 
 RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/C/M/13 
12 August 2004 
 
 (04-3402 ) 
Trade Negotiations Committee 
30 June 2004  
 
 
 
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard  
on 30 June 2004  
 
Chairman: Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi (Director-General)  
 
 Subjects discussed
: Page  
 
1. Reports by the Chairpersons of bodies established by the TNC ..........................................1  
2. Statements by participants..................................................................................................... 19 
 
 
1. Reports by the Chairpersons of bodies established by the TNC 
1. The Chairman  noted that the Chairpersons of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture, the Special Session of the Council fo r Trade in Services and the Negotiating Group on 
Market Access would provide Members with oral reports to take into account the most recent 
activities in their respective areas.  Written reports  had been circulated in the following official 
documents: 
Special Session of the Council for TRIPS:      TN/IP/10 
Negotiating Group on Rules:        TN/RL/9 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body:     TN/DS/10 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment:    TN/TE/9 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development:    TN/CTD/10  
2. He wished first to refer to the fax he had sen t to delegations on 24 J une, as this particular 
meeting of the TNC would have an important role in  the process of developing the substance of the 
July outcome.  In his fax, he had pointed out th at the agenda for the present meeting, which was the 
same as that for previous TNC meetings, in f act understated its importance.  This was a very 
important meeting because it provided Members with the opportunity for a kind of reality check on 
substantive progress towards the July outcome.  He expected delegations to use it to develop an 
overall picture of where the membership was headed in  its work for July and for the broad parameters 
of the possible outcomes the following month. 
3. Since the last TNC meeting, he had attended the Third LDC Trade Ministers’ Meeting in 
Dakar, Senegal, the OECD Ministerial meeting in Paris, the Conference of the African Union 
Ministers of Trade in Kigali, Rwanda, the meeti ng of APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade in 
Pucón, Chile and UNCTAD XI in São Paulo, Brazil.  He had just recently returned from an official 
visit to India where he had met the Prime Minister and key Ministers of the new government.  From this intensive ministerial-level activity, ther e was a strong political commitment.  However, TN/C/M/13 
Page 2  
 
 delegations still faced the problem that this was not  being translated into progress in the negotiations 
in Geneva.  This was increasingly worrying. 
4. It was also worrying that delegations were still underestimating the time constraint.  July 
began the following day.  Delegations needed to u se their time more efficiently, starting with the 
present meeting, so he urged all delegations to be substantive but succinct, and not to repeat well 
known positions. 
5. The TNC had before it reports by the Chairpersons of the bodies established by the TNC on 
the state of play in their respective areas, and he  had encouraged them to make their reports as 
substantive as possible.  He thanked them for th eir dedication.  These reports, and the views of 
delegations in reaction to them, should give a good sense of where the membership was heading 
overall. 
6. Seen in this light, the significance of the pr esent meeting became all the more obvious.  He 
urged delegations to use it as an occasion to send c onstructive signals to build convergence.  There 
was a need for flexibility which showed a real wi llingness to negotiate, not rigid positions which 
would inevitably serve to widen divergences and ma ke the collective task even more difficult.  
Progress had been made recently, but still not enough.  Delegations urgently needed to make faster 
progress towards convergence in key areas. 
7. Immediately following the present meeting, the Council Chairman would hold a Heads of 
Delegations meeting to complement the picture fro m the overall General Counc il perspective.  Taking 
account of the discussions over these two days, as well as the continuing work on specific issues, the 
Council Chairman and he intended to circulate a first overall draft text of the July outcome within the 
following two weeks.  There might still be gaps or brack ets in the text or its annexes at this stage, but 
as he had said repeatedly, these should be kept to an absolute minimum. 
8. No one should be under any illusion about the nature of this first draft.  It could not offer a 
magic solution to existing problems.  On the contrary, it would reflect the state of convergence – or divergence – as it existed.  Only the negotiators co uld bridge the remaining gaps.  The first draft 
would not be the end of the process, but rather the launching pad for the last phase in which 
delegations would work to finalize th e July product.  To facilitate thei r efforts to reach agreement, the 
General Council Chairman and he would hold an inte nsive process of consultation leading up to the 
meeting of the General Council towards the end of July. 
9. In recent days, some key Ministers, from devel oping as well as develope d countries, had once 
again suggested that they saw a July deal as quite achievable and had pointed to signs of convergence 
at the political level.  He wished to be frank – the political guidance and direction which delegations 
needed to be able to move ahead was clearly th ere.  The onus was now fairly and squarely on 
negotiators in Geneva to do the deals that po litical leaders clearly wanted them to achieve. 
10. Ambassador Spencer (Australia), Chairman of the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement 
Body , said he had little to add to his written report in TN/DS/10.  The gist of that report was that 
Members had agreed on the need for more time to complete the review of the DSU with which the 
Special Session had been charged.  Members wanted to continue to work on the understanding that all 
proposals remained on the table and that these negotia tions were outside the Single Undertaking.  Due 
to the unanimity within the group on this question,  he did not believe it was a major subject for 
decision and recommended that the TNC might take note of his report and of the consensus to continue the work.  The TNC might recommend to the General Council that it endorse the proposal to 
continue the work.  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 3 
 
 
 11. Ambassador Ahmad (Pakistan), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS , 
said that since his last report to the TNC on the eighth meeting that had been held in April, the Special 
Session had met once on 18 June.  The report, contai ned in document TN/IP/10 , provided information 
on that meeting as well as on the status of the work  in the Special Session.  He wished to draw 
attention to paragraph 7 on outstanding issues, whic h stated that a range of issues required further 
work, in particular resolving the key issues of the le gal effects of registration and participation in the 
system.  He also wished to highlight paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report, which stated that participants 
had reaffirmed their commitment to pursue the negotiations actively and which set out the organization of work.  He believed that the report re flected the thinking of participants.  The Special 
Session was not planning to hold any furthe r meetings prior to the summer break. 
12. Ambassador Ali (Bangladesh), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade 
and Environment , said his written report to the TNC had been  circulated in document TN/TE/9.  He 
had presided over two Special Session meetings thus fa r, and it had been only at the 22 June meeting 
that he had sensed real engagement by delegations .  However, it was no surp rise that the trade and 
environment negotiations were fraught with sensitiviti es.  On paragraph 31(i) of the negotiations, he 
sensed that the vast majority of Members were  generally satisfied with the current MEA-WTO 
relationship and remained to be persuaded that there was a problem which needed to be fixed.  
However, proponents of the so-called "conceptual a pproach" argued that even good relationships were 
capable of improvement, and that there did not n eed to be a problem for a recommendation to be 
made in this context.  In fact, they argued th at the WTO should not wait for a crisis, and they had 
accordingly had made some specific proposals.  It w as evident that on this part of the environment 
mandate, the WTO faced a daunting task.  At this stage of the negotiations, he recommended that 
more discussions be held, with a view to achieving a positive result for all delegations. 
13. Under paragraph 31(ii), partic ipants had exchanged views on the various avenues for 
cooperation and information exchange which the Co mmittee had previously identified, and on which 
his predecessor, Ambassador Biké (Gabon), had repor ted to the TNC.  It was his sense that the 
Special Session should begin to reflect on how some  of these ideas could be packaged towards a 
potential outcome under this part of the mandate .  This was an area where progress should be 
relatively easier. 
14. With respect to the criteria for the granting of observer status, very limited discussion had 
taken place since the Cancún Ministerial Conference.  Some delegations believed that the question of 
granting observer status needed to be addressed by the TNC and the General Council as a systemic, 
horizontal issue.  He wished to remind delegations that the Special Session had been given a specific 
mandate on this subject and only in respect to e nvironmental organizations.  In other words, it was 
required to resolve the issue of observership of su ch bodies, and it needed to focus on how criteria of 
the granting of observer status for environmental or ganizations might be developed.  Therefore, he 
hoped that some progress could be made.   
15. He was particularly pleased with the devel opments on paragraph 31(iii).  Discussions under 
this paragraph were becoming more concrete.  Japan , Qatar, and Chinese Taipei had all tabled their 
own lists of environmental goods.  In some cases th ese lists were preliminary and designed to be 
supplemented.  Furthermore, some developing co untries were beginning to actively engage.  China 
had made a very useful statement at the 22 June meeting on how these negotiations could be 
structured, suggesting the development of a "com mon" and a "development" list of environmental 
goods.  He looked forward to the submission of its actual list at some point soon. 
16. In this context, he encouraged delegations to continue submitting specific examples of the 
products, or product categories, that they would li ke to see included in the negotiations, so as to 
complement the definitional discussions that the Co mmittee had been holding.  This would allow the 
Special Session to provide useful guidance to NAMA when the time came.  As had been stated in the TN/C/M/13 
Page 4  
 
 written report, the World Customs Organization, th e OECD and UNCTAD had been invited to make 
presentations on this aspect of the mandate reflec ting a desire of the membership to draw upon 
appropriate expertise and experience.  In terms of  the July package, he proposed that the Special 
Session be encouraged to continue  pursuing its paragra ph 31 mandate, with a view to achieving a 
positive outcome in the negotiations. 
17. Ambassador Pérez Motta (Mexico), Chai rman of the Negotiating Group on Rules
, said the 
written report of the Group was contained in TN/R L/9.  The Group had began discussions in March 
2004 after the recess following the Cancún Ministeria l Conference and it had worked in an efficient 
manner.  Good discussions had taken place at a techni cal level in informal mode and with the active 
participation of all Members, w ho had began to discuss the large number of highly detailed proposals 
which had been forwarded by several delegations .  The Group had gone beyond the discussions of the 
July package since, as he saw it, delegations had already dealt with July.  An intense programme had 
been agreed for the forthcoming quarter, and he  wished to thank delegations for their active 
participation and for avoiding unnecessary procedural  discussions.  The Group also had not dwelled 
on artificial deadlines, which would have been a waste of time.   
18. Ambassador Jara (Chile), Chairman of the Special Session of the Council for Trade in 
Services , said that the present meeting fell in the middle of services week, and his final report would 
be submitted only at the Special Session's conclusion bu t it would be based on the following.  On the 
status of work, Ministers at Doha had agreed th at initial offers were to  be submitted by 31 March 
2003, which was more than a year ago.  To date, 44 offers had been received (counting the European 
Communities as one).  This represented  65 Members who had submitted an offer, with the most 
recent being Brazil on 28 June.  Apart from least-de veloped country (LDC) Members, this meant that 
some 52 Members had yet to submit an initial offer.  He viewed this as cause for serious concern.   
19. In a previous report he had informed the TNC of his intention to engage in "confessional" 
bilateral consultations with those Members that had no t tabled an initial offer in order to ascertain the 
reasons for delays and to determine if any technical  assistance could be provided.  With the exception 
of two Members that he planned to meet with shortly , he had held such consu ltations with all of the 
concerned Members that had representation in Gene va and had contacted non-resident Members.  
Several of those Members that he had consulted with had indicated their ability and willingness to 
submit their initial offers before the end of July , while other Members had indicated they would 
require more time.  These meetings had been c onducted in a positive atmosphere and had provided 
him with a fuller understanding of the political and technical difficulties being faced, which included 
the technical complexities involved in preparing an  offer, the necessary domestic coordination process 
involving government departments and other stake holders, the overwhelming effect of voluminous 
requests made by some Members and the dampeni ng of progress resulting from the missed deadlines 
and the Cancún Ministerial Conference.   
20. On future work, in considering the way forward, Members should bear in mind the 
"negotiating architecture" to which Members had ag reed for the services negotiations.  In accordance 
with GATS Article XIX, Members had adopted Gu idelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services, the Modalities for the Treatment  of Autonomous Liberali zation and the Modalities 
for the Special Treatment for LDCs.  These instru ments continued to guide and provide the main 
direction for the negotiations.  They, inter alia , reaffirmed that the negotiations aimed to achieve 
progressively higher levels of liberalization, required  Members to give special attention to sectors and 
modes of supply of export interest to developing countries, and recognized the right of Members to 
regulate and to introduce new regulations.  In add ition, Members remained committed to intensifying 
their efforts to conclude the negotiations on rule -making in accordance with their respective mandates 
and deadlines.  Several Members had stressed th e importance of maintaining a balance between 
negotiations on rules and negotiations on specifi c commitments.  Members also had acknowledged 
that full engagement by all participants was of utmo st importance for the success of the negotiations.     TN/C/M/13 
 Page 5 
 
 
 21. As he had reported to the TNC on previous o ccasions, the quality of the offers on the table 
was generally modest and several Members had expressed disappointment in this regard.  Members agreed that an important future step in the negotia tions would be the submission of revised offers.  A 
decision on the date for revised offers would need to  take into account the particular nature of the 
services negotiations which relied mainly on the re quest-offer approach.  Advancing this process 
towards a successful conclusion might  require successive rounds of revisions that would consolidate 
the results of bilateral negotiations as well as wo rk undertaken by Members on technical issues.  
Several Members had indicated that the date for th e submission of revised offers should be three to 
four months prior to the Sixth Ministerial Confer ence.  At present, however, Members had not found 
it feasible to recommend a specific date for the submi ssion of revised offers.  The discussion of a date 
for the submission of revised offers had been ha mpered by the uncertainty about other key dates 
relating to the DDA negotiations, including the date of  the Sixth Ministerial Conference.  A date for 
the submission of revised offers should, however, be set and several Members had expressed the view 
that this date needed to be decided by the TNC as part of the expected outcome in July 2004.     
22. Members of the Special Session of the Council fo r Trade in Services should review all aspects 
of the negotiations in advance of the next Minist erial meeting in order to provide a full report, 
including any possible recommendations, to the TNC.     
23. It had been his hope to conclude this report by  saying that the Special Session had agreed on a 
set of recommendations on how to pursue further progress in the negotiations.  However, despite 
much good will, a consensus still eluded Members, but  delegations were worki ng hard and he trusted 
that by Friday agreed language could be submitted to the TNC.  If such agreement was not reached, 
he would then have to reflect on how  and what to report.  He added that delegations had been working 
on the basis of conditional trust, namely that even  if agreement was reached  in the Special Session, 
delegations would be free to withhold approval at  the TNC or at the General Council should they 
perceive that the balances or linkages did not meet their expectations.   
24. The set of recommendations being worked on were  very brief and opera tional in nature and 
with an agreement would include approximately the fo llowing elements: (i) initial offers;  (ii) the date 
for the submission of revised offers;  (iii) the quality of offers;  (iv) modes of supply of sectors of interest to developed countries;  (v) rule-making;  (v i) technical assistance;  and, (vii) what the Special 
Session should be doing with a view towards the Sixth Ministerial Conference.   
25. In his consultations and in the Special Session, many Members had expressed their concern 
and expectations that in the so-called July packag e, services negotiations be treated at the same level 
as agriculture and NAMA, particularly in light of the possibility that Members approved and agreed 
on a set of recommendations concerning the way forwar d.  He underlined that if an agreement was 
secured by Friday, this set of recommendation wo uld be language agreement upon by Members and 
not just the view of the Chairman on his own respons ibility.  Not only did many Members believe this 
was important, but in the last weeks representati ves of the private services industries of many 
Members such as Australia, Canada, Chile, the EC, Hong Kong China, India, Japan, Singapore and 
the United States had also echoed this concern and had come to Geneva to express their support for 
the negotiations and the expectation that this area be given the adequate prominence in any package. 
26. Mr. Ismail (South Africa), Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Trade and 
Development , said document TN/CTD/10 contained his report on the work of the CTD Special 
Session.  At the last TNC, he had informed Memb ers that the Special Session had held one formal 
meeting to discuss the structure of its future work.  He also had mentioned that at that formal meeting 
he had, in an attempt to take the Work Progr amme on special and diffe rential treatment (S&D) 
forward and to unlock the existing impasse, put three qu estions to Members:  First, he had asked what 
Members wished to do with the proposals on which th ey had already agreed to in principle; second, 
he had asked how Members felt th e current discussions on S&D could be made more productive; and TN/C/M/13 
Page 6  
 
 third, he had sought Members suggestions on the wa y forward so as to fulfil the Doha mandate of 
making S&D more precise, e ffective and operational. 
27. Based on these questions, he had held a number of  informal consultations in which he had 
suggested that engaging in a broader debate on the underlying development issues related to S&D 
would assist in identifying possible areas of conve rgence.  Some Members had expressed support for 
such an approach, while others had insisted on the need to focus on the Agre ement-specific proposals.  
However, Members had agreed on the need to ma ke more progress on S&D and had reiterated the 
importance of the development dimension of the DDA.  However, views had differed on whether or 
not it was opportune to harvest the package of  recommendations on the 28 Agreement-specific 
proposals or whether these should be adopted only af ter the package had been further strengthened.   
28. As a result of the ongoing work for the July package, he had continued to hold informal 
consultations to identify possible S&D elements for the July package.  Based on Members feedback in 
these consultations, it appeared that the developm ent component of the July package on S&D would 
constitute three elements:  first, a rededication a nd commitment to the development dimension of the 
WTO and the need to ensure that the Doha Round was a genuine development round; second, a 
decision on the 28 Agreement-specific proposals on wh ich Members had agreed to in principle; and 
third, an elaboration of the process that would unlock the current impasse and take the work on 
remaining issues forward.  
29. During these consultations, he had stressed the importance of agreeing on a set of guiding 
principles that would advance the work on S&D which could, inter alia , include a commitment to 
participate and strengthen the multilateral rules-base d system and work towards ensuring that this 
system was fair, balanced, coherent and supportive of  development.  His intention was to hold further 
bilateral and plurilateral consulta tions to build on these three elements.  An open-ended informal 
meeting had been scheduled for 5 July to discuss Members' views on the actual language that could 
constitute the S&D component of the July package, a nd he hoped that in the coming days and week he 
would receive sufficient feedback from Members to be able to put forward a text at the 5 July meeting 
to be forwarded to the Chairman of the General Council. 
30. Ambassador Jóhannesson (Iceland), Chairman  of the Negotiating Group on Market Access
, 
said that no written report had been provided to  Members for the present meeting.  As many 
delegations were aware, he had been holding intens ive consultations the past two days in order to 
prepare for the present meeting and there had been  no time to issue a written report taking into 
account these consultations.  However, the oral report he was making on his own responsibility was 
being made available in writing to all delegations. 
31. His report was as follows: 
 "The first part of my comments will focus on the work done to date in the Group.  
Following that I hope to offer some thoughts on my assessment of the overall progress made by the Group and the Group's future work. 
 
Status of Work 
 
 Under my chairmanship, the Group has held three meetings this year; in March, May 
and June.  My philosophy from the start has been that it was time for delegations to engage in 
an exercise of clarification and discussion with each  other.  My role as Chair was to facilitate 
discussions and not be the negotiator.  I also  requested Members to avoid making lengthy 
position statements,  which I felt would do more ha rm than good to the process.  It was also 
my perception that it was important for Members to feel a sense of ownership of any product that emerged from the NAMA Group.  To this e ffect, the three meetings, that I have just  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 7 
 
 
 referred to, were structured in such a manner so as to give delegations the maximum amount 
of time to engage in direct contacts.     For the sake of completeness I would like to highlight some aspects of these three 
meetings.  
 
 The first meeting
 of the Group in 2004 took place from 29-31 March and a report of 
that meeting has already been provided to the TNC in TN/MA/13.  This meeting was important in that it led to an effective resumption of the Group's work.  Delegations demonstrated a willingness to engage in frank discussions.  Also, there was an understanding 
in the Group that it was working to reach a framework on modalities by the end of July 2004.  
I would note that in addition to bilateral and plurilateral meetings, some delegations took the 
initiative to host open-ended cons ultations on a thematic basis.  
  The second meeting
 took place from 10-12 May and was also a productive session.  
The process by which the opportunity was given to delegations to meet on a one-to-one basis 
and engage in a real and meaningful manner w as considered constructive.  Delegations were 
active, and many indicated that the meetings  they had held were positive, with focused 
discussions and frank exchanges.  There had been a sincere attempt by Members to understand problems of their trading partners, and in some instances to explore possible solutions.  In this sense, negotiations appeared to have moved into a more dynamic phase.    
 
 Additionally, more work was done on the Group's mandate linked to non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs).  The generally held view until th at point in time had been that the work on 
NTBs was lagging somewhat behind that of tariffs .  Many delegations felt that now might be 
the time to focus on that area of the Group's ma ndate.  As a result, I requested the Secretariat 
to conduct an information session at that May meeting on the status of the Group's NTB 
work.  It was a very useful exercise as many questions were raised about the various NTBs notified and how they should be addressed.  It was also agreed that the Group at its next 
session would undertake a multilateral examination of  the NTBs which had been notified by 6 
Members under the new format.  The Group al so took note of the initiative taken by a 
Member to organize an open-ended NTB se ssion on wood and forest products, at which 
industry representatives were invite d to make presentations.    
  The third meeting
 of the Group which took place from 9-11 June was again useful in 
that a number of meetings took place between delegations to further clarify positions and 
issues.  What I found particularly encourag ing about this session was that delegations 
appeared to be discussing post-July matters.  As  part of the stock-taking exercise, one report 
was made regarding a plurilateral meeting held on sectorals which was found to be useful in 
overall terms.  Following this report an inte resting discussion ensued subsequent to a 
statement by a delegate in which he made reference to the NAMA aspects of Commissioners 
Lamy and Fischler's letter.  Strong and dive rgent views were expressed on these aspects.  
 
 At this meeting, the Negotiating Group also undertook a multilateral examination of 
notified NTBS on the basis of a Secretariat doc ument (JOB(04)/62).  The document contained 
a series of questions which it was hoped w ould help to focus the discussions.  The 
examination was useful in that it showed that  Members needed to do some more groundwork, 
and to dedicate more time to understanding the i ssues sufficiently.  In this respect, the Group 
agreed to hold another NTB session at its next  meeting, where it could discuss a process to 
address some of the issues raised in the multilateral examination.    Regarding new submissions, I would note that in the first half of this year two papers 
have been circulated and considered by th e Negotiating Group.  One was a paper setting out TN/C/M/13 
Page 8  
 
 the concerns of the ACP Group and another was a sectoral tariff elimination proposal on raw 
materials submitted by the United Arab Emirates.  This concludes my report on the status of 
work done by the Group in the first half of this year.  I would now like to turn to my overall assessment and the future work of the Group. 
 
Overall assessment and future work 
 
(i) Overall assessment
 
  My overall assessment is that since the begi nning of this year,  a lot of progress has 
been made in furthering the understanding am ong delegations of their respective concerns.  
External factors have helped the process but al so the current structure of meetings where 
more time was allocated for delegations to enga ge on a one-to-one basis has played its part in 
contributing to improving the atmospherics.  More  importantly, the polarized discussions that 
characterized the pre-Cancún phase were not so evident.     
 
 Especially in the area of NTBs, there has been progress.  Delegations have begun to focus on issues, and especially after the mu ltilateral examination exercise, Members have 
begun to realize that more work and input will be required from them if the process has to move forward.  Essentially the question bo ils down to what NTBs can be addressed 
effectively in the Group and in what manner.  I would note that there are some Members who 
are taking the initiative of looking at NTBs which exist in certain sectors; what I would call 
the sectoral/vertical approach.  Representatives of private industry involved in these sectors had also been invited to give their views to Members regarding the specific NTBs which 
could be addressed.  I have encouraged such initiatives on the understanding that this process 
is transparent and whatever results emerge  from this process are also multilateralized.  
 
(ii) Future work
 
  As many of you are aware, I have been hol ding a number of consultations these past 
few days in order to take stock of the state- of-play in the Group and in order to assess how the 
Group can move forward in order to reach its  objective of a framework on modalities by the 
end of July.  I would note that these consultations were particularly useful in that delegations 
were very candid about their positions and for that I would like to thank them.  This is certainly the kind of interaction that I would encourage.   While, the consultations did not permit me to detect and report to this Committee a 
common basis on which the Group can move forward at this stage, I would nevertheless like 
to say that, it is my perception that items on which further discussions on a NAMA modalities framework could take place are contained in Anne x B of the Cancún text.  Let me be clear, I 
am not making an assessment or drawing any co nclusions on how these items are covered in 
that text or whether all items of interest to  Members are covered.  But it is my perception 
which has been reinforced through discussions held since the beginning of my Chairmanship, 
that items/elements/aspects, whatever you choose to call them, of modalities on which 
discussions could be pursued are covered in this Annex.    In addition, I think it is important to stat e the following for the benefit of this body:  
 
 Firstly
, It is no secret that developments in agriculture do affect NAMA.  However, 
the strength or intensity of that linkage was brought home to me in the recent consultations by some delegations.  For those delegations this link is essential,  or as one delegation put it: it is 
"total".  While, fortunately our "ties" with ag riculture has not meant that substantive work in 
relation to clarifying issues has not taken place, in terms of a framework text, it is the reality  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 9 
 
 
 that those delegations will be reluctant to  advance on NAMA unless th ey see what shape the 
agricultural framework is going to take.  It has also been made clear to me that the notion of 
"conditional trust", a term I borrowed from the Chairman of the Agricultural Committee in 
Special Session, will be difficult for some delegatio ns to apply in practice at this juncture.  
This does cause me concern because unless we are able to take some steps now, we will be 
facing extreme pressure at a certain point in time to deliver a text at very short notice.  
Delegations are aware of the dangers of such an exercise.    I would also like to note for the record th at that there are many other delegations for 
whom this link does not exist and who woul d like to see work on a framework advance 
irrespective of the situation in other areas of the negotiations.  
  Secondly, there have been other developm ents since the Cancún Ministerial meeting 
for which further consideration w ould need to be given as to how they can best be addressed.  
 
 So we are facing a challenging situation but  I think the Group is capable of meeting 
it.  It is clear that a sense of ownership of the final product by Members is essential, and this will certainly guide my work as we move forward.    Turning to the future process, I would lik e to mention that I have postponed the 
formal meeting of the Group which was scheduled to take place from 6-8 July.  Instead my 
intention will be to hold informal consultati ons and perhaps an informal meeting of the 
Negotiating Group at that time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I would conclude by saying that I would count on the co-operation of all delegations 
to be available to work intensively during th e few weeks ahead of us.  You may be called 
upon at short notice and not at the most convenient hours.  I would simply note that negotiations are an exercise in compromise a nd that exercise has to start in the NAMA Group 
as soon as possible.  While I recognize the linka ge issues and the concept of the overall 
package,  it is important to bear in mind that NAMA is one of the components of that 
package.  If it does not deliver, then th e whole package is also at risk." 
 
32. Ambassador Groser (New Zealand), Chairman  of the Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture , said that on Friday, at the conclusion of th e last Agriculture Week, he had concentrated 
entirely on procedure and had foreshadowed that he would use the present TNC meeting to make an 
analysis of where Members stood on the heart of th e matter – what was the emerging shape on points 
of substance.  At the same ti me, he had been strongly encouraged, particularly by developing 
countries, to assert a more of a leadership role. 
33. He had a rather long statement to make at the present meeting in response to that challenge.  
He did not know whether to apologise for its length or  apologise for the time it had taken for him to 
put some substance before the membership as a whol e.  He had been saying for months that one had 
to have some substance to be transparent about.  He re it was.  It was of course a personal statement 
only for noting by the Chair.  He fully appreciated th at delegations would need time to digest it and it 
would need careful study in capitals.  It was bei ng made available in writing to all delegations. 
34. He would welcome feedback and ideas, incl uding on points delega tions thought he had 
missed: one person, no matter how strenuous their e fforts might be to attend consultations, visit some 
capitals, and meet senior representatives was still going to miss key points.  Further, delegations TN/C/M/13 
Page 10  
 
 would note that he had explicitly asked for furt her guidance from the membership on some crucial 
elements, some of them he had described as potential deal breakers.  
35. Finally, delegations should note that at the end of his analysis of the emerging points of 
substantive convergence, he would be making some remarks about how he saw the process to the end 
of July.  Obviously, he was working closely with the other Chairs, including most importantly the 
Chair of the General Council, and the Director General. 
36. His report was as follows: 
"Domestic Support : 
 I see convergence on the following points: 
 
An Overall Cut in Trade Distorting Support : 
 • In order to ensure that we achieve our mandated objective and to take account of the 
different support structures in various, main ly developed, countries I feel there is 
broad support emerging for the concept of an overall reduction commitment for trade 
distorting support.  That is, an overall cut in the sum of de minimis , amber and blue in 
order that the Framework implies an effective cut in trade distorting domestic support.  
 • This will require further creative thinking – but please, not creative thinking that will 
lead to the perverse and quite possibly unintended result that those who have steered 
through their domestic political processes major reductions in trade distorting 
support, and who are signalling their prepare dness to make perhaps larger percentage 
cuts than other major subsidisers, will be exp ected to make cuts from that base.  This 
is not realistic.  
 
As well as the overall commitment it is necessary to  limit recourse to individual elements of 
trade-distorting domestic support in order to ensure coherent results.  
Amber Box: 
 • Here, there seems to be acceptance that wh ere there are higher levels of support, there 
will be greater cuts.   
Product Specific Caps  and Reductions: 
 • There seems some resonance for the concep t of product specific caps with respect to 
AMS so as to ensure that non-subsidiser s do not face the perverse result that in a 
product of key interest to them, product-specific support might be increasing even if the overall level of AMS is declining. 
 • There is strong pressure to go further here: that is, product specific AMS reductions.  
However, my sense is that at the framewo rk stage, it may not be possible to go 
beyond flagging this as a possible outcome in the post-Framework negotiation.  
 
De Minimis: 
 • Reductions in the de minimis  level for developed countries seem widely accepted.   TN/C/M/13 
 Page 11 
 
 
 • A Framework could of course foreshadow the explicit possibility of negotiating the 
elimination of de minimis  completely.  I will need political guidance on this.  
I recognise it is linked to the treatment of Blue Box policies. 
 
The Blue Box: 
 
• The blue box is of course a key – perhaps the key - to this pillar.  There is, I believe, a 
general acknowledgement that the blue box can have a role in agriculture policy 
reform – a halfway house, as it were, in the movement from the most distorting categories of amber and de minimis  to eventually the green box.  
 
• The charge of ‘box shifting’ is something I have discouraged because I believe this is 
no longer a constructive criticism of certain members’ proposals. This 
recommendation is based on my assumption that  there is acceptance of the need for 
criteria in the blue box that will distinguis h blue payments clearly from those in the 
amber box – otherwise it would indeed amount to box shifting.  
 • As indicated, while I believe Members generally recognise that the Blue Box can play 
a role in the reform process, it neverthel ess remains in the trade-distorting category. 
To fulfil the Doha mandate, the Blue box cannot therefore be available for use 
without limit.  
 
• It may not be necessary to specify, at the Framework stage, what the precise limit will 
be; we are, I think, continuing to follow the working hypothesis of no direct numbers in the framework.  
 
• Having said that, because of the lack of uniformity in the way individual developed 
members decided to structure their trade distorting support after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, some flexibility may be re quired in exceptional circumstances where 
to implement any such possible limit would require a far more savage cut than might 
normally be required to reach such a cap on blue. 
 
• I need further guidance on whether the Framework should foreshadow a further 
reduction phase, and if so, under what conditions. 
 
The Green Box: 
 I have seen clear signs of convergence here in recent months: 
 • There will be a need, post Framework, for a clarification and review of the criteria to 
ensure that such green measures are having the desired effect of having no, or at most minimal, effects on trade and production.  Such a review would of course need to 
ensure that the basic concepts, principles  and effectiveness of the Green box remain. 
It is an essential part in the reform process of many members who have been the 
heaviest users of trade distorting support in the past. 
 • My impression from members is that many consider that there are serious 
deficiencies with the monitoring a nd surveillance of green box measures. 
Strengthening multilateral monitoring and surv eillance would be a key element of the 
post-framework negotiation. 
 TN/C/M/13 
Page 12  
 
 Special and Differential Treatment: 
 
• May I commence by noting on an entirely personal basis that the biggest single 
development component in the area of dom estic support will be the substantial 
reduction of developed country trade dist orting support. To restate the obvious: 
developing country treasuries cannot begin to compete on this playing field given 
competing development expenditure prior ities and huge pressure on their budgets.  
 • Nevertheless, some targeted forms of do mestic support will continue to be used by 
developing countries and the structure of our WTO commitments should permit this. 
My sense is that there is wide accepta nce among the membership that developing 
country users of domestic support could be e xpected to have longer time frames and 
lower targets for reductions in trade distorting domestic support. 
  Export Competition 
  
Key Points of Convergence: 
  
There is convergence around:   
• The framework should state that a credible  end point will be fixed in the course of 
this negotiation for the elimination of all forms of export subsidy;  
  • There will be some form of progressive re ductions built into any formula as we track 
down towards such an end point to ensure everything is not just postponed to the end 
date.  Consideration will also need to be given to the way in which such progressive 
reductions, tracking down to the end date, ta ke account of the adjustments required so 
as to avoid excessive political pressure to fi nd creative ways to circumvent the new 
disciplines.  The formula itself that this implies will be negotiated post-framework.  
  • There will also have to be equivalent disciplines on export credits STEs, and food aid. 
But precisely what those ‘equivalent disciplines’  should be is where we need to build 
convergence.  
    
Food Aid: 
  
• Food aid, while a critical component of this equation, is the less difficult issue 
because it is clear that no party is cha llenging the provision of genuine food aid. 
Those developing countries and NGOs that have recently re-emphasised their concerns at some recent radical interpre tations of the implications of parallelism 
should be assured that this is not
 at issue.  
 
• In the context of developing language for a Framework, we are clearly setting up the 
basis for a subsequent negotiation to deve lop operationally effective disciplines to 
prevent commercial displacement, includi ng in relation to surplus disposal. 
 
• Finding the right language on food aid parallelism is not , in my view, likely to be a 
deal breaker.  I sense progress being made in identifying the key food aid practices on which new operationally effective discip lines are required.  They include the 
objective of eliminating commercial displacement most obviously, but also issues  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 13 
 
 
 such as the role of international organisations, whether or not food aid should be 
provided in fully grant form.  
 • If any such new disciplines to be negotia ted in the post-Framework stage had the 
unintended effect of denying to former recipients other goods and services or 
financial resources linked in the past to food aid, it should be possible to identify 
alternative delivery mechanisms so as to  meet the legitimate concerns of the 
vulnerable countries concerned.  
  
Export Credits and Exporting State Trade Enterprises: 
  
Finding the right language for a framework on equivalent disciplines for export credits and 
export monopolies and other exporting state trading enterprises is
 however a potential deal 
breaker.   
There are two definitional terms at issue here: the term ‘export subsidy’ in the classical sense 
and the broader notion that has emerged of ‘e xport competition’.  This is the term which I 
assume we shall continue to use for this pillar.   The broader term that has evolved has policy 
implications, which are only now becoming clearer.   With respect to the first term – export subsidies in the classical sense – there is a high level of 
common understanding, both technically and politically, of what ‘elimination’ means.  We 
have had 50 years to develop definitions and jurisprudence that bears on this matter and a 
rather shorter time – let us say, since the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994, to ponder the long-term viability of permanent agriculture expor t subsidies in today’s world.  Some might 
say the ‘writing has long been  on the wall’ on this matter. 
  
But the writing is not
 on the wall, either technically or in terms of political expectations, for 
the other policy instruments of export credits and export state trading enterprises and similar entities, which are encompassed in the broader te rm ‘export competition’.  Elimination of any 
export subsidy element in these policy instruments is not contested by anyone.  But disciplines that reach further down into the underlying policy mechanisms are not quite as 
self-evident. 
  One option, in spite of this, would be for those Members whose Governments provide export 
credits or monopoly export arrangements to take a very deep breath and signal, either publicly 
or privately, that they will agree at the framework stage
 – that is to say, in the next few weeks, 
to abolish the Governmental instruments themselves.  
  There is an alternative.  Those same Govern ments could agree, or signal in a clearer way
 than 
they have up to now, their preparedness to agr ee to tough language in a framework that would 
focus our subsequent post-framework negotiation on:   
• With respect to export credits including export insurance and guarantees and the like, 
the framework language would foreshadow the elimination of any subsidy element 
and equivalent disciplines on the key para meters of maximum repayment terms or 
tenor, minimum up-front cash payments, interest rates and interest payments, risk premia, and guarantees against defaults, a nd coverage of long-term operating costs 
and losses.  Again, this is not an exclusive list but is my sense of the key parameters.  
  • With respect to export state trading entities and similar entities, elimination of any 
subsidy element, including elimination of an y element that provides for any ability to 
cross-subsidise; elimination of all forms of  government financing, elimination of any TN/C/M/13 
Page 14  
 
 government guarantees, elimination of government underwriting. Obviously, we 
might be able to develop langua ge on additional parameters.  
  These seem to me to be the two obvious ways to  meet the condition of parallelism applied to 
the broader concept of export competition.  Ther e may be other options but I am not aware of 
them.  This broad choice is essentially a political  one and needs the most urgent attention. 
  I should add that I am also aware that some  delegations wish to spread the ‘export 
competition’ net further beyond export credits and exporting state trading enterprises, to include disciplines on differential export taxes and maybe other policy areas.  
   
Developing Country Issues: Additional Elements: 
  
There are also some distinctive developing country  issues that need to be addressed.  Clearly, 
the elimination of all forms of export subsidy will in itself be a truly historic step forward for 
both developing country exporters of agricultu re and those competing with subsidised 
products in their domestic markets – I have ha d that reality recently re-affirmed by the 
statements of the African group and others.  But beyond the core discipline and its positive 
impact on development, there are some additional issues of an S&D nature.   • Special and differential treatment has a role to play in terms of elimination 
timeframes for developing countries and in relation to Article 9.4 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  Paragraph 4 of the Marr akesh Decision on Least Developed and Net 
Food Importing Developing Countries must be  implemented with respect to export 
credits.  More generally, and as indicated above in my comments on food aid, the needs of developing countries will be fact ored into the post-framework negotiations 
and appropriate recognition of this reality will need to be in any framework that I 
could envisage attracting a consensus.  
 •  More broadly, there may also be a need  to recognise that ex ceptional circumstances 
could arise where the disciplines we shall seek to develop post-framework on food aid and export credits might not meet the requirements of particularly vulnerable 
developing countries in exceptional circumstances to cover import needs and or to 
finance imports on a commercial basis. 
  I should emphasise that this latter idea would need  to be developed with great care so as to 
allow such flexibility without having the unint ended effect of undermining the very core 
disciplines we envisage in this pillar.  A ‘place holder’ to allow detailed examination of such a 
provision is likely to be required in the framework .  It would be very difficult to take this 
further before the core formula emerges, pos t-framework, in the export competition area. 
    
Market Access: 
  
I have been saying at successive meetings of  the agriculture group that by far the least 
developed of the pillars was market access.  I was not expressing a novel or a personal view: 
this was widely shared by negotiators.  Many  considered they could see the broad outline or 
‘esquisse’ , to use an old negotiators’ word from the Uruguay Round, of a deal on domestic 
support and export competition but noth ing comparable on market access. 
  The Derbez text had incorporated an appro ach from earlier ‘frameworks’ called a ‘blended 
formula’.      TN/C/M/13 
 Page 15 
 
 
 It is of utmost importance here not to confu se ends with means.  The political and economic 
objectives that led to the blended formula were neither wrong nor misplaced.  We are simply 
now at that stage of a negotiation where alte rnative means of achieving the same objectives 
need to be explored.   Problems Identified with the Blended Formula: 
  
The blend of a Swiss formula and a Uruguay Ro und formula was intended to deal with two 
conflicting objectives: the first objective was liberalisation through a harmonised reduction - 
the Swiss formula was, and remains, a means to  that end; the second objective was to provide 
some way of handling the most sensitive products  which would not fit comfortably into any 
tariff formula that targeted the highest tariffs  for aggressive reduction.  Both these objectives 
remain central to the design of an acceptable Framework.   The specific problems with the blended formula, if I have understood your concerns properly, 
include: 
 • First, and perhaps most importantly, it did not adequately take account of your tariff 
structures, which differ widely.  This was a point of particular concern to many developing countries. 
 
• Second, a number of developing countries had expressed concern over the ability of a 
blended formula to deal with the issue of proportionality: the concept of lesser cuts 
over longer time periods for developing countries is a key requirement, derived from 
our mandate, for our negotiation. 
 
• Third, the blended formula did not give  exporting countries, whether developed or 
developing, the assurances they needed th at there could indeed be substantial 
improvements in access for those products in  the sensitive category or that such a 
category would be appropriately limited.  Agai n, this concern was rooted in the need 
to ensure consistency with a key requiremen t in our mandate – namely, the concept of 
‘substantial improvement’ in market access. 
 
Finally, and I fully ac knowledge that I may be expressing a personal view here, this attempt 
to shoe-horn developing countries, in spite of the vast differe nces in their rural situations from 
those experienced in the agriculture sectors of  developed countries, into a single blended 
formula was predictably creating demands for what might be described as ‘turbo-charged 
special and differential treatment’.  It was certainly clear that a number of vulnerable 
developing countries considered that there was no way they could pers uade their governments 
to adopt anything approaching this formula.  Generally, it has been my personal experience 
that if you press people too hard and don’t listen to their concerns you run the risk of provoking a counter-reaction that may, in th e end, perversely move the whole game 
backwards. 
 
Interest in Exploring a Tiered Approach: 
 
That is the background to the move away from the blend.  My sense is:  
• There is now wide interest in exploring a tiered approach. 
 • A tiered approach would intrinsically ta ke account of the starting point of all 
participants – their existing bound tariff stru ctures and thus, at least potentially, an 
answer to the widespread concern that th e Swiss component within a blended formula TN/C/M/13 
Page 16  
 
 might impose unnecessarily harsh adjustment on countries whose tariffs were 
concentrated in one or other range.  
 • Third, my sense is that there is interest in exploring different liberalisation techniques 
within each band so as to afford negotiato rs the flexibility they need to reach 
agreement in the post-Framework modalities stage.  
 
Sensitive Products: Their ‘Selection’ and ‘Treatment’. 
 
Interest in exploring a new more flexible single approach does not however mean another 
central problem has gone away: the matter of  the selection and treatment of sensitive 
products.   As members know, I have concentrated my informal  consultations on this matter.  I will come 
to the additional flexibilities required for developing countries later.  
 
I see a basic trade-off here that delegations from the most defensive countries now, I believe, 
need to face up to.  Some Members have cr eated negotiated positions clearly designed to 
ensure that, with respect to sensitive products, they could – let me use plain English here – 
have their cake and eat it too.  Nothing unusual about that – at the declaratory phase of a 
negotiation .  But I think we are past that.  We are trying to solve problems now.  
 
However, to be fair to the countries I ha ve in mind, I would make two points.  
 • First, I am well aware that an evoluti on of attitude is taking place on this matter 
informally, in some quarters perhaps th is is more advanced than others.  
 
• Second, while I have done what I can to involve them in the informal negotiations I 
have been chairing, I am aware they are looking for additional opportunities to 
participate more effectively in effective negotiations.  It is a little rough to accuse 
people of showing inadequate flexibility if  they have had onl y limited opportunities 
to engage in real negotiations. 
  
On the other side of the divide in our member ship, namely the exporters, I do not believe the 
exporting countries will accept:  a on the one hand, unconstrained freedom to select the number of tariff lines deemed to 
be ‘sensitive’ – that is, not necessarily subject to the core liberalisation formula or formulae; 
 b on the other hand, unconstrained flexibilit y in the treatment to be accorded such 
products once so selected.   Until this is clarified, it should be no surprise that important exporter interests are objecting 
even to the way sensitive products are described.  This is, in my view, the substance behind 
this otherwise arcane debate between whether sen sitive products are considered an ‘integral 
part’ of the formula or ‘exceptions’.   I have concentrated my informal consultations  – please recall that I have involved well over 
twenty delegations representing many interests and many coalitions in this negotiation – on 
this matter.  I am tending to the following conc lusions on which I would ask you to reflect on 
with the greatest care:    TN/C/M/13 
 Page 17 
 
 
 • An arbitrary number to limit the number of  so-called sensitive products is unlikely to 
attract a consensus.  If a product is sensitiv e, it is sensitive.  That is the political 
reality.  However, it is also clear that selection cannot be completely open.  We need to explore urgently what I have  called ‘constrained flexibility’. 
  
• But we cannot just stop at that point.  The real issue, beyond selection, is the 
treatment of sensitive products and consiste ncy with our mandate.  First, I do not 
believe we shall ever conclude  this negotiation on the basis of an interpretation of the 
Doha mandate that the phrase ‘substantial improvements’ was intended to exempt any tariff line.  
  
• Some of the countries with a variety of sensitive products have suggested that the 
answer lies in ‘some combination of tariff cuts and tariff rate quota commitments’.  I 
think that is a good start, but I would urge more precision in order to reach convergence.  It cannot be ‘pick and choose’ .  There is clearly a role for tariff quota 
expansion, and reduction or elim ination of in quota tariffs in this equation, but I think 
again it would be unwise for me to be  too prescriptive at this stage.  
 Other issues that will impinge on the choices to be made include the question of a tariff cap 
and how it might relate to a tiered approach, tariff escalation, and the special agricultural 
safeguard.  We are not trying to arrive at detailed agreements on all these matters at the 
Framework stage but we need to ensure we have  an adequate agreed base for the subsequent 
modalities negotiation.   The treatment of sensitive products even at the Framework Stage remains, in my firm view, a 
potential deal breaker for members on both sides of the argument – exporters as well as 
developed and developing importers.  Getting this right now see ms to be the critical challenge 
for the market access pillar.  I should also add that in terms of the soundings I have taken, 
particularly with countries using export subsidies,  greater clarity on this point is probably the 
crucial issue in terms of balance for many members.   
Developing Countries: Additional Considerations: 
 
As an opening comment, I have been strongly encouraged by a number of developing 
countries to make the point that the deve lopment needs of our developing country 
membership is not
 one and the same thing as providing flexibility from a defensive, or import, 
perspective.  That is an essential part of it,  but not the whole matter.  The development 
dimension also demands that the export interests of developing countries influence the speed 
and depth of the post-framework market access ne gotiations.  There is a particular concern 
here with respect to tropical products but the point is also a general one. 
 Turning now to the matter of required flexib ilities for the developing countries, I have not 
focussed my attention in the informal nego tiating process on the matter of sensitive products 
for developing countries, including the important issue of SP and SSM.  
 However, the reasons for this ar e I believe well understood.  At an informal consultation I had 
only last night with the African group, one coll eague asked me if I thought there was a high 
degree of convergence on these concepts since a st atement to that effect would give some 
comfort for the smaller or more vulnerable deve loping countries.  I can say today I have no 
doubt that there is a high degree of convergen ce in the membership on these concepts and 
they will need to be fully developed in the post-Framework stage.   TN/C/M/13 
Page 18  
 
 Finally, I am well aware that any framework w ill also need to provide some language to 
ensure that an adequate work programme is in  place, for the post-framework stage, for such 
matters as special products, the special safegua rd mechanism, preferences, duty free access 
for least developed countries and other deve loping countries, and no reduction commitments 
for the LDCs.  
 
Recently Acceding Members: 
 
The Framework will need to recognise the leg itimate concerns of recently acceded Members. 
Many of them are already engaged on aggr essive and often incomplete liberalisation 
programmes that will take their tariffs on ag riculture well below levels in a number of 
important developed countries.    
Cotton: 
 Here, I wish to say today simply that I am continuing my consultations with the proponent 
countries.  These negotiations are proceeding in an  excellent atmosphere.  I have noted with 
care the exceptional reference in the G-8 Su mmit communiqué to the special significance of 
cotton and am trying to identify ways of meeting the concerns of proponents.  However, I am 
not ready to make a recommendation today to  the countries concerned on how cotton might 
best be treated in the structure of  this negotiation and on what terms. 
  
 
The Process from Here: 
 
I have not, let me assure you, started to draft a Framework but the above will give you some 
guidance on where my thinking as the Chair lies and the key points on which I need further 
advice, decisions and above all, convergence.  I am acutely conscious that the Director Gene ral and the General Council Chair will need to 
circulate, before the middle of July, a draft te xt that includes annexes in framework language 
on agriculture and other topics.  I have my eye firmly fixed on that target, though I remain 
flexible on how such an agriculture would be drafted.  
 Above all, I want to ensure that this is a st ructure that, while shaping firmly the negotiations 
over the last remaining weeks, is still open to negotiation.  For reasons relating to both 
substance and the crucial matter of political owne rship that we have talked about extensively 
in the past, it is essential the Membership as a whole has time to digest the matter and 
influence the outcome.  Nobody from the largest  to the smallest Member expects to get 
everything they want, but all must have their opportunity.  On the precise timing, let me end on a whimsica l note.  Yesterday, I was having lunch with 
some colleagues.  As I sat on the Terrace of the restaurant overlooking the magnificent 
European rural landscape, whose produce, for a ll I know, may have been produced with trade 
distorting support and exported with export s ubsidies for generations, I admitted to my 
colleagues that I had a little trouble relating to the furious debate earlier that morning on the 
timing of my paper.  Somehow, I doubted the rea lity that the future of this rural landscape 
depended critically on my judgement as to whet her it was 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 July when I 
hand my paper to Ambassador Oshima.  
 However, I am open to your advice and will take  what seems to me to be the least risky 
option." 
  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 19 
 
 
 37. The Chairman  thanked the Chairpersons for their repor ts and for the hard work they had put 
in on behalf of everyone during this crucial period.  He was reassured that Members would be able to 
continue to count on them in the rema ining weeks before the July meetings. 
38. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the reports of the Chairpersons of the bodies 
established by it. 
2. Statements by participants 
39. The representative of the European Communities  said the reports by the Chairpersons gave an 
excellent overview of where the membership stood ju st four weeks away before the General Council 
at the end of July.  Much hard work had been  invested in the negotiating groups, in numerous 
informal meetings and in a great variety of Minist erial gatherings.  This time, the membership as a 
whole, as well as the different gr oupings, was much better prepared on the various substantive matters 
than had been the case in the period prior to the Cancún Ministerial.  Moreover, this time around, 
there appeared to be widespread political commitmen t to agree to a substantive package of decisions 
by the end of July and it was now up to the Geneva  negotiations to match the expectations which had 
been raised consistently by Ministers. 
40. After listening to the various reports, his de legation believed this was perfectly doable, 
provided that delegations focused on essentials and avoided back loading the process.  He called upon 
all delegations to refrain from the usual tactical ga mes which had been part and parcel of the Geneva 
process.  It had been said time and again that agri culture was the lynchpin of the overall package, and 
while not denying this, his delegation believed it was equally important to ensure an adequate 
development dimension and an overall balance betw een the core elements of the July package. 
41. On agriculture, his delegation was encouraged by the preparatory work so far.  The extensive 
work in the various informal groups had been usef ul and positions had been clarified.  Members had 
engaged, differences had been narrowed and some convergence on cr ucial issues was emerging.  It 
was common ground now that all three pillars should be treated in an equal way with the same level 
of specificity.  It was generally accepted that the fra mework should allow for the full realisation of the 
Doha mandate. 
42. It was equally accepted that all Members' sen sitivities should be properly addressed – both of 
developing and developed countries.  These sensitiv ities were crucial as far as market access was 
concerned.  It appeared from the report by the Chai rman of the Agriculture Special Session that some 
progress had been made in this respect, particularly  as far as the defensive interests of developing 
countries were concerned.  The S&D toolkit was wide-ranging and should ensure that weak and 
vulnerable developing countries remained largely exempt from trade liberalization commitments.  
Moreover, full account would be taken of development needs such as food security and rural 
development.  But more work needed to be done on securing an appropriate formula to take account 
of sensitive products in developed countries.   
43. While in export competition th e membership endorsed and widely appreciated the European 
Communities' conditional offer on export subsidi es had been appreciated and the concept of 
parallelism endorsed, much remained to be done to make it operational.  In  domestic support, there 
was an historic opportunity to reduce substantia lly trade-distorting domestic support, but Members 
still needed to ensure an equal contribution to r ealise this.  While acknowledging that in agriculture 
the devil was in the detail, the Community believe d that delegations should refrain from creating too 
much detail in the framework whic h they were trying to shape.  It remained a framework and 
negotiations on numbers were for the subsequent stage. TN/C/M/13 
Page 20  
 
 44. It was now up to the Chairman of the Agriculture  Special Session to find the appropriate level 
of specificity for an acceptable framework that could both meet the Doha level of ambition and 
address Members' sensitivities.  His delegation would e xpect that by the end of the following week a 
full Chairman's draft would be on the table, including an Annex A for agriculture.  The detailed report of the Agriculture Chairman showed that this c ould be done, allowing for some gaps and brackets.  
Delegations now needed a single text under the aut hority of the Chairman which enabled the entire 
membership to enter into the fina l stage of preparation of the July  package.  It was clear that 
delegations would need time to further narrow down differences and to fine-tune the text, but by now 
this should be done with the full involvement of  the entire membership which obviously did not 
exclude further informal meetings in whatever con centric circles.  Members could not afford once 
again to fail as a consequence of a time squeeze in  the final stage of negotiations.  This time the 
process had to be right and each and every one shou ld have the opportunity to fully engage in the 
negotiations. 
45. Turning to the development dimension, he said it was crucially important to get this right.  
His delegation agreed with the elements that th e Chairman of the CTD Special Session had outlined 
for inclusion in the July pack age.  The first point – rededication and commitment to the WTO 
development dimension – was paramount.  This should permeate the framework for modalities in 
agriculture and NAMA to ensure that appropriate responses were found to the particular challenges 
faced by weak and vulnerable economies in integrati ng more fully into the global trading system and 
as a result of the erosion of non-reciprocal trade pr eferences.  The development paragraph should give 
a clear political message in this respect.  From a de velopment perspective, it was equally important to 
find the right policy response to the cotton producer pr oponents, who were entitled to this.  As far as 
the trade aspect was concerned, it was doable as pa rt of the agriculture negotiations.  On the 
development aspects, the Cotonou Seminar had been  most useful and it appeared that major 
development partners – not in the least the Eur opean Union and its Members States – were fully 
prepared to play their part through effective TR TA programmes involving the various strands of the 
cotton production and supply chain.  More generally, Members should re-emphasise the importance of 
addressing supply side constraints through TRTA and capacity building.  This should be one of the 
major elements of the development paragraph and as a major donor, the European Union and its 
Member States remained very much committed to it. 
46. On NAMA, notwithstanding critics from left and right, the Derbez text reflected a workable 
compromise.  As was well known, his delegation had a number of significant concerns on the text, but 
it had so far refrained from insisting on specific chang es provided that others showed similar restraint.  
This was to avoid unravelling what could be a reasonable basis to carry the work forward.  
Delegations would need to find the right balance between ambition and development needs.  The text 
might need some further fine tuning, but Members s hould keep in mind that they were dealing with a 
framework, and that substantive market opening nego tiations would occur in the subsequent stage of 
the negotiations.  As far as the European Commun ities was concerned, there should be no doubt on 
the importance of this dossier for the overall balance of the Doha Round. 
47. The same was true for services and his delegation was somewhat encouraged by the report by 
the Chairman of the Services Special Session.  Wh ile it was true that the number of offers had 
increased to 65, the overall quality of the offers rema ined totally insufficient.  More initial offers, and 
above all a better quality, were needed.  His dele gation was looking forward to the recommendations 
of the Services Special Session in this respect a nd strongly supported setting a date for the submission 
of revised offers by the TNC in the context of the July package. 
48. Turning to the Singapore issues, he said that by now this should no longer be an issue.  Three 
out of four would no longer be part of the Single Undertaking and consequently no longer part of the 
DDA and of no relevance whatsoever for the Round .  On trade facilitation, Members should work  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 21 
 
 
 hard to give some additional comfort on issues such as costs and DSU aspects.  This should be doable, 
enabling Members to adopt modalities and launch negotiations. 
49. In conclusion, he wished to stress the need for a focused package – in the line with the 
General Council Chairman's skeleton.  Delegations would need to put some flesh on the skeleton, but 
they needed to be wary of any tendency to obesi ty, now considered one of the major plagues of 
modern society.  His delegation called on all Memb ers to keep the package lean, clean and mean to 
the benefit of all. 
50. For brevity's sake, he had not reacted to the othe r reports, but he would offer a few remarks.  
On DSU, his delegation endorsed the continuation of  further work.  The issue of GIs was still very 
much a target within the Community's sight and he  might revert to it in the Heads of Delegations 
meeting which would follow.  Th e negotiations in the Special Session of the TRIPS Council also 
remained a priority for his delegation.  On rul es, his delegation agreed with the Negotiating Group 
Chairman's assessment of the work so  far.  Rules might not be in the forefront of negotiations at this 
stage, but would very much be part of the overa ll balance at the end of the Round.  On trade and 
environment, he agreed with the TNC Chairman's  reaction to the Chairman's report.  Rules and 
procedures in this field were important in order to prevent any further crises between the WTO and 
MEAs. 
51. The representative of Nigeria , on behalf of the African Group , said he wished to make a 
statement of a general nature on both process and subs tance, highlighting certain issues of interest and 
concern which the Group wished to be taken into co nsideration in the preparation of the July package 
and in future work on the DDA.  On process, the Group wished to reiterate the criteria which should 
be observed in preparing the July package and in th e work ahead.  The process should be all inclusive, 
transparent and consensus based.  In  addition, development should be a key element in all aspects of 
the negotiations to ensure a balanced outcome whic h should reflect the current state of play in the 
negotiations. 
52. On substance, the Group's key concerns in the agriculture negotiations were the NFIDCs/LDC 
issue, LDC exemptions and access, longstanding pr eferences, special products/special safeguard 
mechanism and obstacles posed by some export competition and domestic support measures to further 
access of African countries with substantial export interests.  The Group's objective was that these 
issues be dealt with effectively and meaningfully and should feature prominently and in detail in any 
framework agreement.  In addition, the Group also believed that further reform in agriculture should 
aim to attain the objectives set out in the Doha mandate.  Each round of agriculture negotiations 
should take into account the need for appropriate policy space that would allow African countries to 
pursue agricultural policies that were supportiv e of their development goals, poverty reduction 
strategies and food security and livelihood concerns.  Furthermore, the framework and the associated 
modalities should address all the three pillars in a ba lanced and equitable manner, and, in accordance 
with the Doha mandate, binding, precise and effective S&D treatment should be an  integral part of all 
elements of the negotiations on agriculture. 
53. On NAMA, the Group was concerned at the oral report by the Chairman of the Negotiating 
Group on the current state of play in the negotiati ons.  The Group had met with the Chairman and had 
conveyed its concerns on the negotiations.  It was of the view that the Derbez text alone could not be 
the basis of preparing any framework on NAMA and that  there was the need to take into consideration 
the positive elements and proposals that had been put forward by Members.  The Derbez text, and the 
other proposals including that of the Group, should be the basis of preparing a framework on NAMA 
and also for future work and the Group called on the Chairman to take this into account. 
54. On the report by the Chairman of the CTD Special Session, the Group had difficulty with 
Chairman's proposal to harvest the 28 Agreement-spec ific proposals that had been agreed in principle TN/C/M/13 
Page 22  
 
 since they did not have any economic value or si gnificance.  The Group urged developed Members to 
show the necessary flexibility and political will so as  to achieve tangible results in this area.  The 
Group also called on the Chairman to intensify cons ultations so that meaningful results could be 
achieved in this important area. 
55. On cotton, the Group wished to underscore the importance of this issue to the economies of 
many African countries.  In this regard, the Group st ressed that the issue be dealt with as a stand-alone 
issue and not be included as part of the agriculture package.  An appropriate and effective solution on 
cotton should cover both the trade and developmenta l aspects of the Cotton Initiative.  The Group 
reiterated the need to find an early and effective solution to the issue. 
56. Since the Doha Round was a development Round , the Group wished to emphasize the need to 
give more attention to the development com ponents of the DDA by addressing all development-
related issues.  The Group wished to see tangible pr ogress and results in both the July package and the 
subsequent work ahead.  The Group believed that the membership needed to send a positive message 
to the outside world that it was really committed to development.  In conclusion, the Group reaffirmed 
its commitment and engagement in all aspects of the negotiations as well as its readiness to participate 
constructively, so as to achieve a framework that wa s acceptable to all Members by the July deadline.  
The sense of urgency to have a package by the Ju ly deadline should not, however, deviate attention 
from having a package that was both good and development friendly. 
57. The representative of the United States
 said Members had 31 days – one month – to finalize 
agreements on the frameworks that had eluded them  at Cancún.  Time was short and delegations 
needed to transform general sentiments of good will in to action.  This was a tough job.  The challenge 
was to produce a package that put the Round back on track.  This did not require producing a new 
Ministerial declaration at this point.  Rather, Memb ers needed to concentrat e on setting the stage for 
the next phase of the negotiations and the ultimat e success of the DDA.  To succeed, delegations had 
to ensure that the results in July maintained a high level of ambition and provide d the substance 
necessary for negotiators to work, while reflecting the overall balance of the Single Undertaking that 
Ministers had agreed at Doha was essential to the DDA.   
58. The task that delegations needed to complete w as clear:  to produce a fairly simple, compact 
package that reflected all the interests and commit ments of Members and a programme of work that 
enabled Members to address their concerns and inter ests in the next stage of the negotiations.  The 
question was whether delegations had the necessary i ngredients.  The reports from the Chairpersons 
suggested that delegations were making head way, but it would require additional focus, 
determination, flexibility and a readin ess to compromise to meet the goal. 
59. At the recent G-8 Summit hosted by President Bush, Leaders had pledged their commitment 
to the DDA negotiations.  More specifically, they ha d instructed Ministers to seize this moment of 
strategic economic opportunity by achieving global re duction to barriers to trade in order to deepen 
the emerging growth being experien ced by various regions in the world.  The commitment of the 
Leaders had been very explicit.  They had said that  the multilateral trading system was the best means 
of achieving greater and effective trade libera lization and stronger global trade rules.   
60. They had focused on the most pressing task ah ead – pushing ahead on the core issues in the 
negotiations, which were the drivers of economic development and growth, namely substantially 
reducing trade-distorting agricultural subsidies a nd barriers to access to markets; opening markets 
more widely to trade in goods; expanding oppor tunities for trade in services; overhauling and 
improving customs rules and other relevant procedures to facilita te trade; and advancing the 
development of all countries, especially the poorest, within the WTO system.  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 23 
 
 
 61. Agriculture was without doubt the key to generati ng progress in other core issues of the DDA.  
The Agriculture Chairman's report had indicated the distance Members had come since Cancún in 
developing the needed framework to continue, bu t he had also identified several key issues that 
needed to be addressed to achieve a July package.  Specifically, th e following concepts were at the 
centre of the detailed discussions between Members:  (i) establishing a credible end-point for the 
elimination of export subsidies a nd parallel treatment of other trade-distorting export practices; (ii) 
substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic s upport (i.e., substantially larger reductions for the 
most trade-distorting means of support than had been agreed in the Uruguay Round); and (iii) 
substantial improvements in market access by formulas – more effective than those that had been used 
in the Uruguay Round – that would ensure that  high tariffs were cut more than others. 
62. Discussions managed by the Agriculture Chairman  were helping to clarify the issues and 
develop approaches to address specific formulas and c oncepts.  In the coming weeks, much effort 
would be required of all – at both the technical a nd political levels – to ensure that there were 
approaches on all three pillars, approaches that co mported with the Doha mandate and yielded both 
ambition and specificity to take Members to the ne xt phase of negotiations.  However, Members could 
not afford to sit back and wait for results in agricult ure to be delivered.  Delegations needed to ready 
the other elements for July, so that  the package could come together. 
63. The NAMA text that had emerged from Cancún had provided a sufficient basis to carry the 
work forward.  On the one hand, each delegation c ould offer its own set of changes, but that most 
likely would result in lengthening the debate excessively and would divert delegations from 
substantive negotiation.  Alternativ ely, delegations could agree that the text identified the areas for 
work, and set out a plan to carry work forward into the next phase of negotiations.  The United States 
believed that, at the present meeting, delegations s hould confirm for the Chairman of NAMA that the 
latter approach was the way to proceed.  It was necessary to be practical and determine that the 
elements for a good result in market access were ev ident in the text and in the post-July period, 
Members needed to further elaborat e these elements into modalities.  For this reason, at this stage his 
delegation advocated agreeing upon a roadmap that  moved Members forward and would enable 
negotiators to find the right balance betw een ambition and the needed flexibility. 
64. The services negotiations were the third critical element in securing the necessary 
liberalization to move the global economy forward.  The United States believed that, in keeping with 
the Doha mandate, the July package should highlig ht the importance of achieving progressive and 
substantial liberalization across all sectors and modes of supply in the services negotiations.  The 
United States also believed that the TNC should set  a date for submission of improved offers and 
suggested that the date be determined in relation to  other key dates that might be established for other 
aspects of the DDA market access negotiations.  Th e treatment of services was worthy of specific 
attention in the July package.  His delegation was hopeful that by the end of  the week the Services 
Chairman would have recommendations to be approved at the end of July.  
65. The United States was pleased that the debate on the Singapore issues had been replaced with 
a serious effort to launch negotiations on trade fa cilitation in July, which was clearly an essential 
element of the package.  Questions remained, but th e shift in focus was welcome.  The ingredients for 
modalities on trade facilitation were evident.  Like others, the United States saw a unique opportunity 
for the negotiations to draw upon a broad array of experiences and resources to develop a creative, 
can-do approach to these negotiations.  His delegation wished to negotiate an agreement that could be 
implemented, even if in some cases, for some Members, it might take some more time, and technical 
assistance, to do so.   
66. Questions remained about what to do with the other issues identified at the WTO's first 
Ministerial meeting in Singapore.  For its part, the Un ited States was ready to work with others to find 
the appropriate and fair compromise that would enable Members to move forward.  It was clear that TN/C/M/13 
Page 24  
 
 the three issues of competition, investment and tran sparency in government procurement would not be 
part of the Single Undertaking.  Nevertheless, it might be beneficial, even to the opponents of 
negotiations on these subjects, to maintain a modest  degree of study within the WTO to enable all 
Members to determine for themselves the rele vance of these issues to their trade goals. 
67. Like others, the United States saw the question of development permeating the work in the 
DDA.  His delegation was grateful to the CTD Speci al Session Chairman in helping to build on the 
progress to date and was ready to consider how best  to implement the results secured before Cancún 
on the specific proposals that had been submitted by some of the smaller and poorer economies.  That 
said, the work was far from finished on this topic.  A new work plan for the fu ture was needed and to 
succeed, everyone needed to be practical a nd pragmatic as the negotiations proceeded. 
68. One area singled out after Cancún for work had b een the important question of cotton.  When 
Leaders at the G-8 had agreed on their statement on tr ade, they had flagged cotton as a particular issue 
that required attention.  In their remarks they had st ated that:  "cotton, a matter of primary concern to 
our African partners, can be best addressed ambiti ously as part of the agricultural negotiations, while 
at the same time working on development related issu es with the international financial institutions".  
His delegation thought this provided a sound basis on  which to build as the negotiations in the WTO 
proceeded.  His delegation was pleased to report to Members that since the important meeting on cotton in Benin, a number of steps were being taken to focus on the pr oblems in this area.  The United 
States had held special meetings in Africa focusi ng on science and technology, where cotton had been 
given prominence.  The following month, in partners hip with the U.S. National Cotton Council, there 
would be a programme for the countries that had ta ken this initiative at Cancún on cotton.  The focus 
was on diversification and cooperati on, and it would explore ways and means to diversify, facilitate 
reform and promote growth.  The United States w ould work with others to ensure that the 
development-related aspects of this sector continued to move forward, through bilateral efforts, and in 
cooperation with the international financial institutions.  His delegation looked forward to the report 
by the Secretariat on progress to date and remain ed committed to the appropriate follow through. 
69. In addition, he wished to call attention to  a brand new U.S. assistance programme, over and 
above the current assistance, called the Millennium  Challenge Account (MCA).  In January, the 
United States Congress had authorized the Millennium  Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer 
the MCA and had provided $1 billion in initial fundin g for fiscal year (FY) 2004.  President Bush had 
pledged to increase funding for the MCA to $5 b illion a year starting in FY 2006, roughly a 50% 
increase over current U.S. core development assist ance.  The MCC would establish results-oriented 
partnerships with the countries that qualified for funding and would enter into a proposal, or 
"compact," with each recipient country that laid out  mutually agreed concrete objectives, benchmarks 
and responsibilities.  In May, the MCC had selected  16 initial countries to be eligible to develop a 
compact to receive MCA assistance.  He was also pleased to report that the U.S. Congress had taken 
important steps to address concerns of African part ners by extending the special programme of tariff 
preferences under the African Growth and Oppor tunity Act (AGOA), which would ensure tariff 
preferences until 2015.   
70. His delegation noted that many partners had ra ised concerns about implementation issues.  
There were many differences of views about the best  way forward in this area and there were many 
competing agendas.  Like others, his delegation belie ved that the outcome that had been proposed at 
Cancún offered the best means of accommodating c oncerns.  It was the responsibility of the TNC, 
negotiating bodies and other WTO bodies to find appr opriate solutions.  The Director-General had 
undertaken consultations in the past, and he shoul d continue to do so.  The United States would 
continue to pursue proposals in the negotiating groups aimed at addressing many of these issues. 
71. He had not mentioned each and every point of the agenda and work programme agreed at 
Doha, but he wished to reassure partners that th e United States fully respected the bargain it had  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 25 
 
 
 struck at Doha and would continue to act accordingly.   In the area of rules, for example, his delegation 
had been an active participant in the work to date, both tabling substantive proposals and actively 
engaging in the dialogue on proposals by others. 
72. On the paper to be presented by the Chairmen  of the General Council and the TNC, Members 
should not at this point become fixated on a specific arbitrary date for its delivery.  Rather, the timing 
and the structure of this paper should be guided by the need to strike the right balance between the 
ripeness of the issues and the need to provide ad equate time to Members to absorb the paper and 
engage on the issues in time to comp lete the work by the end of July. 
73. Members stood at the verge of an historic economic opportunity.  Estimates varied, but the 
there was the potential to lift out of poverty somewhere between 300 and 500 million people by 2015, 
if Members succeeded in achieving ambitious results, especially in the core negotiating agenda.  Thus, 
everyone had a powerful incentive to ensure that a si gnificant next step was taken in July toward this 
achievement.  It would take hard work, determinat ion and flexibility on the part of all.  The United 
States was committed to playing its leadership role in meeting this challenge and working together 
with all, and it hoped and trusted that others were ready to play their part. 
74. The representative of Switzerland  urged the Chairman to start the real multilateral process as 
soon as possible.  Flexibility would not fall from h eaven and at least one week was needed for 
Members to arrange their negotiating positions in re lation to a text.  Members could not achieve the 
package needed by the end of July without a di scussion on substance and everyone needed to be 
inspired by a real-world approach  rather than by dogmas or abstract concepts.  His delegation hoped 
that as the process advanced, clearer and more pos itive signals would come out from all groups and 
Members. 
75. He said he now wished to make a stat ement on agriculture on behalf of the G-101.  The G-10 
was one group of the larger comm unity of friends of flexibility, who represented the majority of 
Members.  For the G-10, it was necessary to ha ve a framework which was coherent, provided for 
flexibility and balance in order to  accommodate the diversity of Members' agricultures.  A one-size-
fits-all solution could not achieve such objectives.  The framework, therefore, was an important step 
forward to fair and equitable results. 
76. The G-10 was committed to substantial improveme nt of market access, in accordance with 
the Doha mandate.  As importing countries, G-10 Me mbers were significantly contributing to world 
trade in agricultural products, representing 13% of  world agricultural imports.  Their experience of 
implementing the Uruguay Round Agreement showed the fact that tariff reductions under the 
Uruguay Round formula had contribut ed to substantial improvement of market access of agricultural 
products.  The Group was prepared to discuss vari ous types of tariff reduction formula if their 
concerns and sensitivities were duly met.  The G-10 was ready to look at the so-called tiered formula 
and any formula should be common for all Members,  with adequate S&D tr eatment, and provide for 
taking into account non-trade concerns.  In this re gard, concepts such as tariff capping and mandatory 
expansion of TRQs applicable uniform ly to all products, did not provide this flexibility, and they were 
against these measures.  Sensitive products should be made subject only to a minimum level of tariff 
cuts, but it should be noted that the Group was ready to cut tariffs also in sensitive products.  TRQ 
commitments on a case-by-case basis might need to be  discussed to achieve fair and balanced results 
if the above-mentioned sensitivities and concerns were duly met.  It could also be considered that a 
certain part of the above-mentioned TRQ commitments  might be adequately set aside for developing 
countries.  Improvement of WTO rules, especially in  the area of special safe guards, would facilitate 
Members' readiness to undertake substantial market access commitments. 
                                                      
1 Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Iceland, Israel, Japa n, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway and 
Switzerland. TN/C/M/13 
Page 26  
 
 77. His delegation would make available to delegati ons a full written statement on behalf of the 
G-10, which would contain also the Group's positio ns on domestic support and export competition.  
78. Speaking again as representative of Switzerland
, he said that in the area of NAMA Members 
needed a framework that would allow for an amb itious outcome, as mandated by Ministers in Doha, 
and in order to reach the right balance betwee n market access in agricultural products and non-
agricultural products.  Emerging markets should theref ore make efforts in opening their markets, not 
only vis-à-vis developed countries, but also to foster  South-South trade, which according to estimates 
would reach 50% of world trade the following year.  The poorest Members on the other hand should only be required to make concessi ons commensurate with their development levels and needs. 
79. On the Singapore issues, a decision was needed  on the launching of negotiations on trade 
facilitation in the July package in order to have a balanced approach.  On  the other three issues, 
discussions in the relevant working groups should be resumed, but Switzerland understood that the 
Doha Round would, unfortunately, be concluded without these three issues being part of the final 
outcome.  However, there could be no successful conclusion of the Round without trade facilitation 
being part of it.   
80. Services was another essential part of the outcome  and his delegation shared the expectations 
of the Chairman that there would be the same level of treatment of services in the July package as the 
other negotiating issues.  Development aspects were key, as was the issue of cotton and his delegation 
was ready to work constructively to  find solutions to the various open questions.  For the other areas 
of negotiation, clear indications would be need on how to pursue them in the July document.  
81. Finally, he wished to take up one final issue,  which was very important to his delegation and 
to many other delegations.  Speaking on behalf of the GI Friends Group
, he said he was pleased to 
issue the following statement2 on behalf of the Friends of geograp hical indications (GIs) which were 
more than 50 Members of the WTO.  The statemen t built on the one that had been made by Kenya on 
behalf of the GI Friends Group at the last TNC m eeting on 21 April.  In the present statement, he 
wished to recall the commitments WTO Members had ta ken in Doha with regard to extension of the 
protection of geographical indicati ons provided by Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, refer to the 
goal of GI extension and reiterate what action WTO Members needed to take at this stage of the negotiation process. 
82. Ministers in Doha and WTO Members in subsequent TNC meetings had declared that they 
attached the utmost importance to the issue of GI extension.  However, to date no progress had been 
made.  The members of the GI Friends Group consider ed GI extension to be an essential element of a 
balanced outcome of the Doha Round.  At a cr ucial time in the Doha Round, when important 
decisions in other fields of negotiations awaited adoption, a clear signal should be given that GI 
extension would be part of the overall results of the negotiations. 
83. The additional protection which the TRIPS Ag reement currently reserved for geographical 
indications for wines and spirits ensured that such GIs were only used for wines and spirits which 
actually originated from the place indicated by the GI, thereby guaranteeing that only the genuine 
product reached the end consumer with the GI att ached.  This was the very purpose of geographical 
indications and such level of prot ection should apply to all GIs, irrespective of the nature of the 
product which they designated. 
84. Only with this more effective level of protec tion at their disposal would producers of tea, 
coffee, rice, silk, cotton, fruits, spices, tobacco, handicrafts, watch es, carpets and other products be 
able to prevent the usurpation of their geographi cal indications and the free-riding on the reputation 
                                                     
 
2 The full text of this statement was subsequently circulated in document TN/C/4.  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 27 
 
 
 and quality of their products.  Ne vertheless, in the current situa tion, geographical indications of 
products other than wines and spirits could be usurped and free-ridden upo n by products not having 
the respective origin or quality.  Thus, by such illegiti mate use, they risked to become generic, to lose 
all their economic potential and economic  value and to deceive consumers. 
85. GI extension struck the right balance between WTO Members as it would, on the one hand, 
create a level playing field and equal opportunities for the use of geographical indications for all 
WTO Members, beyond those producing wines and spir its, for all their genuine  products which had a 
specific geographical origin to which a specific quality , reputation or other characteristic was linked.  
86. GI extension held a great potential for all WTO Members and this had been shown 
impressively by producers of GI products from all over the world urging the WTO at its recent public 
symposium to make progress on GI extension with the motto "let's preserve localisation within 
globalization".  Producers and speakers from a wide  range of WTO Members such as China, France, 
Guatemala, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, the Un ited States and Switzerland had come to Geneva to 
attend the symposium and to explain why they depe nded on a more effective protection of GIs for 
their products by WTO law to make a better living.   The GI Friends Group believed that the issue of 
GIs had to be appropriately reflected in the pack age Members were supposed to adopt by the end of 
July. 
87. The representative of Brazil  said the Chairman's remarks on the need to avoid repeating well 
known positions prompted him to make a few considera tions of his own on this issue.  First, this 
Round would be so much simpler if it were not for the substance.  Of course delegations could still 
get the process wrong, but it would definitely be a lot easier if one could use a ratchet that would 
allow movement in only one direction.  That of  course was not the case and sometimes if people did 
not repeat well-known positions, others might think e rroneously that they might have changed their 
positions on substance.  He thought that the best c ontribution delegations coul d make to one another, 
to the Chairman and to the Chairpersons was to be  absolutely clear about where they stood on the 
critical issues. 
88. In the agriculture negotiations for example, ever yone knew the hard work that had been going 
on with a view to achieving results by the end of Ju ly.  Delegations had heard indications of flexibility 
at the highest level and were trying to take adva ntage of these positive signals.  However, in spite of 
very lengthy negotiations, more substantive discussi ons were still needed.  Whether these discussions 
would turn out to be mere repetitions of positions w as something that would only become clear in the 
course of the next weeks.  In the meantime, it was almost inevitable that delegations would also 
restate the central elements of their positions. 
89. On the issue of repetitions, an old maxim said that  generals always fought the last war.  They 
usually had a list of things they would have done differently and that  would have secured victory.  It 
was less usual for them to think of the last war and dream of doing the same things all over again, 
unless they had won the war.  And yet, this might be  happening in some areas with regard to Cancún.  
Cancún had not succeeded; success had eluded Members not because of any procedural glitch, but 
rather because of strong substan tive divergences, especially in agricu lture, which was the core and the 
“raison d’être” of this Round.  It would bode ill fo r the future if the only hope lay in the adoption of 
texts that had been rejected in the n ear past for good and still valid reasons. 
90. He wished to reiterate that Brazil had doubts a bout the cost effectiven ess of frameworks, in 
terms of the relationship between the effort put into the negotiation of them and the likely actual 
result.  However, Brazil had agreed to negotiate a framework for July and would do everything to 
achieve it and he had mentioned this simply to poin t out that the membership should not lose sight of 
what really mattered which was the fulfilment of the Doha mandate.  It was now necessary to renew the collective commitment to that endeavour.  What ever the level of generality it contained, the TN/C/M/13 
Page 28  
 
 framework had to signal that commitment and not constrain the possibilities of the negotiation and, 
above all, not compromise the level of ambiti on of the mandate.  The framework should allow 
Members to promptly look at the modalities – num bers, figures, dates, percentages – which was 
where they would find the balance that was needed in the overall negotiation.  Anything else that 
would be achieved in July would be a bonus and Brazil continued to work to obtain it. 
91. The Agriculture Chairman had delivered a ve ry detailed and substantive report, and his 
delegation would have to read it before making any substantive comment.  Members had just 
concluded the fourth week of agricultural meetings.  The intensive meetings which had taken place in 
different formats on the details of key elements in all three pillars had been an important and 
necessary exercise.  Some of the discussions in wh ich Brazil had taken part had followed Ministerial 
meetings, one of which had taken place in São Paulo among five parties, but some positive signals of 
flexibility that had been sent out by Ministers had yet to be translated into concrete movement.  
Everyone was working hard for that to happen and w ould be trying again in the coming days.  Despite 
all the effort and some convergence on a number of issues, the overall solution still eluded the 
membership.  He did not think this should be ascri bed to any shortcomings of the negotiators, as 
sometimes might be inferred by some remarks here and there.  It was quite clear that success could 
only be achieved if and when po litical will and negotiating circum stances walked hand in hand.  
92. As a broad coalition of developing countries, th e G-20 was doing its part.  In São Paulo, 
Ministers had clearly reinforced once again their co mmitment to the success of the negotiations.  The 
G-20 remained engaged, with a constructive spirit,  to find balanced results in the agriculture 
negotiations.  He urged other parties to follow the same path in order to reach a framework agreement 
by July. 
93. NAMA was one of the key areas of the negotiation.  Members should strive for a framework 
in July in line with the level of ambition and genera lity that would be achieved in agriculture.  It was 
necessary to do better than the Derbez text for NAM A, which was general where it should be specific, 
and specific where it should be general.  The Derbez text was general in the application of the central 
concept of “less than full reciprocity in reducti on commitments” and it was specific in the sectoral 
component, which was not even mentioned in the mandate, but which had received an entire 
paragraph, detailing and prejudging some features th at should be left for decision at the modalities 
phase. 
94. The Derbez text was not written in stone.  Alt hough there were potential risks in reopening it, 
there were more risks in trying to freeze it.  Brazi l had made clear its difficulties with the sectoral 
approach and would maintain this position.  It would also maintain its position on the principle of 
total and complete linkage of NAMA to agriculture  and on the overall development components of 
this Round.  He would note that these linkages were not  a matter of choice.  They were prescribed in 
the mandate, as it included the Single Undertaking as the principle under which Members were working.  Unless people wanted to do away with th e principle of the Single Undertaking, everything 
was linked to everything.  For Brazil, agri culture was at the centre of everything. 
95. Turning to rules, he said that the decision to hold open-ended informal meetings to discuss in-
depth rules issues had proved useful, as assessed by  the Negotiating Group Chairman in his report to 
the TNC.  Nonetheless, in the last Negotiating Grou p meeting, the Chairman had remarked that the 
Group had lagged behind other negotia ting groups in terms of number and duration of meetings.  To 
have different negotiating groups movi ng at different paces was not a desirable objective, in particular 
in the case of rules, where there w as a need for intensive technical wo rk.  Hence, it was vital that the 
Group intensified its programme of m eetings after the summer break.   
96.
 Brazil considered the outstanding implementation issues, referred to in paragraph 12 of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, to be an integral pa rt of the Doha Development Round.  It had, in  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 29 
 
 
 particular, a specific interest in two of these issu es, namely TRIMS and the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity.  Together with India and other 
developing countries, Brazil had tabled proposals on both issues that it expected to be taken seriously 
by partners.  Action on implementation issues was cr ucial in ensuring that the development dimension 
of the Doha Round effectively materialized.  It wa s therefore of the utmost importance that these 
issues figured prominently in the Ju ly package.  He had to repeat this position lest people forget the 
commitment assumed in Doha.  Brazil favoured the establishment of a specific negotiating group linked to the TNC to discuss proposals on outstanding implementation issues that Members might consider to be a priority.  
97. The Doha Ministerial Declaration had raised  new hopes that S&D provisions would finally 
address developing countries' needs, in order to he lp integration into the world trading system.  In 
Doha, Ministers had explicitly recognized the deve lopmental dimension of S&D, by means of a 
mandate that stated that these provisions "shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and 
making them more precise, effectiv e and operational".  The results so far had been disappointing.  
Members needed concrete progress in this area, in line with the mandate.  S&D had to stop being an 
afterthought in WTO rules, but also in the Round.  His delegation was confident that the Chairman of 
the CTD Special Session would perform the miracle everyone expected of him.  
98. On services, Brazil had tabled its initial o ffer in a positive spirit as a contribution to the 
ongoing negotiations and as an indication of its con tinued commitment to the Doha mandate and to 
the pursuit of an enhanced multilateral regime governing trade in services and goods.  It would 
continue to engage in the services negotiations  and look forward to achieving progress in the 
negotiations on rules.  He wished to stress agai n that market access in the services negotiations, as 
well as the services roadmap, were linked to what happened in other areas of the negotiations.  Brazil 
would therefore be prepared to make additional efforts commensurate with the achievements in the 
areas of priority interest to it, especially agriculture  which was, again, the core and the “raison d’être” 
of this Round. 
99. The Singapore issues were not formally part of  the Single Undertaking, but he would mention 
them because of their importance for the overall pa ckage.  First, on investment, competition policy 
and government procurement, one possibility that  came to mind was that Members could make a 
formal statement to the effect th at these issues would not be taken up in negotiations of the Doha 
Round in any form, nor would they be the object of  any plurilateral approach in the regular Work 
Programme of the WTO.  Second, on trade facilitati on, which was a systemic issue, Brazil would be 
prepared to proceed with negotiations.  This, of  course, would be conditioned on agreement on 
substantive modalities, which woul d have to be the object of c onsensus before the negotiations 
actually started. 
100. The representative of Pakistan
 hoped that this session would be a crucial turning point and 
agreed with the European Communities that Members were much better prepared this time than in 
Cancún.  The report of the Agriculture Chairman w as encouraging, but some of his perceptions or 
conclusions did not necessarily coincide with the d eclaration of the G-8 leaders.  The leaders had 
asked for fundamental agricultural reform, agreed that  all three pillars of th e agriculture negotiations 
should be treated with equal ambition and emphasi zed that movement on agriculture would help 
generate progress in other core issues of the DDA.   
101. He asked what had happened so far.  In th e case of domestic support, the only indication 
Members had so far was that whatever reforms had already been done by major subsidisers would be 
formally bound in the WTO.  For th e foreseeable future, at least in the next 10 years, they did not see 
any change in the status quo.  Thus, for meaningful  reform in domestic support, the Chairman had to 
be clear about the starting level, i.e. whether it w as bound hypothetical levels or real applied levels. TN/C/M/13 
Page 30  
 
 102. In the case of export competition, the Europ ean Union had taken a major step forward by 
agreeing to eliminate export subsidies by a specific date  still to be negotiated.  However, this had been 
linked through parallelism to export credits and state trading enterprises.  Developed countries which 
provided significant export credits or had monopoly state trading enterprises had not indicated their willingness to meet this challenge.  Therefore, Me mbers might still have major difficulties in this 
pillar unless the countries concerned showed flexibility.  
103. On market access, his delegation felt in a sli ghtly better position than a few months ago.  
Principles incorporated in G-20 proposals had been a ccepted to a certain extent.  However, with the 
many exceptions being sought, even a banded formul a would eventually look like a blended formula 
which the G-20 had rejected in the past.  In orde r to move the process forward, he welcomed the 
initiative of the Chairman of the Special Session to ta ble a text on the basis of the elements he had 
enumerated and had been agreed to by G-8 leaders.  
104. He realized, as noted by the NAMA Chairman, th at the current NAMA text was not an ideal 
solution.  However, he agreed with the European  Communities and the United States that further work 
could be built on this text.  Co re elements on the general formul a and non-tariff barriers existed and 
he agreed with Brazil that more work would have to be done on the sectoral approach.  
105. On Singapore Issues, he welcomed the United Stat es' statement that three out of four issues 
would not be part of the Single Undertaking.  On  trade facilitation, he felt there could be forward 
movement if certain concerns of developing countri es and LDCs relating to scope of negotiations and 
costs were adequately addressed.  On development is sues, he agreed with the Chairman of the CTD 
that there was a need for rededication and commitm ent to the development dimension of the DDA.  
Of the 28 Agreement-specific proposals his delegatio n had examined hardly any would impact on the 
development of developing countries.  Therefore, he  encouraged the Chairman of the Special Session 
to continue his work for a more meaningful pack age.  On Services, he said his delegation might 
submit its own offer in the near future.   
106. The representative of Paraguay
 expressed his appreciation to  the General Council and TNC 
Chairmen for their efforts in facilitating progress in the negotiations.  Paraguay had been participating 
in a constructive fashion under the Doha Work Pr ogramme and had underlined the importance those 
issues which were of priority to improve the st andards of living of developing countries and the 
LDCs.  The fundamental idea behind the Doha R ound was development with agriculture being the 
central part of it.  His delegation was determined  to make further progress and integrate agriculture 
completely within the disciplines of the WTO.  Paraguay reiterated that progress in negotiations on 
agriculture would be decisive a nd its links to all other issues unde r negotiation were uncontested.  The 
level of ambition established in agriculture would set the tone for progress overall and this level of 
ambition should reflect the agreemen t reached by Ministers in Doha.   
107. His delegation welcomed the statement by the Chairman of the Agriculture Special Session 
and agreed that the three pillars should be ba lanced.  Paraguay, as a Member of the G-20, had 
submitted a proposal on market access where it had demonstrated its flexibil ity and suggested that 
progress be made gradually and in a proportionate fashion.  If Members were going to make progress 
in the other two pillars which were also fundame ntal and move towards an  overall and substantive 
reduction in the support and measures that distorted tr ade, he believed that there should be greater 
clarity by the main parties as to what was meant by domestic support and export credit.   
108. Paraguay, as a small and vulnerable land-locked  economy, was cognisant of the development 
dimension of agriculture to promote the liberalizat ion of trade.  His request and concern was that 
opportunities should be generated to create conditi ons where small and vulnerable countries could 
participate in international trade and, to this e nd, Paraguay was adopting an offensive position in these 
negotiations.   TN/C/M/13 
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 109. Paraguay was devoting its efforts to these nego tiations because it believed in the WTO and in 
the multilateral trading system.  Despite the unful filled promises of the past Paraguay remained 
committed to achieving a package by July.  The politi cal will was there and he was determined to 
making technical progress.  However, great concer n still remained for developing countries in the 
fields of S&D treatment and the programme for small economies and ther e was still no substantial 
progress towards achieving the harvest which a ll Members were waiting for in July.   
110. In concluding he emphasized the firm commitm ent of the government of Paraguay to the 
Doha Ministerial mandate.  His delegation was willin g to what was necessary so as to make progress 
in these negotiations and to achieve the substantive r esults required.  To this end, Paraguay remained 
convinced that the agricultural framework should in clude a level of specificity which reflected the 
Doha level of ambition. 
111. The representative of Mexico  said it was of the utmost importance to this organization to 
arrive at a framework decision by July.  It was clear that without these agreements Members would 
run the risk that the work that had been accomp lished since the beginning of 2002 might be lost 
altogether.  This politically complex year represente d a daunting challenge to Members.  The failure 
to pursue these negotiations now would have serious  consequences for the Organization.  Such a 
failure would send a very poor signal out to the public in general.   
112. However, there had been positive progress in the negotiations.  A number of meetings of 
Ministers of different countries, development leve ls and interests had taken place and had yielded 
positive results, e.g. the OECD meeting in Paris and the APEC meeting recently held in Pucón, Chile.  
There had been other, more focused, meetings such  as those in Dakar, Kigali and Georgetown and he 
believed that all these meetings, including the G- 20 meeting in Mauritius, would continue to be 
helpful towards an appropriate decision in July .  Such positive political signals needed to be 
transferred to the negotiations themselves although it  remained that many of these were technically 
complex as was the case with agriculture.  Although his delegation remained optimistic there was still 
the possibility that the difficulty and intrinsic comple xity of the issues themselves could frustrate the 
ambition of Ministers.   
113. On agriculture, the clear and judicious report of the Agriculture Chairman highlighted the 
subjects on which there had been important progress, those that required greater effort in the near 
future and those which were not part of the framewo rk, but should be relegated to future discussion.  
This report was progress in itself and would shortly le ad to a first approximation by the Chairman that 
would enable Members better to assess the decision to be taken in July.   
114. His delegation had been among those who had told the Chairman that he had to take more of 
a leadership role and provide guidance to small as well as large groups.  The Chairman should lead 
the process with his draft document and bring Members together in professional and serious discussions.   
115. On NAMA, he was pleased with the emerging consensus that Members should use the Derbez 
text as a basis for negotiations.  The purpose was to  combine ambition with flexibility and if Members 
were to decide to make changes in the Derbez text , they would have to achieve both an ambitious and 
flexible result which took into account the different  circumstances prevailing within countries.  As 
regards the sectoral approach this was an area wh ere there might be greater flexibility so as to avoid 
positions from becoming more rigid.  
116. On Singapore issues, he agreed with Brazil that on trade facilitation Members should move 
swiftly to modalities which would lead to earnest nego tiations and it should be clear that this was part 
of the Single Undertaking.  The other three shoul d remain outside the Single Undertaking and could 
not be part of any kind of negotiation, including a pl urilateral one.  The work of the other three groups TN/C/M/13 
Page 32  
 
 should be suspended at this point .  On services, he was pleased that the Services Chairman's report 
had provided for a specific recommendation to sectors and modes of interest to developing countries, especially to mode 4 
117. The representative of Singapore
 said Members were at a critical phase in efforts to obtain a 
July package and said that things were not lookin g good.  With the General Council less than a month 
away, the necessary movement was not seen at this la te stage which was, sadly, consistent with the 
disappointing record since the launch of the Roun d in Doha in 2001.  Since then, deadline after 
deadline had been missed culminating with failure in  Cancún.  Singapore, like  many other Members, 
saw July as the last chance before 2005 to lay dow n a working framework for the DDA negotiations.  
If delegations failed in July, there would be a long wa it to restart the talks, but more importantly, the 
July package was critical for the credibility of this Organisation.  A July failure would risk the loss of 
interest among key stakeholders such as governments who had invested both time and resources in the DDA.  At the same time, businesses would see a July failure as evidence of the WTO's irrelevance in 
a world where change was occurring faster and faster .  All of this might erode political will to support 
the Round. 
118. The political commitment expressed towards c oncluding a July package needed to be 
translated into action.  It was ess ential that the substance of the July  package emerged soon.  The plan 
to have a draft document by 9 July was a reflecti on of this urgency.  But doubts had been expressed 
by some as to whether it was possible to have the Annexes ready by then, in particular the framework 
on agriculture.  Even if Annexes were prepared, they could end up with many square brackets and 
gaps, so he asked whether this s hould be delayed until something cred ible on substance appeared.  He 
worried that if one waited too long before rel easing a draft document, there might not be enough time 
to discuss it and ensure that everyone bought into it.   
119. Overall, he thought the shape of the packag e was becoming slightly clearer.  On NAMA, 
there was a growing convergence that the Derbez text could be a basis to move forward which 
Singapore could support.  The Derbez text was far from perfect, but it had a fine balance which he 
cautioned against unravelling.  The Services Chai rman had done a good job in proposing draft 
language which was balanced.  It was important not to tinker too much with the language to reflect 
each delegation's wish list, but rather have th e language not exclude the key concerns of the 
membership. 
120. The agriculture situation was complex and ther e was a small group of key players discussing 
how to move forward.  This might not be ideal for those who were not included, but in practical terms 
it might be the most realistic way to make progress.  However, even if the five interested parties and 
other key Members were able to eventually reach an  agreement, the challenge ahead was to translate 
this into a multilateral consensus among the wider membership.   
121. The lack of progress on Singapore issues was also a source of great concern.  It remained a 
potential deal-breaker despite the fact that Memb ers were down to discussing a relatively modest one 
plus three outcome.  While Singapore was flexible , it was particularly important, and possible, to 
launch negotiations in trade facilitation with agreed  modalities.  This was for many delegations an 
important component of a balanced July package.   He thought the sooner the drafting of modalities 
could be done on trade facilitation, the better.  Memb ers needed time to arrive at a framework that 
satisfied everyone.  In this respect, his delegati ons supported the suggestion to convene a small group 
of interested parties representing different viewpoints to draft the modalities.   
122. Development issues remained difficult, but it was essential that there was something to show 
for efforts in this area in the July  package.  The best way forward w as to harvest the 28 proposals that 
had been agreed upon, and have a clear commitmen t in the July document to work towards an 
eventual agreement on a larger package.  This was not the ideal outcome that many developing  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 33 
 
 
 countries had been looking for, but this was probabl y the best possible outcome at this stage, where 
the primary focus should be to keep the momentum of the DDA going.   
123. On the overall process, as Members entered the final lap to the July General Council, it was 
critical that the process was seen to be transparent a nd inclusive.  Everyone should come away feeling 
that their views had been taken into account, and th at there was something in it for them.  In other 
words, there had to be a sense of ownership for a relatively smooth and predictable path to July.  
Singapore stood ready to work with the Chairmen an d Members for a credible July package, but time 
was running out and Members had to pull out all the stops to get this important task done. 
124. The representative of Ecuador  said it was unfortunate that the main objective of the Doha 
Round, which was the development di mension, had yet to be recognised with the exception of cotton.  
Implementation issues left over from the Uruguay Round and S&D treatment were still pending and 
open in this Round and it was unacceptable to ha ve proposals and texts which excluded developing 
countries.  Although Ecuador was not a Member of any of the negotiating groups which had been set 
up on the agricultural issues, his delegation supp orted the proposal for the framework regarding 
modalities for agriculture which had been presented on 28 May by the G-20 Group.   
125. On market access, the tariff barriers reduction formula should lead to the elimination of tariff 
peaks, which had not been accomplished during th e Uruguay Round, either in applying the Uruguay 
Round formula or with the use of a blended formula which had been proposed by the G-20.  In order 
to ensure transparency, Ecuador supported the proposal  on tariff conversion or "tariffication" of all the 
non-ad valorem  tariffs bound after the Uruguay Round, according to a methodology to be agreed.   
126. On tropical products, his country had received no real explanation as to why bananas had 
been excluded from the list of tropical products.  He  reiterated his desire in seeing compliance with 
the provisions in paragraph 5 of the Preamble to  the Agreement on Agriculture and the broadest 
possible liberalization of trade in tropical pr oducts whether processed or unprocessed.  Such 
liberalization should also encourage production that was particularly important in order to achieve 
diversification that would help abandon the growing of crops used to make narcotics.  This concern 
had already been expressed on sev eral occasions.  In this connection, his delegation endorsed 
paragraph 5, part E, of the af orementioned proposal by the G-20 Member countries in relation to 
market access. 
127. On S&D treatment, Ecuador supported the me ntion of special products in the framework 
document because of their strategic importance fo r the economy, trade, development, environment 
and rural society of developing countries.  A list of  these strategic products should be drawn up on the 
basis of a methodology to be agreed.  As part of the concept of S&D treatment, like the G-20, 
Ecuador emphasised the need to broaden and ensure the greatest possible tariff liberalization for tariff 
quotas in those developed countries that had the highest tariff peaks, giving priority access to developing country Members, which should not be re quired to grant reciprocity.  In parallel, the 
regulations used to administer tariff quotas shoul d be made more flexible  and developing countries 
should be given S&D treatment.  Ecuador favoured the immediate elim ination of the special safeguard 
measures for developed countries. 
128. Maintaining the system of preferences should not serve as a pretext to put off the opening up 
of developed markets.  Ecuador maintained that the deadline for the substantial reduction of export 
subsidies should be a short time line with the final objective being the full elimination of such subsidies.  This should apply to developing and deve loped countries to guarantee fair competition 
conditions in all markets with a view to avoiding  systemic distortions in trade which affected 
developing countries that could not finance export subsidies.   TN/C/M/13 
Page 34  
 
 129. On export competition, since subsidies had not been included within the framework of the 
Ecuador-United States free trade agreement, this was of special importance to Ecuador.  According to 
the Doha mandate, Members had committed themselves to "reductions of, with a view to phasing out, 
all forms of export subsidies".  Ecuador, like ma ny other developing countries, could not commit 
itself to tariff reductions in any depth as long as distortions created by export subsidies and 
disproportionate domestic aid continued, particularly in the Blue, Amber, and Green Boxes.  The 
period for the reduction of subsidies should be substantially shorter th an the period of application for 
the reduction on tariffs.  This subs tantial reduction of export subsidi es should take place with a view 
to ensuring that Members could guarantee fair c onditions of competition and that South-South trade 
was on an equal footing.   
130. On domestic support, he believed it was necessary that more strict disciplines be designed 
which would mean that there should be no shifting fr om the Blue and Amber Boxes to the Green Box.  
Ecuador advocated the elimination of the Blue Bo x.  His delegation believed that newly acceded 
Members should be subject to the exact same co nditions on tariff reducti ons, quotas, subsidies, 
domestic support and all the other commitments arisi ng out of the Agricultural Agreement.  It was 
important to carefully analyse the nature and ex tent of what had been done and the degree of 
application prior to establishing arbitrary and sp ecial conditions which would authorise certain 
countries greater flexibilities in the three pillars.   
131. One proposal which had been submitted in this organization, regarding the incorporation into 
the negotiations of the concept of "weak and vul nerable countries" or "the poorest countries" and 
others in similar situations, especially G-90 Member s, was of particular concern to Ecuador because 
of its implications.  Ecua dor had raised systemic questions on this issue since the proposal sought to 
create a new category of developing countries, outside those already in the WTO and its negotiations mandate.  He viewed the proposal as a political a ttempt to divide the cohesion which existed among 
the developing countries within the WTO and it also a ppeared to be an effort to distort the issue of 
less than full reciprocity which should apply to  all developing countries.  This would create 
uncertainty on the parameters and criteria of the c oncept itself.  The special feature of the multilateral 
system was the contribution made by all its Members to implementing the commitments stemming from the negotiating mandates, the transparency of its procedures and the full participation of its Members.  The current proposal sought to detract  from these objectives when there might be other 
ways of more effectively integrating developi ng countries into the trad e liberalization process. 
132. On NAMA, Ecuador supported the Derbez doc ument as a basis for the framework of 
modalities with its very fragile and delicate balanc e between flexibility and ambitions subject to the 
adjustments that would be made at a later stage to accommodate the needs and requirements of all the 
developing countries in application of the principle of  less than full reciprocity according to the Doha 
mandate.  The progress of negotiations in NAMA wo uld depend on progress made in the agricultural 
sector in line with the commitment wh ich had been agreed in Doha.   
133. The flexibility for developing countries should be reflected in particular in the components of 
the formula, through a differential coefficient, in the implementation periods and in the scope of the 
exceptions.  The formula should be the main negotia ting modality and the sectoral approach should be 
voluntary.  At the current stage of the negotiations, with the exception of the LDCs, tariff binding by 
Members of the WTO should not be considered  as a concession as such but as the necessary 
foundation for making tariff reductions  derived from the formula.  Ecuador, together with other Latin 
American countries, had contributed to the system by binding its tariffs and hoped that the other 
Members would make an equal contribution so th at the principle of equity prevailed in these 
negotiations. 
134. While Ecuador was committed to ensuring progr ess on services, and agreed on the need to 
make progress on the presentation of better and more  offers, it required the parallel of balanced  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 35 
 
 
 progress on standards and disciplines which governed  these commitments, the evaluation of benefits 
resulting from the progress of liberalisation which had been made in services such as Article IV of the 
GATS.  He also elaborated on taking into account the special interests of the developing countries 
including sectors and modes of supply of interest for their exports, for example, temporary movement 
of persons and a commitment by all Members to take  into account the development issues, agreed in 
the Doha agenda. 
135. On intellectual property and a multilateral regist er for wines and spirits, Ecuador preferred 
that the register be voluntary.  He was worried th at the creation of a mandatory list would alter the 
present balance of rights and obligations that had been agreed to during the Uruguay Round and the 
fundamental principles, as substantive rights in the TRIPS Agreement, would be modified.  The 
proposals on a compulsory register would give rise to new obligations that would be detrimental to 
the rights acquired under the TRIPS Agreement, a nd would lessen or even eliminate the existing 
flexibility or balances, affecting not  only the provisions of section 3 of part II of the Agreement, but 
also provisions in other sections.  Moreover, it woul d hamper application of domestic legislation and 
would increase the current costs of a system that sought  to obtain protection and ensure enforcement.  
The costs would be transferred to governments and producers in third countries with developing 
countries such as Ecuador suffering the most damage.  
136. The representative of Benin  associated his delegation with the statement made by Nigeria on 
behalf of the African Group.  On the proposal which had been submitted on the cotton dossier, 
particularly the question of the request contained in  the sectoral initiative in favour of cotton within 
the framework of the agricultural dossier, his delega tion underscored the fact that the co-authors of 
the sectoral initiative for cotton very much hoped th at urgent and appropria te solutions would be 
found in relation to their request.  He reminded dele gations that the co-authors of the initiative had 
asked from the very beginning that this issue be tr eated separately to take into consideration the 
urgency and the seriousness of the problems in the cotton industry for the economies of the countries 
concerned.   
137. It was against this background that the cotton dossier had been studied by the Ministers in 
Cancún as Item 2 of the agenda of the Confer ence which was adopted on 10 September 2003 and 
which was contained in document WT/MIN(03)/W /1 of 6 August 2003.  In Cancún a separate 
paragraph had been set aside for cotton in the sec ond revised version of the Conference text.  The 
wording of that paragraph had not been accepted by the co-authors of the initiative nor by a number of 
other Members of the WTO.  He wished to recall th at during the work of the General Council of 15 
December 2003, the cotton dossier had been id entified together with agriculture, NAMA and 
Singapore issues as one of the four priority issues on which consultations woul d have to continue in 
the post-Cancún phase of negotiations. 
138. The co-authors of the sectoral initiative on co tton reaffirmed the need to recognise the 
urgency and the specificity which underlay the submi ssion of the cotton initiative.  They wished that 
this urgency be taken into consideration in examin ing this dossier in a manner which was distinct and 
separate from the paragraph on agriculture so that appropriate solutions might be found both to the 
commercial and development aspects of the cotton issue. 
139. The representative of Bangladesh , on behalf of the LDC Group , said LDCs contributed less 
than half of one per cent of total world trade.  Although they had a major stake in the negotiations, 
their stake was somewhat different from the major players in world trade.  It was not the LDCs' 
intention to lower the level of ambition of the negotiations by reaching the lowest common 
denominator.  They had some specific concerns in sev eral areas of the negotiations and felt that these 
concerns could easily be taken on board by the Me mbers through special provisions in the agreements 
currently being negotiated.  In this context, he drew Members' attention to Article XI.2 of the 
Marrakesh Declaration which had laid down the manne r in which the concerns of the LDCs were to TN/C/M/13 
Page 36  
 
 be accommodated.  He realized that most trade nego tiators were guided by the trade concerns of the 
industries in their countries.  However, the LDCs looked upon the agreements that were currently 
being negotiated from a developmental perspectiv e and he hoped that the Members of the WTO 
would appreciate the perspectives from wh ich LDCs approached such issues. 
140. Many of the LDCs would be affected by the outcome of the agriculture negotiations.  They 
remained engaged with the Chairman of the Special  Session and with other interested countries to 
achieve a meaningful outcome that complimented the LDCs' development efforts.  He was pleased 
that the Agriculture Chairman had reflected some of  his concerns in his statement and hoped that two 
other issues, tariff escalation and erosion of preferences would also be addressed.  The LDCs supported the statement of Benin on cotton.   
141. NAMA was an area of great interest to their co mmunities in terms of trade.  Some of their 
concerns had already been incorporated in Annex B of the Derbez text but the LDCs needed some 
additional elements such as binding commitments  from developed-country Members on duty and 
quota-free market access for all of their products.  He  also urged developing countries that were able 
to do so to extend to LDCs the same facility.  As  in agriculture, measures to counteract the notion of 
preference margins also required attention.  The Chairman of NAMA had mentioned non-tariff 
barriers.  For LDCs, he wished all NTMs and NTBs that affected LDC exports to be addressed in the 
NAMA group. 
142. S&D provisions were critical for the LDCs a nd since he had explained that LDCs did not 
wish the agreements to be brought down to the lowest common denominator, it was through the S&D provisions that LDCs could be ke pt on board.  The CTD Chairman had outlined three specific points 
in his approach to further treatment of S&D treatm ent in the Special Session in paragraph 4 of his 
report.  While he appreciated the efforts to move  forward in this difficult area of the negotiations, 
LDCs had to clearly outline their perspectives.  The 28 S&D proposals the Chairman had referred to 
were part of the overall negotiations on S&D issues.   It just happened to be in a sequence that 
Members were following of trying to handle the easy issues first.  The 28 proposals of Annex C of the 
Cancún Ministerial Text included 12 proposals of the LDCs, which he regarded as a broader package.  
He was grateful to all those who had participated in drawing up this package.  However, at this stage 
LDCs were not prepared to accept a partial package as an early harvest.  They wished to see a fruitful 
outcome to the discussions on S&D, particularly on  the proposals that had been submitted by the 
developing country participants.  They preferred to go for the entire package of proposals, a package 
that had economic value to them.  Members shoul d come up with language that conformed to the 
Doha mandate of making it precise, effective and operational.  He supported the Chairman's third 
bullet point with the proviso that the total package of S&D should be looked at as a whole and not on a piecemeal basis.  
143. On trade facilitation, LDCs had yet to see clarif ication of the mandate for the negotiations that 
might be adopted by explicit consensus.  He stre ssed that negotiations could only begin with an 
explicit mandate.  He was committed to remaining enga ged in this process of clarification to develop 
a clear mandate for the negotiations.  As for the other three issues, he believed there was broad 
support for dropping them from the WTO Work Pr ogramme and a clear understanding was required 
in the July package to this effect.   
144. On services, LDCs looked forward to further engagement in this most important area and 
hoped that an acceptable agreed report could be reac hed.  The LDCs looked forward to the text that 
would be presented by the Chairmen of the General Council and TNC.   
145. The representative of Canada
 said Members had set out from Doha two and half years ago 
with three overriding objectives: to unlock the potential of liberalized  trade, to ensure that global 
market opportunities were available to all WTO me mbers, and to make trade a true engine for  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 37 
 
 
 development, economic growth and poverty reduction.  Members were at a critical juncture in the 
journey and the task was clear – to build the foun dation for the next phase of these negotiations.  The 
objective was not to conclude negotiations but to m ove them forward.  He was very worried about 
whether there was willingness to make the compro mises necessary to reach a successful outcome at 
the end of July. 
146. Agriculture continued to lay at the centre of this Round, because it was the most trade-
distorted sector, and because agricultural trade refo rm held the promise of improving the lives of 
hundreds of millions of producers a nd consumers around the world.  The harsh reality was that if 
Members failed to reach agreement on an ambitio us agricultural framework within the next few 
weeks, after two and a half years of hard work, th ese negotiations would grind to a halt.  Delegations 
would have failed producers and c onsumers and would have failed in  making trade a stronger engine 
for development and economic growth around the world. 
147. Considerable progress had been made toward s an agricultural framework.  It was now 
possible to envisage a world without export subsid ies, with disciplines on other forms of export 
competition, with dramatically reduced trade-dist orting domestic support, and with improved market 
access for farmers and producers around the world.  Members were getting closer to this historic 
achievement, but very little time remained to close the remaining gaps and to reach agreement on an 
ambitious foundation to provide movement  to the next phase of the negotiations. 
148. Members could not expect the framework to an swer all questions and address all concerns, 
but it could be expected to be ambitious and an y draft framework proposal should be available in 
good time for all Members to review, consider, and c onclude negotiations in its  final form before the 
end of July.  There were several other elements of  this Round that were integral to the needs and 
concerns of WTO Members and agreement had to be  obtained in some of these areas to allow these 
negotiations to proceed. 
149. On NAMA, Canada appreciated the difficulties the Negotiating Group faced and noted the 
Chairman's assessment that in light of the consulta tions he had to date there was no commonly agreed 
basis on the way forward.  Canada had been read y to accept the Derbez text as a basis for a way 
forward which would keep the door open to an ambitious outcome balanced by the necessary 
flexibility to address developing countri es' interests.  The text was not perfect, but this was Canada's 
contribution to the "conditional trust" called for by  the NAMA Chairman.  Rather than unravelling the 
text, Canada preferred that it be used as th e basis for the next phase of negotiations.   
150. In Services, Canada sought agreement on a text requiring Members who had not yet 
submitted their initial offers to do so as soon as possi ble.  His delegation also sought agreement on a 
date for the submission of revised offers.  Servi ces was an important aspect of these negotiations and 
should keep pace with the other elements of the Ro und.  Canada wished to see development-related 
concerns addressed in this Round.  Many of these i ssues were being addressed within the core agenda 
of agriculture, NAMA, services, and rules.  In a ddition, he would like to see a firm commitment on 
addressing the cotton issue in the agriculture ne gotiations, and a way forward on S&D treatment. 
151. On Singapore issues, Canada fully supported the launch of negotiations on trade facilitation 
on the basis of modalities established in Annex E of the Derbez text.  His delegations also supported 
continued work on in the WTO on the other three is sues of transparency in government procurement, 
investment, and competition policy. 
152. Canada was fully committed to progress in July .  Success this summer was a necessary step in 
the road forward to realizing the full potential of th e DDA.  Recent declarations and statements by the 
G-8 leaders, APEC Ministers, the African Union Trade Ministers and others around the world had all acknowledged that WTO Members were now facing a moment of strategic opportunity – the TN/C/M/13 
Page 38  
 
 opportunity to use rules-based trade liberalization to  boost global prosperity, fight poverty, and raise 
living standards around the world.  Canada looke d forward to working with all WTO Members, 
through July and beyond, to achieve these common objectives. 
153. The representative of China
 said that previous interventions  by all Members had highlighted 
the urgency for progress in the process due to the short time limit and the remaining gaps among 
Members on the major issues, particularly on the three pillars of the agricultural negotiations.  
Agriculture was at the centre of this Round and the other issues of NAMA and services were closely 
linked to agriculture.  China looked forward to seei ng the framework draft by the Chairman of the 
General Council and the Director-General early next month to have serious discussions and to 
accelerate the process on the negotiations.  He preferred an earlier draft to a later due to the time 
constraints.  He stressed that such a draft w ould need to contain an Annex on agriculture.   
154. China had been encouraged by the analysis of  the Agriculture Chairman on areas of potential 
convergence.  China believed it was important to ca rry out the Doha mandate in a comprehensive and 
balanced manner both in terms of the levels of ambition and specificity.  While market access was 
complex and important to many Members, equal em phasis should be given to the other two pillars, 
namely export competition and domestic support.  Un less the very serious trade distortion in these 
two pillars were adequately addressed in real term s, he was not as optimistic about the substantial 
progress on market access.  The issue of cotton shoul d be dealt with as the priority for phasing out 
export subsidies and trade distorting domestic suppor t.  On NAMA, China a ppreciated the approach 
by the Group Chairman for further work to be prep ared for the July framework.  On services, China 
was encouraged on the progress alread y achieved in this area.  It should not be too difficult to provide 
services its appropriate status in the July framework.   
155. He said that the CTD Chairman had provided a direction which Members should work hard to 
address since S&D treatment for developing Members was a very important element for the success of the negotiations.  The principle of less than full reciprocity should apply in all sectors and S&D 
treatment should be sufficient to meet the needs of development and to take care of the concerns of 
the developing Members.  LDCs should be exem pted from making further commitments in this 
Round and efforts should be made to explore ways and means on the issue of erosion of preferences.  
The particular concerns of the recently acceded  Members should also be effectively addressed. 
156. On Singapore issues, China supported the efforts to work on modalities with a view to launch 
negotiations on trade facilitation.  His delegation would keep an open mind as far the other three 
issues were concerned.  Although they were defin itely out of the Single Undertaking, Members might 
continue discussions after the July framework on whether they should be totally dropped from the 
WTO Work Programme.  Despite all the difficulti es facing Members, China hoped that substantive 
progress could be made in agriculture as well as in other sectors over the next couple of weeks as Members were all fully committed to a more solid , open and fair multilateral trading system.  He 
believed that a more inclusive and more transparen t process of negotiations at this stage was crucial 
for the success of having a framework before the end of July. 
157. The representative of Egypt
 was hopeful that the July package containing the frameworks 
would be finalized during the coming weeks.  Egyp t had shown flexibility, and would spare no efforts 
toward achieving progress in this exercise.  Howe ver, a good outcome should above all be balanced.  
As a Member of the G-20, her delegation attached great importance to the conclusion of a framework 
on agriculture.  This was a prerequisite, as it would enable Members to move on other tracks.  A deal 
on agriculture was not a prerequisite for automatic ity of success on other negotia ting tracks.  It could 
only be so if the needs of developing countries we re addressed in a way compatible with the ultimate 
goal of the trade Round which was development.  TN/C/M/13 
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 158. On NAMA her delegation advocated a framework th at demonstrated less than full reciprocity 
and flexibility.  The level of details in this framewo rk should be comparable to the one in agriculture.  
Egypt also advocated a development component of commercial value and an outline that guided the 
process of handling these issues.  An outline that ensured a successful outcome.  Members should not 
confuse means with ends.  Meeting the July deadlin e was not an aim in itself.  The ultimate goal was 
the fulfilment of the Doha mandate and its deve lopment objectives which was the aim of the entire 
Round.  Trying to meet the deadline should not deviate delegations from their main objectives. 
159. The representative of Lesotho  said there appeared to be a growing trend of submitting 
documents and reports on a Chairman's own responsib ility which at times did not reflect all views of 
all Members.  This concept did not appear in th e Marrakesh Agreement, Article XI which established 
the decision-making processes and spoke of the principle of consensus and therefore joint 
responsibility.  It might be argued that the concept had been developed by a practice, but clarification 
of the concept might be necessary in the light  of the current Member-driven processes.   
160. Regarding the CTD and the Chairman's 28 Ag reements-specific proposals, his delegation 
preferred having taking a holistic approach.  The le vel of expectation might need to be clearly 
established to carry out future work in the light of paragraph 44 of the D oha mandate or reviewing 
S&D provisions with a view to strengthening th em and making them more precise, effective and 
operational.   
161. With regard to the Special Session of the Disput e Settlement Body, he said that once again the 
concept of the Chairman's own responsibility had ap peared.  With the proposal on target dates the 
whole process could be open-ended since it was also  outside the single undertaking.  Regarding the 
part of the Services Chairman's report where he eluded to his consultations with Members who had 
not made offers, Lesotho would be looking forwar d to such consultations as a delegation.  He 
believed that the July package would also need  to address the implementation-related issues and 
concerns in line with the Doha mandate.  While L esotho did not wish to be pessimistic, he believed 
that the July General Council meeting should be  a progress report on the December 2003 General 
Council meeting. 
162. The Chairman  said he did not wish to bore delegations by repeating his plea from the 
beginning of the meeting that delegations atte mpted to move positions and make constructive 
contributions towards the reports of the Chairpersons .  Some had tried to do this, but others had not 
been very helpful.  Some delegations were even  criticising the Chairperson's reports which was the 
same kind of vicious circle that had been seen last year.  Members should now be looking at each 
others' positions and not at the Chairpersons' reports.  He said that if delegations were unable to move 
on their present positions it boded ill for the July meeti ng.  He warned delegations that the draft text 
which he and the Chairman would be producing shor tly would not solve anyone's problems but would 
reflect the quality of the discussions among Members.   
163. The representative of Malaysia  said agriculture was so important to the development agenda 
because of its importance to developing countries and yet it was the sector where distortions had 
existed far so long.  Members should ensure, as the end of July approached, that whatever framework 
was arrived at, it should conform to the DDA which m eant that issues that were outside the mandate 
should not be brought into play within the context of the July exercise.   
164. On NAMA, he agreed that the Derbez text coul d be a basis for work.  However, it should not 
and could not be the framework itself and the conc erns of Members on this issue should be fully 
reflected in the July document.  On services, Malaysia would like to see balance in respect of market 
access as well as rule making.  On development, c ontinuation of work should be within the mandate 
of paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.   There was a need to adopt an approach that 
could produce results rather than one th at would be divisive and unproductive. TN/C/M/13 
Page 40  
 
 165. Singapore issues had been described as a distrac tion by some parties from the core issues of 
the WTO which Members should address in these ne gotiations.  However, the Singapore issues were 
very difficult issues for Malaysia which had been reflected in its position throughout the years from 
Singapore to Doha as well as in Cancún.  As a cont ribution to unblock the ne gotiations, Malaysia had 
signalled its preparedness to agree to negotiations on  trade facilitation, but it believed that the other 
three issues should be dropped from the WTO Work Programme.   
166.  The representative of India
 agreed with the Chairman's intervention on the limitations of the 
texts prepared by Chairpersons and on the im portance of negotiation among Members.  Members 
were now in a negotiating stage, where commercia l interests and sensitivities of Member countries 
were involved.  India's experience during the past two years provided important  guidelines that should 
not be ignored.  Several Chairper sons had made genuine  and well meaning efforts to produce texts 
that could help to carry the negotiations forward.  India's experience had been that if a text did not 
fully reflect sensitivities and concerns or was perceive d not to adhere to the Doha mandate, it failed to 
make progress.  This should be kept in mind during the next few days to avoid repeating history.  
167. Agriculture was the most crucial element in the negotiations, and with the exception of one or 
two Members, all had deep sensitivities in this sector  be it as a country with strong exporting interests 
or as a net food importing country, a commodity  dependent country, a country with huge, 
impoverished rural economies or a newly acceded count ry that had delivered much more than other 
Member countries in the process of accession.  Any text  that the Chairman wished to produce should 
reflect a balance of interests.  While this was easi er said than done, he had faith in the Agriculture 
Chairman's sense of realism and his ability to go to the core of issues.  
168. The G-20 had worked hard to move this pro cess forward.  On market access, its paper 
signified a sincere attempt to find consensus throug h a process of accommodation of diverse interests.  
However, progress could be achieved only if there w as commensurate movement in all three pillars.  
Members could not have one level of specificity a nd one level of ambition in one pillar and different, 
lower levels of ambition and specificity in the other two pillars.  On the cotton issue, he hoped that the 
concerns of the proponents would be effectively addressed  in the July package. 
169. On NAMA, there was no doubt that Members were operating at a distinctly different level of 
specificity as compared to agriculture.  It was important that the framework agreement acted as a 
bridge between the past and the future, fac ilitating future negotiation without compromising 
Members’ interests and concerns expressed in th e past, and carrying forward all proposals now on the 
table.  
170. India attached a great deal of importance to services negotiations a nd believed there was a 
need to speed up the negotiations in this area, which could provid e benefits both to developed and 
developing countries.  The former Chairman of  the General Council had chosen four issues for 
concentrated work in the post-Can cún phase because they were, in his opinion, more controversial not 
because they had a higher priority.  Services in the July framework s hould have the same status, the 
same importance, as the other two market access areas.  He was happy to note that many Members in 
the Special Session thought likewise.   
171. He wished to bring to the Chairman's atten tion the general and widespread dissatisfaction 
among developing countries with the lack of progress on development issues.  He was concerned that 
there was no effective game plan for negotiating implementation issues and S&D treatment issues.  
The CTD Special Session could make progress on S&D issues only if there was commitment on the 
part of all Members.  Implementation issues seemed to be in an orphaned state at present.  India 
endorsed Brazil’s suggestion for a special negotiatin g group to discuss implementation issues.  Any 
July framework would have meaning for developing countries only if there was a feeling that S&D treatment and implementation issues had been effectively addressed.   TN/C/M/13 
 Page 41 
 
 
 172. On Singapore issues, there had been progress at and after Cancún.  Members had definitely 
moved closer towards convergence, even though a gr eat deal of work, particularly technical work, 
remained to be done.   
173. As Members worked toward s a July framework, they should be conscious of two facts.  First, 
there was no difference of opinion whatsoever on th e importance of achieving a framework in July.  
Second, the framework should necessarily take into acc ount the interests and concerns of all Members 
in a fair and equitable manner.  It was necessary in  this process of moving towards a framework to be 
inclusive and transparent as all Members had important stakes in these negotiations. 
174. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that after listening to the reports, he felt that 
Members were moving steadily towards the July p ackage, but that the challenge ahead remained 
daunting.  The DDA was at a crossroads.  At the beginning of this year Members had promised to do 
all to prevent 2004 from being a lost year and had trie d hard in the past few mo nths to build the basis 
for a framework agreement that would put the DDA on a healthy, balanced and sustainable track.  If 
the window of July was missed, the DDA woul d be dormant for quite some time.   
175. He said that Members had to be realistic about the objective of the July deadline.  What was 
needed was an agreement which would provide a suff icient degree of direction to keep the momentum 
of the DDA negotiations.  Many ministers had dem onstrated strong political will to make the July 
package and the DDA a success and it was now necessary to translate this political will into flexibility 
and pragmatism in Geneva. 
176. On Agriculture, Members had been  working hard to strive for compromises before the next 
meeting in mid-July.  The Agriculture Chairman had pl ayed a pivotal facilitating role in that process.  
Hong Kong, China was concerned that even if a deal could be struck among a number of key players 
in the coming week or so, considerable time would still be needed to multilateralize the deal.  A heavy 
dose of flexibility and pragmatism was require d.  While acknowledging the linkage between 
agriculture and other areas like NAMA, he urged Member s to continue to stay engaged on the basis of 
conditional trust.  It was necessary to guard against the very real risk that even if there was an 
eleventh hour deal on agriculture, Members might not have sufficient time to finalize the other 
elements. 
177. On NAMA, the Derbez text provided a good basis for further work.  It contained all the 
essential elements and had struck a delicate balance between them.  While some of the more difficult 
issues could only be resolved at the modality phase,  the Derbez text did not prejudge any Member's 
position on these issues.  
178. On services, he strongly believed that progress should be made on this important area to 
achieve a truly balanced outcome and supporte d the elements of the CTS Special Session as 
recommended by its Chairman.  Hong Kong, China ag reed with the European Communities that the 
TNC should set benchmarks for submission of impr oved offers.  While the services benchmark might 
inevitably be linked to those of NAMA and agricultu re, delegations should also take into account the 
special nature of services negotiations.  Moreover, th e benchmark should be rea listic and pragmatic so 
as to allow sufficient time for preparation by Members, and to allow time for review of the progress of negotiations prior to the next Ministerial. 
179. On Rules, a great deal of work remained to be done in this highly technical area.  It was 
important to ensure parallel movements between rules negotiations, particularly anti-dumping, and 
other important subjects in the DDA in order to achie ve a balanced package.  On development issues, 
he shared the hope in the Chairman's report regarding an early harvest on the 28 Agreement-specific 
proposals.  If this proved impossible in the limited time available, Members should at least unlock the current impasse over the sequence of discussion on Agreement-specific proposals and cross-cutting TN/C/M/13 
Page 42  
 
 issues and set out a clear roadmap for future work  in the CTD Special Session.  To unblock the 
logjam, flexibility by both developing and developed Members was required.  
180. On the DSU review, he was disappointed about  the missing of another deadline and agreed 
that the work in the Special Session should continue  and that it would be premature to set any new 
deadline at this stage.  Nevertheless, this should be kept under review and Members should consider a 
new target date when the situation was ripe. 
181. On Singapore issues, many delegations saw th e launching of trade facilitation negotiations as 
an essential component for a balan ced July package.  Some devel oping Members wanted clarification 
on certain issues before launching negotiations.  Ne vertheless, many of these issues could only be 
adequately addressed in the process of negotiations.  The key to cracking this issue by the end of July 
would be to have an open mind on how the draft m odalities in the Derbez text  could be improved to 
increase the level of comfort for these Members, and for all Members to devote a higher degree of trust to the negotiation process. 
182. There were divergent views on the remaining three Singapore issues and he did not believe 
Members could reach a solution soon.  It would be pr agmatic to agree in July to drop them from the 
Single Undertaking and the Doha negotiations while leaving open the question of how to deal with 
them in the WTO to be further discussed in the Ge neral Council after the summer.  He agreed with 
Brazil to rule out plurilateral negotiations on th ese issues.  These issues should not cause Members to 
drag their feet from making progress on other areas of the DDA. 
183. He wished to see an early rel ease of the July draft so that sufficient time was allowed for 
Ministers and capital officials to have a global view of the eventual package.  The draft should ideally 
contain sufficient details of the core elements, partic ularly the draft Annexes.  In this sense, the issue 
of a partial or unbalanced draft w ould be counter productive.  So if a few more days were required for 
putting the jigsaw puzzle together, he would not object to waiting a little while.   
184. He said that without a satisfactory package,  an unfortunate signal would be sent to 
governments and businesses around the world that the WTO was no longer capable of delivering 
results on trade liberalisation and multilateral ru le-making.  Without the necessary political and 
business attention and support, the DDA would be come unfinished business and every Member would 
be a loser.  Delegations should no longer be co mplacent and should redouble efforts to avoid a last-
minute deal among key Ministers.  Members should s how the outside world that the Geneva process 
could be flexible, pragmatic and could deliver results. 
185. The representative of Trinidad & Tobago
, on behalf of the ACP Group , said that as 
delegations intensified work over the next few week s, it would be important not to lose sight of the 
fact that DDA was intended to be a Developmen t Round and that reforming the multilateral trading 
system to make it more amenable to foster ing economic development and alleviating poverty 
remained the guiding principle. 
186. The critical issue had been the development of an integrated framework, which incorporated 
meaningful, targeted and operational S&D treatment provisions cutting across all issues.  This would 
assist in ensuring that developing countries, pa rticularly the weakest and most vulnerable among 
them, derived a commensurate share of the gains fr om liberalisation.  Accordingly, the ACP Group 
welcomed the recent European Union initiative and urged Members to give this proposal the 
consideration which it deserved with a view to its possible incorporation into the framework. 
187. While remaining steadfast in their commitmen t to the multilateral negotiating process, ACP 
countries continued to have an explicit interest  in the development of mechanisms which would 
increase the competitiveness of their economies, create of a greater sense of balance in global trade  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 43 
 
 
 between developed and developing countries a nd increase the complementarity between WTO rules 
and the policy instruments required for the sustainabl e development of their economies.  It was also 
necessary to recognise within the context of a m odalities framework of the peculiar circumstances 
facing LDCs and Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). 
188. Although the ACP Group recognised the need to ha ve more focused discussions to generate 
compromise, transparency and inclusion remain ed important WTO principles, which should be 
adhered to.  This was necessary if Members were to  have political ownership of the framework, as the 
negotiating and consultation processes e volved, and for such a text to be indicative of the negotiating 
reality, as well as the collective con cerns and interests of Members. 
189. Therefore, it was imperative that ample opport unity be provided for all Members to be 
actively engaged in the process as they sought to generate, before the summer break, a product, which 
presented clear solutions, had the necessary malleabilit y to cater to their needs and complied with all 
aspects of the mandate set down by Ministers at Doha , particularly the development dimension.  It 
was equally important that in cons tructing individual components of the July package, there should be 
a balance in respect of the specificity and level of detail. 
190. Moreover, it was essential that effective progr ess be made on developm ent and outstanding 
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, which were key elements for the achievement of the 
objectives of the Doha Round of negotiations. 
191. Given that agriculture was of critical importance to ACP countries, their Members 
underscored the importance of providing the appr opriate policy space and flexibility needed to 
safeguard their food and livelihood security, as well as address poverty alleviation and rural 
development concerns.  At the same time their s upply side capacity constraints and the pursuit of 
increased competitiveness of their domestic agri cultural sectors should be taken into account.  
Moreover, it was imperative that the three pilla rs of market access, domestic support and export 
competition be dealt with in tandem and that th ere be the same degree of clarity and detail among 
them.  It was also critical that precise and operational S&D be an integral part of all the elements of 
the agriculture framework. 
192. The current Round of trade negotiations should see k to substantially improve market access 
for all agricultural products from ACP countries,  recognise longstanding preferences as a fundamental 
tool of development that has a useful role to pl ay in the reform process, and address tariff peaks and 
escalation in developed countries while simultaneously  taking into consideration the interests of 
preference-receiving countries.  Furthermore, a ll developed countries and developing Members, 
which were in a position to do so, should also seek to provide duty and quota free access for all LDC 
agricultural products.  He also said that NTBs s hould be treated in parallel with tariff reduction. 
193. The ACP welcomed the efforts of some Members to develop an alternative approach to the 
reduction of agricultural tariffs, given their concerns in  respect of the inherent structural deficiencies 
of the blended approach currently on the table.  Ho wever, any alternative, banded or tiered approach, 
should by necessity take into account their particul ar needs and development concerns, be tariff 
structure neutral, produce predictable results and should not undermine the efficacy of S&D treatment 
measures enshrined in the framework.  Moreover, the ACP Group would be unable to accept the application of a non-linear, harmonising formula in any alternative approach which was advanced. 
194. From the perspective of the ACP, the movement towards the development of a new box for 
sensitive products was also viewed as a positive step.  However, within this box there should be clear 
S&D treatment for the se nsitive products of developing countries .  In addition, there should be a 
distinction between sensitive produc ts and Special Products (SPs) of developing countries.  This was 
necessary to ensure a distillation of the non-trade concerns of developing countries from that of TN/C/M/13 
Page 44  
 
 developed Members.  Further, he thought that de veloping countries should have the latitude to self-
designate a proportion of tariff lines as SPs and that th ese should neither be subject to tariff reductions 
nor new Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) commitments.  The ACP also supported the establishment of a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for use by developing countries. 
195. In the area of domestic support, they viewed positively the movement towards a harmonising 
approach to reduce the provision of trade-distorti ng domestic support, emer ging broad support for the 
reduction of de minimis levels fo r developed countries, refining exis ting and/or having new Blue Box 
criteria, possible review of the Green Box criteria to ensure that such measures were in fact not or at 
most minimally trade-distorting as well as improving the notification and monitoring processes. 
196. Notwithstanding this, in the coming weeks the major users of domestic support measures 
should seek to be more forthcoming on the issue of product specific reduction commitments which cut 
along Amber Box, Blue Box and de minimis.  Furthe r, discussions should also focus on the crafting of 
modalities which would prevent the indiscriminate transferring of subsidies between and within 
boxes.  These represented two initiatives, which, inte r alia, could form an integral part of the 
multilateral solution to the cotton issue. 
197. In respect of the export competition pillar, th e Group supported the principle of equivalence, 
which sought to discipline, in parallel, the entire spectrum of export competition measures.  For the 
ACP, addressing export subsidies, export credits, elements of food aid, export insurance and/or 
guarantee schemes, state trading enterprises, and measures of similar effect at the framework stage, represented an acceptable approach to delivering the mandate in this area.  These measures should be 
disciplined where utilised by deve loped Members, since such use could undermine price, volumes of 
production and trade, thereby influencing both dom estic production and trade participation of those 
countries which lacked the capacity to provide sim ilar levels of support.  However, it was also 
important for the STEs of the weak and vulnera ble Members to be exempted from additional 
disciplines and the particular situation of LDCs and NFIDCs be taken into  account.  Furthermore, 
access to emergency and non-emergency food aid by  the most vulnerable Members should not be 
unduly inhibited. 
198. The ACP also had an interest in the establishmen t of a WTO-consistent system in respect of 
local and regional purchases, when possible, on food aid supply for developing countries and LDCs in 
emergency situations. 
199. The ACP also welcomed the prominence given to  the cotton issue in the draft outline of the 
framework issued by the Chairman  of the General Council, and supported the efforts to address the 
trade and development aspects of cotton.  Howeve r, the deliberations on the different pillars of 
agriculture had not reflected a real willingness on th e part of most Members to find a meaningful 
solution.  For the ACP, the July framework should provide a clear commitment to and provide the basis for an expedient resolution of this critical i ssue, ensuring that modalities contained in each of the 
pillars contributed substantively to the achievement of this objective. 
200. From the perspective of the ACP, negotiati ons on NAMA should facilita te the development, 
upgrading and industrialisation processes being undertak en in ACP countries.  In this regard, there 
should be a recognition that any indiscriminate lowe ring of their industrial tariffs could dampen these 
processes, possibly leading to de-industrialisation in some instances.  Therefore, it was essential that 
the July framework provided the policy space and flex ibility to allow ACP coun tries to institute the 
requisite instruments of industrial policy necessary to achieve their domestic development objectives.  
The NAMA modalities framework should also seek to operationalize the principle of less then full 
reciprocity enshrined in the mandate set down at D oha.  It was also equally important for: (i) the 
approach to industrial tariff reduction to provid e adequate flexibility and scope to enable ACP 
countries to have access to effective levels of pr eferences necessar y to maintain competitiveness in  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 45 
 
 
 their export markets; (ii) the issue of tariff bindi ngs be approached in a way, which provided an 
incentive for countries to increase their levels of bind ing; (iii) NTBs to be addressed in parallel with 
tariff reductions in the negotiations; and (iv) LDCs, in addition to being exempt from making further 
tariff reductions, to benefit from duty and quota-fre e market access for all their products into all 
markets of developed countries, as well as markets of those developing countries, which were in a 
position to so. 
201. The Group believed that the July package should reflect the critical importance of the services 
sector to developing countries in general, and the AC P in particular.  There should also be cognisance 
of the fact that the liberalisation of services undertaken thus far had largely failed to redress the 
imbalances which exist in respect of supply capacity, efficiency and competitiveness.  Not 
surprisingly therefore, the gains which had been derived had primarily accrued to a few Members.  
There should be respect for the principle of progressi ve liberalisation and the need for Members of the 
ACP Group to regulate trade in services and libera lise in a way which was consistent with their 
national policy objectives.  In view of the capacity constraints technical assistance and capacity building programmes should be fundamental elements  of the modalities frame work in this area. 
202. In the area of WTO rules, the needs of th e ACP should be explicitly taken into account 
through the laying of guidelines for: (i) negotia tion of simplified procedures which would facilitate 
application of trade remedies by ACP countries, in appropriate cases; (ii) providing additional 
flexibility to cater to the specific needs of LDCs; and (iii) the provision of technical assistance to 
establish the necessary institutional framework  and undertake human resource training. 
203. The ACP noted the increasing convergence of vi ews towards the development of a Work 
Programme on trade facilitation.  However, be fore any agreement by explicit consensus on 
negotiating modalities, a number of issues still needed to  be clarified, in respect of, inter alia, the 
provision of technical assistance, the clarificati on of the implications of adopting a multilateral 
framework on trade facilitation, estimating the cost of implementation of new rules, determining who 
would or should meet the cost of compliance, adju stment and implementation, clarifying the issue of 
the application of the dispute settlement mechanis m and determining whether the new rules would be 
binding.  Accordingly, the ACP also called for the remaining issues of trade and investment; trade and 
competition policy; and transparency in governme nt procurement to be dropped from the Work 
Programme. 
204. He hoped that his overview of the general thi nking of the ACP Group had provided additional 
clarity and assisted in guiding the way forward with regard to developing the draft framework.  He 
also hoped that the declaration and other documen ts emanating from the ACP Ministerial Meeting 
scheduled to be held in Mauritius on 11 July 2004, would be fed into the process and contribute 
towards the July Package. 
205. The representative of Kenya
 supported the statement made by Nigeria on behalf of the 
African Group and the ACP statement.  As the TNC Chairman had stated, Ministers at various fora 
had provided political will that should enable Member s to achieve meaningful progress.  He sensed a 
fear of the type of multilateral rules that would result from these negotiations which might not benefit 
the weak and vulnerable Members of this or ganization.  This was why Kenya had supported 
delegations which had argued that the S&D tr eatment toolkit should include exemption from 
reduction commitments for the weak and vulnerable. 
206. Many Members had alluded to the linkages in  the negotiations between agriculture and 
NAMA.  He continued to observe the contradicti on in the ambitions by some Members in these two 
important areas noticing that some Members had very high ambitions in NAMA and the while having 
very low ambitions in agriculture.  The same leve l of ambitions should apply in both areas.  There 
were specific sensitivities in both agriculture a nd NAMA and the same principles should apply. TN/C/M/13 
Page 46  
 
 207. On services, Kenya had the impression that services negotiations had been running smoothly.  
This impression might not be right given that Me mbers could not agree on the Chairman's written 
report to the TNC and he hoped this was not the tip of  the iceberg.  On agri culture, he expected the 
framework in July to be balanced, equitable and refl ect the Doha mandate.  The level of specificity in 
the three pillars should also apply to S&D treatment.   
208. He respected the NAMA Chairman's view that the Derbez text was the basis of a framework, 
but felt that the Derbez text could not be the onl y basis of a possible framework.  The proposals and 
comments Kenya had made should also be taken into c onsideration.  In addition, it was clear that the 
Derbez text on agriculture and its accompanying A nnex was no longer a basis for the agriculture 
framework.  The simple reason was that the text th at had been issued in Cancún no longer reflected 
the technical and political realities confronting th e negotiations on agriculture.  Likewise, on 
Singapore issues, the Derbez text was no longer a cred ible starting point for the July framework.  This 
was also the case for NAMA. 
209. The African Trade Ministers meeting held recen tly in Kigali had highlighted explicitly the 
inappropriateness of the Derbez text and its Annex in  relation to NAMA.  The text circulated at the 
last informal HOD had stated th at the "proposals contained in the Derbez text and its annex on 
NAMA are in contradiction of the principle of less than full reciprocity as enshrined in the Doha 
mandate and as such would deepen the crisis of  de-industrialization and accentuate the unemployment 
and poverty crisis in our countries." 
210. On the report by the Chairman of the CTD in Special Session, Kenya was committed to 
finalising work on S&D treatment without any furt her delay.  Since Cancún no significant work had 
taken place and positions had hardly changed.  Th erefore, he advocated setting up a comprehensive 
work programme with clear benchmarks of what need ed to be done at each stage.  The submission of 
Kenya on behalf of the African Group, LDC Group, ACP Group, India and Indonesia (TN/C/16) offered a practical guide in this respect.  The CT D Chairman might find the submission useful in 
preparing his report for the July package and the fu ture work programme for S&D.  He agreed with 
Brazil that on implementation issues a new ne gotiating group should be established.   
211. On Singapore issues, Kenya was guided by the Ki gali consensus.  He requested that Members 
look at the declaration to see what position the Minist ers had taken in Kigali.  He reiterated that the 
Doha Round of trade talks would qualify as a de velopment Round not only by acknowledging it but 
by making it a reality by locking key development elem ents into the frameworks.   A lot needed to be 
done between now and the end of July and Kenya encouraged the Chairmen of various negotiating 
bodies to continue working at manageable speed fo r a package that would be acceptable to all.   
212. The representative of Japan
 said his delegation was strongly committed to contributing to the 
progress of the Round including in the area of agriculture.  In order for it to do so, Japan needed a July 
package with balanced results.  Several speakers ha d already referred to balance and Japan, the largest 
net food importing country in the world, had been ma king a great deal of reform efforts in agriculture, 
and would continue to do so.  Outcomes in agricu lture, which in themselves needed to be balanced, 
would have to be matched by progress in other areas such as NAMA, Singapore issues, services and rules.  Moreover, development was a central issue of the current Round, and the balance of the Round 
would also include the need to respond to the voi ces of the developing Members.  It was equally 
important to strike a balance between amb ition and flexibility in each negotiating area. 
213. On agriculture, balances were  needed between ambition and flexibility, between exporting 
and importing Members and among the three pillars.  Jap an believed that all forms of export subsides 
should be eliminated.  In this context, equivalent  disciplines should be applied to all forms of export 
subsides including export credit, food aid and state trading enterprises (STEs).  On domestic support, 
trade-distorting support should be subject to grea ter reductions.  On market access, substantial  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 47 
 
 
 improvement in market access with considera tion of Members' sensitivities reflecting non-trade 
concerns should be realized in accordance with the Doha mandate.  From this perspective, 
consideration for sensitivities of all Members s hould be appropriately addressed as a rule.  Tariff 
capping and mandatory expansion of TRQ applicable to all products impaired such flexibility and 
were not acceptable.  Furthermore, Japan was pr epared to discuss various types of tariff reduction 
formula if its concerns and sensitivities were duly me t.  In the overall agriculture negotiation process, 
transparency and inclusiveness were prerequisites fo r striking a right balance.  In this connection, 
Japan would continue to engage actively in th e process conducted by the Agriculture Chairman. 
214. On the cotton issue, Japan hoped that further progress would be made through the 
engagement of international or ganizations in the follow-up to the African Regional Workshop on 
Cotton held in Cotonou in March.  Alongside such  international efforts, Japan was undertaking its 
own initiatives such as a package of assistance specifically designed to address the issues of cotton 
and agriculture in Benin, which was one of the fo ur proponents of the cotton initiative.  On NAMA, 
Members needed to allow for the post-July negotiations , on the basis of the Derbez text, to ensure in 
concrete terms a right balance between a high le vel of ambition and the necessary flexibility.  
Singapore Issues were elements of the overall balance.   
215. On services, Japan was encouraged by the num ber of 65 initial offers mentioned by the 
Chairman but urged more Members, and major deve loping countries in particular, to submit their 
initial offers early to fulfil their responsibilities as WTO Members.  On rules, steady progress of the 
negotiations was necessary.  In particular, Japan  supported future accelerated negotiations on anti-
dumping, as mentioned in the Chairman's report, TN/ RC/9.  On development issues, Japan intended to 
respond to the legitimate interests of developing c ountries in S&D treatment in each negotiating area 
and in the work of the CTD in Special Session.   
216. Due to the looming July deadline, Members should all contribute to the progress of the 
negotiations by showing flexibility while maintainin g the level of ambition.  The credibility of the 
WTO was at stake.  He emphasised that in orde r to shape the July package, Japan was strongly 
committed to and would actively engage in the process here in Geneva. 
217. The representative of Venezuela  said that on agriculture, all Members had a major 
responsibility, and the major partners had to make an effort not to depart from the goals that had been 
set in Doha.  Otherwise it would be difficult to restructure world agricultural trade and developing 
countries would find it difficult to adopt proposals which did not directly reflect their own rural development and food security goals.  Venezuela understood the delicacy of the present situation and 
the need to hold a Ministerial which squarely a ddressed the needs of developing countries.  His 
delegation was ready to contribute to the negotiatin g process, but this should not imply a race against 
the clock which would compel leaders to adopt framework agreements that did not change the 
existing structure for world agricultu ral trade.  He reiterated Venezuela's interests and concerns in key 
areas as reflected in the documents that had b een circulated by the G-20 and the G-33.   
218. Venezuela took special interest in special a nd tropical products which combined a defensive 
protection of its development and food security concerns and the ab ility to take advantage of the 
supposed benefits of more liberalized markets.  He w as concerned that at this stage that the results of 
these delicate negotiations would be prejudice in sev eral areas of great sensitivity to developing 
countries within the pillars of the agricultural agreement.   
219. On NAMA, Venezuela wanted the text to be a dopted for the July meeting to be proportional 
to that of agriculture, namely that both should have  similar levels of ambition.  Similarly, the text 
should reflect those areas of consensus on substa ntial discussions within the Negotiation Group.  
Members should be mindful that in a framework s ubstantive decisions coul d not be decided on all TN/C/M/13 
Page 48  
 
 matters and those issues for which there was no con sensus should be sidelined for a subsequent stage 
of negotiations. 
220. Venezuela's approach on services was that it shoul d not be given priority to market access 
without taking into account the development needs of  developing country economies.  For this reason, 
he believed that a new timetable for accelerating negotiations on specific undertakings outside the 
global context of this process should be established.   He hoped that in the work programme to be 
adopted at the extraordinary session of the Council of  Services, Members would reflect the principles 
outlined in paragraph 2 of Article XIX. 
221. Venezuela hoped that S&D treatment be given eq ual weight to the four post-Cancún themes 
because they were no less important that the overall equilibrium that had been established at Doha.  
Transparency at this stage and in future stages should play a main role in negotiations.  For this 
reason, he called attention to the difficulties of delegations not invited to  meetings and for new 
developments being difficult to assess by authoriti es in the capitals.  On Singapore issues, Venezuela 
was clear that three of the four issues were outside  the negotiations as indicated by Brazil.  On trade 
facilitation, Venezuela was ready to continue with th e process of consultations to decide on the issue's 
future course of action.   
222. The representative of Indonesia
 said the reports from the various Chairpersons showed that 
Members had not fully taken advantage of the wi ndow of opportunity provided by their political 
masters.  Results could only be achieved by th e deadline if there was genuine willingness from key 
Members to move and show the necessary flexibility on issues of particular interest to developing 
countries such as agriculture.  It was important to en sure that the July pack age adhered to the Doha 
mandate on ambition and flexibilities.  His delegation wished to have the p ackage contain the same 
level of generality and specificity across all issues.  This was important, not just to enable Members to 
understand the level of ambition and flexibility among i ssues, but also to ensure that delegations were 
moving at an equal pace as the modalities stage of the negotiations began.   
223. On agriculture, no matter how hard the Chairman tr ied, at the end of the day, it was up to the 
Members to reach agreement on a framework.  For Indonesia, joining consensus on an agriculture 
framework would require that it adhered to the le vel of ambition and flexibilities of the original 
mandate.  This meant that on domestic support the framework had to provide for real substantial 
reduction in all forms of trade distorting support provided by the biggest distorters.  On export 
competition, this meant a framework should provide fo r the credible end date for the elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies. 
224. All Members had to contribute on market access.  However developing country Members 
should do so in a proportional manner so as to ensure a fair and equitable outcome.  On the issue of 
sensitivity in market access, the sensitivity of deve loped Members should be di fferentiated from real 
development problems faced by many developing c ountries.  In this context, the treatment for 
sensitive products for developed and developing countries should be differentiated.  Addressing 
sensitivities of developed Members should not le ad to providing S&D treatment to developed 
countries or undermining the concept of S&D treatment for developing countries. 
225. Indonesia was willing to take th e necessary steps towards pr ogress on NAMA, but it believed 
that progress should be in line with progress in other negotiations such as agriculture.  In this context, 
it was important to ensure that the framework in NAMA and agriculture had the same level of 
generality and specificity.  On using elements of Annex B of the Derbez text as the basis for an 
eventual framework in NAMA, he shared the view s expressed by the representative of Brazil.  Annex 
B was inadequate in reflecting the mandate on issues of particular interest to developing countries, 
while at the same time it went beyond the mandate on cer tain issues of interest to developed countries.  
Thus, he fully supported the call to have a better text than Annex B.  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 49 
 
 
 226. With regard to development issues, particul arly negotiations on S&D treatment, he was 
disappointed on the lack of progress in the negotiatio n on development issues, especially in light of 
this Round being called a development Round and he  thought that the July package should provide a 
clear picture on future work with the rest of the S&D proposals in line with the principle of being a 
development Round. 
227. On services, the July package should not only highlight the current stage and the level of 
initial offers, but also some other issues which we re of utmost importance in increasing the capacity 
and participation of developing countries in the ser vices global market such as the assessment of trade 
in services on specific sectors and modes of supply.   
228. On rules, there should be a right balance be tween market access negotiations and rule making 
negotiations.  Only through a balanced outcome could Members be confid ent in convincing their 
industries on the importance of services trade libera lization.  Based on the Doha mandate, the Rules 
Group had successfully identified many provisions that  needed to be further clarified and improved, 
particularly in the area of anti-dumping and s ubsidies and countervailing measures.  The Group 
should now accelerate its work to the improvement  the Agreement on Anti-dumping and Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures.  On RTAs, while he advocated improved RTA transparency, he 
stressed the importance of S&D as an important el ement of the RTAs for the interests of developing 
countries. 
229. On Singapore issues, the July package should ad dress these issues in their totality.  Indonesia 
would have difficulties undertaking further work on one particular issue, while not making it clear what would happen to the other three issues.  For Indonesia, this meant that investment, competition 
policy, and government procurement would not just be out of the Doha Work Programme, but out of 
the WTO Work Programme.  Only then could Me mbers contemplate undertaking negotiations on 
trade facilitation based on a consensus on the modalities. 
230. In working towards the deadline,  the process was just as importa nt as the substantive issues 
and at this stage of the negotiation, it was vita l that all Members had confidence in the process.  
Members needed to know what was going on in th e various small group meeti ng and consultations, as 
well as any other process.  For these reasons, transp arency and inclusiveness remained crucial.  
Furthermore, past mistakes such as texts put on the table without Member support should not be 
repeated.  Members should do away with the premise that a good text was when no Member liked the text because, at the end of the day as a Member driv en organization, Members would reject a text that 
they did not like.   
231. The representative of Thailand
 said her delegation hoped that the signs of flexibilities and 
convergence on the outstanding issues would soon emerge  so that Members could have a clear picture 
of where they were h eaded by early July. 
232. Agriculture was a key area of the negotiations.  Constructive development in the agriculture 
negotiations would generate fa vourable movements in other areas.  Thailand attached great 
importance to a high level of ambition in agricult ure as mandated by the Ministers in Doha.  On 
market access for agricultural products, she insisted that sensitive products should not receive 
unlimited flexibility in this liberalization process, but her delegation could agree that more options 
should be available for those sensitive products.  Hi gh ambition was also needed in the other pillars 
with the level of ambition in domes tic support and level of specificity being comparable with those of 
market access. 
233. On NAMA, Thailand saw the Derbez text as a basi s, but not as a framework  itself.  In this 
regard, she was prepared to work days and night s and constructively with the Chairman of the 
Negotiating Group to secure a text.  On services, th e submission date of revised offers should be TN/C/M/13 
Page 50  
 
 consistent with the specific dates set in the other ke y areas of the negotiations.  In addition, due regard 
should be given to the quality of offers, particularly  in sectors and modes of supply of export interest 
to developing countries.  
234. Productive and constructive actions needed to be taken promptly on S&D treatment.  She 
supported the three elements suggested by the Ch airman to be included in the development 
component of the July outcome.  However, an y deal to advance the work on S&D should be 
consistent with the Doha mandate  of making S&D treatment more precise, effective and operational 
and should make no distinction betw een developing country Members.  On dispute settlement, a new 
target date should be set so that a work programme could be established. 
235. Achieving a concrete framework level package by July was crucial.  This would not only 
revive the stalled Doha Round, but would also pr epare the ground for its successful conclusion which 
in the long term should greatly enhance world economic growth and development to the benefit of all.   
236. The representative of Sri Lanka
 said that the agriculture ne gotiations was the single most 
important issue under the DDA for most countries.  However, a small group of developing countries 
could end up as losers which was recently highlighted  by the IMF.  The countries which could end up 
as losers could include net food importing developi ng countries and other sma ll and weak vulnerable 
economies.  The concerns of these countries should be taken into account in these negotiations, so he 
was concerned with issues that had been raised  under the SP and SSM allia nce umbrella and those 
related to food aid. 
237. His delegation strongly believed that the issue of SP and SSM was crucial in addressing food 
and livelihood security, poverty a lleviation and rural development in developing countries.  SPs 
should be a stand-alone category which should not be  bundled with any other category of products in 
a framework text.  He underlined the importance of non-emergency food aid and subsidized export 
credit for developing countries.  The definition of fo od aid should be a broade r concept and should be 
looked at not only from exporting countries' perspective, but also from the point of view of beneficiary countries.   
238. The issue of preferential trade should be a ddressed in a comprehensive manner from the 
perspective of all developing countries particularly from weak and vulnerable ones.  For example, the 
negotiations should look not only at the impact of preference erosion but also consider non-
availability of enhanced preferential access to a fe w weak and vulnerable countries and also the level 
of preference utilization.   
239. His delegation had welcomed, at the NAMA meet ing, the proposals contained in the letter 
sent by European Communities Commissioners Pascal  Lamy and Franz Fischler, particularly their 
reference to "other weak or vulnerable developing  countries in a similar situation to LDCs".  He 
believed any framework text on NAMA in the July package should include the substance of this 
proposal especially to cover the offensive interest s of these countries, particularly those which at 
present did not receive enhanced preferential access into their main markets.  These countries were 
presently at a position of competitive disadvantage.  Though Sri Lanka was a low income, small and 
vulnerable economy, it did not need this "Round for fr ee".  It was ready to exchange concessions in 
return for meaningful and tangible access for its main  export products in its main markets.  Annex B 
of the Derbez text did not reflect Sri Lanka's inte rests adequately.  As pointed out by Brazil, the 
Derbez text was not written in stone and freezing it w ould result in greater difficulties than opening it. 
240. Sri Lanka had always believed that a well-developed services sector was essential for 
economic development in particular that liberalizat ion of infrastructural and logistic services could 
make economies efficient and the goods sector more co mpetitive.  It was from this perspective that Sri 
Lanka approached the service negotiations.  Sri Lanka had already submitted its initial offer in  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 51 
 
 
 services, it urged others to do so and it recognized th e need for improved offers, particularly in areas 
of importance to developing  countries like mode 4. 
241. Sri Lanka had always recognized the importance of trade facilitation for developing countries 
in general and trade dependent de veloping countries in particular.  The speedy clearance of goods and 
simplifying procedures would certainly reduce transaction costs and increase competitiveness.  
However, experience on the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement had demonstrated 
that in spite of a five year transition period, many countries needed more time to implement the 
Agreement.  Therefore, the agreement on trade facilitation which would cover a broader area than mere customs procedures would need a comprehens ive approach including greater flexibilities and a 
high level of technical assistance. 
242. In this context, he reported that when Sr i Lanka had difficulties with regard to the 
implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement ot her Members were always ready to be flexible 
as required, and based on this experience he reco mmended a similar approach on trade facilitation. 
243. The representative of Korea
 said his delegation was firmly co mmitted and would contribute to 
the goal of arriving at a framework package by the end of July.  The picture painted by the 
Chairpersons did not allow Members to be overly op timistic.  He was especially concerned about the 
difficult task of producing a truly balanced framewo rk on agriculture, which was undoubtedly a key to 
reaching a deal on the July package.   He was also concerned that th e delay in progress in agriculture 
was leading to little movement in other areas, wh ich in turn made it more difficult to ensure a 
balanced outcome. 
244. Nevertheless, Korea was encouraged that a ll Members shared the will to produce a 
framework package in July.  Given the time constrai nts and the persistent differences in substantive 
interests, Members might not be able to reach a perf ect agreement by July that could satisfy all.  But 
Korea believed that with a proper mix of realism, flexibility and the leadership of all the Chairpersons, Members could produce a package that  was reasonably balanced and acceptable to all. 
245. Korea believed that for the efforts in agriculture to  be successful, they needed to be inclusive.  
In terms of substance, inclusiveness required reflect ing the core interests of Members.  For importing 
countries like Korea, it was particularly important that their sensitivities – including their difficulties 
with higher tariff deeper cuts, tariff capping and ma ndatory TRQ expansion – should be duly reflected 
in the final text.  It was also essential that flexib ilities to address these sensiti vities be built into the 
framework.  He counted on the Agriculture Chairm an's experience on where Members had to move 
forward. 
246. Korea agreed with the NAMA Group Chairman that  a minimalist approach might be the most 
practical at this stage.  Even though everybody had some points to add to or subtract from the Derbez 
Text, all had to admit that it was far too risky to widely re-open the text at this stage. 
247. Members would have to agree on a text that provided further momentum in the services 
negotiations.  In this light, he believed that a re ference to the need to submit initial offers and 
establishment of the benchmarks fo r improved offers woul d be particularly useful.  Development 
issues were without a doubt one of the most important parts of the DDA.  Korea supported the three element approach proposed by the Chairman of the Special Session of the Trade and Development 
Committee regarding S&D issues.  He also hoped that the 28 Agreement-specific S&D treatment 
proposals could be annexed to the July package. 
248. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 said the TNC Chairman's cautious but pragmatic 
approach would serve well as a driving force to move the Doha Round forward.  On agriculture, TN/C/M/13 
Page 52  
 
 Switzerland had elaborated Chinese Taipei's concerns as a G-10 Member.  The Agriculture 
Chairman's comments on newly acceded Member s should be taken into consideration. 
249. He agreed that Annex B of the Derbez text could be a basis for future work on NAMA 
although further improvement was needed.  It was n ecessary to reach an ambitious goal at the end of 
the DDA.  He encouraged ambition on services a nd urged those Members, who had not yet done so, 
to submit their initial offers.  Also, progress in ru le-making was as important as market access.  On 
Singapore issues, he supported the launching of nego tiations on trade facilitation while keeping the 
other three Singapore issues on the WTO agenda. 
250. He emphasized the importance of transparency  on the process of consensus building.  To 
ensure that each Member had complete information in the negotiations, he strongly believed that all 
Members were entitled to be informed about progre ss after any major consultations conducted by a 
Chairperson of any negotiation group.  To be fu lly informed was vital to guarantee meaningful 
participation of Members in all phases of the negot iations since transparency should be the lifeblood 
of this negotiating process. 
251. The representative of Chile
 said Ministers of APEC were strongly committed with a sense of 
urgency to achieving a meaningful package by July  in agriculture, NAMA, trade facilitation, services 
and other areas.  Some good progress had been made in agriculture, but it had been slow.  Market 
access had made some progress while domestic suppor t was lagging behind.  He was encouraged by 
the progress, but more work was needed.  He commende d the so-called FIPs (Five Interested Parties) 
who had worked towards a meeting of minds.  Many  wide divergences still remained, but after having 
heard the Agriculture Chairman's report, he was more optimistic. 
252. He thought the group called "the Friends of Fl exibility" should instead call themselves FOPP 
– "Friends of Permanent Protection".  He agreed with  the group that flexibility was crucial, but he also 
underlined the work of the Agriculture Chairman th at an arbitrary number to limit flexibility did not 
work.  One answer was that tho se who needed flexibility could have it, but at a higher price.   
253. On NAMA, the APEC Ministerial statement in  Pucón had stated that "the negotiating 
framework for non-agricultural mark et access on the basis of the Derbez text is balanced and provides 
for real improvements on market access and addresses no tariff barriers".  He agreed with this expression of his Ministers and thought that the Derbez text was a good basis on which to proceed.  However, given the disagreements on how to deal with the Derbez text he encouraged Members to 
proceed to work on the basis of conditional trus t.  It was not possible for NAMA to wait until 
agriculture had been fixed.  On the expressions th at the level of ambition on NAMA had lessened, he 
said this was due to the reaction against those Members who required flexibility on agriculture.  
Although he regretted that reality, it would be those Members' responsibility at the end of the day.   
254. Chile rejected and resented terms such as " free-riding", "usurpation" and "deception to 
consumers" from the statement of friends of GIs, pa rticularly "usurpation" which had a definite legal 
connotation.  This was not the right way to preced e to seek international co-operation and the group 
was not making more friends by doing as much.  If one wished to be serious on this issue, one had to 
act seriously and engage in a debate on what one wanted, to what extent, to assess the costs and to 
assess all the consequences.  He added that those who wanted an extension of GIs had refused to 
discuss the issue in a serious, detailed and technical manner. 
255. Ministers of APEC wished to see trade facilitation within the Single Undertaking and in the 
July package.  It was essential to negotiate moda lities as soon as possible since trade facilitation was 
very complex and delicate for many developing countries who needed time to negotiate.  The 
concerns of many Members on the modalities and the Derbez text needed to be addressed as soon as  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 53 
 
 
 possible.  The more time that passed developing countries would lose out because there would remain 
less time to negotiate on these very delicate matters. 
256. The representative of Australia  endorsed the call by the European Communities and the 
United States that the scope of the July outcome s hould focus on the action that  was necessary at this 
stage in order to ensure continue d progress of the negotiations and the Work Programme as a whole.  
Members should focus on those subjects on which specific decisions were needed to move the 
negotiations to the next phase.  This was not a mid- term review, it was not a Ministerial Conference, 
and apart from putting the three Singapore issues aside , no one was suggesting that any other issue be 
put to one side.  Members were not proposing to re interpret the mandate nor expand the mandate.  No 
issue was sought to be elevated above others, so Members should be pragmatic, practical and business 
oriented and not load up any decision with the whole lot of unnecessary padding. 
257. Despite all the efforts, Members were still some  way from agreeing on a text of a modalities 
framework, but the level of engagement had inte nsified significantly in recent weeks, and many 
issues, which had remained hidden under obscure and ambiguous formulations  since August of last 
year, had risen to the surface.  There was a far be tter appreciation among all de legations of what was 
at stake and what countries were prepared to do.  To the Cairns Group the test against which any 
modalities text would be assessed would be whether it could deliver an outcome which was consistent 
with the ambitious mandate set in Doha.  If it w as capable of delivering significant improvements in 
market access, substantial reductions in trade di storting support and phasing out all forms of exports 
subsidies, Australia would be the first to support it.   Provided it did not prejudice such an outcome he 
would be able to agree to it.  However, if all it di d was to consolidate the status quo or to confirm that 
billions of dollars and Euros and Yen would conti nue to distort international trade, that support 
measures would simply be transferred from one col oured box to another or that market access would 
remain restricted and simply transferred from one ex ternal supply to another, then it would not pass 
the test.  The Cairns Group was fully committed to developing a framework text, provided that it was 
consistent with the mandate.   
258. It was desirable that the Agriculture Chairman was confident that his text would attract broad 
support.  Australia realised that any draft would not be the final word and that there would be a couple 
of weeks to refine and improve it.  However, if Members looked back at the history, Chairmen texts 
since Doha had not fared particularly well, so Me mbers should be weary of stampeding the process.  
Naturally, if one could develop a framework text on agriculture with the appropriate specificity, this 
would provide the momentum needed to have the same level of ambition on NAMA, on services and 
other issues. 
259. On Singapore issues, he joined others in app ealing for the beginning of a negotiation on trade 
facilitation to be launched in July.  He thought it was conceivable that  with more concerted effort over 
the next couple of weeks, Members could find so me modalities which would give everyone a degree 
of comfort.  The other three were going to be put  to one side, outside the Single Undertaking and 
outside the Work Programme of the Doha mandate .  He asked what would be the problem with 
continuing, at least some work on these issues whic h all delegations knew were  going to be important 
in one way or another in the years to come.  He asked what was to stop Members from having at least 
some work programme in the WTO, completely ou tside the negotiations.  There was obviously some 
way to go before progress could be made on a number of implementation issues.  As part of the July package, Australia hoped that Members could agree to renew their determination to find practical 
solutions to those issues which were genuine im plementation issues of interest to developing 
countries. 
260. The representative of the Philippines
 said the challenge before Members appeared to be acute 
in the agriculture negotiations.  He  was concerned about an asymmetric  movement in the three pillars, 
especially the inability of certain Members to match high level rhetoric with ground level negotiations TN/C/M/13 
Page 54  
 
 in domestic support and export competition.  Balance and the original ambition of the Doha mandate 
were important in the agriculture negotiations.   
261. Members appeared to be back to the banded appr oach in agriculture and this approach should 
be seriously explored in NAMA without necessarily deviating from the contours of Annex B in the 
Derbez text.  In particular, emphasis should be la id not only on present bound rates, but on present 
applied rates in this banded approach.  This w as one important way to operationalize S&D treatment, 
credit and recognise autonomous liberalization. 
262. On the issue of development, he supported the three elements of the CTD Chairman for the 
July package.  Members n eeded to be circumspect on the issue of "underlying development issues".  
There were already enough unproductive discussions on the philosophy of distinction among 
developing countries and instead Members should focus attention on the 28 Agreement-specific 
proposals and the others that awaited attention. 
263. On trade facilitation, there might be a percepti on that the launching of negotiations was just a 
matter of time and confluence of other circumstances,  for example, an acceptabl e agriculture package.  
Unfortunately, it might not be as simple as that.  A nnex E of the Derbez text was highly insufficient to 
serve as modalities and more work on it was nece ssary before Members could assess whether or not 
explicit consensus on modalities was at last possible. 
264. The representative of Romania
 said that on agriculture, her delegation believed there were 
enough elements to be included in a framework.  On NAMA, the Derbez text should be used when 
drafting the framework, allowing for as much flexibility  as needed to meet the mandate.  On services, 
the number and quality of offers should increase whil e not forgetting that there were several objective 
constraints for many developing countries.  S&D tr eatment deserved attention both in the specific 
areas of negotiations and in the dedicated package. 
265. Romania stressed the importance of better protection for goods covered by GIs in the form of 
intellectual property rights for small and medium sized producers in her country.  Trade facilitation 
could be an important issues for all WTO Member s and establishing a framework was doable, mainly 
if the relevant concerns of developi ng countries could be properly addressed. 
266. Romania wished to see the Chairmen's draft as s oon as possible, to allow it to be reviewed in 
its capital and enable her country to actively pa rticipate in building consensus both for trade 
development and for the credibility of the multilateral trading system. 
267. The representative of Costa Rica  said  that with only a few weeks away from a possible 
decision on a package, the progress that had been ma de was not sufficient.  However, not obtaining a 
package was not an option for Costa Rica and the pa ckage had to be ambitious.  On agriculture, Costa 
Rica supported ambition in each of the three pillars since it could not imagine a result without dealing 
with export subsidies, substantial reduction of domestic support and improvement in market access. 
268. He believed particular attention ha d to be given to products of interest to developing countries 
including tropical products under the market ac cess pillar.  The export interests of developing 
countries were an essential part of S&D treatmen t and this situation should be reflected in the 
modalities.  Until now work had focused on one of th e two aspects of S&D treatment in the defensive 
interests of developing countries which were importa nt, but S&D treatment for the offensive interests 
of developing countries were either more important  or at least as important and substantial results 
would contribute directly to economic gr owth and development of these countries. 
269. The results of the Doha Round for developing c ountries within the next few years would not 
be measured in terms of how many exemptions to  liberalization had been given to the developing  TN/C/M/13 
 Page 55 
 
 
 countries, but rather how much progress had been made in opening up the access opportunities for 
developing country products.  On NAMA, he felt th at the Annex to the Derbez text contained the 
minimum aspects for achieving the ambitious results  which he expected.  His delegation certainly 
linked the various sectors of the negotiations within  the Single Undertaking and this should allow for 
simultaneous progress in the various areas involved.  Members should avoid running the risk of 
solving agriculture without leaving enough time to continue on other areas such as NAMA and 
Singapore issues. 
270. Costa Rica hoped that Members would be in a position to launch and work intensively on 
trade facilitation modalities after July.  He favoured the work on the other three areas continuing in 
the working groups if they were outside the Single Undertaking.   
271. The representative of Colombia  said her delegation would have preferred to have an early 
agreement on agriculture which woul d have facilitated participation in  other areas of the negotiations.  
She noted that Members had been able to identify cer tain issues which might be subsequently tackled 
with some broad orientations, defined parameters and the importance of recognizing the export 
interest as an essential factor in connection with S&D treatment.  This new dimension of S&D 
treatment would make it possible to recognize Colo mbia's special interest in tropical products. 
272. On NAMA, she agreed with th e United States that Members should take elements in the 
Derbez text to continue working after July w ithout prejudicing the position of countries in the 
negotiations.  She agreed with the Services Chai rman on the elements to be included in the 
negotiations.  However, she underscored that Colombia  attached special importance to the direct link 
between the improvement of offers and the sectors and modes of supply which had been identified by 
the developing countries as being priority areas or sectors. 
273. Colombia recognized the legitimacy of regional meetings to coordinate  positions.  However, 
she appealed to Members to maintain their flexib ility for the Geneva process because a set view of 
any group of countries might prejudice the success of the work in Geneva. 
274. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note  of the statements. 
275. The Chairman  said that, having heard the report by the Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Dispute Settlement Body and the subsequent di scussion, he proposed to pass on to the General 
Council the TNC's recommendation that the work in the Special Session should continue on the basis 
set out by Ambassador Spencer in his report. 
276. The Trade Negotiations Committee so agreed . 
277. The Chairman  said that Members had been working hard .  It was also clear that the various 
reports by the Chairpersons had indicated some tangible progress in some areas.  However, it 
remained that in several areas delegations were  still bogged down by unmovable positions.  In some 
areas, he was unsure whether Members had moved forw ard or backward from Cancún.  Crisis loomed 
as the July General Council meeting approached and some might say that delegations might need a 
crisis to inject a sense of urgency to force positio ns to be moved.  In the light of these complex 
negotiations, he was sure that late moves could mean a recipe for failure.  The Chairman of NAMA 
had significantly remarked that there was danger in ha ving to deliver a text at a very short notice.  
Although it was clear that forward movement in agriculture could impact positively on other areas, he cautioned Members that it might not leave enough time for the rest of the issues to follow and complete a substantive framework agreement that would meet the Doha mandate.  Members had the 
opportunity to capture historic breakthroughs in ar eas like agriculture and Singapore issues, but this 
opportunity might not still be there after the summer break. TN/C/M/13 
Page 56  
 
 278. He reminded delegations that all that was atte mpted with the July package was to lay the 
foundation for the next hard stage of the negotiations .  Some delegations had argued in favour of a 
short July text.  He thought Members were within a striking distance of the Ju ly package, but the line 
between success and failure was a very thin one and Members were running out of excuses for failure.  
He said that delegations would only have themselves to blame for a failure. 
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