal on domestic support (NG/W/35).  First, Canada proposed an
overall limit on all types of domestic support.  This limitation, together with a formula that delivered
major reductions in trade-distorting support, was aimed at ensuring that the reform programme
reduced inequities.  Second, Canada proposed that support meeting the criteria of Annex 2 of theAgreement on Agriculture should be permanently recognized as non-countervailable.  Canada stated
that if programmes in the Green Box did not cause material distortions to production, it followed that
they would not cause material injury to producers in importing countries.  In these cases, the current
rules of GATT Article VI and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures would
prevent such programmes from being subject to countervailing duties and the Agreement onAgriculture should recognize this by making non-distorting policies non-countervailable.
69. The representative of Colombia noted that the Canadian proposal addressed the design of a
formula that would eliminated disparities in the levels of support provided by different countries, an
idea that needed to be further developed.  While it agreed that Annex 2 measures which did not distort
trade should be non-countervailable it also stated that there was a need to revise the specific measuresin the Green Box.  Colombia did not agree that only support above de minimis  levels should be
eliminated but that de minimis  support should only be available as part of special and differential
treatment.  Establishing a general limit for all types of support seemed to be a way of extending the
de minimis  concept both to other distorting support measures, such as the Blue Box and to some trade-
distorting measures in the Green Box.  In Colombia 's view, an essential objective of agricultural
reform was to eliminate all forms of support that distorted production and trade.
70. The representative of Switzerland expressed some reservations for a proposal which appeared
to make the domestic support structure established in the Uruguay Round more rigid.  Fixing an upper
limit to total support could discourage governments from shifting support in the direction of reform
which could block the reform process.  Taking into account the different natures of agriculture in
different countries, such an approach would not work.  However, Switzerland stated that it appeared
as though Canada accepted that the Blue Box should be maintained.  Switzerland supported the non-countervailability of Green Box measures.
71. The representative of New Zealand believed the causes of distortions in agricultural trade and
production had to be addressed.  In many ways the Canadian proposal complemented the Cairns
Group proposals which sought to eliminate all forms of trade-distorting subsidies.  One of New
Zealand's objectives in the negotiations was to ensure that eventually all domestic support measuresmet the fundamental requirement of no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production.   New Zealand was interested in the proposal to maintain the non-countervailable status of
Annex 2 on the assumption that the Green Box co ntained at most minimally trade-distortingG/AG/NG/R/5
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measures.  Such a move would give Members the confidence to pursue non-trade concerns in a non-
trade distorting manner.
72. The representative of the European Communities noted that the proposal to remove disparities
in support among Members would mean some Members would have to reduce their supports by
greater amounts than others.  He noted that even if the same percentage reductions were imposed, this
would mean a greater adjustment in those countries that had higher levels of support.  In respect of theBlue Box, he stated that measures that were linked to production restraints should continue to be
treated separately from Amber Box supports.  If not, there was a danger that similar measures would
be introduced under the Green Box.  The European Communities also believed that the Peace Clause
was a necessary part of any Agreement on Agriculture.  However, it believed that the purpose of the
Peace Clause was not to deprive any country of its rights, but to avoid a situation where the results of
negotiations, as approved and ratified by all Members, were put into question by the dispute
settlement process.  The only cases that should be subject to dispute settlement procedures were thosecases where one Member believed that it was being hurt by the application of measures which
purported to fall within the rules of Agreement on Agriculture, but did not.
73. Mauritius (NG/W/119) noted that Japan had stat ed earlier that there did not appear to be
consensus on the concept of non-trade distortion.  Therefore, it was difficult to determine what "non-
trade distorting" measures could be included under A nnex 2.  Furthermore, it could not be said that
certain measures, such as research, had absolutely no impact on trade.  He reiterated that, like many
other developing countries, Mauritius did not have the resources to use Annex 2 measures and it was
necessary to find alternative support measures to address his country's concerns.  Discussions on the
issue non-countervailability of Green Box support could not benefit only those countries which had
the necessary financial resources to use such measures.
74. The representative of India (NG/W/114) supported the objective to remove disparities in
support levels between countries by using a harmonising formula.  India also supported a review of
the Green Box aimed at removing trade-distorti ng measures and, furthermore, the approach put
forward by Canada of an overall cap on domestic support would help check the practice of shifting
support from prohibited to permissible categories.  India did not, however, support any extension of
Peace Clause beyond its expiry date at the end of 2003.
75. The Czech Republic (NG/W/134) stated that it would be more appropriate to focus on
developing the existing rules on domestic support to take into account the specific needs and
situations of different Members and to maintain the current framework of rules on domestic support.
To establish an overall limit for all types of support would undermine the reform process as well asthe structural adjustment currently under way in a number of countries, including the Czech Republic.
On the other hand, the Czech Republic had some sympathy for the idea of reducing inequities and
disparities in support levels between countries.  The Czech Republic was also prepared to consider the
permanent non-countervailability of Green Box support, but was not prepared to go along with any
limitation on the scope of the Peace Clause.
76. The representative of Korea (NG/W/117) supported the proposal that domestic support
meeting Annex 2 criteria should be non-countervailable.  Korea could also go along with the proposalto review the Green Box criteria if such a review was undertaken in a way which took into account the
needs of different Members, as well as the obliga tion that the measures covered in the Box did not
distort production or trade.  However, Korea noted that each category of domestic support had its own
legitimacy and limits were not applied to the Green Box because they had no more than minimal
effects on trade and production.  Furthermore, he di d not accept the proposal that Amber Box supports
should be harmonized between different Members.  He stated that the best way to ensure a smooth
reform process would be to encourage Members to continue their on-going reforms, keeping in mind
the long-term objective set out in Article 20, rather than to develop rigid rules which gave no scope
for flexibility.G/AG/NG/R/5
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77. The representative of Norway (NG/W/120) supp orted the Canadian proposal that Green Box
policies should be permanently recognized as non-countervailable.  However, he could not accept that
limits should be placed on Green Box support because such support was non-trade distorting.
Similarly, limits could not be accepted for Blue Box as this covered production-limiting programmes
which had only limited effects on trade.  Nevertheless, Norway was prepared to consider further
reductions in Amber Box domestic support, and suggested that support for products aimed at thedomestic market should be subject to less stringent reduction commitments than support for products
destined for export.
78. The representative of Japan, like Korea, stressed the need to keep the current framework of
rules on domestic support.  The Blue Box was needed because it was a useful instrument for policy
conversion from Amber to Green.  Japan could not accept a cap on Green Box support.  Furthermore,
since the multifunctional role of agriculture was closely linked with production, it was very difficult
to make all the supports, which address the multifunctional role, de-coupled from production.  Japanwas concerned that because there was no definition of the word "trade-distorting" the idea of
eliminating trade-distorting measures was arbitrary.  It believed that Members should first focus on
the appropriateness of policy objectives instead of whether certain measures were trade-distorting or
not.   Finally, Japan stressed the need to maintain the Peace Clause.
79. On behalf of Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, the representative of
Cuba (NG/W/129) stated that the current structure of rules on domestic support in the Agreement on
Agriculture had to be modified.  He pointed ou t that in proposal G/AG/NG/W/14 these countries,
along with some other developing countries, had suggested that a single general support box should
be created and disciplines developed for measures within this category.  This approach was needed
because the current Green Box had been developed to address the non-trade concerns of developedcountries.
80. The United States did not agree with Canada’s proposal to include Green Box support in an
overall limit on domestic support.  Since programmes in the Green category were no more than
minimally trade-distorting, capping them should not be the focus of work in the WTO.  Instead, the
United States recommended addressing the further development of Green Box criteria in a way thatwould ensure it covered only measures that had at most a minimal trade and production distorting
effect.  Nor did it accept that limits should be placed on governments' rights to provide certain types
of support such as technical assistance, research and development and domestic food aid especially
when the current negotiations would result in significant reductions in support to farmers through
border measures and trade-distorting subsidies.
81. The representative of Hungary (NG/W/132) did not accept the rationale to limit the use of the
Green Box support although it did support the su ggestion that Green Box measures should be non-
countervailable.  However, he noted that his country's approach was broader than that of Canada's as
it wanted the existing Peace Clause extended because it played an important role in terms of providing
legal security for agricultural policy reform.
82. Venezuela (NG/W/133) supported the suggestion that there should be an overall limit to
domestic support which would encourage reform away  from trade-distorting measures and eliminate
disparities between countries.  However, it noted that there were no specific proposals on special and
differential treatment.  Furthermore, it reserved its position on permanently recognizing Green Box
measures as non-countervailable as this would only serve to further aggravate current imbalances in
the Agreement.  Such protection as offered by the Peace Clause was more appropriate for developing
country programmes directed at non-trade concerns such as poverty alleviation, rural developmentand food security.
83. The representative of Mexico did not believe that it was appropriate to establish a maximum
limit for all countries on domestic support.  He needed to consider the implications of making supportG/AG/NG/R/5
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non-countervailable which in some countries covered very substantial policy programmes.  Like
Venezuela, Mexico noted that the proposal did not cover special and differential treatment.
84. The representative of Canada clarified, in respect of the Swiss intervention, that Canada was
aiming at a major reduction of trade-distorting Amber and Blue Box support, leading finally to the
elimination of trade-distorting support above de minimis  levels.  Furthermore, Canada was not
proposing a continuation of the existing Peace Clause, it wanted it recognized that if the Green Boxonly contained non-trade distorting subsidies, th en these non-distorting policies should be non-
countervailable.
(d) Cairns Group:  WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal
– Export Restrictions and Taxes (NG/W/93)
85. On behalf of the Cairns Group, the representative of Australia introduced the proposal on
export restrictions and taxes.  The proposal called for effective disciplines in this area to be developed
which took account of the special and differential needs of developing countries.  It  addressed relatedconcerns about food security as well as concerns that food importing countries had expressed about
the use of export restrictions and taxes, either for political reasons, or to meet short-term supply
shortages in producing countries.  The proposal also highlighted the link between export restrictions
and taxes and another major market concern, tariff escalation, which discouraged exporting countries
from developing their food processing industries. According to the Cairns Group, targeting andtightening the disciplines on export restrictions a nd taxes would contribute to creating a fairer and
more equal trading system as part of the larger package of substantial liberalization of agricultural
trade.
86. Several Members welcomed the Cairns Group proposal as a useful contribution and
recognized the truth of much of the analysis underlyi ng an area in much need of reform.  Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the European Communities, Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Kenya,
Korea and the United States generally agreed that uncertainty surrounding the application of export
restrictions and taxes exacerbated countries' food security concerns.  Therefore, WTO disciplines
needed to be strengthened in order to increase the reliability of global food supply.  Some Members
also agreed that, when designing stricter disciplines on export restrictions and taxes, Article 12.2 ofthe Agreement on Agriculture should be maintained, as proposed by the Cairns Group, and that its
special and differential treatment provisions should be strengthened or extended, with particular
consideration to least-developed countries and  net food-importing developing countries.
87. The delegation of Japan welcomed the Cairns' Group initiative to address an area which, in its
view, was inadequately covered in the existing WTO agreements, especially when compared withdisciplines on imports.  On the other hand, Japan maintained reservations concerning the correlation
between the elimination of tariff escalation and the elimination of export taxes as presented in the
Cairns Group proposal.  The representative of Japan believed that this matter needed further
discussions.
88. This view was supported by the representative of Korea (NG/W/117) who stressed that the
biggest problem with export restrictions was the ex isting imbalance of rights and obligations between
net-exporters and net-importers.  In this context, Korea expressed the hope that this point would notbe overlooked in the discussions.  The delegate of New Zealand expressed appreciation for the
acknowledgement made by Japan and noted that the Cairns Group proposal responded to the issues
raised by some Members in their respective proposals, particularly Japan and Korea.
89. The representative of Hungary (NG/W/132) stated that he unde rstood the concerns of certain
importing countries but felt that this exercise should not be one-sided and ignore the responsibilitiesof governments of exporting countries for ensuring food security for their own populations.G/AG/NG/R/5
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90. While agreeing that export embargoes should be prohibited, the representative of the
European Communities stated that further consideration might be needed on the question of whether
mechanisms to reduce price variability inside the exporting countries should be allowed. The EC did
not accept that prices would stabilize if all trade distortions were removed.  On rare occasions, the EC
had imposed export taxes in order to prevent internal prices from increasing to very high levels which
had kept prices inside the Communities below world levels.  As a result EC production had notincreased and so the EC had not contributed to subsequent price falls.  As far as developing countries
were concerned, he stated that the approach described by the Cairns Group could help to deal with
food security, but only as part of other measures designed to address the poverty situation.  Even with
no export taxes, fluctuations in world markets could be expected and, in certain circumstances,
developing countries might require more foreign exchange reserves to satisfy their import needs.
91. Colombia responded to the EC's statement on the effects of export restrictions on domestic
and world markets.  While internal prices might be stabilized by such measures instability on worldmarkets would increase as supply was withdrawn in times of high prices thus pushing up prices even
further.  Such a situation only served to further distort world price signals and prolonged cycles of
world price instability.
92. The United States supported the proposal and noted that some countries used export taxes for
supply management reasons, which disrupted markets and undermined food security in othercountries.  The United States wanted export taxes eliminated, especially when applied for competitive
advantages such as differential export taxes, while retaining the option, for certain developing
countries, to use export taxes as a legitimate method to obtain much needed revenue.  The United
States also noted that export taxes and restrictions were sometimes justified as being needed to
overcome tariff escalation, which in its view had to be eliminated.
93. On behalf of Cuba, Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic the representative of
the Dominican Republic (NG/W/129) pointed to the similarities between the market access proposal
from the group of developing countries (NG/W/37) and the Cairns Group's proposal.  She stressed
that trade in agricultural products was increasingly moving towards processed products and tariff
escalation had become a major obstacle for developing countries that were trying to move away fromthe export of primary commodities and into more processed products while, at the same time, trying
to counter the progressive reduction of farmers' in comes.  In this respect, a harmonizing formula
designed to remove tariff escalation and tariff peaks was needed along with an undertaking from
developed countries to fully liberalize market access for processed tropical agricultural products.
94. Argentina stated that there were two categories of export taxes and restrictions.  One was
linked to international prices and, in a way, could be seen as the complement to export subsidies in
trying to stabilize domestic prices.  However, in doing so international price fluctuations were
increased.  When international prices were low, export subsidies were used, thereby increasing world
supply and further depressing international prices.  When international prices increased, export
restrictions and taxes were used, which reduced world supply and further increased international
prices.  The second category of export restrictions was not related to international prices, but to tariff
escalation.  When a developing country faced tariffs which increased as the value added of itsagricultural exports increased, and when no financial means were available to subsidize its domestic
processing industry, the only recourse it had was to tax its commodity exports.  Export taxes
effectively, albeit artificially, had an expansionary effect on domestic supply, and lowered the
domestic price of raw materials inputs.  This enabled the domestic processing industry to compete and
compensated it for the high tariffs it had to pay in its export markets due to the tariff escalation.  Froma developing country's perspective, therefore, addressing the link between tariff escalation and export
restrictions and taxes was crucial in these negotiations.
95. In thanking those delegations that had commented on the proposal, the representative of New
Zealand, on behalf of the Cairns Group, supported the points made by Colombia and Argentina.  InG/AG/NG/R/5
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his opinion, the EC would have to agree that its export taxes increased the world price instability.
Furthermore, by insulating domestic farmers from world price changes the EC reduced any incentive
to change production patterns in the face of changing market conditions.
(e) Switzerland:  WTO:  Negotiations on Agriculture (NG/W/94)
96. Switzerland noted that it was effectively submitting two proposals. The first dealt with the
various issues in the negotiations and the second outlined Switzerland's programme of negotiations.Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture required that the reform process took account of non-trade
concerns, including multifunctionality, and the specific concerns of developing and transition
economies.  Furthermore, an equitable trading system also meant certain elements had to be included
such as geographical indications, labelling (particularly in relation to production methods), food
safety (including the precautionary principle) and measures promoting animal welfare and sustainable
development.  On market access, it proposed that tariffs should be subject to request and offer
negotiations along with an average percentage reduction on bound tariffs.  For tariff quotas, noallocation method should be ruled out in advance, bu t the rules and disciplines required to ensure that
the administration guaranteed market access should be developed, and the special safeguard clause
would continue to be needed.  Domestic support as needed to allow agriculture to provide the non-
trade services required by society and agreement was needed on the instruments that could be used
before reduction commitments were made.  The Green Box should cover most non-trade concernsalthough the criteria might need to be examined so it could be used to address developing countries'
concerns.  All export competition instruments needed to be covered in the negotiations.  The Peace
Clause had to be maintained.  Finally, Switzerland stated that there was no legal or formal link
between the agricultural negotiations and the start of a new round of negotiations a round that
addressed all Members' concerns would favour a more rapid and substantial conclusion of thenegotiations.  The programme of negotiations put forward in the proposal covered three main
elements:  consolidation and broadening of the rules, negotiation of the reduction of the different
forms of support which had a negative effect on trade, and recognition of the new challenges of
agriculture.
97. Australia, Paraguay, (on behalf of MERCOSUR and the associated states of Chile and
Bolivia), the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, Mexico, the United States,
Guatemala, South Africa, Venezuela and Canada stated that they were disappointed with the Swiss
proposal.
98. Many of these countries, including Australi a (NG/W/109), MERCOSUR, Chile, Bolivia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, Guatemala, felt that the proposal put forwardreasons why reform could not take place and to advance a range of modalities that would limit reform.
They, stated that the suggestion that rules for non-trade concerns should be developed first before the
question of reduction commitments could be examined was not acceptable.  Article 20 required
substantial reductions in support and protection while taking account of certain factors, one of which
was non-trade concerns.  Along with South Africa, Venezuela, Canada and New Zealand they felt that
some issues raised in the proposal such as geographical indications, environmental costs and problems
with production methods would only frustrate the negotiations and would not contribute to achievingthe objective set out in Article 20.  The proposal to negotiate tariff reductions through a request and
offer method was considered time consuming and laborious and Australia pointed out that the average
reduction method suggested could be used to avoi d improving market access for some products.  In
addition, the suggestion that an unlimited range of tariff quota administration methods should be
allowed was not acceptable.  However, it was no ted that Switzerland had stated that non-trade
concerns should be addressed in transparent, targeted and specific ways.
99. A number of  these countries, including Colombia, Chile, Canada, New Zealand along with
India stated that although they agreed with Switzerland that all forms of export subsidies should beG/AG/NG/R/5
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subject to reductions they wanted all forms of export subsidies eliminated and could not agree to any
increase for any product.
100. MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia added that they did not accept that the Peace Clause should
be extended or that the special safeguard should be retained in a general way.  They pointed out that
the needs of developing countries had to be taken into account in the negotiations which should
ensure their integration into the world trading system through improved access to markets andincreased flexibility, as suggested in the Cairns Group's proposals.
101. Chile added that it recognized the efforts made by Switzerland to reform and it recognized
that each country had the right to establish its own objectives and that disciplines were needed to
ensure that measures used to achieve social objectives should not harm other countries.  Chile also felt
that the Peace Clause effectively restricted the rights to protection from subsidized production and
exports especially for the weakest and smallest countries and that it should be eliminated.  It was
noted that the list of different categories of countries given in the proposal did not include oneparticular category to which Chile belonged, that of developing countries that did not subsidize their
agricultural sectors.
102. On behalf of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand the representative of the
Philippines stated that special and differential treatment should concentrate on the development
objectives of developing countries.  This meant is was not just about specific provisions but that thenegotiations should also pursue development objectives, for example, by developed countries giving
market access opportunities.  While they agreed that such treatment was transitionary she stated that it
should continue while developed countries continued to use trade-distorting measures that damaged
the development goals of developing countries.  In this respect she stated that promoting the
objectives related to non-trade concerns of developed countries should not be pursued at the expenseof special and differential treatment for developing countries.
103. Thailand (NG/W/126) added that progress was needed towards achieving a market based
agricultural trading system.  The non-trade concerns of developed and developing countries were
quite different.  Developing countries had to address issues such as survival and development of
subsistence farmers while developed countries concentrate on relative luxuries such as food safety andlandscape.  These types of concerns should be addressed at their own expense and the Green Box
already gave room to address them.  Multifunctionality should not be used as an excuse for
protectionism, especially as this, unlike special and differential treatment was not linked to
development.  It could examine the idea that Article XXVIII of GATT could be used as a basis for
developing a formula to convert from tariff quotas to tariff only situations.
104. Colombia stated that the proposal on export subsidies did not reflect the continuation of the
reform process.  Colombia pointed out the difference in the methodologies for calculating the AMS
and the PSE and stated that the AMS was not a measure of reform or of its evolution.  Colombia
supported the statement by the Philippines on special and differential treatment and pointed out that
the measures taken by developed countries to address their non-trade concerns should not affect the
non-trade concerns of developing countries.  Colombia believed that the Peace Clause should cover
only the Green Box and measure for special and differential treatment and that the special safeguardshould not be available to developed countries.
105. Mexico expressed some concern about any conditionality in the proposal such as on non-trade
concerns and reductions in domestic support.  Non-trade concerns were to be taken into account
according to Article 20(c).
106. The United States noted that some elements of the proposal could contribute to the reform
process.  However, it shared concerns about the level of ambition although it did note that Switzerland
had stated in the proposal that measures to address non-trade concerns should not be at the expense ofG/AG/NG/R/5
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other countries.  The United States also agreed that the Green Box enabled most Members to address
their non-trade concerns.
107. Guatemala noted that Article 20 required that non-trade concerns were taken into account but
not that rules and disciplines be developed for them or that domestic support should be negotiated
after them.  It stated that the current criteria in  the Green Box should cover all non-trade concerns and
not just the majority and that the Peace Clause ex pired in 2003.  It did not want to see it continued
beyond then.
108. South African stated that it noted that Switzerland had emphasized non-trade concerns but
gave much less emphasis in its proposal to substantial progressive reductions in support and
protection.  Maintaining the status quo would not help integrate developing countries into the global
economy.  The emphasis on non-trade concerns could allow those countries that had the resources to
address their non-trade concerns to the detriment of those that did not have resources.
109. In making its preliminary comments Venezuela (NG/W/133) stated that the Agreement on
Agriculture had allowed many developed countries to maintain their trade-distorting policies and that
the reform should lead to a fair and equitable system.  It noted that Switzerland's proposal sought to
improve special and differential treatment and to assist the integration of developing countries into the
world trading system but it also suggested that such measures should be transitional and applied on a
case-by-case basis.  These limitations were contrasted with the broad view given to its agriculturalpolicy concerns and the addition of new issues such as geographical indications and other new issues.
110. Canada noted that Article 20 gave clear guidance for reform in the direction of substantial
progressive reductions in support and protection.  However, the increase in support by some Members
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round contradi cted this direction which was why Canada wanted
to have an overall limit to support.  In addition, to seeking the abolition of all forms of exportsubsidies Canada also wanted to see better disciplines established to cover food aid.  The Food Aid
Convention however, covered only a limited number of products and countries and, therefore, such
disciplines should be developed in the WTO.  Canada noted that Switzerland had not presented any
justification to support its claims concerning state-trading enterprises.
111. India noted that there were many similarities between the Swiss and the EC proposals and
stated that it would not repeat the comments it had already made.  In addition to stating that export
subsidies should be eliminated and not increased for any product India asked Switzerland to elaborate
on its suggestion that Article XXVIII of GATT could be used as a basis for transition from tariff
quotas to tariff only arrangements.  India pointed ou t that it, along with Switzerland and some other
countries, had given to the TRIPs Council a proposal on extending protection to geographicalindications to products other than wines and spirits.
112. New Zealand noted that it shared some positions with Switzerland.  It noted especially that
non-trade concerns should be addressed through the Green Box and suggested that leaving Green Box
spending uncapped could be an incentive to policy reform provided the fundamental criteria of no, or
at most minimal, trade distortion was kept.  Although New Zealand was pleased to see the
commitment to tariff reductions it stated that the method of request and offer going product by
product and case by case would not achieve significant reductions.  It agreed that the differencebetween in- and out-of-quota tariffs was important and pointed out that this was why the Cairns
Group had proposed reductions in tariffs and increases in tariff quota volumes, which would also help
the shift to tariff only situations.  In the meantime however, tariff quota administration had to be
examined to ensure the methods used did not impede access.  New Zealand agreed that special and
differential treatment should address the development objectives of developing countries and it wasprepared to negotiate such trea tment in the areas of domestic support, market access and export
competition.G/AG/NG/R/5
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113. A number of countries agreed with many of the points it made, including Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, Korea, Mauritius, the EC, Norway and
Japan.  Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic noted, in
particular, the flexible approach proposed for developing countries and countries in transition to
market orientated economies.  The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Mauritius and the
EC agreed that the extension of geographical indications should be part of the negotiations.  Hungarynoted that there was a certain link between progress in the market access negotiations and the
treatment of geographical indications.  The EC pointed out that this meant access for EC products in
other markets and was not about increasing barriers  to the EC market.  Slovenia (NG/W/123) also
supported the suggestions made concerning production and processing methods, and environmental
costs and stated that results in these areas would affect progress in other areas.
114. Poland noted that the proposal tried to make progress while taking account of the experience
in implementation of the Uruguay Round.  However, Poland felt that in market access it would bebetter to have a basic formula for reduction of tariffs supplemented by a request and offer procedure
rather than the reverse as proposed by Switzerland.  Poland agreed that tariff quota administration
needed clarification and supported the open-minded approach proposed.  It also supported the
retention of the special safeguard, the Blue and Green Boxes and the proposal on export competition.
115. The Czech Republic (NG/W/134) felt that the proposal put agriculture into the correct
perspective in terms of the non-trade concerns it addressed, although the measures that dealt with such
non-trade concerns should not harm other countries.  However, other countries needed to consider the
continuation of the reform programme in terms of Members' commitments.  The Czech Republic was
sympathetic to the suggestion that modalities should be defined to allow negotiations for the abolition
of tariff quotas and that the special safeguard should be examined to see how its operation could beimproved.  It also found merit in the proposal that the rules on measures to address non-trade concerns
should be first addressed before the Amber Box and stated that the specific needs of transition
economies had to be taken into account which excluded a ceiling to the Green Box.  Although the
Czech Republic's position on export competition was known it felt that any doubts about existing
procedures under Article XXVIII of GATT should be clarified.
116. Slovenia supported the approach taken in the proposal to non-trade concerns, especially
measures to address sustainability of rural areas a nd the need to discuss instruments to address these
concerns.  It shared the Swiss position concerning tariff reductions and stated that it was important for
small economies that tariff negotiations proceeded product by product and case by case while taking
account of non-trade concerns.
117. Hungary (NG/W/132) agreed that the diversity of country situations required flexibility in
multilateral disciplines and claimed that the "one size fits all approach" would be detrimental to the
majority of Members regardless of "size".  Hungary supported several ideas and proposals made by
Switzerland including the statement that measures taken to address non-trade concerns should not
harm other countries.  Its views concerning tariff quota administration, the special safeguard, export
competition, a review of the Green Box and the Peace Clause were similar.  In light of recent
developments, and measures taken in response, Hungary suggested the time might have come toexamine the modalities and scope of the precautionary principle.  However, care was needed to find
the right balance between food safety and to avoid it being used for protectionism.
118. The representative of Bulgaria (NG/W/111) st ated that a broad round of negotiations was
needed to help agriculture and to allow all Members to address their interests.  Bulgaria supported the
proposal that reductions should be from bound levels with flexibility to specific needs of Members,including those with economies in transition, as reflected in the proposal from the group of such
countries in NG/W/56 and 57.  Bulgaria supported the proposals on tariff quota administration, which
stated that all forms of export support should be treated in similar ways and wanted the consideration
of non-trade concerns to accommodate the multifunctional role of agriculture.G/AG/NG/R/5
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119. The Slovak Republic noted that it had already made its position clear and concentrated on a
few points.  It noted in particular that all countries had the right to set their own objectives for non-
trade concerns and the proposal on the special safeguard as such a measure was needed in the future.
120. Korea (NG/W/117) shared many of the views expressed in the proposal, including those
concerning the impact of the Agreement on Agriculture on agricultural trade.  In its view increased
liberalization would not automatically lead to achievement of all objectives.  Tariff reduction requireda flexible approach for developing countries, net food-importers and transition economies.  No
method of tariff administration should be excluded in advance and Korea was interested in the ideas
on how to address non-trade concerns thr ough the Amber, Blue and Green Boxes.
121. Mauritius (NG/W/119) also shared many of the views put forward by Switzerland especially
that Article 20 was the basis for negotiations and that each Member had the right to fix its own
objectives and decide on its own non-trade concerns and the instruments to achieve these should be
transparent, targeted and specific.  Mauritius agreed that non-trade concerns were not linked toparticular stages of development and were of concern to all countries both developed and developing,
although developing countries might require different instruments.  The reform process had to give
solutions that would favour the economy, social cond itions and the environment in particular.  Special
and differential treatment should aid developing countries to integrate into the global trading system
this would only be possible if such treatment was linked to the specific needs of countries' diversesituations.  While it might need periodic reviews, special and differential treatment needed to be
permanent.  The negotiations needed to find appropr iate instruments to assist specific needs, including
small island states which faced the erosion of margins.
122. The representative of the European Communities noted that it was possible to argue about
what should be negotiated first but in the end everything had to be agreed and examining non-tradeconcerns first could make room for progress on market access, domestic support and export
competition.  The EC agreed with most points raised by Switzerland including the importance of
special and differential treatment, the need for tariff concessions, initiatives in favour of least-
developed countries and geographical indications.  The need to address all issues related to export
competition, that attention was needed concerning the transition from tariff quotas to tariff onlysystems, that the special safeguard should be retained, although modalities could be discussed, and
that a Peace Clause was needed to ensure that those that abided by the Agreement were not subject to
litigation.  The EC sympathized with the view that  a request and offer approach to market access
might be cumbersome and believed its own proposal of an overall average reduction backed by a
minimum reduction per tariff line would be faster and would allow Members to address their specificneeds.  While the EC felt that detailed discussion of tariff quota administration could deal with what
methods were allowed, it believed that the key was first that administration should not prevent quota
fill which would determine what methods were permissible.
123. Norway (NG/W/120) endorsed a number of elements of the Swiss proposal.  In particular, it
believed that reform should not just avoid harming the environment, but should favour it and improve
economic and social conditions.  Therefore, the promotion of sustainable development and
environmental concerns had to be taken into acc ount in the negotiations when designing the future
rules and disciplines for agricultural trade as was put forward in Norway's proposal.  Norway agreed
with Switzerland that a flexible approach to tari ff reductions was needed and that tariff quotas should
be administered in ways that were transparent and equitable.  Also, there should be no absolute
multilateral ceiling on the Green Box and disciplines should be developed for all forms of export
assistance.  Finally, Norway supported Switzerland’s suggestion that the negotiations adopt acoordinated and consensual approach with due consideration to the interests of all parties.
124. Japan welcomed the proposal as it was aimed at meeting the demands of those countries
whose agriculture policies were in the process of change in domestic policies.  Japan agreed that in
considering tariff rate quota allocation methods no method should be excluded in advance, but ratherG/AG/NG/R/5
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Members should examine the rules and disciplines required to guarantee market access.  It also agreed
with the need for flexibility for individual products  when deciding tariff quotas and tariff levels.
Green Box spending should not be capped as this would restrict opportunities for those countries
currently implementing agricultural policy reform  under the framework of the existing rules.
Commitment levels under the aggregate measurement of support had to be carefully set so as not to
undermine the benefits gained from the multifunctionality of agriculture.  Japan agreed that the totalaggregate measurement of support levels should be negotiated from bound levels.  The existing rules
and disciplines on export competition needed to be strengthened in order to redress the imbalance in
the rules and disciplines applied to agricultural exporting and importing countries.  Japan had yet to
develop a clear position on geographical indica tions or on production or processing methods.
125. Croatia noted the difference in views and background between different countries and felt that
the proposal could be the basis for negotiations.  For non-trade concerns and market access, Croatia
emphasized that the request offer procedure was supplemented by formula although, as Poland, hesuggested it could be reversed.  Tariff quota administration was of concern to Croatia which had
commitments to open tariff quotas.  Croatia was struck  by the size of subsidies paid in Switzerland to
agriculture and felt that the ability of countries to support agriculture had to be taken into account in
the negotiations.
126. Switzerland pointed out that flexibility in negotiations was needed to make progress and to
take account of the different situations facing different Members.  While some Members wanted
complete reform through the negotiations others, including Switzerland, believed this was the second
stage of the reform process which had to be agreed and implemented before a third phase could begin.
Switzerland believed that it was necessary to firs t negotiate the rules and then the commitments so
that Members knew the context of those commitments.  On special and differential treatmentSwitzerland noted that country categories existed and it felt that a single solution could lead to a
disappointing outcome, therefore, it was necessary to consider and develop ideas on how this issue
should be dealt with.  Concerning non-trade conc erns, it noted that some were common to all
countries while some were specific to certain countries. The Green Box should make it possible for
Switzerland to address most of its non-trade concerns provided that there was no absolute ceiling.Specific modalities would need to be defined for countries without sufficient financial resources to
use the Green Box instruments in order to also address their non-trade concerns.  Topics such as the
protection of geographical indications, the problems relating to production methods, and the
internalization of environmental costs would need pr ogress here or in other fora to allow significant
progress in the agricultural negotiations.  On market access, Switzerland noted that the proposal toshift to a tariff-only system was in line with the objectives of the multilateral trading system.  On
export subsidies, Switzerland's proposal for a procedure to be developed whereby a greater reduction
in one product could be compensated by an increase in another product would depended on the size of
the reductions and on other issues in other areas although Switzerland believed that all forms of
export restrictions should be eliminated.  Finally, the Peace Clause would have to be extended at least
for the duration of the negotiations so as to provide a safety net.
(f) Swaziland:  Market Access under Special and Differential Treatment for Small
Developing Countries (NG/W/95)
127. Swaziland highlighted the main points in its proposal which was based on the basic principle
that no developing country should be made worse off by the process of liberalization.  Developing
countries' welfare often depended on the performance of a small number of products, especially in
rural areas.  This dependence meant they were vulnerable to both supply and demand changes and tocompetition on the domestic markets with substitutable products while the scope for improvement
was restricted due to limited land area and distance from export markets.  Agricultural exports helped
the economy through employment, incomes and associated services and delivered positive
externalities such as soil conservation and contributions to tourism.  While economic theory of
competition might be correct to say inefficient industries should close and resources allowed to shiftG/AG/NG/R/5
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to more productive areas, this ignored equity and poor mobility of some resources such as labour.
Many developing countries relied on preferential schemes and radical and rapid liberalization would
disrupt this by lowering investment and export earnings.  Swaziland recommended that current
preferential arrangements should be protected long enough to enable developing countries to develop.
Applying preferences to all developing countries would mean some would become better-off at the
expense of others.  Technical assistance should be provided and tariff escalation reduced to enablesmall developing countries to develop agriculture processing industries and to exploit development
opportunities.
128. A number of developing countries, including Barbados, St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago,
Jamaica, Fiji, Namibia and Mauritius broadly supported the proposal by Swaziland and agreed that
transition arrangements were needed and enough time given for adjustment as preference margins
were eroded.
129. On behalf of Barbados, St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago the representative of Barbados
focussed on special and differential treatment and the integration of developing countries into the
global economy.  These countries felt that no group should be marginalize by the process of reform.
Flexibility in the negotiations was needed to take account of the needs of small developing countries,
especially those that depended on preferences.  Jamaica supported the statement by Barbados and
agreed that all concerns expressed by Members needed to be taken into account in the negotiations.  Italso shared the assessment of the need for preferen ces to overcome the constraints that faced small
developing countries and the need to achieve equity and fairness in the reform process.
130. Mauritius (NG/W/119) stated that it had already noted the vulnerability of small developing
countries and noted that the proposal by Swaziland brought out many of the difficulties they faced.
Their small land surfaces mean they had no real advantages in agricultural production while thedistance to export markets added to their difficulties.  It was the cost of transport that explained why
the exemptions for developing countries under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture were
needed.  A level playing field would not answer the problems facing these countries and their
concerns had to be taken into account.
131. Fiji supported the proposal and noted the similarities between it and those from other small
developing countries that depended on a small num ber of exports under preferential arrangements.
Agriculture was a key activity for the development of small developing countries and it took time to
create alternatives and time to adapt to trading on an open market.  The multilateral agriculture
negotiations needed to find an appropriate compro mise between the different positions to minimize
any negative impacts.  Fiji suggested that treatment similar to that given to least-developed countries
was needed for small developing countries.
132. The representative of Namibia stated that he agreed with most of the points made in the
proposal and that Namibia also wanted to see the negotiations result in improved welfare for
developing countries.  Like Swaziland, Namibia's rural population depended on agriculture.  It, too,
benefited from preferences and the export earnings that resulted from these preferences helped rural
communities and small scale producers.  Namibia felt that existing special and differential treatment
provisions were not really effective and additional measures were needed, such as tackling tariff peaksand escalation, to allow for development.  While supporting the proposal Namibia highlighted two
areas which it felt needed more attention:  food security, which for Namibia was a crucial concern for
developing countries, and productivity as some countries had large surface areas but low productivity.
133. Kenya also pointed out that many of the problems highlighted in the proposal applied to other
African countries that were not defined as small.  Kenya's applied tariffs were well below its ceilingbindings but it had experienced problems with substandard and subsidized products being dumped on
its markets.  These imports of subsidized products were damaging domestic production and Kenya
referred to its submission WT/GC/W/233 to the General Council in the preparations for the 1999G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 27
Ministerial Conference.  Export credit, guarantee and insurance schemes had a similar effect to direct
export subsidies and companies with market power could also distort markets.  For its exports, Kenya
found they continued to face high tariffs and tariff escalation in its export markets in addition to
problems associated with SPS measures.  Kenya did benefit from preferential access but substantial
reductions in MFN rates could erode this advantage.  It believed that all countries had to participate in
liberalization for developing countries to benefit.  Furthermore, a fundamental review of special anddifferential treatment was needed as it was more than just longer time-frames or lower commitments
and should target shortcomings in terms of supply capacity, economic development and financial
resources as well as issues like food insecurity and rural poverty.  The proposal by the group of
developing countries on the development box (NG/W/13) should be taken into account.  Kenya
suggested that a number of issues could be added to Swaziland's proposal including better market
access for products of interest to developing countries, elimination of all trade-distorting measures
used by developed countries, establishment of a food security or development box which couldinclude policy flexibility to address different concerns, technical co-operation to meet SPS standards,
the end of the Peace Clause in 2003 and products that did not comply with national standards should
not be sold for export.  Finally Kenya suggested that the negotiations should take account of the three
proposals by the group of developing countries of  which it was a member (NG/W/13, 14 and 37).
134. Other delegations recognized the difficulties facing small developing countries and suggested
ways in which their concerns could be incorporated into the negotiations.  These countries included
MERCOSUR and associated countr ies (Bolivia and Chile), New Zealand, Canada, Japan, the EC,
Hungary and the United States.  MERCOSUR and it s associated states, New Zealand and Canada,
stressed the need to improve market access.  New Zealand and Canada also noted that some
developing countries might need some time to adapt to changes in the agricultural trading
environment.  Hungary (NG/W/132) stated that the proposal argued rather convincingly for special
treatment of small developing countries which should be taken into account in the negotiations.  The
United States stated that it would examine the propo sal carefully and noted that it would continue to
provide preferences itself.  In the long run however, these would be eroded but it was prepared to
work with other Members to prepare for this eventuality.
135.  On behalf of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile the representative of Paraguay agreed with
some of the suggestions in the proposal especially the need to concentrate on improving market access
and some of the references to special and differential treatment.  He pointed out that some of the
countries on whose behalf he was speaking were familiar with some of the other problems raised by
Swaziland, such as those associated with being a landlocked state.  However, he pointed out thatalthough non-reciprocal agreements did give better ma rket access, experience had shown that this was
sometimes at the expense of other developing countries.  Bolivia supported the statement by the
representative of Paraguay and agreed with Swaziland concerning the disadvantages of being a
landlocked country.  Bolivia stated that the negotiations should not introduce new categories of
countries but the special characteristics of countries should be taken into account in the negotiations,
including how to mitigate any negative effects that might arise.
136.  New Zealand agreed on the need to integrate developing countries into the world trading
system and suggested that the key lay in improved market access.  This was prevented by high levels
of protection, export subsidies and other practices in some developed countries and, like Swaziland,
New Zealand hoped these would be brought to an end.
137. Canada agreed that transition measures might be needed and noted the concerns expressed by
some developing countries that special and differential treatment for one group of countries shouldnot harm other developing countries.  In both de veloped and developing countries investment was
based on existing trade patterns which meant change would not happen quickly but it was important
to move in the right direction towards a more level playing field.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 28
138. South Africa agreed that no developing country should be made worse off as a result of the
negotiations but pointed out that if reform was not achieved in the direction set out in Article 20 most
developing countries would be worse off.  Special provisions were needed to ensure that those
countries that currently enjoyed preferential arrangements also benefited but a level playing field was
the key to agricultural development in many deve loping countries.  South Africa looked forward to
working with its partners in the Southern African Development Community in the negotiations.
139. The representative of the European Communities stated that the proposal from Swaziland was
constructive and practical.  The analysis in the proposal underlined the need for the negotiations to
take account of the situation of developing countries and to work towards the goals of ensuring that
special and differential treatment provisions were accessible to low and middle income countries and
towards a recognition of their non-trade concerns.
140. Norway (NG/W/120) noted that the proposal sh owed the challenges facing many developing
countries.  The reform process should support the development needs of developing countries andMembers should bear in mind the differences between different developing countries some of which
faced many constraints and which needed flexibility in national policy design.  Norway supported the
suggestion that the right to use the special safeguard should be extended to all developing countries.
141. The representative of Japan noted that the proposal showed the importance of non-trade
concerns to both developed and developing countries.  He stated that the negotiations should takeaccount of non-trade concerns and special and differential treatment as required by Article 20 and
supported the idea that flexibility was needed to allow different agriculture systems to co-exist.  In
this regard Japan felt that uniform special and differential treatment would be limited in addressing
the needs of developing countries.  He suggested that Members should consider carefully whether
putting small developing countries in a separate category was an effective way to address their needs.Japan recognised that the implementation of the Uruguay Round suggested that improved market
access would not benefit many developing countries.
142. Swaziland noted that it was now necessary to wo rk on concrete proposals on how special and
differential treatment could be applied to the small developing group of countries.  He noted that food
security was particularly important for net food-importers.  While export earnings could improve thecapacity to import food, food security especially for net food-importing countries remained a concern.
Swaziland hoped that as the negotiations went forward more attention would be given to issues of
relevance to small developing countries.
(g) Mauritius:  WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (NG/W/96)
143. Mauritius (NG/W/119) introduced its proposal pointing out that it had been developed from
the perspective of a small island developing state that was a single commodity exporter and a net
food-importer.  It was seeking a balance between trade and non-trade concerns as a result was needed
that addressed all concerns.  Mauritius pointed out that the constraints facing SIDS were structural
and permanent and they would never be able to be co mpetitive despite their best efforts.  Therefore, a
market only approach was not suitable and non-trade concerns had to be emphasized.  Mauritius noted
that developing countries' share of exports remained at about 30 per cent, SIDS share was only 2.5 per
cent and declining.  The outcome of the negotiations should include solutions for SIDS that had toearn foreign exchange in order to import their food needs.
144. A number of other small island developing states agreed with some elements of the proposal.
Fiji stated that some of the suggestions in the proposal would allow small developing countries,
including SIDS, to avoid marginalization.  Fiji also noted that the EC proposal and statements by the
United States would reaffirm their preferences.  Fiji faced many obstacles to development and itfound it hard to develop sufficient economies of scale while, in addition, it was prone to natural
disasters and other problems.G/AG/NG/R/5
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145. On behalf of CARICOM the representative of Grenada agreed that food security for SIDS
required export earnings and some exemptions from liberalization and access to technology.  He
reiterated that non-trade concerns should be addressed in ways that minimized trade distortion and
stated that special and differential treatment should be in the general rules and then addressed by
specific targeted measures such as assistance for marketing.  While CARICOM recognized the basis
for the suggestion that some sensitive products should be exempt from market access concessions, hepointed out such exemptions should limited in time as they could have long run implications for
competitiveness.  On market access he noted that trade preferences should be predictable although
non-tariff measures, such as rules of origin, could make market access difficult.  Some other
suggestions in the proposal could be elaborated such as the special safeguard, and suggestions on
domestic support.  Finally, he noted that the paper raised some important cross-linkages between
different areas such as export taxes and food security.
146. A number of developing countries gave some support to the proposal but felt that many of the
issues applied to more countries than SIDS.  These countries included Swaziland, Sri Lanka, Namibia,
India (NG/W/114) and Kor ea.  India empathised with the proposal but noted that it sought a broader
dispensation to cover countries that had large numbers of small vulnerable farms.
147. Swaziland (NG/W/125) noted that most of the issues raised in the proposal applied to small
developing states generally and he highlighted a few:
− Flexibility was needed to enable developing countries to address their non-trade
concerns.
− Effective instruments were needed under  special and differential treatment and
technical co-operation to enable developing countries to become more competitive.
− Predictable market access opportunities and guaranteed prices were needed for
exports although developing countries should be able to exclude sensitive productsfrom commitments on market access and domestic supports.
148. Sri Lanka (NG/W/124) stated that most developing countries had not benefited from the
Uruguay Round and therefore needed better special and differential treatment.  In particular, food
security could be improved through the combination of measures in the proposal such as ensuring
stable export earnings and creating food reserves.
149. In making some preliminary comments the representative of Namibia stated that he agreed
that on non-trade concerns each country had different concerns and so the instruments availableshould differ.  However, in other areas Namibia expressed some doubts such as the idea of having
international food reserves, excluding some products from commitments (especially from
commitments on export subsidies).  Namibia wanted to see market access opportunities improved to
allow increased market share and to allow greater diversity of exports;  technical co-operation to meet
sanitary and phytosanitary standards was needed to help countries achieve these goals.
150. Korea (NG/W/117) noted that the proposal covered many issued it found important.  It stated
that Members needed to allow the co-existence of di fferent patterns of farming by allowing Members
flexibility to address their concerns.  Special and differential treatment was needed to enable
developing countries to improve their competitiveness and to alleviate rural poverty.  Korea shared
some of the suggestions including exemption of  certain products from commitments and the Peace
Clause.
151. Some developed countries also supported many elements of the proposal, including Poland,
Norway, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Japan.  Poland supported some elements especially the
idea that different agriculture systems should be able to co-exist and that different countries needed to
be able to use different mechanisms to address their specific non-trade concerns.  Poland also sharedG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 30
the idea that further liberalization would have to take account of the needs of fragile economies.
Hungary (NG/W/132) agreed that the shift to mi nimally trade-distorting support is not only the
question of will, but also of financial resources available, since very often these types of support are
relatively more costly to implement.  Hungary and the Czech Republic also noted that other issues
would also affect the negotiations such as geographical indications.  The Czech Republic noted that
non-trade concerns were important to both developed and developing countries and a differentiatedapproach was needed.  He stated that countries with economies in transition to market orientation also
needed to be able to exclude sensitive products from further liberalization and agreed that the Peace
Clause should be retained.
152. Norway (NG/W/120) noted the similarities between the proposal made by the group of small
island developing states (NG/W/97) and that by Mauritius.  It appreciated the need to find solutions to
non-trade concerns based on the agreed rules that would enable agriculture to play its multifunctional
role.  The negotiations needed to take account of food security concerns.  Under market accessNorway noted that most small island developing states depended on a small number of export
products.  While efforts should be made to diversify, market access for their traditional key
commodities should not be eroded.  Norway agreed that SIDS needed to be able to develop the right
policy combination based on their special needs and conditions and that the Peace Clause should be
retained.
153. Japan stated that many of the issues raised, such as food security, rural development and the
environment, were of concern to many countries a lthough the instruments used to address them would
differ from one country to another.  Different types of agricultural systems should be allowed to
continue and Japan noted the difficulties facing SIDS in addressing their non-trade concerns,
especially food security.  It also stated that it understood why Mauritius preferred to keep preferentialaccess arrangements rather than general tariff reductions as these would benefit only a few countries.
Japan also understood the problems facing Mauritius under domestic support and export competition
and agreed that exporting state trading enterprises needed more disciplines.
154. Liechtenstein also understood the position of small developing countries and noted their
vulnerability and the insecurity of the trading environment and its impact on food security.  It wasessential that the negotiations achieve results acceptable to all which meant all views had to be taken
into account.
155. On behalf of MERCOSUR and its associated states the representative of Paraguay stated that
they shared much of the analysis but did not accept many of the suggestions made in the proposal.
Measures that distorted trade should not be needed to solve problems.  It was impossible for Mauritiusto meet its non-trade concerns with measures that cost money but it would help if developed countries
stopped supporting production.  Furthermore, libera lization would improve certainty of supply and
food security.  It appeared inconsistent to argue for both improved market access for exports and for
restricting imports for some products.  All forms of export subsidies should be eliminated and not just
reduced and the Peace Clause had helped in the transition process but should be left to expire in 2004
with no continuation.
156. Brazil supported the statement by Paraguay and noted the similarity between the views
expressed in the proposal by Mauritius and the ideas on multifunctionality put forward by some
developed countries.  Brazil understood the basis for Mauritius' call for balance and the desire to
defend the specificity of agriculture through non-trade concerns.  The Agreement on Agriculture
already included a number of special and differential treatment measures which could be used to
address developing countries' concerns.  Brazil wa s not opposed to preferential arrangements but it
pointed out that when they meant discrimination between developing countries they caused trade
diversion which should be avoided in the negotiations.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 31
157. Colombia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand stated that special and
differential treatment should be more than just longer implementation periods.  Colombia also noted
the proposals put forward by the Cairns Group in this  regard.  However, it did not believe that some of
the issues raised, such as geographical indications and SPS measures, were for the agriculture
negotiations.
158. On behalf of the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand the representative of the
Philippines stated that they supported the suggesti on that the negotiations should deliver meaningful
special and differential treatment but such treatmen t should be for all developing countries.  While
developing countries should be able to use the Green Box to address their non-trade concerns, such as
poverty alleviation, the fundamental criteria should not be relaxed.  Other forms of flexibility should
be covered by special and differential treatment.
159. New Zealand agreed that the modalities that would be negotiated should be flexible to address
the needs of developing countries but did not accept that excluding some products from the processwould help.  However, through trade, developed countries should give a stable supply of foreign
exchange which was often restricted at the moment by high market access barriers in some developed
countries.  It was surprised to see the suggestions concerning export competition as these were clearly
not in the interests of developing countries.
160. The European Communities noted the proposal complimented those by the EC and
Swaziland and raised the issue of how non-trade con cerns affected small island developing states.
The EC suggested that the appropriate response to  non-trade concerns may come from policies that
were targeted, transparent and minimally trade distorting.  Food security was, of course, very
important and the issue would have to be examined in depth in the next phase of the negotiations.  On
market access he pointed out that the particular problems facing developing countries in general, andSIDS in particular, would have to be addressed and that the EC proposal had suggested that
preferences should be made stable and predictable to assist in development of the agriculture and food
sectors.  The proposal by Mauritius showed the importance of progressive reductions in MFN tariff
rates.
161. The representative of Canada agreed on the importance of some non-trade concerns but
expressed some concern about the methods Mauritius to use to address them as they would not lead to
fundamental reform which was the objective of the negotiations.  She also felt that there were some
inconsistencies in the proposal and pointed out that Mauritius had stated that it could not afford
minimally trade distorting ways of addressing non-trade concerns but Canada had found these to be
cheaper and more effective.  Similarly, Canada queried the extent to which food security would beimproved by the suggestions in the proposal.  She noted that a number of developing countries had
already argued that dumping undermined local production and leaving existing distortions in place
would not contribute to their development.  Sim ilarly, Canada could not agree to the proposal to
maintain privileged access to developed country markets at the expense of other countries.  It
accepted that the situation would change gradually but felt that the negotiations should result in
improved access for all products to all countries to permit development in areas where each country
had a real advantage rather than development reflecting decisions by bureaucrats or colonial history.
162. The United States agreed on some of the broader objectives in the proposal relating to non-
trade concerns and food security.  However, it had a different approach to reform which it stated
needed to be substantial and maintaining distor tionary measures was not the way forward.  The
United States would consider how to take account of  the views in the proposal while moving in the
direction of market orientated reform.
163. Mauritius (NG/W/119) pointed out that it was a small island state that really only produced a
single commodity.  While it hoped to produce a greater variety in the future it hoped that someday it
would be able to do so, but this was not likely in the short term.  It noted that non-trade concerns wereG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 32
not the prerogative of any single country or group of countries and that a market only approach was
not suitable.  A balance between trade and non-trade concerns was needed and different measures
were needed in different circumstances.  Mauritius could not use measures that came under Annex 2
of the Agreement on Agriculture but was not opposed to a re-examination of Annex 2 on the
understanding that creative solutions could be found for those that unable to avail themselves of the
Green Box.  A cautious approach to reform of export credit rules was needed taking account of bothArticle 10.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Decision on Least-Developed and Net Food-
Importing Developing countries.  Although some of th e issues raised in the proposal were also being
dealt with in parallel for a some were not being dealt with elsewhere, such as technology, which
Mauritius stated was an important part of the agriculture negotiations.  Finally it pointed out that
equity was not the same as sameness and the negotiations should allow a set of instruments to be used
that would allow flexibility to address different situations.
(h) Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Jamaica, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinid ad and Tobago:  WTO Negotiations on
Agriculture:  Proposals by Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (NG/W/97 and
Corr.1)
164. In introducing the proposal, the representative of St. Lucia highlighted the structural
weakness small island developing states (SIDS) faced in their efforts to retain and improve their small
share of international trade. These constraints included, weak agricultural production, difficult
topography, scarcity of resources, vulnerability to disasters and remoteness from major export
markets.  The result was high unit costs of production and transportation which made it difficult for
them to achieve the levels of competitiveness needed to benefit from new opportunities or even to
retain their presence on international markets.  Furthermore, technical and financial assistance alonewould not suffice.  SIDS needed secure market access for the limited range of commodities they
exported.  In addition, they should not have to provide reciprocal market access to developed
countries in preferential trading arrangements.  Finally it was emphasized that SIDS sought
appropriate special and differential treatment for all  developing countries.
165. Some of the other sponsors to the paper supported St. Lucia's paper.  Barbados had
emphasized the economic vulnerability of SIDS.  A number of studies had shown that small
economies suffered high economic volatility compared to OECD countries.  While the cause had
many reasons one major contributor was changes in terms of trade.  Barbados believed that some
method should be developed to give credit to developing country Members that had adopted relatively
less trade-distorting measures and for those that had undertaken unilateral reforms ahead of, or insome instances in preparation for, deeper multilateral integration.
166. The representative of Cuba stated that the economies of SIDS, in particular their agricultural
sectors, were fragile due to their vulnerability to natural disasters and because of their limited number
of basic agricultural commodities.  It was Cuba's hope that appropriate flexibility afforded to these
countries would enable them to reach a higher level of competitiveness resulting in more effective
participation in international trade.
167. The representative of Mauritius (NG/W/119) st ated that the structural weaknesses of SIDS
made it very difficult for them to achieve higher levels of competitiveness.  A recent United Nations
Environment Programme report had indicated that global warming would bring significant losses due
to more frequent hurricanes, loss of land, damage to fishing stock, agriculture and water supplies
which could exceed 10 per cent of national wealth for SIDS.  It was important that SIDS get security
of access for the small number of commodities they were able to produce on a commercial basis.Stable and predictable export earnings would allow them to build up foreign exchange reserves to
purchase food on reasonable terms and to invest in other sectors.G/AG/NG/R/5
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168. The representative of Fiji fully supported the proposal.  He strongly submitted that the non-
reciprocal preferential tariff rates provided to developing countries in the agriculture agreement had to
be improved and bound with a view of ensuring that existing access commitments were not
undermined by the continuation of the reform process.
169. Some other developing countries, including Swaziland, Kenya and Pakistan, noted the
similarities between the problems outlined in the pr oposal and the difficulties they faced.  Swaziland
pointed at the similarities in the problems it faced compared with those of SIDS.  Swaziland had first
hand experience with the vulnerability associated with dependence on a few agricultural exports and
therefore supported the proposal that SIDS should be provided with security of market access for the
one or two commodities.  Swaziland also supported the proposal that non-reciprocal preferential tariff
rates be provided to developing countries and bound for the duration of the reform process.  It was
clear from the SIDS proposal that preferential market access arrangements were not meant to be
permanent but stated that they should not lead to a reduction of the welfare in other developingcountries.
170. Kenya stated that the difficulties facing SIDS were similar to those facing other low-income
developing countries like Kenya.  Complex rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and
technical regulations all made market access to other countries difficult.  These constraints were
emerging as some of the most serious barriers to trade for his country.  On the issue of vulnerability, itnoted that it, too, suffered frequent disasters and was currently experiencing a severe drought which
had put millions of people in a precarious situation.  He agreed on the need to maintain preferential
arrangements and the need to protect domestic producers from import surges, especially where these
threatened domestic food production in rural areas.
171. Pakistan also supported the general thrust of the proposal but noted that some of the more
specific suggestions should take into account the interests of the low-income developing countries that
were net food-importers, like Pakistan.  For example, the proposal for specific duty-free tariff rate
quotas outside minimum access quotas should be provided to low-income, net food-importing
developing countries as well as SIDS.  Pakistan agr eed that developing countries should be able to use
special safeguards and that the NFIDC Decision should  be made operational.  It also supported the
idea of giving credit to countries that had undertaken unilateral liberalization under structural
adjustment programmes.  These countries could be given the flexibility not to lower their tariff or
other forms of protection even further.
172. Colombia stated that the proposal highlighted the importance of special and differential
treatment and noted that it agreed with some elements of the proposal, such as improved marketaccess for products of interest to developing countries.  Colombia also supported the proposal to bind
the unilateral preferences granted to developing countries.  On food security and its relation to
domestic production, Colombia noted that most developing country Members did not have the
financial resources to benefit from a higher de minimis  level, therefore, technical assistance to
enhance agricultural productivity was essential to enable them to take advantage of improvements in
market access.
173. On behalf of MERCOSUR and associated states the representative of Paraguay stated that the
proposal showed that SIDS faced many non-tariff barriers, including difficult administrative
procedures.  However, the rules had to be applied equally to all countries without creating sub-
categories.  Dependency on a limited number of basic agricultural commodities was a problem that
needed to be addressed by improving the value added of exported products and reducing tariff
escalation which would help.  In addition, the elimination of export subsidies and the reduction ofdomestic support in developed countries would also help improve the performance of the agriculture
sectors.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 34
174. The representative of New Zealand noted that it was sympathetic towards developing country
concerns.  Agriculture was the basis for sound economic growth and development for many
developing countries including SIDS.  New Zealand recognized that no Member's market access
conditions should be undermined in the transition to freer agricultural trade but, in the context of
substantial progressive reductions in support and protection, it was not possible to freeze the margin
of preference.  Overall many of the suggestion in the proposal, including those relating to foodsecurity, were in line with Cairns Group proposals on special and differential treatment for developing
countries.  Technical assistance to the SIDS was also essential and New Zealand was undertaking a
significant amount of such assistance in the Paci fic region, particularly with respect to meeting
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements.
175. The representative of Hungary stated that he shared the view that countries which had gone
through extensive unilateral deregulation and liberalization, and which exhibited a high degree of
openness to the world market, should receive credit for this when new commitments were beingnegotiated.
176. On behalf of ASEAN the representative of the Philippines agreed that the SIDS proposal
clearly showed the importance of agriculture in the economies of developing and least-developed
countries.  ASEAN shared the view that the Uruguay Round's benefits, in particular better access to
markets of developed countries, had not been substantial.  Difficulties in exporting agriculturalproducts to developed markets persisted and in some cases had become worse as disguised barriers to
trade, such as sanitary or phytosanitary measures, were introduced.  ASEAN supported the proposal
for a framework that would ensure the provision of technical assistance related to meeting such
requirements, in particular the transfer of technology for improved competitiveness, which would also
enhance food security.  The general thrust of the proposal on non-reciprocal preferential tradingarrangements was in line with ASEAN's ow n proposal (NG/W/55), however, the increasing
concessionary nature of preferences was of concer n as it eroded the fundamental principles of non-
discrimination and non-reciprocity, and resulted  in unpredictable market access conditions for
developing countries. ASEAN's position was that the negotiations had to result in explicit
commitments by developed countries to conform to the principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity so as to ensure that improving the welfare of some would not be at the expense of others.
177. Switzerland noted that the proposal showed there were serious concerns that could not be
solved by trade measures alone.  In accommodating these concerns, Members faced an economic and
legal problem.  The economic problem lay in the competition from some developing countries and the
potential exports from SIDS.  The legal problem was the coherence of the proposal with the overallprinciple of non-discrimination.  For Switzerland the problem had to be approached pragmatically and
all countries had to make an effort to integrate SI DS into the international trading system.  A broad
discussion on non-trade concerns could provide some key instruments to the solution.
178. The representative of Japan stressed that due consideration had to be given to the
disadvantages inherent in the SIDS agricultural sectors.  This idea was reflected in Japan's own
proposal which pointed at the need to take into account the differing nature of agricultural systems in
different countries.  However, Japan did not support a uniform tariff reduction that would only enablea small number of competitive exporting countries to benefit on international agricultural markets.
The preservation of preferences would be more beneficial for many developing countries.  On food
security, Japan recalled that it had proposed the idea of creating a framework for international food
stockholding to strengthen food aid schemes for developing countries.  Japan was of the view that the
SIDS proposal on the improvement of the Green Box provisions regarding the payments for naturaldisasters was particularly worthy of further consideration in light of their vulnerability.
179. The representative from the European Communities drew the Committee's attention to the
dilemma posed by the current SIDS proposal, as well as the proposals by Swaziland and Mauritius.
On one hand, Members were committed to a general liberalization of trade, but on the other hand, byG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 35
doing so they were eroding trade preferences which were important to some vulnerable countries.
The EC faced increasing difficulties reconciling the preferences it had given to ACP countries (many
of which were SIDS) with its WTO obligations, particularly in relation to certain commodities.  The
EC had come to the conclusion that the best way forward was via free-trade agreements with the
double objective of giving greater security to preferential tariffs and, at the same time, further
encouraging the integration of these countries into world trade.  Although the EC could not guaranteepreferential margins, because it was also committed to general tariff reductions, it did realize that the
adjustment process was difficult.  Although technical assistance might help, adjustment time was also
needed and this had been one of the key ingredients in the Cotonou Agreement.  In its comprehensive
proposal (NG/W/90) the EC had recognized that ex tra time might be needed for the most vulnerable
countries to dismantle tariffs and this along with technical assistance would be better than
permanently different rules.
180. The representative of Poland noted that his country fully shared the assessments of
Switzerland and the European Communities.  Poland considered that the proposal on market access in
particular deserved further exploration and was ready to work on special and differential treatment for
developing countries.
181. The representative of Venezuela noted that the majority of the Members making the proposal
were Caribbean countries like her own.  While she stressed that many of the concerns raised in theproposal were shared by the majority of developing countries, she understood that special
consideration had to be given to these islands.  Venezuela noted that SIDS barely held a very small
portion of world exports, and the proposal to consolidate preferential access was valuable.  Also,
increased technical assistance and the transfer of technology, particularly on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures as well as other technical standards, was important.
182. The United States stated that it would study wi th interest some the suggestions in the SIDS
proposal.  However, although the United States believed that the agricultural negotiations had to take
into account the needs of developing countries with respect to food security and non-trade concerns, it
feared that some of the suggestions were not mark et oriented.  With respect to concerns regarding
sanitary and phytosanitary issues, the United States noted that it had provided a great deal of technicalassistance to developing countries regarding SPS requirements and would continue to do so.
183.  Commenting on the intervention by the European  Communities, the representative of Brazil
emphasized her country's position vis-à-vis  preferential arrangements.  Whilst Brazil was in favour of
preferential agreements they should not discriminate between developing countries. Greater market
access had to be available for all.  The challenge of the reform process lay in the exposure of domesticproduction to competition, not in the selective opening of markets or choice of products to import.  In
this context Brazil noted the difficulties the EC was experiencing with some agricultural products in
giving duty and tariff free access to essentially all products.
184. In response, the representative of St. Lucia, noted that what was important was the
development of an understanding of the unique pr oblems facing SIDS.  Jamaica as well as Trinidad
and Tobago emphasized that SIDS were open to trade and did not oppose liberalization.  In fact, they
had to engage in trade and they had a very high level of imports but a small range of exports uponwhich they could rely.  This was the reason for their income volatility.  When conditions changed on
the external market it had a significant and disproportional impact on the economies that were
involved.  Hence the importance of security, predictability, and stability of access for some certain
critical products.  Furthermore, their very small share of world trade meant that measures that
enhanced their participation in world trade would have very little effect on other countries.G/AG/NG/R/5
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 (i) Korea:  Proposal for WTO Negotiations on Agriculture (NG/W/98)
185. The representative of Korea (NG/W/117) introduced its negotiating proposal and highlighted
the main elements.  He stressed that the country was a net food-importer with a negative balance of
trade in agricultural products.  Korea's experience of the implementation of the Uruguay Round had
caused a deterioration in the terms of trade for farm households and widened the income gap between
urban and rural sectors, largely due to the sharp increase in agricultural imports.
186. A number of countries stated that they were disappointed with the proposal from Korea,
including MERCOSUR, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, New Zealand, Mexico, Australia, United States,
Guatemala and Pakistan.  They noted that Korea wanted increased flexibility and pointed out that this
would increase distortions in the international mark et and obstacles to trade and many of them felt
that the proposal was not in the direction set out by Article 20 and could be a backward step.
MERCOSUR, Colombia, New Zealand, and Guatemala were concerned by some of the issues raised
by Korea, such as food safety and biotechnology, the precautionary principle and food quality whichsome felt were covered by other Agreements.  Austra lia, Canada and Chile noted that as part of APEC
Korea had stated that export subsidies should be eliminated and they contrasted this with the proposal
that called only for reductions and New Zealand pointed out that Korea did not use export subsidies
and suggested that it should agree to their abolition.
187. On behalf of MERCOSUR and the associated states of Bolivia and Chile the representative of
Paraguay noted that the proposal claimed that ther e were imbalances in the Agreement on Agriculture
between developed and developing countries and stated that the results would have been much better
if support and protection had been reduced more.  He pointed out that increased imports were not a
problem, nor were sectoral imbalances, in fact, the problem was distortions in international markets.
While he noted that the proposal included some interesting elements it contained very little that wasacceptable;  lax management of tariff quotas, a special safeguard for perishable goods, maintaining
the Blue Box and the exemptions from commitments for certain products were all backward steps.  He
pointed out that the Green Box already gave sufficient flexibility to deal with non-trade concerns and
this should prevent distortions or new obstacles to trade.  Finally he pointed out that Korea was a
relatively well developed country and asked if it really belonged in the categories of net food-importing developing countries or developing countries.
188. Colombia noted that the proposal concentrated on multifunctionality and pointed out that
Article 20 referred to non-trade concerns which, it believed, should be addressed in ways that did not
distort trade.  There should be no exemptions for tariff reductions in wealthy countries and Annex 5,
that Korea had used in the past, should be eliminated.  Article 20 called for substantial reductions insupport and protection and Colombia contrasted with Korea's suggestion that tariff reductions should
be gradual and minimal.  Nor could tariffs be reduced in isolation as reform also required substantial
reductions in domestic support.  Maintaining the Blue Box and giving greater flexibility under the
Green Box while continuing de minimis  limits would only perpetuate distortions in world trade.  The
special safeguard should be available only to developing countries.  Colombia did agree with Korea
that all forms of export support should be disciplined and believed it was particularly important that
clear rules and disciplines on both importing and exporting state trading enterprises should beestablished.  It also felt that the proposals on special and differential treatment could be analysed.
189. The representative of New Zealand agreed with Korea that a broad round of trade
negotiations was desirable but pointed out that Article 20 required progress in agriculture anyway.
While she noted that non-trade concerns were to be taken into account in the negotiations she pointed
out that this should not be at the expense of liberalization and was not convinced that distortionarymeasures were needed to address them.  She also noted that Korea had stated that it needed the
flexibility of the Blue Box but did not use it.  On export restrictions and taxes she stated that New
Zealand could work on new disciplines and on special and differential treatment.  She agreed that theG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 37
special needs of developing countries should be addressed especially given the growing level of trade
between developing countries.
190. Mexico pointed out that a special safeguard for seasonal or perishable products was not in the
direction of reform set out by Article 20 and anyway Article XIX of GATT already provided for
safeguards.  Mexico was also concerned by the approach in the proposal to multifunctionality and to
new themes such as food safety and the precautionary principle and food quality.  Such issues shouldnot form part of the agriculture negotiations.
191. The representative of Australia felt that the proposal argued for maintaining trade-distorting
mechanisms and even introducing new ones.  He noted that Korea said it was importing more and
pointed out that this was a positive outcome as the objective of the WTO was to increase trade.  As
countries exported more to Korea they were able to afford importing more industrial goods from
Korea.
192. Canada noted the call for a flexible and gradual approach to reform and pointed out that
commitments were usually phased-in over several years which gave time for adjustment.  This
phasing in of commitments suggested that Members should be ambitious concerning the end result
although they could be flexible of the time-frame.  Korea's call for flexibility in terms of market
access for certain products would not result in improved market access.  Canada wanted better market
access for all agriculture and food products to all countries and it wanted the inequities in accessreduced by Members.  Korea's approach could increase inequities in market access.  In domestic
support Canada agreed that reform was a long-term process and that some Members had shifted
support to the Green Box but the negotiations should continue this process.  While the Green Box
could be examined the basic criteria of no, or at most minimal, trade distortion had to remain.
193. Chile supported the statement made on its behalf by the representative of Paraguay and added
that it was well aware of the agricultural situati on in Korea.  In noted that although agriculture was
only a relatively small part of Korea's economy it had important social and economic impact.
However, Chile pointed out that imports of agricultural products had actually declined as a percentage
of total imports since 1990 and the absolute value of imports had also fallen.  Therefore, it could not
accept Korea's analysis of the impact of the Uruguay Round.  Chile was concerned by the proposalthat tariff reductions should be minimal and pointed out that tariffs in Korea for products of interest to
Chile were very high.  It noted that Korea wanted to satisfy its non-trade concerns and the specificity
of agriculture and stated that in addressing such issues Korea should not transfer the cost to another
country.
194. Bolivia (NG/W/110) supported the statements by Australia and Paraguay and added that it
was a developing country that was a net importer of services and industrial goods but did not have any
protectionist policies in these areas or in agriculture.  It pointed out that its exports to Korea had
declined in recent years while its imports from Kor ea, and its trade deficit with Korea, had increased.
So, when Korea suggested special treatment for agri culture and a gradual approach to reform, Bolivia
noted the lack of progress over the past fifty years.  For Bolivia, to address its non-trade concerns
required reductions in support and protection for its exports and an end to imports of products that
received export subsidies or were of low quality.
195. The United States noted that it shared common goals with Korea in some areas such as food
security and non-trade concerns and it agreed with it on the role of food aid in food security and the
need to address biotechnology.  However, overall it was disappointed that Korea, a relatively wealthy
country, sought to exempt some sectors from reform which would prevent a fair and comprehensive
agreement on market access.  The United States noted that many countries shared the samesensitivities and wanted the negotiations to address trade, non-trade concerns and special and
differential treatment and this should be done through active reform and non-trade concerns should be
addressed in ways that did not distort trade.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 38
196. The representative of Guatemala supported th at statements by other Cairns Group members
and noted that market access could not be granted in a conditional manner as suggested in the
proposal.  Instead, market access should be open to all and should be accompanied by the elimination
of trade-distorting subsidies so that developing countries could participate fully in the negotiations.
197. Pakistan noted that there were some interestin g elements in the proposal but it did not accept
any link between the agriculture negotiations and a broad round.  Korea's proposal suggested that theexisting domestic support framework should be retained but Pakistan could see no rational basis for
the Blue Box which it felt should be eliminated.  It was also concerned by the increasing level of
support provided through the Green Box some of which could be more than minimally trade
distorting, furthermore, support under the heading of multifunctionality and the exemptions proposed
by Korea could cause greater distortions to trade.  The reform process was supposed to remove
inequalities and distortions.  Pakistan welcomed the suggestions concerning special and differential
treatment especially that provisions should be more practical and operational and suggested that theywere also made binding.
198. Turkey noted that there were some similarities between its positions and Korea's.  It agreed
that tariffs should be reduced in a gradual and flexible manner based on the final bound rates in
Members' schedules and added that developing countries should do so only if domestic support and
export subsidies were reduced.  He added that Turkey also wanted to see tariff structures simplifiedwith all tariffs on an ad valorem  basis.  Tariff quota administration also needed to be addressed to
ensure it was transparent and predictable.  The special safeguard had been introduced as a transitional
instrument which should be abolished in the negotiations or extended to other Members.  While the
Green Box was supported Turkey stated that it should be subject to clear rules and definitions.
Finally, he hoped that the issue of inflation on domestic support commitments would be addressed asthis issue was very important to Turkey.
199. A number of countries supported the many elements of Korea's proposal or stated that it was a
basis on which they could negotiate, these countries included Japan, Norway, Poland, the EC,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Mauritius and Switzerland.  Poland agreed, in particular, with the need
for a balanced outcome.  Hungary, Japan, the Czech Republic and Mauritius agreed that for allMembers to participate in the reform process a flexible and gradual approach was needed.  Hungary
(NG/W/132) added that it agreed that the scope of the Green Box should be examined and the effect
of inflation on domestic support reduction commitments.  The Czech Republic also agreed that that
the negotiations should be part of a broad round.
200. Japan agreed with most of the proposal, in particular, that the agriculture negotiations should
be part of a general round and that non-trade concerns, including multifunctionality and special and
differential treatment, required a flexible approach.  Japan also agreed that the scope and criteria for
the Green Box should be examined to increase its flexibility and the reduction commitments on
domestic support should be applied on an aggregated basis.  The balance of rights and obligations
between importing and exporting countries also needed to be addressed, in part by strengthening the
rules on export restraints.  Flexibility should be given to developing countries for market access,
domestic support and export competition.  Finally, Japan also agreed that it was important to respondto consumer concerns on new issues and that they should be taken into account in the context of trade
rules.
201. Norway (NG/W/120) agreed with Korea that the experience and effects of the Agreement on
Agriculture had to be analysed as required by Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Norway
supported the suggestion that tariff reductions should be from bound rates, that the special safeguardshould be retained, that the framework of Green, Blue and Amber Boxes for domestic support should
be kept, that all forms of export support should be addressed and that further measures for special and
differential treatment were needed for developing c ountries.  The multifunctionality of agriculture andG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 39
its provision of public goods, such as food security, protection of the environment and rural
development, had to be safeguarded.
202. The representative of the European Communities noted that there was a big difference
between agriculture in the EC and in Korea but that they shared many of the views expressed in the
proposal.  In particular, the EC agreed that the negotiations had to take account of special and
differential treatment and non-trade concerns and that the Green Box should be re-examined to ensurethat it covered goals such as environmental protection and poverty alleviation.  The EC also suggested
that these should be addressed in targeted and minimally trade distorting ways.  The framework of
the Blue and Green Boxes should be retained to allow transition away from trade-distorting supports.
Export competition was more than export subsidies and included state trading enterprises, export
credits and food aid when used for market promo tion.  The special safeguard should be retained.
Some other issues, such as tariff reductions, were for a later stage of the negotiations.
203. Mauritius also shared most of the suggestions by Korea and stated that the Uruguay Round
had not reflected the views of all Members in a balanced manner.  Different forms of agriculture
should be allowed to co-exist which required the concerns of all Members to be reflected in an
equitable manner.  Public goods, such as food security, the environment, rural viability and cultural
heritage needed support.  Mauritius also agreed that reduction commitments on domestic support
should be on a disaggregated basis and that subsidies exempt from reduction should be extended toinclude income safety net and other income based payments.  Many of the suggestions were relevant
to small island developing states, including the exemptions for export subsidies.
204. In responding to the statements made on its proposal Korea (NG/W/117) pointed to the
statement by Israel on Japan's proposal on the wide diversity of farming.  Korea had joined the reform
process in the WTO but pointed out that, while a realistic approach acceptable to all was needed,Korea was still in the process of development in all areas, including economic, political, social and
other ones.  Korea also stressed that the agricultural sector in particular remained the most under-
developed in society and would retain its status as a developing country in the WTO.  The special
safeguard for perishable products was needed as the current special safeguard, although useful, was
too restricted as it applied only to products that had undergone tariffication.  Similarly, the generalsafeguard was not useful as it took too long to appl y.  Korea claimed that the low level of agricultural
self-sufficiency was causing serious social and economic problems which justified the need for
flexibility in making commitments.
(j) Mali: Malian Proposals for Future Negotiations on Agriculture (NG/W/99)
205. Discussion of Mali's proposal was postponed until the next Special Session.
(k) Caribbean Community (CARICOM):  WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – Market
Access (NG/W/100)
206. Grenada stated on behalf of CARICOM that CARICOM remained committed to the long-
term objective of establishing a fair and market-oriented trading system.  CARICOM countries were
among the most liberal in their hemisphere and had used the least trade-distorting instruments but
regrettably had not benefited proportionally from the increase in world trade.   CARICOM's  proposal
focused on market access opportunities including further work on tariff preferences;  financial andtechnical assistance in the process of economi c adjustment and diversification, and a prudent
safeguard regime.
207. Namibia and Sri Lanka welcomed the proposal and noted that they were faced with similar
challenges as CARICOM.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 40
208. In commenting on the CARICOM and the SIDS proposals Sri Lanka (NG/W/124) noted that
it, too, was disadvantaged by the limited size of the domestic market reducing the scope for
economies of scale, dependence on a few export crops and a narrow industrial base.  Sri Lanka
supported, in particular, the proposed tariff reductions and binding of tariff preferences, as well as
proposals to protect small farmers in least-developed and net food-importing developing countries
from import surges of sensitive products.
209. Namibia expressed strong support for the proposal.  Namibia, like CARICOM, had
undertaken autonomous liberalization by eliminating export subsidies and reforming marketing
boards and hoped that other countries would follow suit.  On the other hand, Namibia faced resource
constraints which made it difficult to introduce new technology and to develop the infrastructure and
institutional capacity necessary to partic ipate meaningfully in international trade.
210. Paraguay, on behalf of MERCOSUR including the associated members of Bolivia and Chile,
welcomed the proposal as a constructive contribution to the negotiations.  MERCOSUR could supporta number of elements in the proposals, in particular the call for improved market access for products
of interest to developing countries which should be accompanied by measures to ensure that labelling,
SPS and other measures did not undermine access opportunities.  While MERCOSUR agreed that
tariff preferences should be stable, transparent and predictable, such preferences must not be
prejudicial to the interests of other developing countries.
211. Cuba welcomed the proposal and endorsed its main elements.  Together with similar
proposals from other developing countries, CARICOM's proposal might serve as a common basis of
the interests of the developing countries.
212. Hungary (NG/W/132) welcomed the proposal a nd endorsed the notion that the benefits of
freer trade should reach all countries.  To facilitate the adjustment to a liberalized tradingenvironment, sufficiently long transition periods were required.
213. New Zealand was pleased to note that CARICOM recognized that a freer and market-oriented
international market place for agricultural products would go a long way to helping small developing
economies.  In this regard, market access improvements were essential and New Zealand supported
the focus on reducing or eliminating tariff escalation and tariff peaks, as well as simpler and clearermarket access opportunities.  Moreover, New Zealand recognized that countries needed sufficient
time to adjust to the erosion of the margin of preference as multilateral liberalization continued.
New Zealand was open to examining ways to ease the speed of adjustment as part of an ambitious
outcome on market access.  New Zealand also agreed that technical assistance and capacity building
were needed to allow full integration into the world economy and more needed to be done to improvethe implementation of the Marrakesh Net Food-Importing Developing Country Decision.
214. The EC complemented CARICOM for the clear exposition of the difficulties that its members
were facing.  The EC was acutely aware of the difficult task of CARICOM's transition to two-way
trade in an open trading environment and time for adjustment and assistance would be necessary to
achieve this objective.  On the issue of non-trade concerns, these should be well-targeted, transparent
and not more than minimally trade-distorting.  The EC considered this to be part of a process where
the gains from trade were realized without losing the non-trade benefits that agriculture could provide.
The EC recognized that for the negotiations to succeed they had to benefit all countries.
215. The United States welcomed the active partic ipation by CARICOM in these negotiations.
The United States shared their concerns that trade barriers continued to inhibit market access
opportunities, as reflected in the US proposal (NG/W/58). The United States believed that all
countries would benefit from the reform process and therefore all countries had to contribute to it.Special and differential treatment should be afforded to developing countries, particularly the least-
developed countries. The United States supported the need for technical assistance and capacity-G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 41
building in developing countries since this assistance would enhance the capability to more actively
participate in the international markets.
216. Norway welcomed the proposal and noted its emphasis on the need to balance trade and non-
trade concerns (NG/W/120).  The proposals by CARICOM, the small island developing countries,
Mauritius and Swaziland, exemplified the diversity of developing country situations and highlighted
the need to find effective solutions for their problems.  Norway recognized the vital importance ofstable and predictable market access, as well as technical and financial assistance to overcome supply
side constraints.  In the view of Norway, trade-related technical assistance should be increased
considerably and the Marrakesh Net Food-Im porting Developing Country Decision should be
reviewed to ensure effective implementation.
217. Canada welcomed CARICOM's focus on continui ng the reform process.  In the view of
Canada, to remove the imbalance in the trading sy stem it was necessary to continue reforms, while
adapting the pace of adjustment to the specific circumstances of countries.  Canada was thus open toallowing different levels and phasing of market access commitments to developing countries, while
taking into account that developing countries were  important markets for other developing countries.
Canada had also proposed improved tariff quota access and administration and was open to an
examination of measures limiting access to non-substantial suppliers.  Tariff quotas had the advantage
of providing immediate access whereas even reduced tariffs did not guarantee real access in the shortterm.
218. Japan supported CARICOM's efforts in engagi ng in structural reforms through capacity
building and Japan would provide various forms of necessary assistance to these countries according
to their individual needs.  He also expressed his further disagreement with further liberalization
without taking account of the specific circumstances of each country.
219. Grenada, on behalf of CARICOM, thanked delegations for their positive response,
particularly concerning tariff preferences and the possibility of providing assistance.  In response to
comments by a number of developing countries facing similar challenges as CARICOM, it was noted
that the proposal was intended to be inclusive and not to preclude other Members which might be
similarly disadvantaged.
(l) Norway:  WTO Agriculture Negotiations (NG/W/101)
220. Discussion of Norway's pr oposal was postponed until the next Special Session.
(m) India:  Negotiations on WTO Agreement on  Agriculture;  Proposals by India in the
Areas of:  (i) Food Security  (ii) Market A ccess  (iii) Domestic Support  and  (iv) Export
Competition (NG/W/102)
221. The representative of India noted that the inequities in the Agreement on Agriculture had
made the imbalances between rich and poor coun tries worse (NG/W/114).  The negotiations would
have to ensure that measures which contributed to distortions in international trade were eliminated so
that trade could be fair and market oriented.   Greater equity was needed in the rules and disciplines
between those Members that created distortions and those who suffered from them.  India could
consider further liberalization only after those developed countries that contributed to distortions in
international trade had shown what commitments in export competition and domestic support they
were going to make.  The broad objectives of India's proposal fell into two categories.  The first, to
ensure the food security and livelihood of the many people in India that depended on agriculture. The
second, to create opportunities for agricultural exports by securing market access in developed
country markets.  Agriculture in India and ma ny developing countries was characterized by
subsistence farming and the constraints to production were elaborated in detail in the proposal.  Thenegotiations had to find a way to deal with this model of agriculture and the intensive industrial typeG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 42
of agriculture found in other countries.  He stressed that the issues of special and differential treatment
and food security had to be built into the negotiations as an integral part of the three main pillars of
market access, domestic support and export competition to ensure they resulted in meaningful results.
222. A number of countries, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, supported most
of the points made in the proposal by India, in  particular, the creation of a Food Security Box.
Pakistan and Sri Lanka (NG/W/124) pointed out that the Food Security Box was similar to theproposal they had made along with other devel oping countries on a Development Box.  Pakistan
noted that the title given to the Box was not important although the term "development" could take
into account a broader range of developmental concerns.  In addition to the idea of a Development
Box, Sri Lanka (NG/W/124) stated that it could support several of the proposals in the Indian paper
regarding domestic support, market access, export subsidies and the coverage of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
223. Indonesia (NG/W/115) stated that it shared many  of the ideas in the proposal which, it felt,
were similar to those put forward by the Cairns Group and also provided concrete and operational
special and differential treatment to developing countries.  In particular, Indonesia agreed that imports
of subsidized products could jeopardize the livelihood of farmers in large agrarian economies and that
a minimum level of self-sufficiency was needed in developing countries.  On domestic support,
Indonesia endorsed the Indian proposal that product specific support to low-income resource poorfarmers should be excluded from the AMS calculations and that domestic support measures taken by
developing countries for poverty alleviation, rural development and employment as well as
diversification of agriculture be exempted from any reduction commitments.
224. The representative of Nigeria noted that food security was a common concern for both India
and Nigeria and agriculture in both countries was labour intensive and characterized by smalllandholdings that received no support and used few inputs.  He stated that the proposal could help to
improve market access and create a more level playing field in agricultural trade.  Nigeria welcomed
the consideration of special and differential treatment as well as food security as an integral part of
any future Agreement on Agriculture.
225. On behalf of Malaysia and Singapore the representative of Malaysia (NG/W/118) stated that
the proposal shared many common elements with those from the Cairns Group.  These common
elements included the following:  ensuring the Gr een Box covered only non trade-distorting measures,
the distinction between the non-trade concerns of developing countries and the multifunctionality of
agriculture put forward by some developed countries, the need to address tariff peaks and escalation,
down payments by developed countries, the exemptions for developing countries for certain measuresand the flexibility for developing countries in maintaining tariffs.
226. The representative of Venezuela (NG/W/133) agreed on the importance of food security for
developing countries, and the role of agriculture in the political, social and economic life of these
countries.   Venezuela argued that on market access and domestic support, developing countries
needed sufficient flexibility to address food security, rural development and the alleviation of poverty.
Improved market access for products of interest to developing countries should not be weakened by
non-tariff barriers, tariff peaks or escalation.  On domestic support it was important to take intoconsideration the financial and institutional limitations that affected developing countries and made it
difficult to use programmes contained in Annex 2.  Venezuela argued that export competition had to
be dealt with in a comprehensive manner, addressing reductions on all types of subsidies and keeping
in mind the mandate contained in Article 10.2 of the Agreement.
227. Colombia shared the analysis on developing country problems set out in the Indian proposal,
in particular, with respect to the effects of direct payments on trade, particularly payments that
affected production although technically decoupled.  Tariff reduction in developing countries had to
be done in co-ordination with the elimination of domestic support and export subsidies in theG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 43
developed countries.  Colombia also agreed with India on the importance of food security and stated
that this was a developing country concern.
228. A number of delegations, including Hungary, Ma uritius and Norway stated that the proposal
showed that market forces alone could not address all agriculture issues.  Hungary (NG/W/132) stated
that there were situations when government interv ention was needed for the recovery of agricultural
productions, such as in countries in transition to market orientated economies.  The agriculturalreform process would only be fair if every Member had the opportunity to use measures necessary for
development and structural adjustment in order to take advantage of comparative advantages,
although these measures had to be the least trade distorting as possible.
229. Mauritius (NG/W/119) stated that the agricultural situation in India showed the diversity of
agricultural situations around the world and demonstrated the need to move away from a "one-size-
fits-all" approach.  Developing countries in general, and net food-importing countries in particular,
needed to pursue policies aimed at increasing agricultural production and productivity.  However, notall net food-importing developing countries could become self-sufficient and not all were able to use
Annex 2 measures or other subsidies aimed at maintaining rural employment.  The process of trade
liberalization would even further marginalize small producers and there was therefore a need to
maintain an appropriate mechanism to safeguard their livelihood.  It was for these reasons that the
SIDS had proposed that they be provided with secure access to their historical markets.  The removalor erosion of trade preferences would further marginalize small producers.
230. The representative of Norway (NG/W/120) appreciated the key role agriculture played in
agrarian developing economies where it was essential in addressing poverty and food security
concerns.  He stated that agriculture in developed countries contributed to the viability of rural
communities, protecting the environment and obtaining long-term food security even if it appeared tobe a minor part of the economy.  In countries that faced difficult production conditions it was not
possible to address non-trade concerns without government intervention.  In this regard, the extent
that such policy measures might have a negative spill-over effect on other countries was an important
issue that needed to be addressed in the negotiations.  Norway recognized that improved market
access for agricultural products was of vital importance to many developing countries and Norwaywould give special attention to products of particular interest to developing countries when
considering further MFN tariff reductions.  Norway also recognized the need for stricter disciplines on
export competition measures and on Amber Box support to export-oriented production.  However,
every Member, developing as well as developed, should have flexibility in national policy design to
foster production necessary to address domestic non-trade concerns.
231. In making some preliminary comments on the proposal Mexico stated that it could not go
along with the proposal that the Green Box should be revised as suggested by India by removing the
criteria for certain forms of direct payments to farmers.
232. On behalf of Mercosur and its associate states, the representative of Paraguay noted that India
had referred to the FAO's definition of food security which stressed the physical and economic access
to food.  This helped to clarify the distinction be tween food security concerns of poor countries and
those of rich countries.  He noted that India had put forward a number of legitimate proposals inrespect of food security, in particular those referring to Annex 2, which were intended to alleviate
poverty as well as ensure agricultural development in poor areas.  He noted the similarities with the
Cairns Group's proposals and shared much of the just ification on market access.  The expansion of the
product coverage of the Agreement was also an interesting proposal.  Export subsidies would have to
be reduced to zero if poor countries were to be expected to open up their markets.
233. A number of Members agreed with certain aspects of the proposal but were concerned that it
did not offer new market access opportunities.  These Members included Thailand, the Philippines,
the EC, New Zealand and the United States.  Thailand (NG/W/126) and the Philippines felt thatG/AG/NG/R/5
Page 44
developing countries should not be able to exempt themselves from offering a minimum market
access as this would send the wrong signal to other developing countries to take agricultural trade
reforms as well.  Nor did Thailand support the proposal to delete negative product specific supports
from the AMS calculation as this would increase distortions.   It stated that at present there was no
level playing field in agricultural trade as many developed countries continued to heavily subsidize
their farmers.
234. The Philippines (NG/W/122) noted that many of the elements in the proposal were aimed at
correcting inequities in the current Agreement on Agriculture which allowed many developed
countries to use production and trade-distorting policies.  While, the Philippines supported many of
the suggestions on  domestic support it also wanted policies that encouraged increased production
eliminated from the Green Box and the de minimis  to cease to apply to developed countries.  On
market access, the Philippines supported Thailand on market access by developing countries and
added that minimum access opportunities opened by developing countries should not be for productsfrom developed countries that received trade-distorting domestic support and export subsidies.  The
Philippines stated that commitments by developing countries on market access should depend on
commitments by developed countries on domestic support and export subsidies.
235. The representative of the European Communities noted that many of India's non-trade
concerns, such as poverty alleviation and rural development, would have to be taken into account inthe negotiations.  He also stated that that special an d differential treatment would justify several of the
specific measures in the proposal.  Some issues needed more elaboration including the proposal to
extend the product coverage of the Agreement on Agriculture.  However, the EC was also concerned
with the proposals on market access.  While it might be necessary to improve gradually market access
opportunities, restricting trade in the way proposed would reduce its wealth creation potential.  Acountry the size of India, with a population greater than the EC, the United States and Japan
combined, would benefit from more liberal exchan ge of goods along with its trading partners.
236. The United States noted the ambitious reforms proposed by India.  It, too, had called for
substantial reductions or elimination of trade-distorting measures using many of the same approaches
proposed by India.  The United States recognized that many countries, in particular developingcountries, had been disappointed by the results of the Uruguay Round Agreement and it was
unfortunate that many countries, developed and developing, still had high levels of trade-distorting
support and protection.  However, for all countries to benefit from the negotiations, all needed to
engage in the reform process.  The United States appreciated India's offer to consider reducing tariffs,
but noted the importance of moving forward without requiring preconditions or one-sided downpayments.
237. The representative of New Zealand acknowledged that trade distortions, especially from some
of the richer developed countries, could be argued to create the need for compensatory measures
which were sometimes trade distorting.  However, New Zealand believed that all countries had to
contribute to trade liberalization and this would be to everyone’s advantage in the long term.  On
market access, New Zealand noted that the Cairns Group had also identified high tariffs, tariff peaks
and tariff escalation as restricting development.  On domestic support, New Zealand noted thatwithout substantial progress an ambitious outcome w ould not be possible and noted that the proposal
also provided good arguments for the abolition of all forms of export subsidies over a very short
period.
238. The Chairman suspended the discussion of the Indian proposal due to time constraints and
noted that it would be the first to be considered at the next Special Session in March 2001.  Thefollowing countries had indicated their intention to make statements:  Australia, Honduras, Czech
Republic, Korea, Canada, Japan, Cuba and Chile.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 45
OTHER BUSINESS
239. Bolivia referred to a note that had been subm itted to the Chairman for the General Council in
January 2001 concerning the meetings on the negotiations on services and agriculture. It pointed out
that small delegations had difficulties in participating effectively when these were scheduled for the
same time, even if such meetings were informal.  In drawing attention to this situation Bolivia asked
that these concerns be taken into account in organising meetings and noted that similar concerns hadbeen expressed by other Members.G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 46
ANNEX
FIFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
(G/AG/NG/5)
Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales, to the General Council
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, which was established by the General
Council to conduct the negotiations for continuing the reform process under Article 20 of the
Agreement on Agriculture (WT/GC/M/53, paragraph 39 refers), held its fifth meeting on
5-7 February 2001.
2. The agenda as set out in WTO/AIR/1471 was adopted.
3. The following new or additional proposals for continuing the reform process were presented
and examined at the meeting:  (i) a comprehensive negotiating proposal by the European
Communities (NG/W/90);  (ii) a negotiating  proposal by Japan on WTO negotiations (NG/W/91);
(iii) a proposal by Canada on "Domestic Support " (NG/W/92);  (iv) a Cairns Group proposal on
"Export Restrictions and Taxes" (NG/W/93);  (v) a proposal by Switzerland on "WTO: Negotiationson Agriculture" (NG/W/94);  (vi) a proposal by Swaziland on "Market Access Under Special and
Differential Treatment for Small Developing Countries" (NG/W/95);  (vii) a proposal by Mauritius on
"WTO Negotiations on Agriculture" (NG/W/96);  (viii) "Proposals by Small Island Developing
Countries (SIDS)" from Cuba, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trin idad and Tobago (NG/W/97);  (ix) "Proposal for
WTO Negotiations on Agriculture" by the Republic of Korea (NG/W/98);  (x) a proposal on behalf of
Members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) "WTO Negotiations on Agriculture – Market
Access" (NG/W/100).  Consideration of the proposal presented at the meeting by India, on
"Negotiations on WTO Agreement on Agriculture" ( NG/W/102), is to be completed at the additional
meeting referred to in paragraph 4 below.
4. The time available for this meeting did not allow for the presentation and consideration of the
following proposals:  (i) proposals by Mali for the "Future Negotiations on Agriculture" (NG/W/99);
(ii) a proposal by Norway on "WTO Agriculture Negotiations" (NG/W/101);  (iii) a proposal by
Poland on "WTO Negotiations for Continuation of the Reform Process in the Agricultural Sector"
(NG/W/103);  (iv) a proposal on "State Trading En terprises" by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay (MERCOSUR), Bolivia, Chile and Colomb ia (NG/W/104);  (v) a proposal by Morocco
(NG/W/105);  (vi) a proposal by Turkey on "WTO Negotiations on Agriculture" (NG/W/106);  and
(vii) a comprehensive proposal by the Arab Repub lic of Egypt (NG/W/107).  These proposals, plus
any new proposals that may be submitted, as well as the technical submission by Argentina
(NG/W/88), will be for presentation and consideration at an additional Special Session meeting which
it was agreed will be held for this purpose on 22-23 March 2001.
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Note:  "NG/W/-" refers to documents in the series:  "G/AG/NG/W/-".G/AG/NG/R/5
Page 47
5. As requested by the participants concerned, the following statements made at the meeting are
being circulated:  Argentina (NG/W/108);  Austra lia (NG/W/109);  Bolivia (NG/W/110);  Bulgaria
(NG/W/111);  Canada (NG/W/112);  Guatemala (NG/W/113) ;  India (NG/W/114);  Indonesia
(NG/W115);  Japan (NG/W/116);   Korea (NG/W/117);  Malaysia (NG/W/118);  Mauritius
(NG/W/119);  Norway (NG/W/120);  Pakistan ( NG/W/121);  Philippines (NG/W/122);  Slovenia
(NG/W/123);  Sri Lanka (NG/W/124);  Swaz iland (NG/W/125); Thailand (NG/W/126) and United
States (NG/W/127).  (Statements made at the fourth Special Session but circulated after the
appearance of the Chairman's report on that meeting (G/AG/NG/4) are:  Hungary on behalf of
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Mongolia, the Slovak Republic and Slov enia (NG/W/85);  Jamaica (NG/W/86);  and the
Czech Republic (NG/W/87).)
6. In the course of the meeting the opportunity was taken to hold open-ended informal
consultations on the work of the end-March stock-taking meeting and on the programme and
arrangements for the second phase of the negotiations under Article 20 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.  It was noted that the Chairman woul d continue his informal consultations and contacts
and that it was his intention to convene another open-ended informal meeting in advance of the end-
March stock-taking meeting to discuss a draft text which sketches out possible elements for thesecond phase programme and arrangements.
7. It was agreed that the end-March stock-taking meeting would be held on 26–28 March 2001,
with the aim being to conclude that meeting at the morning session on Wednesday 28 March.  (It was
noted that the regular, back-to-back meeting of the Committee on Agriculture would accordingly take
place on 29-30 March 2001.)
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