RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/DSB/M/130
18 August 2002
(02-4962)
Dispute Settlement Body
29 July 2002
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 29 July 2002
Chairman:  Mr. Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay)
Prior to the adoption of the agenda, the item concerning the request for the establishment of a
panel in the case on:  "Peru – Tax Treatment on Certain Imported Products" was removed from the
proposed agenda at the request of Chile (WT/DS255/4).
Subject discussed: Page
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB.........................2
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:  Status report by the United
States......................................................................................................................... ..................2
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States.......................2
2. Turkey – Certain import procedures for fresh fruit .............................................................3
(a) Request for the establishmen t of a panel by Ecuador .................................................................3
3. United States – Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel
products ....................................................................................................................... ..............4
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Brazil.....................................................................4
4. United States – Final countervailing duty determination with respect to certain
softwood lumber from Canada................................................................................................5
(a) Request for the establishm ent of a panel by Canada ..................................................................5
5. United States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plate from
India .......................................................................................................................... .................6
(a) Report of the Panel ......................................................................................................... ............6
6. Proposed nominations for the indicative list of governmental and
non-governmental  pane lists..................................................................................................... 9
(a) Statement by  the Chairman................................................................................................... ......9WT/DSB/M/130
Page 2
1. Surveillance of implementation of recommendations adopted by the DSB
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copy right Act:  Status report by the United States
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
1. The Chairman recalled that Article 21.6 of the DSU required that "unless the DSB decides
otherwise, the issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the
agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of establishment of the reasonable
period of time pursuant to paragraph 3 and shall remain on the DSB's agenda until the issue is
resolved".  He proposed that the two sub-items to which he had referred be considered separately.
(a) United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyri ght Act:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS160/18/Add.6)
2. The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS160/18/Add.6 which contained the status
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act.
3. The representative of the United States said that in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU,
her country had provided an additional status report in this dispute on 18 July 2002.  As noted in the
report, the United States had been engaged in discussions with the EC to find a positive and mutually
acceptable resolution of the dispute.  The United States was working hard to reach a mutually
acceptable arrangement consistent with WTO rules.  The US Administration continued to engage
actively with the US Congress on this matter and looked forward to resolving the dispute.
4. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation had noted that the
US Administration was working with the US Congre ss, but the EC was still concerned about the lack
of implementation of the DSB's recommendations a nd rulings and about prospects for Congressional
action in the short term, taking into account the Summer Recess and legislative elections next autumn.
5. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
(b) United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916:  Status report by the United States
(WT/DS136/14/Add.6 - WT/DS162/17/Add.6)
6. The Chairman drew attention to docume nt WT/DS136/14/Add.6 – WT/DS162/17/Add.6
which contained the status report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's
recommendations in the case concerning the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.
7. The representative of the United States said that the United States had provided an additional
status report in this dispute on 18 July 2002, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.  As noted in
that report, bills had been introduced in both the US Senate (S.2224) and the US House of
Representatives (H.R. 3557) which would repeal the 1916 Act and apply to all pending court cases.
She said that the United States would continue to work for further progress in this matter with a view
to achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution to this dispute with the EC and Japan.
8. The representative of the European Communities said that to facilitate the implementation of
the DSB's recommendations and rulings, the EC had agreed first to extend the implementation
deadline by five months and then to suspend the arbitration proceedings until 30 June 2002.  This
latter deadline had now expired and the latest status report by the United States again showed no
progress.  The bills introduced in the House of Representative and in the Senate to repeal the 1916 Act
and to terminate pending cases had not been adopted or even discussed by the US Congress.  ThisWT/DSB/M/130
Page 3
continuous delay on implementation of this case un dermined the credibility  of US commitments to
compliance.  The EC would also like to remind the United States that the proceedings brought against
EC companies in the Printing Press case would resume on 8 August, if the 1916 Act had not been
repealed by that date.  This had become very unlikely with the summer recess starting on 29 July in
the House of Representatives and at the end of the week in the Senate.  Notwithstanding the clearcondemnation of the 1916 Act, EC companies would be involved in extremely costly litigation
procedures and could even be found liable.  Obviously such a result would not be acceptable to the
EC.  He stressed again the extreme urgency of getting some positive developments in this case,
including action by the US Administration to seek a renewed stay in the court proceedings against the
EC companies, pending rapid action by the US Congress to repeal the 1916 Act.
9. The representative of Japan recalled that her country had stated on many occasions in the
DSB that its goal was to obtain prompt compliance by the United States.  As pointed out at the
24 June DSB regular meeting, the communication contained in WT/DS162/21, dated 4 March 2002,
clearly stipulated that "the arbitration proceeding may be reactivated at the request of either party after
30 June 2002 if no substantial progress has been made in resolving this dispute by that date".  This
date had already passed.  Japan therefore shared the EC's concern that the suspended proceedings in
the US domestic courts under 1916 Act would be re-opened as of 8 August, which would lead toserious financial consequences for the respondent Japanese companies.  Japan strongly urged the
United States to continue its best efforts to have the bill repealing the 1916 Act passed by the US
Congress as soon as possible.  Japan reiterated that it reserved its right to suspend concessions or
other obligations with regard to this case.
10. The representative of Mexico said that he wi shed to express his country's interest in the
prompt resolution of this dispute.
11. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to revert to this matter at its next regular
meeting.
2. Turkey – Certain import procedures for fresh fruit
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Ecuador (WT/DS237/3)
12. The Chairman recalled that the DSB considered this matter at its meeting on 24 June 2002
and had agreed to revert to it.  He drew attention to the communication from Ecuador contained in
document WT/DS237/3.
13. The representative of Ecuador said that, in accordance with the DSU provisions, his country
wished to request, once again, that a panel be establis hed to examine this matter.  He then said that his
authorities had been informed by the Turkish authorit ies that Turkey had recently – in the past week –
proceeded to amend certain import procedures for fresh fruit in order to meet Ecuador's concerns.Ecuador recognized this gesture of goodwill by Turkey which had been designed to settle this dispute.
For its part, and in reciprocity, Ecuador had decided to delay the composition of the panel.  In this
way, Ecuador would be able to initiate immediately with Turkey a detailed review of the technical
implications of the amendment to verify if it did i ndeed satisfy Ecuador's concerns with regard to the
implementation of such measures, and whether the Turkish fresh fruit import regime had been broughtinto compliance with the covered Agreements.  Ecuado r believed that it was essential to ensure that
the measures that would put an end to this dispute remained in force through a mutually agreed
solution, which would be notified to the DSB and to other relevant WTO bodies.
14. The representative of Turkey expressed disappointment with the decision of Ecuador to have
the panel established with regard to the dispute over the importation of bananas.  He said that, through
a communiqué, Turkey had recently amended the existing legislation in order to meet Ecuador's
concerns.  Consequently, his authorities had immediately informed Ecuador, in writing, of this newWT/DSB/M/130
Page 4
development and had asked Ecuador to withdraw its request for the establishment of a panel.  Turkey
believed that, as a result of this new legislation, there was no legal basis for the establishment of a
panel.  Nonetheless, Turkey would try its best in  order to find a bilateral solution to this dispute.
15. The Chairman said that it was his understanding that Ecuador had requested the establishment
of a panel, but that in light of the new development concerning the Turkish legislation, it would be
willing to suspend the composition of the panel once such a panel was established.  He therefore
proposed that, in accordance with the DSU provisions, the DSB agree to establish a panel.
16. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6 with standard terms of reference.
17. The representatives of the European Communities and the United States  reserved their third-
party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.
3. United States – Definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Brazil (WT/DS259/10)
18. The Chairman drew attention to the communication from Brazil contained in document
WT/DS259/10.
19. The representative of Brazil said that his country had requested consultations with the United
States on 21 May, 2002, concerning the definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel
products, imposed by the United States in Proclamation No. 7529 entitled: "To Facilitate Positive
Adjustment to Competition from Imports of Certain Steel Products", of 5 March, and its
accompanying memorandum of 7 March.  He recalled that consultations under Article 4 of the DSU,
Article XXII of the GATT 1994 and Article 14 of the Agreement on Safeguards, had been held in
Geneva on 13 June 2002.  Brazil and the United States had since jointly considered that theconsultations had failed to resolve the dispute.  Brazil considered that these safeguard measures, the
underlying investigations and ensuing reports, and the decision of the US President to impose
safeguard measures were inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the GATT 1994
and the Agreement on Safeguards and, as a result, nullified and impaired the benefits accruing to
Brazil under those Agreements.  More specifically, and as detailed in Brazil's request circulated asWT/DS259/10, the measures implemented by the United States violated a number of provisions
including Articles I:1, X:3 and XIX of GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards.  The WTO-inconsistent safeguard measures imposed by the United States had caused
considerable disarray in the world steel market and had significantly impacted on Brazil's exports of
steel and steel products.  It was worth noting that the Brazilian steel sector had gone through a large
and rigorous privatization and modernization process and had recognizably acquired a high degree of
competitiveness in the international market.  The Brazilian Government considered that the
preservation of free market conditions and the observance of the disciplines of the multilateral trading
system were of fundamental importance.  Therefore, in accordance with relevant WTO provisions,
Brazil had no alternative but to request the establishment of a panel at the present meeting to examine
this matter, with standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7 of the DSU.  He expressed his
delegation's appreciation for the cooperation that had been shown by all Members concerned in thismatter to facilitate the consideration of this complaint through a single panel process pursuant to
Article 9.1 of the DSU.
20. The representative of the United States said that it was regrettable that Brazil had chosen to
challenge the US safeguard measures.  These measures were fully consistent with the applicable
portions of the Safeguards Agreement and the GATT 1994.  The United States believed that thedispute settlement process would ultimately reach the same conclusion.  Based on prior discussions
between the parties, the United States would not oppose the establishment of a panel at the presentWT/DSB/M/130
Page 5
meeting.  Consistent with Article 9.1 of the DSU, th e United States was of the view that this request
should be referred to the single panel already established at the request of China, the EC, Japan,
Korea, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland so that a single panel would consider all eight panel
requests.
21. The representative of the European Comm unities said that the EC welcomed the
establishment of a panel upon the first consideration of the panel request and the fact that Brazil's
complaint would be examined by the single Panel that had been established to examine the complaints
of the EC, Japan, Korea, China, Switzerland, Norw ay and New Zealand.  He recalled that the single
Panel had been composed by the Director-General on 25 July 2002 and it was the EC's expectation
that the DSU procedure against the steel safeguard measures implemented by the United States would
now proceed expeditiously, in particular since the EC's exporters were losing thousands if not
millions of dollars everyday.
22. The representative of Japan said that, like the EC, her country welcomed the establishment of
a panel to examine this matter.  Japan was in agreement with the United States that this matter should
be examined by the single Panel established previously at the request of Japan and the other
complainants.
23. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed  that the request by Brazil for the
establishment of a panel with standard terms of reference is accepted.  The DSB further agreed that, as
provided for in Article 9.1 of the DSU in respect of multiple complainants, the Panel established at the
3 June DSB meeting to examine the complaint by the European Communities contained in
WT/DS248/12, which pursuant to the DSB's decisions on 14 and 24 June as well as on 8 July 2002
was also requested to examine the complaint by Japan contained in WT/DS249/6, the complaint byKorea contained in WT/DS251/7, the complaint by China contained in WT/DS252/5, the complaint
by Switzerland contained in WT/DS253/5, the co mplaint by Norway contained in WT/DS254/5, and
the complaint by New Zealand contained in WT/DS258/9, would also examine the complaint by
Brazil contained in WT/DS259/10.
24. The Chairman said that since a single Panel had been established those delegations who had
reserved their third-party rights to participate in the proceedings of the Panel established at the 3 June
and then subsequently on 14, 24 June as well as on 8 July 2002 DSB meetings shall be considered as
third parties in the Panel established at the present meeting.
25. The DSB took note of the statement.
4. United States – Final countervailing duty determination with respect to certain softwood
lumber from Canada
(a) Request for the establishment of a panel by Canada (WT/DS257/2)
26. The Chairman drew attention to the communi cation from Canada contained in document
WT/DS257/2.
27. The representative of Canada said that on 21 March 2002 his country had requested
consultations with the United States regarding the final countervailing duty determination made by the
US Department of Commerce with respect to cer tain softwood lumber from Canada on 3 May 2002.
He said that these consultations had been held on 18 June 2002, but had failed to resolve the dispute.
It was Canada's view that the final countervailing duty determination violated the obligations of the
United States under the SCM Agreement.  In particular:  (i) the investigation had been initiated on the
basis of a petition that did not have sufficient evid ence of subsidy and that did not adequately identify
the petitioners;  (ii) the final determination had impermissibly treated the Canadian stumpage practiceas a financial contribution in the form of a "provision of goods";  (iii) the final determination hadWT/DSB/M/130
Page 6
found a "benefit" through an illegal comparison with benchmarks outside of the market under
investigation;  and (iv) the final determination had inflated the alleged subsidy rate by a number of
means not permitted under the SCM Agreement.  Furthermore, Canada also considered that the
United States violated its obligations under the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994 with respect to
the provision of expedited and company-specific administrative reviews.  Consequently, and inaccordance with the relevant provisions of the DSU, the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement,
Canada was requesting the establishment of a panel to consider these matters.
28. The representative of the United States expressed regrets over the decision by Canada to
request the establishment of a panel.  As a substantive matter, the United States believed that Canada's
claims lacked merit.  Of more immediate concern, however, was that in its request for the
establishment of a panel, Canada had identified a new measure on which there had not been any
consultation.  Specifically, Canada's panel request for the first time identified the US CommerceDepartment's initiation of expedited reviews as an inconsistent "measure".  Canada's consultation
request did not, however, mention the initiation of these reviews, nor did Canada and the United
States consult on this issue.  The US Commerce Department did not in fact initiate the expedited
reviews until 17 July, almost a full month after the consultations had been held.  The United States
could not agree to the establishment of a panel at this time.  In addition, if Canada sought theestablishment of a panel at a future DSB meeting based on its current panel request, the United States
would raise the concerns it had just expressed with the panel, if such a panel was established.  In the
view of the United States, Canada had two options th at would be consistent with the DSU.  First, if
Canada wished to drop its challenge to the initiation of the expedited reviews, it could file a new
request for a panel that did not identify that measure.   Alternatively, if Canada wished to include the
initiation of the expedited reviews as a measure, it could file a new request for consultations and the
United States and Canada could have meaningful consultations about this new measure.
29. The DSB took note of the statements and agreed
 to revert to this matter.
5. United States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on steel plate from India
(a) Report of the Panel (WT/DS206/R and Corr.1)
30. The Chairman recalled that at its meeting on 24 July 2001, the DSB had established a panel to
examine the complaint by India pertaining to this matter.  The Report of the Panel contained in
WT/DS206/R and Corr.1 had been circulated on 28 J une 2002 as an unrestricted document.  He said
that the Panel Report was now before the DSB for adoption at the request of India.  This adoption
procedure was without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on the Panel Report.
31. The representative of India said that his country welcomed the Panel Report and was seeking
the adoption of the Report by the DSB at the present meeting.  India wished to thank the members of
Panel as well the Secretariat for their hard work and was gratified that the Panel had found in favour
of India on the key issue that the United States had acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by refusing to take into
account the US sales price information in the anti-dumping investigation and by relying entirely on
facts available in determining dumping margin on the steel plate producer, namely, the SteelAuthority of India Limited (SAIL).  In the investigation, SAIL had submitted detailed questionnaire
responses to the US Department of Commerce (U SDOC) providing information on its US and home
market sales and costs of production of steel plate products.  USDOC had conducted lengthy on-site
verifications of SAIL's data, during which, as the Panel confirmed, USDOC had found no significant
problems with SAIL's US sales database.  However,  because SAIL's home market sales and cost data
had been found to be unverifiable and could not be used "without undue difficulty", USDOC had
applied its "long-standing practice" of rejecting the entirety of SAIL's data, including the US sales
data, and applying "total adverse facts available" .  The result was that USDOC had used the highest
rate alleged in the petition submitted by the US steel industry – 72.49 per cent.  Had USDOC usedWT/DSB/M/130
Page 7
SAIL's data which was verifiable and usable, the margins would have been below 15 per cent.  The
Panel had agreed with India by finding that USDOC had improperly failed to take into account SAIL's
US sales data in violation of Article 6.8 and Annex 2, paragraph 3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
This was a clear rejection of USDOC's  longstanding "total facts available" practice.  In the future, it
would require USDOC to use partial data supplied by foreign respondents in calculating dumpingmargins.  The practical effect of the ruling would make it more difficult for anti-dumping
investigating authorities to generate high dumping margins by not using the data provided by foreign
respondents.  No longer could investigating officials reject all data submitted by a foreign respondent
and instead use pre-selected data provided by domestic petitioners in the anti-dumping petition – data
calculated to result in the highest possible margins.  The Panel's ruling confirmed that in the future,
unless non-biased and objective investigating officials were justified in finding that it was unduly
difficult to use the respondent's partial data, these officials had to use the verifiable and timelysubmitted respondent's data in combination with ot her information to calculate the dumping margin.
32. However, India was disappointed and remained unconvinced of the Panel's findings and its
reasoning on US statutory provisions and on Articl e 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The Panel
had found that Sections 776(a), 782(d) and 782(e) of the US Tariff Act of 1930 were not mandatory,
and therefore, not inconsistent with US obligations under Anti-Dumping Agreement.  However, thesestatutory provisions, especially Section 782(e)(3), imposed conditions/requirements additional to
those provided for in paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  They required the
respondents before the USDOC to demonstrate that their overall information was complete before
their information could be used in the Anti-Dumping investigation.  The parties to dispute had
admitted that this was additional to those set out in paragraph 3 of Annex II of Anti-DumpingAgreement, yet the Panel failed to address this issue and simply found that the US statutory provisions
were not mandatory.
33. Similarly, the Panel had failed to address the US practice of "total facts available" in anti-
dumping investigations.  It considered this long-standing practice as not a pre-established
administrative practice.  This practice provided adequate notice to the responding parties before theUSDOC as to what would happen to them if they did not provide one of the "essential components" of
information.  For example, if a respondent knew in advance that it could not provide cost of
production information in the USDOC's format, it migh t not take the trouble of trying to respond to
any of requests for information, because any info rmation it would supply would simply be rejected
under this continually applied practice.  The fact th at the DOC was not required to apply this practice
as a matter of law would not make it any less an "administrative procedure" that could be subject to
challenge under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  If the Panel's reasoning were to be applied, certainprocedures whose conformity with the requirements of the Anti-Dumping Agreement might be under
doubt, but resorted to during an anti-dumping investigation would not be a "mandatory" practice, this
would open the door for US and other anti-dumping authorities to label procedures as "practices" and
thereby immunise them from challenge under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
34. Another disappointing aspect of the Panel Report was its interpretation of S&D provisions,
namely, Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The Panel seemed to have found that the word
"shall" meant "should" and "must" meant "may".  This was contrary to the Appellate Body's
interpretation.  In particular, India was concerned with the view of the Panel that "the phrase 'when
considering the application of anti-dumping measures under this Agreement' referred to the final
decision whether to apply a final measure, and not intermediate decisions concerning such matters asinvestigative procedures and choices of methodology during the course of the investigation".  The
term "considering the application of anti-dumping measures" had to be interpreted as including
consideration during the investigative process of the preconditions for the use or employment of
anti-dumping measures as well.  Any other interpretation would mean that the drafters of the Anti-
Dumping Agreement did not take into account the special situation of developing-country Members inrelation to the investigative process even though Article 6.13 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement
evidenced a special concern for the problems of small companies, including those from developed-WT/DSB/M/130
Page 8
country Members.  India was also concerned by the implications of the Panel's finding that a Member
was not obligated to have the lesser duty rule in its domestic legislation, as this was not a mandatory
requirement.  In India's view, this would render  various non-mandatory obligations not only in the
Anti-Dumping Agreement but also in other agreemen ts devoid of any commitment or meaning.  It
was India's expectation that the United States would promptly and fully implement the rulings andrecommendations of the Panel in this dispute including, if appropriate, the withdrawal of anti-
dumping duties imposed on CTL steel plate imports from India.
35. The representative of the United States said that her country wished to thank the members of
the Panel and the Secretariat for their hard work.  The analysis in the Panel Report showed that the
Panel carefully and thoughtfully examined the important matters before it.  This dispute involved
complicated issues involving the proper interpretation of the "facts available" provisions of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, as applied when an anti-dumping respondent failed to provide the vastmajority of necessary information.  The United States agreed with most of the Panel's findings in this
dispute.  For example, the United States welcomed the Panel's rejection of India's challenge to the US
statutory "facts available" provisions.  The Panel based its analysis in part on the recognition that the
meaning of national law was a question of fact.  The United States fully supported the Panel's
analytical approach.  The United States was also pleased that the Panel had rejected India's attempt toexpand the types of anti-dumping "measures" potentially subject to WTO dispute settlement.  The
Panel had correctly concluded that the so-called facts available "practice" was not a measure which
could independently give rise to a WTO violati on.  The Panel had also found, correctly, that India
misinterpreted the requirements of Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The Panel had found
that the United States had fulfilled the requirements of that provision when it had met with the Indianrespondent to discuss the possibility of a suspension agreement.  Finally, the United States welcomed
the Panel's recognition that a company's failure to provide necessary information might justify the
rejection of other information which, if viewed in isolation, would need to be taken into account.
Given the interrelated nature of the various elements of an anti-dumping calculation, it was not
enough simply to focus on particular pieces or "categories" of information.  She said that the UnitedStates would also like to comment briefly on one as pect of the Panel's decision with which it did not
agree.  During the dispute, India had submitted the so-called "Hayes affidavits" in support of its
argument that the United States could have used the Indian respondent's US sales price information
without "undue difficulty".  The Panel had refused to exclude the affidavits from the proceeding
because it viewed them as "an aspect of India's argument", and not as new facts.  But even if the
affidavits were properly viewed as "arguments", they were post hoc arguments that were not raised
during the anti-dumping investigation.  The United States saw no way to reconcile the Panel'sdecision to accept India's post hoc arguments with its decision to reject the US arguments on the very
same issue on the grounds that those US arguments were themselves allegedly post hoc.  Having said
that, the United States believed that this Report was thoughtfully and carefully reasoned and wished
once again to thank the Panel and Secretariat.
36. The representative of Chile said that his country welcomed the conclusions and findings of
the Panel Report.  As a third party in this disput e, Chile had a systemic interest in the correct
interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  The Report that
would be adopted at the present meeting showed onc e again how some Members did not rest in their
quest to stretch the limits of the Anti-Dumping Agr eement disciplines, in an attempt to use them as
disguised barriers to trade.  Chile valued the fact that the Panel had concluded that the anti-dumpingduty order challenged by India was inconsistent with several provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and the GATT 1994.  While Chile did not wish to comment on all the conclusions and
findings, it would like to concentrate on an argument advanced by it which was not appropriately
reflected in the Panel Report.  Indeed, while India and other third parties had argued that paragraphs 3
and 5 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement were mandatory in nature, based on aninterpretation that Chile also shared, Chile had added that the Spanish text of those paragraphs made
them mandatory without doubt.  In its interim review, the Panel stated that it had not relied on Chile's
argument since its analysis and ruling were ba sed on Article 6.8 of Anti-Dumping Agreement whichWT/DSB/M/130
Page 9
established that the provisions of Annex II were mandatory.  While Chile agreed again with this line
of thinking, it would have preferred to see its argument reflected in the Report – in accordance with
Article 10.2 of the DSU, especially since those ar guments reaffirmed the conclusions of the Panel.
Finally, Chile urged the United States to promptly and fully implement the DSB's recommendations
and rulings through the withdrawal of the measure in question.
37. The DSB took note of the statements and adopted  the Panel Report contained in
WT/DS206/R and Corr.1.
6. Proposed nominations for the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental
panelists
(a) Statement by the Chairman
38. The Chairman, speaking under "Other Business", recalled that in accordance with the
proposals for the administration of the indicative list of panelists approved by the DSB on
31 May 1995, the list should be updated every two years.  To this effect, he asked Members to
forward updated curricula vitae of persons appearing on the current indicative list contained in
documents WT/DSB/19 and Add.1 through 4 as well as any modifications they would wish to make
to the list.  He proposed that this be done by the end of November 2002 in order to enable the
Secretariat to circulate an updated indicative list in December 2002.
39. The DSB took note of the statement.
__________