RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/WGTCP/W/32
26September 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-4006)
Original: English Working Group ontheInteraction
between Trade andCompetition Policy
COMMUNICATION FROM JAPAN
Thefollowing communication, dated 10September 1997, hasbeenreceived fromthedelegation
ofJapan withtherequest thatitbecirculated toMembers.
_______________
I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY
1. ThePurpose ofTrade Laws andCompetition Laws
Bothtradelaws, which regulate tradepolicy, andcompetition laws, which regulate competition
policy, have, despite some different perspectives, acommon coreobjective: tomaximize economic
welfare byimproving theenvironment formore efficient resources allocation.
Trade lawsintend toachieve thecoreobjective above bypromoting trade. Most ofthe
international agreements ontradestatethatgovernments should restrict orabolish theirborder measures
which restrain trade. Restricting orabolishing such measures promotes trade byimproving its
transparency andpredictability, and,atthesame time, bysecuring faircompetition onthedomestic
market between domestic andforeign firms, itenables anefficient distribution ofresources.
Competition lawssuchastheanti-monopoly lawintend toachieve thecoreobjective above
bypromoting freeandfaircompetition between private firms. Restricting anti-competitive activities
offirms (such asprivate monopolization, unreasonable restraint ofcompetition, andunfair commercial
practices) secures faircompetition onthedomestic market among firms andenables anefficient
distribution ofresources.
Furthermore, trade lawsandcompetition lawsareindicated tohavecomplementary effects
aswellascontradictory effects witheachother (Iwata 1997, Messerlin 1996, Nagaoka 1996). In
addition, bothlawsinclude similar provisions (such asanti-dumping provisions intrade lawsand
anti-predatory pricing provisions incompetition laws).
Thustradelawsandcompetition lawsareclosely related toeachother, sharing acommon core
objective, including similar provisions, andhaving positive andnegative interactions. Wewillanalyse
indetail suchinteractions between tradelawsandcompetition laws, andsuggest whatshould bestudied
inthisWorking Group.WT/WGTCP/W/32
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2. Interaction between Trade Laws andCompetition Laws
(1) Complementary effects
Trade lawsandcompetition lawshavecomplementary effects witheachother inachieving
thecommon coreobjective; i.e.,economic development through maximization ofeconomic welfare.
(a) Complementary effects oftrade lawstocompetition laws
When anexporting firmtriestodominate amarket ofanimporting country byexpelling other
competitors through predatory pricing, thegovernment oftheimporting country canrestrain suchan
anti-competitive action byutilizing trade laws(e.g., anti-dumping measures), evenifthecompetition
lawsandtheirenforcement mechanism oftheexporting and/or importing country isimmature.1In
suchacase,thetradelawssecure faircompetition inthedomestic market between domestic andforeign
firms. Thus, under suchatheoretical circumstance, tradelawsarecomplementary tocompetition laws.
(Themajority ofempirical research, however, point outthatsuchcomplementary function
oftrade lawscanrarely beutilized inreality: these economic studies indicate thatconditions under
which exporting firms canrationally enforce predatory pricing arestrictly limited. Oftwoempirical
studies, oneindicates thatonly5%ofresearched cases whereby anti-dumping measures wereimposed
hadanactual possibility ofpredatory pricing (Messerlin 1996), while theother indicates only10%
(Willig 1993).)
(b) Complementary effects ofcompetition lawstotrade laws
When amonopolistic firmoranoligopolistic firm, bytaking advantage ofitshighshare of
themarket, conducts anti-competitive action forthepurpose ofexpelling foreign competitors from
thedomestic market, thegovernment canrestrict such action bycompetition laws, such asthe
anti-monopoly law,topromote trade.
Also, itissaidthatanti-dumping measures would become unnecessary oncerelevant countries
areequipped withsufficient levelofcommon competition lawsandtheirenforcement mechanism to
restrict predatory pricing. The1957 Treaty ofRome which constituted theEuropean Communities,
andtheAustralia NewZealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), and,
Free-TradeAgreementbetweenChileandCanadaseemtobeexamplesthatincorporatedsuchstandpoint.
(2) Contradictory effects
While trade lawsandcompetition lawshavecomplementary effects witheachother, itisalso
saidthatbothlawshavecontradictory effects.
(a) Contradictory effects oftrade lawsupon competition laws
(i) Anti-competitive effect oftrade measures
Some tradelawssuchastheAnti-dumping Agreement oftheWTO justify government measures
toprotect domestic firms fromunfair pricesetting. Since trade-restrictive border measures aregenerally
prohibited, thesetrademeasures are,asatemporary exception fromtheprinciple offreetrade, admitted
strictly inthecaseofunfair trade. Since these lawslackcompetition perspective, theyareoften taken
1Seealsothesecond paragraph of3.(3)WT/WGTCP/W/32
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asajustificationforeconomicallyinefficienttrademeasures.Moreover,theirinadequate(e.g.,prolonged
and/or frequent) application areusedforprotecting inefficient domestic industry.
Suchtrade measures themselves andtheirextensive application willdistort, byraising prices
unjustly onthemarket, freeandfaircompetition between foreign anddomestic firms onthemarket
ofanimporting country. According toempirical research intheUnited States, import decreases by
anaverage of73%when more than50%oftheanti-dumping margin isimposed (USITC1995). The
research alsoshows theresult ofasimulation thattheeconomic welfare oftheUnited States hasdeclined
considerably because ofanti-dumping measures imposed bythegovernment.
"TheJapanese DRAM Case(1986)": during thedumping investigation bytheUSgovernment
onJapanese DRAM over256KB, theFairTrade Commission oftheUSsubmitted areport tothe
International Trade Committee andtheDepartment ofCommerce, asserting thatthesalesprice bythe
Japanese firmwasacompetitive price where theexpenditure ofwhich could becollected within a
reasonable period, andthatimposing anti-dumping dutywould beagainst competition policy.
Nevertheless, theassertion oftheUSFTC wasnotaccepted anditwasnotuntiltheJapanese firm
accepted anagreement toraise price thattheinvestigation wassuspended.
(ii) Anti-competitive useoftrade measures
When afirmhasthepower tocontrol onadomestic market, theanti-dumping measure can
beusedbythefirm(anditsgovernment) asastrategic tool,which results inrestraining competition
inthemarket (Nagaoka 1966). Twotypes ofsuchanti-competitive behaviour havebeenpointed out:
oneistouseanti-dumping measures asatooltorealize cooperative pricesetting bydomestic andforeign
firms; theother istouseanti-dumping measures inorder tomonopolize thedomestic market.
Anempirical research implies theexistence ofboththetypes described. Asforthefirsttype,
theresearch shows thatthetotalshare ofthecomplainant andtheaccused firmreaches more than95%
oftheworld market in30%ofthecases researched. (Thetotalmarket share reaches 90%in45%of
thecases researched.) (Messerlin 1996) Asforthesecond type, another research shows thatasmuch
as8%oftheanti-dumping cases researched havebeencases inwhich amonopolizing firmwasthe
complainant. (Messerlin 1996)
"TheJapanese Glycin Case(1985)": during thedumping investigation bytheEuropean
Commission onJapanese glycin (achemical product), consumers oftheEC,aswellastwo
Japanese firms, insisted that,considering oligopolistic situation oftheECmarket (i.e., only
oneECfirmandtwoJapanese firms existinthemarket), imposing anti-dumping dutyon
Japanese glycin willleadtomonopolization oftheECmarket, which inturn,reduces potential
benefit forconsumers from competitive price cutting. Nevertheless, theassertion wasnot
accepted andtheanti-dumping dutywasimposed.
(b) Contradictory effects bycompetition lawsupon trade laws
Competition lawscould cause trade distorting effect bytheirinadequate application (such as
extraterritorial application orexemptions).
Theextraterritorial application ofdomestic competition lawtoprotect adomestic firmacting
onaforeign market may, notonlyinfringe thesovereignty ofaforeign country, butalsodistort
competition within theforeign market andtrade between thetwocountries.
Under certain conditions, exemption clauses ofcompetition laws exclude potentially
anti-competitive practice fromapplying competition laws. Suchclauses canberegarded asakindofWT/WGTCP/W/32
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forbearance bythegovernment, which could distort trade. Forexample, when domestic firms inthe
industry subject totheexemption clause ofthecompetition law,inorder toexpel foreign competitors,
conduct anti-competitive practices bytaking advantage oftheirhighshare ofthedomestic market, the
exemption clause could havetheeffect ofprotecting inefficient domestic industry anddistorting trade.
3. TheObjective andTask ofthisWorking Group
(1) Objective
While GATT/WTO haspursued international rule-making ontherestriction andabolishment
oftrade measures, verylittlehasbeendoneordiscussed toincorporate competition perspective into
international rules. However, astheworld trade system hasbeenliberalized, andthemarket being
opened, theneeds forimplementing legalframework toensure freeandfaircompetition, across the
border andwithin thedomestic market, hasbecome greater thanever.
Inaddition toexamining theperspective ofpromoting trade, theWorking Group onthe
Interaction between Trade andCompetition Policy isexpected toexamine theoretical possibilities of
introducing theperspective ofcompetition, which hasbeenlacking intheGATT/WTO. Webelieve
thattheWorking Group willplayasignificant roleinachieving thecommon coreobjective ofboth
trade lawsandcompetition lawstorealize economic development through maximizing theeconomic
welfare byanefficient distribution ofresources.
Specifically, webelieve thattheWorking Group should putemphasis on;(a)examining,
comprehensively andcollectively, theinteraction (complementary effects andcontradictory effects)
between tradelawsandcompetition laws; andthus,(b)providing aneducative process fordeveloping
countries where competition lawsandtheirenforcement mechanism arenotsufficiently equipped.
Indoingso,itisnecessarytoclarifyhowcompetitionlawsandenforcementwouldcontributeinbringing
about economic development through increasing economic welfare.
(2) Task
Bearing inmind theobjective anditseducative characteristic ofthisWorking Group, as
mentioned above, weshould examine thecomplementary effects andcontradictory effects between
trade lawsandcompetition laws, bothcomprehensively andcollectively, and,inparticular, examine
howtoutilize complementary andcontradictory provisions inachieving thecommon coreobjective
ofrealizing economic development through anefficient distribution ofresources.
Forexample, weshould examine which provisions oftheanti-dumping laware,inpractice,
complementarytocompetitionlawsorhowanti-dumpinglawscouldbecomplementedbythecompetition
laws. Weshould alsoexamine howsuchcomplementary provisions could besetoutduring thepossible
process ofconvergence ofcompetition lawsamong economies.
(3) Further consideration
Weshould bearinmind, notonlytheimportance ofcompetition lawsandtheirenforcement
mechanism oneconomic development, butalsothefactthattheform oftrade lawsandcompetition
lawsinachieving thecommon coreobjective could differ depending on,forexample, thesizeorthe
development stage ofeacheconomy. Inparticular, weshould payattention todeveloping countries
sothattheycansmoothly formulate competition lawsandtheir enforcement mechanism without
unnecessary economic confusion.WT/WGTCP/W/32
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Weshould alsobearinmind thatlackofcompetition lawsandtheirenforcement mechanism
inanexporting economy doesnotnecessary justify trademeasures bythegovernment ofanimporting
economy tocounteract thelack. Thatisbecause, thedomestic market ofasmall economy, ifitis
quiteopentotheoutside economy andifitstradeoccupies verylargeproportion ofitsentire economy,
willbecome competitive through import. (Iwata 1996, Messerlin 1996)
References
Iwata K.,1997. "Competition Policy andUnfair Trade Measures." Trade andTariffs (January 1997).
Messerlin P.A., 1996. "Competition Policy andAnti-dumping Reform: AnExercise inTransition."
Forthcoming inTheWorld Trading System: Challenges Ahead, edited byJ.Scott, Institute for
International Economics.
Nagaoka S.,1997. "Anchi-danpingu-sochi nodoukou tokongo nokaikaku [Anti-dumping Measures
andFuture Reformation]." inBoueki toKanzei [Trade andTariffs] (April 1997).
Nagaoka S.,1996. "Anti-dumping Policy andCompetition." InC.R. Fritschtak, Regulatory Policies
andReform: AComparative Perspective. World Bank.
NIKKIYU1996.Anchi-danpingu-houtoKyousou-hou[Anti-dumpingandCompetitionLaw].NIKKIYU.
U.S.International Trade Commission 1995. TheEconomic Effects ofAnti-dumping andCountervailing
Duty Orders andSuspension Agreements.
Willig R.D., 1993. "TheEconomic Effects ofAnti-dumping Policy." InAnti-dumping andCompetition
Policy. OECD.
II. STOCK-TAKING OFPROVISIONS RELATED TOCOMPETITION
1. Stock-taking ofExisting WTO Provisions: AComment ontheInformal NotebytheSecretariat
Theinformal notebytheSecretariat, "Competition-related Provisions inExisting WTO
Agreement" dated 17June1997, recognizes that"most WTO agreements mayberegarded asrelated
tocompetition, inthattheylimittheability ofgovernments toimpose trademeasures thatwould have
theeffect ofconstraining ordistorting competition (particularly competition fromforeign sources) in
markets forgoods orservices". However, thisnotestates that"there would belittlepurpose inlisting
allthese provisions, since suchalistembraces mostWTO provisions andwould cover ground which
iswell-trodden intheWTO" and"instead ofthisbroad approach, thisnotefocuses onWTO provisions
which areconcerned withthepractices ofenterprises, whether public orprivate andwhether acting
individually orcollectively, thatmaydistort orimpede international tradeandwithwhatgovernments
areallowed orrequired todotoregulate orremedy suchpractices".
However, concerning therelationship between tradelawsandcompetition lawsandtheobjective
ofthisWorking Group mentioned inSection Iabove, theapproach oftheSecretariat isnotsufficient.
Although most WTO Agreements areundoubtedly related tocompetition, alltheprovisions donot
have tobecovered. Since thisWorking Group istoexamine "theinteraction between trade and
competition policy", theemphasis ofstock-taking should beplaced ontheprovisions withsuch
interaction.WT/WGTCP/W/32
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Theprovisionsshowninthenoteas,relatedtocompetitioninexistingWTOAgreements,regulate
thegovernmental measures required tosecure fairandfreecompetition. Thus theycould beregarded
asapartofcompetition lawsamong WTO rules. Theobjective ofthisstock-taking istoclarify how
farprovisions orelements related tocompetition areincluded ineachareaoftheWTO Agreements.
Thiswork isindispensable inexamine thetheoretical possibility ofcomprehensive rulesinthefuture.
Ontheotherhand, thework bytheSecretariat onlyfocuses onhowmuch thepresent provisions
oftheWTO contribute tosecuring fairandfreecompetition, notpaying attention tothecontradictory
effects between trade lawsandcompetition lawsmentioned above.
What Japan would liketoemphasize istheimportance ofexamining whether thereareprovisions
among WTO Agreements which possess anti-competitive characteristic orwhich allow anti-competitive
governmental measures. Forexample, theAnti-dumping Agreement oftheWTO2could have
contradictory effects oncompetition, especially when itisinadequately applied (recognition ofdamage,
rateofanti-dumping duty, etc.)eventhough imposing anti-dumping dutycould complement thedefects
ofinternational competition laws.
ThisWorking Group should, therefore, examine notonlycomplementary butalsocontradictory
effects oncompetition based ontheoretical andempirical analysis, asnecessary. Thenotebythe
Secretariat, which justmentions theexistence oftheAnti-dumping Agreement, needs toinclude the
above point inorder tocontribute toameaningful examination ofthisWorking Group.
Provisions among theWTO Agreements withsucheffects seemtobewithin alimited number.
Basically suchprovisions arethose regulating trademeasures bythegovernment inthename ofsecuring
fairtrade onadomestic market, orthose protecting adomestic industry from anunfair export from
foreign firms. Considering pastexperience, suchprovisions arealmost limited to:
(a) Article VIofGATT 1994 andtheAnti-dumping Agreement2;
(b) Article XVIofGATT 1994 andtheAgreement onSubsidies andCountervailing
Measures; and
(c) Article XIXofGATT 1994 andtheAgreement onSafeguards.
2. Japanese Anti-monopoly ActanditsEnforcement3
(1) ThePurpose andRoleoftheAnti-monopoly Act
(i) Freeeconomy andtheAnti-monopoly Act
TheJapanese Anti-monopoly Act4isaimed atpromoting freeandfaircompetition, stimulating
thecreative initiative offirms, encouraging thebusiness activities ofenterprises, raising employment
levels andpeople 'srealincome, andthereby promoting ademocratic andwholesome development
2"The Agreement onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994"
3Detailed information isavailable ontheinternet homepage ofJapanese Fair Trade Commission
(http://www.jftc.go.jp).
4Enactedin1947.Itsfullnameis"TheActConcerningProhibitionofPrivateMonopolizationandMaintenance
ofFairTrade".WT/WGTCP/W/32
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ofthenational economy. Thisactsetsforththebasic rulesconcerning business activities inorder to
maintain economic order inafreeeconomy.
(ii) Firms andtheAnti-monopoly Act
TheAnti-monopoly Actisintended toenable firms toengage infreebusiness activities inan
openeconomytostimulatethecreativeinitiativeoffirmsandtopromotebusinessactivitiesbyeliminating
unreasonable restraint.
(iii) Consumers andtheAnti-monopoly Act
TheAnti-monopoly Actprohibits anti-competitive practices, which prevent consumers from
influencing themarket mechanism, andsafeguards theinterests ofconsumers byensuring freeand
faircompetition.
(2) Practices Subject toControl bytheAnti-monopoly Act
(i) Unreasonable restraint oftrade (Cartels)
TheAnti-monopoly Actstates thatnofirms shallcarry outanyunreasonable restraint oftrade.
Unreasonable restraint oftrade refers tocartels among firms. Cartels usually mean, among
others, agreements ortheunderstanding tofixprices andlimitthevolume ofproduction andsales.
These areclassified, according totheobject ofrestriction, intoprice cartels, volume cartels, market
allocation cartels andbidriggings. Since cartels haveadverse effects, suchasunreasonably raising
prices, which allow inefficient firms tosurvive andstagnate theoverall economy, theyarestrictly
prohibited bycompetition lawsinalmost allcountries.
TheAnti-monopolyAct,inadditiontoprohibitingcartelsasan"unreasonablerestraintoftrade",
alsohasspecial provisions toprohibit anyunreasonable restraint oftradeformed bytradeassociations
andcartels between domestic andforeign firms ("international cartel").
(ii) Monopoly andoligopoly
Ifasmall number offirms control almost theentire market, competition cannot function
effectively. Consequently, regarding suchmonopoly oroligopoly, theAnti-monopoly Act:(i)prohibits
conduct thatexcludes orcontrols thebusiness activities ofother entrepreneurs ("prohibition ofprivate
monopolization"); and(ii)provides forsteps torestore competition, should amonopolistic situation
ariseandleadtonegative market performances ("measures against monopolistic situations"). Besides
suchprovisions, theActalsorequires submission ofareport explaining parallel priceriseswhich occur
when themarket isinanoligopolistic situation.
(iii) Mergers andacquisitions
TheAnti-monopoly Actstipulates various restrictions onmergers andacquisitions. Thus it
prohibits stockholding byfirms orother juridical entities, interlocking directorates among companies,
mergers bycompanies andacquisitions ofbusinesses, ifsuch actions maysubstantially restrain
competitioninanyparticularfieldoftrade.Furthermore,inordertopreventanyexcessiveconcentration
ofeconomic power, theActprohibits holding companies andlimits thetotalamount ofstockholdings
bylarge-scale non-financial firms andstockholdings byfinancial companies.WT/WGTCP/W/32
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Mandatory filing ofadvance notifications withtheFairTrade Commission isprescribed in
regardtomergersandbusinessacquisitionsand,inthecaseofstockholdingandinterlockingdirectorates,
apostfactum notification orreport isrequired.
(iv) Unfair trade practices
Forthemarket mechanism tofunction andboost theefficiency ofanational economy, fair
competition musttakeplace byoffering goods andservices ofahighquality atreasonable prices. In
lightofthisneed, theAnti-monopoly Actprohibits conduct which mayimpede faircompetition as
"unfair trade practices."
Some activities areunder "general designation," which apply toallindustries, while others
areunder "specific designation," which apply tospecified industries.
The"general designation" cites16types ofconduct asunfair trade practices ("Unfair Trade
Practices", FairTrade Commission Notification, No.1518June1982). They canbeclassified into
thefollowing three broad categories:
(a) Conduct which mayrestrain freecompetition: e.g.,Refusal todeal, discriminatory
pricing, dumping, resale price maintenance.
(b) Competition which initselfcannot beconsidered fair:e.g.,Inducement ofcustomers
bydeceptive methods oroffers ofexcessive premiums, tying arrangements.
(c) Conduct oflarge firms forcing unreasonable demands onclients bytaking advantage
ofdominant bargaining positions.
Some ofthese practices areunlawful inprinciple, suchastheresale price maintenance, while
others aredetermined onacase-by-case basis, according towhether ornottheyimpede faircompetition.
(v) Activities oftrade associations
"Substantially restraining competition inanyparticular fieldoftrade" byanytradeassociation,
which isacombination orfederation oftwoormore firms, isprohibited.
Inaddition, tradeassociations areprohibited fromlimiting thenumber offirms inanyparticular
fieldofbusiness, unjustly restricting thefunctions oractivities ofmember firms, orhaving firms employ
actsthatconstitute unfair trade practices.
(vi) Restrictive international contracts, etc.
TheAnti-monopoly Actregulates anti-competitive conducts under anyagreement orcontract
between Japanese andforeign firms. First, itprohibits firms from entering intoanyinternational
agreement orcontract which contains matters thatconstitute unfair trade practices.
(3) Enforcement oftheAnti-monopoly Act
(i) RoleoftheFairTrade Commission
TheFairTrade Commission isestablished asanadministrative organ toimplement the
Anti-monopoly Actandcompetition policy. TheFairTrade Commission, administratively attached
tothePrime Minister, ispositioned intheadministrative organization ofthestateasanextra-ministerialWT/WGTCP/W/32
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body ofthePrime Minister 'sOffice, andindependently exercises itsauthority without being directed
orsupervised byanyone else.TheFairTrade Commission hasacharacter ofaquasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial organ. Forexample, theFairTrade Commission canestablish theprocedure forhandling
cases andhearing procedures asaquasi-legislative power, andcanissue adecision afterhearing as
aquasi-judicial power.
(ii) Enforcement activities
Toachieve thepurpose oftheAnti-monopoly Act,which istopromote freeandfaircompetition,
theFairTrade Commission isengaged invarious activities. Thus itisrequired toinform theDietof
itsactivities every yearinanannual report.
(a) Investigation ofviolations oftheAnti-monopoly Act,cease anddesist orders,
andimposition ofsurcharge
TheFairTrade Commission collects information andreceives reports fromthegeneral public
onsuspected violations oftheAnti-monopoly Act. TheCommission investigates cases ofsuspected
violations based onsuchinformation depending ontheircontents andreliability. Inconducting such
investigations, theFairTrade Commission canavailitselfasbeing aninvestigating authority, including
thatrelated tothedirect inspection ofthefirms concerned. If,asaresult ofaninvestigation, aviolation
isfound, theCommission canorder theoffender tocease anddesist theconduct.
Whereasthisceaseanddesistorderisissuedasanadministrativedispositionknownasadecision,
aprior quasi-judicial procedure, which issimilar tothatofacourt trialandcalled the"hearing
procedure," istaken inorder toensure thejustice of"decision". Acriminal procedure against any
major offense under theAnti-monopoly Actcanbeinitiated onlyafteranaccusation isfiledbythe
FairTrade Commission withthePublic Prosecutor General.
Suitsforwithdrawal ofanydecision, damage suitsunder theAnti-monopoly Actandcriminal
suitsconcerning anyviolation oftheAnti-monopoly Actareunder exclusive jurisdiction oftheTokyo
High Court.
Ifanillegal cartel pertaining topricehasbeenformed, theFairTrade Commission willimpose
surcharges tocollect theunlawful gains fromthefirms involved inaddition toissuing anorder tocease
anddesist. Thesumofthesurcharge iscalculated according tothefollowing formula:
(b) Notifications
Inorder toensure aneffective regulation ofconduct inviolation oftheAnti-monopoly Act,
thereareavariety ofsystems ofreporting andnotification under theAct.TheFairTrade Commission
examines thecontents ofsuchreports andnotifications submitted byfirms andtrade associations.
(c) Research Regarding Economic Situation andBusiness Activities
Inorder tokeeptrack oftheeconomic situation ofvarious industries inJapan andtheactual
circumstances ofbusiness activities, theFairTrade Commission willcarry outresearch, including
thatoncorporate groups, theactual situation oftransactions between firms, theactual situation of
distributionandongovernmentalregulationsystems.Thefindingsoftheresearchareusedforidentifying
problems, aswellasbeing usedasbasic material forenforcing theAnti-monopoly Act.