RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/C/M/1
14 February 2002
(02-0723)
Trade Negotiations Committee
28 January and 1 February 2002
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 28 January and 1 February 2002
Chairman:  Mr. Stuart Harbinson (Hong Kong, China)1
Subjects discussed:
1. Election of Chairperson
2. Structure of the Negotiations and Arrangements for Chairing3. Schedule of Work of the Trade Negotiations Committee4. Other Organizational and Management Issues Related to the Negotiations
1. The Chairman reported he had been conducting wide-ranging consultations on the items on
the agenda.  Progress had been made in these consultations, and agreement was close in some areas,
but it seemed that there was a preference among Members to see a positive understanding on all of
these items.  He recalled the mandate the Trade Negotiations Committee had received from Ministers
at Doha.  He was sure all delegations were totally committed to fulfilling this mandate.  This was why
the flexibility which he was pleased to say had become increasingly evident in the consultations must
be built on.  With this in mind, he intended to continue the informal consultations with a redoubledsense of urgency.  He proposed, therefore, to adjourn the formal meeting.  Since it would be
continuing in the near future, he suggested that this was not the time for delegations to put on record
their views on the items on the agenda which were, after all, still evolving in the consultations.
2. The Trade Negotiations Committee agreed to the Chairman's proposal and adjourned
.
3. At the resumed meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee on 1 February, the Chairman
suggested that agenda items 1, 2 and 3 be taken up together, and then made a further report on his
consultations.  He recalled his statement at the General Council meeting held on
19-20 December 2001 in which he had outlined the tasks facing Members following the decision byMinisters at Doha to establish a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC).  These tasks included the
appointment of a Chair for the TNC, a decision on the structure for the negotiations and the election
of the Chairpersons of the bodies under that structure.
4. In that statement, he had informed delegations that he would be engaging in intensive
consultations on these issues in preparation for the first TNC meeting.  In accordance with that
                                                     
1  The meeting was opened by Mr. Stuart Harbinson, Chairman of the General Council.TN/C/M/1
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commitment he had, since early January, met with a very large number of Members, individually as
well as in groups, to hear their views on these issues and to get a sense of where possible
compromises could be found.  He had also held two Heads-of-Delegations meetings, as steps in these
consultations.
5. At the December meeting, as well as during the consultations, he had emphasized the fact that
Ministers had set a very tight schedule for the completion of the negotiations.  In this light, he
believed Members had a common responsibility to ensure that the institutional issues of the TNC were
resolved quickly so as to enable them to start the negotiation process without delay.
6. He wished to express his gratitude to all delegations for their very constructive and co-
operative approach.  From the start of the work, it had been encouraging to note the strongcommitment of Members to respond to the mandate given to them by Ministers at Doha.  Indeed,
many delegations had repeatedly expressed the imperative of moving quickly and efficiently into the
negotiating phase, which is what would be possible following the decisions the present meeting was
invited to take.  The backdrop to these decisions was the informal document he had circulated to
delegations as a Statement by the Chairman of the General Council, which reflected his understandingof the broad lines of opinion that had come out of the consultations.  This Statement would be
circulated separately as a TNC document.
2  While it did not purport to be a fully negotiated document,
it did embody a good deal of reflection and he was sure all delegations would make every effort to
follow the principles and practices it identified.
7. The text of the Statement by the Chairman of the General Council read as follows:
"A. Introductory Comments
First of all I should emphasize that the mandate for the TNC, as for the negotiations
as a whole, is that agreed by Ministers at Doha in November 2001 and set out in their
Ministerial Declaration – paragraphs 45 to 52 of that Declaration in particular relate to the
TNC which Ministers have established under the authority of the General Council to
supervise the overall conduct of the negotiations.  It shall establish appropriate negotiating
mechanisms as required and supervise the progress of the negotiations.  Other specific
functions are set out elsewhere in the Declaration, for example in relation to implementation
issues.
That is the mandate.  Our task is to give effect to it efficiently and promptly. It is in
this spirit that I have considered the suggestions by a number of delegations concerning
possible guidance to assist the TNC's work.  Clearly, any such guidance should help the TNC
to fulfil its mandate, not make it more difficult. This said, it may assist delegations if I set outmy understanding, derived from the extensive consultations I have held, of some basic
principles and practices which I believe it is widely felt we should keep in mind as the TNC
carries out its work under its Ministerial Mandate. This statement will, of course, be reflected
in the minutes of the TNC and also circulated as a TNC document.
I hope it will provide some assurance to delegations that we are all committed to
seeing the work of the TNC and the negotiations it supervises conducted according to the best
WTO practices and in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner. In keeping with usual
WTO practice, the TNC should follow the General Council's Rules of Procedure mutatis
mutandis, i.e. with only such adjustments as may be found necessary.
I should like to note that in my consultations a wide variety of views have been
expressed, and I am grateful to delegations for the cooperative and constructive spirit they
                                                     
2  Subsequently circulated as document TN/C/1, dated 5 February 2002.TN/C/M/1
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have shown throughout.  While I have carefully considered and attempted to reflect
delegations' views in my statement, I must stress that this is not a fully negotiated text.
Delegations will of course have the opportunity under Item 4 of the Agenda to express their
views and understandings of the sense of the points I am putting forward in summary here.  I
should, however, like to note in particular the view expressed by a number of delegations thatthe proposed appointment of the Director-General ex officio  as Chairman of the TNC under
Item 1 of the Agenda is an exceptional arrangement and that appointments to WTO bodies
should normally be made from among representatives of WTO Members.
B. Principles and Practices
General Council Authority
• In line with the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the TNC has been established by Ministers
under the authority of the General Council with  the mandate of supervising the overall
conduct of the negotiations.  The TNC and its negotiating bodies do not constitute a parallel
or competing machinery to the existing WTO bodies.
• The General Council is in charge of the WTO's work programme as a whole, including
that set out in the Doha Declaration. The TNC should report to each regular meeting of
the General Council. The General Council retains the overall responsibility for thepreparations for Ministerial Conferences.
Transparency and Process
• The Ministerial Declaration sets out that the negotiations shall be conducted in a
transparent manner among participants, in order to facilitate the effective participation of
all.
• In its own work, and also in its supervision of the conduct of the negotiations, the TNC
should build on the best practices established over the past two years with regard tointernal transparency and participation of all Members. These practices were articulated
by my predecessor, Ambassador Bryn, on 17 July 2000 (document WT/GC/M/57) as areflection of the mainstream of the extensive discussions on internal transparency.
• Minutes of meetings of the TNC and of negotiating bodies should be circulated
expeditiously and in all three official languages at the same time. Furthermore, theSecretariat is urged to take all possible steps to ensure the prompt and efficient
dissemination of information relating to nego tiations to non-resident and smaller missions
in particular.
• The constraints of smaller delegations should be taken into account when scheduling
meetings. The TNC will keep the calendar of meetings under surveillance.  As an overallguideline, as far as possible only one negotiating body should meet at the same time.  The
TNC should consider how this arrangement should be supervised.
Chairpersons of the TNC and Negotiating Bodies
• Chairpersons should be impartial and objective, and discharge their duties in accordance
with the mandate conferred on the TNC by Ministers.TN/C/M/1
Page 4
• Chairpersons should ensure transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making and
consultative processes taking into account the intergovernmental and Member-drivencharacter of the WTO.
• Chairpersons should aim to facilitate consensus among participants and should seek to
evolve consensus texts through the negotiation process.
• In their regular reporting to overseeing bodies, Chairpersons should reflect consensus, or
where this is not possible, different positions on issues.
• The General Council should ensure that suitable arrangements are made to promote
continuity in the work of the TNC during the transition from the current to the next
Director-General.
• The Chairperson of the TNC should work in close cooperation with the Chairperson of
the General Council and the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies.
C. Proposals for Action by the TNC
• I propose that the TNC take note of my statement and endorse the Principles and
Practices set out in Section B of that statement.
Agenda Item 1
• I propose that the TNC appoint the Director-General in an ex officio  capacity to chair the
TNC until the deadline of 1 January 2005 established in the Doha Declaration.  It isunderstood that doing so does not create a precedent for the future.
Agenda Item 2
I propose that:
• The TNC adopt the following structure:
- the agriculture and services negotiations will be pursued in Special Sessions of the
Committee on Agriculture and the Council for Trade in Services, respectively;
- negotiations on market access for non-agricultural products will take place in a
Negotiating Group on Market Access to be created;
- negotiations on the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and
registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits under the Agreementon Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights will take place in
Special Sessions of the TRIPS Council, while other issues in paragraphs 18 and
19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration relating to TRIPS will be addressed in
regular meetings of the TRIPS Council on a priority basis;
- negotiations on WTO rules will take place in a Negotiating Group on Rules to be
created;
- negotiations on improvements and clarifications to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding will take place in Special Sessions of the Dispute Settlement Body;
- negotiations on trade and environment will take place in Special Sessions of the
Committee on Trade and Environment;  andTN/C/M/1
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- negotiations on outstanding implementation issues will take place in the relevant
bodies in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 12 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration and of the Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns
of 14 November 2001.
• As reaffirmed by Ministers at Doha, provisions for special and differential treatment are
an integral part of the WTO Agreements.  The negotiations and other aspects of the workprogramme shall take fully into account the principle of special and differential treatment
for developing and least-developed countries as provided for in paragraph 50 of the
Ministerial Declaration.  The review of all special and differential treatment provisions
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational provided for in paragraph 44 of the Ministerial Declaration shall be carried
out by the Committee on Trade and Development in Special Sessions.
• The Chairman of the General Council consult on the chairmanships of the individual
negotiating bodies. Consideration should be given to the overall balance between
developed and developing-country candidates, bearing in mind the quality and integrity of
each individual.
• The Chairpersons of individual negotiating bodies be appointed to serve up to the Fifth
Ministerial Conference, at which time all the appointments will be reviewed.Chairpersons should be selected from among Geneva-based representatives in the
majority. Other qualified individuals nominated by Member governments could also be
considered. This would have to be on the und erstanding that these individuals would be
available in Geneva as often as needed, and that any related costs would need to behandled in a way which did not disadvantage Members for whom there could be a
problem.
Agenda Item 3
• I propose that the TNC develop its own work schedule on the basis of one meeting every
2-3 months, but with provision for more meetings when necessary."
8. The Trade Negotiations Committee took note of the statement and endorsed  the Principles
and Practices set out in Section B of that Statement.
9. The Chairman then invited the Trade Negotiations Committee to agree to the proposals he
had set out under agenda items 1, 2 and 3 as reflected in his Statement.
10. The representative of Bulgaria asked whether, as far as geographical indications were
concerned, he could assume that the TRIPS Council in regular session would engage in a substantive
debate.
11. The Chairman replied in the affirmative.  He  again invited the Trade Negotiations Committee
to agree to the proposals he had set out.
12. The Trade Negotiations Committee so agreed.
13. The Chairman said that unfortunately, and to his great regret, the Director-General was unable
to be present at the meeting since he had been obliged to depart on an important official mission,
including meetings with other agencies in pursuit of the capacity-building agenda.  He intended,
therefore, as Chairman of the General Council, to chair the remainder of the meeting in the Director-
General's absence.TN/C/M/1
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4. Other organizational and management issues related to the negotiations
14. The Chairman said that there were probably some issues under this agenda item which would
need the TNC's consideration as the negotiations unfolded.  He invited delegations to speak on this
item or to make statements relating to the previous three items.
15. Many delegations thanked the Chairman for the considerable efforts he had made in his work
on the preparations for the present meeting.16. The representative of the European Communities said that during the work of the previous
few weeks aimed at preparing the present meeting, the principal objective of his delegation had been
to get the negotiations off to a good start and as soon as possible.  It had acknowledged that to do sorequired a fair amount of confidence building amongst Members, notably to meet concerns of smaller
missions.  In spelling out guidelines and practices and endorsing them, Members had gone a long
way, and sometimes even beyond, to address particular fears or concerns.  The Community believed
that what was important was to deal with all negotiating issues on an equal footing and to ensure that
negotiations got off to a start without delay with co mpetent leaderships and sufficient continuity.  It
was therefore important that the TNC had decided on its Chairman and the structure of the
negotiations bodies and that it had endorsed the principles and practices.  The Community
acknowledged that, as far as the Singapore issues were concerned, work would start in the existing
groups, but it should be borne in mind that Ministers had agreed that negotiations would take place
after the fifth Ministerial Conference where decisions should be taken on the modalities of thenegotiations.  This meant that on all these issues serious work would have to be taken in hand, and
that sufficient time would be allocated for such work.  It also implied that the existing Working
Groups should be in a position to report to the TNC.  The structure of the negotiations would be
reviewed in the light of the proceedings of the fifth Ministerial Conference.
17. The representative of Argentina said that, with regard to agenda item 2, it was the
understanding of his delegation that the Chairman's answer to the question posed by the delegation of
Bulgaria was not legally binding on Members.  Each WTO body mandated by the present decision
would establish specifically how to address the di fferent issues forwarded to it through the TNC by
the Ministers in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  In light of this, his delegation requested that
document WT/MIN(01)/W/83 be incorporated as part of the present statement and formally recorded
in the minutes of the meeting.
18. The representative of Zimbabwe, on behalf of the African Group , said the Group had made it
clear from the beginning that it was opposed to the selection of the Director-General as Chairman of
the TNC for the simple reason that the WTO was an intergovernmental organization that should
continue to be Member-driven.  The Group's decision had been based on a systemic concern and noton personalities, and it found security in institutions rather than individuals.  Against its better
judgement, the Group had agreed that the Director-General should chair the TNC.  This was a one-off
decision and did not set a precedent for the future.  The African Group, together with other
delegations, had made the setting up of ground rules a pre-condition to agreeing to the chairmanship
of the Director-General.  The Group could not under stand why in a rules-based organization some of
its partners had been averse to this proposal.  The Group noted that the General Council Chairman had
set out in his statement some rules in this regard, which were, however, still short of what the Group
thought would give the right level of comfort.  It remained convinced, for example, that any
Chairperson should not submit on his own authority a negotiating text to a higher body.  In the event
that there was no consensus regarding the text, then any divergent positions of delegations should beclearly reflected.  The Group hoped the principle of equitable developed/developing-country
representation would be implemented regarding the selection of Chairpersons.  To make this even
more balanced, the Group would have been happier with the appointment of Vice-Chairpersons.
                                                     
3  Reproduced in Annex I.TN/C/M/1
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Some Members felt they had been short-changed in the past, and they were determined this time
around to keep their fingers on the pulse of the negotiations.  The African Group was committed to
the Doha work programme in much the same manner, it believed, as the whole WTO membership.  It
was in this spirit that the Group was willing to go along with what the Chairman had set out in his
statement.  The Group's concerns, as had been set out here and elsewhere, still stood and should betaken note of.  Good faith, transparency and inclusiveness had to remain an integral part of the
conduct of any Chairperson and of any negotiations.  The Group hoped it would not have reason to
one day again raise or draw attention to these principles.  With that understanding, the Group was
prepared to go along with the Chairman's Statement.
19. The representative of Tanzania said the LDCs had made their position known on the question
of the chairmanship of the TNC at the General Council Meeting of 19 December 2001, and they had
reiterated that position on subsequent occasions.  These Members believed it was institutionally
wrong and even harmful to have the Director-General of the WTO to chair the TNC, which was a
body of an intergovernmental institution.  It was wrong because it went against the accepted norms of
intergovernmental bodies and it was harmful because it would overburden the office of the Director-
General and create other institutional oddities.  The Director-General was the head of the Secretariat,whose main function was to service the membership and the negotiations, and it was therefore
improper for that office to lead an intergovernmental process such as the negotiations.  It had been
said that there was a precedent for such an appointment in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  But that
was during the days of GATT, which was not an organization.  The WTO was a fully-fledged
organization with clear demarcation lines between the legislative and negotiating functions and theexecutive or Secretariat functions.  It was wrong fo r the Director-General to chair the TNC just as it
was wrong for the Director-General to chair the Committee on Agriculture or the DSB.  It had been
said that it would ensure impartiality if the Dir ector-General would chair the TNC.  This was like
arguing that the best guarantee for objective decision-making in the organization would be to
surrender the Chairmanships of the various bodies to the DDGs and other members of the Secretariat.It had been said that by making the Director-General the Chairman of the TNC Members were
ensuring that the Director-General had a clear role in the organization.  This was like saying that if
there were no post-Doha negotiations, the Direct or-General and the entire Secretariat would be
irrelevant to the organization.
20. His delegation still believed, as a matter of principle, that the Chairmanship of the TNC
should be in the hands of a representative of a Member State – a Geneva-based Ambassador, and itwas wrong for the Director-General as head of the Secretariat to be given that role just as it would be
wrong for the Secretary-General of the UN to chair the General Assembly or the 5th Committee of the
UN.  There was nothing personal about taking this position – this was not because his delegation did
not like the incumbent or the incoming Director-General.  Both Mike Moore and Dr. Supachai were,
in fact, their friends.  It was on record that no Director-General had done more for the LDCs thanMike Moore and his delegation had said so many times.  And his delegation had nothing against Dr.
Supachai, who came from the wider constituency of de veloping countries.  In the same vein, anybody
who thought that the LDC delegations were taking this position because some of the delegates might
be personally interested in the job ought to be ignored with utter contempt, because the LDC
delegations were not all that small-minded as to mix personal matters and conviction of principles.  Inany case, only one person could occupy that position, and almost all LDC delegates shared the view
that the Chairman of the TNC should be a representative of a member State who enjoyed the
confidence of the Members.  The LDCs believed history would prove them right.
21. His delegation was committed to ensuring that the post-Doha negotiations start without undue
delay so that they could be successfully concluded within the deadline all had subscribed to in Doha.
In Doha, Ministers had compromised on a number of impor tant issues so as not to be seen to frustrate
world economic recovery and his delegation was prepared to compromise again in order to see the
negotiations take place without delay.  Thus it did not want to stand in the way of a consensus and
was prepared to compromise its position, while still holding it as correct, and it would accept theTN/C/M/1
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Director-General to chair the TNC provided there were also clear guidelines with regard to the
negotiating process under the TNC and the other negotiating bodies.  Such guidelines would be
needed even if the TNC had been chaired by the Ambassador of a Member State, but it was more
imperative to have clear guidelines in a set-up on which his delegation had such strong reservations.
It was for this reason that these guidelines shou ld have a binding nature, so that the negotiating
process became predictable and not be a "best endeavour" exercise.  After all, the TNC was
established under the authority of the General Council and it was only proper if the General Council,
representing the will of the entire membership, were to exercise its authority by defining the
operational parameters of the TNC and the other negotiating bodies.  The guidelines should aim at
ensuring that the negotiating process was guided by  the need for transparency, consensus in decision-
making, inclusiveness and accountability to all Members.  His delegation believed this was what the
General Council Chairman had attempted to do.  His delegation would naturally have preferred theguidelines to be tighter, but it appreciated the need to allow some flexibility to the TNC and the
negotiating bodies and to their Chairpersons, and it could live with, in principle, the Chairman's
proposals in section B.
22. However, his delegation was concerned with the way the constraints of smaller delegations
had been addressed in the last bullet point under the sub-heading "Transparency and Process" with
regard to the number of meetings that negotiating bodies could hold at the same time.  During the
preparations for the Doha Ministerial Conference, hi s delegation and other LDCs had insisted that any
post-Doha programme of work should take into account their inability to participate effectively in a
broad work programme.  Their manpower and other constraints were well known, and so they hadexpected that the negotiations would be arranged in such a way that there would not be more than one
meeting at the same time.  These delegations were therefore uncomfortable with the stated
arrangement which envisaged up to two meetings at the same time.  They appealed to the rest of the
membership to reflect on this and they requested the Chairman of the TNC and the Chairpersons of
the negotiating bodies to take into account their spec ial circumstances.  With regard to consensus in
the negotiating process, his delegation was particularly appreciative of the elements under the section
on "Chairpersons of the TNC and Negotiating Bodies" especially where it was emphasized that texts
should reflect consensus through the negotiation process.  It believed this would go a long way to
ensuring that it was the views of Members that would be reflected and not those of a single individual
or only a few Members.  His delegation also apprec iated the indication in the fourth bullet that where
there was no consensus, the Chairman should specify the differences.  However, his delegation's
preference in that regard would be that where there was no consensus, the Chairman should "specifythe different positions" rather than the current reference to "specify substantive differences" as drafted
in the fourth bullet.
23. In section C, his delegation appreciated the way the position of the Director-General as
Chairman of the TNC has been phrased, clearly implying that the Director-General's appointment asChairman of the TNC was an exceptional arrangement, without setting a precedence for the future and
limited to 1 January 2005.  His delegation hoped that nothing would be done to tamper with this
compromise arrangement.  His delegation agreed in principle with the formulation under Agenda Item
2 and it was particularly glad to see some clarity on how and where outstanding implementation
issues would be dealt with.  Similarly, it was happy to see that other issues related to TRIPS asidentified in Articles 18 and 19 of the Doha Declaration would be adequately addressed on a priority
basis, and that special and differential treatment provisions would be adequately dealt with as
envisaged in the Doha Declaration.  Finally, with  regard to the chairmanships of the negotiating
bodies, his delegation was happy that its clear preference for Geneva-based Ambassadors had been
largely accommodated, and it could accept a few non-Geneva candidates nominated by Governments.
However, his delegation wished to emphasize that the principle of balance between developed and
developing-country candidates must be scrupulously adhered to and in that regard it expected a fair
representation from Africa as well as from the LD Cs, to mention only the most marginalized groups.TN/C/M/1
Page 9
24. The Chairman pointed out that it was set out in the principles and practices that the TNC
should consider how the proposed arrangement for the scheduling of meetings should be supervised,
and this was clearly going to be a matter which would receive further attention in the TNC.  The
Secretariat was also looking into ways to improv e the dissemination of information relating to the
negotiations in particular to the non-resident and smaller missions.
25. The representative of the United States said that her delegation shared the concern of others
that the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies should be given adequate flexibility in their role as
chair, and it believed that the principles the TNC had endorsed would allow such flexibility.  It would
be important to reassure the Chairpersons of this, and they should provide the leadership expected of a
chairperson.  The principles, along with the decisi ons taken by the TNC, did not alter any of the Doha
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, which remained the primary documents guiding the workahead.  Like others, her delegation was eager to get this work under way, and to fulfill the mandate
within the three-year time-frame agreed by Ministers.
26. The representative of Pakistan requested that two papers submitted by his delegation and
others, WT/GC/584 and TN/C/W/25, be placed on the record of the present meeting.  The concern of
his delegation with regard to the appointment of the Chairman of the TNC had been systemic and not
related to personalities.  His delegation appreciated the General Council Chairman's observation that
the appointment of the Director-General ex officio  would be an exceptional arrangement and would
not create a precedent, and his delegation hoped it would not be asked to repeat this decision in the
future.  His delegation expected that, in future absences of the Director-General, the TNC would bechaired by either the Chairman of the General Council or one of the Chairpersons of the negotiating
bodies, and not by another senior official ex officio .  His delegation was happy with the structure and
substance of the decision the TNC had taken on agenda item 2, and it attached particular importance
to the provisions relating to implementation and to special and differential treatment, and it believed
that these two areas would constitute an important and integral part of the negotiating process in theDoha round.  His delegation noted that some of the provisions relating to these two areas would
require early, or earlier, decisions than the deadline of January 2005 established in the Doha
Declaration.  Success in such early action on these issues would provide greater momentum to the rest
of the negotiations.  His delegation hoped that the structure would be set up soon, that the negotiations
would commence expeditiously and that they would finish by the deadline so that it would not be
necessary to repeat the present exercise.
27. The representative of Brunei Darussalam, on behalf of the ASEAN Members
, said that the
Chairman's Statement had adequately captured the views and concerns of the ASEAN Members on
the issues it addressed, with regard to the TNC Chairperson, the structure of the negotiations and the
process which would ensure transparency and the effective participation of all, in particular smaller
delegations.  The stakes were high for all Members in the negotiations, and the ASEAN Membershoped the work would now proceed expeditiously.
28. The representative of the Philippines welcomed the substance, the tenor as well as the
structure of the General Council Chairman's Statement which the Chairman had presented with his
usual studied, deliberate and creative approach.  This approach might overcome a crucial legal issue –that of the binding nature of the document.  In the ordinary course of events, a Chairman's statement
was not legally binding.  So, what was it that allowed a meeting to proceed on the basis of an agreed
statement?   It was the Members' common wish to get down to business for the good of the
organization.  The present Statement itself invited the TNC to reflect the Statement in the minutes and
circulate it as a TNC document, and set out specific proposals for adoption by the TNC.  As amechanism established under the authority of the General Council, these were strong exhortations
which his delegation hoped the TNC would follow to the letter.  However, his delegation was sure
                                                     
4  Reproduced in Annex II.
5  Reproduced in Annex III.TN/C/M/1
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that this document did not fully and clearly cover all the concerns raised and the doubts remaining in
the delegations' minds.  Nevertheless, the basic principles, best practices and operational guidelines
covered in the Statement should allow Members to establish and operationalize the TNC, which was
surely everyone's objective.  Following and consistent with these broad principles and guidelines,
more organizational and procedural details would have to be put in place, but the comfort level hadbeen raised enough to allow all Members to fully engage in the work ahead.  The outcome of the
preparations for the present meeting augured well for the strength of the organization.  With regard to
the question of transparency and sound and neutral management, his delegation wished to propose the
following three principles.  First, all negotiations , formal or informal, should be conducted and only
occur in negotiating fora.  Recommended decisions or  consensus of negotiating fora should only be
made in plenary meetings.  Secondly, Chairs, or in their absence Vice-Chairs, should be fully
responsible for the substantive part of the negotiating process under their respective jurisdictions.  TheTNC Chairman should not interfere in these substantive discussions in one way or another, nor should
he resort to so-called "Friends of the Chair" ostensibly to facilitate or promote consensus.  Chairs of
negotiating fora were themselves the facilitators.  Th irdly, at the start of the negotiating process, the
negotiating groups should draw up their respective terms of reference, particularly clarifying the
scope, the objectives and, where possible, the elements covered by the negotiations.  The GeneralCouncil should approve these terms of reference and only the General Council or the Ministers should
be able to amend them.
29. The representative of Mexico said that his country, as a developing country and as host of the
next Ministerial Conference, firmly believed in negotiating processes that were transparent and
inclusive.  This belief had been demonstrated during the Doha Ministerial Conference when his
Minister had been invited to act as facilitator in the discussions on the Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health.  At the start of his work in this respect, his Minister had invited all delegations to
participate actively in the elaboration of the Declaration, and during the process it had been necessary
to move to a larger room.  This was an illustration of the importance his country attached totransparency and inclusiveness.  However, he wi shed to make it clear that the present Mexican
government favoured simple and flexible legal structures.  It was for this reason that his delegation
had insisted that there were no better guidelines than those agreed by all Ministers in paragraphs 45 to
52 of the Doha Declaration.  Excess regulation would always lead to paralysis, which was surely not
what was wanted by Members in this organiza tion.  A few days previously, President Fox had
announced a complete review of business in Mexic o, following which companies were starting up in
very short time-periods such as 24 hours.  This was the kind of approach needed in WTO.Nevertheless, his delegation had now accepted the elaboration of the present principles and practices
in order to build confidence.  On the other hand, Me xico would not be flexible in any way with regard
to respecting the time-frames set out in the Doha Declaration.
30. The representative of Panama said that the multilateral trading system had been strengthened
by the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration in Doha.  It was now important to maintain the
momentum started in Doha, in particular in the light of the global economic situation.  For these
reasons, his delegation agreed with the Chairman's Statement.  His delegation proposed that the TNC
recommend to the General Council the rapid establishment of the Working Groups on Trade, Debt
and Finance and on Trade and Transfer of Technology so that Ministers would be able to evaluate theresult of the work in these areas with a view to considering further work or negotiations.  With regard
to the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies, the appointments should respect the criteria of
geographical distribution and level of development, and ensure continuity to allow the negotiations to
be concluded within the time-frames set by Ministers.  The work schedule of the TNC should include
short and medium-term benchmarks to allow the General Council to evaluate the progress of work onthe basis of reports by the negotiating bodies.  An annual schedule of meetings should also be set, to
allow governments to plan the attendance of experts from capital at important meetings.
31. The representative of Switzerland said that the appointment of the Director-General ex officio
as Chairman of the TNC was the proof of the realis m and wisdom of the Members of this organizationTN/C/M/1
Page 11
and demonstrated their confidence in the institution.  This appointment was the most practical solution
and would assure continuity in the leadership of the negotiations.  The TNC would now be able to
fulfill the supervisory role assigned to it by Ministers at Doha, ensuring the transparency of the
negotiating process and evaluating the balance across the different negotiations.  His delegation was
satisfied that the arrangements for the work that had been elaborated would not unreasonably limit theChairpersons of the negotiating bodies, who should  be able to choose their own methods aimed at
promoting consensus, while respecting the parameters of the principles and practices, and overall
transparency.  With regard to geographical indications, his delegation and others had also submitted a
paper during the Doha Ministerial Conference setting out their joint position on this issue.
32. The representative of Egypt said that successful outcome of the work of the previous days
aimed at elaborating the Chairman's Statement boded well for the work ahead.  The TNC was now on
the right track to begin its work in earnest, which s hould be as soon as possible in view of the heavy
and substantial agenda set by Ministers in Doha.  Among the principles and practices endorsed by the
TNC, his delegation hoped that the principle of transparency would always permeate the work of the
TNC and its subsidiary bodies.  Also important were the principles of having, as far as possible, just
one negotiating body meeting at a time, that of having the different positions reflected in the reportingprocess, and that of minutes being distributed expeditiously.
33. The representative of the Czech Republic said that there was no doubt about the importance
of the present meeting.  Ministers had given their Geneva-based representatives a lot of work and only
three years to complete the negotiations.  His delega tion took this timetable very seriously.  The task
of the present meeting was to get the process right, and his delegation was happy that it had been able
to comply with this task by agreeing on certain principles and practices, appointing the Chairperson
and agreeing on a negotiating structure.  On the question of the negotiating structure, he wished to
reiterate that his delegation had been flexible on whether to create new negotiating groups or use the
existing bodies meeting in special sessions.  However, it had always stressed the need for trulydedicated bodies, which, on the one hand, would have the potential to produce concrete results and,
on the other hand, would not detract from the regular WTO work that had to proceed on schedule.  It
had also promoted a consistent approach towards the negotiating structure in which all negotiating
subjects would receive the same treatment – appointment of Chairpersons, reporting to the TNC and
so on.  His delegation believed that such an approach was the only viable way to preserve the
principle of a single undertaking which had been agreed at Doha.
34. The negotiating structure which the TNC had just agreed to and which was rooted in the
process of intensive consultations conducted by the General Council Chairman, had some important
weak points.  However, it seemed to be the maximum that could be achieved at this point in time,
without running the risk of rewriting the Ministeria l Declaration.  It was a step forward to make the
Declaration operational and start the ball rolling.  Moreover, his delegation had been reassured by theChairman's response to the question posed by Bulgaria regarding the issue of the extension of
protection of geographical indications to products other than wines and spirits.  Apparently, the
manner in which this subject was going to be handled should not lead to another round of protracted
and inconclusive procedural games.  On the contrary, it would be necessary to have productive and
substantive meetings to comply with the mandate given by Ministers at Doha to launch negotiationson the issue of extension.  On the Singapore issues, namely investment, competition, transparency in
government procurement and trade facilitation, his delegation believed that the fact that the decision
on the structure remained silent on these topics did not detract from their importance.  Everyone
would certainly abide by the mandate given by Minist ers to work with a view to reaching, by the time
of the Fifth Ministerial Conference, consensus on modalities of negotiations in these areas.  Finally,the Czech Republic was fully committed to the process.  His delegation stood ready to work hard with
a view to proving that this institution was workin g well and that it could deliver the meaningful and
balanced results the outside world expected from it within a relatively short period of three years.TN/C/M/1
Page 12
35. The representative of India said that the Chairman's Statement was a kind of compromise.  It
did not satisfy all delegations, perhaps not even any of them, but everyone had tried their best to put
the document together.  It represented a first step in what would be a long and arduous process.
Interpreting some parts of the Doha Declaration would be a difficult task.  Reaching a consensus
conclusion would be an extremely difficult task that the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies wouldhave to address.  In the work of the previous few days, wide differences of interpretation had been
evident in some areas, such as implementation and geographical indications.  Tremendous effort
would be required by all concerned.  The Chairman's Statement set out the structure for the
negotiations, and in addition the Working Groups on trade and investment, trade and competition
policy and government procurement would continue their study processes in a focussed manner.  His
delegation hoped that everyone would participate in a constructive manner to see how these elements
could also be addressed.  His delegation did not consider that negotiations were commencing on theseissues, and this position was quite clear from the record of the meeting and from the Statement by the
Chairman at the Doha Ministerial Conference.  His delegation hoped that these issues would not
prove to be a major controversy which would derail a good part of the negotiations.  With regard to
the question of who would chair the TNC in the absence of the Director-General, his delegation
agreed with others that it would be appropriate that the Chairman of the General Council or aChairperson of a negotiating body chair the meeting in this situation, since no Vice-Chair had been
provided for.  His delegation looked forward to pa rticipating constructively in the work ahead, and it
hoped the time schedules would be adhered to and that it would be possible to bring the Work
Programme to a successful conclusion.
36. The representative of Bulgaria, referring to the Chairman's Statement, said that he had
received the document in the informal meeting just prior to the present meeting, and his delegation
had not been involved in its preparation.  In the section on transparency and process, the second bullet
referred to established best practices.  Such practices had never been established, and his delegation
could not agree to an institutionalization of something which had never been agreed upon through theback door.  His delegation would not describe what was being referred to as best practices.  These
principles by themselves did not constitute a solution to the problem of internal transparency.  For
such a solution much more was needed, including some concrete specific steps which had already
been proposed but never implemented.  It was also doubtful whether what was being referred to were
practices, since the principles concerned had not been consistently followed.  One example was the
preparations for the present meeting.  His delegation ha d made it clear that it wished to be involved in
the informal consultations on the negotiating structure and other aspects, but it had been excludedfrom those consultations and its views were not reflected.  The state of internal transparency in the
organization needed to be improved.  His delegation could not agree that the problem of transparency
be dealt with by a simple reference to a statement by the Chairman of the General Council not
previously agreed to by Members.  The problem of transparency in the negotiations needed to be dealt
with in a much more specific way through the adop tion of clear and explicit rules.  He wished to
express some ideas on such rules:  (a) A discussion in the negotiating bodies must be initiated by
proposals circulated to all Members.  Chairpersons should not engage in any small group or bilateral
meetings at the stage of preparation of proposals as this would be seen as being incompatible with
their neutrality and independence.  The preparation of proposals should be mainly a matter for
Members and groups of Members, and no small group meetings by the Chair should take place beforea proposal was circulated to all Members.  (b) Proposals for formal decisions or amendments to them
should be circulated to all Members not later than the convening notice for the respective meeting.  It
was unacceptable to his delegation that it received draft decisions at the meeting itself, as at the
present meeting.  This was a violation of the current rules of procedure of the General Council.  (c)
Minutes of formal and informal discussions should be circulated promptly and in no case later thanten days after the respective meeting.  (d) Materials for the negotiations including any proposals
would be distributed also electronically.  (e)  His delegation wished that there should be not more than
one meeting of negotiating bodies at the same time.TN/C/M/1
Page 13
37. Turning to the proposals in part C of the Chairman's Statement, his delegation had agreed to
the proposal under agenda item 1 and noted that it was not a precedent for the future.  This implied,
however, a new and enhanced role for the Director-General not foreseen in the Marrakesh Agreement.
His delegation believed that this decision made it even more important to adopt procedures for the
appointment of Directors-General.  Such proced ures should have been adopted by September 2000,
and it was high time that the General Council returned to this matter and set, as a beginning, a new
deadline for the adoption of such procedures.  On agenda item 2, his delegation had agreed to the
Chairman's proposal only in order not to delay the adoption of the decision.  Unfortunately, his
delegation had not been consulted on this proposal before the informal meeting of the preceding day,
and it did not believe that this was good arrangement because it did not treat all negotiating subjects in
an equal and consistent way.  It also separated issues that belonged together and put together issues
which had nothing to do with each other as far as their substance was concerned.  The logic of theDoha Declaration was that where there was a specific mandate, implementation issues would be dealt
with under that mandate.  So it should have been lo gical that both the establishment of a register for
geographical indications and the extension of the additional protection to other products be dealt with
by a single negotiating body.  Nevertheless, his delegation was prepared to accept the Chairman's
proposal because it was assured that there would be a substantive discussion on geographicalindications in the TRIPS Council and that there would be no repetition of the useless discussions of
the previous two years on mandates and procedures.  In the view of his delegation, a substantive
debate must include a discussion on the modalities for the extension of the additional protection for
geographical indications under Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to products other than wines and
spirits with a view to proposing such modalities to  the TNC.  His delegation did not agree with the
statement by Argentina.  He wished to recall that, at Doha, his delegation with others had expressed
their position that there was a clear negotiating mandate for the extension of the additional protection
for geographical indications as reflected in communications WT/MIN(01)/W/9 and 11.  As reflected
in WT/MIN(01)/SR/9, it was only on the basis of the understandings expressed, inter alia , in these
two communications that his delegation had been prepared to accept the Doha Declaration.
38. The representative of Jamaica emphasized his delegation's commitment to the mandate and
time-frames agreed by Ministers at Doha and said that in paragraphs 45 to 52 of the Doha
Declaration, Ministers had established the foundation of a negotiating structure which delegations had
further elaborated.  Ministers had also provided important political direction regarding the nature of
the process upon which Members were about to embark.  In paragraph 49, Ministers had stated that
"The negotiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner among participants, in order to facilitatethe effective participation of all.  They shall be conducted with a view to ensuring benefits to all
participants and to achieving an overall balance in the outcome of the negotiations".  In making this
affirmation Ministers had made a clear link between process and substantive outcome.  Developing
guidelines and procedures would ensure the fullest possible adherence to the Doha Declaration from
the outset.  Although some delegations had expressed concern over what was perceived as eitherprocedural quibbling or the imposition of too ma ny procedures, Jamaica remained convinced that
clear rules and transparent guidelines would contribute to efficiency through clarity and predictability.
Too much flexibility and too much vagueness could be counterproductive.  Although the current
guidelines were not ideal they nevertheless represente d an important step in the right direction in this
organization.  Although his delegation could accept the guidelines, Jamaica believed that theChairman of the TNC should have been drawn from the ranks of Members.  There were sound
institutional reasons for having a Member chair the body that supervised negotiations amongst
Members.  This did not mean that the Director-General and the Secretariat would not have an
important role to play in respect of the post-Doha negotiating agenda, and the wider post-Doha
process.  Jamaica fully supported a meaningful role for the Director-General of the organization, butnot necessarily as the Chairman of the TNC.  However, his delegation accepted the decision on this
matter taken by the membership as a whole.
39. A second important issue for Jamaica appeared in section B under the heading "Chairpersons
of the TNC and Negotiating Bodies".  His delegation was not fully reassured by the third indent,TN/C/M/1
Page 14
relating to reports to higher bodies by Chairpersons.  Without seeking in any way to tie the hands of
Chairpersons, who must naturally show initiative in seeking to arrive at consensus, Jamaica believed
that when consensus could not be attained, not only the regular reports transmitted to higher bodies,
but also the drafts of any negotiating texts, should indicate or reflect the differing positions that may
have precluded consensus.  A third area related to balance in the selection of Chairpersons.  Hisdelegation was convinced that the issue of an overall balance that encompassed both regular bodies
and the negotiating bodies was important and as result the responsibility for such consultations, and
for developing a slate of names, should reside with the Chairman of the General Council.  The
Chairman's Statement could have been clearer on this.  A fourth matter of importance for his
delegation related to the records of meetings and he urged the Secretariat to be as helpful and as
creative as possible in taking what the guidelines listed as "all possible steps to ensure the prompt and
efficient dissemination of information relating to the negotiations, to non-resident and smallermissions in particular".  Jamaica remained confid ent that the Secretariat would respond as fully as
possible to this need.
40. The representative of Peru supported the principles that would govern the activities of the
Chairman of the TNC and the negotiating bodies throughout the negotiations.  He recalled his
delegation's longstanding support for close cooperation between the Chairman of the TNC and the
Chairman of the General Council.  The role of the General Council should be to supervise overall
progress in the negotiations and the various subsidiary bodies should work in a coordinated and
complementary fashion.  Peru appreciated the fact that there would be a mechanism to ensure that
there would not be simultaneous negotiations so as to facilitate the effective participation by alldelegations and in particular smaller delegations.  He expressed support for the Chairman's proposal
that the Director-General should be appointed to chair the TNC in an ex officio  capacity given the
many advantages of this arrangement.  Selecting the Director-General to chair the TNC would provide
continuity to the negotiating process and would pre-empt extensive negotiations over other possible
candidates.  This arrangement would also provide the Secretariat, and in particular the Director-General, with a very active role and would ensure neutrality and independence.  Since there would be
a change of Director-General during the negotiations, it would be useful to have a mechanism that
would allow the incoming Director-General to be fully informed of progress in the negotiations well
in advance so as to ensure that the transfer would be efficient and smooth.  Peru supported the
structure of the negotiations as outlined by the Chairman, including the establishment of negotiating
bodies.  Nevertheless, it was reasonable for developing countries to argue that existing WTO bodies
should be used as far as possible and that Members should avoid creating a great number of newnegotiating bodies.  At the same time it was important to ensure the necessary division of labour in
specialized areas.  With respect to the selection of the Chairs for the negotiating bodies his delegation
preferred these to be representatives of delegations in Geneva.  However, there could be justification
for selecting other appropriate individuals with special qualifications.  These Chairpersons should
serve until the Fifth Ministerial Conference to ensure continuity and there should be balance,including geographical, in the distribution of the posts of Chairpersons to ensure the participation of
developing countries in the conduct of negotiations.  Special attention would have to be given to
ensuring the broad and balanced participation of all Members throughout the negotiating process,
including in consultations.  Peru was confident that Members of the WTO would be able to assume
their responsibilities and establish the necessary impetus to avoid getting bogged down in questions ofprocedure and to move forward on the substantive negotiations as soon as possible.
41. The representative of the Slovak Republic welcomed the inclusion of the paragraphs on
transparency which would facilitate the participation of all Members in future negotiations.
Negotiations conducted in a transparent, efficient and constructive spirit would assist Members inachieving the objectives set out in the Ministerial Declaration.  The Slovak Republic supported the
structure of negotiations as outlined in the Chairman's Statement and was in favour of organizing
back-to-back meetings of the regular and negotiating bodies whenever possible in order to facilitate
the work of both capital-based as well as Geneva-based officials.  In light of the results of this
meeting Members could now focus on the prompt start of negotiations.TN/C/M/1
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42. The representative of China said that his delegation believed that since the WTO was a rules-
based organization Members needed rules and principles to guide the work of the TNC and its
subsidiary bodies.  Many delegations had often spoken about the signals that should be sent out to the
international community from Members' deliberations in this organization and through their action onthese rules and principles the message that had gone out was the correct one.  If the first official TNC
meeting had been held earlier, Members would not have been able to send out a correct message.  He
emphasized that all work within each and every intergovernmental body remained the business of
Members.  China was therefore of the view that Chairpersons of all these bodies should, without
exception, be appointed from among Members.  To facilitate the early start of the work of the TNC,
China had adopted a flexible attitude towards th e chairmanship of the TNC.  However, as the
Chairman had clearly indicated in his statement, appointing the Director-General in an ex-officio
capacity to chair the TNC did not create a precedent for the future.  In concluding, he said that with
the ground rules for  the work of the TNC and its subsidiary bodies now established, China was
looking forward to cooperating with other Member s for the completion of other related preparations
so as to start the substantive negotiations at an early date.
43. The representative of Argentina, on behalf of 
Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile, expressed his
satisfaction that Members had managed to keep the momentum of the process initiated by the Doha
Declaration.  He was convinced of the importance of complying with what had been agreed at the
Ministerial Conference in Doha, including respecting the established deadlines.  The appointment of
the Director-General to chair the TNC in an ex officio  capacity was the decision that best respected the
criteria of functional continuity and access, and would ensure the strengthening of the WTO as an
institution.  This decision would also strengthen the negotiating structure overall.  It was in the
interest of all Members that there would be full participation by developing countries and this meant
that Members should avoid parallel structures, overlapping functions or having multiple negotiating
bodies scheduled at the same time.  The decisions Members had taken corresponded to these needs.The separate treatment for negotiations on improvements and clarifications to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding in Special Sessions was also appropriate.  He said that it was clear that the TNC should
function under the auspices of the General Council and supported the establishment of guidelines to
ensure the proper methodology and organizational basis for the negotiations.  Decisions taken at Doha
had set a final deadline in January 2005 and a number of other intermediate deadlines which Members
should adhere to.  He emphasized the full commitment of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile to move
forward on the election of the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies.
44. The representative of Morocco said that the Chairman's Statement was a true reflection of
interest and political will on the part of all Members.  He welcomed the fact that the positions his
delegation had defended throughout this process in solidarity with developing countries, and in
particular with the African countries were reflecte d in the statement.  This was a tribute to the
flexibility of all parties involved.  He stressed the importance of ensuring that the TNC could embark
on its work promptly  and said that Members had provided the best possible shape to the Doha
Declaration adopted by Ministers in Doha.  Members had succeeded in establishing positive modus
operandi  which would allow negotiations to commence without delay.  In concluding, he
congratulated the Director-General and assured him of Morocco's support in carrying out his duties.
45. The representative of Colombia agreed with Mexico that excess regulations could impede the
conduct of negotiations.  Nevertheless, the principles and practices endorsed by all Members would
contribute to building confidence.  He welcomed th e appointment of the Director-General to chair the
TNC since this would both strengthen the organization and facilitate negotiations.  His delegationbelieved that it was important from the perspective of continuity to ensure an appropriate transition
from one Director-General to another.  He disagreed with a previous delegation which had called into
question the transparency of this process, since it had been obvious to all Members that the Chairman
had maintained the highest regard for the need for transparency in all his work.TN/C/M/1
Page 16
46. The representative of Hungary said that Members, in a little over two-and-half months, had
succeeded in creating the conditions for the launching of actual negotiations which in the case of the
Uruguay Round had taken six months.  However, delegations still had to select the Chairpersons of
the individual negotiating bodies.  He said that proportionality and representation in consultations was
important and Hungary as well as other easter n and central European delegations had not been
entirely satisfied in this regard in the preparations  for Doha and at the Ministerial Conference itself.
He hoped that all interested delegations that wished to take active part in deliberations would be
allowed to do so and that his region would be taken into account when the distribution of
chairmanships was considered.  Hungary was pleased to see that the issue of TRIPS-related questions
had found a place and that a negotiating forum had been ensured.  He took note of the sections dealing
with geographical indications and welcomed the Chairman's affirmation that a substantive debate on
this issue would take place in the TRIPS Council.  He said that, despite the fact that certain
delegations had questioned the Chairman's answer on this, his delegation remained convinced that it
was for Members to decide if there would be substantive talks on any issue.
47. The representative of Uganda, on behalf of the LDCs, thanked the Chairman for his efforts to
ensure that the work of the TNC could begin as mandated by Ministers in paragraph 46 of Doha
Ministerial Declaration and commended the transparent and inclusive manner in which consultations
had been undertaken.  He expressed appreciation for the fact that the Chairman had genuinely listened
to the views of LDCs and hoped that this practice wo uld be emulated in the future work of the TNC.
The LDCs had an important stake in the negotiations  and were determined to participate in shaping
the outcome.  He referred to a statement by Tanzania on behalf of the LDCs on 19 December 2001 inwhich the LDC position on the Chairmanship of TNC and the arrangements for its work had been
outlined.  He said that the LDCs could join the consensus to appoint the Director-General, ex officio,
as Chairman of the TNC on the understanding that this was on an exceptional basis and created no
precedent.  The TNC, operating under the authority of the General Council, as well as the negotiating
bodies established under the TNC, were intergovernmental bodies and as such should be chaired byrepresentatives of Members.  This would ensure membership control and uphold the Member-driven
nature which Members cherished and often emphasized.  The Secretariat would continue to provide
support services and advise as was done in other international organizations as well as was current
practice with respect to other WTO bodies, including the Ministerial Conference.  He disagreed with
those who had advocated following the practice of previous GATT Rounds  where the Director-
General had chaired the negotiations.  Since January 1995, the WTO had become a fully-fledged
international organization with a clear distinction between the role of the Secretariat and theintergovernmental bodies consisting of representatives of Member governments.  He said that there
were other aspects of the GATT culture which Members should relinquish and modernize to bring
them in line with the intergovernmental character of WTO as an international organization.  He noted
that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) had successfully negotiated a number of Treaties and Conventions which requiredenforcement under the TRIPS Agreement.  Those Negotiations had always been presided over by
representatives of Members with the support of a Secretariat.  It had never been suggested that the
Directors-General of those organizations should pres ide over negotiations among Members.  He noted
that such an approach ensured that the organizations were Member-driven rather than Secretariat-
driven and allowed a Secretariat to advise objectively the implications of the suggested proposals.
48. The LDCs also believed that it would have been useful to have the Vice-Chairpersons of
individual negotiating groups.  Such Vice-Chairp ersons could have carried out consultations in
specific areas and would have deputized for the Chairpersons when necessary.  Such an arrangement
would not have been disruptive but would have facilitated the smooth operation of the negotiatinggroups.  He emphasized that the LDCs were committed to concluding negotiations within the deadline
agreed at Doha.  The LDCs did not wish to stand in the way of a consensus and were prepared to
compromise on a clear understanding that Members agreed on very clear guidelines with regard to the
negotiating process for the TNC and the other negotiating bodies.  These guidelines had to be binding
to ensure a predictable, transparent, inclusive and accountable negotiating process.  While they wouldTN/C/M/1
Page 17
have preferred clearer guidelines they also recognized  the need for flexibility.  During the preparatory
process for Doha, the LDCs had requested that the post-Doha work program should take into account
the constraints faced by these delegations and in this light, the LDCs expected the negotiations to be
organized in such a way that not more than one meeting should take place at the same time.  He
indicated that the LDCs would request the Chairman of the TNC and Chairpersons of the negotiatingbodies to take into account their special constraints.  In concluding, he expressed satisfaction that
Members had agreed on a set of ground rules regarding principles and practices to guide the work of
TNC and the negotiating bodies.  These rules recognized that the TNC should report periodically to
the General Council.  It would remain for the Genera l Council to report to the Ministerial Conference.
He noted that the LDCs believed that the level of comfort provided for in the ground rules was
adequate for them to join the consensus.
49. The representative of Botswana associated her delegation with the statement made by
Zimbabwe on behalf of the African Group and the statements by Tanzania and Uganda on behalf of
the least-developed and other developing countries.  Her delegation had initially expressed serious
reservations about the creation of additional negotiating bodies which would duplicate or overlap with
existing bodies and as a result stretch the capacities of smaller delegations.  Such concerns were stillan issue since, in practice, the TNC duplicated the work of the General Council.  The TNC was
effectively the General Council, except for differences in name and in the Chairpersons thus resulting
in a situation where the General Council would be reporting to itself.  She emphasized that consensus,
transparency and inclusiveness should continue to be the hallmarks of WTO work.  She recalled that
during consultations on the chairmanship of the TNC her delegation had spoken strongly in favour ofthe chairmanship of the TNC falling to a Geneva-based representative of a Member on a rotational
basis.  Such an arrangement would have been consistent with the member-driven and
intergovernmental nature of the WTO.  Making the WTO Director-General Chairman of the TNC
would seriously compromise the impartiality and objectivity of the Secretariat in the negotiating
process.  She noted that since the majority viewpoint appeared to be for the WTO Director-General tobe appointed Chairman of the TNC in an ex officio  capacity, her delegation would go along with that
consensus.  This arrangement should, however, not create a precedent for the future.  In concluding,
she endorsed the principles and practices set out in Section B of the Chairman's Statement and assured
the Director-General of her delegation's full support and assistance in the execution of his mandate.
Botswana was eager to get the negotiations off to a good and immediate start in order to achieve the
completion of these negotiations within the three-year time-frame set by Ministers at Doha.
50. The representative of Hong Kong, China said that the Chairman's Statement represented a
good balance between taking into account the concerns of a number of developing Members on the
principles and practices of the negotiating process and avoiding placing a straight-jacket on the
process.  It was positive that Members had now reached a consensus on the TNC chairmanship.  This
was a practical arrangement which would ensure continuity in the negotiating process and enable it tostart quickly.  Ministers at Doha had set an ambitious agenda under a tight deadline and Members
were now off to a relatively smooth start.  However, as others had pointed out, there were greater
challenges ahead.  He felt confident that the current as well as the incoming Director-General would
work closely with the General Council Chairman, the Chairpersons of the negotiating bodies and
indeed the whole membership in ensuring that Members would be able to meet these challengessuccessfully over the next three years.
51. The representative of Cuba said that her delegation's position on the appointment of the
Chairman of the TNC as well as on the rules of procedure which should govern the negotiations and
work provided for in the Doha declaration was reflected in document TN/C/W/2.  Her delegationwished to reiterate some of the concerns which had been expressed by the Cuban Minister at the
Ministerial Conference in Doha with respect to lack of transparency.  She expressed hope that the
negotiating process would restore confidence in the WTO.  This would be achieved not only through
the full participation of all countries and improved dissemination of information, but also through a
truly interactive process where delegations would have the possibility to have their interests taken intoTN/C/M/1
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account.  Although the Chairman's Statement did no t mention the issues of trade, debt and finance,
trade and transfer of technology, and small and medium-sized economies, Cuba hoped that these
would receive the treatment accorded to them in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Cuba agreed with
India that only at the Fifth Ministerial Conference would Members decide, by consensus, whether to
proceed with negotiations on the Singapore issues.  In the meantime, Members should continue toexchange information and clarify these complex issues.  In concluding, she emphasized Cuba's
commitment to participate constructively to complete the Doha mandate.
52. The representative of Slovenia said that Slovenia believed that all negotiating subjects should
receive equal treatment in the negotiations.  This would have to be reflected in the decision on the
structure of the negotiations.  Nevertheless, his delegation supported the proposed negotiating
structure and emphasized that the issue of geographical indications would be duly and substantiallyaddressed in regular meetings of the TRIPS Council on the basis of paragraphs 12 and 18 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.  He said that while the Chairman's Statement was important to begin
negotiations in earnest, it did not in any way re-write or overrule the Ministerial Decisions.  He
strongly disagreed with the comments made previously by one delegation.  No negotiating group
could decide on its own how to treat different su bjects, but would have to follow the mandate given
by the Ministers.
53. The representative of Chile said that the TNC had rendered a service to itself by appointing
the Director-General as this would strengthen the intergovernmental character of the WTO as well as
the institution itself.  He agreed with Jamaica that the guiding principles and procedures wouldcontribute positively to the substantive negotiations.  However, as Mexico had pointed out, over-
regulation of the negotiating process could also be a stumbling-block.  It would be important for
Members to strike a good balance in this respect.  He said that while he agreed with the Philippines
that informal and formal negotiations should be held in their appropriate fora, this would not work in
an area such as market access where negotiations remained essentially bilateral.  This demonstratedthat some flexibility would be needed.  He disagreed with Bulgaria with respect to the lack of
transparency of the consultation process and on his proposals for a number of  rules in this area.  He
also did not agree with Bulgaria's comments on ge ographical indications.  He agreed with Jamaica
concerning the importance of dissemination of info rmation.  The circulation of minutes of meetings
was in some ways different from other initiatives to  disseminate information to delegations that did
not have representation in Geneva or smaller missions with capacity constraints.  He believed that
some imaginative thinking and the use of certain electronic or audiovisual media could improve thelevel of participation of many Members of the WTO.
54. The representative of Turkey congratulated the Chairman for having cleared the way for
negotiations to take place.
55. The Chairman said that the previous three weeks of concentrated work had been a worthwhile
exercise, with the WTO off to a good start in the negotiations.  He thanked all delegations for their
dedication, patience, flexibility and considerable sense of forbearance throughout the consultations.
He was confident that if Members could maintain this approach, the negotiations and the overall work
programme could make good progress.  On the issue of the next meeting of the TNC, he said that theTNC Chairman would let delegations know his inte ntions in this regard in the near future.
56. The General Council took note of the statements.
_______________TN/C/M/1
Page 19
ANNEX I
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/MIN(01)/W/8
12 November 2001
(01-5726)
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
Fourth Session
Doha, 9 - 13 November 2001Original:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM ARGENTINA REGARDING PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 12
OF THE DRAFT MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
Communication from Argentina
The following communication, dated 12 November 2001, has been received from the
Secretary of Trade and International Economic Relations and Consular Affairs of Argentina, with the
request that it be circulated as an official document of the Fourth Ministerial Conference.
_______________
I have the pleasure to write to you regarding paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial
Declaration, to the extent they refer to the issue of geographical indications.
Argentina wishes to state very clearly its understanding of these two paragraphs, as follows:We understand that paragraph 18 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration is incorrectly drafted in
legal terms since it refers to "the extension of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to
products other than wines and spirits".  In this regard, we recall that Article 23 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides for the protection of geographical indications only in relation to wines andspirits.  There is no provision whatsoever in the WTO Agreements granting additional protection of
geographical indications to products other than wines and spirits nor any agreed mandate to negotiate
the extension of this additional protection.
Consequently, this issue cannot be treated as an implementation issue and addressed pursuant
to paragraph 12.
Concerning paragraph 12, we understand that the reference to "outstanding implementation
issues" refers to the issues previously included in paragraphs 21 and 22 of document
Job(99)/5868/Rev.1, dated 19 October 1999.
In this regard, we would like to express our understanding that there is no agreement to
negotiate the "other outstanding implementation issues" referred to under (b) and that, by the end of
2002, consensus will be required in order to launch any negotiations on these issues.
_______________TN/C/M/1
Page 20
ANNEX II
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/58
21 December 2001
(01-6453)
Original:  English
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE (TNC)
AND RELATED ISSUES
Communication from Cuba, Dominica n Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Kenya,
Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe
The following communication has been received from the delegations of Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
_______________
1. In light of the mandate in paragraph 46 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, whereby the
TNC shall supervise the overall conduct of the negotiations, we would like to convey the following
considerations in relation to the setting up and operation of the TNC and its related bodies.  We hope
these considerations are seen as a constructive contribution by our delegations to realize the calls for
an increased participation of developing countries.  In this fashion, we expect that all elements of the
follow up of the Fourth Ministerial Conference will receive the same transparent, inclusive andmember-driven treatment that is called for in the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  In particular, this
should ensure that small missions are able to participate effectively in all elements of the WTO work
programme, including the new negotiations.  The first of those elements, and probably the most
important one, is the definition and establishment of the TNC.
I. ROLE OF GENERAL COUNCIL VIS-À-VIS  THE TNC
2. The General Council shall guide the work of the TNC in order to keep the negotiating process
under the supervision of the membership.  Therefore, it is proposed that:
(a) The TNC shall work in accordance with di rect instructions from the General Council.
(b) The TNC shall report to the General Council, at least once every 3 months.  The
General Council shall take stock of progress of the meetings and make an assessmentbefore agreeing to the next programme of negotiating meetings.
(c) All aspects of the negotiating procedures a nd structures of the TNC shall be adopted
by the General Council.TN/C/M/1
Page 21
II. NUMBER OF NEGOTIATING BODIES
3. Specific negotiating groups shall be kept to a minimum wherever possible, since the
proliferation of negotiating bodies is a major concern to developing countries, especially smaller
missions.  Therefore, it is proposed that:
(a) All negotiations should take place in special sessions of existing bodies.
(b) In the event new bodies are to be set up, the number should be kept to the minimum.
(c) The constraints of smaller missions shall be taken into account in developing a
programme of work and calendar of meetings.
(d) No more than one negotiating body shall meet at one time, even in informal mode.  A
reasonable time-gap shall be allowed between the meetings of the different bodies.
III. SELECTION OF CHAIRS AND THEIR ROLE
4. The General Council shall ensure that Chairs of the TNC and other relevant negotiating
bodies are selected in a fully transparent and inclusive manner which reflects a balanced and
proportional representation of the membership and ensures their active participation throughout the
process.  Therefore, it is proposed that
(a) Chairs and Vice-Chairs shall be selected as a result of an explicit consensus in formal
meetings.
(b) Distribution of Chairs and Vice-Chairs be tween developed and developing countries
shall proportionately reflect the present composition of the WTO membership.
(c) Chairs will be selected from the membership within the General Council.
(d) Chairs will be appointed for no longer than 1 year, with the possibility of re-election
if so decided by consensus.
(e) Whenever there is an appointment of a Chair from a developed country, the Vice-
Chair will be from a developing country who will take over the chairmanship after
the Chair's period is complete.
(f) The Chair shall coordinate negotiations in a neutral manner, and shall ensure that all
views are represented accurately.
IV. OTHER ISSUES
(a) All meeting minutes shall be an accurate and objective account of what was actually
said, and all opinions shall be recorded verbatim.  The minutes of each meeting shall
be made available to Members within 10 days of the conclusion of each meeting.
(b) All informal and other consultations on draft decisions and/or negotiating texts shall
be undertaken only in open-ended meetings.
(c) Any negotiating text shall be made available to all participants at least 2 weeks in
advance, in all three of the official languages of the WTO, in order to allow for
reasonable consideration in Geneva and by our authorities in capitals.TN/C/M/1
Page 22
(d) All disagreements shall be reflected in bracketed texts and/or alternative language
formulations.
(e) Before the end of the negotiations, an evaluation shall be undertaken, under the
supervision of the General Council, on the extent to which S&D Treatment objectives
have been attained and the balance in the outcomes of negotiations have been takeninto account, as set out in the Doha Declaration.
(f) Any mid-term review shall also consider the above points.
(g) If at any stage any text in any negotiating group is "opened", then all areas shall be
subject to modifications if required.
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Page 23
ANNEX III
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/C/W/2
29 January 2002
(02-0447)
Trade Negotiations Committee Original:  English
ORGANIZATION OF NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN THE DOHA
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION
Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, H onduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe1
The following communication, dated 28 January 2002, has been received from the Permanent
Mission of India.
_______________
5. The Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD) pr ovides that the overall conduct of the
negotiations shall be supervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), under the authority of theGeneral Council. The TNC shall establish appropriate negotiating mechanisms and supervise the
progress of the negotiations (para 46). DMD further provides that the negotiations shall be conducted
in a transparent manner among participants, in order to facilitate the effective participation of all
(para 49).
6. The organization of the negotiations, including the structure and the process, should fully
reflect the inter-governmental and member-driven character of the WTO.  The organization of the
work programme should be such that it facilitates and promotes effective participation by all theMembers in the negotiations.  The process should engender transparency and consensus-based
decision making.
(a) Role of TNC
- As envisaged in the DMD, the General Council should exercise overall supervision of the
functioning of the TNC;
- The negotiating procedures and structures of the TNC should be approved by the General
Council;
- The Chairperson of both the TNC and the Negotiating Groups that may be set up under the
TNC should be approved by the General Council;
- The TNC shall work in accordance with instructions from the General Council;
                                                     
1 This communication is without prejudice to the individual positions held by these countries on the
Chairmanship of the TNC.TN/C/M/1
Page 24
- The TNC shall report to the General Council on the progress of work in the various
negotiating groups after each of its meetings.  If required, a special session of the General
Council should be organized for this purpose;
- All negotiations should be conducted, as far as possible, in the special sessions of the existing
bodies.  We only envisage the setting up of two additional negotiating groups namely (i)
Rules & (ii) Market access for non-agricultural products.
(b) Negotiating Process
- All negotiations, informal or formal ones, should be conducted only in meetings that are open
to all members;
- Minutes of all meetings should be made available as soon as possible and in any case well in
advance of the next meeting of the group, in all official languages.  This would be essential so
that non-Geneva based Missions can be kept abreast of the negotiations.  This would also
facilitate Geneva based delegations that are not able to participate in particular meetings forwhatever reason;
- The Chairperson of the negotiating groups shall only submit negotiating texts, which have the
consensus of the group and not texts prepared on his own authority.  Negotiating texts should
be made available to participants, in all official languages, well in advance of the next date ofthe meeting at which the text is to be considered.  This would enable proper consideration of
the issues by the Members and provide sufficient time for delegations to consult with their
capitals;
- As negotiations progress, it will be the responsibility of each negotiating group, if necessary
with the assistance of a drafting group, the membership of which will be open ended, to draft
proposals for further consideration;
- Reports and draft decisions of the negotiating groups to be sent up to higher bodies, should be
agreed upon in the concerned negotiating body by consensus.  In case there is no consensus
on any issue, differing views of members, w ith alternate suggestions for decision, should be
reflected in the drafts to be sent up to higher bodies for decision.
(c) Role of Chairperson of TNC and Negotiating Bodies
- The chairpersons of the negotiating groups shall be elected by consensus from Geneva based 
Ambassadors;
- The chairperson shall ensure that the meetings of the groups are convened in accordance with 
the rules, procedures and guidelines established in this regard;
- They shall oversee the orderly conduct of the meeting.  On the conclusion of the meeting
chairpersons shall ensure that the minutes of the meetings are circulated to all the members
within a fortnight in all languages;
- The chairperson shall present the output of the drafting group, including any draft decision
and relevant papers, for the consideration of the negotiating group and the consideredoutcome of the negotiating group, at a subsequent stage, to the superior body;
- The chairperson of the TNC shall submit reports, which accurately reflect the deliberations in
the negotiating group.
__________