RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/ADP/Q1/EGY/3
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/3
14 April 1999
(99-1492)
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing MeasuresOriginal:  English
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS
Questions Posed by ROMANIA
Regarding the Notifications of EGYPT1
The following communication, dated 6 April 1999, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of Romania.
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In November 1998, Egypt notified to the WTO Law No. 161 of June 1998 and Implementing
Regulations of the Egyptian Law No. 161 Concerning the Protection of the National Economy fromInjurious Effects of Unfair Practices in International Law ("IR").
Anti-dumping methodologies
Definition – general question.  In Egyptian Law No. 161 and in IR, Article 1 states that
"Injurious Practices" means, among other factors, the "unjustifiable increase of imports which causes
serious injury to the domestic industry …".
1. What is the meaning of the term "unjustifiable"?  How does this comply with
determination of injury under the WTO Agreements?
Application requirements.  The Egyptian IR is silent on the information needed to be
contained in an application.  Articles 13 and 14 indicate only the requirement of "written application"
which shall include the "evidence", the "injury" and the "causal link" between each.
2. Has Egypt promulgated another regulation determining the "form" of the application
for initiation of an A-D investigation?  If yes, could Egypt provide this regulation?  Ifnot, how will Egypt ensure that the application complies with the requirements of
Article 5.2 of the A-D Agreement?
Volume of imports.  In examining the imports that are either dumped or subsidized, Article 1
of the Egyptian IR states that injurious practice will be considered under "the increase of imports as a
result of dumping …" and Article 39 requires the "existence of significant increase in dumped
imports".
                                                     
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3. Do the Egyptian authorities consider that these provisions are in accordance with
Article 3.2 of the A-D Agreement, which requires the examination of the volume of
dumped imports?
Determination of injury.  Upon provisions of Article 41, the Investigating Authority shall
verify that the injury suffered by the industry is caused by the dumped imports and not due to "any
other factors".
4. What are the "other factors" to be taken into consideration when determining the
source of the injury?
Article 22(2) states that the notice of the initiation of an investigation published by the
Investigating Authority shall also include "a description of the product in question".  This is the single
reference, in the entire Egyptian IR, on the description of the product under investigation.
5. Do the Egyptian authorities consider that only the description of the product is
according to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement?  If yes,
please explain, in the framework of the above-mentioned WTO Agreement, at what
level of description will the Egyptian authority interpret "like product".
Also, Article 38 states the cases in which the Investigating Authority shall prepare a report to
recommend the termination of the investigation.  Under Article 5.8 of the A-D Agreement, an
application shall be rejected  and an investigation  shall be terminated promptly  when there is not
sufficient evidence of either dumping or injury … .
6. Is Article 38 of the Egyptian IR referring only to those special circumstances when an
investigation is initiated without receiving a written application?  If not, please
explain where is the consistency of Article 38 with the provisions of the A-D
Agreement?
Confidential information.  In Article 8 of the Egyptian IR it is mentioned that the non-
confidential summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence.
7. What are, in the view of the Egyptian authorities, the limits of a reasonable
understanding?  Could, for example, a request for confidentiality of production,
consumption or stocks, be accepted as such by Egypt.
8. How do the Egyptian authorities verify the accuracy of the information presented by
all parties involved?
Article 9 of the Egyptian IR requires, for all persons and bodies, "the protection of
confidentiality of information and data in cases wh ere it is necessary for the purpose of investigation
or appeal, to have access to such information".  Meanwhile:
- Article 29 states that "subject to the requirement to protect confidential information"
the Investigating Authority "shall make available all information and data,  relevant to
the investigation, to all parties concerned" and "shall disclose  the confidential
information to the court or the expert it appoints" with the "written permission" from
the submitting party;G/ADP/Q1/EGY/3
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- According to Article 23, the representatives of the exporting country will get only a
copy of the non-confidential version of the application;
- Article 6 of Law 161 prohibits the disclosure of confidential data and information
without an explicit written permission of the submitting party and Article 7 states
penalties for violating the prohibition, "without prejudice to more stringent penalties
prescribed by law".
9. Under what circumstances does Egypt consider that it would be "necessary to have
access to such information"?
10. Could Egypt please explain what information and data are relevant to the
investigation?  Are these assimilated with the non-confidential version of the
application?  If yes, is the Egyptian IR a tool for the Egyptian authorities to have anational protective system?  If not, please  explain, under the Egyptian IR provisions,
what are the details of the non-confidential version permitting a reasonable
understanding of the information submitted in confidence?
11. What are the more stringent prejudices prescribed by Law 161?Selection of Normal Value (NV).  Article 34 of Egyptian IR specifies that the NV shall be
constructed according to the "cost of production in the country of origin plus an appropriate amount
for selling, general and administrative costs and a reasonable margin of profit" and when the NV
cannot thus be determined, it "shall be constructed according to the export price of the goods to a third
country" in case "the domestic sales of subject goods account for less than 5 per cent of the export
sales to Egypt".
12. Do the Egyptian authorities consider that the WTO Agreement's emphasis on
"sufficient magnitude" of sales less than 5 per cent of the volume of the domestic
sales will provide always a proper comparison?
Facts available.  The stipulations of Article 24 of the Egyptian IR allows the Investigating
Authority "to limit the investigation to a representative sample of parties or types of products
involved" if the numbers of exporters is too large.  Article 37 states that "the highest dumping margin
shall be applied to the unknown or non-cooperative exporters".
13. Do the Egyptian authorities intend to select the representative sample according to the
provisions of Article 6.10.1 of the same WTO Agreement, in which it is mentionedthat, when choosing exporters, producers or importers concerned, it is preferable to
make consultation with them and to have their consent?  If these provisions are not
going to be followed, on what other basis is the authority going to select the sample?
14. How does Egypt intend to respond if it finds that a party has only partially
cooperated?
Provisional measures
15. Are the conditions from Article 44 the only requirements for applying the provisional
measures by Egypt?  If not, is Egypt going to complete the regulation in respect of
Article 7.1 of the A-D Agreement?G/ADP/Q1/EGY/3
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Administrative process.  In outlining Egyptian A-D methodology, IR refers variously to the
export appointed, list of experts, Investigating Authority, Advisory Committee, Administrative Court,
Minister of Trade and Supply.  For example, Article 3 of the IR suggests that the "Advisory
Committee" will consider the results concluded by the "Investigating Authority" and also can make
recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Supply for the extension of the investigating period(Article 11 of the IR).
Article 30 stipulates that the investigation shall be terminated "if the Investigating Authority
finds insufficient evidence …" while Article 38 states that the "Investigating Authority shall prepare a
report to recommend the termination of the investigation …".
According to Article 87, the Minister of Trade and Supply may impose additional duties or
any other restrictions on imports, in accordance with WTO rules.
Regarding the provisions of Article 95, it appears that the Egyptian IR gives to the
Administrative Court jurisdiction over A-D matters.
16. How is the responsibility for administrating the Egyptian IR divided between the
above-mentioned entities?  Which of these entities has actual responsibility for
rendering final determination in an A-D investigation?
17. What are the duties and responsibilities of the Advisory Committee?  Please explain
the competencies, rules and work-systems set out by the decree mentioned in
Article 3.  Is the organization and membership different from case to case?
18. Does the Minister of Trade and Supply have any attributes differing from A-D
matters in applying countervailing matters, as stated in Article 85?  Please also
explain what additional duties and what other restriction on imports the Egyptian
Minister of Trade and Supply may impose, according to WTO Agreements.
19. Could Egypt indicate whether the Administrative Court considers appeals relating to
A-D measures and decisions?  What are the relevant rules and procedures in the
framework of Article 95?  Is the final judgement given by the Administrative Court,
which allows the Minister of Trade and Supply to terminate or reconsider the A-Dmeasures?
20. Will Egypt reconsider the A-D matters only in the light of dispute settlement panels
in WTO?  What about the Recommendation adopted by the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices?
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