RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/AHG/W/4
27March 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-1227)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
AdHocGroup onImplementation
TOPICS 1,4,7AND OTHERS*
Proposals byVenezuela
Thefollowing communication, dated 12March 1997, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofVenezuela.
_______________
1. Treatment ofconfidential information
Withrespect tothetreatment ofconfidential information, wethinkthatitisnecessary toclarify
thewordingofArticle6.5oftheAnti-DumpingAgreement,sinceitlendsitselftovariousinterpretations.
According tothisArticle, "Any information which isbynature confidential ...orwhich isprovided
onaconfidential basis byparties toaninvestigation shall, upon good cause shown, betreated as
suchbytheauthorities". (Italics andboldadded.)
Asthispartially quoted provision stands, thecompetent administrative authorities could be
faced withtwotypes ofinformation forwhich confidentiality isrequested: (i)information which is
bynature confidential (e.g., many experts agree thatinformation oncosts isbynature confidential);
and(ii)information which isprovided onaconfidential basis byparties toaninvestigation ,i.e.,
information thatisnotconfidential bynature butwhose disclosure, forreasons oftrade secrecy or
strategy, could beofsignificant competitive advantage tothecompetitors oftheparty supplying the
information ortoathirdparty. Anumber ofquestions arisewhen theAgreement stipulates thatthe
request forconfidentiality should show good cause.
Theneedfortheapplicant toshowgoodcause forconfidential treatment under thesaidprovision
could beinterpreted asarising onlyinthecaseofinformation which bynature, orperse,isnot
confidential. Tothatend,wepropose thataclearer ideabegiven ofwhatisconsidered tobeinformation
which isbynature confidential, byproviding anillustrative, non-exhaustive list,toserve asareference
forthecompetent authorities, oftheinformation thatcould beconsidered confidential bynature .
Inthecaseofrequests forconfidential treatment ofinformation which isnotconfidential bynature,
ontheother hand, theapplicant would havetoshow good cause asstipulated intheAgreement.
*SeedocumentG/ADP/W/401fordescriptionsofthenumberedtopics.Theadditionaltopicsaredocumentation
oftheapplicationforinitiationofaninvestigation;noticeofandaccesstotheinformationofanA-Dinvestigation;
andreview fornewexporters.G/ADP/AHG/W/4
Page2
2. Initiation ofinvestigations exofficio (special circumstances)
Theterm"special circumstances" usedinArticle 5.6oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement israther
vague andcould leadtoconflicts between Member countries when anexofficio investigation isinitiated.
Inourview, consideration could begiven, inconnection withtheinitiation ofinvestigations
without priorapplication, tocircumstances inwhich thedomestic industry affected ishighly fragmented
anditscomponents areunable tojoinforces inorder tosubmit anapplication ortoparticipate asactive
complainants inaninvestigation, aswellastodomestic producers withlittleornothing intheway
ofeconomic resources.
Moreover, itshould bemade clearwhether initiation ofaninvestigation exofficio alsoapplies
toapplicationsmadebyothergovernmentagenciestothecompetentauthority,forexampleiftheMinistry
ofAgriculture requests theinitiation ofaninvestigation onimports ofagricultural products.
3. Informing theinterested parties ofthe"essential facts" before thefinaldetermination
Anexamination ofArticle 6.9oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, concerning theobligation to
inform allinterested parties oftheessential factsunder consideration which form thebasis forthe
decision whether toapply definitive measures, reveals aneedtoclarify certain basic elements.
Firstly, theArticle doesnotspecify thenature oftheinformation tobesupplied totheinterested
parties, anomission which could result inthesupply ofincomplete information bythecompetent
authority andcould haveanimpact ontheparties 'defence. Wethink thattheinformation orfacts
tobeincluded inthenotification inquestion should bespecified indetail.
Secondly, wehaveobserved thatthetime-limit within which thecompetent authorities must
inform theinterested parties oftheessential factsunder consideration forthedecision isquite vague
andunclear("...insufficienttime...").SincetheAgreementdoesnotprovideforanyspecifictime-limit
inthisconnection, thecompetent authorities arefreetointerpret theobligation astheyseefit,which
inmany cases would limit theinterested parties 'possibility todefend themselves. Itistherefore
necessarytospecify,ontheonehand,themomentintheproceedingsatwhichtheauthoritiesarerequired
toinform theinterested parties oftheessential facts(forexample, when theauthorities arrive atan
affirmative ornegative finaldetermination) and,ontheother hand, thetime-period available tothe
interested parties todefend theirinterests (forexample, 30daysfollowing thenotification oftheessential
facts).
Finally, itisimportant tostress thattheessential factsreferred toinArticle 6.9must inno
caseprejudge thefinaldecision about tobeadopted bythecompetent authorities. Consequently, we
think thatitisessential thatthereports oftheresults should belimited toabriefdescription ofthe
procedure carried outandthemethodology usedbythecompetent authority without mentioning the
determination thelatter hasreached.
4. Documentation oftheapplication forinitiation ofaninvestigation
With respect tothedocumentation tobeincluded inapplications fortheinitiation ofan
investigation aslaiddown inArticle 5.2oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, acertain lackofprecision
istobeseen. TheArticle expressly stipulates that"Simple assertion, unsubstantiated byrelevant
evidence ,cannot besufficient tomeettherequirements ofthisparagraph. Theapplication shallcontain
suchinformation asisreasonably available totheapplicant onthefollowing ..."(Italics andboldadded.)
Inother words, according totheArticle theevidence presented bytheinterested party mustberelevant
andtheinformation contained intheapplication reasonably available totheapplicant.G/ADP/AHG/W/4
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Obviously, thesense andthemeaning ofthislegalprovision isfarfromclear. Theexpression
"relevant evidence" which is"reasonably available totheapplicant" isquite vague andcould be
interpreted indifferent ways byMember countries.
5. Notice ofandaccess toinformation inananti-dumping investigation
Article 6.1.3 oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement stipulates thatthecompetent administrative
authorities shallprovide thefulltextoftheapplication totheexporters involved intheanti-dumping
investigation inquestion andtotheauthorities oftheexporting country.
Infact,thisprovision isnotatallclear, sinceitispossible tointerpret theterm"shall provide"
(i)inthesense ofsupplying theentire textoftheapplication, i.e.,alloftheinformation, evidence,
documents andannexes thattheapplicants havesubmitted tothecompetent authorities, which would
slowdown theinvestigation; and(ii)inthesense thattheparties expressly mentioned inthesaidarticle
would havefullaccess tothetextoftheapplication submitted bytheinterested parties assoonasthe
anti-dumping investigation hasbeeninitiated.
Intheinterests ofuniformity ofcriteria, wethink thatitwould bewisetoclarify themeaning
andscope oftheobligation inArticle 6.1.3 oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, soastoavoid possible
differences ofinterpretation.
6. Review fornewexporters
Article 9.5oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement suggests thattheadministrative authorities must
promptlycarryoutareviewforexportersaffectedbyananti-dumpingdutywhodonothaveanindividual
ratebecause theydidnotcarry outanyexports during theperiod oftheinvestigation (review fornew
exporters). Thisreview iscarried outoncondition thattheexporters inquestion canshow thatthey
arenotrelated toanyofthesuppliers whoaresubject todefinitive anti-dumping duties.
Theabove-mentioned provision alsostipulates thatreview fornewexporters shallbeinitiated
andcarried outonanaccelerated basis,compared tonormal dutyassessment andreview proceedings
intheimporting Member.
Inaddition, thisArticle oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement issilent, inthisparticular area, as
totheminimum time-period thatthecompetent authorities should allow, once theanti-dumping
investigation hasbeenconcluded, toreceive andaccept requests relating toreviews fornewexporters.
Thecompetent administrative authorities clearly haveconsiderable leeway inapplying the
provisions ofArticle 9.5oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement. Inotherwords, theArticle isopentovarious
conflictinginterpretations,and"newexporters"wishingtoenteraparticularmarketwouldfaceadefinite
lackoflegalsafety, andsobedeterred fromcarrying outtheirwishtoselltheirproducts onthatmarket.
Wethink itappropriate toidentify, define andclarify theabove instances oflackofprecision
intheAgreement.