Note: Advance written questions by WTO Members and replies provided by the U.S: Government
are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/88/Add.1.WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/M/88
4 January 2002
(02-0040)
Trade Policy Review Body
14 and 17 September 2001
TRADE POLICY REVIEW
UNITED STATES
Minutes of Meeting
Chairperson:  H.E. Mr. Pekka Huhtaniemi (Finland)
Page
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 4
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES 5
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 12
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY 15
V. REPLIES FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
MEMBERS AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 35
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 38WT/TPR/M/88
Page 3
1. The sixth Trade Policy Review of the United States was held on 14 and 17 September 2001.
The Chairperson, on behalf of WTO Members, expressed his condolences to the United States and its
people for the dramatic events that occurred on 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington.
2. The Director General, on behalf of the Secretariat and WTO Members, also expressed
his condolences, solidarity, and cohesion with the United States.  Under these circumstances,
the WTO's duty was to continue its work, and stay on station as instructed by its Members.  Although
the forthcoming accession of China to the WTO was a positive development of the 21st century,
these attacks had also shown how fragile the international context was.  They were an insult to the
rules-based system symbolized by the WTO.
3. Delegations that took the floor also expressed their condolences.
4. The representative of the United States thanked delegations for their condolences, and
expressed her sympathy for those Members whose nationals might be among the unaccounted victims.
The United States would continue to work for prosperity and peace within a rules-based system as
embodied by the WTO.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 4
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON
5. The Chairperson welcomed the delegation of the United States led by H.E. Ms. Linnet F.
Deily, and the discussant, H.E. Mr. Milan Hovorka (Czech Republic).  As usual, the discussant would
speak in his personal capacity.  In accordance with established procedures, the discussant had made
available in advance a broad outline of the themes he intended to raise (WT/TPR/D/67).
The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trade Policy Reviews and the elements of the procedures
of meetings.  The report of the Government of the United States was contained in documentWT/TPR/G/88 and that of the Secretariat in docu ment WT/TPR/S/88.  Copies of advance written
questions, submitted by:  Australia;  Bangladesh;  Brazil;  Canada;  Chile; Costa Rica;  the European
Union;  Hong Kong, China;  India;   Japan;  Malaysia,  New Zealand; Norway;  the Republic of Korea;
Switzerland;  and Thailand had been transmitted to the delegation of the United States.  These and
responses provided by the U.S. Government are reproduced in WT/TPR/M/88/Add.1.
6. The Chairperson suggested that, in the context of the preparation of the Doha Ministerial
Conference, the draft report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2001 be considered for adoption on
17 September 2001.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 5
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
7. The representative of the United States  stated that her country welcomed the review of the
American trade policy, and the discussion of U.S. efforts to support and expand the multilateral
trading system.  The United States viewed the Trade Policy Review (TPR) process as an essential
contribution to the efforts made by the WTO to increase transparency and to foster a better
understanding of U.S. policies by its trading partners.
8. For more than 60 years, the United States had pursued a policy of trade liberalization, seeking
open markets and expanded international trade, based on the belief that lowering trade barriers
increased labour productivity and real wages, expanded consumer choice and spending power, and
raised the rate of economic growth in the intermed iate term, for high income and low income countries
alike.  After the Second World War, adherence to these principles had guided U.S. leadership in the
establishment of a system of multilateral rules: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, one ofthe pillars of the post-World War II system. Since 1995, the WTO had continued its work to promote
sustainable economic growth and increased standards of living through trade.  The WTO had been at
the center of U.S. efforts to open markets worldwide.  The United States had collaborated with its
trading partners to improve the WTO, and to conclude agreements promoting both greater prosperity
and economic freedom, such as the Uruguay Round Agreement and subsequent multilateralAgreements.
9. By laying the foundation for increased international economic exchange through trade policy
liberalization, by brokering mutually agreed-upon rules for international commerce, by providing an
ongoing forum for discussion, dispute settlement, and negotiation, the GATT and WTO had made an
enormous contribution to international peace, economic stability and development, and the well-being
of populations worldwide.  The raison d'être  of the WTO was to provide a rules-based system for
international trade that expanded economic opportunity and protects the rights of all Members.
10. The United States was proud to be part of these efforts, and features of U.S. trade policy
continued to reflect this participation: an open, competitive market at home, compliance with WTO
obligations, and leadership in the multilateral trad ing system.  The United States remained committed
to these principles, and dedicated to ensuring that the multilateral system embodied in the WTO
continued to evolve and expand to serve mankin d's efforts for sustainable economic growth and
development.  This was also reflected in its commitment to the launch of a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations at Doha.
11. She recalled the recent statement by the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, that
"continued trade liberalization is essential to promoting global economic growth and alleviating
poverty."  In the context of the current global economic slowdown, it was essential that the UnitedStates pressed forward to pursue open markets, and that the WTO rules-based trading system was
strengthened, expanded, and deepened.
(1) D
OMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
12. The U.S. economic record since its last TPR solidly demonstrated the value of open markets
under the rule of law, in pursuance of WTO commitments.  The U.S. economy continued to maintainlow inflation and create jobs, in no small measure due to the impetus provided by continued
liberalization of both international and domestic commerce.
13. Real GDP growth had decreased only slightly, passing from an annual average of 4.4% in the
period of the previous review, 1996-98, to 4.1% in the period of the current review (1998-00).  Most
recently, however, growth in the U.S. economy ha d slowed considerably, and was only 0.2% at anWT/TPR/M/88
Page 6
annual rate in the second quarter of 2001.  This slowdown reflected several quarters of reductions in
excess business inventories and decline in non-residential business investment from exceptionally highlevels in recent years.  The U.S. Administration, however, expected a pick-up in economic activity for
the second half of 2001, and had forecast a rate of GDP growth for 2001 of 1.7%.  However, the
current slowdown in no way affected the United States' strong commitment to open markets and
expanded trade as essential keys to economic growth and increased living standards.
14. The growth of business investment had played an  important role in business expansion in the
period under review; much of which had been fuelled by business demand for computers,
telecommunication equipment, and other productivity-enhancing durable equipment.  From the
previous to the current review period, the rate of growth of real non-residential fixed investment had
decreased from 12.4% to a still strong 9% per year.  In 2000, non-residential fixed investment had
reached 14.6% of real GDP.
15. In the period 1996-98, output per hour worked in the business sector had risen at a 2.5%
annual rate;  while in the period 1998-00 this rate had risen to 2.8%.  In manufacturing alone,
productivity increased at an annual rate of 5.4% in 1998-00.  This sustained productivity growth had
contributed to an overall annual increase in measured real worker compensation of 2.5% per year in
the 1998-00 and 1996-98 periods.
16. Improvements in the labour market during the review period had also been
notable. Employment had increased by 3.7 million jobs, or 2.8%, from 1998 to 2000, compared
with 4.8 million jobs, or 3.6%, in the comparable period of the previous U.S. trade policy review.
The unemployment rate, which had averaged 4.4% in 1998-99, had dropped to an average 4.1% in
1999-00.  With the recent slowdown of the U.S.  economy, however, employment markets had
weakened:  August 2001 data showed a rise in th e unemployment rate to 4.9%, its highest level in
nearly four years, and a cumulative loss of one million manufacturing jobs since July 2000.
17. Rapid technological change offered remarkable economic opportunity, particularly for those
workers with the skills to prosper in the evolving workplace.  The Administration believed in
continuous improvement of education standards to help spread opportunity as widely as possible and
to assure the broad dissemination of economic benefits from new technologies.
18. Clearly, the economic slowdown would be a challenge, both in its immediate effects and in
the development of plans for the future.  The United States had moved to reduce the burden of taxation
on citizens and had relaxed monetary policy in order to stimulate demand and restore forward
momentum.
(2) I
NTERNATIONAL TRADE RESULTS
19. The United States had maintained an open market, which had benefited its economy, its
trading partners, and the trading system as a whole. In nominal terms, U.S. imports of goods and
services had risen by US$340 billion in the last two years, to a level of US$1.44 trillion in 2000,
continuing to make the United States the world's largest importer.  The United States alone accounted
for 31% of global import growth between 1998 and 2000.  The United States had acted responsibly
and assisted other WTO Members by maintaining and expanding access to its market during variousinternational financial crises in 1999-00.
20. U.S. imports from developing countries had increased by 82% since 1994, faster than imports
from (non-NAFTA) OECD countries.  Developing countries had supplied over 25% of the increase in
U.S. imports since the Uruguay Round implementation.  U.S. imports from the least-developedWT/TPR/M/88
Page 7
countries, had grown  by 127% over 1990-99.  In 1999, U.S. imports from least-developed countries
had totalled US$6.6 billion, and had risen to US$9.2 billion in 2000, a 39% increase.
21. Since 1998, total goods and services exports had risen from US$933 billion to
US$1,066 billion.  It was estimated that more than 12 million jobs currently were supported by
exports.  Such jobs tended to be higher skilled j obs, supported by goods exports, paying 13% to 18%
more than the U.S. national average.  Export growth, however, had slowed during this review period.
Growth of real exports of goods and services had dropped from an average of 7.1% per year from1996 to 1998, compared with 6.3 % from 1998 to 2000.  Goods and services exports had reached 11%
of nominal GDP in 2000.
22. Strong growth in GDP and even stronger growth in domestic demand had contributed to
rapidly increasing imports. Imports of goods and services had risen from US$1,099 billion in 1998 to
US$1,441 billion in 2000.  In real terms, U.S. imports had grown at an average annual rate of 11.9%from 1998 to 2000, compared with 12.7% in the period 1996-98.  Goods and services imports had
reached 14.6% of nominal GDP in 2000.  The quantity  of duty-free imports from developing countries
had risen to 62% in 2000 up from 46% in 1994, prior to implementation of the Uruguay Round.
23. The combination of generally stronger economic growth in the United States than in many of
its trading partners during this period, together with the desire of many foreign residents to participatein the strongly performing U.S. economy through increased foreign investment, had contributed to a
sharp increase in the U.S. trade deficit.  The U.S. deficit in trade in goods and services had risen from
US$167 billion in 1998 to US$376 billion in 2000.
24. The lessons learned about the effects of open, pro-competitive policies at home and at the
border offered promise across the globe for further reducing poverty, raising living standards, and
enhancing growth.  The United States expected international trade to continue to play a central role in
economic growth and development, both in the United States and worldwide.
(3) T
RADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
25. President Bush had placed enactment of U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) at the top of
his trade legislative agenda.  The formal legislative process had begun, with the introduction in
Congress of a TPA bill, which would give the President the necessary authority to pursue the
negotiating objectives set forth in his 2001 International Trade Legislative Agenda.
26. A priority of the United States was the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
at the Ministerial Conference in Doha.  President Bush and other G-7 leaders had pledged, in their July
2001 meeting, to engage personally and jointly to ensure a successful launch of an ambitious new
round of global trade negotiations at the Ministerial Conference.  The United States supported the
launch of a new round of negotiations for a number of important reasons:  (i) expanding tradeopportunities could play a key role in stimulating flagging economies and helping to ignite economic
recovery and expansion by providing farmers, workers, and businesses around the globe with new
opportunities to sell their products;  (ii) as the President had stated, helping developing countries build
a better future was a priority objective of U.S. foreign policy, and free trade was the only proven path
out of poverty.  A new round could enhance these objectives.
27. In laying the foundation for a successful launch of new negotiations, the United States had
recognized the difficulties that many developing countries had experienced in trying to implement
certain WTO obligations, and had been working with other Members to develop appropriate
responses.  There had already been meaningful progress on these issues.  The United States wouldWT/TPR/M/88
Page 8
work with its partners to achieve further progress in the area of implementation, including  through
negotiations, where appropriate.
(i) Regional and bilateral initiatives
28. The United States had continued to develop its regional and bilateral initiatives, within the
scope of WTO rules, to complement its efforts within the multilateral trading system, consistently with
its multilateral obligations.  These efforts focused on furthering trade liberalization through regional
and bilateral free-trade agreements, and by granting unilateral import access to the Caribbean basinand sub-Saharan African countries.
29. At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas, the United States and the 33 other democratically
elected governments in the Western Hemisphere had agreed to negotiate a Free Trade Area (FTA) of
the Americas by 2005, covering 800 million people living in North and South America and the
Caribbean basin.
30. In April 2001, the United States and Chile announced their intention to complete
negotiations on a comprehensive FTA by the end of 2001.  The United States was also engaged
in negotiations with Singapore on a comprehensive FTA.  In January 2001, the United States,
Canada, and Mexico had agreed on a third round of accelerated tariff reductions, under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The Administration was also seekingCongressional enactment of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, signed in October 2000.  Looking beyond free-trade
agreements, the United States had signed, and was seeking legislative enactment, of bilateral trade
agreements with Viet Nam and Laos.
31. With respect to unilateral pr eferences, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) had
been signed into law in May 2000.  AGOA established a new framework for U.S. trade, investment,
and development policy for sub-Saharan Africa.  AGOA beneficiaries enjoyed duty-free market
access, for essentially all products, under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences programme.Also enacted in May 2000, the Caribbean Basin Trad e Partnership Act (CBTPA) provided preferential
access for products that had previously been excluded from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).  The
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) continued to have a positive impact on the trade of the four
Andean-region countries with the United States.  The President's trade agenda called for the
continuation of Andean trade preferences and an expansion of this programme's benefits.
32. Important activity had taken place within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum, including leaders and ministerial agreements, the work of senior officials and the Committee
on Trade and Investment, to give effect to APEC's vision of free and open regional trade and
investment.  The United States and the European Union had continued to utilize the Transatlantic
Economic Partnership (TEP) initiative to deepen and systematize their trade-related cooperation.
(ii) Implementation of WTO commitments
33. The United States had implemented the tariff cuts resulting from the 1994 Uruguay Round
Agreements Act on schedule, and would complete them by 2004.  The current U.S. trade-weighted
average tariff was just under 3% on a legally bound basis, under the WTO, and would continue to fall
with the full implementation of its WTO commitments.
34. The U.S. agriculture tariff and subsidy reductions had been implemented as mandated by the
Agreement on Agriculture.  Agricultural tariffs had been lowered by an average of 36%.  The average
applied tariff for agricultural products in 2000 of 10.4% was among the world's lowest.  As a result,
U.S. agricultural imports from developing countries had risen to over US$12.3 billion in 2000.  TheWT/TPR/M/88
Page 9
U.S. sanitary and phytosanitary standards and inspection procedures were, likewise, in accordance
with the SPS Agreement, based on science and protecting public health.
35. U.S. rules and procedures regarding volunt ary product standards, mandatory technical
regulations, and the procedures used to determine whether a particular product met such standards or
regulations were in accordance with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  The National
Institute of Standards and Technology served as enquiry point, maintaining a reference collection and
responding to requests for information concerning standards and conformity assessment procedures.
36. Under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing  (ATC), implementation of U.S. commitments
was on schedule.  The United States remained committed to fully implement the Agreement.
U.S. imports of textiles and clothing had increased by 90% overall since the WTO had entered into
force, or by an average rate of 11.3% each year (in square meters equivalent).  Developing-country
exports of textiles and clothing to the United States had grown 72% since 1994, reaching a value ofUS$42 billion in 2000.  In value terms, imports of textiles and clothing had increased absolutely by
79.4% or by an average rate of 10.2% each year since the WTO had entered into force.
37. The U.S. service market was generally open to domestic and foreign competition.  Imports of
services in 2000 had reached US$217 billion.  The United States had made commitments in virtually
every services sector, and participated in the WTO Agreements on Basic TelecommunicationsServices and Financial Services.  U.S. domestic telecommunications reform legislation promoted
innovation and competition, and was WTO-consistent.
38. U.S. intellectual property statutes, including patent, trade mark and copyright laws, and their
enforcement, fully reflected WTO standards.  Since its last TPR, the United States had enacted the
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act.  In a ddition, the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright
Damages Improvement Act of 1999 had amended Federal copyright law to increase the statutory
damages available for copyright infringement.
39. The United States considered the Dispute Se ttlement Understanding (DSU) as fundamental
to the functioning of the WTO.  Effective, timely dispute resolution not only helped Members
resolve specific disputes but also gave the public greater confidence in the trading system.  It was a
high priority in U.S. trade policy to ensure re spect for the dispute settlement system, and for that
reason it was imperative that all WTO Members respect panel and Appellate Body rulings.  TheUnited States had been an active user of the WTO dispute settlement system, filing or participating in
106 complaints: nearly three quarters (43 of 59) had resulted either in satisfactory settlement or panel
decisions in favour of the United States.
40. The fact that panels were closed to public observers reduced public confidence in the
dispute settlement process and, to some extent, in the WTO itself.  The United States had sought toimprove the transparency of the process by seeking public comment on every dispute settlement
proceeding where the United States was a party, a nd had made written submissions to panels and the
WTO Appellate Body available to the public as soon as they were submitted.  The United States stood
ready to open to the public any dispute settlement proceeding in which the United States participated,
if the other party or parties agreed.  In this regard, the United States urged the WTO to open itsadjudicative proceedings to the public and publish panel decisions promptly.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 10
(iii) Trade capacity building
41. The United States understood that trade liberalization had to be coupled with strengthening the
capacity of developing countries to take advantage of opportunities.  Therefore, trade-related capacity
building was essential to integrate developing countries into the global trading system and to allow
international trade to foster economic growth and poverty reduction.
42. In 2000, the United States had provided a grant of US$650,000 to the WTO Global Trust Fund
to conduct educational workshops on trade policy and WTO rules for countries in Africa, and developcomputer-based training modules on the multilateral system.  In 2001, the United States had
announced a US$1million contribution to the WTO Global Trust Fund to help developing countries
meet their Uruguay Round commitments, and planned to make a similar contribution in 2002.  The
United States had also made a US$200,000 contribution to the Integrated Framework Trust Fund, and
a US$500,000 contribution for parallel activities to help least developed countries (LDCs) tomainstream trade.
43. Overall, U.S. funding of trade capacity-building programmes, which totalled over
US$1.1 billion during the 1999-01 three-year period, was rising steadily.  According to the latest
figures, the United States had provided US$297 million in 1999, US$365 million in 2000 and
US$466 million in 2001 on trade capacity building assistance.  This assistance had helped developingcountries in every region of the world to expand their negotiating ability, to implement agreements and
to address behind-the-border constraints.
44. In particular, the United States had provided more than US$18 million over 1999-00 for WTO
accession capacity-building activities to 17 countries in the accession process.  In 1999 and 2000, the
United States had provided approximately US$30 million to help countries to harmonize their tariff
structure and customs practices in compliance with WTO requirements, and adopt measures to
improve customs administration in order to reduce processing times, facilitate border crossings, andimprove economic efficiency.  Since October 1998, the United States had provided training or other
assistance on intellectual property rights to officials from approximately 65 countries, involving more
than 240 different seminars, courses or other events.  The United States had provided assistance to
help countries in the Caribbean, in Africa, and elsewhere, design and implement food safety systems
so that their agricultural exports could meet international and U.S. standards.  The United States hadalso given US$640,000 to the World Bank to assist African countries to help find ways to participate
in the development of standards and disseminate information on standards to facilitate their market
access.  In 1999 and 2000 the United States had provided more than US$60 million to build the
capacity of local institutions to provide trade-related information and support services to local
businesses.  Considerable additional assistance was also being provided in areas such as infrastructure,finance, governance and transparency, human resources and labour standards, and environment.
45. The United States would continue to work with other countries, with the World Bank, and
through the WTO to strengthen capacity building assistance both to LDCs and to other
developing countries, and was currently constructing a data base on its activities to help improve
assistance coordination and better respond to developing countries requests for assistance.Another indication of its increased focus in this area was the decision announced in August 2001 by
the United States Agency for International Development to establish a Bureau of Economic Growth,
Agriculture and Trade responsible for its trade capacity building technical assistance.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 11
(iv) Sustainable development and labour policy
46. The United States believed that international trade, complemented by appropriate national
environmental policies could make an important contribution to environmental protection.  These
policies could serve environmental purposes by reducing market distortions that interfered with cost
internalization, thus alleviating poverty, helping gove rnments generate the resources needed to address
environmental challenges, and creating markets for environmental goods, services, and technologies.
47. The United States attached great importance to the WTO work on linkages between trade
and environment, and in supporting Members' sh ared commitment to sustainable development, as
reflected in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement.  It was important to identify and pursue areas
where trade liberalization held particular promise for yielding both trade and environmental benefits.
In this respect, three specific areas in the sector of trade-distorting agricultural policies had been
identified:  (a) the elimination of agricultural expo rt subsidies, (b) subsidies contributing to over-
fishing, and (c) opening markets for environmental goods and services.
48. Participation in the global economy through international trade was the primary avenue for
growth and development.  International trade had also increased opportunities for workers to expand
their earnings and employment options.  The challenge for governments was to ensure that citizens
benefited from globalization while minimizing the ec onomic and social costs of adjustment.  It was
now widely recognized that respect for, and adherence to, internationally recognized core labour
standards was an important element in responding to this challenge.
49. Ministers had renewed their commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core
labour standards in the 1996 Singapore Declaration.  In addition, the 1998 International Labour Office
(ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (endorsed by virtually all WTO
governments as members of the ILO) had affirmed the obligation to adhere to the principles
concerning freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of forced orcompulsory labour; the abolition of child labour;  and the elimination of discrimination in
employment.  In this regard, the United States would continue to work with other WTO Members to
ensure that these important commitments were kept in mind as work moved forward.
50. In conclusion, the WTO was an integral part both of the U.S. domestic economic agenda for
growth and prosperity, and of its commitment to a more peaceful and prosperous world community.The multilateral trading system had offered the United States and its trading partners great
opportunities for prosperity and growth.  Since its last Trade Policy Review, the United States had
derived remarkable benefits from the WTO, which had helped create economic opportunity and been a
strong force for economic stability and open markets.  The United States was therefore committed to
ensuring that the benefits of WTO membership were broadly spread, was proud of its role in thecreation and development of the WTO, and applauded the work of its trading partners and of the
Secretariat, for their dedication to the system and their ideals of open markets, transparency, and the
rule of law.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 12
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT
51. The discussant expressed his sadness over the tragic events that had occurred in the United
States on 11 September 2001.  Such an unprecedented and unjustifiable act of violence, causing huge
casualties, pain and damage, could not leave anyone indifferent.  He expressed his deepest sympathy
and condolences to the Government and people of the United States as well as to countries and
families who had had casualties in New York and/or Washington D.C., while encouraging those who
were still looking for their relatives.
52. The terrorist attacks had exposed one of the world's current challenges, and were a reminder of
the importance of multilateralism and international cooperation.  Only through concerted joint efforts
could the international community combat terrorism,  and deal with other pressing problems of the
global world, such as poverty eradication, reducing inequities, and sustainable development.  The
WTO had a role to play.  The presence of the United States at this meeting, and the introductorystatement by Ambassador Deily testified to the United States' leadership in the WTO as well as its
determination not to give way to those who wished to destroy the democratic values for which the
United States prominently stood.
53. In the period covered by the Review, the U.S. economy had continued to perform well,
recording the longest economic expansion ever.  This expansion, which had begun as early as the firstquarter of 1991, had its roots in sound fiscal and monetary policies, in the promotion of competition,
and was fuelled by business investment, consumer spending, and exports.
54. Strong economic growth had persisted in 1999 and 2000, with a two-year annual average
growth rate of 4.1%, well above the average of the whole period of expansion (3.6%).  In 2000, most
of the growth had taken place in the first two qu arters while slowing in the second half to 0.2%.
According to the U.S. authorities, this decelerati on reflected larger decreases in non-residential fixed
investment, a contraction in exports of goods a nd services, and a slowdown in consumer spending.
55. The U.S. economy was facing a number of downside risks, and its outlook remained
uncertain.  Further labour productivity growth, one of the cornerstones of the U.S. economic success,
and positive developments in business and consumer confidence were expected to facilitate the
adjustment of the U.S. current account deficit.  The latter was nevertheless considered by the IMF as
unsustainable in the longer term;  it had widened to 4.5% of GDP in 2000 (US$445 billion) mainly asa result of a deterioration in the merchandise balance, and accounted for 7.7% of savings of the rest of
the world.  Nevertheless, as the U.S authorities realized that any sudden correction could adversely
impact U.S. and global economic activity, they had not set any deficit reduction target.
56. Although it was still premature to assess their impact on the U.S. economy and the global
economic environment, the tragic 11 September 2001 events had made the situation more complex.  Inits assessment of 12 September 2001, the IMF had stated that these attacks would have a limited
impact on the international economy and the global financial system.  In fact, due to financial
injections provided by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan the global monetary
institutions and systems had been working well.
57. Trade had to be part of any forward-lookin g response to the slowdown in U.S. economic
activity and to the challenges posed by recent events, and remained a prerequisite for political stability
and international peace.  In this respect, U.S. trade policy and practices had considerable effects on the
multilateral trading system.  According to the IMF data, in 2000 the United States had accounted for
over one fifth of world GDP, and for nearly a quarter of the expansion in world GDP during the period
1992-00.  In 1999, trade with the United States accounted for over 15% of world trade and for overWT/TPR/M/88
Page 13
5% of world GDP.  In this regard, the U.S. authorities had reported that 31% of global import growth
between 1998 and 2000 had been generated by the United States.
58. Simultaneously, a favourable external environment, including improved market access for
goods and services, was indispensable to boost the U.S. economy, correct the current account deficit,
and preserve domestic support for free trade.  The authorities should be encouraged to take all
necessary steps to resist any protectionist measures resulting from the slowdown.  Members would
welcome the United States' renewed commitment to open trade and to the multilateral trading system
embodied in the International Trade Agenda including the request for TPA, and a comprehensive trade
agenda confirming its commitment to open and liberalized international trade on a multilateral,
regional and bilateral basis.  U.S. leadership in the WTO was a building block of President Bush's
Agenda.  He praised the United States for effective and timely implementation of its WTO
commitments, and of the Dispute Settlement  Body (DSB) rulings and recommendations.
59. Refraining from unilateral actions, and resorting instead to DSB procedures went to the
heart of the legitimacy and credibility of the system.  He noted that concerns with regard to
unilateralism in U.S. trade policy persisted.  Also, from January 1999 to May 2001, the United States
was the respondent in 24 cases out of the 77 requests for DSB consultations.  He asked whether these
figures were the result of efforts made to protect access to the large U.S. market;  and whether theUnited States envisaged a strengthened consultative mechanism to avoid an increase in trade frictions.
60. The United States had a systemic interest in  strengthening the multilateral trading system
through a new round of trade talks, as witnessed by its commitment to launching a new round of
negotiations in Doha.  This review would provide th e opportunity to understand U.S. motivations for a
new round of negotiations as well as its positions with regard to specific issues discussed in the
preparatory process.
61. The pursuit of regional trade initiatives constituted another important pillar of U.S. trade
policy-making, and was perceived by the authorities as complementary to the multilateral framework
of trade liberalization.  In this context, he asked whether there were any complementarities between
the WTO and the FTAA negotiations, or any elements of the FTAA that could eventually help to
shape the future WTO agenda.
62. He also asked about the U.S. experience linking unilateral trade preferences and domestic
reforms in beneficiaries countries, and whether all eligible countries under the respective schemes had
effectively qualified as beneficiaries.
63. The United States had always held the view that trade protection instruments were important
to preserve its political commitment to open trade.  However, frequent U.S. anti-dumping,
countervailing and safeguards actions had become a cause of serious concern to WTO Members.
64. Although, the United States ranked among the most open trade and investment markets, its
regulatory framework remained complex and consisted of an enormous number of laws and
regulations.  In this context, he welcomed the "notice and comment" procedure, which allowing public
discussion on trade-related issues.
65. He praised the United States for its efforts towards increased transparency of trade and trade-
related negotiations both domestically and internationally, including in the WTO and the FTAA.  He
asked how comments on the FTAA draft text would be solicited and handled.
66. One exception to the pro-competitive stand of U.S. policy concerned government
procurement.  The Buy American Act and similar provisions applied at state and local levels gaveWT/TPR/M/88
Page 14
preference to domestically and locally produced goods over imported products.  He noted that rather
considerable scope for discriminatory purchasing practices remained, and asked what initiatives hadbeen taken by the United States to grant national treatment to any country willing to reciprocate.
67. Noting that foreign participation was precluded from domestic shipping trade, which
continued to be reserved for ships registered under the U.S. flag and built in the United States, he
asked about any plans to modify the existing cabotage laws to promote competition.  He also asked
when the 50%  ad valorem  duty, imposed when vessels repaired abroad re-entered the United States,
would be eliminated.  With regard to international shipping services, the Secretariat had pointed to
nationality-based preference requirements for about 50% of government-generated cargoes, the
totality of military cargoes, and cargoes generated by Eximbank loans.  These cargoes had to be
carried on U.S. flag vessels.  He noted in this respect that most of the remaining U.S. international
ocean-borne trade was carried by foreign flag vessels.
68. He then turned to restrictions to national trea tment in other services sectors.  In financial
services a majority of directors of national banks had to be U.S. citizens and approximately half of the
states required all or the majority of the board of directors of depository financial institutions to be
U.S. citizens.  In air transport, domestic air services could only be provided by U.S. carriers, and crews
engaged in domestic air passenger and freight service had to be U.S. nationals or resident aliens.  Inaddition, benefits resulting from reduction of restrictions to national treatment were yet to materialize
in the electricity services branch.  He was confident that these aspects would be touched upon in the
negotiations on trade in services.
69. The objective of the Fair Act of 1996 had been to reduce state intervention in agriculture and
enhance its responsiveness to market signals.  Noting considerable recent increases in producer
subsidization, he asked how these fitted with the original objective of the legislation, and with the U.S
proposals in the mandated negotiations in agriculture.  He wondered whether it was possible to make aclear cut between trade-distorting and non-distorting s ubsidies, as proposed by the United States in the
current negotiations on agriculture.
70. A comprehensive steel safeguard investigation had been initiated by the U.S.  International
Trade Commission as a part of the authorities' Multilateral Initiative on Steel in June 2001.  Given
that steel imports had contracted by 30% in the first four months of 2001 compared with the sameperiod in 2000, he enquired about the necessity of such an investigation, and how the U.S. authorities
intended to promote the elements of the initiative.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 15
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY
71. The representative of Japan recalled that U.S. economic growth in the 1990s had contributed
to the stabilization of the world economy.  However, he was concerned about the recent economic
slow-down, and hoped that the U.S. Government would take appropriate measures to stimulate the
U.S. economy.
72. He referred to the leadership of the United States in the past trade rounds, and hoped that the
United States would continue to commit itself to developing the multilateral trading system, and
firmly observe the WTO Agreements both in letter and spirit.  It was essential to launch a new round
in Doha with a well balanced agenda that would clarify, strengthen, and develop multilateral trade
rules.  Japan expected the United States to demonstrate once again its leadership and flexibility in this
respect.
73. The United States' commitment to negotiate the FTAA should not undermine the multilateral
trading system but rather complement and strengthen it.  This basic principle should also apply to all
FTAs, including those yet to be concluded.
74. He regretted that the process for TPA legislation was being slowed by partisan confrontation
in Congress.  Noting that the lack of negotiating authority could be an obstacle to substantial progress
in the negotiating process, he expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would redouble its effortfor an early adoption of the TPA Bill.
75. He referred to the recent safeguard investigatio n with regard to the steel industry and to the
fact that since 1997, 14 Japanese steel products had been subject to anti-dumping investigations and,
among those, nine investigations had resulted in the levy of anti-dumping duties.  He stated that if
anti-dumping and safeguards measures were abused for the purpose of protectionism, trade relations
would suffer.  In the case of "Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products" (WT/DS184), the DOC's
methodology for calculating the anti-dumping ma rgin, as well as the USITC's methodology for
determining injury were found to be inconsistent with the relevant WTO Agreements.  Japan
welcomed the U.S. Government's assurance that it would promptly comply with the DSB
recommendations, and expected that the regulations concerned would be amended and the
methodologies used by the DOC and the U.S.  International Trade Commission (USITC) improved
without delay.  He strongly urged the U.S. Government to conduct proceedings of trade remedymeasures with extreme caution and in strict accordance with the WTO Agreements.  He stressed that
even the initiation of investigations needed to be considered with sufficient caution.
76. Japan was also concerned about the WTO inconsistency of the so-called Byrd Amendment,
and, together with the EU and other countries, had requested the establishment of a panel to examine
this Amendment.  Japan regretted that the U.S.  Government had published implementing regulations
despite the fact that the U.S. Government had objected to the Amendment when it was introduced.
77. As shown in its WTO negotiating proposal in agriculture, the United States was eager to
improve market access for its products, and lower the levels of protection, especially through reducing
substantially trade-distorting domestic supports.  However, the United States still maintained high
tariffs on certain agricultural products, and had implemented four emergency farm aids, amounting toas much as US$27.3 billion.  These aids included US$18.5 billion of Market Loss Assistance
Payments, notified as Amber Box measures, to relieve farmers from the income shortfall caused by the
stagnation of grain prices since 1998.  Japan solicited clarification on the consistency of these
measures with the U.S. negotiating proposal.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 16
78. He commended the high level of liberalization in  the services sector but noted that the regime
of supervision and regulation differed from one State to another;  this put considerable burden uponforeign suppliers intending to conduct business in the United States.  He called for initiatives to
harmonize state-level regulations.  On maritime transport services, Japan strongly requested the
United States to fully participate in the negotiations, and review its restrictive practices.
79. He was concerned that unilateral measures such as those under the "Super 301" provisions
could be in violation of the WTO Agreements.  Japan intended to monitor how the United States madeuse of the related laws and regulations in light of the commitment taken at the DSB meeting on the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974.  Although "Super 301" and Title VII were due to expire at the end of 2001,
other measures, such as the "Special 301" and "Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1998, (the telecommunications provisions) would remain in force.  Japan
continued to be concerned about such a unilateral approach and strongly requested the United States toensure consistency with the WTO Agreements when applying such regulations.  He also urged the
United States to observe adequate procedures when imposing retaliatory measures authorized by the
DSB, taking into account the on-going discussions on the DSU amendment.
80. He mentioned the establishment in June 2001 of "The Japan-U.S. Economic Partnership for
Growth", as a framework of economic consultation.  Japan welcomed the Bush Administration'sintention to build a cooperative economic relationship between the two countries, and further hoped
that a constructive two-way dialogue would take place within that framework.
81. The representative of the European Union (EU) said that the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership had been established to intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation in trade
and investment, and was aimed at creating an open and more accessible world trading system while
improving and developing the EU/U.S. economic re lationship.  In spite of several trade disputes
hitting the headlines, both the EU and the Unit ed States were committed to a politically and
economically significant cooperation agenda, and their economic and trade links were underpinned by
strong overall relations reflecting their communality of views and values.  The EU was working with
the United States to seek convergence on the scope of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, namely the
launch of a new round of trade negotiations, and the two were seeing eye-to-eye most parts of the
agenda.
82. He requested a deeper insight into the U.S. Government's future on trade policy
intentions.  He welcomed the regional initiatives, intended to support and complement the rules-based
and trade-expanding orientation of the multilateral trading system as well as to capture and multiply
the benefits of an expanding global trading system.  He sought U.S. views on the relationship between
the ongoing FTAA negotiations, multilateral negotia tions, and other bilateral or regional initiatives.
He also asked about the nature and state of play  of discussions with MERCOSUR countries with a
view to launching negotiations in a 4+1 format.  Th e EU agreed with the United States that it was
important to identify areas where trade liberalization held particular promise for yielding both trade
and environmental benefits.  He asked for more information on means used to make trade policy
supportive of sustainable development.
83. Standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment, and compliance of national with
international standards were an extremely important issue because of their effect on many industrial
sectors.  Noting that this was an issue where European and U.S. interest might not always correspond,
he asked about the Government's new "National Standards Strategy".
84. The representative of India raised the issue of social security taxes levied on the earnings of
professionals deputed temporarily in the United States for software consultancy and development
services.  These taxes totaled 21.5% of their total earnings.  He urged the U.S. authorities to look intoWT/TPR/M/88
Page 17
the matter.  He joined previous speakers in cal ling for more uniform national regulatory regimes and
market access conditions for professional services across States.  H-1B visas issued to Indianprofessionals were valid for only one State, and special permission was required for any change of
location.  This requirement acted, in his view, as a non-tariff barrier.  In light of statistics by the
Information Technology Association of America showing that the United States would face a shortage
of 300,000 professionals in the next three years, he suggested that the United States consider
increasing the present cap on H-1B visas for IT professionals.
85. The lack of commercially meaningful integration of the textiles and clothing sector into the
GATT 1994 had caused anguish to developing countries, for whom the sector played an extremely
important role.  In the first and second stages of integration as well as in the schedule finalized for the
third stage, the United States had implemented the ATC provisions in letter but not in spirit, by
back-loading virtually all items under restraint.  Over 80% of trade in textiles and clothing covered bybilateral restraints remained to be integrated by 1 January 2005;  for apparel alone, the percentage to
be integrated would be 89%.  For India's apparel trade under quota, 96.4% remained to be integrated at
the end of the tenth year, as well as 95.83% of India's yarn trade, and 98.8% of India's fabric trade.
86. Implementation of the ATC had not brought any tangible benefits to India.  While exports of
textiles and clothing from India to the United Stat es grew in dollar terms by 87.4% during the period
1991-92 to 1995-96, the corresponding rate of growth during the period 1996-97 to 1999-00 was only
14.3%.  New barriers had been created by restraining countries:  quota increases had been linked to
non-trade issues, while greater market access had been given on a selective basis to some countries in
exchange for accepting unilateral changes in the U.S. rules of origin.  As a result of a number of
regional trade arrangements a substantial portion of textiles trade had shifted to preferential partners.
Further, high tariffs and tariff peaks remained.  By reducing the demand for more processed imports,
tariff escalation had hampered the expansion of processing industries in developing countries.  Heurged the United States to accelerate the integration process in line with Articles 2.10 and 2.15 of the
ATC.
87. Revised U.S. rules of origin on textiles, which had entered into force on 1 July 1996, had also
adversely affected exports of textiles and clothing products to the United States.  In addition,
India's exports to intermediary countries had been adversely affected, because the new rulesencouraged U.S. importers to source their requirements from countries whose exports were not
restrained through quota.  Further, the U.S. proposal for adoption of its rules of origin multilaterally as
part of the WTO harmonization work programme w ould have serious implications on the flow of
textile and clothing trade in the future.  India requested the U.S. authorities to consider making
changes in the U.S. rules of origin to take into account developing countries' problems.  The recentamendment to the U.S. rules of origin, under the U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000, had
adversely affected market access for cotton.
88. He also noted that certification by the Development Commissioner on India's handicrafts
items had been disregarded, resulting in holding up of consignments in U.S. ports.  He believed that
this was contrary to the provisions of the Indo-U.S. bilateral textile agreement.
89. He asked for the rationale of the proposed 2001 Steel Revitalization Act as well as its
compatibility with WTO rules.  He believed that th e required Import Notification Certificate, under the
Steel Import Notification and Monitoring Program asked as a non-tariff barrier;  while it contained
various details, such as importer's name, address, country or origin, it was valid only for 30 days.  He
also wished to hear more about the U.S. initiative towards elimination of world excess capacity ofsteel and of subsidies in steel production, and how this initiative would be consistent with the
WTO rules.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 18
90. Contingency measures generated uncertainty for exporters as well as considerable legal costs.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body had found the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 inconsistent with theGATT 1994.  The 1916 Act prohibited the import and sale of products at a price substantially less than
the actual market value in the principal markets of the country of their production.  India requested the
United States to stop launching AD/CVD investig ations on insignificant grounds, as they had a
chilling effect on the exports from the countries under investigation.  He also asked whether the
provision for constructive remedies in favour of developing countries, as required under Article 15 ofthe ADA, had been given effect into U.S. law.
91. He recalled the observation in the Secretariat Report that "GSP preferences can be made
conditional to policy changes in the beneficiary countries in areas such as protection of labour rights
and of intellectual property", and reiterated that preferential treatment under the GSP scheme should
be given on a unilateral, non-reciprocal, and unconditional basis to eligible countries.  Placingadditional conditions and linking trade preferences to non-trade issues violated, in his view, the basic
tenet of the GSP.  For Members who were not able to meet them, these conditions amounted to a
penalty.  He asked the U.S. authorities to consider dropping these conditionalities in the granting of
GSP preferences.  He also urged the United States to notify to the WTO all U.S. preferential schemes,
including under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act.
92. He joined previous speakers' views regarding the initiation of unilateral trade actions
by Members.  The threat of use of Section 301 brought uncertainties among trading partners,
and he urged repeal of this section.  Finally, he asked the United States to take the lead among
developed-country Members towards a meaningful resolution of the problems that had arisen in the
implementation of existing WTO Agreements.
93. The representative of Canada welcomed the significant contribution of the United States to the
strength of the global trading system, and to the work of the WTO, including its recent engagement
and leadership in seeking the launch of new negotiations at Doha.  Canada also welcomed the public
pronouncements of President Bush, Trade Representative Zoellick, Secretary Evans, and others who
had articulated clearly the case for trade liberalization and the benefits accruing to producers and
consumers.  The United States had also been a leader in efforts to improve the transparency and
efficacy of the WTO (and other multilateral institutions).  Canada shared the conviction that the bestmeans to respond to legitimate concerns about the impact of globalization was through openness,
dialogue, and inclusion.  Ways should be found to better include civil society in the work of the WTO
while respecting its government-to-government nature.  Canada had seen the fruits of such an
approach in the negotiations towards an FTAA, and supported a similar approach in the WTO.
94. He was encouraged by the support expressed by the U.S. Government to the WTO dispute
settlement provisions.  Canada trusted that respect  of the rule of law would continue to guide its
approach in dispute settlement proceedings and in discussions about improvements to the DSU, and
that the United States would refrain from invoking unilateral, self-judging standard of fairness in
international trade relations.  Canada applauded recent U.S. initiatives, like the AGOA and the CBI,
which unilaterally reduced U.S. tariff measures for many African and Caribbean LDCs, andencouraged U.S. corporate investment in these countries.  Canada also hoped that these trade-
enhancing initiatives were not reduced by proposed changes to the CBI regulations, which would
require yarns and fabric to undergo dyeing and finishing in the United States in order to qualify for
benefits.
95. It was disappointing that official support to the U.S. agri-food sector had nearly
tripled between 1997 and 2000, exceeding the decline in the value of agricultural output.  Some in the
U.S. agri-food industry were seeking further spending increases for the next ten years.  It would be
essential to the prospects for far-reaching agricu ltural trade reform that the United States actWT/TPR/M/88
Page 19
consistently with its pro-reform negotiating agenda.  He called for the establishment of a fair and
market-oriented agricultural trading system, one where producers could compete among themselvesand not with national treasuries.
96. Like others, he expressed major concern about the “Byrd” Amendment as it created a perverse
incentive for industries to launch, and to join in, petitions that might lack strong justification.
97. Canada believed that certain provisions of U.S. of anti-dumping and countervailing law did
not correctly implement international obligations, and had brought challenges to pursue its complaints.Canada was convinced that there were ways to make trade remedy regimes more transparent and more
consistent, enhancing the trading environment for all while preserving the intent of these regimes.
Canada was dismayed by the political debate in the United States, sought to make support for the
existing U.S. trade law regime the litmus test of government’s commitment to any trade remedies
regime.
98. The increase in AD investigations and orders had harmed customers, industry, and
communities in both importing and exporting countries, who suffered from the imposition of duties on
lumber, on steel, and on agricultural products.  Special interests  were not only active at the federal
level:  slowing of economic growth, coupled with sh ifts in patterns of commerce and technology, had
given rise to pressure on individual States.  He called for the United States to guard against arecurrence of a State’s unilateral imposition of trade barriers under the guise of health, safety or other
regulation.  He called for Members to ensure that trade policy did not become the captive of special
interests who saw their status and fortunes threatened by those who were more productive, those with
comparative advantages, and those more adept at implementing technological change.
99. Softwood lumber had been, the subject of three countervailing duty investigations in the last
20 years without sustained subsidy findings.  This issue had been the subject of several panels under
the Canada/U.S. FTA;  and in the GATT/WTO.  Canada was now facing CVD and AD actions, and
had recently requested consultations in accordance with the DSU.  The costs associated with
these challenges were enormous to workers, to companies, to communities, and to customers on both
sides of the border.  He noted the U.S. Trade Representative's remarks before the House Ways and
Means Committee in March 2001 that:  restrictions on trade have victims, "farmers, school teachers,
factory and office workers, small business people, and many others have to pay more for clothing orfood or homes or equipment because of visible and invisible taxes on trade."  The impact of years of
litigation and duties had been devastating for Canadi an exporters.  The latest twist in the battle
to restrict Canadian exports was an arbitrary preliminary determination by the DOC to impose a
19.3% countervailing duty, based almost exclusiv ely on one programme, namely:  provincial forest
management regimes.  The DOC, by its own admission, had made the determination ofremuneration (or subsidy) by comparing the Canadian regime to conditions in the United States.
However, the SCM Agreement stipulated that any determination of remuneration be made on the basis
of conditions in the country under investigation.  The United States had, in his view, violated this
obligation.
100. Moreover, the DOC had made a critical-circumstances determination, resulting in the
imposition of retroactive duties, despite the Department's inability to identify a countervailable export
subsidy and the absence of an injury finding.  Finally, the DOC had set aside precedence in the last
15 years, and decided to impose the provisional measure on an entered-value basis, further penalizing
Canadian lumber producers, particularly re-manufacturers and value-added operations.  Canada had
requested consultations on these and other decisions and on a related provision of the U.S. trade law,and hoped to reach a mutually satisfactory solution.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 20
101. The U.S. authorities had conducted nine investigations of the Canadian Wheat Board
since 1990;  all unsuccessful.  This harassment continued, and was spilling over into the WTOnegotiations.  Canada was also concerned over repeated and ongoing threats to cut off access to
Canadian exports of sugar syrups and over the long-standing prohibition on seal products maintained
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.  Noting the enormous increase in ad hoc  payments to farm
production, he hoped that the new farm bill would restore the integrity of the Freedom to Farm Act of
1996, and demonstrate a renewed commitment to the goal of secure, expanding markets foragricultural producers and customers.
102. Canada welcomed the United States’ commitment to an agreement on transparency in
government procurement, and pledged to continue to  work together with the United States to that
end.  For the signatories to the Agreement on  Government Procurement (GPA), predictable
market access continued to be a key issue.  The United States should be prepared to discuss ways tolower the barriers created at the federal level by small business set-asides, and at the state level by
domestic-content requirements imposed on federally funded transportation projects.
103. The representative of Korea acknowledged the strong trade ties between his country and the
United States with total trade in 2000 reaching almost US$70 billion, and the benefits deriving thereof.
The rapid Asian economic recovery from the financial crisis had benefited from an open and vibrantU.S. economy, which had played a leading role as an engine for world economic growth, and
introducing a "new economy" based on information technology industries.
104. Korea trusted that on-going efforts by the U.S. Government to inject fresh impetus into
the U.S. economy would succeed in steering clear of  a protracted slowdown.  Korea took note of the
U.S. policies to pursue trade liberalization through various initiatives at bilateral, regional, and
multilateral levels.  Of particular importance was U.S. active participation in WTO activities
contributing to the strengthening of the multilatera l trading system.  Korea welcomed the launching of
a new round of trade negotiations, and hoped that the United States would lead the way to help
orchestrate the political will necessary to that end.
105. Korea was worried about the recent trend marked by the enforcement of import
restriction measures.  Anti-dumping and countervailing duty issues had triggered the most complaints
by U.S. trading partners:  many recent DSB rulings had highlighted the inconsistency of thesemeasures with the WTO Agreements, including the method of injury determination.  Korea was one of
the countries most affected by these measures, and, therefore, hoped that the United States would
ensure that anti-dumping and countervailing measures were consistent with WTO rules, and would
refrain from initiating unwarranted investigations.
106. The Byrd Amendment and steel investigation under Article 201 of the Trade Act was
another matter of concern.  Allocating the proceeds of anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders to
the petitioners could not be consistent with the purposes of anti-dumping and countervailing
measures aiming at correcting unfair trading, and were likely to pave the way for frequent abuse by the
U.S. industry.  The current difficulties faced by the U.S. steel industry did not appear to be caused by
imports, but rather by internal structural problems.  Korea encouraged the United States to reconsiderits position regarding import restriction measures, and, in particular, the safeguard measure on pipeline
from Korea.
107. The representative of Brazil recalled that the United States was Brazil's most important trading
partner, accounting for approximately 20% of its total foreign trade (19% of exports and 24% of
imports).  A high-level dialogue with the U.S. aut horities in trade-related areas had taken place, and
had contributed to the resolution of at least one important dispute.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 21
108. Brazil welcomed the commitment of the U.S. Administration towards trade liberalization and
the multilateral trading system, and recognized that the United States was an important force behindthe efforts to launch a new round.
109. The United States had one of the world’s most open and transparent trade and investment
regimes.  However, it maintained a number of tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as other practices
protecting sectors of export interest to many developing countries, i.e. tariff peaks, specific duties,
subsidies (particularly in the agricultural sector), and abusive anti-dumping and countervailingpractices (in particular in the steel sector).
110. Tariff and non-tariff barriers directly affected around 60% of Brazilian exports to the United
States of agri-food and manufactured products, in particular steel, orange juice, sugar, tobacco, and
soybeans, characterized by increased subsidies.  As a result, since the beginning of the 1990s, U.S.
exports to Brazil had increased around 200% whereas Brazilian exports to the United States hadincreased only between 30% and 40%.
111. Abusive anti-dumping and countervailing practices on steel had been further intensified by
initiatives such as the Byrd Amendment.  The safeguard investigation initiated in June 2001 had added
to measures aimed at protecting the U.S. steel industry.
112. With regard to tariff and tariff peaks, although the U.S. average tariff was low, at around 5%,
there were 311 products with tariffs above 15%, of  which 130 were above 35%;  of these, 29 pr oducts
had tariffs between 50% and 70%, and 35 products between 70% and 350%.
113. Tariffs peaks affected Brazilian agricultural exports, i.e. tobacco, sugar, and orange juice.
Brazil’s maximum level of bound tariffs in the WTO, with very few exceptions, was 35%, while
applied tariffs were lower.
114. U.S. non-tariff barriers were even more restrictive.  Access of competitive Brazilian
agricultural products had been affected by incr eased government support to U.S. farmers, which
amounted to some US$23 billion in 2000.  The Loan Deficiency Payments affecting Brazil's exports of
soybeans was of particular concern.  Brazil had already engaged in informal consultations with the
United States on this matter.  Barriers in the professional services subsector were also a matter of
concern.
115. The representative of New Zealand welcomed the commitment by the President of the
United States to ensure its renewed leadership in in ternational trade issues at the multilateral, regional,
and bilateral levels.  The United States had de monstrated its commitment to trade liberalization
through its strong support for a successful laun ch of a new broad-based and balanced round of
multilateral trade negotiations, the continued drive to achieve the APEC Bogor Goals, and the
negotiation of complementary WTO-consistent bilate ral and plurilateral FTAs.  New Zealand shared
these broad commitments, and valued the opportunity to work with the United States in developing a
conducive climate for a new WTO round.
116. New Zealand also welcomed the U.S. commitment to on-going agricultural trade liberalization
as evidenced by its comprehensive proposals for the WTO mandated negotiations on agriculture, and
as enunciated and restated by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Veneman and the U.S. TradeRepresentative Zoellick during their meeting with Cairns Group Ministers in Punta del Este.
New Zealand shared USTR Zoellick’s assessment that "the best way, indeed the only way, to achieve
significant liberalization of agriculture globally is through a new trade round", and agreed that
agriculture had to be central to any new global trade negotiations.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 22
117. New Zealand was disappointed that direct go vernment payments to U.S. farmers had
reached historic levels notwithstanding the passage of the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act, meant towean U.S. farmers away from relia nce on subsidies.  The agri-food sector was the largest recipient of
U.S. government outlays, which nearly tripled between 1997 and 2000, exceeding the decline in the
value of agricultural output.  New Zealand urged the United States to hold true to its goals, and to
renew its efforts to eliminate export subsidies, to increase market access, and to substantively reduce
trade-distorting domestic subsidies.  New Zealand commended the United States for the tough politicaldecision earlier in the year to notify its Market Loan Assistance payments under the "amber box" in its
1998 domestic support notification.
118. Tariff protection remained inconsistently high on U.S. agricultural products where the average
applied rate was 10.4% compared with 4.5% for non-agricultural products.  Some  agricultural
subsectors also bore the highest percentage of tariff peaks while tariff peaks had reached prohibitivelevels for a number of products.
119. Tariff rate quotas applied to a number of agricultural subsectors, including beef and dairy
products, which were of particular interest to New Ze aland.  The high level of out-of-quota tariff rates
at an average of 53% was particularly disappointing.  Tariff quotas continued to be one of the main
instruments of import protection for a number of agricultural products.
120. New Zealand was generally satisfied with the recent agreement by the United States to
terminate the safeguard tariff rate quota measure on New Zealand lamb as from 15 November 2001.
The successful conclusion to this dispute showed that the WTO dispute settlement process could, and
did work well.  New Zealand had reservations about U.S. dairy policies, and the complex and
prescriptive nature of the regulations governing dairy imports. Indeed, the U.S dairy sector, with its
high tariffs, small quotas, complex systems of administration of tariff quotas and licensing, its liberal
use of export subsidies, and recourse to domestic income support, seemed largely out of step with theoverall trend in U.S. trade policy towards a more open, competitive, and market-oriented trading
system.
121. New Zealand had expressed concerns about the recourse by the United States to export
subsidies and the Dairy Export Incentive Programme:  these practices resulted in depressed dairy
prices, substantially below the prevailing world price.  Draft U.S. legislation seeking to place tariffrate quotas on milk protein concentrate and casein at severely restrictive levels was also of concern to
New Zealand, and appeared to contradict the U.S. statements in support of open markets, and the
direction of U.S. domestic agriculture policy.
122. The United States had the right to maintain sanitary and phytosanitary measures to meet its
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.  However, New Zealand encouraged theUnited States to take steps to expedite the science-based risk analysis, and to develop appropriate
import conditions for a range of agricultural products to develop new trading opportunities.
123. New Zealand was pleased to join with the United States, Brunei, Chile, and Singapore in
negotiating a plurilateral open skies agreement, and hoped to work further with the United States to
liberalize air services and other service sectors at a multilateral level.
124. New Zealand remained confident that the United States would continue to demonstrate
effective leadership as a proponent of free trade and a liberal international trading system by
addressing sectors in its economy, particularly in the dairy and food industries, that retained high
levels of protectionism: this would set the right tone for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.WT/TPR/M/88
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125. The representative of Brunei, on behalf of ASEAN Members, noted the role played by
the United States in the multilateral trading system, and the impact of its trade policies on all
WTO Members.  The United States should continue to play a role in the momentum for economic
growth in trade, particularly in the co ntext of the current global economic downturn.
126. High specific and compound rates on agri-food and tobacco products, clothing, footwear and
headgear, and textiles continued to act as barriers to trade, and were of great concern to developing
countries.  Notwithstanding preferential rates granted to some developing countries, the majority ofWTO developing-country Members faced high entry barriers to the U.S. market.  In addition, other
forms of sizeable trade barriers tended to be concentrated in sensitive sectors.  ASEAN urged the
United States to eliminate these barriers as expeditiously as possible.
127. ASEAN was concerned about the increase in the initiation of anti-dumping investigations,
compounded by an increase in countervailing duty initiated in parallel to the anti-dumpinginvestigations.  The recent resort to safeguard actio ns particularly in the steel industry was also at
concern as such measures could result in protectionism. In light of a possible global economic
downturn, ASEAN urged the United States to resist calls from its constituencies to embark on
protectionist measures.
128. ASEAN was pleased that the United States was committed to reducing the existing high trade
barriers in agricultural trade, while seeking to obtain solid gains in trade liberalization in the on-going
negotiations on agriculture.  ASEAN regretted the large increase of Government subsidies to  the
agriculture sector, which could only contribute to distortive trade in agricultural products with
deleterious effects on the agricultural products of developing countries. This situation could hamper
world food security, one of the United States main concerns in the current negotiations on agriculture.
ASEAN urged the United States to take bold measures to curb the use of such trade-distortive
agriculture subsidies.
129. ASEAN and the United States had always enjoye d a strong and stable investment relationship
as reflected, inter alia , by the economic cooperation in APEC.  ASEAN supported U.S. engagement in
the region, and the dialogue between business peoples and governments, which allowed further
strengthening of trade and investment ties betw een the two regions.  ASEAN believed that it was
important that the United States continued its open, transparent, and effective system of internationaltrade disciplines and procedures.  The United States should refrain from adopting protectionist
measures, and instead adopt liberalization supportive and pro-competitive policies.
130. The representative of Chile acknowledged the openness and transparency of the U.S. economy
while stressing that certain instruments, regulations, and policies pointed in the opposite direction.
Although, these policies were the exception, their impact on other economies could be sometimesdisastrous.
131. Chile welcomed U.S. support for the launching of a new broad round at Doha, its active
participation in the FTAA, and the negotiations on a bilateral free-trade agreement.  Chile also
welcomed the plurilateral open-skies agreement, complementary to another agreement already reached
by Chile in this area.
132. Nevertheless, improvement was necessary in the areas of anti-dumping, subsidies,
safeguards, elimination of exports subsidies in agriculture, in particular the agri-food sector, and
domestic trade-distorting measures.  The WTO had a role to play.  Chile wondered whether the large
number of DSB disputes was the result of a mistaken interpretation and implementation of trade policy
instruments by the United States.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 24
133. Chile noted the increase in the initiation of anti-dumping investigations, particularly
on steel, but also on agri-food products originating in Chile.  These investigations and the dutiessubsequently applied had created uncertainty, and increased costs both for exporters and the
government.  Chile expressed its concern with regard to the Byrd Amendment, as it provided an
incentive for U.S. producers to seek protection th rough anti-dumping measures.  The United States'
experience in the DSB was a clear indication that U.S. law and practices were not fully consistent with
the WTO.
134. Chile expressed its concern with regard to subsidies in agriculture that affected production and
trade and eroded developing countries' comparative advantage.
135. The United States and Chile shared common objectives in the mandated negotiations on
agriculture, i.e. non-discrimination, elimination of export subsidies and domestic support measures,
and on services.  Chile shared the idea that Members had to ensure the availability of high qualityservices at affordable prices, promoting economic growth.  Chile hoped that negotiations in trade in
services would contribute to this goal, and that as a result the United States would eliminate existing
restrictions, i.e. for maritime transport.
136. Chile maintained a trade interest in professional services, and noted that restrictions existed on
national treatment and market access, in particular in the areas of delivery of professional services, andrequirements regarding residency and nationality.  In addition, lack of uniformity and transparency
among States was noted.
137. Chile regretted the U.S approach in government procurement, which it considered
exclusionist, protectionist, and mercantilist.  Chile was encouraged by the Bush Administration's
commitment to liberalization in trade in goods and services, and investment.  It was vital to Chile and
to the world that this course of action be maintained.
138. The representative of Hong Kong, China recalled  that the United States had long been a very
important trading partner of Hong Kong, China.  In 2000, total trade between the United States and
Hong Kong, China amounted to US$61 billion, accounting for about 15% of Hong Kong, China's
overall trade.  Thus, the U.S. trade policies had a direct and profound impact on the economy of Hong
Kong, China.
139. Hong Kong, China appreciated the U.S. commitment to the multilateral trading system despite
mounting political pressure to protect domestic industries against international competition, and its
active participation in the WTO.  Hong Kong, China supported proposals relating to the early
derestriction and circulation of WTO documents as a means to enhance public understanding of the
WTO work and decisions.  However, it believed that consultation with domestic constituencies,
including NGOs, should remain primarily the responsibility of individual Members.  Enhancingtransparency was a different matter from allowing direct participation in the WTO, and, in this respect,
Hong Kong, China had reservations on the U.S. proposal to expand public access to dispute settlement
proceedings.  Hong Kong, China could not agree that there was a connection between labour standards
and trade issues, and did not see the justifications for regarding implementation of core labour
standards as a subject relevant for TPRM reviews.  Ministers at Singapore had categorically rejectedthe use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and had clearly stated that the WTO was not the
competent body to deal with labour standards.  Hong Kong, China agreed that, as stated in the
Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the ILO was the right instance to discuss international labour
issues.
140. While appreciating that the United States maintained one of the world's most open trade and
investment regimes, the U.S. average MFN tariff levels for certain groups of commodities were stillWT/TPR/M/88
Page 25
relatively high, including those for textiles and cl othing products, footwear, and food products.  Tariff
escalation was noticeable in the food and tobacco indus tries, textiles, clothing, and leather industries,
and had an adverse impact on higher-value-added e xports from developing countries.  Hong Kong,
China urged the United States to consider meaningf ul reduction in tariff rates to further liberalize
trade.
141. The United States had continued to make active use of contingency measures, i.e. anti-
dumping, countervailing and safeguards actions.  The number of anti-dumping investigations climbedto 46 in 1999 and to 45 in 2000 which were peaks since the establishment of the WTO.  Hong Kong,
China was concerned that anti-dumping measures might possibly be abused for protectionist purposes,
and unnecessary obstacles and burdens might be caused to exporters.  In this connection, the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the Byrd Amendment) would provide a strong
incentive for the U.S. domestic producers to invoke anti-dumping provisions resulting in additionalimpediments to inflows of competitive imports into the U.S. markets, and further tilt the playing field
in favor of domestic producers.  A panel had been established to examine the consistency of the above
Act with the provisions of the GATT and the Anti-dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreements.  Hong Kong, China registered strong systemic interest in this case and had
requested to join the proceedings as a third party.
142. Hong Kong, China welcomed the U.S. commitment to the launch of a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations.  The new round should have a clearly defined negotiating objectives
and Hong Kong, China hoped that the United States could continue to play a leading role in the run-up
to and at Doha, and work with other Members to inject further momentum for launching the new
round.
143. The representative of Switzerland recalled that trade relations between his country and the
United States had traditionally been very good.  The United States was Switzerland's most important
non-European trading partner with a share of 12.8% of its total exports, and 7.4% of its imports in
2000;  it was the second export market for Swiss products.  On the import side, it was the fourth
supplier of goods to Switzerland, and the most important market outside Europe for investment.
144. Switzerland welcomed the entry into force in November 1999 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(Financial Modernization Services) codifying the co nsolidation of the U.S. financial regulation and
breaking the segmentation of the financial services activities.  Though the GLB Act did not alter the
border between banking and commerce, it offered new opportunities for a wider range of activities.
145. Switzerland found two points of particular impor tance in the reports.  First, the TPR was
taking place in a less favorable economic environment from the previous one.  In 2001, the
United States was facing a significant slowdown a GDP  growth, expected to fall to an annual rate of
around 1.5% in 2001, from 5% in 2000.  This situation, combined with the present global economic
downturn,  was a matter of concern for U.S. trading partners, as it was likely to increase pressure on
U.S. firms and labour to seek greater import protection.  These signs had been seen during the past few
months in several industries.  In such a situation, it became even more important for trading partners to
be able to rely on the multilateral trading system, and on the predictability and legal security that theWTO offered.
146. Second, the FTAA should make a significant contribution to intra-regional cooperation along
the lines of NAFTA, which had contributed to a strengthening of U.S. economic relations with Canada
and Mexico.  This was a major development.  NAFTA was today a significant part of the U.S. trading
system, and the FTAA was expected to become a significant part thereof.  Developments of economicrelations on a regional level were complementary to developments on a larger WTO scale.  Therefore,
any development at regional level had to be in compliance with the multilateral trading system.WT/TPR/M/88
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147. The United States was a key player in the launch of a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations.  In Doha, a clear signal should be give n to the business community that the international
framework would be adapted to economic developments, taking into consideration the wider trade-
related concerns expressed by societies, including legitimate concerns of developing countries.
Switzerland was fully confident that the United States would successfully contribute to finding
appropriate solutions to these concerns.
148. The representative of Australia recalled that the United States was Australia's second largest
trading partner (after Japan), accounting for 14% of Australia's total merchandise trade.  In 2000-01
total two-way merchandise trade with the United States was valued at A$34 billion, of which exports
to the United States were valued at A$11.7 billion.  The United States was also the largest source of
Australian imports, valued at A$22.4 billion in 2000-01.  Services exports to the U.S. had grown
strongly to A$5.8 billion in 2000 while imports we re at A$6.3 billion, resulting in a deficit of
A$526 million.
149. Australia welcomed President Bush's attachment to the principle of open markets, his
support for the multilateral trading system, his commitment to the launch of a new round of
WTO negotiations, and his Administration's initiative in seeking new negotiating authority from
Congress.  The United States had been the engine of world economic growth over the last decade.  Thesoftening in the U.S. economy, and signs of further deterioration in consumer confidence were matters
of concern.  Australia had a strong interest in s eeing a return to sustained economic growth in the
United States.  East Asia would be particularly badly affected by a sustained U.S. economic
slowdown, given its high dependence on exports and on the U.S. market.
150. While acknowledging that access to the U.S. market was liberal by international
standards, Australia continued to carry a substantial merchandise trade deficit with the United States:
A$10.7 billion in 2000-01.  Some sectors of the U.S. economy remained highly resistant to change,particularly the agriculture and maritime sectors.  Australia had a strong interest in seeing continuing
reform of U.S. agriculture, particularly in sectors such as sugar, grains, dairy, and cotton.
151. Australia welcomed the recent U.S. commitment to remove its tariff rate quota on imports of
chilled and frozen lamb meat by 15 November 2001, six months after the WTO DSB's adoption of the
Appellate Body and panel Reports on this measure.  Nevertheless, the measure, found to have beenWTO inconsistent, had been in place for more than two years.
152. Australia urged the United States to resist pressures for increased protection on imports of
milk protein concentrates and on steel, products which were of importance in their trading
relationship.  Australia also urged the U.S. Administration, in its consideration of the elements of a
new Omnibus Farm Bill to come into effect on 1 October 2002, to reiterate the reforms contained inthe 1996 Fair Act and to reverse the drift towards increased protectionism and provision of
government largesse that had been evident in recent years.
153. The United States would have a vital leadership role in achieving the launch of a new round of
trade negotiations.  Australia would continue to work closely with the United States to maximize
prospects for the launch of a new round, and to build support for a manageable agenda.  Australiaencouraged the United States to continue to asse rt its commitment to have agriculture firmly on the
agenda of a new round.  The Cairns Group shared that commitment, reaffirmed at the recent
Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este, and looked forward to close cooperation and dialogue on these
issues in the lead-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference.
154. Australia was also pleased that, Prime Minister Howard and President Bush had recently
agreed in Washington that the Australian Minister for Trade and the United States TradeWT/TPR/M/88
Page 27
Representative would report to respective leaders before the end of the year 2001 on how to advance
the proposal for a bilateral FTA, which could help create momentum for global trade liberalization.
155. The representative of Costa Rica acknowledged that the United States maintained one of the
world's most open and transparent trade regimes, which had been of vital importance for world
economic growth.  The United States had also improved market access conditions, contributing to the
economic development of developing countries, including Costa Rica.
156. The United States was Costa Rica's major trade partner, taking roughly 52% of total exports
(US$3 billion per year) comprising computers spare parts, bananas, textiles, and coffee, and supplying
55% of Costa Rica's imports.
157. The representative of Colombia recalled that during the fifth Trade Policy Review of the
United States, Colombia had praised the important role that the United States had played during the
Asian crisis.  In particular, the economic boom in the United States together with increased flexibilityof the Asian markets had been major factors in the prompt recovery of the world economy.
158. Two years later, however, the symptoms of an  economic slowdown had started to be felt.
Declining consumption growth would likely result in lower imports.  The U.S. economy was the most
transparent and predictable in terms of tariffs, amongst the lowest in the world.  However, tariff peaks,
together with the combination of specific and ad valorem  duties for products of interest to developing
countries constituted an important protectionist trend.
159. Furthermore, as a result of the economic slow down pressures towards protectionist measures
had increased.  Colombia urged the United States not to indulge in restrictive measures, which would
affect developing countries and deepen the world economic slowdown.
160. The United States was Colombia's major trading partner with bilateral trade exceeding
US$11 billion in 2000, representing 50% of Colombia's exports and 40% of its imports.  Colombia
was a beneficiary of the GSP for Andean countries, and hoped that those preferences could beextended in time, and expanded in coverage to incl ude to textiles and clothing.  Colombia also wished
to enter into negotiations with the United States e ither for a bilateral trade agreement or to adhere to
NAFTA.
161. The United States played an important role in the multilateral trading system.  Therefore,
Colombia hoped that its commitment to multilatera lism would be translated into the launch a new
round of negotiations, taking into account the needs of developing countries.
162. The representative of Turkey recalled that the United States was one of his country's major
trading partners (bilateral trade of US$7 billion in  2000), and that trade flows had been increasing in
recent years.
163. The United States had one of the world's most transparent and predictable trading systems.
However, some of its trading practices were somewhat restrictive and deserved attention.  First,
although most imports either entered the U.S. market  duty-free or were subject to low tariffs, tariff
escalation on agricultural products as well as on textiles, clothing, and leather products exceeded four
times the MFN average tariff rates, resulting in a negative impact on higher-value-added exports from
Turkey.
164. Anti-dumping  investigations were focussed on certain sectors, i.e. steel products, while sunset
reviews had often resulted in continuation of some measures in place.  Some measures applied onWT/TPR/M/88
Page 28
Turkish goods had been continuing for 15 years.  Turkey was concerned that anti-dumping duties had
become anti-competitive in nature.
165. Turkey was also concerned about the  recent investigation under Section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974 initiated by the USITIC on steel products, and had already entered into consultations with the
United States on this issue.  Turkey believed that th e U.S. investigation should not result in safeguard
measures.
166. The United States maintained a number of restrictions under the Buy American Act:  this was
an obstacle to trade as it created an unfair envi ronment for competition for Turkish exports.  Controls
carried out by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sometimes created delays and obstacles to
market access.
167. Turkey welcomed the United States' continued leadership for the improvement of the rules-
based multilateral trading system.
168. The representative of Norway expressed his country's satisfaction with the U.S.
Administration's support for continued liberalization of world trade and for the WTO.  Free trade and
open markets were essential to promote growth and prosperity.  In this context, Norway commended
the United States for maintaining an open, transparent, and accountable trade and investment regime.
169. Uncertainties had persisted as to how long the unprecedented expansion period of the U.S.
economy of more than a decade could be sustained.  Unfortunately, economic indicators over the last
few months were giving reason for concern as th e slowdown was becoming more apparent.  In this
situation, maintaining an open trading system was more important than ever.  Norway was pleased
with the joint work with the United States for the launch of a new round of negotiations in the WTO.
170. Like many other Members, the United States had put increased effort into the negotiation of
bilateral and regional treaties.  Norway welcomed the new opportunities in trade and development for
countries in Africa and the Caribbean resulting from the African Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA), and the Caribbean Trade Partnership Act (C TPA).  However, the development of regional
agreements should complement and not serve as an alternative to the continuous work towards an
improved multilateral trading framework.
171. Norway was generally satisfied with the United States open trading regime vis-à-vis
Norwegian trade in goods and services.  The United States maintained a free and fair competitionapproach regarding international shipping markets, and the U.S. market, with some exceptions, was
open to foreign participants.
172. However, in connection with maritime transport services, it was a paradox that this sector was
not covered by the GATS.  International shipping was, with some exceptions, already a liberalized
sector, and was a major facilitator for international trade.  Moreover, given the right regulatory regime,significant advantages could be reaped from further moving transport from road to sea. Norway
wished to see this sector included as part of the U.S. commitments under the GATS Agreement, and
urged the United States to participate constructively in the negotiations on maritime services to be part
of a final and balanced Agreement.
173. Norway was concerned about the U.S. use of trade remedies, and in particular the continued
prevalence of anti-dumping and countervailing duties.  The adoption of the "Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act", the Byrd Amendment, was particularly discouraging as it created a financial
incentive for the industry to raise anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases, and  provided
motivation for maintaining existing measures.WT/TPR/M/88
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174. Even though Section 301 reviews had been more sparingly used over the last three years, the
extensive number of reviews carried out in 2000 was cause for concern as they could result inunilateral trade measures.  Norway was also concerned about the Buy American Act, which included
measures that in practice restricted, and thus discriminated, foreign participation in public
procurement.
175. Norway was nevertheless pleased that the United States considered implementation of core
labour standards as relevant for TPRs, and appreciated the information provided on U.S. labour lawand practice.  A multilateral dialogue on the relation between trade and social development was of
relevance to the WTO.
176. Norway was also glad to note that the United States attached great importance to the work of
the WTO on the links between trade and environment.  The connection between trade and
environment and sustainable development should be at the forefront of Members' minds whenlaunching a new round of multilateral negotiations.  The environmental reviews, currently conducted
for the ongoing WTO-negotiations on agriculture and services as well as in the negotiations on
regional and bilateral agreements were an important tool to that end.  Norway had also conducted
environmental reviews on the effect of trade liberaliz ation on environment in specific sectors, such as
fisheries, transport, and agriculture, and was ready to share its experience with other Members.Norway looked forwards to hearing from the United  States on the findings of the on-going reviews.
177. Norway also commended the United States for its bilateral and multilateral contributions to
trade-related capacity building, in particular its contributions to the WTO fund for technical assistance
and to the Integrated Framework trust fund pilot programme.
178. The U.S.-Norwegian trade relationship was excellent, and had been so, for many years.
Norway looked forward to working constructively with the United States and other Members to launch
a new broad round of multilateral trade negotiations.
179. The representative of Cuba recalled that in 1998 the United States had applied unilateral
economic sanctions, maintained against several States, including Cuba, whose trade and economy had
been seriously affected.  Measures against Cuba had political objectives. Close to some 20 pieces of
U.S. legislation imposed an economic and financial embargo, which had lasted for more than 40 years.
Since July 1999, the U.S. Government had strengthen these measures.  Due to the unilateral nature andthe extra-territorial scope of the implementation of this legislation, they continued to have an effect on
trade and were a matter of concern to Members.
180. In October 2000, the U.S. Congress and the Administration had approved legislation for the
reform of trade sanctions and increase of exports.  This was contained in title IX of the Agricultural
Apropiations Act for 2001, which did not eliminate the existing unilateral sanctions against the exportsof agriculture goods and medicines, including medical equipment to Cuba.  To the contrary, some of
these prohibitions or restrictions had been strengthened, and the mechanism to obtain export licences
had been only slightly modified.  The practice of submitting sale of these products to agency or
departmental consultation, authorization, and political decision by the U.S. Government was
inconsistent with international trade rules.  The Act prohibited U.S. exporters from using public andprivate credits for the sale of agricultural products and food stuff to Cuba, codified the restrictions on
travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba, maintained restrictions on the sale of medicines and medical products,
and on maritime transport, and reinforced restrictions of importation of goods and services from Cuba.
181. The Helms-Burton law and Section 2.11 of the Omnibus Act of 1974 reinforced unilateral and
extra-territorial measures that were inconsistent with the WTO rules.WT/TPR/M/88
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182. The embargo against Cuba was inconsistent with international law and with the United States'
claim of world leadership in the implementation of action and initiatives promoting trade liberalizationleading to market opening and growth of internat ional trade. Therefore, Cuba wondered how the
United States intended to bring its actions against Cuba into conformity with WTO rules and practices.
183. The representative of Argentina acknowledged the openness and transparency of the U.S.
trade and investment regimes, but noted that there were a number of barriers to trade and market
access in sectors of interest to developing countries.
184. Argentina had had a chronic and long-standing de ficit of US$23 billion over the past ten years
in its bilateral trade with the United States.  Argentina's opening to trade in the 1990s and subsequent
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements had helped to increase U.S. exports to Argentina
by 445%, while Argentina's exports had grown by only 85%.  Argentina believed that its performance
could have been better if it had encountered fewer trade barriers.
185. Noting the restrictive effect of tariff quotas on products such as beef, peanuts and subproducts,
dairy products, sugar, and tobacco, with high and in some cases prohibitive out-of-quota tariffs,
Argentina believed that the administration of quotas could be improved in certain cases. In the case of
peanuts, a large part of Argentina's annual quota was actually filled by other suppliers, in some cases
up to 60% of its entire quota.  Regarding diary products, quotas were administered on a first come,first served basis  and were covered in the first months of the year.
186. With respect to sanitary and phytosanitary measures, Argentina was currently holding
technical negotiations to obtain authorization to export products such as lamb, meat, poultry, oregano,
strawberries, other berries, and cherries.  However, delays were encountered, which were prejudicial
to Argentina's exports.  Argentina wished to see this  exercise streamlined so as to obtain the necessary
authorization.
187. Tariff peaks were another problem faced by Argentinian exports to the United States.  In some
cases the ad valorem  equivalent of specific duty was over 70%.
188. Trade remedies had affected a series of products from Argentina, particularly steel products
and honey.  In this respect, the "Byrd Amendment" would further encourage U.S. producers to request
the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, given that there would be a concrete benefit
for the petitioners.
189. Argentina was concerned by the increased support granted to the U.S. agricultural sector in
recent years.  In 2000, domestic support had increased by 69% with respect to the previous year, to
US$32 billion.  Direct export subsidies had reached US$329 million, twice the amount granted the
previous year.
190. The representative of Singapore recognized the leadership of the United States in the
multilateral trade liberalization as well as its efforts with regard to regional initiatives complementing
its multilateral efforts.  The U.S.-Singapore agreement was part of those efforts.  The United States
was Singapore's main trade partner, with a two-way trade of US$43 billion in 2000, and the largest
direct foreign investor (US$23 billion) in the same year.
191. The bilateral Free Trade Agreement between the two countries would further enhance their
economic relationship, and would benefit the United States-ASEAN initiative as well as the
multilateral liberalization under the aegis of the WTO.  Singapore looked forward to concluding it as
soon as possible.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 31
192. The representative of Mauritius recalled that the United States had always been seen as a
leader in multilateralism and trade liberalization, openness, and transparency.  The United States was
the largest single economy and leader in the world.  Indeed, in 2000 the United States imported goods
and services worth some US$1.2 trillion, 66% of which entered the U.S. market duty free.
193. Whether such a regime would be equally suitable or successful in the case of a small island
economy with multiple constraints remained a subject of debate.  Nonetheless, Mauritius welcomed
the openness of the United States, which had led to preferential trade liberalization measures, i.e. GSP,the Andean Trade Preference Act, the CBTPA, and the AGOA.
194. The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) institutionalized a commitment for
strengthening relations between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa and provided a spectrum of
incentives for achieving sustainable development.  Less than a year after the enactment of the Africa
Bill, results were already very encouraging.  AGOA had already contributed to some meaningful
investments in sub-Saharan Africa, namely in Namibia and Lesotho, and more could be forthcoming if
access were further facilitated.
195. Mauritius looked forward to working with the United States for an AGOA II, which would
expand trade opportunities and encourage more investment in sub-Saharan Africa, and was
encouraged by the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Sub-Saharan African Trade and EconomicCooperation Forum due on 4 and 5 October 2001.  This meeting would provide a forum for discussion
between the United States and sub-Saharan African countries on expanding trade and investment.
Mauritius believed that AGOA was a clear demonstration of the commitment to assist Africa's
integration into the global economy.
196. Mauritius trusted that the generosity and understanding driving the United States towards
bilaterally assisting weaker economies, i.e. through the Trade Adjustment Assistance Programme
would also prevail in the multilateral system, in particular, when confronted with the concerns of smallisland economies and single commodity producers.
197. Whilst Mauritius shared several U.S. objectiv es on how the multilateral trading system should
move forward, it required assurance and understanding that the concerns of all, even the weakest,
would be considered in the process.  This was the only way to ensure support from the international
community for greater trade liberalization.
198. Mauritius also acknowledged the role played by the United States in capacity building
and technical assistance both at bilateral and multilateral level.  In the financial year 1999/00 the
U.S. Government had provided assistance  amounting to US$100.9 million to sub-Saharan Africa for
its trade-related capacity-building programme.  In 2000-01, the United States had provided more than
US$1.6 million to the WTO for technical assistance activities, and yearly over US$300 million fortrade-related capacity building activities through bilateral and multilateral aid programmes.  In the
context of the IF, the United States had also undertaken activities in Zambia to help mainstream trade
into its development agenda, and was currently providing US$500,000 to undertake similar efforts in
Mali and Mozambique where its trade capacity-building activities were under way.  Mauritius, like
several other SADC Members, had benefited significantly from U.S. assistance on sanitary andphytosanitary issues, and welcomed continued assistance in this area.
199. The representative of Hungary stated that his country trusted that the U.S. Government would
find ways and means to combat the economic slowdown experienced in the first half of 2001.
200. Although the United States maintained one of the most open and transparent trade and
investment regimes in the world, some sensitive sectors continued to receive significant protection inWT/TPR/M/88
Page 32
terms of market access barriers and government subsidies.  Partly due to natural disasters, direct
government assistance to the agri-food industry nearly tripled between 1997 and 2000, and currentlyamounted to over one half of net farm income.  Significant tariff barriers, peak tariffs and tariff
escalation were present in the agri-food industry as well as in other sensitive areas.  Tariff quotas
remained the main instruments of protection for some important agricultural products, including dairy,
and acted de facto  as quantitative restrictions for a number of them, where the out-of-quota tariff rates
were prohibitive.  Such high rates effectively prevent out-of-quota exports of certain types of cheesefrom Hungary.  In addition, for certain dairy products, including cheese, partner governments had
to designate preferred importers two months before the start of the quota year and there was no
possibility to reallocate quota shares during the year.  This inflexibility, at times, resulted in an
underfill of tariff quotas, even where demand existed.  Hungary wished to know whether the U.S.
Government would be willing to relax these regula tions, making possible at least the reallocation of
quota shares during the year.
201. The United States maintained import prohibitions for sanitary and phytosanitary reasons.
Although in May 2000 the Animal and Plant Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture
had found Hungary to be free from Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Hungary was put into a special
category of FMD-free countries from which the importation of swine and ruminant products wassubject to certain restrictions and additional conditions, which were not clear.  In this respect, while in
the SPS Committee the U.S. delegation had confirmed that Hungary could export fresh, chilled, and
frozen products of Hungarian origin, the Animal a nd Plant Inspection Service had informed Hungary
that it could not.  Hungary requested the U.S. delegation to clarify the situation, especially as the
USDA had lifted the import ban in May 2001 for ten EU countries where no cases of the disease had
been found.
202. The United States continued to make active use of contingency measures, in particular
anti-dumping and countervailing actions, and a large percentage of DSB cases involved steel-related
products.  The global safeguard investigation initiated on 22 June 2001 was of interest and concern to
Hungary, which hoped that a WTO-consistent investigation would find no injury to domestic industry.
203. Hungarian exporters, in particular those selling public transportation equipment, found the
application of the Buy American Act overly restrictive, resulting in lessened price competitiveness or,in cases, the outright prohibition of Hungarian supplies.
204. The United States was a very important economic partner for Hungary.  A steady growth of
bilateral trade, suggesting that that there was no general problem of market access, continued in the
review period.  The total volume of two-way trade had grown by over 30% in the past two years, and
surpassed US$2.6 billion.  The United States was Hungary's fifth largest export market and rankedseventh among the countries supplying Hungary.  The healthy development of Hungarian exports to
the United States could, to a significant extent, be attributed to two factors:  U.S. companies were
significant investors in Hungary, which had important trade implications for both exports and imports;
and Hungary was a beneficiary of the GSP system, to which it attached great importance.  The latest
renewal of the GSP expired on 30 September 2001.  Hungary was interested in hearing about theprospects of its further extension.  Bilateral investment ties were also very important as the total value
of U.S. investments in Hungary was over US$7 billion, accounting for approximately one third of the
total received in the past decade.
205. Hungary agreed that the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at Doha
would be beneficial to the world economy, while st rengthening the existing multilateral trading system
embodied in the WTO.  Hungary welcomed the U.S.  support for negotiations on rules for foreign
direct investment and competition policy.WT/TPR/M/88
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206. The representative of the Czech Republic commended the U.S. authorities for the
determination in supporting open trade through the strengthening of the multilateral trading system,
and the launch of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at Doha.  He noted that although the
level of overall U.S. tariffs protection was among the lowest in the world, tariff quotas for some
agricultural products acted de facto as quantitative restrictions.
207. He also noted that detailed technical specification of products was requested in customs
clearance procedures, which slowed down access of goods to the U.S. market for small and medium-size producers.  The Czech Republic requested information on whether any changes or adjustments
facilitating market access were possible.
208. The representative of Romania recalled that her country fully shared the view of the U.S.
authorities that regional initiatives had to be co mplementary to the strengthening the global trading
system.  In spite of its current account deficit, the United States had resisted  protectionist pressures,remaining essentially open to imports.
209. The participation of the United States in the WTO continued to be of major importance,
including through its valuable contribution to the various issues, such as increasing transparency,
mandated negotiations, and e-commerce.  The United States continued to be the most active
complainant and respondent in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism:  out of the 34 U.S. complaintsactive between January 1999 to May 2001, one case regarded Romania.  The settlement of this case
was to be notified shortly to the DSB.
210. The United States was a significant trading partner for Romania, and an important provider of
technical assistance for economic reform.  Bilatera l relations had strengthened steadily during the past
ten years, especially under the aegis of the strategic partnership launched in 1997.  Among the
countries investing in Romania, the U.S. ranked fourth after France, Germany, and the Netherlands,
being the first non-European investor in Romania.  With economic reform and restructuring wellunder way in Romania, an increasingly business-friendly environment and prospects for a second year
of growth of over 5% the future held great potential for enhanced cooperation between Romania and
the United States, including in areas such as information technology and e-commerce, petrochemicals,
and services.
211. Romania encouraged the United States to mainta in its leadership and hard work in shaping
and improving future international trade rules, specifically through the launching a round of
multilateral trade negotiations in Doha.
212. The representative of the Slovak Republic recalled that the United States was one of his
country's most important trading partners, and investors.  The Slovak Republic appreciated the
openness of the U.S. trade-policy regime, and its contribution to the world economy as well as itsinitiatives towards the strengthening of the mult ilateral trading system.  She encouraged the
United States to continue its leadership towards a new round, based on a balanced agenda.
213. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago, also on behalf of Jamaica, acknowledged that the
United States was one of, if not the most liberalized economy in the world, and that it would help the
world economy and the world trading system if a number of other major trading countries were toemulate it.
214. For CARICOM member countries, the regional integration process and regional trade
initiatives, which were complementary to the multilateral trading system and equally as important, had
played a critical role in their efforts to achieve trade and economic growth and fuller integration into
the world trading system. Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica were active participants in the processWT/TPR/M/88
Page 34
aimed at creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  They also pursued bilateral agreements
with fellow countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and had been beneficiaries of theCaribbean Basin Initiative, expanded with some conditionalities through the CBTPA to provide
enhanced market access, and providing duty-free access to the U.S. market.
215. Technical-assistance and capacity-building init iatives, together with freely chosen sound
national policies, were required to enable developing countries to participate effectively in the system,
to draw benefits, and to comply with their obligations.  She referred to the increasing imposition ofstringent standards as in the case of SPS.  These acted as non-tariff barriers.
216. U.S. leadership, its weight in shaping the system, its expressed commitment to "extending the
benefits of trade liberalization to the developing world, fostering their integration into the world
trading system, and ensuring a successful launch at Doha that will offer benefits to all countries and
ensure that the WTO can meet the challenges of the 21
th century", were important.  Trinidad and
Tobago hoped that the United States would exercise this leadership and ensure that the agenda for
Doha paid attention to inclusiveness, and catered for all Members from the largest to the smallest.
217. The representative of Belize said that his country was impacted by the regional initiatives of
the United States within its CBI Programme, and would likely be impacted profoundly by the FTAA.
Therefore, understanding the trade-policy objectives of the United States and the core tenetsunderpinning them were of key importance to enhancing Belize's engagement in the regional and
global trade systems.
218. The United States had shown leadership in trad e-related capacity-building initiatives.  This
was a positive development.  Nevertheless, there was still much to be done to aid the integration of
developing countries into the multilateral trading sy stem, and more specifically in areas of interest to
them.  Belize invited the United States to use its leadership to that end.WT/TPR/M/88
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V. REPLIES FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES MEMBERS
AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
(i) Economic Environment
219. The Chairperson invited the representative of the United States to focus her responses on three
main themes:  (i) economic environment;  (ii) trade policies and measures;  and (iii) sectorial policies
and measures.
220. The representative of the United States presented her delegation's responses on the economic
environment;  these are reproduced in Annex II.
221. The discussant recalled that the terrorist attacks would have an impact on certain companies,
some of which had already started to feel the consequences thereof.  It was encouraging to hear that
the U.S. authorities remained committed to open trade, and that it had moved on various fronts to
restore business and consumer confidence.  He remained confident that the United States wouldexercise its leadership to nail down differences regarding the future WTO agenda, and bring as many
developing countries as possible into the multilateral trading system.
222. With regard to trade and environment, a balance had to be struck between the United States'
pragmatic approach, the comprehensive approach defended by a number of Members, and the position
of countries fearing that environmental issues could serve as a pretext for new trade barriers, and werenot ready to see this issue on the agenda of the next round of negotiations.
223. The representative of India noted that the United States wished to see a permanent
moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.  As the approach to the issue was
different among U.S. States, India solicited clarifications.  A Congress initiative was under way on
moratorium-related issues, India wished to better understand the U.S. position before committing itself
to a moratorium.  With respect to the GSP, I ndia recalled that GSP schemes were supposed to be
unilateral and unconditional.
224. The representative of Senegal supported the United States' commitment to open trade.
Senegal remained convinced that the United States would strengthen its technical-assistance
programmes to fully integrate developing and least-developed countries, in particular, into
international trade.
225. The representative of the United States replied that with regard to e-commerce, a Commission
had been established in 1999 and to tackle this issue.  A tax moratorium was in place in the United
States, and was applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
(ii) Trade policies and measures
226. The representative of the United States presented her delegation's initial written responses on
trade policies and measures (Annex II).
227. The discussant asked whether the United States intended to convert non- ad valorem  into
ad valorem  duties, i.e. in the context of a new round of trade negotiations, and enquired about the U.S.
policy objective in applying non- ad valorem  duties on industrial products.  He also wished to hear the
U.S. delegation on the fact that specific duties had a bigger impact on cheap than on luxury products,
and on lack of transparency of non- ad valorem  duties compared with ad valorem  duties.  He also
asked about the United States' position with respect to mutual recognition agreements for standards
and third-party certification.WT/TPR/M/88
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228. The representative of Japan stated that the agenda for a new round of negotiation had to
include AD issues.  Japan wished to hear the U.S.  delegation on the Anti-dumping Act of 1916, and on
measures foreseen to implement the rulings of the Panel and the Appellate Body reports on steel.
229. The representative of Cuba requested an explanation with respect to the Helms-Burton Act's
consistency with GATT/WTO provisions, which had non- discrimination as their main principle.  She
considered that the Act pursued political rather than commercial purposes.
230. The representative of India pointed out that while the U.S. average tariffs might be low on
average, very high tariffs persisted for textiles and leather products.  This was a matter of concern.
Specific duties in the U.S. tariff schedule, especially in agriculture, made it difficult for other trading
partners to appreciate the real impact of tariff protection.
231. He suggested that before taking anti-dumping actions, countries should examine possibilities
of applying other remedies, in particular to developing-country Members.  In this respect, he askedwhether there were provisions in the U.S. anti-dumping law to implement the provisions of Article 15
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  India was also concerned with respect to the Byrd Amendment,
which it considered to be an in-built incentive to create more complaints.  India appreciated the U.S.
commitment that measures under Section 301 would be used in a WTO-consistent manner, but noted
the threat-effect of these measures.
232. The representative of Malaysia noted that reclassification of latex gloves for non-medical use
by the U.S. customs services under sub-heading 401.519.10 had implied a 3% import duty, while
before the reclassification exercise, this item was duty free.  This was a matter of concern to Malaysia.
233. In her reply, the representative of the United States stated that U.S experience with third-party
certification had worked well, and that the United States had been working in the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade to increase other Members' understanding of this approach.  With
respect to tariffs, it was noted that the effective level of protection of specific duties dropped over timeas they were eroded by inflation.  Negotiations would provide the opportunity to address both
industrial and agricultural tariffs.  The United States did not intend to take unilateral action in this
respect.  With regard to the dispute with Japan regarding steel, at the 10 September 2001 DSB meeting
the United States had stated its intention to comply with the DSB rulings and recommendations
(DS/184) within a reasonable period of time, to be determined together with Japan.  Regarding thedispute on the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, the reasonable period of time had been extended, and the
USTR was continuing to work with Congress on that  matter.  The United States had nothing to add to
reply to Cuba at that stage.  Written replies to specific questions submitted by Malaysia and India
would be provided at a later stage.
(iii) Sectoral policies and measures
234. The representative of the United States, presented her delegation's initial responses on
sectorial policies and measures (Annex II).
235. The representative of Norway noted that agriculture and fisheries had been classified under the
same heading, and asked for clarifications.  He stated that the Jones Act had been subject to a two-year
review as mandated by the GATT 1994.  This issue had been unsuccessfully discussed in the General
Council.  The Jones Act went beyond cabotage.  Many Members in the General Council had
questioned whether the objectives pursued by the United States through the Jones Act could be
fulfilled in a manner consistent with the GATT 1994.  He asked how the United States saw thebiannual reviews, and if it was considering proposing any changes to the Jones Act.WT/TPR/M/88
Page 37
236. The representative of India  recalled issues relating to Indian professionals employed in the
computer sector, and social security taxes.
237. With regard to trade in textiles, under the ATC, India was concerned that integration and
liberalization were not going together.  India noted  that the liberalization process under the ATC was
supposed to be two-pronged:  integration and growth  should act together to achieve liberalization.
However, because of the way the ATC had been structured, restraining countries could achieve the
percentage of integration indicated in the Agreement, without really enhancing market-access.  In the
case of India's exports to the United States, only 56 of the 750 quotas had been integrated, including atthe third stage of integration, while only 20% of the restrained trade would be free of out-of-quota
restrictions by the end of January 2005.  As for apparel items, only 15% of restrained trade would have
been dismantled by the third stage.  India was concerned about the rate of growth of its textile andclothing exports to the United States, had decreased since the ATC.
238. The representative of the European Union recognized existing pressures by the U.S. unions in
the steel sector.  The EU suggested that the balance between imports and exports in this sector be
analysed.
239. The representative of Brazil recalled the importance attached by his delegation to the issues of
e-commerce, tariffs, tariffs structure, contingency measures, TBT and SPS, intellectual property,
agriculture, steel, and services.
240. The representative of the United States replied that in the General Council there had been
divergent opinions among Members with regard to the Jones Act.  The United States saw the review
process as a transparency exercise, and not as a means to examine other ways to achieve the Jones
Act's objectives.  With respect to textiles, she agreed with India's point of view that both integration
and growth should be channels for liberalization.  Regarding the question by the EU, investigations
under Section 201 were under way to assess whether increased imports of certain steel products might
have affected domestic industry, without necessarily  addressing products' characteristics.  Written
replies would be provided to questions raised by Brazil and India.
241. The Chairperson recalled that the Draft Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2001 had
been circulated to Members in document WT/TPR/W/28.
242. The representative of the Secretariat (Mr. C. Boonekamp) said that as a result of consultations
on wording of the Annual Report, the following proposals had been submitted:  (i) paragraph 10 of the
Report should suggest that the Report was prepared by the Secretariat, and provided a factual and
independent review of trade policies (India);  (ii) while the rest of the report appeared to be acceptable
to Members, an exception remained with regard to indent 12 of paragraph 12 on governmentprocurement, which read:  "government procurement preferences, transparency and procedures".
243. The representative of India suggested that paragraph 12, indent 12, read:  "government
procurement preferences and procedures".
244. The Chairperson suggested that the report be adopted, subject to consultations with India1.
245. The Trade Policy Review Body so agreed.
                                                     
1 Subsequent to the meeting agreement on text was reached.WT/TPR/M/88
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON
246. We have had a successful sixth Review of the trade policies and practices of the United States.
This Review has allowed Members to understand better the trade policies of the new U.S.
Administration, and to voice their views on how these policies might affect them.  It is by fostering
such exchanges that this Mechanism contributes to  the smoother working of the multilateral trading
system, rooted in the belief that cooperation in the field of trade is a condition for the well-being of,
and peaceful relations among nations.  These I believe were important considerations at a time whenglobal economic difficulties and recent terrorist attacks loom large in our minds.
247. Members have again recognized the United States' crucial role in the global economy and as
well, the vital contribution it makes to the WTO.  The size of the U.S. economy together with its
generally liberal, pro-competitive trade policies have made the United States the world's largest single
importing country, and a mainstay of world grow th.  Members were thus concerned about the
slowdown in U.S. economic activity, and encouraged  the authorities to continue with the measures
they were taking to address this;  they urged the United States to resist any protectionist measures that
might arise.  Members also expressed strong interest in the new Administration's trade policy
objectives, both in the context of the WTO and with respect to preferential trade negotiations;  several
welcomed the strong U.S. support for a new round of  multilateral trade negotiations.  We have also
noted that the Administration has placed enactment of Trade Promotion Authority at the top of its
trade legislative agenda.
248. Members recognized that the United States has among the world's most open and transparent
trade and investment regimes.  Consonant with this, the average MFN U.S. tariff is relatively low.
However, a number of Members pointed to the persistence of tariff peaks and escalation in some
sectors of particular interest to developing countries, such as agriculture and textiles and clothing;
peaks were also present for motor vehicles and ships.  They also noted the use of specific andcompound rates, which increase tariff protection in times of falling prices.  The size, administration
and fill rates of tariff quotas were also of concern.  Some Members noted that unilateral U.S. trade
preferences were in certain cases conditional on policy changes in the beneficiary countries.
249. The large and growing number of anti-dumping investigations was a point of
considerable concern, and seen by many as potentially protectionist.  It was noted that investigationswithout clear justifications result in harassment to exporters.  Several Members expressed concern that
the Byrd Amendment gives remedy that might not be appropriate under multilateral rules, and that it
would lead to the proliferation of petitions for investigations.
250. The United States has made its public procurement subject to the disciplines of the GPA and
was asked to submit the statistics required under the Agreement.  Members also sought information onU.S. plans to relax remaining purchasing restrictions, particularly those in the Buy American Act and
similar legislation.  Concerns were expressed about the impact of set-asides, and about sub-federal
purchasing measures.
251. Widespread interest was expressed in U.S. policies regarding standards and technical
regulations, including mutual recognition agreements, the greater adoption of international standards,and the notification to WTO of sub-federal measures.  Environment-related trade issues were also
raised, including with respect to energy and fisheries subsidies and to trade in products issued from
biotechnology.
252. On competition policy, the United States was encouraged to reduce the number of exemptions
to its anti-trust laws, both at a Federal and State level.  On intellectual property, the United States wasurged to align its practices more closely with those of other Members, including by adopting the first-WT/TPR/M/88
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to-file system, eliminating trade restrictive aspects of the patent system, and streamlining the early
publication system.  Concern was expressed with respect to the WTO compatibility of Special 301investigation provisions.
253. Sectoral policies and measures were the subject of many interventions.  The United States is
one of the world's largest producers and importers of food, but many Members noted that a range of
measures assist the agri-food sector.  Agriculture is the largest recipient of government outlays to the
private sector, nearly tripling between 1997 and 2000 and with the increase exceeding the decline inagricultural output.  Specific attention was given to U.S. sugar and dairy policy, as well as to the use
of export credits and food aid.  Many participants considered U.S. SPS requirements to be complex
and lengthy.
254. In textiles and clothing, several Members pointed to the fact that although the United States
was implementing the ATC as scheduled there had been a rather limited effective liberalizationof trade.  Some Members noted the expected effects of the recent Trade Development Act, including
on third-country input suppliers.  Members also noted the increased protection afforded to the
steel industry through contingency measures, noting that these measures were not an alternative to the
U.S. industry improving its competitiveness.
255. Members commended the United States for its generally liberal services sector.  However,
many noted that access to the U.S. maritime transport market continued to be severely restricted, and
that in financial and professional services restrictions could arise at the state level.  The extent of
recent liberalization of U.S. air transport services under bilateral open-skies agreements was also
raised.
256. Other matters raised in the Review included:
− foreign investment regulations and remaining restrictions;
− the extent of U.S. support for a multilateral investment agreement in the WTO;
− certain aspects of customs registration, documentation, procedures and fees, which were seen
as unnecessarily increasing costs for traders;
− taxation issues, including of foreign professionals, electronic commerce and of exports;
− measures, notably under the Section 301 family of laws designed, among other things, to open
markets for U.S. exporters;  and
− trade restrictions for foreign policy reasons, in some cases involving extra-territoriality.
257. Members appreciated the oral and written responses and explanations provided by the U.S.
delegation, and look forward to receiving answers on outstanding questions.
258. In conclusion, it is my strong sense that the readiness of the United States, of
Ambassador Deily and her delegation, to undertake this Review at this particularly difficult time
underlines a strong commitment to this Mechanism and the WTO.  This adds poignancy to the U.S.
position that the WTO is an integral part of the U.S. domestic economic agenda.  We have had, I
believe, a frank and constructive discussion of U.S. trade policies, and of the challenges posed by the
changing external environment, notably a slowing global economy.  I welcome the fact that the United
States is as ready as ever to engage trading partners in finding ways to meet those challenges.  The
United States maintains, I think we all agree, one of the world's most open trade regimes, but in certain
areas some of its features give rise to significant concerns on the part of other WTO Members.
Addressing these would be to the benefit of us all, and certainly the multilateral system.
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