RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/M/44
28 July 1999
(99-3164)
General Council
Special Session
7 July 1999
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 7 July 1999
Chairman:  Mr. A. Mchumo (Tanzania)
Subjects discussed: Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference
- Continuation of discussion of substantive issues arising from the
Ministerial Declaration of May 1998, including proposals by
Members, with the following suggested focus:  "Further
discussion of proposals on paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial
Declaration"
(a) Proposals on paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Declaration(b) Proposals on paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
1. The Chairman recalled that, as agreed by the General Council at its Special Session on
25 February, the suggested focus of the present meeting was "further discussion of proposals on
paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Ministerial Declaration". Since the General Council Special Session on
17 June, several additional proposals had been received in regard to both paragraphs 9 and 10 issues,
and New Zealand had circulated to delegations excerpts from the statement of the Chair at the
meeting of APEC Trade Ministers Meeting held in Auckland on 29-30 June. He suggested thatMembers begin with presentations of specific proposals, whether circulated in writing or not, starting
with paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Declaration, and move on to paragraph 10. As in previous
meetings, in order to structure the presentation of proposals on paragraph 9, he suggested that
Members take these up in the order in which their subject matter was dealt with in that paragraph. He
added that, following the exchange of views at the informal meeting held the previous day and earlierthat morning regarding the need for holding additi onal issue-specific informal meetings before the
Formal Special Session scheduled for the end of the month, he would circulate shortly a schedule of
such meetings with the suggested focus for each..
(a) Proposals on paragraph 9 of the Ministerial Declaration2. The representative of New Zealand, speaking on behalf of the APEC Members
, drew
attention to an excerpt from the Statement of the Chair of the Meeting of APEC Ministers
Responsible for Trade, held on 29-30 June in Auckland (WT/L/305). This document did not constitute
a proposal for the preparatory process, but was of direct relevance to the work Members were
pursuing in relation to following-up paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration.
The introduction to the paper recognized APEC's support for the multilateral trading system and theWT/GC/M/44
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mutually reinforcing goals of both APEC a nd the WTO. Paragraph 11 noted APEC Ministers'
agreement on the importance of ensuring full implementation of existing WTO agreements.  As was
clear from the informal discussions that had been  held, the area of implementation remained a key
priority for work in the lead up to Seattle. In paragraph 12, the importance that APEC Ministers
attached to early progress on broad-based multilateral negotiations in the WTO, "achieving an overallbalance of interests of all Members", was highlighted.  The need for the intensification of activity in
Geneva in the final stage, or third phase, of preparations for the Seattle Conference in this regard was
noted.  As regards the reference to the need for drafting to begin on the Seattle Ministerial Declaration
in August, this was a reminder to the Secretariat and Members that at least some drafting work should
be going on in people's minds during the August break.  The agreement among APEC Ministers that
the negotiating agenda should be broader than the built-in agenda was referred to in paragraph 13. In
particular, and of relevance to a number of the proposals tabled to date, was the agreement inparagraph 13 that negotiations on industrial, or non-agricultural, tariffs should serve as an integral part
of the negotiations to be launched at Seattle.  There was also agreement within APEC that the
negotiations should conclude within three years. The importance of ensuring that the concerns of
developing economies, including least-developed c ountries, were addressed in new WTO negotiations
was highlighted in paragraph 14, and issues in this area, as well as other possible issues for inclusionon the agenda of the Seattle Conference, would be considered by APEC Ministers at their September
meeting. The importance of the Accelerated Tariff Liberalisation (ATL) initiative in providing
impetus to the wider negotiation on industrial (non-agricultural) tariffs, which APEC Ministers had
agreed should be launched at Seattle, was highlighted in paragraph 15.  The support that the initiative
had achieved to date was welcomed, and Ministers had agreed that ATL participating economiesshould engage again with WTO Members in July on their reaction to the initiative and on how it
would tie in to the launch, conduct, and outcome of any new WTO negotiations.  In this regard,
further consultations on the ATL initiative with a range of non-APEC Members would be pursued in
Geneva in the course of the following week and any Member wanting more information on the
subject could follow up directly with the New Zealand Mission in Geneva. Paragraphs 16 and 17noted the recognition of the growing support within  WTO for negotiations on industrial tariffs, and
the further contribution that APEC could make to tariff liberalisation within the WTO, in addition to
the areas already covered under the ATL initiative.  Six sectors on which APEC had already
undertaken work were mentioned in particular.  He  hoped it would be clear that APEC members, all
of whom were either WTO Members or applicants for membership, were fully appraised of the range
of challenges ahead in the lead-up to Seattle, and were committed to making a constructive
contribution in this regard. While not included in the communication, he also noted that on 28 June,preceding the Ministerial Meeting, APEC had held a seminar in Auckland entitled "Bridging the Gap:
Explaining Trade and Investment Liberalisation".  This seminar had been part of an ongoing APEC
initiative to communicate more effectively with communities on the impacts of trade and investment
liberalisation.  Ministers had endorsed the emphasis of the seminar on the importance of developing
innovative communication tools, the need to eliminate jargon, to focus on things that were directlyrelevant to people's experience, and to improve transparency.  They had agreed that the Seattle
Ministerial Conference would be a key opportunity for conveying a strong message on the benefits of
trade and investment liberalisation.
3. The representative of Brazil, recalling points his delegation had made at previous meetings,
said that Brazil attached importance to the terms of paragraph 8 of the Geneva Ministerial
Declaration, under which Ministers at Seattle were to further pursue an "evaluation of the
implementation of individual agreements and the realization of their objectives", covering, " inter alia ,
the problems encountered in implementation and the consequent impact on the trade and development
prospects of Members". The concept of implementation was not confined, as some Members seemed
to understand, to technical difficulties in putting into effect the obligations contracted in the UruguayRound, nor was it a question that could be solved si mply by technical cooperation or other means of
assistance, welcome though they might be. During the first phase of the preparatory process, Brazil
had pointed out significant imbalances in the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements andWT/GC/M/44
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had noted that the reasonable expectations resulting from the Uruguay Round had been frustrated. The
first source of disappointment was the recognition that the level of obligations contracted in that
Round had often proved to be too high for some Members. Slightly longer implementation time-
frames had not been enough to address the stark asymmetries stemming from disparities in levels of
development among Members, and developing countries faced structural deficiencies that could notbe overcome in just a few years.  The playing field had not been level at the conclusion of the last
Round, it was not level at the present time, and w ould not be level for quite some time. Another
reason for frustration was the fact that implementation of special and differential treatment had fallen
far short of expectations.  Quite often, S&D provisions consisted of exhortations or recommendations
that were rarely, if ever, observed.  Besides, whenever a dispute arose in the context of the DSU,
developed countries consistently alleged that S&D provisions were "exceptions" to the general
provisions of the WTO Agreements and that the developing country concerned had to meet the burdenof proof, thus following the practice of one particul ar legal system. The S&D provisions were part of
the bargain struck in Marrakesh.  They were not "exceptions" and should be treated on an equal
footing to every other provision of the Agreements, and Members should find ways of stating this
unambiguously, if necessary by introducing the appropriate adjustments and corrections. Brazil was
convinced that the clauses concerning S&D treatment for all developing countries should berevitalized.  Their basic idea and the centrality of their purpose in a globalized economy could not be
ignored.  A genuine multilateral trading system, in order to be properly operative and fair, should
recognize the different levels of development of its Members, and provide for equitable conditions of
participation in the international market. Brazil believed that development concerns should be the
focus of, and should be mainstreamed in the discussions concerning implementation, and thatimplementation, together with the items of the built-in agenda and other mandated reviews, should
come first and foremost in the future agenda.  It would be unreasonable to expect some Members to
fully engage in a new round of negotiations if the existing imbalances were not addressed. The
General Council schedule as many meetings as necessary for a full appraisal of the issues concerning
implementation and the built-in agenda, preferably with debates structured around thematic clusters.A full discussion on the proposals and views of Members on those two areas was essential to
successful preparations for the Ministerial Conference. Brazil would be submitting proposals and
comments that would try to address some of the asymmetries arising from, or made manifest by the
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and the fulfilment of the mandate of the built-in
agenda, especially with regard to agriculture.  Such contributions might be further specified or
complemented by other proposals in the subsequent stages of the preparatory process.
4. The representative of Argentina recalled that GATS Article XIX stated that for each round
negotiating guidelines and procedures would be established. On that basis and in order to contribute to
the preparations for the Seattle Ministerial Conference, Argentina had submitted a proposal
(WT/GC/W/231) which identified the principal elemen ts for the forthcoming negotiations in this area,
regarding the objectives, scope, principles and modalities, time-frame and structure of the
negotiations. The aim of the proposal was to provide a succinct outline for the negotiating guidelines,although Argentina did not exclude the possibility of submitting further proposals to expand on
certain aspects of it. The services negotiations should aim at achieving progressively higher levels of
liberalization of trade in services, promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually
advantageous basis and securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, and achieving the
objective of the GATS on increasing participation of developing countries in trade in services and theexpansion of their services exports. With regard to the scope, Argentina believed that no service
sectors or modes of supply should be excluded a priori from the negotiations, but recognized that
flexibility should be given to developing countries for opening fewer sectors or liberalizing fewer
types of transaction, in accordance with Article XIX:2. The rest of the negotiations should be
composed of the following: (i) a review of the annexes concerning MFN exemptions and Air
Transport Services; (ii) the development of disciplines on domestic regulation in accordance with
Article VI:4, and on rules, such as emergency safeguards, subsidies, and government procurement;
and (iii) the development of criteria for mutual recognition on the basis of Article VII:5. ArgentinaWT/GC/M/44
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gave priority to negotiations on rules in the area of  subsidies, with the aim of eliminating subsidies
that had an export-enhancing effect or that modified the conditions of competition in favour of service
suppliers receiving the subsidy. The proposal also pointed out the following principles and modalities
for the negotiations: (i) progressive liberalization; (ii) recognition of autonomous liberalization
undertaken since previous negotiations; (iii) the possibility of negotiating on a bilateral, plurilateral ormultilateral basis; and (iv) a request/offer approach. One further important point was that the
negotiations should be conducted within the existing architecture of the GATS, both in terms of the
approach to scheduling specific commitments and the four modes of supply. Argentina believed that
any negotiating methodology proposed should not undermine the basic architecture of the GATS nor
be contrary to its fundamental principles. Finally, he wished to elaborate on two issues covered by
paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration, the time-frame and the structure of the negotiations.
Argentina believed that the negotiations should be conducted and concluded on the basis of a singleundertaking, and had not specified a time-frame in its services proposal as it would obviously be the
same as that for the negotiations as a whole. Nevertheless, Argentina preferred negotiations lasting
three years, with a mid-term review. The structure of the negotiations should conform to the following
criteria: (i) unnecessary proliferation of bodies should be avoided; (ii) negotiating functions should be
clearly assigned to avoid overlaps and, if necessary, consideration should be given to the reassignmentof activities among the existing bodies in the area of services, only for the duration of the
negotiations;  and (iii) the needs of smaller delegations should be taken into account in deciding the
number of bodies and scheduling of meetings.
5. The representative of Bangladesh, speaking on behalf of the least-developed country
Members, informed the General Council of the outcome of the Coordinating Workshop for Senior
Advisers to Ministers of Trade in LDCs in Preparation for the third WTO Ministerial Conference,
held in South Africa from 21-25 June 1999, which had resulted in a set of coordinated proposals for
the Conference. He expressed the participants' appreciation of the contribution to the meeting which
the Chairman of the General Council had made. The meeting had reviewed the experiences and
problems of LDCs in the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and had assessed the
impact of the Agreements on their trade and devel opment prospects.  The meeting had examined the
question of enhancing LDCs' capacities to actively participate in the process of global trade rule-
making and in identifying issues of interest to them in order to promote and safeguard potential
benefits and to protect against possible risks and losses.  The meeting had formulated proposals for a
Comprehensive New Plan of Action (CNPA) for integrating the LDCs into the global economy, the
broad parameters of which he had provided at the informal intersessional meeting of the General
Council held on 14 and 16 December 1998. The proposal he was submitting at the present meeting1
provided the contents of the CNPA, and covered a broad spectrum of issue areas of  key interest to
LDCs. The proposals were sharp, succinct, focussed and entirely de-ideologized, and were the product
of business-like deliberations. The Members submitting the proposals hoped to further refine some of
the proposals in the coming weeks.
6. The representative of Japan, referring to his Government's proposal on agriculture
(WT/GC/W/220), said that Japan believed the objec tives for the next agricultural negotiations were to
establish a set of rules and disciplines that were genuinely fair and equitable for both food-importing
and exporting countries, as well as for developed and developing countries, and which allowed a
coexistence of the various types of agriculture among Members. The following should be ensured in
such rules and disciplines: (a) due consideration should be given to the importance of themultifunctionality of agriculture, allowing for smooth implementation of domestic agricultural
policies, and to differences in natural conditions by taking into consideration the historical
background of each Member; (b) due consideration should be given to the fact that domestic
agricultural production was a basis for food security, by taking into account the instability of food
supply and demand in the international market and the problems of starvation and malnutrition in
                                                     
1 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/251.WT/GC/M/44
Page 5
developing countries; and (c) redressal of the imbalance in rights and obligations under WTO rules
between exporting and importing countries. An inde pendent group for agricultural negotiations should
be set up in the next negotiations in light of the particular characteristics of agriculture, which
required Members to consider a wide range of issues, such as domestic support, border measures and
export rules, in a comprehensive manner.  Negotiations on those issues should be pursuedcomprehensively and effectively in such a group. Furthermore, an appropriate forum should be
established to address new issues, including genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), from a broad
perspective.  Work in such a forum should include an analysis of the current situation, identification
of the questions to be dealt with, as well as the relationship between such questions and existing WTO
rules and disciplines. Turning to Japan's proposal on forestry and fishery products (WT/GC/W/221),
he said that these products were exhaustible natural resources which were renewable but could be
depleted without proper management. The objectives of the forthcoming negotiations on suchproducts should be to establish a set of rules and disciplines which contributed to the sustainable
utilization of resources through the promotion of  adequate resource conservation and management,
and which were also fair and equitable both for exporting and importing countries. With respect to
these products, it was indispensable to examine all the relevant factors in a comprehensive manner,
giving due consideration to global environmental issues and to resource conservation andmanagement issues, in order to ensure sustainable utilization of resources.  To enable such
comprehensive examination, a group for forestry and fishery products should be established
independently from negotiations on other non-agricultural products.
7. With regard to industrial tariffs, he said that in order to secure sound development of the
world economy, it was crucially important to realize a predictable and credible trade environment.From this viewpoint, Japan's proposal
2 suggested that industrial tariff negotiations be included in the
forthcoming negotiations with the aim of further reducing tariff rates, improving the coverage of
bound products, and harmonizing and simplifying tariff structures among Members. The tariff
negotiations should be comprehensive without a priori exclusion to ensure that all Members, whether
developed, developing, or transition economies, would benefit. As for modalities, a formula-cutapproach, where all Members reduced their tariffs to target rates by way of a formula, should be
applied as a basis.  Such target rates should be set in accordance with the scale of economic
development of each Member, paying due attention to the situation of developing-country Members.
The general reduction should be effectively supplemented by, among others, zero-for-zero and
harmonization approaches. Japan had also submitted a proposal on investment (WT/GC/W/239) in the
belief that, in the era of globalization, enhancing predictability for investors would both promote
foreign direct investment and expand world trade, thereby contributing to the development of theworld economy.  This fact supplied strong grounds for Japan to propose that multilateral rule-making
on investment be included in the next WTO negoti ations. At the same time, Japan believed that a
future WTO agreement on investment rules needed to  reflect the interests of all Members, by making
a clear distinction from negotiations carried out in other fora with different memberships. Due
consideration should therefore be given to providing an appropriate balance with regard to thedevelopment needs of developing-country Members.  Japan's proposal contained a realistic approach
to a WTO agreement on investment, and proposed some of the principal elements: (i) the agreement
should cover foreign direct investment, which was the most direct contribution to the economic
development of host countries. Investment rules in the WTO should therefore aim at providing the
necessary disciplines for governmental measures on foreign direct investment; (ii) priority should begiven to improving the transparency and stability of the legal systems in host countries; (iii) the
approach should be progressive. Although the WTO principles of national treatment and MFN
treatment should be included in future investment ru les, national treatment for foreign companies in a
pre-establishment phase should be introduced in a progressive manner, adopting a positive-list
approach; and (iv) the existing WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be used without
introducing a new State-investor dispute settlement mechanism.
                                                     
2 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/243.WT/GC/M/44
Page 6
8. As regards anti-dumping, Japan was concerned that frequent use of anti-dumping measures
was nullifying the benefits of tariff reductions. Fair administration of anti-dumping and other trade
remedies was also one of the principal interests of developing countries. Japan's proposal on anti-
dumping (WT/GC/W/240) was for a review of the cu rrent provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
with a view to negotiations on appropriate amendments, keeping in mind the objective of improvingimplementation and strengthening disciplines. On TBT, Japan believed that adequate administration
of the TBT Agreement was crucial, in the light of the importance of standards in the modern
economy, and in this context the Agreement contained several provisions which needed further
clarification. Japan's proposal (WT/GC/W/241) was to include negotiations on the TBT Agreement in
the forthcoming negotiations, in particular the issue of securing transparency, openness and
impartiality in international standards development procedures, and also with a view to developing
requirements that an international standard should fulfill. In the area of TRIPS, he said that the
effective and appropriate protection of intellectual property rights was important for the promotion of
liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment.  First and foremost, it was crucial to implement
the TRIPS Agreement completely and to operate domes tic systems effectively.  In addition, in line
with new technological developments and social needs, the TRIPS Agreement should be further
improved in the next round of negotiations, and harmonization of intellectual property right systemsand effective measures against counterfeiting were especially important. It would also be beneficial to
incorporate into the TRIPS Agreement new treaties or conventions which had been concluded in other
fora and which achieved higher levels of protection of intellectual property rights. In this regard,
Japan's proposal (WT/GC/W/242) was that the TRIPS Agreement should be addressed in the
negotiations.  In concluding, he said that Japan would shortly be submitting proposals in the areas ofservices, trade facilitation and electronic commerce.
9. The representative of the European Communities, referring to the Communities' proposal on
possible decisions at Seattle (WT/GC/W/232), said that the launch of multilateral trade negotiations at
Seattle was the overriding objective for the Community.  It believed that this was also the objective of
the membership of WTO and that Members should continue to give priority to this objective.However, it was clear that there were a number of issues which would be mature for decision when
Ministers met in Seattle, and provided that they did not detract from the broader objective, the
Community was proposing a number of suggestions. First, tariff-free treatment for products from
least-developed countries was an issue which the Community had raised on numerous occasions. The
Community had proposed that Ministers make a commitment at Seattle to ensure duty-free market
access, no later than the end of the next round of negotiations, for essentially all products originating
in the least-developed countries. Second, in the area of transparency, the Community had identifiedthree items in the proposal: (i) derestriction of documents and consultations with civil society; (ii) the
DSU review, where the Community believed that certain features would be deliverable in Seattle. The
Community was favourable towards improved transp arency in dispute settlement procedures within
the overall context of a balanced package of DSU reforms, including professionalization of panels.
Agreement before Seattle on a broad package of DSU reforms was necessary to encouragewidespread support for improved transparency.  Transparency in the context of the DSU review
should be considered as a separate issue from the more general transparency question in the areas of
derestriction of documents and consultations with civil society; and (iii) transparency in government
procurement, which was the basic building block of a stable and predictable procurement regime, and
the Community believed that the substance of a tr ansparency agreement was more important than its
timing, and hoped that this issue would be ready for Seattle. Third, in the area of coherence, the
Community would be looking for an endorsement by the heads of international organizations of joint
efforts which supported capacity building so that developing countries could derive full benefits from
a new round of trade liberalization, and would be seeking an appropriate text to this effect in the
Seattle Ministerial Declaration. Fourth, the Community noted the progress made in the DSU review,and supported the notion of a balanced package of DSU reforms which could be achieved for formal
adoption at Seattle, and which would include the issue of implementation, although the Community
did acknowledge that there were a number of difficulties and that time was short. Fifth, in the areaWT/GC/M/44
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electronic commerce, the Community believed that ther e was a balance to be struck in terms of the
ideas put forward by other Members, notably the United States, in relation to prolongation of the
present standstill in the application of customs duties. This should be matched or balanced by a
package of trade principles, and a combination of the two approaches was achievable in Seattle. The
Community's proposals for discussions at Seattle were intended as a balanced package and, takentogether, would foster the integration of developing  countries, in particular the least-developed, into
the multilateral system, help strengthen the WTO as an institution, including its rules based approach,
and demonstrate the WTO’s openness and transparency towards civil society.
10. On trade and investment, he welcomed the proposal by Japan, which was a positive,
constructive and balanced approach to the issue, and emphasized the value of greater legal stability
and guarantees, while acknowledging the need for flexibility in accommodating the development
priorities which many developing countries would wish to see as a feature of any agreement in thisarea. He also wished to introduce a proposal on this issue which his delegation had just submitted
3
which reaffirmed that the European Community and its member States believed that the time hadcome for the WTO to establish a multilateral framewo rk of rules governing international investment,
with the objective of securing a stable and predictable climate for foreign direct investment world-
wide. The focus of the proposal was on foreign direct investment, while at the same timeacknowledging the importance of preserving the ability of host countries to regulate the activity of
investors, whether foreign or domestic. The Community believed that the WTO was the only
multilateral forum that could take fully into account the interests of both developed and developing
countries in their position as home and/or host countries to international investors. The suggested
approach reflected the kind of openness which the European Community already had towards foreigndirect investment, and was along the lines of the GATS model. It was based on commitments to be
undertaken by each Member, arrived at through a process of negotiation, and was the way to allow for
the flexibility that many WTO Members required. Another important issue was balance – while the
objective of such an agreement was to encourage and protect FDI flows, there was a clear need to
preserve the ability of all host countries to regulate, in accordance with basic WTO principles, theexercise of economic activity on their territory, in accordance with their own priorities. In that respect,
the Community believed in the potential of FDI to contribute significantly to economic growth in both
home and host countries, and there was an increasing volume of evidence to demonstrate this
potential.  This was not necessarily the case, however, of any investment under any circumstances.
The Community therefore considered that a framewor k of multilateral rules for FDI should ensure the
right conditions for international investment to be conducive to sustainable development.  Clearly, this
aspect was of even greater importance for developing WTO Members.
11. The representative of Norway, referring to his Government's proposal on services
(WT/GC/W/236), which had also been submitted to the Council for Trade in Services, said that the
point of departure of the proposal was the apparent agreement among all WTO Members on broad
coverage, in the sense that neither any service se ctor nor any mode of supply would be excluded from
the negotiations.  Norway believed that the negotiations should encompass both specific commitmentsand MFN exemptions, and that environmental concerns should be taken into account, translating what
seemed to be an emerging consensus in the Committee on Trade and Environment to the effect that
trade and environmental policies should be mutually supportive and legally consistent in order to
promote the objectives of sustainable development. Turning to Norway's proposal on agriculture
(WT/GC/W/238), he said that Norway, like all WTO Members, was committed to initiatingnegotiations aimed at continuing the agricultural reform process on the basis of Article 20 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.  Since the beginning of implementation of the Agreement in 1995,
substantial progress had been made in reforming agricultural policy and market-orienting the
agricultural sector, and it had been recognised th at policy reform needed to be an on-going process.
With this in mind, Norway had proposed that the forthcoming negotiations should aim at refining and
                                                     
3 Subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/245.WT/GC/M/44
Page 8
elaborating the rules and disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture in order to promote the
objective of a fair and market oriented agricultural trading system, taking into account the need for
sufficient and adequate food supplies, the interests of the developing countries, in particular the least-
developed, and the need to meet important emerging challenges, such as safeguarding and promoting
the non-trade concerns of a multifunctional agricu lture. The negotiations should be finished in a
relatively short period of time, and all aspects of the agricultural negotiations should take place in a
specific agricultural negotiations committee. As reflected in the Preamble to the Agreement, the
interests of developing countries, in particular the least-developed and net-food importing countries,
should be properly addressed.  Many developing countries had not yet been able to take advantage of
the opportunities that the Uruguay Round had offered. Furthermore, increased attention was being
paid to the societal role and multifunctional character of agriculture, as reflected inter alia  by the
focus on non-trade concerns.  The basic characteristics of the agricultural sector implied thatagriculture, also in the future, would have to be  treated separately within the multilateral trading
system. Bearing in mind that the Preamble to the Agreement also emphasised the need to take into
account the equitable sharing of commitments among all Members under the reform programme, it
was clear that a delicate balance should be struck between the interests of net-food importing and
exporting countries.  This symmetry of interests should form an overall framework for the reform
process in general and for the forthcoming negotiations in particular. The reference in Article 20 to
the need to take into account the experience and effects of the reduction commitments during the
implementation period, demonstrated the dynamic character of the Agreement. Policy reform required
further efforts, including addressing new challenges that were emerging, and the major challenge was
to meet the growing demand for sufficient and adequate supplies of food in efficient and sustainableways.  At the same time, the multifunctional character of agriculture should be safeguarded and
promoted beyond the primary function of the agricultural sector of supplying food and fibre.  These
concerns needed to be fully reflected in the continuation of the reform process.
12. The representative of Korea, referring to his Government's proposal on anti-dumping
(WT/GC/W/235), said that although the Anti-Dump ing Agreement represented an improvement over
the Tokyo Round Code, a number of shortcomings had come to light in the course of its
implementation.  Korea was particularly concerned with the ambiguities in some key provisions of the
Agreement that could lead to abuse, and believed that both the increase in the use of anti-dumping
actions and the rise in WTO disputes concerning anti-dumping measures in recent years were closely
related to these ambiguities. There was, therefore, a strong case for reviewing the Agreement and
improving its provisions so as to bring necessary  clarifications and eliminate the so-called "grey
areas" that permitted a wide range of conflicting interpretations. A review of the Anti-DumpingAgreement was also warranted by the changes in the world trade environment.  Important changes
such as increased cross-border activities of multinational corporations, transfer of production facilities
to developing countries and the creation of harmonized rules of origin significantly affected the way
the Agreement functioned.  Consideration of the implications of such changes and making appropriate
adjustments were tasks that the Members should not neglect, and the issue of anti-circumvention, inparticular, required special attention.  Unfortunately, however, the discussions in the Informal Group
on Anti-Circumvention under the Committee on Anti -dumping Practices had not been successful due
to the wide differences in Members' views.  Given the growing importance of anti-circumvention,
Korea believed that a new impetus should be given to the consideration of this issue, and thus had
proposed that Members review and improve as appropriate the provisions of the Anti-DumpingAgreement in the next round of negotiations.  Korea was particularly interested in the areas of
initiation of investigations and review procedures and might submit additional proposals on the details
at a later stage. In the near future, Korea also hoped to be in a position to submit proposals on
industrial products, investment and competition policy.
13. The representative of India said that his Government's proposal on technical barriers to trade
(WT/GC/W/223) had been submitted in the context of two main concerns: (i) to ensure that technical
regulations did not become unnecessary obstacles to international trade; and (ii) to ensure that theWT/GC/M/44
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problems encountered by developing countries in the formulation and application of technical
regulations and standards were overcome. India believed that this was particularly important, since the
technical regulations and standards adopted by developed countries had serious implications for the
market access of products from developing countries. The proposal was aimed at strengthening the
provisions for special and differential treatmen t contained in Article 12 of the TBT Agreement.
Furthermore, the proposal explored ways and means of ensuring the participation of developing
countries in the setting-up of standards and regulations, and it also asked for a serious attempt to be
made to define international standards. India had also suggested that a specific provision be
introduced in Article 12 to ensure that developing countries were given a longer time-frame to comply
with measures affecting products of export interest to them.  In addition, a specific provision should
also be introduced that if a measure in a developed country created difficulties for developing
countries, then it should be reconsidered. India's proposal on services (WT/GC/W/224) sought tobroadly operationalize GATS Articles IV and XIX, and suggested that areas of interest for developing
countries, particularly Mode 4, could be better implemented through a higher level of commitments.
The proposal also set out guidelines for the next round of negotiations, and suggested the setting-up of
a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of Article IV. Turning to the area of textiles and
clothing, he said that the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing had been held out to be the biggestsource of benefits for developing countries from the Uruguay Round. However, after five years of
implementation it was clear that the anticipated benefits had just not materialized. India's proposal
(WT/GC/W/226) highlighted the problems in this area, suggested solutions, and asked developed
importing countries to advance plans for integrat ion in such a way that commercially meaningful
liberalization could take place in this crucial area. The aim of India's proposal on TRIPS(WT/GC/W/225) was to achieve certain public policy and developmental objectives which were
provided for in the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, India had proposed that the transfer of technology should
be promoted through a binding obligation by the holders of proprietary technology, and that the
incompatibility between the Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity should be
addressed. Finally, because of the different nature of the TRIPS Agreement as compared to theGATT, India had attempted to clarify that the concept of non-violation should not apply to the TRIPS
Agreement. Turning to the area of customs valuation, he said that the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 predicated the recognition that, in particular, the
provisions of Article VII needed to be elaborated in order to provide greater uniformity and certainty
in their implementation. The Agreement also recogn ized that a fair, uniform and neutral system for
the valuation of goods for customs purposes should preclude the use of arbitrary or fictitious customs
values, and India wished to emphasize this. However, the Agreement clearly qualified that the actualvalue would be the sale price in the ordinary cour se of trade and under fully competitive conditions.
India's specific proposals (WT/GC/W/227) were aimed at addressing these important provisos and the
need to deter fraud, facilitate genuine trade and protect revenue. On implementation in general, he
wished to reiterate the importance that India attached to the redressal of implementation concerns,
which were critical issues and reflected the imbalances and asymmetries exposed during theimplementation of these Agreements. The redressal of these concerns would be an important factor in
ensuring the integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system. He wished also
to fully associate his delegation with Brazil's statem ent on special and differential treatment. Turning
to the proposal by the European Communities on possible decisions at Seattle (WT/GC/W/232), he
noted that no mention had been made of redressal of implementational concerns among the issueswhere possible decisions could be taken at Seattle.
14. The representative of Hong Kong, China said the position of his Government with regard to
the forthcoming services negotiations had been set out in a proposal which had been submitted to both
the General Council and the Council for Trad e in Services (WT/GC/W/215 – S/C/W/112).
Hong Kong, China fully respected and agreed with the ultimate decision-making role of the General
Council in the preparatory process for the third Ministerial Conference, but also believed that the
Council for Trade in Services could and should have  a complementary role to facilitate the process.
The proposal set out Hong Kong, China's views on the priorities and also the scope and modalities ofWT/GC/M/44
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the negotiations. Hong Kong, China believed that all sectors should be on the table for consideration
and the concept of "progressive liberalization" set out in GATS Article XIX should apply. Obtaining
deeper commitments in market access and national treatment would be a key feature of the round, and
should be achieved by a request/offer approach, supp lemented by other approaches, such as horizontal
or formulae, where necessary and helpful to the proc ess. Hong Kong, China also believed that it was
time for MFN exemptions to be eliminated. Thes e were a derogation from a fundamental principle,
and the Annex on Article II Exemptions stated that they should, in principle, not exceed ten years.
Hong Kong, China proposed that they should be eliminated by 2005 or the end of the next round,
whichever was earlier. With more market access and national treatment, it became clears that barriers
arising from domestic regulation would be a problem in turning that market access and national
treatment into reality. These barriers should be tackled vigorously in the new round, in a pro-
competitive framework. While, Hong Kong, China di d not believe a fundamental review of the GATS
to be desirable or necessary, it was necessary to ensure that GATS rules remained relevant and
responsive to the needs of service providers and consumers. Thus, other provisions needed to be
reviewed, in addition to the built-in agenda items unde r Articles X, XIII and XV, and in this regard he
wished to support Argentina's proposal to address the issue of subsidies. Other areas which needed
clarification included Article V on economic integration agreements in services, the meaning ofnational treatment, and the differentiation between Modes 1 and 2, and their meaning in the national
treatment column. Furthermore, there was a need to  enhance the transparency and certainty of the
specific commitments. Currently, the scheduling methodology as set out in Article XX was not
conducive to clarity. The scope of sectors and commitments was also not clear in all cases.
Hong Kong, China believed that Members at all stages of development needed to feel that they weregaining from the progressive liberalization, which entailed looking hard at the sectors and areas where
developing Members had trade interests and could take action to facilitate them. The capacity to
capitalize on these opportunities, in the widest sense, should be enhanced. There would be distinct
advantage in resolving many of these issues early in the round, so that the background against which
specific commitments were being negotiated was as clear as possible. On the negotiating guidelines,
Hong Kong, China's views on the overall administra tive arrangements had previously been set out in
an informal paper submitted to the Council for Trade in Services.
15. Turning to anti-dumping, he said that Hong Kong, China welcomed the proposals from
ASEAN, India, Japan and Korea and shared the concerns expressed in these proposals about the
increasing use of anti-dumping measures and the increasing number of users of an instrument that
could be easily subject to protectionist abuse.  Such a trend was worrying because abuses and
distortions associated with the use of anti-dumping measures were likely to nullify the benefits oftrade liberalization.  The mere initiation of an investigation, irrespective of whether anti-dumping
measures would be imposed eventually, would trigger trade harassment and trade-stifling effects. A
number of specific concerns had been raised regarding the implementation of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, but a more fundamental question to H ong Kong, China was whether anti-dumping was an
effective and appropriate instrument that could correct  the distortions of competition directly at their
sources. Hong Kong, China believed  that the answer was negative.  More often than not, it was aimed
at providing for discriminatory import relief measures which themselves created additional distortions
to trade and competition. Hong Kong, China also believed that existing WTO rules in this area should
be constantly reviewed to ensure that they were up-to-date in a globalized economy with rapid
technological changes, and therefore supported the suggestion that rules governing anti-dumpingactions should be reviewed with a view to maximi zing the benefits of trade liberalisation for all
Members, in particular developing Members.  Such reviews should also be broad enough to
encompass any underlying principles which might give rise to problems. In this connection,
Hong Kong, China was encouraged that several delegations, on different occasions including in the
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, had submitted ideas toinject competition policy perspectives into rules governing anti-dumping actions.  More efforts should
be taken to ensure that the application of anti-dumping actions took into account economic reality,
and that incentives should be provided to tackle distortions of competition at their source and toWT/GC/M/44
Page 11
encourage pro-competitive trade liberalization, so as to provide Members with incentives to maintain
free trade and open competition commitments.
16. The representative of Uruguay, referring to his Government's proposal on services
(WT/GC/W/234), said that Uruguay attached importance to the next negotiations on trade in services
and expected that, in accordance with GATS Article XIX:1, an overall balance of rights andobligations covering the interests of all Members would be achieved. In relation to the preparation of
negotiating guidelines for these negotiations, Uruguay believed that the assessment of trade in
services foreseen in Article XIX and currently underway in the Council for Trade in Services, was
very important. Without prejudice to this work, and taking into account the calendar of the work
programme agreed by the General Council, Uruguay had submitted this proposal at the present time to
allow Members sufficient time for analysis and comment. The proposal set out the objectives,
principles and elements that Uruguay considered should be included in the negotiating guidelines. Theobjectives of the negotiations should continue to be, as set out in the Punta del Este Ministerial
Declaration of 1986 and subsequently in the GATS, "expansion of trade in services under conditions
of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting economic growth of all
trading partners and the development of developing countries". With regard to the principles and
elements to be included in the guidelines, Urugua y had identified three elements which it considered
to be important. First, the principle of progressive liberalization which was fundamental in the
structure and functioning of the GATS. Uruguay believed it important to maintain the structure and
functioning of the GATS as it had been agreed and as it stood, on the basis of positive lists of specific
commitments in sectors and modes of supply negotiated and agreed by Members. Furthermore, due
consideration should be given to the appropriate flexibility for developing countries as mentioned inArticle XIX:2. Second, Uruguay believed that the increasing participation of developing countries
referred to in Article IV:1 was essential. At the same time, for the effective implementation of the
provisions in Article IV, developed countries shou ld adopt commercially m eaningful commitments in
the next negotiations in areas of interest to developing countries. Moreover, Article XIX:3 stated that
the negotiating guidelines should establish modaliti es for the special treatment for least-developed
country Members. Third, in accordance with Article XIX:3, the next negotiations should take account
of autonomous liberalization undertaken by Memb ers since the end of the Uruguay Round. Uruguay
also believed that the following elements, that formed part of the work in hand which would have to
continue during the negotiations, should be included in the guidelines: (i) domestic regulations; and
(ii) GATS rules. The work in these areas should continue under the agreed mandates
17. The representative of Hungary, speaking also  on behalf of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Latvia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, introducing a proposal on the concerns of
transition and post-transition economies relating to domestic support in the agricultural negotiations
(WT/GC/W217), said that the Agriculture Agreement exempted certain types of domestic support
from reduction commitments which had no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production or which were limiting such effects.  Apart from these measure-specific exemptions, the
Agreement also recognized that in specific circumstances some types of domestic support mightdeserve special treatment if they provided an indispensable contribution to the economic development
of a certain group of countries. The Agreement did not, however, contain any provision which would
adequately address the specific needs of the agricultural sectors of Members which were in the
process of transformation to a fully-fledged market system or consolidating the results of such a far-
reaching economic process. Therefore, their countries had proposed that adequate ways and meansshould be identified and agreed upon that would enable transition or post-transition economies to
introduce or continue to use support measures that were necessary for the economic transformation of
their agriculture.  Such mechanisms would serve the objective of assisting these countries in their
efforts to establish and consolidate a market-oriented domestic agricultural sector by partly alleviating
the extreme burdens associated with such a process and allowing them to benefit from theircomparative advantage.WT/GC/M/44
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18. The representative of Turkey said that his Go vernment attached great importance to the full
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Turkey also believed that the ongoing negotiations within
the TRIPS Council regarding the additional protection for geographical indications and the
multilateral registration system for geographical indications of wines and spirits should also be
extended to other products. The additional protection for geographical indications was one of theessential elements of the TRIPS Agreement. However,  confining this concept narrowly just to wines
and spirits would not be a fair and equitable treatment of the rights and the interests of Members.
Turkey also believed that extending the scope of protection to other products would play an important
role for the development of local producers and industries concerned. Turkey, along with a number of
Members, had indicated its interest in extending the scope of protection of geographical indications to
other products in addition to wines and spirits, and fully supported the proposals on this issue
submitted up to the present. Turkey proposed
4 that the General Council submit a recommendation to
the third Ministerial Conference in this regard.
19. The representative of Australia said that his delegation's recent ninth proposal on agriculture
(WT/GC/W/237) dealt with the issue of export restrictions and taxes. Australia was committed to
removing restrictions and distortions affecting agriculture, and this proposal reflected Australia's
preparedness to address a range of different pressures which affected both agricultural exporters andimporters. Australia recognized that undisciplined export restrictions and taxes had the potential to
limit supply and increase prices beyond the levels of a fair market. Net food-importing countries had
expressed concerns about how best to ensure their food security in the face of such measures. At the
same time, some developing countries applied export taxes and restrictions as a defense against tariff
escalation and distortions that affected their own export potential. For all of these reasons, Australiabelieved that there were clear benefits to be gained from developing disciplines on export restrictions
and taxes as an integral part of delivering substantial further liberalization in the negotiations on
agriculture.
20. The representative of Pakistan said that implementation issues should be addressed from a
broad policy perspective. The concerns of the majority of the membership of the organization needed
to be addressed if a realistic realignment and rebalancing were to be achieved in the ongoing and
future negotiations. It would be extremely difficult to contemplate negotiations on issues other than
those in the built-in agenda, unless the problems relating to implementation of existing agreements
were satisfactorily addressed. Pakistan had submitted several papers on textiles, agriculture,
movement of natural persons, and dispute settlement, and many of the proposals in these papers dealt
with implementation issues. Pakistan trusted that it  would be possible to find a methodology by which
the implementation concerns raised in various proposals and papers could be addressed by the time ofthe Ministerial Conference. The objective should be to resolve these issues, if possible before Seattle,
so that developing countries would be in a position to consider other proposals on their merits.
Pakistan would not wish implementation once again to become a part of a new package, because these
issues were part of a previous package – the Uruguay Round package. Developing countries, or
indeed any country, should not be expected to pay twice for the same concession or commitment.Pakistan believed that a specific meeting or a mechanism should be assigned to taking up these issues
with a view to their resolution within the comi ng months, and within the preparatory process.
Pakistan's communication on textiles (WT/GC/W/159) contained some proposals relating to
implementation issues, and the recent proposal by India (WT/GC/W/226) was largely complementary
in this respect, and he hoped that both papers would be considered together. Similarly, with regard toagriculture, Pakistan welcomed the proposal submitted by Australia, and also some of the points in the
proposal by New Zealand, and his delegation hoped to be  able to consult with these delegations with a
view to coordinating positions and submitting concerted proposals on issues under both
implementation and the built-in agenda in agriculture.
                                                     
4 A formal proposal was subsequently circulated as document WT/GC/W/249.WT/GC/M/44
Page 13
21. The representative of Argentina, referring to Australia's proposal on agriculture
(WT/GC/W/237), highlighted the importance of tariff escalation and its link to export restrictions on
raw material exports by some countries, and said that paragraph 4 of the proposal was illustrative of
the difficulties faced by the developing countries in this area. Turning to Japan's proposal in this area
(WT/GC/W/220), he said that the Agriculture Agreement's objective of establishing "a fair andmarket-oriented agricultural trading system", had not  been taken into account in the proposal. It was
clear that this type of system could allow the coexistence of various types of agriculture, but this was
not the goal of the Agreement, more a consequence of it. This coexistence depended, like in all trade
coming under WTO, on the capacity of producers to find a place in the market. In its proposal, Japan
suggested that the international market for food was unstable and that this had a negative impact on
food security. His delegation believed that the basis for this idea was false and led to the wrong
conclusion. In reality, all international trade in agriculture was influenced by government policy,making the use of market-balancing mechanisms virtually impossible and causing price instability
which could not be blamed on market shortcomings. The combination of high tariffs and domestic
support isolated producers from market signals, and in highly-developed countries these producers
could maintain production volumes regardless of the domestic level of demand. This led to surpluses
for export which could not attain market prices and which resulted in further price declines. When thiswas coupled with the use of export subsidies, the net result was even more instability, rural poverty,
market crises, degradation of the environment and less food security. Japan had further suggested that
the rules of the Agriculture Agreement should be reviewed. Article 20 clearly established that
continuation of the reform process initiated in the Uruguay Round would require "substantial
progressive reductions in support and protection", and it was probable that, to achieve the"fundamental reform" mentioned in the Article, it would be necessary to review certain provisions of
the Agreement, although with the aim of achieving more liberalization, not less. Japan had also
suggested consideration of some new issues, such as genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) which
was an important issue and could have an effect on various WTO agreements. For the present,
Members were considering the link between GMOs and the TRIPS Agreement in the context of the
review of Article 27:3(b), and it did not appear suitable to take this issue to Seattle. Argentina agreed
that an independent negotiating group would be necessary for agricultural negotiations on domestic
and export subsidies, and this was justified by the rules on agricultural subsidies which allowed some
specific measures to be maintained for a certain time. On the other hand, in the area of market access,
consideration should be given to the possibility of a single negotiation on all merchandise tariffs.
22. As regards the suggestions that natural, historical and cultural differences between countries
be reflected in the WTO rules on agriculture, Argentina could not see why agriculture should be anydifferent from other sectors. Similar considerations could be invoked, for example, for the electrical
industry, pharmaceuticals, textiles, telecommunications and so on. There was one difference among
countries, however, which did have to be reflected in the Agriculture Agreement, and that was the
different levels of development. This had to be reflected in special and differential treatment for
developing countries which allowed them the flexib ility to adapt to the requirements of free trade.
Other differences, whether natural, historical or cultural, did not prevent liberalization but, on the
contrary, justified it and a country's commercial partners benefited from each productive activity in
which it was specialized. He wished to note that the concept of "multifunctionality" was alien to the
Agriculture Agreement, which referred only to "non- trade concerns", and he was unclear as to what
value this new term would add to the concept of non-trade concerns. Argentina believed that theagenda for the reform process should be entirely consistent with Article 20, and was ready to consider
non-trade concerns within the agreed framework of "substantial progressive reductions in support and
protection resulting in fundamental reform" of agricultural trade. In other words, consideration of
non-trade concerns should lead to more liberalization and not less. If some Members were to insist on
introducing the concept of multifunctionality, others would feel obliged to extend the concept to otherareas of trade in goods. The three conditions in paragraph 14 of Japan's proposal would be perfectly
applicable to any industrial sector which it might be necessary to protect in order to preserve
"functions" and "values" in any particular society. On the subject of food security, Japan hadWT/GC/M/44
Page 14
suggested that, due to the dependency of agriculture on the climate, government intervention was
needed and that government policies should take into account each type of product. Governments had
an obligation to ensure the food security of their countries and the problem was particularly serious
where scarcity of local production was coupled with import difficulties. However, this was not the
case for Japan, although it might well be the case for developing countries which lacked foreigncurrency for imports. It was necessary to separate protectionist pretexts from real concerns. Food
security was a problem for the poor, not for the rich, and for this reason discussion on this issue
belonged to the question of special and differential treatment for developing countries. With regard to
the suggestion that there could be different policies for different products, recognition that some
aspects of agricultural trade had more weight than others was unnecessary. However, Argentina was
concerned that this argument might dilute the whole issue of food security, ending in a tangle of
factors which might limit exports of certain products to some specific markets.
23. As regards Norway's proposal on agriculture (WT/GC/W/238), it was striking that a country
in which 2 per cent of the surface area was cultivated, 3 per cent of the workforce was engaged in
agriculture, and agriculture generated 1 per cent of the GDP, was calling, in paragraph 8 of its
proposal, for the creation of permanent discrimination in the area of agriculture within the framework
of WTO. It was interesting that a country with no real interest in the agriculture sector wantedpermanent discrimination against efficient exporters, and he wondered under what WTO provisions
this could be justified. Norway had also proposed that the interests of developing countries should be
properly addressed, and there could be doubt on this matter because this was clearly established in the
Agriculture Agreement. However, he wondered whether, in discriminating against agricultural
exports, the treatment accorded to developing countries could be satisfactory. There were countrieswhere agricultural exports represented a high proportion of total exports, such as, inter alia ,
Cameroon (36 per cent), Sri Lanka (38 per cent), Nicaragua (63 per cent), and Belize (90 per cent)
and he wondered how Norway imagined these coun tries would fare under a multilateral framework
providing permanent discrimination against agricultural exports. His delegation believed that for
countries such as Norway to propose that agricultur e, also in the future, should be treated separately
within the multilateral trading system in a way that discriminated against efficient producers and a
good number of developing countries was going too far.
24. The representative of New Zealand welcomed Australia's proposal on export restrictions and
taxes (WT/GC/W237), and said that an important part of ensuring an effective trading system was
appropriate disciplines in this area, including the elimination of tariff escalation. Negotiations to this
end would be consistent with the objective of creating a fair and market-oriented agriculture trading
system, and would promote economic development for developing-country Members, in particular
least-developed and net food-importing developing country Members.
25. The representative of Egypt said that Egypt had repeatedly indicated its desire for a real
dialogue among Members on various issues, although this seemed to be more and more difficult due
to the number of proposals. The problem was that Members were attempting to exchange views in the
General Council meetings on issues covering all WTO Agreements, the built-in agenda, and mandatednegotiations, which was a very difficult task. It would be necessary to discuss the issues in a more
structured way, and with regard to proposals on implementation, this would mean dealing with
proposals on one agreement at a time. Previous meetings had not been structured, which had led to
Members simply stating their positions, not to a dialogue. Egypt believed that the best approach
would be to have before the General Council a cluster of proposals in relation to specific issues and tohave a structured discussion on this cluster.
26. The representative of Cuba said that his delegation fully supported the proposal on services
by Uruguay (WT/GC/W/234), which could serve as guidelines for the future negotiations in this area.
Cuba believed that the expansion of trade in services should take place under conditions of
transparency, and progressive liberalization in this area should take fully into account the interests ofWT/GC/M/44
Page 15
developing countries. Developed countries should undertake meaningful commitments in areas of
interest to developing countries, and the structural conditions of developing countries should be
strengthened in the areas of technology, commercial  conditions and others with the aim of improving
their participation in the international trade in services.
27. The representative of Uruguay supported Australia's proposal on agricultural export
restrictions and taxes, which was consistent with the Cairn's Group Vision Statement. Uruguay
believed that disciplines on this issue should be developed in the forthcoming negotiations, as an
integral part of substantial liberalization of agricultural trade.
28. The representative of Australia said that some of the proposals on agriculture went to the
heart of the interests of many Members, as the Members submitting them were rich countries able to
afford to subsidize tiny agricultural sectors, and which wished to push onto the rest of the world
community their internal adjustment costs, or  their inability to undertake domestic adjustment
processes. For poor countries, food security was a very serious issue, which was why it was in the
green box, and why special and differential treatment was so important to them. But it was only rich
countries, which could afford production-linked support arrangements, that were talking about
multifunctionality. The proposal by Norway was an attempt to introduce permanent discrimination
against agriculture into this organization, which had been created 50 years ago to end discrimination,not to entrench it in the rules. It had to be clearly understood that allowing the introduction of
multifunctionality would permanently discriminate against all countries having a comparative
advantage in, or a dependance on agriculture, and no Member could afford to allow this to be written
into the WTO rules.
29. The representative of Norway, referring to the comments by Argentina and Australia on his
Government's proposal on agriculture, said that his delegation had no difficulty with the idea that
some other Members did not agree with the proposal. However, his delegation took exception to the
type of statements which had been made, particularly by Argentina, depicting Norway in a way which
was unfitting within an organization such as WTO.
30. The representative of Japan, in reply to the comments by Argentina and Australia on his
Government's proposal on agriculture, said Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement clearly stated that
the next negotiations should take into account non-trade concerns, the experience from implementing
the commitments and the other concerns mentioned in the preamble to the Agreement. Japan's
proposal was based on these considerations and the discussions which had been held in the
Agriculture Committee, and was aimed at being a contribution to discussions in future meetings.
31. The representative of Chile said that Chile fully supported the proposal by Australia on export
restrictions and taxes in agriculture. There was a need for disciplines in this area to eliminate obstacles
and achieve more balanced market access for agricultural products.
32. The representative of Costa Rica expressed his delegation's support for the proposal by
Australia on export restrictions and taxes. His delegation also welcomed the proposals by the
European Community and Japan on a multilateral framework on investment in WTO. Costa Rica had
previously indicated the need to launch comprehensive negotiations including the development ofmultilateral rules on investment, among other issues. The absence of such rules was an important
lacuna within the WTO rules-based system, which had led to a number of inequalities with systemic
consequences. There were several reasons to justify such rules. First, the proliferation of bilateral
agreements for the promotion and protection of investment, even when there was growing
convergence on this issue, had introduced elements of confusion, inefficiency and incertitude, and ledto the fragmentation and superimposing of separate regimes in a world where investment was more
and more global or regional in nature. A multilateral agreement could reduce conflicts between the
rules of different countries and reduce the inefficiencies which this diversity provoked. Second, aWT/GC/M/44
Page 16
framework of rules and international commitments would contribute to stability and predictability in
the global investment environment. Third, investme nt rules could correct the imbalance in the WTO
system, as there were no such rules on goods, despite their existence in the area of services.
Costa Rica was convinced that such rules would benefit both developed and developing countries, and
would shortly be submitting a proposal on this issue.
33. The representative of Turkey said that sound and multilaterally accepted competition policies
and disciplines would further increase market ac cess opportunities, and would further world trade on
the basis of non-discrimination, predictability and transparency. In a globalized world economy, a
multilateral approach on competition would be helpful to achieve the objectives of the WTO. Due to
the nature of the competition rules, it should be borne in mind that a multilateral framework would
work efficiently if all Member countries had national competition legislation, based on a common
understanding reached at the multilateral level.  Th is would facilitate cooperation among competition
authorities in effectively implementing competition law. To this end, Turkey proposed5 that future
work should be focused on studies to reach a common understanding on the issue and to promote the
adoption of national competition laws based on the pr inciples of non-discrimination and transparency.
In doing so, the differences in the provisions of national legislations and administrative procedures
should be taken into account. A multilateral framew ork of competition rules should include provisions
for transitional periods and certain flexibilities to allow Members at different stages of development to
subscribe to the commitments, and due support should be provided to them in strengthening their
infrastructure.
34. The representative of Hong Kong, China said her delegation welcomed the proposal by Japan
on multilateral investment rules (WT/GC/W/239), and shared many of the views in the proposal, in
particular that any agreement should take an incremental approach and contain a few core elements as
a base, including MFN, national treatment, transpar ency, investment incentives and the applicability
of dispute settlement procedures. Hong Kong, Chin a agreed that the developing needs of exporting
Members should be duly considered. The proposal by the European Communities (WT/GC/W/245)
also contained several interesting points, but Hong Kong, China would be interested in a clarification
on the wording of the section on protection of investment and the right to regulate.
35. The representative of Hungary said that although the beneficial effects of international
investment were widely recognized, there were no comprehensive multilateral rules in place for
investment.  Such comprehensive rules would brin g the necessary transparency, predictability and
security for firms operating in the global market , whatever their ownership structure or place of
incorporation.  Hungary believed that the WTO was the place to work out such rules, which should be
based on the principle of non-discrimination while recognising the rights of governments to takemeasures in order to attain public policy objectives.  A multilateral investment agreement could
reduce distortions in investment flows and inefficient allocation of resources caused by the great
number and variety of regulations on investment issues.  Hungary believed that the time had come for
the WTO to establish a multilateral framework of rules governing international investment.  Against
this background, his delegation welcomed the proposals by the European Communities and Japan, andin particular appreciated the similar approach chosen by them.  Both proposals contained many
elements that were, to a large extent, in line with Hungary's view. The proposals focussed mainly on
FDI and tried to limit the scope and ease the problems common to many Members by a very broad
definition of investment. Both proposals took a bottom-up, or positive list approach and
acknowledged that liberalisation in the pre-establishment phase should be introduced progressively,providing the required flexibility for Members. Both proposals also foresaw the application of the
principle of non-discrimination in a possible agreement and called for full national treatment in the
post-establishment phase. Finally, Hungary especially welcomed the explicit mention in the Japanese
                                                     
5 A formal proposal by Turkey was subsequently circulated as WT/GC/W/250.WT/GC/M/44
Page 17
proposal that disputes between investors and states should be excluded, and shared the view that such
disputes would be irreconcilable with the basic character of the dispute settlement mechanism.
36. The representative of Korea supported the proposals by the European Communities and Japan
on trade and investment. The general thrust of both proposal was similar to the views of Korea. The
recent proliferation of bilateral and regional investment arrangements had led to a coexistence ofsometimes mutually incompatible disciplines whic h might distort investment flows. Korea believed
that multilateral rules on investment offered a solutio n to this problem by enhancing transparency and
predictability in the international investment regime, which in turn would facilitate freer and more
stable flows of investment and expand global welfar e. Concerns over the potential cost which had yet
to be proven should not discourage negotiations in this area. Multilateral investment rules should not
work as an impediment to the development of host countries, and the development dimension should
be an integral part of such rules, and could be effectively addressed by providing safeguardmechanisms which allowed for a certain flexibility for host countries. The future investment rules in
WTO should, thus, achieve a balance between the goal of facilitating investment flows and the need
to allow viable policy options for developing countries. Given the experience in recent negotiations in
this area, Korea believed that in order for the negotiations to be successful a middle-of-the-road
approach should be taken, in terms of host protection and liberalization of investment, and Korea'sproposal on investment, shortly to be submitted, would follow this approach.
37. The representative of the Philippines, speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Members
, referring
to Japan's proposal on investment, said that ensuring transparency and stability in legal systems and
policies was, indeed, a primordial concern of host countries including the developing countries.
ASEAN also agreed that transparency and stability, among other factors, reduced costs and risks forthe foreign investor, the home country and the host country, and thus encouraged investments and
promoted growth.  As ASEAN had pointed out in the Working Group on Trade and Investment, in
this age of globalization and openness, each country, being a potential recipient of foreign direct
investments (FDI), would do all it could through legisl ation and best practices to successfully compete
for and attract FDI.  Furthermore, ASEAN had al so stressed that governments would not easily
reverse policies or law only to risk damaging their countries' development prospects. ASEAN
wondered whether multilateral rules, which Japan advocated in its paper, would address all the
problems that could arise in the operation of FDI wo rld-wide, or if such rules which overly stressed
the treatment and protection of FDI would only compound such problems.  Again, as ASEAN had
stated in the Working Group, the feasibility of multilateral rules on investment would hinge on
whether or not they filled a void that must be filled. If so, one must also ensure the ability of these
rules to address in a balanced manner the diverse and evolving interests of all countries. Anydiscussion of benefits from such rules could not be  confined to only those that would accrue to the
source of the FDI.  To balance the discussion, it should also be asked if multilateral rules would
indeed translate into more investment flows and consequent net benefits for a host country, or whether
they were being mooted as a false panacea. ASEAN believed that the notion of multilateral rules on
investment, as suggested by Japan, lacked a development dimension.  ASEAN had adequately
elaborated on this issue in the Working Group, and wished to emphasize that there should be a means
to manifest the development dimension in each of the elements that comprised any set of multilateral
rules on investment. Japan had further argued that developing countries needed to be given sufficient
time before being expected to implement commitments, and suggested a positive-list approach.
ASEAN regretted this approach to the development dimension which only centered on extended time-frames.  As ASEAN had attempted to make clear at the present meeting and in  previous statements,
the issue at stake was not merely rules that would protect FDI, foreign investors and home countries,
but more importantly the development dimension of foreign direct investment.  There was a
substantive difference between these two. The crux of the matter was how multilateral rules could
take on board the development dimension so that development objectives were not just paid lipservice in preambular aspirations, and conveniently operationalized through mere extended transition
periods.WT/GC/M/44
Page 18
38. The representative of Chile, referring to Japan's proposal on investment, said that Chile
believed, based on its own experience, that foreign direct investment was one of the principal motors
of economic development and growth, and would continue to play a major role as a complement to
national investment, in particular with regard to domestic savings regimes, transfer of technology,
creation of new types of job, and diversification of exports, which would open new markets for goods
and services. Chile supported Japan's proposal with respect to the need to establish multilateral rules
aimed at creating predictability and stability for foreign direct investment. Chile believed that the
WTO was the obvious forum for such multilateral ru les, which should include principles such as
transparency, non-discrimination through MFN and national treatment, investment protection and
dispute settlement procedures.
39. The representative of the Czech Republic recalled his delegation's previous statements that
the next round of negotiations should be comprehensive and include issues such as investment and
competition policy. His delegation therefore welcomed the proposals on investment by the European
Community and Japan, and the proposal on competition by Turkey, and would offer comments on a
subsequent occasion.
40. The representative of Japan, responding to ASEAN's comments on Japan's proposal on
investment, said that investment rules would enhan ce predictability and enable long-term investment,
leading to an increase not only in the amount of  investment but also in the scale and level of
technology of such investments. The sharp increase in the number of bilateral and regional investment
agreements in the recent past indicated the em ergence of a common understanding that investment
rules could have a positive effect on economic development. The rules suggested by Japan would not
prevent efforts by developing countries to develop their infrastructure, human resources or policies oneconomic development, but would instead complement these efforts by providing a stable investment
environment. The formulation of rules on investme nt would have to give full consideration to the
needs of developing countries to implement policies corresponding to their levels of development.
ASEAN had stated that the proposal lacked a development dimension, but Japan wished to emphasize
its belief that development was an important element of this issue.
41. The representative of Iceland said that Members were aware that a detailed discussion of the
relationship between subsidies reform, trade and sustainable fisheries had taken place in the
Committee on Trade and Environment.  This relationship had been regarded as positive and there was
a growing recognition of the need for governments to make a substantive contribution in this regard.
In its proposal regarding fisheries subsidies (WT/GC/W/229), Iceland had proposed that, as a part of
the forthcoming negotiations, Members should agree to eliminate subsidies that contributed to
fisheries overcapacity, in view of the fact that they distorted trade, seriously undermined sustainableutilisation of fish stocks and hampered sustainabl e development.  Overcapacity of the global fishing
fleet was, along with inadequate management regimes, the predominant cause of the depletion of fish
stocks in many regions.  It was generally recognized that government subsidies and other market
distortions were primary factors in causing this overcapacity.  The encouragement of the use of
fisheries resources beyond normal economic rates of exploitation also created supply distortions thatplaced downward pressures on world seafood prices and affected the ability of all countries,
particularly developing countries, to achieve adequate economic returns from their fisheries resources.
Given that the industrialized countries were responsible for the bulk of the subsidies granted to the
global fisheries sector, the negative trade-distorting effects of these subsidies affected first and
foremost the fish-exporting developing countries.  The removal of these subsidies would therefore
benefit the developing countries most and their prospects for sustainable development.  Therefore,
elimination of subsidies that contributed to fisheries overexploitation would represent a clear “win-
win” achievement in the area of trade, the environment and sustainable development.
42.  The representative of Chile welcomed the proposal by Iceland and said that his delegation
would follow with great interest the idea to eliminate trade-distorting fisheries subsidies whichWT/GC/M/44
Page 19
undermined the development of countries and the sustainable management of fisheries.  His
delegation would be in favour of discussing this issue at greater length on the basis that the
liberalization of trade was fundamental for the sustainable development of countries.
43. The representative of Hong Kong, China, referring to the proposals by Japan on industrial
tariffs (WT/GC/W/243) and forestry and fishery products (WT/GC/W/221) expressed satisfaction that
these proposals supported comprehensive negotiations on non-agricultural tariffs, covering all sectors
with no a priori exclusions.  In particular, his delegation shared the view that a formula approach
should be adopted and tariff peaks as well as nuisance tariffs should be reduced or eliminated.  A
uniform approach and objective should be applied to all non-agricultural products, including forestry
and fishery products.
44. The representative of the Philippines said that his delegation shared the concerns raised by
Iceland with respect to fisheries subsidies that resulted in overcapacity in global fishing fleets and
hampered efforts towards sustainable development.  Fishery subsidies promoted the operation of
distant water fleets fishing off the coasts of developing countries and created unfair competition with
local fishermen.  Considering its experiences in dealing with the subsidies issue the WTO could,
within the confines of its mandate, contribute significantly in addressing the issue of fisheries
subsidies.  In this regard, his delegation supported the proposal by Iceland that Members should agreeto eliminate fisheries subsidies that resulted in ov ercapacity and excess effort in global fishing fleets.
Such negotiations should begin with an examinati on of present WTO provisions that were relevant to
this issue, including the subsidie s agreement.  There was a need to look into how fishery subsidies
fared against that agreement, particularly in respect of the disciplines on prohibited, actionable, and
non-actionable subsidies.
45. The representative of Australia welcomed Iceland's proposal, and said that, when considering
the WTO's role, a key issue would be whether focus should be on subsidies provided to the fishing
industry or whether there were other subsidies which affected fishing sustainability.  It would also be
necessary to look at whether there were other production distorting measures which might not be
subsidies in the strict WTO sense, but which could be usefully addressed through WTO disciplines.In referring to Japan's proposal (WT/GC/W/221) which mentioned the possible existence of some
positive fishery subsidies that contributed to the su stainability of fishery resources, current research
suggested that such positive subsidies comprised only a small part of the total subsidies which
currently impacted on fishing capacity and sustainability.
46. The representative of New Zealand welcomed  Iceland's proposal which complemented the
work undertaken in the Committee on Trade and Environment, and said that the previous week there
had been an extensive discussion on this subject, which testified to the strong concern within theWTO membership about the need for action to address fishery subsidies.  His Government had
submitted a paper to the CTE on this matter (WT/CTE/W/121).  The problems faced as a result of
subsidies that contributed to fisheries overcapacity could not only be seen as an environmental
problem.  With developing countries accounting for over half of world trade in fish and fish products,
subsidies in this sector had an impact not only on the environment, but also on development and trade.A recent World Bank study had estimated that the total amount of subsidies in the fisheries sector was
between US$14 and 20 billion a year, half of which was provided by OECD countries alone.
Although it was possible that some subsidies could have positive environmental and non-trade
distorting effects, the World Bank analysis also indicated that these accounted for at most 5 per cent
of all subsidies provided world-wide. This was a timely issue to consider in the context of thepreparatory process and within other relevant WTO bodies.
47. The representative of the United States welcomed Iceland's proposal that the WTO should
take action to eliminate those fisheries subsidies that were environmentally harmful and trade-
distorting.  Iceland's proposal succinctly and eloquently made the case for this course of action.  AsWT/GC/M/44
Page 20
pointed out by Iceland, these subsidies were bad both for the environment and for trade.  It was
noteworthy that members of the FAO recently had adopted a plan of action for the management of
fishing capacity which called for action to reduce and eliminate all factors, including subsidies that
contributed directly or indirectly to the build-up of excess fishing capacity.  At the high-level
symposium on trade and environment his delegation had emphasized that the WTO had an importantrole to play by working together with the FAO on  the elimination of subsidies that contributed to
overfishing.
48. The representative of Japan, referring to Iceland's proposal, said that the sustainable use of
resources was the important issue in the context of today's fisheries. Japan did not believe that one
should focus exclusively on subsidies but should also extract and examine every element which
hindered the sustainable use of resources.  Moreover, Members should recognize the fact that among
fisheries subsidies there were useful ones, such as subsidies for reducing overexploitation, subsidiesfor promoting resources management and subsidies for renewable resources.  If, after extracting all
elements which hindered sustainable use of resources and following an examination of
countermeasures, a conclusion was reached to the effect that fisheries subsidies were the main
problem, then Members should examine how to improve those subsidies.  Such examination should
be done in the FAO which had expertise in fisheries management.  Japan believed that theinappropriate management of fishery resources and flag of convenience fleets were also main causes
of the problem of the sustainable use of resources and that the relevant countries should take steps
towards solving those problems.
49. The representative of Norway welcomed Iceland's proposal which pointed to a problem that
should be of concern to all Members, namely that use of certain subsidies contributed to excessive
fishing capacity and depletion of fish stocks in many regions.  Norway considered certain types of
subsidies as one cause of excess fishing capacity.  However, to solve the problem of excess capacity
and unsustainable use of fish stocks and the protection of the marine environment, Members needed
to take a broader approach.  This was what the FAO Committee on Fisheries had done through its
adoption of an International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.  This plan aimedat ensuring that levels of fishing efforts were commensurate with sustainable use of fishery resources.
His delegation was pleased that Iceland had underlined the link between efforts in the WTO and the
work of the FAO.  Norway had taken an active part in the work on the FAO Plan of Action and saw
the management of fishing capacity as an important element of the overall resource management in
the fisheries sector.  His delegation considered it useful that the WTO had made its contribution
towards realisation of the objectives of the FAO Plan of Action within its sphere of competence.
Environmentally damaging subsidies falling under the generic rules of the Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures were particularly relevant in this respect.
(b) Proposals on paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Declaration
50. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had submitted a proposal on
paragraph 10 (W/GC/W/230) on behalf of Argentina, Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand,Uruguay, and Hong Kong China.  The proposal was that Ministers at Seattle launch a round of
multilateral trade negotiations aimed at the progressive liberalisation of trade in goods and services
and the improvement and, when agreed, further development of WTO rules in a way that achieved an
overall balance of the interests of all Members.  The round should end no later than three years after it
began and should be launched, conducted and concluded in the form of a single undertaking.Ministers should meet half-way through the round to assess progress and at the end of the round to
agree on the results.  Between ministerial conferences, the General Council should meet in Special
Session to direct the negotiations.  The background to the proposal was that Ministers had agreed in
May 1998 that the General Council would submit to them recommendations for decision on the scope,
structure and time-frames of the WTO work programme to ensure that the work programme beganWT/GC/M/44
Page 21
and concluded expeditiously.  The scope, structure and time-frames would need to be fully reflected
in a self-contained declaration.  The decisions that Ministers would take by consensus at Seattle
would determine the scope of the work programme.  Whatever the components of the WTO's
negotiating programme, it should be in the form of a multilateral round as a single undertaking in
order to ensure a package that achieved an overall balance among the interests of all Members.  Itwould be important to maintain the confidence of the business community in the ability of the WTO
to produce meaningful outcomes.  The Seattle Ministerial Conference could thus acknowledge the
possibility of early results.  A mid-term review of progress in the round could take decisions, if
warranted, on whether any early results could be applied by Members provisionally until the
conclusion of the round.  Any early results should be treated as part of a single undertaking.  It would
be crucial to aim at concluding the negotiations within a short time-frame.  Government, business and
the wider community would not want to wait too long for outcomes, as had been the case with theUruguay Round.  A three year time-frame seemed sensible since, unlike the Uruguay Round, all the
possible negotiating issues had already been dealt with extensively in the WTO.  A three-year time-
frame suggested that clear, concise and explicit negotiating plans should be agreed at the Seattle
Ministerial Conference.  Work on negotiating plans should not be at the expense of the short amount
of time available for the negotiations proper.  As regards the overall management of the WTO workprogramme, political supervision would be important.  Thus, the fourth Ministerial Conference
provided an opportunity for Ministers to assess progress, give any necessary direction and to take any
agreed early decisions.  Intersessional supervision of the negotiations could be provided by the
General Council meeting in Special Session. From Australia's own perspective, there were three
crucial ingredients for ensuring a successful WTO work programme after Seattle.  First, it had to offerbalanced gains for all Members.  This meant that the mandated negotiations in agriculture and
services had to be complemented with, at the very least, negotiations on non-agricultural tariffs and
non-tariff measures.  In this context, Australia was pleased that the recent meeting of APEC Trade
Ministers had endorsed the call for non-agricultural tariff negotiations in the WTO.  APEC was a
diverse grouping, comprising developed and developing and small and large economies, but all theseeconomies were now united in calling for an expanded market access negotiating agenda in the WTO.
Secondly, the work programme had to be credible.  Australia believed that a focused market access
round was capable of delivering real and balanced benefits in a relatively short time-frame.  Members
had to be careful not to jeopardize the prospect of  real gains in a short time-frame by overloading the
negotiating agenda, and ensure that a credible negotiating programme was well-prepared – i.e.
decisions on negotiations at Seattle should be sufficiently clear and detailed, and be accompanied by
negotiating plans that allowed negotiations to begin quickly and proceed smoothly.  Thirdly, theround should be a single undertaking.  This was the only way to ensure that all Members could enter
into the negotiations knowing that the final pack age of outcomes would contain something for them.
A single undertaking did not necessarily rule out early harvests, since an agreement on the provisional
implementation of early results would depend on those results benefiting the broad range of WTO
Members.  Australia looked forward to comments on the proposal that it and other Members hadtabled on the management of a new round.  Time for working out the details of a round was relatively
short, and Members could not continue to discuss the issue in abstract and general terms.  His
delegation hoped that this and other proposals would allow Members to begin a more focused and
practical discussion of how to manage the WTO's negotiating programme.
51. The representative of Argentina said that as one of the co-authors of the proposal in
WT/GC/W/230 his delegation wished to emphasize the importance it attached to a new round of
negotiations where clear negotiating mandates, political will and the spirit of compromise prevailed.
Such a round should last three years and be based on a clear understanding of the depth of
negotiations in each area, thereby providing an addi tional guarantee with respect to the principle of a
single undertaking. In addition, Members should not, at this point, concern themselves withobligations related to possible early results. His delegation believed that early results could only be
considered when the necessary consensus existed and to the extent that such decisions reflected an
overall balance among the interests of Members.WT/GC/M/44
Page 22
52. The representative of India, referring to the proposal in WT/GC/W/230, said that since
deliberations on issues relating to paragraph 9 were not complete it was premature to consider
possible recommendations arising out of considerations of areas and elements of this paragraph. There
was no consensus on the concept and constitution of the so-called new round.  India remained
committed to addressing implementation concerns and the built-in-agenda.  There was no consensuson any of the other issues which had been suggest ed for inclusion by various Members. It would
therefore be appropriate to postpone any discussion on these issues until Members had reached some
conclusions and clarity on paragraph 9 issues.  With respect to the concept of a single undertaking, his
delegation had already expressed its views at the Special Session on 17 June.  Since there were still
some differences in perception about the meaning and full impact of this concept, it would be useful if
the Secretariat could prepare a factual paper which provided a legal interpretation of this concept and
explained how it had evolved in the different st ages of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  India
believed that the proposed time-frame of three years should only be indicative.  The objective of
concluding the negotiations by a given date should not, in any way,  override the importance that the
membership as a whole should attach to the need for the effective and substantive participation by all
delegations.  Compressing any indicative time-frame might make it difficult for delegations with
limited resources to participate in various negotiations in a meaningful and effective manner.
53. The representative of Morocco, as one of the co-authors of the proposal in WT/GC/W/230,
said that the proposal did not concern the actual conduct of the negotiations as this was an element
which would be decided by consensus at a later stage. The proposal referred only to questions
regarding the organization of work referred to in paragraph 10 of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration.
Morocco believed that the future negotiations should be comprehensive and global and be conductedas a single undertaking.  The Seattle Ministerial Declaration should be clear in this respect and should
envisage a detailed negotiating plan which identified the objectives of the negotiations in each area
and ensured a balance of interests among all Members.  It should avoid any ambiguity which would
lead to future interpretation problems.  Morocco wa s flexible with regard to the time-frame of the
negotiations and considered three years the minimum to complete a round of negotiations.  The time-frame depended both on the scope and conduct of the negotiations as well as the objectives to be
achieved. His delegation believed that nothing hindered the informal and provisional conclusion of
negotiations in certain sectors while waiting for the conclusion of the full round of negotiations.  To
proceed differently would jeopardize the principle of  a single undertaking.  Similarly, the provisional
implementation of certain early harvests did not pose any difficulties as long as this was done on an
individual, voluntary and non-reciprocal basis until th e end of the full round of negotiations.  Morocco
believed that the General Council in Special Sessions was the appropriate forum for the conduct andsupervision of the negotiations. Taking into consideration the difficulties of small delegations,
Members should avoid a multiplication of new bodies with the objective of allowing these delegations
to participate effectively in the negotiations.
54. The representative of Singapore, as a co-sponsor of the proposal in WT/GC/W/230, said that
significant statements and ideas had been made about how some Members saw the scope, structure
and time-frame of new negotiations to be launched in 2000.  The question was how Members could
structure the format and content of the future work programme so as to achieve what all separately or
collectively aspired to.  Singapore believed that a number of specific issues had to be addressed.  The
scope, by its very nature, had to be proposal-driven.  Some proposals were already on the table and
were being addressed by the General Council.  With respect to the mandated negotiations inagriculture and services her delegation believed that these had to take place together with market
opening in other areas such as industrial tariffs, and the need to evolve new rules to adapt to rapid
changes in the trading environment and new technology.  The crucial issue was how to decide on a
scope that would meet the balanced interests of all Members.  Not all issues were ready for
negotiations – some such as agriculture and services were more advanced and mature than others.  Yetthere were issues for which Members could not foresee the end result, but which were important
enough not to be excluded from a balanced negotiating package.  There was also the question of theWT/GC/M/44
Page 23
intensity and the level of ambitions that Members hoped to achieve for each negotiating issue.  This
could be broadly defined in the parameters on each negotiating topic that Ministers had to decide
upon at Seattle.  Concerning modalities, the Uruguay Round negotiations had been conducted on the
premise of a single undertaking with a common deadline.  It had taken eight years to conclude.  At
Marrakesh, Ministers had therefore decided that, to avoid overloading the agenda and recurring crises,they should meet once every two years.  This would also provide a relief valve to enable Ministers to
adjust the course and direction from time to time.  However, if past negotiations were to serve as a
guide, the reality of negotiations was that at least in practice, progress could best be advanced and
results assured if negotiations were conducted as a single undertaking with an imposed deadline.
Otherwise, progress would often slow to a crawl.  The biennial Ministerial Conference was a new
institution that Members could harness to provide for new dynamism in the WTO work programme
and negotiations in two ways.  First, they would provide an occasion during the intervening period for
Ministers to approve results that were ripe for conclusion.  Second, they would enable Members to
take stock and review the progress of the negotiations and decide what could further be done to goad
the process along.  Singapore also considered it important that the Seattle Ministerial Declaration
clearly indicate results of what Members had set out to do at the Singapore and Geneva Ministerial
Conferences.  First, as agreed in Geneva in May 1998, Members needed to undertake a collectiveevaluation of implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments, how it had fared and the reasons
for perceived satisfaction or failures.  Members might need to take some collective decisions as to
how to address the systemic problems in order to  overcome the deep concerns of the developing
countries.  Second, a progress report on the Plan of Action for the least-developed countries had to be
produced as had been agreed in Singapore and Geneva. With respect to the bench-marking for results,her delegation believed that Ministerial Conferences should not be regarded as mere administrative
board meetings.  They could take decisions that would bench-mark progress or results in two areas.
The first would range from simple house-keeping decisions like renewal of mandates of working
groups to those which would improve the efficacy of the WTO system, such as procedures in dispute
settlement.  The second would relate to market access results and breakthroughs in WTO rule-makingareas.  It would also be vital that the Seattle Declaration send the right signal to the market with
regard to the international trading environment and prospects for further global liberalisation.  There
should be a reaffirmation of Ministers' collective commitment to keep up the momentum of
multilateral trade liberalisation by launching a new round.  In conclusion, her delegation wished to
emphasize the need to ensure that the scope of the balanced package was manageable and that it
brought tangible results within a reasonable period of three years.  That would be the most crucial
decision that the Ministers would have to take at Seattle.
55. The representative of Australia, commenting on the statement by India concerning the
proposal in WT/GC/W/230, said it was clear that th e details of the scope would not be finally agreed
until late in this process.  In the meantime, Members needed to reflect and discuss elements of the
structure and the time-frame and it was in this light the proposal should be seen.
56. The representative of Thailand said that the proposal in WT/GC/W/230, of which Thailand
was a co-sponsor, served as a good basis for the organization and management of the future work
programme.  In principle, Thailand supported the launch of a comprehensive new round of trade
negotiations and it would be desirable if the General Council could send such a recommendation,
including a clear scope, structure and time-frame to the Ministerial Conference.  The new round
should maintain the form of a single package with a common deadline.  Regarding the scope of
negotiations, Thailand supported the idea that a new round should be comprehensive, as opposed to
sectoral, in nature.  Sectoral negotiations, by their very nature, would not achieve the balance of
interests among all Members as they would only allow narrow interests of a few to predominate over
others.  It was his delegation's understanding that, fundamentally, there had to be a balance of interests
of all concerns.  The built-in agenda, including the mandated negotiations, was already a part of theexisting commitments and work should therefore proceed independently as mandated, and should not
be taken hostage by the inclusion of new issues into a new round.  Thailand also attached importanceWT/GC/M/44
Page 24
to implementation, and it was in the interest of all Members and the system itself to seek improvement
on implementation in order to redress any imbalance that might exist in the Uruguay Round results.
In addition, for the WTO to be relevant in the next millennium, it had to be in a position to cope with
the evolution in world trade and economic environment.  The inclusion of the so-called new issues in
the new round of negotiations would have to be  decided by consensus and, most importantly, such
issues had to be directly related with trade, and already have been dealt with, extensively and
adequately, in the WTO. Regarding the structure, Thailand believed that the General Council should
primarily be the body which took care of the negotiations.  However, questions relating to the
continuity of the Chairmanship of this body, th e workload of the General Council, and the need to
avoid creating layers of mechanisms within the body would have to be taken into account.  At the
same time, given the already extensive responsibility of the General Council, some flexibility would
be necessary to avoid overloading this body with every substantive issue brought to this organization.Therefore, for those negotiations which might require technical expertise or might impose a large
workload, an ad-hoc negotiating body should be created to take care of the negotiations while
allowing the General Council to function as the ov erseeing body of the whole negotiation process.
57. The representative of Turkey said that hi s government was committed to comprehensive
negotiations.  It was his delegation's understanding that a comprehensive agenda would include, in
addition to mandated negotiations, such new issues as trade facilitation and competition.  In addition,
implementation issues in general, and the particular concerns of developing-country Members, needed
to be dealt with in a substantive manner in the Seattle Ministerial Declaration.  A particular emphasis
should be placed on measures to ensure the significant integration of LDCs into the multilateral
system.  It was important that the scope and the content of each negotiating subject be unambiguouslydefined and specifically included in the Ministerial Declaration.  Thus, before negotiations were
undertaken, each Member would know precisely the content of each negotiating subject and what
specific topics would be negotiated.  In other words, after negotiations had been formally initiated, no
additional, complementary or side issues should be introduced into the negotiation of a subject other
than those clearly defined in the Ministerial Declaration.  With regard to the time-frame he said thatthe forthcoming negotiations would hinge, to a great extent, on the scope of the negotiating agenda.
In order to attain early and balanced results which benefited all Members, it was important not be
over-ambitious in bringing additional issues into the negotiations.  Based on the experience from
previous multilateral rounds of trade negotiations it would not be unrealistic to set a time-frame of
three years for the completion of the forthcoming round.  Concerning the organization of work, the
establishment of a Trade Negotiations Committee with a single authority to oversee the entire
negotiating process would provide a sound and practical  framework.  This type of arrangement would
be more result-oriented and would facilitate the forthcoming negotiations.  Turkey believed that the
successful practice in this regard during the Uruguay Round had set a good precedent.  The Trade
Negotiations Committee could delegate the related work to the existing individual committees when
deemed appropriate, or could set up new committees, on the basis of their expertise and competence
over the issues, when necessary.  Turkey believed that negotiations should result in a singleundertaking. Individual agreements should not be adopted for implementation until all agreements had
been ratified as part of a single undertaking.  The single undertaking method allowed for a balanced
approach and a more effective trade-off process between sectors since Members had to reach
agreement on all areas included in the negotiating agenda before implementation.  Thus, Turkey was
committed to a single undertaking formula, which took due account of divergent interests andprovided reasonable safeguards in protecting the concerns of all Members.
58. The representative of Mauritius said that his delegation wished to thank the Chairman and the
Secretariat for circulating the subject list of th e proposals submitted in phase 2 (JOB(99)/3978) and
the draft schedule of informal meetings. With respect to the clarifications given by the Chairman in
the informal meeting in response to the question fr om the Jamaican delegation on the subject list, his
delegation had taken note of the following points: (i) the subject list was not all inclusive, but was
only indicative at this stage and was liable to change based on further proposals of Members and anyWT/GC/M/44
Page 25
discussions that would give rise to the need for additional elements to be included; (ii) the issues
raised were not mutually exclusive; (iii) the subj ect list was without prejudice to the interests of
Members; (iv) all issues were important and, as such, there was no hierarchy in the proposals; and
(vi) the outcome would not be pre-empted. A valuable suggestion had also been made by Venezuela
in the informal meeting to the effect that a summary of proposals be prepared by the Secretariat andmade available to Members.  Smaller delegations, like Venezuela and Bulgaria, who had supported
the proposal, had argued that this summary would be very useful, and his delegation wished to
express its support for their suggestion. He added that several Members had been finding it difficult to
cope with the large number of WTO meetings.  On certain occasions there was overlap, with the result
that it was not possible for many Members to attend a number of meetings.  While the primacy of the
General Council remained beyond doubt, something should be done to avoid these situations.  His
delegation requested confirmation that the suggested programme of informal meetings in thepreparatory process for the coming weeks was indicative of the prospects that the discussions would
indeed be exhausted on schedule.  The positioning of the agenda items in the work schedule did leave
his delegation a bit sceptical about such prospects. Furthermore, his delegation had a substantial
interest in paragraph 10 and had not found itself in a position to be able to make concrete proposals
for presentation in the informal meeting on that paragraph.  This was because the Committee on Tradeand Development had only shortly prior to the meeting concluded its own meeting on concerns and
problems of small economies.  The Committee had still not finished its work, with the report of the
Commonwealth/World Bank Task Force still in a draft form. The co-chairmen of the Task Force had
announced that there was still more work to be done before the final report could be made available to
the WTO Secretariat and Members, and the WTO Secretariat itself was awaiting this final report so asto present it to the Committee on Trade and Development and the General Council. For these reasons,
his delegation requested that it be allowed the flexibility to make its concrete proposals after the
release of the report, which was likely to be in September.
59. The General Council took note of the statements.
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