WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/153
13 March 2001
(01-1208)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy
COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES
The following is the final text of a paper received from the Permanent Delegation of the
United States which was circulated as an advance copy for the Working Group's meeting of2-3 October 2000.
_______________
The Role of Competition Advocacy
In our submission to the last meeting of this Working Group, we discussed ways in which
Members can create a "culture of competition".1  We emphasized that acceptance of competition
policy principles as a core element of national economic policy requires society to understand and
support the valuable role that competition plays in a market economy.  One important method offacilitating the process of creating and maintaining a culture of competition is competition advocacy.
2
Advocacy provides a way to promote the replacement of unwarranted government restrictions
on competition with pro-competitive laws and policies.  Advocacy is an important complement to the
direct enforcement of antitrust laws.  In some circumstances, incorporation of sound principles of
competition policy in legislation and regulations may be more effective than bringing enforcement
actions in developing and transition economies.  One important reason that dismantling unwarranted
government barriers to competition is a critical element of competition policy is that these
impediments are generally more durable than those created by purely private actions.
The form and focus of competition advocacy can vary depending on a country's legal system
and economic circumstances.  In Part I of this paper we discuss the competition advocacy programs ofthe federal antitrust agencies in the United States.
3  In Part II we address the possible roles for
competition advocacy in developing and transition economies, and offer some practical suggestions
on implementation.
1. The Advocacy Role of The US Antitrust Agencies
Overview of advocacy efforts
The interests of consumers are not always fully represented in legislative and regulatory fora.
As a consequence, laws and regulations are sometimes proposed or adopted that may harm consumer
welfare by inappropriately imposing various types of restrictions on competition.  The aim of the
competition advocacy programs of the US antitrust agencies - the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")                                                     
1 WT/WGTCP/W/142 (9 June 2000).
2 See Submission from Canada, The Significance of Competition Policy Advocacy ,
WT/WGTCP/W/146 (June 2000), which discusses the benefits of advocacy and provides a specific case study
drawn from its experience in the telecommunications industry.
3 The United States submission to this Working Group on The Impact of Regulatory Practices, State
Monopolies and Exclusive Rights on Competition an d International Trade , WT/WGTCP/W/83 (27 July  1998)
contained a briefer discussion of these programs.WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 2
and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") (collectively, "the antitrust agencies")
- is to represent the interests of consumers in pr eventing the adoption of restraints that can reduce
competition and consumer welfare.  Thus, the stated goals of the DOJ's advocacy programme are to:
eliminate existing regulation that is unnecessary or too costly; discourage unnecessary new regulation;
minimize competitive distortions where regulations are needed by encouraging use of the leastanticompetitive regulatory methods; and ensure that regulation is designed to meet legitimate
objectives.
4  The goals of the FTC's advocacy program, which are similar though more generally
stated (and also cover its consumer protection mission), are to prevent or lessen injury to consumers
and competition that may be caused by government activities that interfere with the proper
functioning of the marketplace, and by advising appropriate government and self-regulatory bodies on
the potential effects, both positive and negative, of proposed legislation, rules, or industry guides or
codes.   Even when the specific advice of the antitrust agencies is not accepted, advocacy is valuable in
a broader context because it allows the agencies  to share their expertise with regulators and
legislators5 and to bring to their and the public's attention the potential costs to consumers of proposed
laws and regulations.
One important area in which the antitrust agencies have engaged in competition advocacy is
in governmental rate-making proceedings, when it appeared that the proceeding could result in
unnecessary harm to consumer welfare without compensating benefits.  The antitrust agencies have
also submitted arguments and analyses against limitations on entry where competition was feasible.
The DOJ and FTC have urged that potential rivals be provided access to monopoly or essential
facilities, with reasonable compensation, where access was necessary to promote new entry against
firms that had maintained monopoly positions under prior regulatory systems.  The antitrust agencieshave also argued against regulatory approval of output restrictions that could harm consumers without
producing compensating economic benefits.
Advocacy before decision makers in the national government generally has the broadest
impact.  The following are examples of the antitrust agencies' competition advocacy before the US
Congress:
- During Congressional hearings in the mid-1990s on revising the Communications
Act, the DOJ argued that monopoly providers of local telephone services should face
effective local competition before being permitted to offer long distance services, and
that the law allowing the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to immunize
mergers of local exchange telephone companies from the antitrust laws should be
repealed.  Congress adopted these changes as part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
- In 1998,  FTC Chairman Pitofsky testified before Congress in opposition to proposed
legislation to create an exemption from the antitrust laws to enable health care
professionals to negotiate collectively with health plans over fees and other terms of
dealing.  He described the costs to consumers and competition of this proposal and
the lack of need for immunity because legi timate collaborative activity is already
protected under the antitrust laws.  The proposed legislation did not pass.
- In connection with Congress' consideration of the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act in 1995, the DOJ supported legislation to abolish the Interstate
                                                     
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Manual at V-1 (Feb. 1998).
5 See Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Committee to Study the
Role of the Federal Trade Commission , 58 ANTITRUST  L J 43, 94-95 (1989) (" ABA Report "), which measures
the success of the FTC advocacy programme based on the consistency of regulators' decisions with FTCrecommendations and the presentation of information by FTC staff that was not previously well understood bydecision-makers or as thoroughly presented by other participants in the proceeding.WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 3
Commerce Commission (ICC), and argued that future railroad mergers should be
reviewed under the same antitrust standards that apply to other industries.  The
Department of  Transportation (DOT) also supported this position, noting that its
departures from DOJ advice during the period when DOT reviewed airline mergers
had been widely criticized.  The ICC was abolished, but the merger standardrecommendation largely was not incorporated into the new statute.
- Federal agencies issue regulations to implement legislation enacted by the US
Congress.  Advocacy efforts of the DOJ and FTC have been especially useful in
promoting competition in industries undergoing restructuring.  Both agencies have
played significant roles in helping to transform heavily regulated industries, such as
telecommunications, surface and air transportation, and securities trading, to
competitive markets in which pricing and entry are based on market forces rather thangovernmental decisions.  When they have had the legal authority to do so, the
agencies have sometimes combined law enfo rcement with advocacy to achieve their
goals.
- The FTC and DOJ have shared staff studies and analyses with regulatory agencies to
improve the transition from regulated to deregulated markets.  For example, in 1991FTC staff submitted a comment to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") on
proposed revisions to rules governing the sale and transfer of airline "slots" - rights to
take-off and land - at a high traffic density US airport.  The FTC staff comment
contained a detailed empirical analysis demonstrating that allocation of slots by
market methods was not leading to anticompetitive behaviour, i.e., large slot holdershoarding their slots to exclude competitors.  Thus, FTC staff concluded that
allocation need not be aimed at spreading slots among as many firms as possible.
The FAA issued a final rule in 1992 that was consistent with the FTC's position,
citing the FTC staff comment as a basis for its decision.
Both the FTC and DOJ also have been involved in the efforts of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to implement the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which created the
opportunity for competition in the w holesaling of electricity.  The antitrust agencies filed extensive
comments on certain FERC proposals, analyzing the means by which competition among generators
could be furthered through the transmission of pow er over the lines of the former monopolist.  The
comments also argued that structural remedies are preferable to regulatory, behavioural solutions in
safeguarding non-discriminatory access to the tran smission grid and in controlling market power in
electricity generation.  In its 1995 proceeding on open access to wholesale electricity transmissionservices, FERC did not adopt the agencies' suggestion for "operational unbundling" but recognized its
potential usefulness if milder measures did not have the desired results.  Subsequently, FERC
essentially adopted the antitrust agencies' approach by approving an independent system operator for
California and for other areas in the US.  More recently, FERC has undertaken a policy review on the
generic issue of establishing regional transmission organizations in all areas of the US.  Thus,although the antitrust agencies' recommendation was not adopted initially, the principles and approach
that we advocated ultimately had a demonstrable impact.
Through advocacy to regulatory agencies, the FTC and DOJ also have encouraged regulators
to apply competition principles to the greatest extent possible.  For example, we successfullyWT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 4
advocated that FERC adopt the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines as the analytical framework
for conducting the competition analysis of public utility mergers in the electric power industry.6
Under the US federal system, State and local government bodies have wide authority over
intrastate commercial activity.  The US Supreme Court has held that action by a local or state
government to regulate an industry can be immune from federal antitrust liability if it meets the legalstandards of the "state action doctrine".
7  As a result, competition advocacy is often the most effective
mechanism for addressing restraints on competition imposed by state and local governments.
Because State and local governments often lack resources to fully evaluate the potential effects of
their decisions on competition, the federal antitrus t agencies are frequently invited to comment on
legislative or regulatory proposals.
For example, when a state legislature proposed a rule to raise the educational threshold for
licensing of certified public accountants, FTC staff submitted comments observing that this wouldlikely result in higher entry costs and prices.  FTC staff also suggested that the state should consider
whether the new requirement is necessary to ensure quality of service as well as whether consumers
can make their own choices regarding the quality level they need and are willing to pay for.
Regulatory restraints on entry were also addressed in the joint opposition by the DOJ and FTC to a
proposal in one state to prevent non-lawyers from handling closings of real estate transactions andrefinancings.
In addition to issues regarding entry, the antitrust agencies' advocacies before state
governments have addressed such regulatory constraints on competition as price and rate regulations
affecting a liquor distribution market, limitations on commercial relationships between optometrists
and nonprofessionals, limits on the number of marine pilots in a region, and restrictions on collisiondamage waivers for automobile rentals.
8  Our advocacies have been an important catalyst for the
deregulation of markets for professional services, and have stimulated price and quality competition
for such services as eyeglasses, funerals, and medical care.  The FTC has also provided numerous
comments to state public utility commissions rega rding competition issues involving deregulating the
electric power industry.9
Authority for advocacy role
Although, unlike some Members' antitrust laws, the US antitrust laws do not contain specific
authorization for competition advocacy, there are a variety of legal bases for such activities.
Participation by the FTC and DOJ in specified industry-specific regulatory proceedings is authorized
when the regulatory agency is investigating conduct that might violate certain provisions of the
federal antitrust laws.  Various statutes also authorize the DOJ and the FTC to provide advice to
regulatory agencies on competition matters raised by activities that must be approved by the regulator.Even where regulatory statutes do not specifically authorize such participation, the regulatory
agencies' procedures usually permit the FTC and DOJ to intervene for the purpose of offering their
views on competition issues.
                                                     
6 Under section 203 of the Federal Power Act, FE RC reviews mergers of utilities engaged in the
interstate sale and transmission of electricity under a pub lic interest standard that includes but is not limited to
antitrust considerations.  Although the antitrust agencies al so review utility mergers, FERC has had the lead role
while the antitrust agencies may take an advocacy role in its proceedings.
7 FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 504 US 621 (1991);  Parker v. Brown, 317 US 341 (1943).
8 A complete listing and the texts of FTC advocacies filed since 1994 can be found on the FTC home
page, at www.ftc.gov/be/advofile.htm.   DOJ advocacies can be found on the DOJ website at
www.doj.gov/atr/public/comments.
9 The FTC staff's views on electricity deregulation issues are set forth in FTC Staff Report: Competition
and Consumer Protection Perspectives on Electric Power Regulatory Reform, www.ftc.gov/be/v000009.htm
(21 July, 2000).WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 5
In addition, Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides general authority for the
FTC to gather information, prepare reports, and publicize its findings as may be best adapted for
public information and use.10  This provision has been interpreted to allow the FTC to provide
comments and advice to state and federal legislative and regulatory bodies on competition policy and
consumer protection issues.
There are also non-statutory bases for advocacy.  Both agencies are often invited either
specifically or through a public notice to offer federal and state legislators and regulators their views
on competition issues raised by a proposed legislation or regulation.  Competition advocacy in
national legislative matters is based on the US Congress' practice of soliciting the views of the
Executive Branch of the US government, of which DOJ is part, and other parts of the government on
matters related to their experience and expertise.  In addition, the FTC and DOJ participate as
members of task forces or interagency committees charged with formulating the Administration'spolicy on many economic issues.  For example, both agencies have participated in an interagency
working group on the electricity industry.
Forms and modalities of competition advocacy
The scope of the federal antitrust agencies' competition advocacy is related to the parameters
of the agencies' law enforcement authority.  Thus, ad vocacy, rather than enforcement, is used largely
in areas in which the agencies lack enforcement jurisdiction, for example because the conduct benefits
from antitrust immunity.
Advocacy may be formal or informal; the choice depends largely on the particular
institutional setting.  The antitrust agencies' formal competition advocacy has taken several forms.
We have provided the US Congress with written and oral testimony on competition issues raised byproposed legislation.  In most regulatory proceedings, our participation consists of written
submissions, sometimes supplemented by expert testimony.  Some of these submissions have
consisted of in-house empirical studies for consideration in the antitrust agencies' deliberations, for
example studies by antitrust agency economists on the effects of price-cap regulation of telephone
rates and the aforementioned analysis of the effects of the market for take-off and landing rights.  Inthe case of state legislatures and state and local agencies, advocacy typically takes the form of a letter
and, occasionally, testimony in public hearings.  Since the 1970s, the antitrust agencies have filed
over 2000 comments or other formal submissions in regulatory proceedings.
Informal advocacy also takes various forms.  FTC and DOJ staff often informally advise
legislators or their staffs on issues before the Congress.  In the case of some regulatory agencies, there
is a history of staff-level consultations and exchanges as well as a sharing ideas among political
officials.  These kinds of exchanges likely contributed significantly to deregulation initiatives inseveral sectors.  In our experience, formal advocacy is generally more effective when complemented
by informal consultations between antitrust and regulatory agencies.  At least one regulatory agency,
the FCC, has implemented rules that allow off-the-record, ex parte  communications between its staff
and other agencies.  On occasion, FTC and DOJ staff have been seconded to other government
agencies to assist them in dealing with competition issues; for example, agency economists andlawyers have been detailed to FERC, the ICC, the Federal Maritime Commission, and the FCC to
assist in deregulation efforts.  They have also participated in Executive Branch task forces or
committees.  In addition, DOJ and FTC officials often engage in informal competition advocacy by
giving speeches before industry and consumer groups and participating in panel discussions of
competition and regulatory issues; this can be an important mechanism for helping to instill a culture
of competition and to promote the benefits of pro-competitive policies.
                                                     
10 15 U.S.C.Sec.46.WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 6
The DOJ and FTC's competition advocacies rely on arguments based on competition
principles drawn from law and economics and, where available, appropriate empirical evidence
designed to bring to the attention of decision makers the potential benefits of the competitive
approach.  There are, however, some sectors in which advocacy must be undertaken with particular
sensitivity to policy concerns other than antitrust, such as health, environmental protection, and safety.While recognizing these concerns, the antitrust ag encies deal only with the economic impact and
recommend possible market-based alternatives; they do not take positions on, or engage in any debate
about, the priority and weight of other policy considerations.
Required resources and their impact on advocacy efforts
Like antitrust  agencies in other countries, the DOJ and FTC have to continuously assess how
best to use their limited resources.  Over time, competition priorities change - sometimes more
resources need to be allotted to law enforcement against private restraints rather than to advocacy.
Thus, in recent years the record number of mergers notified for review and clearance have consumed
increasing proportions of  the agencies' budgets.
Limits on resources require the antitrust agencies to choose among various advocacy
opportunities.  In making these decisions, we assess the significance of the potential impact of the
legislation, rule, or regulation on consumers, our abil ity to contribute useful advice and analysis, and
the likelihood that our advocacy will be effective.  In many cases our ability to comment is based on
specific expertise that our staffs have accumulated through law enforcement or research in the same or
related industries.  In other instances, we may determine that our ability to bring a unique perspective
- the impact on competition and consumers - to the proceeding is sufficient to justify our advocacy
effort.  Sometimes, we may, after considering factors including the likelihood of success and the costof participation, decide not to undertake a particular advocacy.
Expertise in regulated markets is essential for most of our advocacies.  Staff lawyers and
economists with enforcement, research, or other experience in the pertinent industry are largely
responsible for evaluating the issues and preparing the submissions.  Close working relationships with
staff at the various regulatory agencies is also important in developing and maintaining our staffs'expertise.
It is difficult to determine with precision the cost of the agencies' advocacy programs. At the
FTC, the programme is coordinated by one staff person.  The DOJ programme is supervised by a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.  The FTC estimates that the advocacy programme currently
consumes about one percent of its budget, down from two to five percent in the late1980s when
formal advocacies averaged 30 per year
11 - approximately double the number filed in recent years.
This decline reflects not only resource constraints but the success of the programme in earlier years inidentifying the most obvious and pervasive restraints on competition.
12  These figures relate only to
formal advocacies, so they do not take into account the even more difficult measurement of  the costs
and frequency of informal efforts.  Nonetheless, our experience suggests that effective advocacy
programs can be implemented with modest funding, provided there are appropriate selection criteria
and priority setting.  In addition, as a competition agency gains expertise in particular areas, fewerresources are needed to address the issues in subsequent advocacies.
2. The Role of Competition Advocacy in Developing and Transition Economies
Competition advocacy may be especially important  in countries engaged in reforming their
overall economic policies.  In many economies in the early stages of the transition from state control
to a market-based system, the potential for competition law enforcement actions is limited because the
                                                     
11 See ABA Report , supra  note 5, at 95.
12 Id. at 94-95.WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 7
antitrust law may focus on private restraints on competition.  More important, the primary focus of
government activity may be market-oriented economic reform, which requires the elimination of
inappropriate government intervention in the market and the adoption of laws and economic policies
that facilitate the flourishing of a market-based economy.
Through competition advocacy, the competition agency can influence public policy-making
by identifying and opposing government-imposed impediments to market rivalry and recommending
alternative solutions to economic policy problems in order to promote competition, economic
efficiency, and consumer welfare.  However, expectations must be realistic.  Competition advocacy
faces significant challenges especially in countries in which the competition agency is relatively new
and when there is a lack of understanding by persons in and out of government of how competition
can protect consumers.13
Based on lessons from the advocacy experience in the US and in transition economies,14
competition antitrust agency officials can play a significant role in the process of economic reform,particularly in the areas of trade liberalization, economic regulation, state aids, and the
de-monopolization and privatization of state enterprises.
15  Trade liberalization - reduction of import
restrictions, investment controls, and domestic production or content requirements - is an important
element of the development of competitive market s.  But liberalization has been controversial -
domestic producers, including state-owned firms, sometimes lobby the government not to relax trade
barriers that protect their market position and insulate them from new competition that often may be
more efficient.  Antitrust officials in some transition economies have fought trade protection, in some
instances as the sole voice of opposition.  Faced with economic and social arguments for erecting
trade barriers, competition agencies have often focused their strongest opposition on protectionistmeasures that are not tied to temporary restructuring programs.
16  The role of the antitrust agency in
this area is to ensure that the policymaker is informed of the benefits of trade liberalization to
competition and consumer welfare.
The advocacy role of new antitrust agencies may seem to differ in scope from that of their
counterparts in developed economies but their missions are essentially the same – to promotecompetition in regulated markets and the application of competition principles to the greatest extent
possible in new regulations.  Advocacy in transition economies can focus on competition issues raised
in the restructuring of infrastructure industries , industry standard-setting, governmental licensing
requirements, regulation of natural monopolies, and specific regulatory proceedings.
17
                                                     
13 See, e.g., A. Fornalczyk,  Competition Policy During Transformation of a Centrally Planned
Economy , ANNUAL  PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, at 394  (B.
Hawk ed., 1993); OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, at 16 (1999).
14 See, e.g.,  A. Fornalczyk, supra  note 13 ; The World Bank and OECD, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY ("OECD FRAMEWORK"),
Ch. 6 (1999); W. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competiti on Institutions in Transition Economies , 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L 403 (1997);  B. Slay and V. Capelik, Perilous beginnings: the establishment of
antimonopoly and consumer protection programs in the Republic of Georgia ,  43 ANTITRUST BULL. 15
(1998); OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, supra  note 13.
15 The OECD has issued policy recommendations on regulatory reform that include giving competition
authorities the authority to advocate reform, in addition to enforcement tools, particularly when anticompetitiveregulation risks frustrating economic reform.  OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM -
SUMMARY (June 1997).
16 See, e.g., A. Fornalczyk, supra  note 13, at 393.  In discussing her experience as former President of
the Polish Antimonopoly Office, she recalls that "we have reserved our strongest objections to proposals for
adopting trade barriers that are not tied to a specific, ti me-limited programme to restructure the industry and
then leave it to face competition in the world market".
17 See, e.g., OECD FRAMEWORK, supra  note14, at 96.WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 8
Antitrust officials in transition economies initially may face unique problems in explaining
the benefits of competition and the dangers of over-regulation.  For example, there may be tendencies
within the government to over-regulate the economy, stemming from the days of central planning, and
pressure from interest groups accustomed to being insulated from competition.  Given that this often
occurs in the very situations that present the greatest potential for benefits from regulatory reform, it isimportant in these cases to educate those in and outside of the government about how unnecessary
economic regulation, including in sectors like telecommunications and energy that previously were
considered to be natural monopolies, may harm economic development and consumers by stifling
competition.
Privatization of state-owned enterprises is a high priority of market-oriented reform.  In most
developing and transition economies an agency is responsible for conducting the privatizationprocess.  Many countries' laws provide for formal participation by the competition agency either by
intervening in a privatization case or under merger control provisions of the competition law.  In
others countries the competition agency has only limited ability to intervene directly.  In transition
and developing economies, state-owned enterprises may be insulated from market rivalry and benefit
from government-imposed barriers to entry, state subsidies, and price regulation.
18  Privatization can
often be structured to establish viable competing firms rather than retaining extant organizational
structures.  Competition officials in transition economies can advocate privatization policies that
maximize opportunities for competition following privatization19 and avoid transforming state
monopolies into private ones.  These may include lowering entry barriers, including trade barriers,
partial divestiture, or complete restructuring.  Th e task of the competition agency may be difficult
given the political factors that enter into the priv atization process, requiring the agency to persuade
participants and the public of the benefits of the policies it is advocating.  However, competition
agencies often have succeeded in accomplishing these objectives.20
State aids can harm competition when they bestow discriminatory advantages on incumbent
firms with the aim of making domestic industries more competitive in the global market or protecting
them from more efficient firms seeking to enter their markets.  Where such aid is not prohibited, as is
often the case under the European Union's rules, competition advocacy can seek equal conditions for
all market operators.  Competition agencies can inform the government and the public of the benefits
and drawbacks of proposed or existing state ai ds.  For example, the agency may show how the
long-term detrimental effects of the aid outweighs its short-term benefits by delaying structural
changes necessary to develop a competitive market or to make domestic firms more viable.  Theagency also may suggest more efficient means of addressing the social or economic concern that
prompted the aid.
Transparent administrative and legislative procedures are crucial to the establishment and
maintenance of an effective competition advocacy program.  Thus, for a competition agency to be
aware of a proposed potentially anticompetitive regulation or law - an obvious pre-requisite to its
ability to convey its views - it is important that there be an administrative law procedure that invitespublic comment on proposed rules and regulations.  The agency should have adequate time to prepare
its position and there must be fair procedures under which its views will be considered.  Advocacy is
also facilitated by procedural mechanisms such as public hearings on legislative or regulatory
proposals that afford a legal right to interested pe rsons to express their views.  These rights and
procedures should be reinforced by sanctions against bureaucratic abuse of power.
21
                                                     
18 See, e.g., W. Kovacic and B. Slay, supra  note 14, at 38.
19 When privatization creates competing entities, the antitrust authority, in its enforcement role, can
preserve these benefits by scrutinizing proposed mergers to ensure that they do not re-establish monopolies.
20 See A. Fornalczyk, supra  note 13, at 392.
21 See A. Rodriquez and M. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for
Developing Countries ,  19 N.C. J. INT'L. L & COM. REG. 209, 223 (1994).WT/WGTCP/W/153
Page 9
Competition advocacy may be more effective when the role and powers of the agency
responsible for its implementation are explicitly defined in the law.  However, formal powers may not
be essential if, as under the US system, there is lati tude for antitrust officials to engage in meaningful
advocacy activities.  Informal competition advocacy can be highly effective in encouraging debate
and providing information on potential anticompetitive effects in order to promote more informedpolicy decisions.  Development of non-confrontational and mutually respectful relationships with
governmental bodies that formulate, enact, or ad minister economic policies can be a potent means of
advocating competition principles.  Even published interviews of antitrust agency officials that
provide a consumer perspective can be an effective means of communicating arguments against
potentially anticompetitive regulations.
22
Although, as the US experience shows, competition advocacy does not require an extensive
commitment of resources, it is important that the competition agency have expertise or access to
outside experts in technical areas other than compet ition policy to ensure that the agency's position is
accurate and credible.23
3. Conclusion
Competition advocacy can play an important role in promoting competition policy as an
integral part of a government's economic framework.  For developing and transition economies, in
particular, it can be an effective tool in a programme of market-oriented reform aimed at minimizing
unnecessary government intervention in the marketplace.
While there is no single preferred format or legal framework that assures the success of
competition advocacy, it is essential to have access to expertise in technical areas other than
competition policy, whether in-house or outside in academia or elsewhere.  Advocacy can be resource
intensive but careful selection of the matters in which to participate can minimize this potential
constraint.  Given the often controversial nature of proceedings warranting intervention, competitionadvocacy is best guided by realistic goals and a non-confrontational strategy that informs decision
makers of competition principles and competitive concerns and suggests alternatives that are less
restrictive of competition and consumer welfare.  To be effective, competition advocacy requires
transparent administrative procedures, particularly notice of proposed laws and regulations, and an
effective mechanism for meaningful participation by competition agencies as well as other interested
parties.  Finally, competition advocacy must be backed up by law enforcement as the private
marketplace evolves in order to preserve the benefits of privatization, de-monopolization, andregulatory reform.
__________
                                                     
22 C. Conrath and B. Freeman, A Response to "The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for
Developing Countries",  19 N.C. J INT'L L & COM. REG. 233, 245 (1994).
23 See, e.g., OECD, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES, supra
note 14, at 45, 78