 
  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/SPS/GEN/517 
19 October 2004 
 (04-4410) 
Committee on Sanitary a nd Phytosanitary Measures Original:   English 
  
 
  
TIAKINA AOTEAROA - PROTECT NEW ZEALAND:  THE BIOSECURITY  
STRATEGY FOR NEW ZEALAND 
 
Submission by New Zealand
 
   The following communication, received on 13 Octo ber 2004, is being circulated at the request 
of the Delegation of New Zealand. 
 
 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. In October 2001, New Zealand informed th e SPS Committee (G/SPS/GEN/284), that the New 
Zealand Government was developing a "Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand” which aimed to provide direction and guidance for all agencies involved in biosecurity. 
2. The purpose of this submission is to provide an  update on developments in the adoption and 
implementation of the Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand. 
II. BIOSECURITY STRATEGY FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A. O
UTCOMES  
3. The Biosecurity Strategy concludes that New Ze aland’s biosecurity system is well developed 
with many activities in which it excels, from border inspection through to pest management.  It also 
identifies areas, however, where improvement is re quired.  These include (but are not limited to) a 
need for clarified roles and accountabilities, better coordination between a nd within the different 
levels of government, and improved prioritisation and decision-making.  
4. Recommendations from the Biosecurity Strategy are provided in the form of ten "first steps" 
and a set of 57 "expectations".  The first ten steps involve specific changes to the biosecurity system. 
They are to:  
(a) Make Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) clearly accountable for overall 
management of the whole biosecurity syst em, on behalf of all New Zealanders;  
(b) Put in place the necessary systems, struct ures and capabilities within MAF to support 
its role, starting with strong strategic capability;  G/SPS/GEN/517 
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 (c) Establish governance mechanisms (includi ng a reconstituted Biosecurity Council and 
chief executives’ forum) to support this strategy’s implementation and monitor 
performance;  
(d) Encourage all New Zealanders to support and participate in biosecurity through a 
social marketing programme;  
(e) Identify ways to involve Maori fully in biosecurity issues and decisions, nationally 
and locally;  
(f) Identify, prioritize and review current and emerging risks – from pre-border to pest 
management and across aquatic and terrestrial environments;  
(g) Establish national leadership and c oordination of pest management;  
(h) Recognize the contribution of science to biosecurity (strategically and operationally) 
and fund it properly;  
(i) Ensure decision-making processes take account of risks to a number of factors 
including the economy, biodiversity, and human health in setting priorities;  and  
(j) Increase funding over the next five years for priority areas, and build organizational 
capability across the system. 
B. A
DOPTION  
5. In August 2003, the Government endorsed the Biosecurity Strategy and agreed that the 
recommendations set out in the Biosecurity Strategy  should form the basis for improvements to New 
Zealand's biosecurity system over the next five years.  
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
6. The Biosecurity Strategy outlined a comprehe nsive set of expectations of the future 
performance of the biosecurity system.  Whilst acknowledging that the New Zealand biosecurity 
system is world leading in many respects, the Biosecurity Strategy also notes areas in which 
performance needs to be improved.  Pressure on the system had been building from two main sources: 
more travellers, new markets and increased volume of trade; and greater expectations and scope, 
particularly around biodiversity and human health.  The Biosecurity Strategy indicated that the 
biosecurity system had not adapted fast enough to  these new challenges.  Key concerns included 
inadequate information analysis and dissemination,  weak strategic capability, unrealised opportunities 
for process improvement and failure to learn lessons from experience.   
7. The biosecurity system is evolving and biosecu rity issues and considerations have become 
increasingly complex and public.  Public and political expectations about the nature of the system 
have changed, requiring changes in cap ability, resourcing and priorities.   
8. Given this change in the environment and these expectations, it was clear that some far-
reaching organizational change was essential.  The current biosecurity structure and processes needed 
to be re-shaped and strengthened.  The new structur e aims to improve the c onsistency and quality of 
the provision of biosecurity services, in a newly-fo cused and functional manner.  This will require 
growth in capability and in functions.  Some additi onal funding has already been sought and obtained.    G/SPS/GEN/517 
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 9. New ways of working, communication processe s and behaviour will also be needed to 
successfully implement the Biosecurity Strategy.  Improvements in quality and focus will occur not 
just because of additional resources, but importantly  through working smarter and more effectively.  
The adoption of new ways of working, developm ent and refinement of processes, more robust 
analysis of data, improved use of  technology and formalising learning from experience will be needed 
to support the new structure.  Formal project ma nagement disciplines and methodologies will be a key 
part of the operation of the new structure a nd will underpin many technical and management 
processes. 
A. NEW BIOSECURITY AGENCY – BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND  
10. The existing Biosecurity Authority within MA F will be restructured on a "points of 
intervention" approach based on three streams of  activity – pre clearance, post clearance and policy 
and business development. 
11. The Pre Clearance Directorate will have specific responsibility and accountability for 
managing biosecurity risks up to the point they enter New Zealand.  For imported goods this corresponds to the time when they are given biosecu rity clearance.  For passively imported organisms 
this means the time before they arrive in New Ze aland and begin to establish.  This will include 
responsibility for new organisms enforcement and contai nment.  The Pre Clearance Directorate is also 
accountable for the majority of the biosecurity -related services required for the export of New 
Zealand products. 
12. The Post Clearance Directorate will be responsib le for managing "residual" biosecurity risks, 
that is risks that cannot be managed by pre clearance activities or that remain after pre clearance 
conditions have been met, and/or where risk is  already present within New Zealand.  The broad 
categories of responsibility are:  (a) surveillance;  (b) incursion response;  and (c) pest management. 
13. The Policy and Business Directorate will be broadly responsible for providing a set of 
functions that integrate activities across the New Zealand Biosecurity Agency (NBA), that develop frameworks and processes to support the achievement of outcomes, and that provide management 
support.  The key functions include: policy analysis , including economic impact analysis; biosecurity 
strategic science functions; biosecurity awareness and education; international coordination; advice on 
Maori responsiveness; business analysis; planning;  co-ordination of corporate services and contract 
management.  The Policy and Business Directorate will also provide a first point of contact and major 
link point for the relationship with the Biosecurity Strategic Unit. 
14. The new structure, to be called Biosecurity  New Zealand, will come into effect from 
1 November 2004.  Biosecurity New Zealand will remain an integral part of MAF. 
B. B
IOSECURITY STRATEGIC UNIT 
15. The Biosecurity Strategy highlighted inadequate strategic capability in th e biosecurity system.  
The Strategy stressed the need for this strategic capability to be introduced in a way that is 
demonstrably ‘whole of system’ in orientation.  The Biosecurity Strategic Unit (BSU) is being 
established to filful this objective. 
16. In May 2004, it was agreed that the BSU would operate as an independent group reporting 
directly to the Director-General of MAF for an in itial period of at least eighteen months.  It is 
considered desirable given that some of the sta ffing for the BSU consists  of secondments from a 
variety of agencies with interests in the biosecurity  system, including the Department of Conservation, 
the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Health. G/SPS/GEN/517 
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 17. The main focus and prime accountability of the BSU is supporting the leadership and 
governance of the biosecurity system.  The BSU will be primarily accountable for: 
(a) Providing expert advice to the MAF Ch ief Executive and Chief Executives Forum on 
all components of New Zealand’s strategic biosecurity direction, capability, frameworks, policies and priorities;  
(b) Ensuring that biosecurity-related marine , agriculture, horticulture, forestry, 
conservation, health, economic, social a nd cultural objectives are fully integrated 
within the "whole of system" biosecurity approach; 
(c) Championing the Biosecurity Strategy;  
(d) Defining roles, responsibilities and boundaries across the biosecurity system; 
(e) Managing stakeholder bodies and ensuring the coordination of input to various 
governance fora;  and  
(f) Designing and managing relevant in terdepartmental budget processes. 
18. The BSU and Biosecurity New Zealand will work closely together to support the effective 
development and implementation of the Biosecurity Strategy.   
IV. FURTHER INFORMATION 
19. Further information can be found at: 
  http://www.maf.govt.nz/biosecurity/bio-strategy/index.htm  
  
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