WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DS108/AB/RW
14 January 2002
(02-0152 )
Original:  English
UNITED STATES – TAX TREATMENT FOR "FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATIONS"
RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 21.5 OF THE DSU BY THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
AB-2001-8
Report of the Appellate BodyWT/DS108/AB/RW
Page i
I. Introduc tion................................................................................................................. ................1
II. Background.................................................................................................................. ...............5
A. Overview of United States Rules of Taxation ................................................................5
B. ETI Act........................................................................................................................ ...6
III. Arguments of the Participan ts and Third Pa rticipan ts ................................................................9
A. Claims of Error by the United States – Appellant ......................................................... 9
1. Subsidies Contingent Upon Export under the  SCM Agreement ......................9
2. Export Subsidies under the  Agreement on Agriculture ..................................12
3. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 ......................................................................13
4. Withdrawal of th e FSC Subsidies...................................................................14
B. Arguments of the European Communities – Appellee ................................................. 14
1. Subsidies Contingent Upon Export under the  SCM Agreement ....................14
2. Export Subsidies under the  Agreement on Agriculture ..................................18
3. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 ......................................................................18
4. Withdrawal of th e FSC Subsidies...................................................................18
C. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant....................................... 19
1. Article 10.3 of the DSU:  Third Party Rights .................................................19
2. Conditional Appeals .......................................................................................19
D. Arguments of the United States – Appellee.................................................................. 20
1. Article 10.3 of the DSU:  Third Party Rights .................................................20
2. Conditional Appeals .......................................................................................21
E. Arguments of the Third Participants............................................................................ 21
1. Australia..........................................................................................................21
2. Canada ............................................................................................................22
3. India ................................................................................................................22
4. Japan ...............................................................................................................22
IV. Issues Raised in this Appeal ................................................................................................ .....23
V. Article 1.1 of the  SCM Agreement :  "Foregoing Revenue" that is "Otherwise Due" ..............24
VI. Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement :  Export Con tingency ...................................................33
VII. Footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement :  Avoiding Double Taxation of Foreign-Source
Income ......................................................................................................................... .............38
VIII. Article 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture :  Export Su bsidies ...........................................60
IX. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 .............................................................................................. ..62
A. Law, Regulation or Requirement Affecting the Internal Use of Imported and
Like Domestic Products............................................................................................... 64
B. "Less Favourable Treatment"...................................................................................... 66WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page ii
X. Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement :  Withdrawal of FSC Subsidies ........................................68
XI. Article 10.3 of the DSU ..................................................................................................... .......71
XII. Conditional Appeals ........................................................................................................ .........77
XIII. Findings and Conclusions.................................................................................................. .......77WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 1
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
APPELLATE BODY
United States – Tax Treatment For "Foreign
Sales Corporations"
Recourse To Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities
United States,  Appellant/Appellee
European Communities,  Appellant/Appellee
Australia,  Third Participant
Canada,   Third Participant
India,   Third Participant
Japan,   Third ParticipantAB-2001-8
Present:Feliciano, Presiding Member
Ganesan, Member
Taniguchi, Member
I. Introduction
1. The United States appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report,
United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations " – Recourse to Article 21.5. of the
DSU by the European Communities  (the "Panel Report").1  The Panel was established to consider a
complaint by the European Communities concerning the consistency of the United States FSCReplacement and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act (the "ETI Act") 
2 with the  Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (the " SCM Agreement "), the  Agreement on Agriculture ,  and
the  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994   (the "GATT 1994").  The ETI Act is a measure
taken by the United States with a view to complying with the recommendations and rulings of theDispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") in  United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" ("US – FSC
 ").3  Pertinent aspects of the ETI Act are described in Section II below, as
well as in paragraphs 2.1-2.8 of the Panel Report.
                                                     
1WT/DS108/RW, 20 August 2001.
2United States Public Law 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
3The recommendations and rulings of the DSB resulted from the adoption, by the DSB, of the
Appellate Body Report in  US – FSC , WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 2000 (the "original Appellate Body
Report").  In this Report, we refer to the panel that considered the original complaint brought by the EuropeanCommunities as the "original panel" and to its report as the "original panel report".WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 2
2. In  US – FSC ,  the original panel concluded that the "FSC measure", consisting of
Sections 921-927 of the United States Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC") and related measuresestablishing special tax treatment for foreign sales corporations, was inconsistent with the UnitedStates' obligations under the  SCM Agreement  and under the  Agreement on Agriculture .
4  T h e
Appellate Body upheld the original panel's finding that the FSC measure was inconsistent with United
States' obligations under the  SCM Agreement  and modified the Panel's findings under the  Agreement
on Agriculture .
3. On 20 March 2000, the DSB adopted the reports of the original panel and the Appellate Body.
The DSB recommended that the United States bring the FSC measure into conformity with itsobligations under the covered agreements and that the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export
subsidies within the meaning of the  SCM Agreement  be withdrawn without delay, namely, "at the
latest with effect from 1 October 2000."
5  At its meeting on 12 October 2000, the DSB acceded to a
request made by the United States to modify the time-period for complying with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings in this dispute so as to expire on 1 November 2000.6  O n
15 November 2000, with a view to such compliance, the United States promulgated the ETI Act.7
The background of this dispute is set out in further detail in the Panel Report.8
4. The European Communities considered that  the ETI Act did not comply with the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB and that it was not consistent with the United States'obligations under the  SCM Agreement ,  the  Agreement on Agriculture ,  and the GATT 1994.  The
European Communities therefore requested that the matter be referred to the original panel pursuantto Article 21.5 of the  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(the "DSU").
9  On 20 December 2000, in accordance with Article 21.5 of the DSU, the DSB referred
the matter to the original panel.10  The Panel Report was circulated to the Members of the World
Trade Organization (the "WTO") on 20 August 2001.
                                                     
4Original Panel Report, US – FSC , WT/DS108/R, adopted 20 March 2000, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS108/AB/R, para. 8.1.
5Ibid., para. 8.8.
6WT/DSB/M/90, paras. 6-7.  See also Panel Report, para. 1.3.
7Panel Report, para. 1.5.
8Ibid., paras. 1.1-1.13.
9WT/DS108/16, 8 December 2000.
10WT/DS108/19, 5 January 2001.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 3
5. The Panel concluded that:
(a) the [ETI] Act is inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement  as it involves subsidies "contingent… upon export
performance" within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement  by reason of the requirement of "use outside the
United States" and fails to fall within the scope of the fifth sentence of
footnote 59 of the  SCM Agreement  because it is not a measure to
avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income within themeaning of footnote 59 of the  SCM Agreement ;
(b) the United States has acted inconsistently with its obligation under
Article 3.2 of the  SCM Agreement  not to maintain subsidies referred
to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the  SCM Agreement ;
(c) the [ETI] Act, by reason of the requirement of "use outside the
United States", involves export subsidies as defined in Article 1(e) of
the  Agreement on Agriculture  for the purposes of Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture  and the United States has acted
inconsistently with its obligations under Article 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture  by applying the export subsidies, with
respect to both scheduled and unscheduled agricultural products, in a
manner that, at the very least, threatens to circumvent its export
subsidy commitments under Article 3.3 of the  Agreement on
Agriculture  and, by acting inconsistently with Article 10.1, the
United States has acted inconsistently with its obligation under
Article 8 of the  Agreement on Agriculture ;
(d) the [ETI] Act is inconsistent with Article III:4 of the  GATT 1994  by
reason of the foreign articles/labour limitation as it accords less
favourable treatment within the meaning of that provision to imported
products than to like products of US origin; and
(e) the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to
be prohibited export subsidies inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of theSCM Agreement  and has therefore failed to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7
SCM Agreement.
11
6. The Panel also concluded that to the extent the United States had acted inconsistently with the
SCM Agreement ,  the  Agreement on Agriculture  and the GATT 1994, the United States had nullified
or impaired benefits accruing to the European Communities under those agreements.12
7. On 15 October 2001, the United States notified the DSB of its intention to appeal certain
issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations developed by the Panel, pursuant to
                                                     
11Panel Report, para. 9.1.
12Ibid. , para. 9.2.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 4
paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the DSU, and filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 20 of the
Working Procedures for Appellate Review  (the " Working Procedures ").13
8. By letter of 22 October 2001, the United States requested the Appellate Body pursuant to
Rule 16(2) of the  Working Procedures  to modify the timetable set out in the Working Schedule for
Appeal for the filing of the appellant's submissions by the United States.  The United States stated that
suspected bioterrorist attacks had compromised the ability of the United States to conduct thenecessary consultations with the United States Congress with regard to this appeal.
14  According to the
United States, the effect of these circumstances was such that adhering to the original timetable wouldresult in manifest unfairness to the United States.  In its letter of 23 October 2001, the EuropeanCommunities did not object to the request  made by the United States, but requested that, in order to
preserve the balance of procedural rights afforded to the participants in this appeal, the AppellateBody extend the deadline for the filing of the European Communities' appellee's submission by14 days.  In a letter dated 23 October 2001, the Division of the Appellate Body hearing the appeal
accepted that the circumstances identified by the United States constituted "exceptional
circumstances" within the meaning of Rule 16(2) of the  Working Procedures  and that maintaining
the deadline for submission of the appellants' submission would result in "manifest unfairness" to theUnited States.  Accordingly, the Division agreed to modify the Working Schedule for this appeal toallow the United States an additional seven days for the filing of its appellant's submission.  In thesame letter, the Division also extended by seven days the deadlines for the filing of the otherappellant's submissions, the appellee's submission, and the third participants' submissions.
9. On 1 November 2001, the United States filed its appellant's submission.
15  O n
6 November 2001, the European Communities filed its other appellant's submission.16  O n
16 November 2001, the European Communities and the United States each filed an appellee'ssubmission.
17  On the same day, Australia, Canada, India and Japan each filed a third participant's
submission.18
                                                     
13WT/DS108/21, 15 October 2001.
14In its letter, the United States explained that, du e to the delivery of the bacterium anthrax to the
United States Congress, several buildings had been temporarily closed, including buildings housing the offices
of United States Senate officials with jurisdiction over the issues arising in this appeal.
15Pursuant to Rule 21(1) of the Working Procedures .
16Pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures .
17Pursuant to Rules 22 and 23(3) of the Working Procedures .
18Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Working Procedures .WT/DS108/AB/RW
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10. The oral hearing in this appeal was held on 26 and 27 November 2001.  The participants and
third participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by the Members ofthe Division hearing the appeal.
11. At the oral hearing, the Division requested the United States to reduce to writing, by
28 November 2001, certain of its responses to questioning.
19  The Division also authorized the
European Communities and the third participants, if they wished, to respond in writing by30 November 2001.
20  In response to this request, the United States filed an additional written
memorandum on 28 November 2001.  The European Communities filed a response to this additionalwritten memorandum on 30 November 2001.
II. Background
A. Overview of United States Rules of Taxation
12. In our Report in  US – FSC ,  we provided certain general background information relating to
United States rules of taxation.  We said:
For United States citizens and residents, the tax laws of the United
States generally operate "on a worldwide basis".  This means that,
generally, the United States asserts the right to tax all income earned
"worldwide" by its citizens and residents.  A corporation organized
under the laws of one of the fifty American states or the District of
Columbia is a "domestic", or United States, corporation, and is
"resident" in the United States for purposes of this "worldwide"taxation system. …
The United States generally taxes any income earned by foreign
corporations within the territory of the United States.  The United
States generally does not tax income that is earned by foreign
corporations outside the United States.  However, [underSection 882(a) IRC], such "foreign-source" income of a foreign
corporation generally will be subject to United States taxation when
such income is "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States".  …
21 (footnotes omitted)
13. This statement continues to describe the United States tax system and is relevant for the
purposes of this appeal also.  In addition, we note that, under Sections 1 and 11 IRC, the United States
imposes a tax on the "taxable income" of its citizens and residents.  According to Section 63(a) IRC,taxable income is equal to "gross income minus the deductions allowed" under the IRC.
                                                     
19Pursuant to Rule 28(1) of the Working Procedures.
20Pursuant to Rule 28(2) of the Working Procedures .
21Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 3, paras. 6-7.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 6
Section 61(a) IRC provides that gross income is "all  income from whatever source derived".  When a
United States citizen or resident is subject to tax, in the United States, on income which is also subjectto tax in a foreign State, the United States grants the taxpayer tax credits, subject to certainlimitations, in respect of the amount of foreign taxes paid.
22
14. The provisions of the IRC relating to these rules of taxation have not been modified by the
ETI Act, although the application of these rules has been altered by the adoption of the ETI Act.
B. ETI Act
15. A detailed description of the measure at issue in this appeal is contained in paragraphs 2.2
to 2.8 of the Panel Report.  Nevertheless, we consider it useful, at this stage, to provide an overviewof the fundamental aspects and key provisions of the ETI Act.
16. The ETI Act consists of five sections.  At issue in this dispute are, first, certain elements of
Sections 2 and 5, which relate to foreign sales corporations and, second, certain elements of Section 3.Section 3, entitled "Treatment of Extraterritorial Income", amends the IRC by inserting into it a newSection 114, as well as a new Subpart E, which is in turn composed of new Sections 941, 942
and 943.  The remaining sections of the ETI Act are not relevant for purposes of this dispute.
23
17. As we have said, the ETI Act was promulgated by the United States with a view to complying
with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in  US – FSC .  Section 2 of the ETI Act repeals the
provisions of the IRC relating to FSCs.24  Section 5(b) prohibits foreign corporations from electing to
be treated as FSCs after 30 September 2000 and provides for the termination of inactive FSCs.
Nevertheless, Section 5(c) creates a "transition period" for certain transactions of existing FSCs.
Specifically, under Section 5(c)(1) of the ETI Act, the repeal of the provisions of the IRC relating toFSCs "shall not apply" to transactions of existing FSCs which occur before 1 January 2002 or to anyother transactions of such FSCs which occur after 31 December 2001, pursuant to a binding contractbetween the FSC and an unrelated person which is in effect on 30 September 2000.  These provisionsare the subject of the European Communities' claim that the United States has not fully withdrawn theFSC subsidies, in accordance with Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement .
                                                     
22Section 901(a) IRC.
23Section 1 relates to the short title of the ETI Act, while Section 4 sets forth a number of "technical
and conforming" amendments.
24Subpart C of part III of Subchapter N of chapter 1, consisting of Sections 921-927 IRC.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 7
18. Sections 114, 941, 942 and 943 IRC were inserted in to the IRC by virtue of Section 3 of the
ETI Act, and create new rules under which certain income is excluded from United States taxation.We refer to these new rules as the "ETI measure" (or sometimes simply as the "measure"), which weoutline below.  In these proceedings, the claims brought by the European Communities under
Article 3.1 of the  SCM Agreement ,  Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the  Agreement on  Agriculture  and
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 contest various elements of this measure.
19. The tax treatment provided by the ETI measure is available to United States' citizens and
residents, including natural persons, corporations and partnerships.  In addition, the provisions of theETI measure also apply to foreign corporations which elect to be treated, for tax purposes, asUnited States corporations.
25  The ETI measure permits all these taxpayers to elect to have qualifying
income taxed in accordance with the provisions of that measure.  This election may be made bytaxpayers on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
20. Generally, income from specific transactions will qualify for treatment in accordance with the
provisions of the ETI measure if it is income attributable to gross receipts:  (i) from specific types of
transaction;  (ii) involving "qualifying foreign trade property" ("QFTP");  and (iii) if the "foreigneconomic process requirement" is fulfilled with respect to each such transaction.
26  Turning to the first
of these conditions, the rules contained in the ETI measure apply, in particular, to income arising fromsale, lease or rental transactions.  The ETI measure also applies to income earned from theperformance of services "related or subsidiary to" qualifying sales or lease transactions, as well as toincome earned from the performance of certain other services.
27
21. The second condition is that these transactions involve QFTP.  Section 943(a)(1) IRC defines
QFTP as property which is:  (A) manufactured, pr oduced, grown or extracted within or outside the
United States;  (B) held primarily for sale, lease or re ntal, in the ordinary course of business, for direct
use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States;  and (C) not more than 50 percent of the
                                                     
25Section 3 of the ETI Act, Section 943(e) IRC.
26Under the ETI Act, the need to satisfy these thr ee conditions is subject to a number of exceptions.
We examine certain of these exceptions below, to the extent  that they are pertinent to our analysis of the issues
on appeal.
27The detailed rules of the ETI measure provide th at foreign trading gross receipts may be earned
through (i) any sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade property;  (ii) any lease or rental
of qualifying foreign trade property;  (iii) any services wh ich are related and subsidiary to (i) and (ii);  (iv) for
engineering or architectural services for construction projects located (or proposed for location) outside the
United States;  and (v) for the performance of managerial  services for a person other than a related person in
furtherance of activities under (i), (ii) or (iii). (Section 3 of the ETI Act, Section 942(a) IRC)  We will generally
refer to sale and lease transactions as a shorthand refere nce to the transactions described in (i) and (ii) of this
footnote.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 8
fair market value of which is attributable to:  (i) articles manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
outside the United States;  and (ii) direct costs for labour performed outside the United States.28
22. The third condition is that the "foreign economic process requirement" must be fulfilled with
respect to each individual transaction.29  This requirement is fulfilled if the taxpayer (or any person
acting under contract with the taxpayer) participated outside the United States in the solicitation,
negotiation, or making of the contract relating to the transaction.  Furthermore, a specified portion ofthe "direct costs" of the transaction must be attributable to activities performed outside theUnited States.
30
23. Section 942(a) IRC designates as "foreign trading gross receipts" the receipts generated in
transactions satisfying all three of these conditions.  Under Section 114(e) IRC, "extraterritorialincome" is the gross income attributable to  foreign trading gross receipts and, under
Section 941(b) IRC, "foreign trade income" is the taxable income attributable to foreign trading grossreceipts.
24. Section 114(a) IRC provides that a taxpayer's gross income "does not include extraterritorial
income".  Section 114(b) IRC adds that this exclusion of extraterritorial income from gross income"shall not apply" to that portion of extraterritorial income which is not "qualifying foreign tradeincome" ("QFTI").  Accordingly, the  only  portion of extraterritorial income which is excluded from
gross income – and, thereby, from United States taxation – is QFTI.
25. QFTI is an amount which, if excluded from the taxpayer's gross income, will result in a
reduction of the taxable income of the taxpayer from the qualifying transaction.  Pursuant toSection 941(a)(1) and (2) IRC, QFTI is calculated as the greatest of, or the taxpayer's choice of, the
following three options:  (i) 30 percent of the foreig n sale and leasing income derived by the taxpayer
from such transaction
 31;  (ii) 1.2 percent of the foreign trading gross receipts derived by the taxpayer
                                                     
28Section 3 of the ETI Act, Section 943(a)(1) IRC.  Section 943(a)(3) and (4) IRC set forth specific
exclusions from this general definition.
29Section 3 of the ETI Act, Section 942(b) IRC.
30The relevant activities are:  (i) advertising and sale s promotion;  (ii) processing of customer orders
and arranging for delivery;  (iii) transportation outside the United States in connection with delivery to thecustomer;  (iv) determination and transmittal of final invoice or statement of account or the receipt of payment;and (v) assumption of credit risk.  A taxpayer will be treated as having satisfied the foreign economic processrequirement when at least 50 percent of the total costs attr ibutable to such activities is attributable to activities
performed outside the United States, or, for at least two of these five categories of activity, when at least 85
percent of the total costs attributable to such category of  activity is attributable to activities performed outside
the United States. (Section 3 of the ETI Act, Section 942(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B) and (b)(3) IRC)
31Foreign sales and leasing income is defined in Section 941(c)(1) IRC.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 9
from the transaction 32;  or (iii) 15 percent of the foreign trade income derived by the taxpayer from
the transaction.33
III. Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants
A. Claims of Error by the United States – Appellant
1. Subsidies Contingent Upon Export under the  SCM Agreement
(a) Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement :  Revenue Foregone that
is "Otherwise Due"
26. The United States requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that the ETI Act confers a subsidy
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .  More specifically, the
United States contends that the Panel "misapplied" the comparison test established in the originalAppellate Body Report.
34
27. The United States argues, first, that the Panel ignored the fact that the definition of "gross
income" is not contained in Section 61 of the IRC alone, but depends also on other sections of the IRC
and, more particularly, on Section 114(a) and (b) IRC.  Second, the Panel erroneously created adistinction between a "specific" and a "general" tax exclusion.  The Panel stated that a Member mayexclude a category of income from taxation only if it  excludes "all of the income" in that category.
The United States contends that such an analysis improperly incorporates the concept of specificity,
found in Article 2 of the  SCM Agreement ,  into the definition of "subsidy" in Article 1.  Third, the
Panel created another erroneous standard by stating that a tax exclusion must have "some kind ofoverall rationale and coherence" if it is to avoid foregoing revenue that is otherwise due.  Such aproposition is inconsistent with the Appellate Body’s prior statement that a Member is free to tax ornot tax the categories of revenues that it chooses.  Fourth, the United States appeals what it considersto be a failure by the Panel to apply the original pa nel's "but for" test, a test which the Appellate Body
had upheld.  The United States submits that "but for" the exclusion of qualifying foreign tradeincome,  all  extraterritorial income would be excluded from "gross income".  Finally, the Panel erred
in finding that extraterritorial income excluded by the ETI Act necessarily would be taxed if the
ETI Act did not exist.  The United States submits that merely classifying income as "gross income"
does not  per se  mean that it would necessarily be taxed, since "gross income" may also be subject to
deferral, deductions or foreign tax credits.
                                                     
32Foreign trading gross receipts are defined in Section 942(a) IRC.
33Foreign trade income is defined in Section 941(b) IRC.
34United States' appellant's submission, para. 107.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 10
28. In its additional written memorandum, the United States emphasizes that, in determining the
relevant benchmark rules of taxation in this case, the "basic issue … is the allocation of incomeearned in an international transaction between the domestic and foreign portions of such income." 
35
The longstanding "normative" principles of the United States permit taxpayers "to structure their
affairs in a manner that separates the foreign-a llocated portion of foreign sales income from the
domestic portion and subjects only the domestic portion to domestic taxation." 36  Traditionally, the
United States has permitted the foreign portion of such income to be allocated outside its taxingjurisdiction through the use of a foreign-incorporated subsidiary of a United States taxpayer.  Theforeign portion of the income earned by such subsidiaries is not subject to United States taxation.
37
The direct allocation, under the ETI Act, of income earned in an internationa l transaction between the
domestic and foreign portions of such income simplifies the method for allocating such incomeoutside United States' taxing jurisdiction.  The ETI Act allows such allocation to be made in respect oftransactions carried out directly by a United States taxpayer – without the use of a foreign subsidiary.
Thus, while the ETI Act reformulates, through a fundamental revision of Sections 61 and 114 of the
IRC, the method by which the United States implements its normative benchmark principles, it isconsistent with such principles.
(b) Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement :  Export Contingency
29. The United States also asks us to reverse the Panel's finding that the ETI Act involves a
subsidy contingent upon export performance within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement .  The United States argues that the Panel incorrectly transformed Article 3.1(a) into a
"reverse national treatment" requirement under which domestic sales must be afforded no lessfavourable treatment than exports or other foreign sales.
38  However, no such requirement is present in
the text of Article 3.1(a) and the availability of a subsidy to purely domestic transactions is irrelevantunder Article 3.1(a).
                                                     
35United States' additional written memorandum, p. 1.
36Ibid., p. 3.
37Subject to the anti-abuse rules contained in Subpart F of the IRC.  (United States' additional written
memorandum, p. 2)
38United States' appellant's submission, para. 142.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 11
30. According to the United States, the Panel artifi cially bifurcated and improperly examined the
ETI Act as if it had one category of treatment for United States-produced goods and a different onefor foreign-produced goods.  In so doing, the Panel created a distinction not found in the ETI Act,which was purposefully drafted to provide tax relief based on export-neutral criteria.
31. The United States maintains that the ETI Act is export-neutral in that it permits income to be
earned without exporting.  Article 3.1(a) does not prohibit subsidies that benefit exporters if conferredthrough export-neutral principles.  In finding the ETI Act to be export-contingent, the Panelimproperly held that a measure violates Article 3.1(a) if exportation is  one  way of obtaining a
subsidy. However, exportation constitutes a prohibited contingency only where exportation is amandatory  condition.  Finally, according to the United States, the Panel erroneously found that an
export-contingent subsidy cannot be cured by expanding the universe of eligible recipients.
(c) Footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement :  Double Taxation of Foreign-
Source Income
32. The United States further requests us to set aside the Panel's findings that the ETI Act is not a
measure to avoid double taxation under the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the SCM  Agreement .  The
Panel erroneously created detailed criteria for a measure to qualify under the fifth sentence of
footnote 59 and, in so doing, improperly established "a new double taxation avoidance code".
39
33. At the outset, the United States submits that the Panel incorrectly imposed on the United
States the burden of proving that the ETI Act is a measure to avoid double taxation.  The Panelignored the Appellate Body’s finding in  EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones)  ("EC – Hormones ")
 40 that related provisions which define key elements of the violations
alleged form part of the elements of the  prima facie  case that a complainant must make.
34. The United States alleges that in finding that the ETI Act is not a measure to avoid double
taxation, the Panel articulated four new principles that cannot be found in the fifth sentence offootnote 59.  First, the Panel incorrectly stated that such a measure must apply to  all  income that is
potentially subject to double taxation.  Second, the Panel found that such a measure cannot encompass
income that might  not  be treated as taxable in other jurisdictions.  Third, the Panel held that a
bona fide  measure to avoid double taxation must contain a "permanent establishment" requirement.
Fourth, the Panel erred in stating that a country which has an extensive system of bilateral tax treatiescould not adopt a measure to avoid double taxation.
                                                     
39United States' appellant's submission, para. 173.
40Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998,
DSR 1998:I, 135 .WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 12
35. The United States claims that in addition, the Panel wrongly created a new standard for
reviewing conformity with the fifth sentence of footno te 59:  the "reasonable legislator" standard.  The
United States sees this as a substitution by the Panel of its judgment for that of a national legislatureas to whether a measure is intended to avoid double taxation.
36. In the view of the United States, the fifth sentence of footnote 59 does not define "double
taxation" or indicate the types of measure that are permissible to "avoid" double taxation.  Thesentence also does not define "foreign-source income".  Two general categories of measures arenevertheless well-accepted and used throughout the world for the avoidance of double taxation:  theexemption (or non-taxation) method and the tax credit method. The United States emphasizes thatinternational tax conventions recognize that countries are free to use one or the other or both methods,and that the methods used vary from country to country.
37. The United States submits that the ETI Act achieves avoidance of double taxation through the
exclusion of extraterritorial income from gross income.  The ETI Act’s legislative history expressly
identifies double taxation avoidance as a primary objective of the ETI Act, and the ETI Act was
designed to parallel certain aspects of the territorial systems of many member States of the EuropeanCommunities.  "Extraterritorial income" under the ETI Act is income derived from foreign
transactions, and, as such, it falls within the ordinary meaning of the phrase "foreign-source income"under footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement .
38. Should we reverse the Panel's finding and hold that the ETI Act is a measure to avoid double
taxation within the meaning of the fifth sentence of footnote 59, the United States requests us tocomplete the analysis and find that, by virtue of footnote 5 to the  SCM Agreement ,  the ETI Act is not
a prohibited export subsidy.
2. Export Subsidies under the  Agreement on Agriculture
39. The United States also asks us to reverse the Panel's finding that the ETI Act is inconsistent
with the United States' obligations under Articles 8 and 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture .  The
Panel’s finding that the ETI Act constitutes an export subsidy under Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on
Agriculture  is based entirely on its finding under the  SCM Agreement .  Because the Panel’s finding
of an export subsidy under the  SCM Agreement  is in error, the United States submits that the Panel’s
finding of an export subsidy under the  Agreement on Agriculture  is also in error.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 13
3. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
40. The United States appeals the Panel's finding that, by reason of its "fair market value rule,"
the ETI Act accords less favourable treatment to imported products than to like United States'products and is, therefore, inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
41. The United States recalls that the "no less favourable treatment" standard under Article III:4
has been interpreted by panels and the Appellate Body to require effective equality of opportunitiesbetween imported products and domestic products.  Since it applied an exclusively  de jure  test in its
analysis, the Panel could have found an inconsistency with Article III:4 only if it demonstrated, in thetext of the measure itself, an "incontrovertible linkage between the text and the imported productswhose internal use allegedly is affected by the measure".
41  The United States considers that the Panel
did not establish such a linkage.
42. The United States contends that an analysis under Article III:4 should focus upon whether the
measure in question is directed, on the one hand, toward particular categories of imports or imports ingeneral, or, on the other hand, whether it is a measure of "general application".  Unlike measures inpast cases involving Article III:4, the ETI Act focuses entirely on income derived from property foruse outside the United States;  within this general framework, the ETI Act establishes variousparameters and limitations on its application, one of which is the fair market value rule.
43. The United States submits that in its analys is of the fair market value rule, the Panel
erroneously equated this rule with a domestic content or domestic value-added requirement.  This
characterization is "plainly incorrect"
 42 because the ETI Act does not refer to United States' content
nor does it predicate eligibility for the tax exclusion upon manufacture in the United States.  TheUnited States emphasizes that, in fact, the fair market value rule can be satisfied without any portionof the fair market value of a product being derived from United States' sources.
44. The United States argues that, in finding the fair market value rule to be inconsistent with
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel failed to establish a meaningful causal link between thatrule and the alleged discrimination against imports and improperly extended the findings of  the panelreport in  Canada – Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive Industry ("Canada – Autos
 ") 43 to a
very different situation.  Moreover, the Panel ignored the findings of the Appellate Body in  Korea –
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef ("Korea – Various Measures on
                                                     
41United States' appellant's submission, para. 253.
42Ibid., para. 256.
43Panel Report, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, a dopted 19 June 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 14
Beef ").44  Whereas in  Korea – Various Measures on Beef ,  the Appellate Body rejected speculative
conclusions by the panel as to possible competitive effects that might result from the differentialtreatment established under the relevant measure and focused, instead, on the actual effects of themeasure, the Panel in this case employed similar sp eculation in finding that the fair market value rule
necessarily places imported products at a comparative disadvantage  vis-à-vis  like domestic products
in the United States' market.  The Panel unreasonably assumed that despite the variety of ways inwhich qualifying foreign trade property could be produced, producers would necessarily source theirproduction in the United States.  The Panel compounded this flawed analysis by further incorrectlyassuming that, having decided to produce goods in the United States, producers would inherentlyprefer using United States components to imported components as a means of meeting the fair marketvalue requirement.
4. Withdrawal of the FSC Subsidies
45. The United States, finally, requests us to set aside the Panel's finding that the ETI Act’s
transition rules are inconsistent with the full withdr awal of the FSC subsidies.  Providing transitional
relief is customary in the United States (and in other countries) when tax laws upon which taxpayershave relied in structuring transactions are chan ged.  The United States contends that failure to
maintain a consistent practice of transition relief would impose significant and unjustified additionaltransaction costs on taxpayers.
B. Arguments of the European Communities – Appellee
1. Subsidies Contingent Upon Export under the  SCM Agreement
(a) Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii):  Revenue Foregone that is "Otherwise Due"
46. The European Communities considers that the United States' appeal does not focus on the
Panel’s reasoning on the existence of a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 1 of theSCM Agreement ,  but rather criticizes certain isolated elements of the Panel's findings and responds to
arguments which the Panel did not even make.
47. According to the European Communities, the Panel did   not  base its conclusion on the notion
that Section 61 of the IRC was the normative benchmark, or say that any exception to it would be asubsidy.  Rather, in analyzing the ETI Act, the Panel looked at the "overall situation as an integratedwhole."
 45  In the view of the European Communities, the United States is also wrong to criticize the
                                                     
44Appellate Body Report, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001.
45Panel Report, para. 8.23.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 15
Panel for distinguishing between broad and specific exclusions, and for observing that even if income
attributable to foreign transactions might be a "category," the United States is not in fact excludingall  of that "category".  The European Communities similarly rejects the criticism by the United States
that the Panel wrongly created an "overall rationale and coherence corollary" to the  SCM Agreement .
Rather, the Panel examined the "overall rationale and coherence" of the ETI Act only after concluding
that the ETI Act resulted in the foregoing of revenue otherwise due.
48. In its response to the United States' additional written memorandum, the European
Communities considers that the United States is arguing that the domestic tax rules against which theETI Act must be assessed are the rules that apportion income between domestic and foreign sourcesso that each part can be taxed differently, and that the ETI Act operates as a "rule of thumb" toachieve a result similar to that which would be achieved under the normal United States' source rules.The European Communities submits that the ETI Act benefits are nevertheless subsidies whenregarded as derogations from the source rules.   The European Communities also points out that the
ETI Act source rules differ from other source rules of the United States tax code and that taxpayers
can elect to their advantage which system to use on a case-by-case basis.
49. As to the alleged failure of the Panel to apply the "but for" test, the European Communities
recalls that, as the Appellate Body pointed out in paragraph 91 of its original Report, the "but for" testis not treaty language and could be easily circumvented by a Member through manipulation of its taxsystem.  In any case, the Panel did in fact apply the " but for" test when it stated that, in the absence of
the ETI Act, extraterritorial income would be "gross income" and thus would be taxed.
46  The
European Communities adds that even if there may be some cases where a taxpayer could avoid
paying some tax in the absence of the ETI Act, it is  nonetheless clear that the ETI Act shelters income
from tax that would otherwise (at least in many cases) be taxed.
(b) Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement :  Export Contingency
50. The European Communities submits that a subsidy contingent upon export performance
necessarily  treats export sales better than domestic sales.  Such "better treatment" is the very rationale
for prohibiting export-contingent subsidies.  The European Communities disputes the United States'argument that the criteria set out in the ETI Act are "export neutral" simply because there is an
alternative to exporting for qualifying for the tax exemption.  The ETI Act embodies a bundle of two
sole  contingencies for two categories of beneficiaries, each of which stipulates a  sole  means to
obtain the tax subsidy.  For one of these categories of beneficiaries, namely those producing goodswithin the United States, it is necessary to export if they are to obtain the subsidy.  For a measure to
                                                     
46Panel Report, para. 8.25.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 16
be inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  it is sufficient to demonstrate that in one,
or in some cases, the receipt of the subsidy is contingent upon export performance.  The EuropeanCommunities insists that the prohibition of export-contingent subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of theSCM Agreement  is absolute and must be respected in all cases.
51. The European Communities adds that the allege d "alternative" for obtaining the ETI benefit,
that is, the relocation of production abroad by United States producers, is not one that realistically willbe used.  This confirms that, in analyzing the Act, it is proper to focus on the alternatives available for
goods which  have already been produced ,  or continue to be produced, in the United States.  In this
context, the only means for such producers to obtain the ETI tax benefit is to export such goods.
52. The European Communities also agrees with the Panel's reasoning that the former FSC
measure cannot be cured merely by extending it to non-export transactions.  The Panel correctlyfound that, as regards the measure at issue – the ETI Act – the only way to eliminate the exportcontingency would be to extend the availability of the  subsidy to include  domestic  sales as well.
(c) Footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement :  Double Taxation of Foreign-
Source Income
53. According to the European Communities, the Panel made clear that the issue of burden of
proof was academic and had no impact on the other findings of the Panel, and that even if the
European Communities bore the burden of proving that the ETI Act did not fall within the scope ofthe fifth sentence of footnote 59, it had discharged that burden.  In any event, the EuropeanCommunities also agrees with the Panel’s finding on the burden of proof relating to this issue.
54. The European Communities supports the view of the Panel that, although it may not be
possible to design a measure that "entirely, exclusively or precisely" avoids double taxation and,therefore, such precision is not required by the fifth sentence of footnote 59, a Member hasnevertheless an obligation to identify the type of income that may be subject to double taxation and toapproximate the boundaries of its measure to it.  The United States has made no attempt to do this.
Rather, the United States includes in the exempted category under the ETI Act income that could not
legitimately be taxed in another jurisdiction.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 17
55. The European Communities contests the United States' claim that the Panel has imposed a
"permanent establishment" requirement as a necessary feature of a double taxation measure.  ThePanel did not articulate any such principle;  indeed, it stated the opposite.  The United States furtheralleges that the Panel held that a country could not institute a measure to avoid double taxation if it
has an extensive system of bilateral tax treaties.  However, in the view of the European Communities,
the Panel merely considered relevant the fact that the ETI Act does not target those situations wheresuch bilateral agreements were not in place.
56. The European Communities also contends that the United States' objection relating to the
application of an alleged  "reasonable legislator" standard is without merit.  The Panel did not applyany such standard.  Rather, the Panel considered whether the character of the ETI Act as a measure toavoid the double taxation of foreign-source income was "reasonably discernible".  In the view of theEuropean Communities, the Panel’s test was legally correct and its assessment of the facts is beyondthe scope of appellate review.
57. With respect to the meaning of "foreign-source" income in the fifth sentence of footnote 59,
the European Communities observes that income derives from economic activities.  Therefore,foreign-source income means income derived from fo reign economic activities.  "Income" is not the
same as "payment".  The fact that a payment come s from abroad does not mean that the income is
generated abroad.  The ETI Act, however, does not require that the economic activities giving rise tothe excluded income take place abroad.  Therefore, the definition of extraterritorial income in theETI Act bears no relation to the determination of foreign-source income, and the ETI Act is not ameasure falling within the scope of footnote 59.  Furthermore, the European Communities notes, the
ETI Act is optional for United States taxpayers, as they can choose between the ETI Act and the other
source rules of the IRC.
58. For all these reasons, the European Communities considers that the Panel correctly found that
the ETI Act is not a measure to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income and is thereforenot covered by the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement .  It follows that the Appellate
Body need not reach the issue of footnote 5 to the  SCM Agreement .  In any event, the European
Communities does not consider that the phrase "measures referred to in Annex I as not constitutingexport subsidies" in footnote 5 includes measures falling within the scope of the fifth sentence of
footnote 59.  Thus, footnote 5 to the  SCM Agreement  does not assist the United States.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 18
2. Export Subsidies under the  Agreement on Agriculture
59. The European Communities notes that the United States' arguments under the  Agreement on
Agriculture  depend entirely on its arguments under the  SCM Agreement .  Accordingly, the European
Communities requests us to uphold the Panel's finding under the  Agreement on Agriculture  for the
same reasons it has asked the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's finding under theSCM Agreement .
3. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
60. The European Communities observes that the United States' appeal with regard to
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 is limited to the Panel’s interpretation of the terms "affecting" and"less favourable treatment" within this provision.  The word "affecting" has, since the inception ofGATT 1947, consistently been interpreted broadly, and was interpreted by the Appellate Body in
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ("EC –
Bananas III
 ") 47 as meaning to "have an effect on" the conditions of competition.  The Panel applied
the same interpretation and correctly concluded that the fair market value rule "affects" the use ofimported products because it modifies the conditions of competition between domestic and importedgoods.  Whereas use of domestic "articles" will contribute to qualifying for the tax exemption, the use
of foreign "articles" will never do so.
61. Thus, the European Communities considers that the Panel correctly found that less favourable
treatment is accorded by reason of the fair market value rule.  All other conditions being equal,United States producers will always have an  incentive  to use inputs of domestic origin.  In certain
cases, due to the cost structure of their production, use of domestic inputs will be necessary in order toobtain the tax benefit.  The European Communities ag rees with the Panel that such an incentive is
sufficient to establish inconsistency with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
4. Withdrawal of the FSC Subsidies
62. The European Communities contends that the United States does not address any of the
Panel’s reasons or rely upon any provision of the covered agreements in support of its appeal on thisissue.  The United States' sole argument seems to be that transition rules are essential to the orderlyshift from one set of tax rules to another.  The European Communities responds that the findings inthe original proceeding took this fact into accoun t and, in stipulating that the FSC subsidies must be
                                                     
47Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 19
withdrawn at the latest with effect from 1 October 2000, allowed the United States a grace period to
introduce the required changes.
C. Claims of Error by the European Communities – Appellant
1. Article 10.3 of the DSU:  Third Party Rights
63. The European Communities requests us to reverse the Panel's finding that third parties are not
entitled to receive  all  of the parties' written submissions to the meeting of the Panel, but only the
first  written submissions.  The European Communities submits that Rule 9 of the Working
Procedures adopted by the Panel, and the Panel's subsequent denial of the European Communities'
request to change this rule, conflict with Article 10.3 of the DSU and the rights of third parties set outtherein.
64. The European Communities recognizes that panels have a certain discretion to establish their
own working procedures.  However, panels may not  derogate from binding provisions of the DSU.
Article 10.3 provides that third parties shall receive "the submissions";  it does not draw anydistinction between different types of submissions.  Rule 9 of the Panel's Working Procedures, and thepractice in Article 21.5 proceedings of requiring that only the first written submissions be provided tothe third parties, are also inconsistent with Article 10.1 of the DSU, which requires panels "fully" to
take into account the interests of Members, including third parties.
65. Furthermore, the European Communities submits that the approach taken by the Panel to third
party rights in this case fails to ensure that third parties will be fully informed about the argumentsexchanged by the time of the substantive panel meeting.  The European Communities disagrees with
the Panel's conclusion that, since Article 10.3 of the DSU refers to the "first meeting" of the panel andsince panels "ordinarily" meet twice, the DSU intends to limit third party access to the first writtensubmissions of the parties in  all  cases.  Rather, Article 10.3 is intended to ensure that third parties are
familiar with the current state of the debate and can meaningfully contribute to it.  The EuropeanCommunities observes that nothing in the DSU re quires a panel to hold two meetings and that
Article 10.3 is drafted in general terms to be applic able in all cases, regardless of how many meetings
are held.
2. Conditional Appeals
66. Should we reverse the Panel's findings, the European Communities requests us to address
claims in respect of which the Panel exercised judicial economy.  The conditional appeals made bythe European Communities relate to the following claims that it made before the Panel:WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 20
(a) that the tax exemption accorded, under the ETI Act, to
income earned in transactions relating to goods produced  outside  the
United States is contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement  in
that it is contingent on export performance by virtue of the "fair
market value rule"; 48
(b) that the ETI Act provides subsidies which are specifically
related to exports within the meaning of item (e) of the Illustrative List
of Export Subsidies in Annex I to the  SCM Agreement ; 49
(c) that the "fair market value rule" in the ETI Act renders the
subsidies granted in respect of goods produced in the United States
(and the subsidies granted in respect of goods produced outside the
United States if they are not contrary to Article 3.1(a)), contingentupon the use of United States' goods over imported goods, contrary to
Article 3.1(b) of the  SCM Agreement ;
 50  and
(d) that the United States, by failing to withdraw the FSC
subsidies and to comply with the rulings and recommendations of the
DSB by the end of the period of time allowed by the DSB, has alsofailed to comply with its obligations under Article 21 of the DSU.
51
67. The European Communities requests us to consider these claims only if we reverse the
findings which led the Panel to exercise judicial economy.  In such case, the European Communities
refers us to the arguments made by it before the Panel in respect of these claims.
D. Arguments of the United States – Appellee
1. Article 10.3 of the DSU:  Third Party Rights
68. The United States claims that the Panel did not err when it declined to find that the rights of
third parties include access to the parties' rebuttal submissions, and requests us to uphold the Panel'sfindings.  Article 10.3 of the DSU does not require that  anything  submitted by the parties prior to the
single meeting with the Panel must be made available to third parties.  Rather, the Panel correctlyconcluded that Article 10.3 presupposes a context where there is more than one panel meeting.
69. To the United States, Article 10.3 is ambiguous when considered in the context of anything
other than standard panel procedures.  The Panel merely construed an ambiguous provision inaccordance with the principles of Article 31 of the  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
                                                     
48European Communities' first submission to the Panel, para. 119;  Panel Report, p. A-23.
49Ibid., para. 158;  p. A-29.
50Ibid. , paras. 183-184;  p. A-34.
51Ibid. , para. 246;  p. A-44.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 21
("Vienna Convention ").52  The Appellate Body has held that the DSU, and in particular its
Appendix 3, leave panels a margin of discretion to deal with specific situations that may arise in aparticular case.  In the view of the United States, the Panel's decision in this case was reasonable andwas well within its margin of discretion.
2. Conditional Appeals
70. The United States submits that the conditions on which the European Communities appeals
the various remaining issues are unclear.  The European Communities states that the Appellate Bodywould need to consider them if it reversed " any  of the findings of the Panel on the claims that the
Panel did address."
 53  (emphasis added)  However, the United States considers it difficult to
comprehend how the Appellate Body’s reversal of certain findings would trigger a consideration of
all  of the claims identified by the European Communities, because considerations of judicial
economy would continue to apply.  Moreover, the Appe llate Body's reversal of certain findings by the
Panel would be dispositive of one or more such claims.
71. With respect to each of the European Communities' claims, the United States refers to the
arguments made in its submissions to the Panel.  With respect to the European Communities' claimsunder Article 3.1(b) of the  SCM Agreement ,  the United States adds that the European Communities
erroneously alleges that Article 3.1(b) is violated if there is "even a slight bias in favour of domesticgoods"
 54 or if a contingency on the use of domestic over imported goods "is not precluded." 55  The
United States recalls that the European Commun ities advanced a similar standard in the  Canada –
Autos 56 case, and neither the panel nor the Appellate Body accepted it.
E. Arguments of the Third Participants
1. Australia
72. Australia agrees with the Panel's findings that the ETI Act provides prohibited export
subsidies contrary to Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .  Australia therefore requests us to uphold
the Panel's conclusions that the United States has not implemented the recommendations and rulingsof the DSB.
                                                     
52Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;  8 International Legal Materials 679.
53European Communities' other appellant's submission, para. 4.
54European Communities' second submission to the Panel, para. 160;  Panel Report, p. C-30.
55European Communities' response to Question 35 posed by the Panel, para. 101;  Panel Report,
p. F-17.
56Panel Report, supra , footnote 43;  Appellate Body Report, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R,
adopted 19 June 2000.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 22
2. Canada
73. Canada asks us to sustain the Panel's findings under the  SCM Agreement .  Under the
United States tax rules, if income fails to qualif y as excluded extraterritorial income within the
meaning of the ETI Act, it remains subject to taxation.  Accordingly, there is a foregoing of
government revenue otherwise due within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .
Canada also agrees with the findings of the Panel that the subsidy is  de jure  contingent on export
performance by reason of the requirement in the ETI Act of use outside the United States.Furthermore, the Panel correctly determined that "the parameters of the ETI Act do not even roughlyapproximate the parameters of a measure to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income"
 57;
accordingly, the ETI Act falls outside the scope of footnote 59.  Finally, Canada requests us to reverse
the finding of the Panel that third parties are not entitled to receive all the main parties’ submissions
preceding a single panel meeting.
3. India
74. India requests that we uphold the Panel's findings under the  SCM Agreement.   The
United States argues that when virtually any type of income could be excluded from tax, suchexclusion would form part of the prevailing domestic standard for taxation, and would therefore not
involve the foregoing of revenue.  According to  India, such an interpretation would render
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) meaningless and would seriously undermine the WTO disciplines on subsidies.
75. India also considers that the Panel was correct in finding that the ETI Act grants subsidies
contingent upon export performance.  While it might be true that by expanding the scope of thesubsidy, certain non-exporting firms could qualify for tax benefits under the ETI Act, the fact remainsthat United States-based producers must export in order to obtain the subsidy.
76. India considers that for a measure to fall within the scope of footnote 59, it is not sufficient
that such a measure may incidentally serve in a particular set of circumstances to avoid doubletaxation.  If this were so, any WTO Member could grant export subsidies and escape sanction under
WTO rules simply by declaring that its measures are measures to avoid double taxation.
4. Japan
77. Japan believes that the Panel's findings under the  SCM Agreement  should be upheld.  The
ETI Act excludes only a limited portion of a potential category of foreign trade income from  taxationand the narrow character of this exclusion gives rise to the foregoing of revenue otherwise due in
                                                     
57Panel Report, para. 8.96.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 23
terms of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .  The subsidy in this case is contingent upon
export.  Mere co-existence of one class of activities eligible for benefits under the Act does notchange the status of the subsidy for the other class to which the benefits are available only uponexportation.
78. Japan also requests us to uphold the Panel's finding that the ETI Act is not a measure to avoid
double taxation within the meaning of the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the SCM Agreement .  The
mere fact that some income excluded from taxation under the Act may potentially be subject todouble taxation is not sufficient to make it a measure to "avoid the double taxation of foreign-sourceincome" within the meaning of footnote 59.
79. Japan recalls that a measure violates Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 when an imported
product is accorded less favorable treatment than the like domestic product.  A measure can accordless favorable treatment even where there are no specific legal requirements to use domestic goods.Notwithstanding the fact that the ETI Act covers goods produced both within and outside the United
States, the scope of the exclusion permitted under the ETI Act for United States-produced goods is
wider than the exclusion permitted for foreign-produced goods.  In Japan's view, so long as suchdisparity in treatment between imported products and domestic products exists, Article III:4 of theGATT 1994 is violated.
IV. Issues Raised in this Appeal
80. This appeal raises the following issues:
(a) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.30 and 8.43 of the Panel Report,
that the ETI measure – which is described in paragraphs 12-25 of this Report –involves the foregoing of revenue which is "otherwise due" and thus gives rise to a"financial contribution" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of theSCM Agreement ;
(b) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.75 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report,
that the ETI measure includes subsidies "contingent … upon export performance"within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ;
(c) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.107 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report
that the ETI measure, viewed as a whole, does not fall within the scope of footnote 59
of the  SCM Agreement   as a measure taken to avoid the double taxation of foreign-
source income;WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 24
(d) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.122 and 9.1(c) of the Panel
Report, that the ETI measure involves export subsidies inconsistent with theUnited States' obligations under Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the  Agreement
on Agriculture ;
(e) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.158 and 9.1(d) of the Panel
Report, that the ETI measure is inconsistent with the United States' obligations underArticle III:4 of the GATT 1994 because it accords less favourable treatment toimported products as compared with like products of United States origin;
(f) whether the Panel erred in finding, in paragraphs 8.170 and 9.1(e) of the Panel
Report, that the United States has not fully withdrawn the subsidies found, inUS – FSC,  to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement ,  and in finding that the United States has, therefore, failed to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7
of the  SCM Agreement ;  and
(g) whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU in declining,
in its decision of 21 February 2001, reproduced in paragraph 6.3 of the Panel Report,to rule that all the written submissions of the parties filed prior to the only meeting ofthe Panel must be provided to the third parties.
V. Article 1.1 of the  SCM Agreement :  "Foregoing Revenue" that is "Otherwise Due"
81. The Panel found that the ETI measure "results in the foregoing of revenue which is 'otherwise
due' and thus gives rise to a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of theSCM Agreement ."
 58
82. In appealing this finding, the United States asserts that the Panel misinterpreted and
misapplied the applicable legal standard under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii), and also mischaracterized therelevant provisions of the IRC.
59  The United States argues that the Panel failed to apply properly the
appropriate comparison, as outlined by the Appellate Body in  US – FSC ,  which involves comparing
a contested tax measure against a "prevailing domestic standard".  According to the United States, theETI measure establishes a general rule of United States taxation whereby the income excluded from
                                                     
58Panel Report, para. 8.43. (footnote omitted)
59We observe that the United States does not appeal the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.48 of the Panel
Report, that the financial contribution it found to exist under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement  
confers a "benefit" within the meaning of Article 1.1 of that Agreement.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 25
taxation is "outside U.S. taxing jurisdiction".60  The United States emphasizes that the ETI measure
involves the allocation of income from certain foreign sales transactions according to its source.  Theallocation of such income into domestic and foreign portions, it states, is "a longstanding normativeprinciple of our system of taxation." 
61   The United States argues that the ETI measure reformulates
the method by which the United States implements this principle, although still in a manner that is
consistent with this principle.  In this connection, the United States mentions that, traditionally, it haspermitted the foreign portion of income from certain foreign sales transactions to be allocated outside
the United States' taxing jurisdiction, and excluded from tax, through the use of a foreign-incorporatedsubsidiary of a United States taxpayer.
83. Furthermore, according to the United States, a Member may  exclude  from taxation a
category of income, consistently with the  SCM Agreement ,  even if it does not exclude  all  of the
income in that category.  The United States conten d s  t h a t  w h e n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a t e g o r y  o f  i n c o m e  i s
excluded from taxation, a Member may choose to exclude, for revenue and other policy
considerations, only a portion of that category of income.
84. The United States also contends that the Panel erred in its identification of the relevant
domestic standard because it misconstrued the concept of "gross income" and ignored otherprovisions of the IRC that are relevant to this dispute.  Consequently, the Panel erred in finding that,in the absence of the ETI measure, extraterritorial income would be "gross income" and would betaxed.  According to the United States, under the IRC, "gross income" is the starting point forcalculating taxable income, but "gross income" by itself is  not  necessarily subject to tax because a
taxpayer can make "deductions " from it.  The Panel thus erred in determining that the prevailing rule
of taxation in the United States is that "gross income" is taxable.
                                                     
60United States' appellant's submission, para. 71.  See also United States' additional written
memorandum, p. 4.
61United States' additional written memorandum, p. 2.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 26
85. Before turning to examine the Panel's finding under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii), certain preliminary
observations regarding the  SCM Agreement  and Article 1.1 thereto should be made.  Article 1.1 of
the  SCM Agreement   sets out a  definition  of a "subsidy" for the purposes of that Agreement.
Although this definition is central to the applicability and operation of the remaining provisions of the
Agreement, Article 1.1 itself does not impose any obligation on Members with respect to the subsidies
it defines.  It is the provisions of the  SCM Agreement   which follow Article 1, such as Articles 3
and 5, which impose obligations on Members with respect to subsidies falling within the definition setforth in Article 1.1.  As we said in our Report in  Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU   ("Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil)
 "):
… the granting of a subsidy is not, in and of itself, prohibited under
the SCM Agreement.  Nor does granting a "subsidy", without more,
constitute an inconsistency with that Agreement .  The universe of
subsidies is vast.  Not all subsidies are inconsistent with the
SCM Agreement .62  (emphasis added)
86. In other words, Article 1.1 of the  SCM Agreement   does not prohibit a Member from
foregoing revenue that is otherwise due under its rules of taxation, even if this also confers a benefitunder Article 1.1(b) of the  SCM Agreement .  However, if a Member's rules of taxation constitute or
provide a subsidy under Article 1.1, and this subsidy is specific under Article 2, the Member must
abide by the obligations set out in the  SCM Agreement  with respect to that subsidy, including the
obligation not to "grant [] or maintain" any su bsidy that is prohibited under Article 3 of the
Agreement.  It was in this context that we said in our Report in  US – FSC ,  that, in principle, a
Member is free not to tax any particular category of income it wishes, even if this results in the grant
of a "subsidy" under Article 1.1 of the  SCM Agreement ,  provided that the Member respects its WTO
obligations with respect to the subsidy.
63
87. The issue we examine under Article 1.1 with respect to the disputed measure is, therefore, a
threshold issue that, by itself, does not determine whether the United States has acted inconsistently
with its obligations under the  SCM Agreement .  With this in mind, we now turn to examine
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .  Pursuant to this provision, there is a "financial
contribution by a government" where "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or notcollected".  We considered the meaning of this phrase in our Report in  US – FSC ,  where we stated:
                                                     
62Appellate Body Report, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 47.
63Supra , footnote 3, para. 90.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 27
… the " foregoing " of revenue " otherwise  due" implies that less
revenue has been raised by the government than would have been
raised in a different situation, or, that is, "otherwise".  Moreover, the
word "foregone" suggests that the government has given up an
entitlement to raise revenue that it could "otherwise" have raised.This cannot, however, be an entitlement in the abstract, because
governments, in theory, could tax  all  revenues.  There must,
therefore, be some defined, normative benchmark against which a
comparison can be made between the revenue actually raised and the
revenue that would have been raised "otherwise".  We, therefore,
agree with the Panel that the term "otherwise due" implies some kind
of comparison between the revenues due under the contested measureand revenues that would be due in some other situation.  We also
agree with the Panel that the basis of comparison must be the tax rules
applied by the Member in question.  …  What is "otherwise due",
therefore, depends on the rules of taxation that each Member, by its
own choice, establishes for itself.64 (italics in original, underlining
added)
88. There are several elements in this statement that bear repeating.  The first is that, under
Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii), a "financial contribution" does not arise simply because a government does not
raise revenue which it could have raised.  It is true that, from a  fiscal  perspective, where a
government chooses not to tax certain income, no revenue is "due" on that income.  However,although a government might, in a sense, be said to "forego" revenue in this situation, this alone givesno indication as to whether the revenue foregone was "otherwise due".  In other words, the mere factthat revenues are not "due" from a fiscal perspective does not determine that the revenues are or arenot "otherwise due" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .
89. A second element which emerges from our earlier Report is that the treaty phrase "otherwise
due" implies a comparison with a "defined, normative benchmark".  The purpose of this comparison is
to distinguish between situations where revenue foregone  is "otherwise due" and situations where
such revenue is  not  "otherwise due".  As Members, in principle, have the sovereign authority to
determine their own rules of taxation, the comparison under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of theSCM Agreement   must necessarily be between the rules of taxation contained in the contested measure
and other rules of taxation of the Member in question.  Such a comparison enables panels and theAppellate Body to reach an objective conclusion, on the basis of the rules of taxation established by aMember, by its own choice, as to whether the contested measure involves the foregoing of revenuethat would be due in some other situation or, in the words of the  SCM Agreement ,  "otherwise due".
90. In our Report in  US – FSC ,  we recognized that it may be difficult to identify the appropriate
normative benchmark for comparison under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) because domestic rules of taxation
                                                     
64Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 3, para. 90.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 28
are varied and complex.65  In identifying the appropriate benchmark for comparison, panels must
obviously ensure that they identify and examine fiscal situations which it is legitimate to compare.  Inother words, there must be a rational basis for comp aring the fiscal treatment of the income subject to
the contested measure and the fiscal treatment of certain other income.  In general terms, in this
comparison, like will be compared with like.  For instance, if the measure at issue involves income
earned in sales transactions, it might not be appropriate to compare the treatment of this income withemployment income.
91. In identifying the normative benchmark, there may be situations where the measure at issue
might be described as an "exception" to a "general" rule of taxation.  In such situations, it may bepossible to apply a "but for" test to examine the fiscal treatment of income absent the contested
measure.  We do not, however, consider that Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) always  requires  panels to identify,
with respect to any particular income, the "general" rule of taxation prevailing in a Member.  Giventhe variety and complexity of domestic tax systems, it will usually be very difficult to isolate a
"general" rule of taxation and "exceptions" to that  "general" rule.  Instead, we believe that panels
should seek to compare the fiscal treatment of legi timately comparable income to determine whether
the contested measure involves the foregoing of revenue which is "otherwise due", in relation to theincome in question.
66
92. In addition, it is important to ensure that the examination under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) involves a
comparison of the fiscal treatment of the relevant in come for taxpayers in comparable situations.  For
instance, if the measure at issue is concerned with the taxation of foreign-source income in the handsof a domestic corporation, it might not be appropriate to compare the measure with the fiscal
treatment of such income in the hands of a foreign corporation.
93. Against this background, we turn to the ETI measure.  This measure lays down rules of
taxation for United States citizens and residents, including both natural and legal persons.  These rulesalso apply to foreign corporations which elect to be treated, for tax purposes, as United Statescorporations.
67  The ETI measure permits these taxpayers to elect to have the income they earn from
                                                     
65Appellate Body Report, supra, footnote 3, para. 91.
66We recognize that a Member may have several rules for taxing comparable income in different ways.
For instance, one portion of a domestic corporation's foreign-source income may not be subject to tax in anycircumstances;  another portion of such income may always be subject to tax;  while a third portion may besubject to tax in some circumstances.  In such a situation, the outcome of the dispute would depend on whichaspect of the rules of taxation was challenged and on a detailed examination of the relationship between thedifferent rules of taxation.  The examination under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement  must be
sufficiently flexible to adjust to the complexities of a Member's domestic rules of taxation.
67Section 943(e) IRC.  Thus, although the ETI measure applies to foreign corporations, these
corporations are deemed for these purposes to be Unite d States corporations and not foreign corporations.  In
our discussion below, we treat these foreign corporations as United States corporations.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 29
certain transactions, involving certain property, taxed according to the rules set forth in the measure.68
The property involved must be "qualifying foreign trade property" ("QFTP"), which, inter alia ,  must
be "manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within or outside the United States" and must beheld primarily for use "outside the United States".
69  The measure applies, inter alia ,  to income
earned from transactions involving the sale or lease of QFTP, and to income earned through the
performance of certain services, including the perfor mance of services "related and subsidiary" to the
sale or lease of QFTP.70  However, subject to limited exceptions, the measure applies to the income
arising in a transaction only if the transaction also satisfies the "foreign economic processrequirement" set out in Section 942(b) IRC.  This requirement will be satisfied, generally speaking,where at least some of the activities comprising the transaction take place outside the United States.
94. Under the ETI measure, certain income earned by United States citizens and residents through
certain relevant transactions, involving QFTP, is known as "extraterritorial income".
71
Section 114(a) IRC excludes extraterritorial income from "gross income" and from the operation of
the rules applicable to "gross income" under Sections 61 and 63 IRC.  However, Section 114(b)
provides that this exclusion of extraterritorial in come from gross income applies solely to that portion
of extraterritorial income which is defined as "qualifying foreign trade income" ("QFTI").  Theamount of QFTI is determined using one of the three formulae set forth in Section 941(a)(1) IRC.
95. In sum, therefore, under the ETI measure, a portion of income – QFTI – earned by
United States citizens and residents is excluded from "gross income" under Section 114(a)and (b) IRC and, thereby, this income is excluded from taxation in the United States.  Where ataxpayer elects to use the ETI measure, it must give up any tax credits it has obtained through taxation
of its income in a foreign jurisdiction that are attributable to the QFTI excluded from taxation.
72
96. The Panel reached the conclusion that the exclusion of QFTI from gross income means that
the measure involves the foregoing of revenue on this portion of income, and also that revenue isotherwise due on this income.  The Panel reasoned that United States taxpayers would "ordinarily" be
                                                     
68Section 942(a)(3) IRC.  We have outlined the United States rules of taxation, including the ETI
measure, in Section II of this Report.
69Qualifying foreign trade property is defined in Section 943(a)(1) and (2) IRC, while Section 943(a)(3)
and (4) identifies property that is excluded from the definition.
70The transactions giving rise to income covered by the measure are described in
Section 942(a)(1) IRC. We recall that we refer to sale and lease transactions as a shorthand reference to the
"sale, exchange or other disposition" of QFTP, and to the "lease or rental" of this property.  SeeSection 942(a)(1)(A) and (B) IRC.
71Section 114(e) IRC, read together with Section 942(a) IRC.
72See  infra , paras. 104 and 181-183.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 30
subject to tax on all income earned in transactions covered by the measure and that the measure
"effectively carves … out" certain income from this other, "ordinary", situation of taxation.73
97. In examining the Panel's findings, we observe that the United States argues that, under the
ETI measure, QFTI is confined to the  foreign-source income  earned by United States citizens and
residents in transactions covered by the measure.  For the purposes of reviewing the Panel's findings
under Article 1.1(a)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement ,  we will assume,  arguendo ,  without trying to reach
any conclusion on the issue at this stage, that the United States correctly characterizes QFTI asforeign-source income.
74  For these purposes, we assume, also  arguendo ,  that the United States
correctly maintains that the measure is merely a continuation of the "longstanding" principle of theUnited States rules of taxation that seeks to allocate income between domestic- and foreign-sourceincome.
98. As we said earlier, under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement ,  the normative
benchmark for determining whether revenue foregone is otherwise due must allow a comparison of
the fiscal treatment of comparable income, in the hands of taxpayers in similar situations.
Accordingly, in identifying the normative benchmar k for comparison in these proceedings, we must
look to the United States' other rules of taxation applicable to the foreign-source income ofUnited States' citizens and residents earned through the sale or lease of property, or through theperformance of "related" services.
75  In so doing, we must ascertain whether, and to what extent, the
United States imposes tax on foreign-source income of United States citizens and residents, includingthe income covered by the measure at issue which the United States considers to be foreign-sourceincome.  In other words, our inquiry under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) is not simply ended at this stage of
analysis because the measure involves an allocation of income between domestic- and foreign-source
income.  Rather, we must compare the way the United States taxes the portion of the income coveredby the measure, which it treats as foreign-source,  with the way it taxes other foreign-source income
under its own rules of taxation.
                                                     
73Panel Report, paras. 8.25-8.26.
74We examine below the merits of the United States' characterization of QFTI as "foreign-source
income", which the United States is entitled to exempt to avoid double taxation of this income, when we review
the Panel's findings regarding footnote 59.  See  infra ,  paras. 121-186.
75We recall that the measure applies to certain foreig n corporations that elect to be treated as United
States corporations.  For the purpose of United States taxation, these corporations are deemed to be United
States corporations. (s upra , para. 93 and footnote 67 thereto)  Thus we do not examine the United States' fiscal
treatment of the foreign-source income of  foreign  corporations including foreign subsidiaries of United States
corporations – that do  not  elect to be treated as United States corporations.  We do not, therefore, examine the
rules of taxation for the foreign-source income of foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations.  See UnitedStates' appellant's submission, paras. 34-36.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 31
99. Under Sections 1 and 11 IRC, the United States imposes tax on the "taxable income" of each
United States citizen and resident.  According to Section 63(a) IRC, taxable income means "grossincome minus the deductions allowed" under the IRC.  Under Section 61(a) IRC, gross income means"all income from whatever source derived ".  (emphasis added)  Thus, Sections 61(a) and 63(a) IRC do
not distinguish between income depending on whether the income is treated by the United States as
domestic- or foreign-source.
76  Rather, these provisions treat "all income from whatever source" in
identical fashion so that, in principle, foreign- source gross income of United States' citizens and
residents, less allowable deductions, is subject to tax as taxable income.
100. However, where a portion of the taxable income of a United States citizen or resident is
subject to tax in a foreign jurisdiction, the United States  credits   the taxpayer, subject to certain
limitations, with the amount of foreign taxes paid or deemed to have been paid by that taxpayer.77
Thus, the tax payable to the United States is reduced by the amount of the tax credit.  However, thetax credit granted cannot, as a proportion of the tax due, exceed the proportion of total taxable income
which foreign-source income makes up.
78  In this situation, where a taxpayer pays taxes in a foreign
jurisdiction, the United States treats a proportion of the tax due to the United States as a tax onforeign-source income, and grants a tax credit with respect to that income.
79
101. In our view, the normative benchmark for dete rmining whether the ETI measure involves the
foregoing of revenue otherwise due, under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement ,  is contained
in the United States rules of taxation regarding the foreign-source income of United States' citizens orresidents, which we have outlined in the preceding paragraph.  Thus, we must compare the taxation offoreign-source income under these "other" rules of taxation, with the taxation of QFTI, which the
United States also treats as foreign-source income of these same taxpayers.
102. In so doing, there appears to be a marked contrast between the "other rules" of taxation
applicable to foreign-source income and the rules of taxation applicable to QFTI.  For United Statescitizens and residents, the United States, in principle, taxes  all  foreign-source income, subject to
                                                     
76Sections 861-865 IRC and 26 CFR 1.861-1.865 provide rules to determine whether income of United
States citizens and residents is from sources within or outside the United States.
77Section 901(a) IRC.  Such creditable foreign taxes are those listed in Sections 901(b), 902
and 960 IRC, but these tax credits are subject to the limitation set forth in Section 904.  See also the applicableFederal Regulations in 26 CFR 1.901-1.902, 1.904 and 1.960.
78Section 904(a) IRC.  We understand this provision to mean that if foreign-source income makes up,
for instance, 10 percent of the total taxable income, the amount of the tax credit cannot exceed 10 percent of the
total tax due.  The amount of the foreign-source income is determined by applying the source rules contained inSections 861-865 IRC and 26 CFR 1.861-1.865.
79See J. Isenbergh, International Taxation – U.S. Taxation of Foreign Persons and Foreign Income ,
2nd ed., (Aspen Law & Business, 1999), Vol. II, para. 30:4, p. 55:2, who states "[t]his limitation [inSection 904(a)] seeks to confine the credit to the U.S. tax attributable to foreign source income."WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 32
permissible deductions, although the United States grants tax credits for foreign taxes paid.  However,
under the ETI measure, QFTI is definitively excluded from United States taxation.
103. In addition, as we noted above, United States citizens and residents can  elect ,  at their own
discretion:  either  to have certain of their income treated as extraterritorial income under the
ETI measure, with the result that a portion will be definitively excluded from taxation as QFTI;  or
these same taxpayers can elect to have the same income taxed under the "other" rules applicable to
foreign-source income, with tax credits being recognized  for, at least, a portion of foreign taxes paid.
Where the taxpayer elects not to be taxed under the ETI measure, the United States taxes this incomeunder the "other" rules of taxation applicable to foreign-source income.  We see this as confirmationthat, absent the ETI measure, the United States w ould tax the income under the "otherwise" applicable
rules of taxation we have used as our benchmark.
104. Clearly, a taxpayer may be expected to elect to use the rules of taxation which result in the
payment of the lowest amount of tax.
80  Thus, where a taxpayer  elects  to be taxed under the
ETI measure, the amount of tax paid by the taxpayer will very likely be less than the tax which the
taxpayer would have paid, on that income, under the rules "otherwise" applicable to foreign-sourceincome, if the taxpayer did not elect to use the ETI measure.  This, too, confirms that theUnited States will forego revenue under the ETI measure that would be "otherwise due".
105. In our view, the definitive exclusion from tax of QFTI, compared with the taxation of other
foreign-source income, and coupled with the right of election for taxpayers to use the rules of taxationmost favourable to them, means that, under the contested measure, the United States foregoes revenueon QFTI which is otherwise due.
106. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.30 and 8.43 of the Panel
Report, that through the measure at issue, the United States government foregoes revenue that isotherwise due within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement ,  and that the
ETI measure, therefore, gives rise to a financial contribution under Article 1.1(a)(1) of thatAgreement.  In so holding, we observe that our reasons have a different focus from those given by the
                                                     
80We mentioned earlier that, where a taxpayer elects to use the ETI measure, it must give up any tax
credits it has obtained through taxation in a foreign State that is attributable to the income excluded from
taxation.  Accordingly, the measure will be beneficial to taxpayers where the amount of tax otherwise due onexcluded QFTI is greater than the amount of tax credits which the taxpayer must give up in relation to theexcluded QFTI.  For instance, this calculus is likely to result in taxpayers electing to use the measure where:  (a)
the amount of income actually taxed in a foreign jurisdiction is less than the amount of excluded QFTI and (b)where the rate of taxation applied to income taxed in a foreign jurisdiction is lower than the United States rate oftaxation that would "otherwise" be applied to the excluded QFTI.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 33
Panel.  In part, this is because, on appeal, the thrust of the United States' arguments has been directed
towards the role of the measure in allocating income as either domestic- or foreign-source.
VI. Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement :  Export Contingency
107. Before the Panel, the European Communities drew a distinction between two  different
subsidies it alleged were granted under the ETI measure.  The first subsidy which the EuropeanCommunities identified was what it called the " basic " subsidy, which related to property produced
"within the United States";  the second subsidy it identified was what it called the " extended " subsidy
which related to property produced "outside the United States".  The European Communities arguedthat both these subsidies are  de jure  contingent upon export performance.
81
108. The Panel found that "the Act involves subsidies 'contingent … upon export performance' by
reason of the requirement of 'use outside the United States' and is therefore inconsistent with
Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ." 82  This finding does not expressly draw any distinction
between property produced "within" the United  States and property produced "outside" the
United States, nor does it adopt the distinction the European Communities drew between the so-called"basic" and "extended" subsidies.  However, this fi nding must be read in the light of the reasoning
which supports it.  In the course of that reasoning, the Panel stated:
… in relation to US-produced goods , the words of the statute itself
make it clear that exporting is a necessary precondition to qualify forthe subsidy.  In respect of US-produced goods , the existence and
amount of the subsidy depends upon the existence of income arising
from the exportation of such goods.  In relation to US-produced
goods , the existence of such income is clearly conditional, or
dependent upon, the exportation of such goods from the UnitedStates.  We are therefore of the view that by necessary implication
the scheme is  de jure  dependent or contingent upon export in
relation to US-produced goods.
83  (emphasis added)
                                                     
81European Communities' first submission to the Panel, paras. 104-120;  Panel Report, pp. A-21 –
A-23.  The European Communities also argued, in the alternative, that both the basic and the extended subsidiesprovided under the ETI Act are  de facto  export contingent.  See European Communities' first submission to the
Panel, paras. 131-145;  Panel Report, pp. A-25 – A-28;  European Communities' response to Question 2 posedby the Panel, para. 6-11;  Panel Report, p. F-3.
82Panel Report, para. 8.75.
83Panel Report, para. 8.60.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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109. This passage indicates that the Panel's finding under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement
addressed only the alleged export contingency of the measure "in relation to" property produced"within " the United States and the Panel concluded that, in respect of this property, the grant of the
subsidy is contingent upon export performance.  (emphasis added)  The Panel's finding did not also
address the alleged export contingency of the measure in relation to property produced "outside" the
United States.  In other words, the Panel examined  the European Communities' claim concerning the
"basic" subsidy, but not the claim regarding the "extended" subsidy.
84
110. The United States appeals the Panel's finding that the measure involves the grant of a subsidy
"contingent … upon export performance".  The United States contends that, under Article 3.1(a) ofthe  SCM Agreement ,  export contingency is a  necessary  condition of grant if a subsidy is to be
export contingent.  It points out that the ETI measure is export-neutral as the tax exclusion is availablewith respect to property that is  not  produced in the United States and, therefore, not exported from
the United States.  Thus, it is argued, the tax exclusion can be obtained without exportation so that
export performance is not a condition that must be satisfied in order to obtain this exclusion.  The
Panel, however, overlooked this fact and "artificially bifurcat[ed]" the ETI measure, examining it onlyas it relates to property produced in the United States.
85  The United States insists that no such
distinction exists under the ETI measure.
111. We start with the text of Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  which provides that
"subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, uponexport performance" are prohibited.  We have considered this provision in several previous appeals.
86
In  Canada – Aircraft ,  we said that the key word in Article 3.1(a) is "contingent", which means
"conditional" or "dependent for its existence on something else".87  In other words, the grant of the
subsidy must be conditional or dependent upon export performance.  Footnote 4 of theSCM Agreement ,  attached to Article 3.1(a), describes the relationship of contingency by stating that
the grant of a subsidy must be "tied to" export performance.  Article 3.1(a) further provides that suchexport contingency may be the "sole []" condition governing the grant of a prohibited subsidy or itmay be "one of several other conditions".
                                                     
84Ibid., para. 8.163.  The European Communities filed a conditional appeal relating to the Panel's
failure to examine the "extended" subsidy, which we will come to below. ( infra , paras. 253-255)
85United States' appellant's submission, paras. 164 and 169.
86Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft ("Canada –
Aircraft "), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, paras. 162-180;  Appellate Body Report, US – FSC , supra ,
footnote 3, paras. 96-121;  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos , supra , footnote 56, paras. 95-117;  Appellate
Body Report, Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) , supra , footnote 62, paras. 25-52.
87Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 86, para. 166.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 35
112. The Panel found that the measure involves  de jure  export contingency in relation to property
produced in the United States and the United States appeals this finding.  We recall that in  Canada –
Autos ,  we stated:
… a subsidy is contingent "in law" upon export performance when
the existence of that condition can be demonstrated on the basis of
the very words of the relevant legislation, regulation or other legal
instrument constituting the measure. … [F]or a subsidy to be  de jure
export contingent, the underlying legal instrument does not always
have to provide  expressis verbis   that the subsidy is available only
upon fulfillment of the condition of export performance.  Such
conditionality can also be derived by necessary implication from the
words actually used in the measure.88
113. Under the ETI measure, the United States excludes from tax a portion of the income earned
by United States citizens and residents through certain transactions involving, or related to, QFTP.We recall that Section 943(a)(1)(A) IRC defines QFTP, inter alia ,  as property "manufactured,
produced, grown, or extracted  within or outside   the United States".
89  (emphasis added)  The ETI
measure, therefore, contemplates two different factual situations, one involving property produced
within the United States and the other involving property produced outside the United States.  Thedistinctiveness of these two situations is confirmed by the presence of two provisions in the IRC, eachaddressing one of these factual situations.  Section 943(a)(2) IRC contains rules that apply only toproperty produced "outside the United States", while Section 943(c) IRC has source rules that addressonly the case of property produced "within the United States".
114. In respect of property produced within the United States, the taxpayer can obtain the subsidy
only by satisfying the conditions in the measure relating to this property and, for this property, the
measure provides only one set of conditions govern ing the grant of subsidy.  The conditions for the
grant of subsidy with respect to property produced  outside  the United States are distinct from those
governing the grant of subsidy in respect of property produced  within  the United States.
                                                     
88Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 56, para. 100.
89Although Section 943(a)(1)(A) IRC applies to property "manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
within or outside the United States", we will refer to pr operty "produced" within or outside the United States as
a shorthand reference.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 36
115. In our view, it is hence appropriate, indeed necessary, under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement ,  to examine separately the conditions pert aining to the grant of the subsidy in the
two different situations addressed by the measure.  We find it difficult to accept the United States'arguments that such examination involves an "artificial bifurcation" of the measure. The measure
itself identifies the two situations which must be different since the very same property cannot be
produced both within and outside the United States.
116. We turn to examine the conditions in the m easure governing the grant of the subsidy for
property produced within the United States.  In its  definition of QFTP, the measure provides that, in
order to obtain the subsidy, this property must be "held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in theordinary course of trade or business for  direct use, consumption, or disposition  outside  the
United States …".
90  For property produced within the United States, this condition means that, for
income to be eligible for the fiscal subsidy, the property must be exported.  In other words, useoutside the United States necessarily implies exportation of the property from the United States (the
place of production) to the place of use.
117. At the oral hearing, we inquired of the United States whether, for property produced within
the United States, such property must be exported from the United States in order to satisfy thecondition of "direct use … outside the United States".  The United States confirmed that such propertymust be exported to satisfy this condition.
91  For this property, then, the requirement of use outside the
United States makes the grant of the tax benefit contingent upon export.
118. It may also be recalled that the measure at issue in the original proceedings in  US – FSC
contained an almost identical condition relating to "direct use … outside the United States" for
property produced in the United States.92  In that appeal, we upheld the panel's finding that the
combination of the requirements to produce property in the United States and use it outside theUnited States gave rise to export contingency under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .  We see no
reason, in this appeal, to reach a conclusion different from our conclusion in the original proceedings,                                                     
90Section 943(a)(1)(B) IRC. (emphasis added)
91United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing.
92Under the FSC measure, qualifying property had to be produced in the United States by a person
other than an FSC , and it had to be held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary course of trade or
business by, or to, an FSC  for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States.
(Section 927(a)(1)(A) and (B), now repealed by the ETI Act)  Under Section 943(a)(1)(B), inserted into the IRCby Section 3 of the ETI Act, a United States citizen or resident producing property within the United States must
hold this property "primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary course of trade or business outside theUnited States."  Thus, the only difference between the provisions at issue in the original proceedings and those
at issue in these proceedings, relating to property pr oduced in the United States, is that the FSC measure
provided that the FSC could not produce the qualifying property, but that it had to be the seller or lessor,whereas the ETI measure does not state who must produce the qualifying property or who must sell it.  Thisdifference between the provisions has no bearing on the export contingency of the respective measures.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 37
namely that there is export contingency, under Article 3.1(a), where the grant of a subsidy is
conditioned upon a requirement that property produced in the United States be used outside theUnited States.
119. We recall that the ETI measure grants a tax exemption in two different sets of circumstances:
(a)  where property is produced  within  the United States and held for use  outside  the United States;
and (b)  where property is produced  outside  the United States and held for use outside the
United States.  Our conclusion that the ETI measure grants subsidies that are export contingent in thefirst set of circumstances is not affected by the fact that the subsidy can also be obtained in the secondset of circumstances.  The fact that the subsidies granted in the second set of circumstances  might  not
be export contingent does not dissolve the export contingency arising in the first set ofcircumstances.
 93  Conversely, the export contingency arising in these circumstances has no bearing on
whether there  is an export contingent subsidy in the second set of circumstances.  Where aUnited States taxpayer is simultaneously producing property within and outside the United States, for
direct use outside the United States, subsidies may be granted under the ETI measure in respect of
both sets of property.  The subsidy granted with respect to the property produced within theUnited States, and exported from there, is export contingent within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) ofthe  SCM Agreement , irrespective of whether the subsidy given in respect of property produced
outside the United States is also export contingent.
120. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.75 and 9.1(a) of the Panel
Report – which is limited to property "manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted" within theUnited States – that the measure at issue grants subsidies contingent in law upon export performance
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .
94  We do not opine upon the alleged
export contingency of the subsidy in relation to property "manufactured, produced, grown, orextracted" outside the United States.
95
                                                     
93We recall that the European Communities makes a conditional appeal of the Panel's exercise of
judicial economy with respect to its claim concerning pr operty produced outside the United States.  We address
this conditional appeal below.  See  infra , paras. 253-255.
94Supra , paras. 108-109.
95We note that the European Communities makes a conditional appeal concerning the Panel's exercise
of judicial economy in relation to this issue.  See  infra , paras. 253-255.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 38
VII. Footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement :  Avoiding Double Taxation of Foreign-Source
Income
121. The United States asserted, before the Panel, that, even if the Act involved export contingent
subsidies, these subsidies would not be prohibited because of the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to theSCM Agreement ,  which is attached to item (e) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I
of that Agreement (the "Illustrative List").
122. The Panel began its inquiry by holding that the United States bore the burden of proving that
the contested measure fell within the scope of the fifth sentence of footnote 59.  The Panel recalled
that the "party asserting the affirmative of a particular claim or defence bears the burden of proof withrespect to that claim or defence," and that, in th is case, the United States was asserting that the
ETI Act was "justified" by footnote 59.
96
123. In examining the United States' arguments under footnote 59, the Panel found that the term
"foreign-source income" refers "to certain income susceptible to 'double taxation'." 97  T h e  P a n e l
observed that a measure need not avoid double taxation of foreign-source income with "precision",nor need it avoid double taxation "entirely" or "exclusively".
98  Nonetheless, the Panel said, "the
relationship between the measure and its asserted purpose – i.e. 'to avoid the double taxation of
foreign-source income …' – must be reasonably discernible." 99  The Panel examined the relationship
between the measure and its asserted purpose by reviewing "the overall structure, design andoperation of the Act".
100  The Panel found that the measure at issue is not taken "to avoid the double
taxation of foreign-source income" within the meaning of the fifth sentence of footnote 59 to theSCM Agreement .
101
124. The United States argues, on appeal, that the Panel erred in finding that the burden of proof
was on the United States to demonstrate that the measure fell within footnote 59. 102  According to the
United States, "the last sentence of footnote 59 is inextricably linked to … Article 3.1(a) [of theSCM Agreement ] and it serves to define the scope of Article 3.1(a)."
 103  Thus, it contends, the
                                                     
96Panel Report, para. 8.90 and footnote 188 thereto.  (footnote omitted)
97Ibid., para. 8.93.
98Ibid., para. 8.95.  (footnote omitted)
99Ibid.
100Ibid.
101Panel Report, paras. 8.107 and 9.1(a).
102United States' appellant's submission, para. 207.
103Ibid., para. 204.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 39
European Communities bears the burden of proving that measure does  not  fall within footnote 59 to
the  SCM Agreement .
125. According to the United States, the fifth sentence of footnote 59 indicates that Members have
"broad flexibility in fashioning double taxation relief".104  It argues that foreign-source income "would
appear to include income arising, at least in part, outside the borders or territory of the Member
instituting a measure to avoid double taxation" as there is a "possibility of double taxation" of suchincome.
105  The United States points to the legislative history of the ETI Act to establish that the
measure was taken to avoid double taxation within the meaning of footnote 59. 106  The United States
maintains that measures to avoid double taxation, under footnote 59, need not be "comprehensive orall-encompassing."
 107
126. We address first the Panel's finding that the United States bears the burden of proving that the
ETI measure falls within the scope of footnote 59.  We have indeed stated that "the burden of proofrests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim
or defence."
 108  In applying this principle in  US – Wool Shirts and Blouses ,  we said:
Articles XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations
under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules
establishing obligations in themselves.  They are in the nature of
affirmative defences.  It is only reasonable that the burden of
establishing such a defence should rest on the party asserting it.109
(footnote omitted)
127. In  EC – Hormones ,  we stressed that the usual rules on burden of proof could not be avoided
simply by describing a particul ar provision as an "exception".110  In that appeal, we explored the
relationship between Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures  (the " SPS Agreement "), as compared with the relationship between Articles I,
III and XX of the GATT 1994.  In the case of the GATT 1994 provisions, we obs erved that Article XX
does not establish any "positive obligations" relevant to determining the proper scope of the obligationsimposed under Articles I and III.  Instead, Article XX sets out circumstances in which Members are
                                                     
104Ibid., para. 218.
105Ibid., paras. 187-188.
106Ibid., para. 194.  See also Panel Report, footnote 197 to para. 8.95.
107United States' appellant's submission, para. 209.
108Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses
from India ("US – Wool Shirts and Blouses "), WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997,
DSR 1997:I, 323, at 335.
109Ibid., at 337.
110Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 40, para. 104.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 40
entitled to "adopt or maintain" measures that are in consistent with the obligations imposed under other
provisions of the GATT 1994, su ch as Articles I and III.
128. Thus, in reviewing the Panel's finding on th e burden of proof under the fifth sentence of
footnote 59, we must determine whether that provisi on determines, in part, the proper scope of the
obligations under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  or whether it provides an exception for a
provision that is otherwise an export contingent subsidy.
129. We recall that, in the original proceedings in this  dispute, we said that the fifth sentence of
footnote 59 "does not purport to establish an excep tion to the general definition of a 'subsidy' …" 111
Thus, a measure taken to avoid the double taxation of  foreign-source income, falling within footnote  59,
may be a "subsidy" under the  SCM Agreement .
130. Article 3.1 of the  SCM Agreement   provides specific obligations with respect to two types of
subsidy:  subsidies contingent upon export performance and subsidies contingent upon the use ofdomestic over imported goods.  Subsidies of these defined types are prohibited under Article 3 of the
SCM Agreement .  Item (e) of the Illustrative List identifies a particular measure which is deemed to be a
prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a).
131. The fifth sentence of footnote 59 provides that item (e) "is not intended to limit a Member
from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprisesor the enterprises of another Member."  In the same way that we do not see the fifth sentence offootnote 59 as altering the scope of the definition of a "subsidy" in Article 1.1 of theSCM Agreement ,  we do not see it as altering either the scope of item (e) of the Illustrative List or the
meaning to be given to the term "subsidies contingent … upon export performance" in Article 3.1(a)
of the  SCM Agreement .  Thus, measures falling within the scope of this sentence of footnote 59 may
continue to be export subsidies, much as they may continue to be subsidies under Article 1.1 of theSCM Agreement .
132. The import of the fifth sentence of footnote 59 is that Members are entitled to "take", or
"adopt" measures to avoid double taxation of foreign-source income, notwithstanding that they maybe, in principle, export subsidies within the meaning of Article 3.1(a).  The fifth sentence offootnote 59, therefore, constitutes an exception to the legal regime applicable to export subsidiesunder Article 3.1(a) by explicitly providing that when a measure is taken to avoid the double taxationof foreign-source income, a Member is entitled to adopt it.
                                                     
111Appellate Body Report, US – FSC , supra , footnote 3, para. 93. (emphasis omitted)WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 41
133. Accordingly, as we indicated in  US – FSC ,  the fifth sentence of footnote 59 constitutes an
affirmative defence that justifies a prohibited export  subsidy when the measure in question is taken "to
avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income".112  In such a situation, the burden of proving that a
measure is justified by falling within the scope of the fifth sentence of footnote 59 rests upon the
responding party.
134. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in pa ragraph 8.90 of the Panel Report, that, in this
case, the burden of proof under the fifth sent ence of footnote 59 falls on the United States.
135. We turn to the United States' appeal that the Pa nel erred in finding that the ETI measure is not
one taken to avoid the double taxation of fo reign-source income under footnote 59 to the
SCM Agreement .
136. We recall that the fifth sentence of footnote 59 provides:
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures
to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income earned by itsenterprises or the enterprises of another Member.
137. We note at the outset that "double taxation" occurs when the same income, in the hands of the
same taxpayer, is liable to tax in different States.  The fifth sentence of footnote 59 applies to ameasure taken by a Member to avoid such double taxation of "foreign-source income".  In examiningthe phrase "foreign-source income", we observe that, in ordinary usage, the word "source" can refer tothe place where a thing originates, and that the words "source" and "origin" can be synonyms.
113  We
consider, therefore, that the word "source", in the context of the fifth sentence of footnote 59, has ameaning akin to "origin" and refers to the place where the income is earned.  This reading issupported by the combination of the words "foreign" and "source" as "foreign" also refers to the place
where the income is earned.  Used in this way, the word "foreign" indicates a source which is external
to the Member adopting the measure at stake.
114  Footnote 59, therefore, applies to measures taken by
a Member to avoid the double taxation of income earned by a taxpayer of that Member in a "foreign"State.
                                                     
112Appellate Body Report, supra,  footnote 3, para. 101.
113Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , C. T. Onions (ed.) (Guild Publishing, 1983), Vol. II, p. 2057.
114Ibid., Vol. I, p. 788.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 42
138. The fifth sentence of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement   permits a Member to take measures
granting special fiscal treatment to "foreign-sour ce income" in order to alleviate a "double taxation"
burden on its taxpayer.  Clearly, if the income benefitting from such special treatment could not betaxed twice, in two different States, there would be no double tax burden to alleviate, and hence no
justification for permitting an exception to the prohibition on export subsidies.  Thus, the term
"foreign-source income" in footnote 59 refers to in come which is susceptible of being taxed in two
States.  The Panel took a similar view when it stated that it understood "the term 'foreign-sourceincome' … to refer to certain income susceptible to 'double taxation'
 ".115
139. It is, however, no easy matter to determine in every situation when income is susceptible of
being taxed in two different States and, thus, when a Member may properly regard income as"foreign-source income".  We have emphasized in previous appeals that Members have the sovereignauthority to determine their own rules of ta xation, provided that they respect their WTO
obligations.
116  Thus, subject to this important proviso, each Member is free to determine the rules it
will use to identify the source of income and the fiscal consequences – to tax or not to tax the
income – flowing from the identification of source.  We see nothing in footnote 59 to theSCM Agreement   which is intended to alter this situation.  We, therefore, agree with the Panel that
footnote 59 does not oblige Members to adopt any particular legal standard to determine whetherincome is foreign-source for the purposes of their double taxation-avoidance measures.
117
140. At the same time, however, footnote 59 does not give Members an unfettered discretion to
avoid double taxation of "foreign-source income" through the grant of export subsidies.  As the fifthsentence of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement  constitutes an exception to the prohibition on export
subsidies, great care must be taken in defining its scope.  If footnote 59 were interpreted to allow a
Member to grant a fiscal preference for  any  income that a Member chooses to regard as foreign-
source, that reading would seriously undermine the prohibition on export subsidies in theSCM Agreement .  That would allow Members, relying on whatever source rules they adopt, to grant
fiscal export subsidies for income that may not actually be susceptible of being taxed in two
                                                     
115Panel Report, para. 8.93.
116See Appellate Body Report,  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ("Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II "), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, 97,
at 110;  Appellate Body Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R,
adopted 12 January 2000, paras. 59-60;  and Appellate Body Report, US – FSC , supra , footnote 3, para. 90.
117Panel Report, para. 8.93.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 43
jurisdictions.  Accordingly, the term "foreign-source income", as used in footnote 59 cannot be
interpreted by reference solely to the rules of the Member taking the measure to avoid double taxationof foreign-source income.
141. Although there is no universally agreed meaning for the term "foreign-source income" in
international tax law, we observe that many States have adopted bilateral or multilateral treaties to
address double taxation.  The United States, for instance, has more than fifty bilateral tax treatiesaddressing double taxation.
118  Frequently, bilateral tax treaties have been based on multilaterally
developed model tax conventions dealing with double taxation.119  In addition, the respective member
States of the Andean Community and of the Caribbean Community have adopted multilateralagreements, binding on the members of each community, that seek to avoid double taxation.
120
                                                     
118Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Publication 901 (Rev. April 2001),
Cat. No. 46849F.
119Two commonly used model tax conventions are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("O.E.C.D.") Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital  ("O.E.C.D. Model Tax Convention ")
and the United Nations Double Taxation Convention between D eveloped and Developing Countries
("U.N. Model Tax Convention "), which contain similar provisions.  The majority of bilateral treaties adopt the
principles of these two model tax conventions, with many also adopting their detailed provisions (see
B. J. Arnold & M. J. McIntyre, International Tax Primer  (Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 100 and
A. H. Qureshi, The Public International Law of Taxation  (Graham & Trotman, 1994), p. 371).  According to the
O.E.C.D., there are close to 350 treaties between O.E.C.D. Members and over 1500 treaties world-wide whichare based on the   O.E.C.D. Model Tax Convention  (O.E.C.D. website, www.oecd.org;  2001).  The member
States of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) adopted a model tax
agreement among themselves, which is to be used when member States conclude bilateral taxation treaties with
third States (Decision 40 of 8 November 1971 of the Andean Group, Annex II, Standard Agreement to Avoid
Double Taxation between Member Countries and Other States Outside the Subregion  (Convenio Tipo para
evitar la doble tributación entre los Países Miembros y otros Estados ajenos a la Subregión ) ("Andean
Community  Model Tax Agreement ").
120The member States of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela) adopted an agreement among themselves to address double taxation(Decision 40 of 8 November 1971 of the Andean Group approving the  Agreement to Avoid Double
Taxation between Member Countries  (Convenio para evitar la doble tributación entre los Paises
Miembros ) (" Andean Community Agreement "). (www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/d040.htm and
www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/d040e.htm)  This agreement entered into force on
1 January 1981.
11 member States of the Caribbean Community (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sain t Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad
and Tobago) also adopted an agreement on double taxation among themselves on 6 July 1994 ( Agreement
Among the Governments of the Member States of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of DoubleTaxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Resp ect to Taxes on Income, Profits or Gains and Capital
Gains and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment ) (" CARICOM Agreement ").
(www.caricom.org under "Information Services" and "Treaties and Protocols")WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 44
142. Although these instruments do not define "foreign-source income" uniformly, it appears to us
that certain widely recognized principles of taxation emerge from them.121  In seeking to give meaning
to the term "foreign-source income" in footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement ,  which is a tax-related
provision in an international trade treaty, we believe that it is appropriate for us to derive assistance
from these widely recognized principles which many States generally apply in the field of taxation.  In
identifying these principles, we bear in mind that the measure at issue seeks to address foreign-source
income of United States citizens and residents – that is, income earned by these taxpayers in "foreign"States where the taxpayers are not resident.
143. We recognize, of course, that the detailed rules on taxation of non-residents differ
considerably from State-to-State, with some States applying rules which may be more likely to tax theincome of non-residents than the rules applied by other States.
 122  However, despite the differences,
there seems to us to be a widely accepted comm on element to these rules.  The common element is
that a "foreign" State will tax a non-resident on income which is generated by activities of the non-
resident that have some link with that State.  Thus, whether a "foreign" State decides to tax non-
residents on income generated by a permanent establishment or whether, absent such anestablishment, it decides to tax a non-resident on income generated by the conduct of a trade orbusiness on its territory, the "foreign" State taxes a non-resident only on income generated by
                                                     
121We observe that, before the Panel, the United States provided examples of the source rules applied
by Brazil, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States.The widely recognized principles of taxation appear to be reflected in these domestic rules of taxation. (UnitedStates' second submission to the Panel, para. 62;  Panel Report, p. C-69;  Exhibits US-24 – US-29 submitted by
the United States to the Panel;  United States' response to Question 12 posed by the Panel, paras. 27-29; Panel
Report, pp. F-38 and F-39)
122For instance, some States will tax a non-resident only on business income generated by a permanent
establishment  on its territory.  In that respect, we observe that the  O.E.C.D. Model Tax Convention  allows a
State to impose tax on business profits generated by a non-resident through a "permanent establishment"situated on its territory.  Article 5.1 of the Convention defines a "permanent establishment" as a "fixed place of
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on".  This definition requires arelatively strong link with the "foreign" State before it may tax a non-resident.  However, Article 5.5 of theConvention adds that a permanent establishment may exist where a person, other than the taxpayer, "habitually
exercises … an authority to conclude contracts" for the taxpayer.  The  O.E.C.D. Model Tax Convention  itself,
therefore, admits of differing standards to determine whether business income was generated by activities linked
to the territory of a "foreign" State.
However, we also observe that some States will tax a non-resident on the basis of activities of a less
permanent character provided there is nonetheless a suff icient connection between the activities generating the
income and the territory of the taxing State. The United States, for instance, taxes the business income of non-residents if the income is "effectively connected" with a trade or business conducted in the United States.(Sections 871(b) and 882(b) IRC)  The United States cites examples of other States which it considers tax non-residents on income generated through a trade or business conducted in that State, without the creation of apermanent establishment (see s upra , footnote 121).WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 45
activities linked to the territory of that State.123  As a result of this link, the "foreign" State treats the
income in question as domestic-source, under its source rules, and taxes it.  Conversely, where theincome of a non-resident does not have any links with a "foreign" State, it is widely accepted that theincome will be subject to tax only in the taxpayer's State of residence, and that this income will not be
subject to taxation by a "foreign" State.
144. Although the participants, and third participants, disagree on precisely whether or to what
extent a "foreign" State will tax the income of a non-resident, none has suggested that a non-resident
                                                     
123We note that the Andean Community Agreement , the CARICOM Agreement , and the Andean
Community Model Tax Agreement and the  O.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model Tax Conventions  describe a variety of
situations in which a "foreign" State is entitled to tax a non-resident on income generated through activitieswhich are linked to that State.  The nature of the links required depends on the nature of the income.
Articles 7 of the Andean Community Agreement  and of the  Andean Community Model Tax Agreement
provide that business profits are taxable only in the State where these profits are "obtained" through business
activities conducted in that State.  Article 8 of the CARICOM Agreement  states that business profits are taxable
only in the State where the business activities generating these profits are "undertaken".  Thus, a non-residentwill be taxed on business profits generated through activities undertaken in a "foreign" State.  Articles 7 of theO.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model Tax Conventions  provide that "business" income of a non-resident, generated through
a "permanent establishment", may be taxed in the State where the permanent establishment is located (see supra , footnote 122).
Articles 5 and 12 of the Andean Community Agreement  and the Andean Community Model Tax
Agreement , Articles 6 and 7.2(i) of the CARICOM Agreement , and Articles 6 and 13 of the  O.E.C.D. and  U.N.
Model Tax Conventions  state that income, or capital gains, derived by a non-resident from immovable property,
or from its alienation, are taxable in the "foreign" State where the property is situated.
Articles 8 of the O.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model Tax Conventions  provide that income generated from the
"operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic" may be taxed in a "foreign" State if the "place of effective
management" of the non-resident enterprise is situated in that State.  Article 8 of the Andean Community
Agreement  and Article 9.1 of the CARICOM Agreement  allow only the State of residence of the enterprise to tax
such "international" income.  However, Article 9.2 of the CARICOM Agreement   provides that where the
transport activities take place exclusively within the territory  of one of the member States, that State shall tax the
income, irrespective of the place of residence of the enterprise.  Article 8 of the Andean Community Model Tax
Agreement  is similar to Article 8 of the Andean Community Agreement ,  while the alternative Article 8 of the
Andean Community Model Tax Agreement ,  allows a State to tax transport activities that take place in that State,
irrespective of the place of residence of the enterprise.
Articles 13 of the Andean Community Agreement  and of the Andean Community Model Tax Agreement ,
and Articles 15 of the CARICOM Agreement  and of the O.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model Tax Conventions ,  indicate
that the employment income of a non-resident may be taxe d in a "foreign" State if the services are rendered or if
the employment is exercised in that State.
According to Article 17 of the CARICOM Agreement , and Articles 16 of the O.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model
Tax Conventions ,  the fees of a non-resident director may be taxed in the "foreign" State if the corporation of
which the person is a director is resident in that State.  Under Article 14 of the Andean Community Agreement
and of the Andean Community Model Tax Agreement , professional services provided by an enterprise may be
taxed in a "foreign" State if the services are performed there.
Under Articles 16 of the 
Andean Community Agreement  and of the Andean Community Model Tax
Agreement , Article 18 of the CARICOM Agreement , and Articles 17 of the O.E.C.D.  and U.N. Model Tax
Conventions , the income of an entertainer derived from "activities" exercised in a "foreign" State may be taxed
in that State.
Thus, in the case of each type of income addressed by these agreements and conventions, a "foreign"
State may tax a non-resident only on income which is generated by activities which are linked to or connectedwith the territory of that State.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 46
will be taxed in a "foreign" State on income generated by activities that are not, in any way, linked to
that "foreign" State.  Indeed, the United States argues that QFTI is foreign-source income because thisportion of extraterritorial income has " sufficient foreign contacts  … [such] that the transaction may be
subject to tax in [a] foreign nation."
 124  (emphasis added)  According to the United States, these
"foreign contacts" are established, under the measure, through the performance of the activities
described in the foreign economic processes requirement under Section 942(b) IRC.125  Thus, the
United States accepts that "foreign-source income" in footnote 59 is income generated by economicactivities that have "sufficient contacts" with a "foreign" State.
145. Accordingly, in our view, "foreign-source income", in footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement ,
refers to income generated by activities of a non-resident taxpayer in a "foreign" State which havesuch links with that State so that the income could properly be subject to tax in that State.
126
146. In view of the divergence in the detailed rules applied by States when taxing non-residents,
there will be many situations where some States tax the income of a non-resident, while other States
would consider that there was an inadequate link to justify the imposition of tax on non-residents.
Thus, from the perspective of the State of residence, there will not be certainty as to when the incomeof its taxpayers will be subject to tax in a "foreign" State.  Despite this uncertainty, one of the widelyrecognized methods of avoiding double taxation is the tax exemption method.
127  Under this method,
States may exempt income from taxation to avoid double taxation, irrespective of whether or not
                                                     
124United States' additional written memorandum, p. 2.
125Ibid.
126We note that Isenbergh states that "the concept of source is not infinitely malleable.  If only for
practical reasons, some connection with a country is required  to justify treating income as being from sources
within that country." (emphasis added)  Isenbergh also states that "commercial or industrial countries regard
income as deriving its source from specific economic activity conducted within them , whereas many developing
countries … focus on whose pocket income is paid from." (emphasis added) (J. Isenbergh, supra , footnote 79,
Vol. I, para. 5.1, p. 5:2)
127See, for instance, Articles 23A of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. Model Tax Conventions .  Among bilateral
tax treaties, see, for instance, Article 22(1)(a) of the  Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for Avoidance of Double Taxation in the Area of Taxes on Income  (Abkommen
zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Islamischen Republik Pakistan zur Vermeidung der
Doppelbesteuerung auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen ), 14 July 1994, Bundesteuerblatt 1995 I p. 617,
Bundesgesetzblatt 1995 II p. 836;  Article 22(2)(a) of the Double Taxation Agreement between Mauritius and
Madagascar (Convention entre le Gouvernement de la République de Maurice et le Gouvernement de la
République de Madagascar  tendant à éviter les doubles impositions et  la prévention de l'évasion fiscale en
matière d'impôts sur le revenu ), 30 August 1994;  and Article 24(b)(1) of the Double Taxation Agreement
between the Republic of France and the United Kingdom  (Convention entre la France et le Royaume-Uni de
Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord tendant à éviter les doubles impositions  et à prévenir l'évasion fiscale en
matière d'impôts sur les revenus ), 22 May 1968,  Journal Officiel de la République française , 24 November
1969, p. 11476, as amended.  See also A. H. Qureshi, supra , footnote 119, p. 370;  B. J. Arnold &
M. J. McIntyre, supra , footnote  119, pp. 40-43;  J. Schuch, "The Methods for the Elimination of Double
Taxation in a Multilateral Tax Treaty", in M. Lang et al. (eds.), Multilateral Tax Treaties, New Developments in
International Tax Law  (Kluwer Law International and Lindeverlagwien, 1998), pp. 129-152;  and M. Pires,
International Juridical Double Taxation of Income (Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1989), pp. 173-184.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 47
another State taxes the exempt income.  The avoidance of double taxation is not an exact science.
Indeed, the income exempted from taxation in the State of residence of the taxpayer might not besubject to a corresponding, or any, tax in a "foreign" State.  Yet, this does not necessarily mean thatthe measure is not taken to avoid double taxation of foreign-source income.  Thus, we agree with the
Panel, and the United States, that measures falling under footnote 59 are not required to be perfectly
tailored to the actual double tax burden.
128
147. However, the fact that measures falling under footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement   may grant
a tax exemption even for income that is not taxed in another jurisdiction does not mean that such tax
exemptions may be granted, under the fifth sentence of footnote 59, for  any  income.  Footnote 59
prescribes that the income benefitting from a double taxation-avoidance measure must be "foreign-source" and, as we have said, that means that the income must have links with a "foreign" State suchthat it could properly be subjected to tax in that State, as well as in the Member taking the doubletaxation-avoidance measure.
148. We also recognize that Members are not obliged by the covered agreements to provide relief
from double taxation.  Footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement   simply preserves the prerogative of
Members to grant such relief, at their discretion, for "foreign-source income".  Accordingly, we do notbelieve that measures falling under footnote 59 must grant relief from  all  double tax burdens.
Rather, Members retain the sovereign authority to  determine for themselves whether, and to what
extent, they will grant such relief.
149. We turn once more to the ETI measure and recall that footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement
applies to measures "tak[en] … to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income …".  Like the
Panel, we will scrutinize the design, structure and architecture of the contested measure to determine
whether it falls within footnote 59.
150. We recall that the United States points to the legislative history of the measure.  According to
certain passages from that legislative history, "the exclusion of … extraterritorial income is a means
of avoiding double taxation".
129  The legislative history also states that the measure was adopted "to
comply with decisions of a World Trade Or ganization dispute panel and Appellate Body." 130  W e
                                                     
128Panel Report, para. 8.95;  United States' appellant's submission, paras. 216-220.
129United States' appellant's submission, para. 194, quoting the United States'  Senate Report on the
FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act  ("Senate Report"), S. Rep. No. 106-416 (2000), Exhibit
US-2 submitted by the United States to the Panel, pp. 2 and 6;  United States'  House of Representatives Report
on the FSC and Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act   ("House Report"), H.R. Rep. No. 106-845
(2000), Exhibit US-3 submitted by the United States to the Panel, pp. 10 and 13.
130Panel Report, footnote 197 to para. 8.95 quoting House Report, p. 19.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 48
take particular note of these statements, though we do not believe that it would be appropriate for us
to end our inquiry here.
151. It is clear to us that the measure addresses situations where United States citizens and
residents have engaged in certain economic activities in a "foreign" State.  We note that a taxpayer
will be treated as having foreign trading gross receipts, which give rise to exempt QFTI, only if the
transaction generating these receipts satisfied the "foreign economic process requirement" inSection 942(b) IRC.
131
152. Under this requirement, certain aspects of the transaction must take place outside the
United States.  First, the taxpayer must have "participated outside the United States" in one of thefollowing activities: the "solicitation", "negotia tion" or "making" of the contract, other than
participation in advertising.  Second, at least 50 percent of certain of the transaction costs must beattributable "to activities performed outside the United States."  The relevant costs are thosepertaining to the following five categories of activity:  "advertising and sales promotion";  "the
processing of customer orders and the arranging for delivery";  "transportation outside the United
States in connection with delivery to the customer";  "the determination and transmittal of a finalinvoice or statement of account or the receipt of payment";  and, "the assumption of credit risk".
132
153. The foreign economic process requirement focuses on activities of the taxpayer in respect of
making and executing the sale or lease of the qualifying property.  While we agree with the EuropeanCommunities that the measure addresses only a limited range of economic activities, we also agreewith the United States that these activities occur in  a "foreign" State, as they must take place outside
the United States.  It is, therefore, clear to us that the foreign economic process requirement
establishes a link between some part of the qualify ing transactions covered by the ETI measure and a
"foreign" State.
154. However, the fact that a transaction involves some foreign element, such as the "foreign
economic process", does not necessarily mean that  all  of the income generated by such a transaction
will be "foreign-source income" within the meaning of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement .  The sale
or lease of property may give rise to taxable income attributable to a variety of activities, of which
                                                     
131See  infra ,  paras.  175-177, where we address the exception to this requirement in
Section 942(c)(1) IRC.
132Sections 942(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 942(b)(3) IRC.  As an alternative, the foreign economic process
requirement may be satisfied where the costs attribut able to activities performed outside the United States
account for at least 85 percent of the costs in two of the five categories mentioned in paragraph 152.  SeeSection 942(b)(2)(B) IRC.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 49
only some may occur in a "foreign" State.  Thus, a sale or lease transaction may give rise to income
attributable to activities such as research and development, manufacturing, advertising, selling,transport,  and administration.  In our view, under footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement ,  the "foreign-
source income" arising in such a transaction is only that portion of the total income which is generated
by and properly attributable to activities that do occur in a "foreign" State.
133  Conversely, the portion
of the total income generated by and properly attribut able to activities that occur within the State of
residence is domestic-source income in that State.  Thus, where sales or lease income  combines
domestic- and foreign-source income,  not all  of the income is foreign-source, just as  not all  of the
income is domestic-source.
155. Under Section 942(a)(1) IRC, "foreign trading gross receipts" are the  entirety  of the receipts
earned by the taxpayer in transactions covered by the measure.  "Extraterritorial income" is defined inSection 114(e) IRC as the gross income attributable  to foreign trading gross receipts of the taxpayer.
"Foreign trade income" is defined in Section 941(b) (1) IRC as the (net) taxable income attributable to
foreign trading gross receipts of the taxpayer.  Under the ETI measure, as we read the statutory
provisions,  all  of the receipts from a qualifying transaction involving qualifying property are treated
as foreign trading gross receipts;  all  of the gross income earned in such a transaction is treated as
extraterritorial income;  and  all  of the (net) taxable income earned in such transaction is treated as
foreign trade income.
156. We said earlier that the  exempt  income under the measure is only QFTI and that the amount
of QFTI is calculated, at the choice of the taxpayer, using one of three different formulae set forth inSection 941(a)(1) IRC.  Under one of these formulae, the amount of QFTI is equal to 15 percent of the
(net) foreign trade income of the taxpayer
 134 (the "15 percent rule"), while under a second, QFTI is
equal to 1.2 percent of foreign trading gross receipts (the "1.2 percent rule").135  Thus, under these two
formulae, QFTI is a  fixed percentage  of either the net amount or the gross amount of  all  of the
income earned by the taxpayer in any qualifying tr ansaction.  Under these formulae, QFTI, therefore,
                                                     
133We note that Isenbergh states that, in the case of sale of goods by a producer, the income generated
by the sales transaction is attributable to "easily dist inguishable activities" which are "often combined", namely
"production and sale" activities.  Isenbergh indicates that in an international sales transaction, these production
and sales activities may take place "in different countries".  These activities, therefore, generate income that has
different sources which are "compounded" unless the income from the different sources is separated.  Isenberghstates that "ideally" the different "elements of the transaction" would be "disengaged" using arm's length pricing
rules.  The manufacturer would be treated as if it had sold the goods to an independent distributor at arm's length
prices, who in turn resold the goods.  This would "dissect" the transaction on the basis of the place where the
different activities occurred.  (J. Isenbergh, supra , footnote 79, Vol. I, para. 10.9, p. 10:16)
134Section 941(a)(1)(C) IRC.
135Section 941(a)(1)(B) IRC.  We note that, under Section 941(a)(1)(A) IRC, QFTI may be 30 percent
of the "foreign sales and leasing income" of the taxpayer.  We will examine this formula below.  See  infra ,
paras. 172-178.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 50
includes a percentage of the income earned by the taxpayer from the activities that, cumulatively,
generated the totality of the income.  In other wo rds, in calculating QFTI under these formulae, the
measure does not purport to distinguish, except on an  "rule of thumb" basis, between domestic- and
foreign-source income according to whether activi ties generating the income occurred in the
United States or in a "foreign State".136  Instead, QFTI is a fixed percentage of an amount that bundles
together both domestic- and foreign-source income.
157. This may be illustrated by way of examples which are based on an example of the operation
of the measure given in the United States' House Report.137  The first example involves two separate
sales transactions.  We assume that a United States corporation manufactures property in the UnitedStates and sells it to an unrelated distributor in the United States, without satisfying the foreigneconomic process requirement.  We assume that the sales price was $80, generating $30 of profit forthe manufacturer.  At the oral hearing, the United States confirmed that, in such a transaction, themanufacturer will have no extraterritorial income and no QFTI.  All of the $30 profit will be gross
income under Section 61(a) IRC.  We next assume that the same distributor sells this same property to
a foreign buyer, for use outside the United States , in a transaction satisfying the foreign economic
process requirement.  The sales price is $100, generating $20 of profit.  At the oral hearing, theUnited States confirmed that the distributor will have $20 of extraterritorial income and, assuming thisis all taxable income, the QFTI will equal $3 using the 15 percent rule in Section 941(a)(1)C) IRC.
158. In this first example, the manufacturer made $30 of profit and the distributor $20.  Of this
total of $50 of profit, only the distributor's $20 of profit is extraterritorial income.  The exempt QFTIis a portion of distributor's sales and distribution profits, and does not include any profits made by the
manufacturer.  The United States explained that the 15 percent rule is intended to allocate the sales
and distribution income earned in a transaction, in  this example by the distributor, between the
domestic portion (85%), and the foreign portion attrib utable to the activities involved in completing
the foreign economic process (15%).
138  Thus, the $3 of QFTI is the amount the United States treats as
exempt foreign-source income in this example, with the remaining $47 treated as United Statesdomestic-source income.
                                                     
136At the oral hearing, the United States referred to  the formulae for calculating the amount of QFTI as
"rules of thumb".
137House Report, p. 20.  The figures used in these examples are also based on the example given in the
United States' House  Report.
138United States' response to questioning at the oral hearing.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 51
159. Our second example is taken directly from the House Report itself, and uses the figures given
in that Report.  It involves precisely the same tran sactions as our first example, with the same sales
prices and profits for the manufacturer and distributor.  However, in this case the manufacturer anddistributor are related parties.  By virtue of Se ction 942(b)(4) IRC, the manufacturer is deemed to
have satisfied the foreign economic process requirement in its transaction with the related distributor
because the distributor satisfied this requirement in the subsequent transaction with the foreign buyer.In other words, because the manufacturer and distributor are related, the measure deems the foreigneconomic process requirement to have been met in the sales transaction between the related parties,
when, in fact, it was not met.  At the oral hearing, the United States confirmed what is stated in theHouse Report, namely that as a result of the "deeming" provision in Section 942(b)(4) IRC, themanufacturer's $30 of profit is treated as extraterritorial income and, assuming this is all taxableincome, the manufacturer's QFTI will equal $4.50 using the 15 percent rule in Section 941(a)(1)(C)IRC.  The distributor will also still have $3 of QFTI.  Thus, the related parties have a total of $7.50 of
exempt QFTI, which the United States regards as foreign-source income.
139  The remaining $42.50 of
profit is treated as domestic-source income.  We will comment on this example below.
160. The third example involves only one transaction:  the direct sale, by a United States
corporation, of property which that corporation manufactured in the United States, to an unrelatedforeign buyer for use outside the United States.  In this example, we assume that the transactionsatisfies the foreign economic process requirement.  We assume also that the sales price was $100,generating $50 of profit for the manufacturer.  Thus, like the last two examples, the total profit fromall activities is $50.  However, unlike the last two examples, the entire $50 profit is earned by the
manufacturer.  At the oral hearing, the United States confirmed that, in this example, the manufacturer
will have $50 of extraterritorial income and, again assuming that this is all taxable income, it willhave $7.50 of QFTI using the 15 percent rule.  The United States argues that the $7.50 representsforeign-source income of the manufacturer, while the remaining $42.50 is taxed in the United Statesas domestic-source income.
161. The differences in tax treatment among these three examples are revealing.  In each example,
precisely the same total amount of profit ($50) is earned from precisely the same activities(manufacture, sales and distribution).  Moreover, the nature and extent of the foreign-based activitiesare identical in each example.  Yet, in these examples, the allocation between domestic- and foreign-
source income that arises from the application of the ETI measure is very different.  Indeed, in the
second and third examples, the amount of income treated as exempt foreign-source income is morethan twice the amount of such income in the first example.
                                                     
139The United States confirmed our understanding at the oral hearing.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 52
162. The reason for the noteworthy difference in the exempt income between the first and third
example is, as we said earlier, that QFTI is calculated as a fixed percentage of  all  of the income
earned by the taxpayer in any qualifying transaction from the cumulation of activities which generatedthe income.
140  In the first example, QFTI was 15 percent of the entire $20 of income earned by the
distributor from the cumulation of its sales and distribution activities;  QFTI did not, however, include
any of the $30 of profits earned by the manufacturer, in a separate transaction, from its activities.  By
contrast, in the third example, because the sale was made directly by a manufacturer, QFTI was15 percent of the entire $50 of income earned by it from the cumulation of all of its activities,including manufacturing, sales and distribution.  Thus, in the third example, QFTI bundles together,as exempt foreign-source income, 15 percent of the manufacturing income from the transaction, aswell as 15 percent of the sales and distribution income.
163. The difference in tax treatment between the first and second examples is explained by
Section 942(b)(4) IRC, which provides that the transaction between the related manufacturer and
distributor is deemed to satisfy the foreign economic process requirement because this requirement is
satisfied in the  subsequent sale  by the distributor  to the unrelated foreign buyer .  Thus, in the
absence of Section 942(b)(4) IRC, the domestic manufacturing income of the related parties wouldnot be included in the calculation of QFTI.  Yet, through the deeming provision, the measure allowsthe related parties to bundle together, in the calculation of QFTI,  all  of the profits earned by them,
including profits earned in a purely domestic transaction between the related parties  inter se .  Thus,
as in the third example, QFTI includes, in the second example, as exempt foreign-source income,15 percent of the manufacturing income, as well as 15 percent of the sales and distribution income.
164. We note that our examples, like the one in the House Report, calculate QFTI using the
15 percent rule.  However, if the taxpayer elected to calculate QFTI using the 1.2 percent rule, similaranomalies in the allocation of income as either domestic- or foreign-source would arise.  Under thisformula also, QFTI would be a portion of the combined domestic- and foreign-source income earnedthrough the cumulation of activities that generated the foreign trading gross receipts of which1.2 percent is QFTI.
141
                                                     
140See  supra , para. 25, for a description of the formulae used to calculate the amount of QFTI.
141Where the taxpayer elects to use the 1.2 percent ru le to calculate the tax exemption with respect to
any transaction, Section 941(a)(3) IRC confines the exemption to the income earned in that single transaction.Any income earned in any other transaction, relating to the same property, cannot benefit from an exemption,even in the case of a second transaction between related parties.  This provision, therefore, effectively excludesthe application of the deeming rule for related parties in Section 942(b)(4) IRC, which allows income from morethan one transaction to be included in the calculation of QFTI.  See  supra , paras. 159 and 163.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 53
165. We have said that, under footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement ,  "foreign-source income" is
income which is generated through activities linked with a "foreign" State.  Although the ETI measureensures that transactions giving rise to exempt QF TI have some link with a "foreign" State, through
compliance with the foreign economic process requirement, two of the measure's allocation rules (the
15 percent and 1.2 percent rules) do not distinguish, on a proper basis, between income generated by
activities that occur in the United States and income  from activities that occur elsewhere.  Rather,
under these two rules, QFTI is a fixed portion of a ll of the income earned by the taxpayer in relevant
transactions, including income generated by activities that occur in the United States, such asmanufacturing income in our examples.  As we have said, income generated by activities that do nothave a link with a "foreign" State is not properly regarded as "foreign-source income" within themeaning of footnote 59, but as domestic-source income.
166. Accordingly, in our view, in the calculation of QFTI using the 1.2 and 15 percent rules set
forth in Section 941(a)(1)(B) and (C) IRC
 142, the ETI measure fails to distinguish between income
which can give rise to foreign-source income – that is, sales and distribution income attributable to the
foreign economic processes – and income which cannot, such as income attributable to United States'manufacturing activities.  As a result, under these two formulae, the ETI measure improperlycombines domestic-source income and foreign-source income in the calculation of QFTI. We,therefore, consider that, when taxpayers elect to use either of these two formulae, the ETI measureresults systematically in a misallocation of domestic- and foreign-source income.
167. Furthermore, as we saw in the second example,  through Section 942(b)(4) IRC, related parties
are able to "sweep into" the calculation of QFTI income from purely domestic transactions, involving
in that example domestic-source manufacturing income.
143  In the absence of this provision, the
separate transactions between the manufacturer and related distributor, and between the distributorand unrelated foreign buyer, would have operated as a means of separating out some domestic- andforeign-source income in these separate transactions.  In other words, the domestic-source income inthe first transaction would not be included in the calculation of QFTI.  However, the result of thedeeming provision in Section 942(b)(4) IRC is to misallocate domestic-source income from the firsttransaction as foreign-source income.
144
                                                     
142See  supra ,  paras. 25 and 156.
143See   supra ,  para. 159.
144We acknowledge that, for certain purposes, related parties may be treated as a single economy entity.
Yet, the application of the deeming rule here adds  another situation where the ETI measure misallocates
domestic- and foreign-source income.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 54
168. Finally, with respect to the two formulae we have just examined – namely, the 1.2 percent
rule or 15 percent rule – we note that the last sentence of this provision states that the amountdetermined under the 1.2 percent rule shall in no case exceed 200 percent of the amount determinedunder the 15 percent rule.  This last sentence of Section 941(a)(1) suggests to us that there could be
situations where the QFTI claimed by a taxpayer under the 1.2 percent rule could be as much as
200 percent of the QFTI computed for the same transactions under the 15 percent rule.  Thisreinforces our view that the approach embodied in the ETI measure can lead to very differentallocations of income between domestic-and foreign-source in respect of precisely the sametransaction.  This implies to us that the different formulae for calculating QFTI result in amisallocation of income as between the domestic-and foreign-source and, through the election whichthe taxpayer can make between these formulae, allows the taxpayer to obtain the maximum benefitfrom the misallocation.
169. The third and final formula for calculating QFTI addresses "foreign sales and leasing income"
("FSLI") and is set forth in Section 941(c)(1) IRC.  This provision states that QFTI may be 30 percent
of the taxpayer's FSLI.  The definition of FSLI contains some noteworthy differences from theallocation rules under the two formulae we have just  examined.  Whereas the first two formulae base
the calculation of QFTI on  combined  domestic- and foreign-source income, in contrast, the definition
of FSLI, under Section 941(c)(1)(A) IRC, does not.  Under this provision, FSLI is limited to the
"foreign trade income properly allocable to activities" that are "performed … outside  the United
States" in satisfaction of the foreign economic process requirement described inSections 942(b)(2)(A)(i) and 942(b)(3) IRC.
145
170. Thus, under this third formula, FSLI is a portion of foreign trade income.146  We recall that,
under Section 941(b) IRC, foreign trade income bundles together both domestic- and foreign-sourceincome.  However, in contrast, FSLI is only that portion of foreign trade income "properly allocable"to foreign sales and distribution activities.  We note that, although the IRC does not define the words"properly allocable", the Senate and House Reports  indicate that those words limit FSLI to foreign
trade income " associated with sales   activities" described in the foreign economic process
requirement.
147  We envisage that the application of such a rule requires the taxpayer to establish that,
in fact, the "alloca[tion]" made is, indeed, "proper".  Interpreted in this way, FSLI is  not  the  entirety 
of the taxpayers' sales and leasing income, but is only the portion "properly allocable" or attributable                                                     
145This method of determining FSLI does not apply to income derived from the "lease or rental" of
QFTP.  We examine below the calculation of FSLI in tran sactions involving the "lease or rental" of QFTP.  See
infra , paras. 170-174.
146 We note that, under Section 941(c)(3)(B) IRC, only " directly  allocable expenses" are to be "taken
into account in computing foreign trade income" for purposes of FSLI. (emphasis added)
147Senate Report, p. 10;  House Report, p. 24.  (emphasis added)WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 55
to foreign activities.  By requiring such a process of separating domestic- and foreign-source income,
on the basis of the locus of the activities generating the income, Section 941(a)(1)(A) IRC includes inthe calculation of FSLI only income which may pr operly be regarded as "foreign-source income"
under footnote 59 of the  SCM Agreement .  In other words, Section 941(c)(1)(A) IRC separates out, or
unbundles, the domestic- and foreign-source income that are combined in foreign trade income.
171. We note, however, that rules on "proper alloca[tion]" in Section 941(c)(1)(A) IRC do  not
apply to income derived from the lease or rental of QFTP.  In the case of income derived from the"lease or rental" of QFTP, FSLI is simply the "foreign trade income" derived from thesetransactions.
148  We recall that foreign trade income bundles together domestic- and foreign-source
income 149, in other words, the process of separating domestic- and foreign-source income that we
consider is contemplated by the words "properly allocable" does  not  apply to FSLI which is lease or
rental income.
172. However, the provisions relating to FSLI include "special rules for leased property" in
Section 941(c)(2) IRC for the calculation of foreign trade income.  These special rules apply in two
situations.  First, where qualifying property is leased by the manufacturer and, second, wherequalifying property which has been leased is sold by the manufacturer.  In these two situations, FSLIis determined as if the manufacturer had acquired the property from a third party at an arm's lengthprice.  The Senate and House Reports explain that:
This limitation is intended to   prevent  foreign sales and leasing
income from including profit associated with manufacturing
activities .
150  (emphasis added)
173. We agree that, under the "special rules for leased property", the use of the arm's length rule
effects a separation of manufacturing income from all other income.151  The amount of FSLI is  all  of
the income,  less  manufacturing income, earned through the lease transaction, or through the sale of
leased property.  FSLI, therefore, combines or bundles together the  remaining  income, irrespective
of the locus of the activities that generated th is income.  The remaining FSLI could combine income
generated by domestic activities and income generated by foreign activities.  As a result the
                                                     
148Section 941(c)(1)(B) IRC.
149See  supra ,  paras. 155 and 166.
150Senate Report, p. 11;  House Report, p. 24.
151We note that Isenbergh considers that the use of arm's length pricing is an appropriate method for
separating manufacturing income from sales income. (J. Isenbergh, supra , footnote 79, Vol. I, para. 10.9,
p. 10:16)  See also  supra ,  footnote 133.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 56
calculation of FSLI for leased property could result in a misallocation of domestic-source income as
foreign-source income.
174. To our minds, the inclusion of certain restrictions in calculating FSLI – the "properly
allocable" rule and the exclusion of manufacturing income – makes all the more striking the omission
of any such restrictions where QFTI is calculated using the other two formulae, that is, the 1.2 percent
and 15 percent rules.  We find it particularly incongruous that one part of the ETI measure expresslyrequires a "proper alloca[tion]" of foreign-source income, on the basis of activities "performed …outside the United States", while the remainder of the measure does not.  We also find it noteworthythat, in one part of the ETI measure, a restriction is included specifically "to prevent" an exemption
being granted to "profit associated with manufacturing activities" – which activities will often takeplace within the United States – while under the 1.2 percent and 15 percent rules no such limitation isprovided to exclude domestic-source manufacturing income.
175. We turn now to two other aspects of the ETI measure which we consider similarly result in
domestic-source income being treated as exempt foreign-source income.  First, for taxpayers with
declared foreign trading gross receipts of up to $5,000,000, Section 942(c)(1) IRC dispenses entirelywith the foreign economic process requirement.  Thus, a portion of the taxpayers' income is treated asexempt foreign-source income even though it has not been established – and need not be established –that the taxpayer undertook any activities outside the United States.  However, in the absence of anestablished link between the income of such taxpayers and their activities in a "foreign" State, we donot believe that there is "foreign-source income" within the meaning of footnote 59 of theSCM Agreement .
176. The United States argued, at the oral hearing, that, in the case of "small" taxpayers with
foreign trading gross receipts of only up to $5,000,000, the burden under the foreign economicprocess requirement is too great to justify imposing this requirement.
152  A t  t h e  o r a l  h e a r i n g ,  t h e
United States also asserted that, where the exception in Section 942(c)(1) IRC applies, there is in anyevent a link with a foreign State because, in these cases, the qualifying property in the transactionmust be used outside the United States.
153  In our view, however, sales income cannot be regarded as
"foreign-source income", under footnote 59, for the sole reason that the property, subject-matter of thesale, is exported to another State, for use there.  The mere fact that the buyer uses property outside theUnited States does not mean that the seller undertook activities in a "foreign" State generating income                                                     
152We note that a taxpayer with no more than $5, 000,000 of declared foreign trading gross receipts may
have other gross receipts which are not d eclared as foreign trading gross receipts.
153Clearly, where the transaction involves the produc tion of QFTP outside the United States, there
would be other foreign links than the use outside the United States.  We deal here with the United States'argument as it relates to property produced within the United States.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 57
there.  Such an interpretation of footnote 59 would, in effect, allow Members to grant a tax exemption
in favour of export-related income on the ground that the exportation by itself of the property rendersthe income "foreign-source".  In our view, this reading would allow Members easily to evade theprohibition on export subsidies in Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement  and render this prohibition
meaningless.
177. Accordingly, where and to the extent that the "$5,000,000"exception in Section 942(c)(1) IRC
applies, the measure grants a tax exemption in favour of income which is not demonstrated to be"foreign-source income" within the meaning of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement .  Rather, this
income remains domestic-source.
178. Second, the measure treats domestic-source income as exempt foreign-source income in
connection with the performance of services "related and subsidiary" to the sale or lease of qualifyingproperty under Section 942(a)(1)(C) IRC.  Under this provision, the performance of certain services inconnection with qualifying property, for example repair or maintenance services, can generate foreign
trading gross receipts and, hence, exempt QFTI.
179. The IRC does not state expressly that these subsidiary and related service activities need to be
performed outside the United States.  We note that the rules contained in the Code of FederalRegulations, which applied to the FSC legislation, continue to apply to the provisions of the measureregarding foreign trading gross receipts.
154  According to these regulations, subsidiary and related
services "may be performed  within  or without the United States." 155   (emphasis added)
180. The measure, in conjunction with these regulations, therefore, exempts QFTI derived by a
United States citizen or resident from the performance of services  within  the United States.  The
activities which generate the services income may occur entirely in the United States.  In our view,
such income has no link with any "foreign" State wh ich could lead to that State taxing the income and
therefore, is not "foreign-source income" w ithin the meaning of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement.
Rather it is domestic-source income.
181. There is one final aspect of the measure to be highlighted.  The measure provides rules that
exempt a portion of income as QFTI so as to avoid, the United States argues, the double taxation offoreign-source income.  The measure does not, however, displace the rules the United Statesotherwise applies to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income.  These other rules involve
the grant of tax credits with respect to foreign-source income on which the taxpayer has paid tax in a
                                                     
154Senate Report, p. 19;  House Report, p. 33.
15526 CFR 1.924(a)–1T–(d).WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 58
"foreign" State.156  Both the ETI measure and these rules continue to be available, and taxpayers with
foreign trading gross receipts under the ETI measure have a  choice ,  on a transaction-by-transaction
basis, to opt either for an exemption of a portion of their income as QFTI or to have the income taxedunder the other rules with tax credits granted to offset the taxes due in the United States.
157  Moreover,
if a taxpayer elects to have income from a transaction taxed under the ETI measure, the taxpayer also
has a choice as to the formula to be used to calculate the amount of QFTI.
182. As we said earlier, taxpayers will obviously opt to use the rules which result in the most
favourable tax treatment for them.  In making its choices, the taxpayer will naturally decide whetherthe tax which is due on exempt QFTI is greater than the tax credits which it could claim if it did notelect to take a tax exemption under the ETI measure.
158
183. Under the ETI measure, the taxpayer can obta in a tax exemption even for income that is
domestic-source income.  The taxpayer will not have fo reign tax credits with respect to this domestic-
source income.  In these circumstances, with no tax credits to surrender, the taxpayer would very
likely opt for an exemption under the ETI measure of income that includes domestic-source income.
The measure operates, in these circumstances, as a means to provide export subsidies for incomeearned from domestic activities.  Correspondingly, the greater the amount of genuine "foreign-sourceincome" included in QFTI, the more likely it is that the taxpayer will have tax credits to give up, andthe less likely it becomes that the ETI measure will be used by the taxpayer.
184. In conclusion, our examination discloses that the measure at issue is an extremely complex
instrument.  We set out to review whether the measure was "tak[en] … to avoid the double taxation offoreign-source income" within the meaning of footnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement .  The ETI measure,
viewed as a whole, does not permit us to conclude that this measure exempts  only  "foreign-source
income".  Rather, in some situations, the ETI measure exempts QFTI which is foreign-sourceincome
 159;  in other situations, the ETI measure exempts QFTI which is not foreign-source 160;  and, in
                                                     
156See  supra ,  para. 100.
157We recall that, under Section 114(d) IRC, a taxpayer gives up tax credits attributable to income
excluded from taxation under the ETI measure.
158See  supra ,  para. 104 and footnote 80 thereto.
159See  supra ,  para. 170, examining the rule that, where QFTI is calculated as 30 percent of FSLI,
FSLI is the income "properly allocable" to certain foreign activities, other than in the case of "lease or rental"income.
160See  supra ,  paras. 175-177, examining the exemption granted to certain taxpayers without
satisfaction of the foreign economic process requirement and, paras. 178-180, examining the exemption grantedfor service-related income where the services are performed in the United States.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 59
yet other situations, the measure exempts QFTI which is a combination of both domestic- and foreign-
source income.161
185. Certainly, if the ETI measure were confined to those aspects which grant a tax exemption for
"foreign-source income", it would fall within footnote 59.  However, the ETI measure is not so
confined.  Rather, in several important respects, two of the three basic allocation rules of the ETI
measure, the (1.2 and 15 percent rules) provide an exemption for domestic-source income.162  We
have said that avoiding double taxation is not an exact science and we recognize that Members musthave a degree of flexibility in tackling double taxation.  However, in our view, the flexibility underfootnote 59 to the  SCM Agreement   does not properly extend to allowing Members to adopt
allocation rules that systematically result in a ta x exemption for income that has no link with a
"foreign" State and that would not be regarded as foreign-source under any of the widely acceptedprinciples of taxation we have reviewed.
186. For these reasons, even though parts of the ETI measure may be regarded as granting a tax
exemption for foreign-source income, we find that the United States has not met its burden of proving
that the ETI measure, viewed as a whole, falls within the justification available under the fifthsentence of footnote 59 of the  SCM Agreement .  Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding in
paragraphs 8.107 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report.
                                                     
161See  supra ,  paras. 156-168, examining the rules whereby QFTI may be calculated either as 1.2
percent of total foreign trading gross receipts or  as 15 percent of total foreign trading income.
162In addition, under the third formula for FSLI, there are circumstances where the ETI measure could
grant a tax exemption for lease or rental income which includes domestic-source income.  See  supra ,  para. 173.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 60
VIII.  Article 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture :  Export Subsidies
187. The United States appeals the Panel's finding that:
… the United States has acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture  by applying the export
subsidies, with respect to both scheduled and unscheduled agricultural
products, in a manner that, at the very least, threatens to circumvent its
export subsidy commitments under Article 3.3 of the  Agreement on
Agriculture .163
188. The Panel reached this conclusion because it considered that its reasoning under the
SCM Agreement   was "also applicable as regards whether the Act gives rise to subsidies contingent
upon export performance within the meaning of Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture  for the
purposes of Article 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture ." 164
189. The United States argues that the ETI measure does not involve export subsidies under
Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture   because the measure is not a prohibited export subsidy
under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .165  For this reason alone, the United States contends that
the Panel erred in finding that the United States had acted inconsistently with its obligations underArticles 10.1 and 8 of the  Agreement on Agriculture .
190. Before addressing the ETI measure we consider it useful to recall our findings regarding the
FSC measure in our Report in  US – FSC .  In that Report, we held that, under the  Agreement
on Agriculture ,  just as in cases under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement ,  a subsidy may
arise where a government foregoes revenues that are otherwise due.
166  In that Report, the reasons
which led us to hold, under the  SCM Agreement ,  that the FSC measure involved the foregoing of
revenue otherwise due, also led us to the same conclusion under the  Agreement on Agriculture .167
191. In its appeal in the original proceedings, the United States did not contest that, if the FSC
measure involved a "benefit" under Article 1.1(b) of the  SCM Agreement ,  it also involved a benefit
under the  Agreement on Agriculture .  We reached the conclusion that the FSC measure "confer[red]
                                                     
163Panel Report, para. 8.122.
164Panel Report, para. 8.116.
165United States' appellant's submission, paras. 247-248.
166Appellate Body Report, US – FSC , supra , footnote 3, para. 138.
167Ibid., para. 139.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 61
upon the recipient the obvious benefit of reduced tax liability and, therefore, reduced tax payments".
Accordingly, we found that the measure involved a subsidy under the  Agreement on Agriculture .168
192. We held, in  US – FSC ,  that there was no reason to read the requirement of "contingent upon
export performance" differently in the  SCM Agreement   and in the  Agreement on Agriculture .
Therefore, for the reasons that led us to conclude, under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  that
this subsidy was contingent upon export performance, we reached the same conclusion under theAgreement on Agriculture .
169
193. In consequence, we held that the FSC measure involved "subsidies contingent upon export
performance" under Article 1(e) of the   Agreement on Agriculture .  As these subsidies had not been
found to be listed in Article 9.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture ,  we examined whether they were
inconsistent with Article 10.1 of that Agreemen t, as the European Communities claimed.  We held
that the subsidies were inconsistent with this provision.
194. In this appeal, the United States contends that the measure is not an export subsidy under
Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture   because, it argues, the measure is not an export subsidy
under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .  We have rejected the United States' appeal regarding the
proper characterization of the measure under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement .  The Panel held,
and we have upheld, that the measure involves the foregoing of revenues that are otherwise due underArticle 1.1(a)(ii) of the  SCM Agreement .  As we indicated in  US – FSC ,  where a government
foregoes revenues that are otherwise due in relation to agricultural products, a subsidy may ariseunder the  Agreement on Agriculture .  The fiscal treatment of agricultural products, under the
measure, is not materially different from the fiscal treatment of products falling within the scope of
the  SCM Agreement .  Accordingly, we see no reason to reach any conclusion under the  Agreement
on Agriculture   that differs from our conclusion under the  SCM Agreement .  The ETI measure also
reduces the liability of United States citizens and residents to pay tax on income earned fromqualifying transactions involving agricultural products.
195. In addition, for the reasons we have given in Part VI of this Report with respect to
Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  the measure makes the grant of subsidies "contingent … upon
export performance" where qualifying property is produced within the United States.  We can see noreason to conclude otherwise under Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture ,  and none has been
suggested to us.  We, therefore, find that the measure also involves subsidies contingent upon export
performance under Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture .
                                                     
168Appellate Body Report, US – FSC , supra , footnote 3, para. 140.
169Ibid., paras. 141-142.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 62
196. For these reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding that the measure involves export subsidies
under Article 1(e) of the  Agreement on Agriculture  with respect to qualifying property produced
within the United States.  We also uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.122 and 9.1(c), that theUnited States acted inconsistently with Articles 10.1 and 8 of the  Agreement on Agriculture .
170
IX. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
197. Before the Panel, the European Communities cha llenged the consistency with Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994 of Section 943(a)(1)(C) IRC, which esta blishes, as one of the conditions of eligibility
for the tax benefits under the ETI measure, that not more than 50 percent of the fair market value ofqualifying property be attributable to articles produced or direct labour performed  outside  the
United States (the "foreign articles/labour limitation" or "fair market value rule").
171
198. The Panel found that:
… by reason of the foreign articles/labour limitation, the Act accords
less favourable treatment within the meaning of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994  to imported products than to like products of US origin
… 172
199. This finding was based on the following three findings by the Panel:  (i) that the imported and
domestic products at issue are "like products" 173;  (ii) that the  measure is a "law, regulation, or
requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or
use" 174;  and (iii) that, by conferring an advantage upon the use of domestic products but not upon the
use of imported products, the measure accords less favourable treatment to imported products inrelation to like   products of United States origin.
175
                                                     
170We note that the United States has not appealed any other aspect of the Panel's finding under
Article 10.1 of the  Agreement on  Agriculture .   In particular, the United States has not appealed the Panel's
finding that it was appropriate to examine the European Communities' primary claim under Article 10.1 of theAgreement on Agriculture ,  without first examining its alternative claim under Article 9.1 of that Agreement.
(Panel Report, para. 8.112 and footnote 219 thereto)  Nor has the United States appealed the Panel's finding thatthe measure is "applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export
subsidy commitments" within the meaning of Article 10.1. (Panel Report, paras. 8.117-8.120)  We note that the
United States did not contest either of these issues before the Panel. (Panel Report, para. 8.112 and footnote 219thereto;  Panel Report, para. 8.121;  and United States ' first submission to the Panel, paras. 220-221;  Panel
Report, p. A-100)
171See  supra , para. 21.  See also  infra , para. 201, for the text of Section 943(a)(1)(C) IRC of the fair
market value rule.
172Panel Report, para. 8.158.
173Ibid., para. 8.135.
174Ibid. , para. 8.149.
175Ibid. , para. 8.158.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 63
200. In its appeal under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the United States does not challenge the
Panel's finding on "like products".  Rather, the United States confines its appeal to the Panel'sfindings:  that the measure  is a "law, regulation, or requirement  affecting  their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use";  and that the measure provides "less favourable
treatment" to imported products as compared with like   products of United States origin.  (emphasis
added)
201. We note that the issues arising under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 relate to the definition of
"QFTP" in the measure, in particular the following requirement, which is contained inSection 943(a)(1)(C) IRC:
(C) not more than 50 per cent of the fair market value of
[Qualifying Foreign Trade Property may be] attributable to -
(i) articles manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
outside the United States, and
(ii) direct costs for labour … performed outside the
United States.
176
202. The European Communities' claim under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, and the Panel's
examination of the ETI Act, concern Section 943(a)(1)(C) solely as it relates to the production ofqualifying property  within  the United States.  We recall that, in examining export contingency under
Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  we considered the ETI measure solely in relation to the
conditions governing the grant of the subsidy for qualifying property produced  within  the
United States.  We do not, therefore, see that th e Panel committed any error of law in adopting the
same approach in its examination of the claim under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
203. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 reads:
The products of the territory of any Member imported into the
territory of any other Member shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting theirinternal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use.
204. Article III:4 is one of a series of provisions in Article III which set forth obligations regarding
"National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation ".  In previous appeals, we have stated that:
                                                     
176We refer to this provision as the "fair market value rule"; the Panel termed it the "foreign
articles/labour limitation".WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 64
The broad and fundamental purpos e of Article III is to avoid
protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures.
More specifically, the purpose of Article III "is to ensure that internal
measures 'not be applied to imported and domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production'".  Toward this end, Article IIIobliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive
conditions for imported products in relation to domestic products. …
Article III protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but
rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and
domestic products.
177  (footnotes omitted)
205. We have also stated that, although this "general principle" is not explicitly invoked in
Article III:4, nevertheless, it "informs" that provision.178  In interpreting Article III:4 we are, therefore,
guided by this principle.
206. With these general considerations in mind, we  turn to the two issues raised by the
United States in its appeal under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
A. Law, Regulation or Requirement Affecting the Internal Use of Imported and Like
Domestic Products
207. The United States contests the Panel's finding that the measure "affects" the internal use of
like imported products, and argues that there is no "necessary relationship" between the fair marketvalue rule and the internal use of imported products.  The United States emphasizes that the fairmarket value rule is a "measure of general application that is not directed against imports".
179  In such
a situation, the United States argues, the word "affecting" in Article III:4 must be given a narrowscope.  However, the United States does not contest the Panel's finding that the fair market value ruleis a "law, regulation or requirement" within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.
                                                     
177Appellate Body Report,  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , supra , footnote 116, at 109-110, quoting
from Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 , adopted 7 November 1989, BISD
36S/345, para. 5.10.  We cited this statement in Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products ("EC – Asbestos "), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted
5 April 2001, para. 97, a dispute that also involved Article III:4 of the GATT 1 994.
178Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos , supra , footnote 177, para. 98.
179United States' appellant's submission, paras. 254-256.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 65
208. We observe that the clause in which the word "affecting" appears – "in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements  affecting  their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use" – serves to define the scope of application of Article III:4.  (emphasis added)
Within this phrase, the word "affecting" operates  as a link between identified types of government
action ("laws, regulations and requirements") and specific transactions, activities and uses relating to
products in the marketplace ("internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution oruse").  It is, therefore, not  any  "laws, regulations and requirements" which are covered by
Article III:4, but only those which " affect " the specific transactions, activities and uses mentioned in
that provision.  Thus, the word "affecting" assists in defining the types of measure that must conformto the obligation not to accord "less favourable treatment" to like imported products, which is set outin Article III:4.
209. The word "affecting" serves a similar function in Article I:1 of the  General Agreement on
Trade in Services  (the "GATS"), where it also defines the types of measure that are subject to the
disciplines set forth elsewhere in the GATS but does not, in itself, impose any obligation.
180  In
EC – Bananas III ,  we considered the meaning of the word "affecting" in that provision of GATS.  We
stated:
[t]he ordinary meaning of the word "affecting" implies a measure that
has "an effect on", which indicates a  broad scope of application .  This
interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous panelsthat the term "affecting" in the context of Article III of the GATT is
wider in scope than such terms as "regulating" or "governing".
181
(emphasis added, footnote omitted)
210. In view of the similar function of the identical word, "affecting", in Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, we also interpret this word, in this provision, as having a "broad scope of application".
211. Turning to the fair market value rule, we recall that, under the ETI measure, a taxpayer
producing property in the United States will be eligible to obtain a tax exemption in respect of incomederived from an export-sale of such property on the condition that, inter alia ,  not more than
50 percent of the fair market value of the product is attributable to articles produced outside theUnited States or to direct costs for labour performed outside the United States.  The United Statesregards the fair market value of property as the sales price of the property in the marketplace.  Fairmarket value is attributable to three different elements:  (i) inputs used to produce the property;
                                                     
180Article I:1 of the GATS provides that "[t]his Agreement applies to measures by Members  affecting 
trade in services."  (emphasis added)
181Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 47, para. 220.  We made the same statement regarding the
word "affecting" in Article I:1 of the GATS in our Report in  Canada – Autos,  supra , footnote 56, para. 150.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 66
(ii) direct labour used to produce the property, and (iii) "non-tangible elements, including intellectual
property rights, goodwill, capital, marketing, distribution, and other services".182
212. Any taxpayer that seeks to obtain a tax exemption under the ETI measure must ensure that, in
the manufacture of qualifying property, it does not "use" imported input products, whose value
comprises more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the end-product.  The fair market value
rule, thus, places an express maximum limit on the extent to which the value of qualifying propertycan be attributable to imported input products.  A manufacturer's use of imported input productsalways counts against the 50 percent ceiling in the fair market value rule, while in contrast, the samemanufacturer's use of like domestic input products has no such negative implication.  Manufacturerswishing to obtain the ETI tax exemption are not restricted, in any way, on the use they make ofdomestic inputs.  The fair market value rule, therefore, influences the manufacturer's choice betweenlike imported and domestic input products if it wishes to obtain the tax exemption under theETI measure.
213. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.149 of its Report, that the fair
market value rule "affects" the "internal … use" of imported products, within the meaning ofArticle III:4 of the GATT 1994, as compared with like domestic pr oducts.
B. "Less Favourable Treatment"
214. We now come to the second part of the United States' appeal of this issue, namely, its
argument that the Panel erred in finding that the fair market value rule accords less favourable
treatment to like imported products.  The United States asserts that it is possible for a manufacturer to
satisfy the fair market value rule without using as inputs  any  goods produced in the United States,
and that the Panel could not, therefore, have found that the fair market value rule involves  de jure
discrimination against imports.
215. The examination of whether a measure involves "less favourable treatment" of imported
products within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 must be grounded in close scrutiny ofthe "fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself".
183  This examination cannot rest on simple
assertion, but must be founded on a careful analysis of the contested measure and of its implications
                                                     
182See United States' first submission to the Panel, para. 201;  Panel Report, pp. A-95 – A-96.  The
United States confirmed our understanding of the fair market value rule in its response to questioning at the oral
hearing.
183Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , supra , footnote 44, para. 142.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 67
in the marketplace.  At the same time, however, the examination need not be based on the  actual
effects  of the contested measure in the marketplace.184
216. If a United States citizen or resident fulfills the prescribed conditions of grant, it obtains a
clearly significant financial benefit in the form of a tax exemption.185  The availability of such a tax
exemption depends upon the taxpayer organizing its business affairs in such a way as to comply with
the prescribed conditions of grant.
217. One of these conditions is the fair market value rule which places, as we have said, an express
maximum limit on the extent to which the value of qualifying property can be attributable to importedinput products.  No such limit exists for like domestic input products.  The fair market value rule,therefore, draws a formal distinction, on its face, between the treatment of like domestic and imported
input products.
186  This formal difference also has substantive importance because, on its face, the fair
market value rule constrains the use of like imported input products.
218. In situations where the use of imported input products in the manufacture of qualifying
property may breach the 50 percent limit and thereby render a manufacturer ineligible to obtain a tax
exemption, the manufacturer will avoid the use of like imported input products if it wishes to obtain atax exemption.  As the 50 percent limit is approached, the manufacturer  will be increasingly sensitiveto the value of the imported input products it can use and to the contribution these products will maketo the fair market value of the property being manufactured.  Before making purchasing decisions, themanufacturer will weigh the choice between domestic and imported input product, in the light of theanticipated value of the end-product, to ensure that the purchases of imported products do notadversely affect the availability of the tax exemption.  These same considerations will never apply if
the manufacturer opts to purchase domestic input products.  Thus, for purposes of satisfying the fair
market value rule and ensuring the availability of the tax benefit, a real and substantive advantageattaches to the use of domestic input products, and a corresponding disadvantage to the use of likeimported products.
219. The difference in resulting treatment between like domestic and imported products becomes
very clear where the manufacturing process is product input-intensive and the value of input products
                                                     
184Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , supra , footnote 116, at 110.
185We recall that the tax exemption may be:  1.2 percen t of foreign trading gross receipts;  15 percent of
foreign trade income;  or 30 percent of foreign sales and leasing income.  See  supra , para. 25.
186See  s upra ,  para. 201, for the text of the fair market value rule.  See also Panel Report, para. 8.133.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 68
typically constitutes more than 50 percent of the fair market value of the qualifying property.187  In
these situations, the measure in effect precludes United States manufacturers who desire the taxbenefit, from making a free choice between like domestic and imported input-products on the basis ofpurely commercial considerations.
220. In sum, if the manufacturer wishes to obtain the beneficial tax exemption under the
ETI measure, the fair market value rule provides a considerable impetus, and, in some circumstances,
in effect, a requirement, for manufacturers to use domestic input products, rather than like importedones.  As such, the fair market value rule treats imported products less favourably than like domesticproducts.
221. In our view, the above conclusion is not nullified by the fact that the fair market value rule
will not give rise to less favourable treatment for like imported products in each and every case.There may well be, as the United States maintains, property which does not require extensive materialand labour inputs such that the fair market value ru le would not, in those cases, bear upon the input
choices manufacturers make.  Even so, the fact remains that in an indefinite number of other cases,
the fair market value rule operates, by its terms, as a significant constraint upon the use of importedinput products.  We are not entitled to disregard that fact.
222. For the above reasons, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.154 and 9.1(d) of its
Report that, by virtue of the fair market value rule, the measure accords less favourable treatmentwithin the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to imported products than to like products of
United States origin.
X. Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement :  Withdrawal of FSC Subsidies
223. The United States appeals the Panel's finding that:
… the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found
to be prohibited export subsidies inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement  and has therefore failed to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7
SCM Agreement .
188
224. The United States notes that the ETI Act repeals the FSC provisions and provides that no
corporation can elect to be treated as an FSC after 30 September 2000.  The ETI Act also contains
                                                     
187We note that the European Communities provided the Panel with a list of circumstances, for
illustrative purposes, where such a requirement to use li ke domestic products may arise. (Annex to the European
Communities' second submission to the Panel;  Panel Report, pp. C-46 – C-52)
188Panel Report, para. 8.170.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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certain transitional rules that, in the view of the United States, ensure taxpayers a degree of certainty
in their tax planning and that are essential to the orderly passage from one set of tax rules to another.The United States submits that, in requiring a Me mber to change its tax rules, WTO rules cannot be
intended to require such a Member to deny its taxpayers the right to an orderly transition.  Thus, the
United States reasons, the Panel's finding that the United States has acted inconsistently with
Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement   should be reversed.
225. We recall that, in our Report in  US – FSC ,  we upheld the panel's finding "that the FSC
measure constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ".
189  In its
report, the panel recommended, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement ,  that the United States
withdraw the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of theSCM Agreement   by 1 October 2000".
190  On 12 October 2000, the DSB acceded to the United States'
request "that the DSB modify the time-period in th is dispute so as to expire on 1 November 2000".191
226. Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement  reads:
If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the
panel  shall recommend  that the subsidizing Member withdraw the
subsidy  without delay .   In this regard, the panel shall specify in its
recommendation the time-period within which the measure  must be
withdrawn .  (emphasis added)
227. In examining this provision in  Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) , we said:
Turning to the ordinary meaning of "withdraw", we observe first that
this word has been defined as "remove" or "take away" , and as "to
take away what has been enjoyed; to take from."  This definition
suggests that "withdrawal" of a subsidy, under Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement ,  refers to the "removal" or "taking away" of that
subsidy.192 (footnotes omitted)
228. Under the ETI Act, no corporation may elect to be treated as an FSC after
30 September 2000.193  However, for FSCs in existence as of that date, the repeal of the original FSC
measure "shall not apply" to any transaction which occurs before 1 January 2002.194  Moreover, even
after that date, existing FSCs can continue to use the original FSC measure for transactions pursuant
                                                     
189Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 3, para. 177(a).
190Original Panel Report, supra , footnote 4, para. 8.8.
191WT/DS108/11, 2 October 2000.  See also WT/DSB/M/90, paras. 6-7.
192Appellate Body Report, supra , footnote 86, para. 45.
193Section 5(b)(1) of the ETI Act.
194Section 5(c)(1)(A) of the ETI Act.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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to a binding contract between the FSC and any unrelated person that was in effect on and after
30 September 2000.195  Thus, by the United States' own acknowledgement, the original FSC measure
continues to apply, unmodified, to existing FSCs in respect of a defined set of transactions.196  The
success of the United States' appeal depends on the success of its argument that prohibited FSC
subsidies can continue to be granted to protect the contractual interests of private parties and to ensure
an orderly transition to the regime of the new measure.  In short, on the basis of these arguments, theUnited States seeks to have the time-period for the full withdrawal of the prohibited FSC subsidiesextended, in some circumstances, indefinitely.
229. Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement   requires prohibited subsidies to be withdrawn "without
delay", and provides that a time-period for such withdrawal shall be specified by the panel.  We cansee no basis in Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement   for extending the time-period prescribed for
withdrawal of prohibited subsidies for the reasons cited by the United States.  In that respect, werecall that, in  Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) , Brazil made a similar argument to the one
made by the United States in these proceedings.  Brazil argued that, after the expiration of the time-
period for withdrawal of the prohibited export subsid ies, it should be permitted to continue to grant
certain of these subsidies because it had assumed contractual obligations, under municipal law, to doso.
197  We rejected this argument, and observed that:
… to continue to make payments under an export subsidy measure
found to be prohibited is not consistent with the obligation to
"withdraw" prohibited export subsidies, in the sense of "removing" or
"taking away".198
230. Thus, as we indicated in that appeal, a Member's obligation under Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement  to withdraw prohibited subsidies "without delay" is unaffected by contractual
obligations that the Member itself may have assumed under municipal law.  Likewise, a Member'sobligation to withdraw prohibited export subsidies, under Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement ,  cannot
be affected by contractual obligations which private parties may have assumed  inter se  in reliance on
laws conferring prohibited export subsidies.  Accordingly, we see no legal basis for extending thetime-period for the United States to withdraw fully the prohibited FSC subsidies.
                                                     
195See Section 5(c)(1)(B)(ii) of the ETI Act.
196Panel Report, para. 8.169.
197Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) , supra , footnote 86, para. 46.
198Ibid., para. 45.WT/DS108/AB/RW
Page 71
231. Accordingly, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.170 and 9.1(e) of its Report, that
the United States has not fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export subsidiesunder Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement  and has therefore failed to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7 of the  SCM Agreement .
XI. Article 10.3 of the DSU
232. In its first written submission to the Panel, the European Communities requested:
… the Panel to make a preliminary ruling to the effect that third
parties are entitled to receive all written submissions of the parties
submitted prior to the meeting of the Panel and to make this
preliminary ruling and communicate it to the parties and the third
parties as soon as possible after receipt of the US first writtensubmission and before the date for the presentation of the second
written submissions.
199  (footnote omitted)
233. The United States requested the Panel to reject the European Communities' request and to
find, on the basis of reasoning employed by prev ious panels proceeding under Article 21.5 of the
DSU, "that the third parties in this proceeding do not have a right to the parties' rebuttalsubmissions."
200
234. On 21 February 2001, the Panel issued a decision to the parties refusing the request of the
European Communities and stating that:
… we do not consider that Article 10.3  DSU  requires that third
parties receive all pre-meeting submissions of the parties (including
rebuttal submissions) in the context of an accelerated proceeding
under Article 21.5  DSU  that involves only one meeting of the parties
and third parties with the panel.201
                                                     
199Panel Report, para. 6.1;  European Communities' first submission to the Panel, paras. 247-258
and 260;  Panel Report, pp. A-44 – A-45.
200Panel Report, para. 6.2. (footnote omitted)
201Ibid., para. 6.3, subpara. 2.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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235. The European Communities appeals this interpretiv e preliminary ruling by the Panel.  In the
view of the European Communities, Rule 9 of the working procedures adopted by the Panel in thiscase (the "Working Procedures") conflicts with Article 10.3 of the DSU and does not respect therights afforded to third parties under the DSU.  According to the European Communities, although
panels have a certain discretion to establish th eir own working procedures, they may not derogate
from binding provisions of the DSU, including the requirement in Article 10.3 of the DSU that"[t]hird parties  shall receive  the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the  first meeting of the
panel ." (emphasis added)  In the view of the European Communities, this requirement means that
third parties are entitled to receive  all  written submissions made  prior to  the  first  meeting of the
panel – even if, as in many proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, there is only one meeting withthe panel.
236. We review briefly the factual background against which this appeal is made.  The Working
Procedures provide for two written submissions by each party to be made to the Panel, followed by a
single meeting of the Panel.  The Panel communicated its proposed Working Procedures to the parties
on 20 December 2000, and requested that the parties comment on them at the organizational meetingof the Panel to be held the following day.  The proposed Rule 9 provided, in relevant part, that:
Third parties shall receive  copies of the parties' first written
submissions .  Any party may decide to provide the third parties with a
copy of its rebuttal or other submissions.  (emphasis added)
237. Neither of the parties commented on the proposed Rule 9 at the organizational meeting.
202
The Working Procedures adopted by the Panel – including the above-quoted portion of Rule 9 – were
communicated to the parties on 22 December 2000, and to the third parties on 4 January 2001.
238. In its first written submission to the Panel, submitted on 17 January 2001, the European
Communities requested the Panel to amend Rule 9 of the Working Procedures to provide that thirdparties shall receive copies of  all  the submissions filed by the parties prior to the single meeting of
                                                     
202Panel Report, para. 6.3, subpara. 11.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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the Panel.203  The United States opposed the request in its first written submission, submitted to the
Panel on 7 February 2001.  On 21 February 2001, the Panel issued its decision denying the request ofthe European Communities.
239. We also note that in proceedings under Article 21.5, which are subject to considerably shorter
time-frames than apply under Article 12.8 of the DSU
 204, panels have adopted the practice of holding a
single meeting with the parties,  rather than two meetings.  At the same time, Article 21.5 panels
uniformly have maintained the practice of requiring parties to file two written submissions.
240. We begin our examination of the European Communities' appeal with Article 12.1 of the
DSU, which states that panels "shall" follow the working procedure set out in Appendix 3 to the DSU
"unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute".  We observe, first, thatthe DSU and, in particular, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of Appendix 3 to the DSU, "contemplate twodistinguishable stages in a proceeding before a panel."
205  The "first stage" comprises the first written
submissions by the parties and the first meeting of the panel, while the "second stage" consists of the
second written submissions – or "rebuttal" subm issions – and the second meeting with the panel.206
However, no provision of the DSU explicitly requires panels to hold two meetings with the parties, or to
oblige the parties to submit two written submissions.
                                                     
203By way of background, we note that the European Communities has, as a third party in four
unrelated proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, requested an Article 21.5 panel to amend a rule in itsworking procedures similar to the contested portion of Rule 9 of the Working Procedures.  Two of those panelsdenied the request by the European Communities.  (Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW, adopted 20 March 2000,  paras. 7.5 –
7.6;  and Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States , WT/DS126/RW and Corr.1, adopted 11 February 2000,
paras. 3.9-3.10)  According to the United States, a similar decision refusing the request of the EuropeanCommunities was taken by the panel in a third case, although such decision was not published as the parties
ultimately reached a mutually acceptable solution.  (Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea – Recourse toArticle 21.5 of the DSU by Korea , WT/DS99/RW, 7 November 2000;  Decision of the panel concerning the EC
request for access to the parties' rebuttal submissions, 27 June 2000, reproduced in part in the United States' firstsubmission to the Panel, para. 236;  Panel Report, p. A-103)  One panel agreed to modify its working proceduresto provide that the third parties in those proceedings were entitled to receive all written submissions submitted
by the parties prior to the single substantive meeting of the panel. (Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting
the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to  Article 21.5 of the DSU by NewZealand and the United States ("Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US)
 "), WT/DS103/RW,
WT/DS113/RW, adopted 18 December 2001, as reversed by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS103/AB/RW,WT/DS113/AB/RW, paras. 2.32-2.35)  This is the first o ccasion on which this issue has been raised on appeal.
204Article 21.5 of the DSU contemplates that panels will complete their work within 90 days, whereas
Articles 12.6 and 12.8 of the DSU contemplate that panels will circulate their reports within six months.
205Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and
Other Items , WT/DS56/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, 1003, para. 79.
206Ibid.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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241. We have already observed that:
[a]lthough panels enjoy some discretion in establishing their own
working procedures, this discretion does not extend to modifying thesubstantive provisions of the DSU.  … Nothing in the DSU gives a
panel the authority either to disregard or to modify other explicit
provisions of the DSU.
207
242. In this appeal, we must determine whether, in refusing to require that the third parties be
given access to the second, "rebuttal", submissions filed prior to the sole substantive meeting with the
Panel, the Panel acted inconsistently with any provision of the DSU.
243. In respect of the provisions of the DSU governing third party rights, we have already
observed that, as the DSU currently stands, the rights of third parties in panel proceedings are limitedto the rights granted under Article 10 and Appendix 3 to the DSU.
208  Beyond those minimum
guarantees, panels enjoy a discretion to grant additional participatory rights to third parties inparticular cases, as long as such "enhanced" rights are consistent with the provisions of the DSU andthe principles of due process.
209  However, panels have no discretion to circumscribe the rights
guaranteed to third parties by the provisions of the DSU.
244. In this appeal, the European Communities alleges that the Working Procedures adopted by the
Panel are inconsistent with the rights afforded to third parties pursuant to Article 10.3 of the DSU,
which provides:
Third parties  shall receive  the submissions of the parties to the dispute
to the  first meeting  of the panel.  (emphasis added)
                                                     
207Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products , WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998, DSR 1998:I, 9, para. 92.
208Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 ("US – 1916 Act "),
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, para. 145.
209Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act , supra , footnote 208, para. 150.  See also Appellate Body
Report, EC-Hormones, supra , footnote 40,  para. 154.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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245. Article 10.3 of the DSU is couched in mandatory language.  By its terms, third parties "shall"
receive "the submissions of the parties to the  first  meeting of the panels". (emphasis added)
Article 10.3 does  not  say that third parties shall receive "the  first  submissions" of the parties, but
rather that they shall receive " the  submissions" of the parties.  (emphasis added)  The number of
submissions that third parties are entitled to receive is  not  stated.  Rather, Article 10.3 defines the
submissions that third parties are entitled to receive by reference to a specific step in the proceedings –
the first meeting of the panel.210  It follows, in our view, that, under this provision, third parties must be
given all of the submissions that have been made by th e parties to the panel up to the first meeting of the
panel, irrespective of the number of such subm issions which are made, including any rebuttal
submissions filed in advance of the first meeting.211
246. The Panel, however, reasoned that the use of the word "first" in Article 10.3 "presupposes a
context where there is more than one meeting of a Panel."212  The Panel concluded, from this
"presupposition", that in proceedings involving a  single  panel meeting, Article 10.3 "must be
understood as limiting third party rights in these proceedings to access to the  first  written
submissions  only,  and as not including access to the written rebuttals." 213
247. In our view, the interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU must start from the express wording
of the provision.  We have noted that the text of Article 10.3 does not limit the number of submissionswhich third parties may receive prior to the "first meeting".  We do not see any reason to"presuppose" that such a limitation applies in cases where the "first meeting" with the Panel proves tobe the only meeting.  The DSU allows panels the flexibility, in determining their procedures, to
request more than one submission in advance of the first meeting, and the DSU also allows for the
possibility that panels may, ultimately, hold only one meeting.  The text of Article 10.3 applies the
same rule in each case – third parties are entitled to receive the submissions to the first meeting.
248. We read the reference to the "first meeting" as reflecting the flexibility that exists in panel
proceedings under the DSU.  Thus, in any proceedings, even if only one meeting with the  parties isinitially scheduled, it cannot be excluded that a second will not be held later.  Panels have thediscretion to request such an additional meeting with the parties, and the parties can also request such
                                                     
210We note, in this regard, that paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU also links the participatory rights
of third parties to this step in the pro ceeding.  It states that third parties " shall be invited in writing to present
their views during a session of the first substantive meeting of the panel ".  (emphasis added)
211We note, in that respect, that the DSU does not place any limits on the number of submissions which
panels can request of the parties in advance of the first meeting.
212Panel Report, para. 6.3, subpara. 5.
213Ibid., para. 6.3, subpara. 9. (emphasis added)WT/DS108/AB/RW
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a meeting with the panel at the stage of interim review.214  The wording of Article 10.3 provides for
this flexibility by referring generically to the "first meeting", which may be one of a series of meetingsor may be the only meeting.
249. Our interpretation of Article 10.3 is also cons istent with the context of that provision.
Article  10.1 directs panels "fully" to take into account  the interests of Members other than the parties to
the dispute, and Article 10.2 requires panels to grant to third parties "an opportunity to be heard".Article 10.3 ensures that, up to a defined stage in the panel proceedings, third parties can participatefully in the proceedings, on the basis of the same written submissions as the parties themselves.Article 10.3 thereby seeks to guarantee that the thir d parties can participate at a session of the first
meeting with the panel in a full and meaningful fash ion that would not be possible if the third parties
were denied written submissions made to the panel before that meeting.  Moreover, panels themselveswill thereby benefit more from the contributions made by third parties and will, therefore, be better able
"fully" to take into account the interests of Me mbers, as directed by Article 10.1 of the DSU.
250. In this regard, we observe that we agree with the panel in  Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New
Zealand and US) , which reasoned that:
Third parties can only [participate in an informed and, hence,
meaningful, manner] if they have received all the information
exchanged between the parties before that session.  Otherwise, third
parties might find themselves in a situation where their oral statements
at the meeting become partially or totally irrelevant or moot in the
light of second submissions by the parties to which third parties did
not have access.  Without access to all the submissions by the parties
to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel, uninformed third partysubmissions could unduly delay panel proceedings and … prevent the
Panel from receiving "the benefit of a useful contribution by third
parties which could help the Panel to make the objective assessment
that it is required to make under Article 11 of the DSU.
215 (footnote
omitted)
251. For these reasons, we believe that Article 10.3 requi res that third parties be provided with all of
the submissions made by the parties up to the time of  the first panel meeting in which the third parties
participate – whether that meeting is the first of tw o panel meetings, or the first and only panel meeting.
Read in this way, Article 10.3 has the same meaning,  and can be applied in the same way, regardless of
the number of panel meetings that are held in a particular case.
                                                     
214Paragraph 12 of Appendix 3 to the DSU recognizes that the standard timetable for panels may be
adjusted to allow for "additional meetings with the parties", including a possible meeting at the stage of interim
review.
215Panel Report, supra , footnote 203, para. 2.34.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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252. We, therefore, find that, in its decision refusi ng the European Communities' request to modify
Rule 9 of the Panel's Working Procedures, the Pane l erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the
DSU.
XII. Conditional Appeals
253. The European Communities makes four conditiona l appeals requesting us to consider claims
in respect of which the Panel exercised judicial economy.216  It declares that these appeals are made
only "in case [the Appellate Body] should reverse those of the Panel’s findings that led the Panel toexercise judicial economy."
 217  The European Communities states explicitly that it is  not  challenging
the Panel's exercise of judicial economy  as such ,  and that it considers that "the Panel has effectively
ruled on all elements of the subsidy scheme under review and has, accordingly, already given
sufficiently precise guidance … ".218
254. The United States observes that "the conditions that would trigger the Appellate Body’s
consideration of any of these claims is not clear".219
255. In this Report, we have upheld all of the Panel's findings under appeal.  Therefore, in any
event, none of the conditions on which the European Communities' appeal is predicated arise, andthere is no need for us to examine any of the conditional appeals.
XIII.  Findings and Conclusions
256. For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:
(a) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.30 and 8.43 of the Panel Report, that the
ETI measure involves the foregoing of revenue which is "otherwise due" and thusgives rise to a "financial contribution" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) ofthe   SCM Agreement ;
(b) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.75 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, that
the ETI measure includes subsidies "contingent … upon export performance" withinthe meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ;
                                                     
216Panel Report, paras. 8.108, 8.162-8.163 and 8.171.
217European Communities' other appellant's submission, para. 31.
218Ibid., para. 30.
219United States' appellee's submission, para. 13.WT/DS108/AB/RW
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(c) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.107 and 9.1(a) of the Panel Report, that
the ETI measure, viewed as a whole, does not fall within the scope of footnote 59 ofthe  SCM Agreement   as a measure taken to avoid the double taxation of foreign-
source income;
(d) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.122 and 9.1(c) of the Panel Report, that
the ETI measure involves export subsidies inconsistent with the United States'obligations under Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the  Agreement on Agriculture ;
(e) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.158 and 9.1(d) of the Panel Report, that
the ETI measure is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under Article III:4of the GATT 1994 because it accords less favourable treatment to imported productsas compared with like products of United States origin;
(f) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 8.170 and 9.1(e) of the Panel Report, that
the United States has not fully withdrawn the subsidies found, in the original
proceedings, to be prohibited export subsidies under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement ,  and that the United States has, therefore, failed fully to implement
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7 of theSCM Agreement ;  and
(g) finds that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 10.3 of the DSU in declining,
in its decision of 21 February 2001, reproduced in paragraph 6.3 of the Panel Report,to rule that all the written submissions of the parties filed prior to the only meeting ofthe Panel must be provided to the third parties.
257. The Appellate Body  recommends  that the DSB request the United States to bring the ETI
measure, found in this Report, and in the Panel Report as modified by this Report, to be inconsistentwith its obligations under Article 3.1(a) of the  SCM Agreement ,  under Articles 3.3, 8 and 10.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture ,  and under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, into conformity with its
obligations under those Agreements, and that the DSB request the United States to implement fullythe recommendations and rulings of the DSB in  US – FSC ,  made pursuant to Article 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement .WT/DS108/AB/RW
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Signed in the original at Geneva this 21st day of December 2001 by:
_________________________
Florentino P. Feliciano
Presiding Member
_________________________ _________________________
A.V. Ganesan Yasuhei Taniguchi
Member Member