WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/244
28 July 2003
(03-4003)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition PolicyOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM THE OECD
The following is the final text of a paper received from the OECD Secretariat, which was
circulated as a room document for the Working Group's meeting of 26-27 May 2003, and is now
made available as a "W" document with the consent of the Group (WT/WGTCP/M/22,paragraph 104).
_______________
Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in a
Trade and Competition Context
INTRODUCTION
1. This paper seeks to stimulate a discussion on the potential merits and approaches to peer
review in a trade and competition context, and in particular within the framework of the WTO. It is
the first phase of an ongoing work programme in the OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition
(Joint Group) examining if and how peer reviews coul d be a useful and operational instrument in the
context of a multilateral trade agreement on competition. Future work will likely focus in a more
detailed and pragmatic manner on the various elements underlying peer review in this context and, indoing so, provide a more comprehensive coverage of various peer review mechanisms currently in
use.
2. Peer review is a method by which countries can assess the quality and effectiveness of their
policies, legislation, policy environments and key institutions. It provides a forum where policies can
be explained and discussed, where information can be sought and concerns expressed, on a non-confrontational and non-adversarial basis. The feedback provides the reviewee with a yardstick for
measuring its system against those of other peers while also informing the reviewing countries. Peer
review mechanisms are used extensively in the OECD. Currently, the WTO has one such mechanism,
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).
3. A number of WTO Members as well as participants in the Joint Group have alluded to the
potential merits of such an approach, or a variant on it, in the context of the WTO's ongoing work on
trade and competition policy.  A recent intervention by Canada in the WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy is illustrative, outlining that "the concept of peer
review offered a possible route for advancing thinking and policy goals relating to competition policy
in the WTO" and thus that "the concept merited se rious consideration as an element of enhanced co-
operation on competition policy in the framework of the WTO".
1  The United States has similarly
                                                     
1 See intervention of Canada, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Report on the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, paras. 65 and 67.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 2
expressed "interest in the idea"2 while Japan has argued that such reviews could act as "a further step"
in the development of competition policy in the WTO.3 Critically, developing country members have
also shown an interest in peer review in a trade and competition context with one small-island
Member noting that a non-binding peer review mechanism had "many advantages and deserved
serious consideration".4  Written submissions include a European Community suggestion that
"voluntary peer review of Member's competition policies" could be a useful mechanism for achieving
greater exchanges of information and experiences in the field.5
4. The Joint Group has also emphasised the merits of peer review. In particular, peer reviews
were identified in Trade and Competition Policies: Options for a Greater Coherence as one of the
key stages to achieving the goal of greater convergence of competition laws and enforcement
practices.6 As such, the Joint Group set out that "(p)eer review may achieve a surprising degree of
practical, informal consensus" and is a "useful process".7  Notably, the Joint Group explicitly
suggested that peer review might be worth pursuing within the broader framework of the WTO and
thus was "one option that WTO Members may  wish to consider" in the future.8  Participants at the
1999 OECD Conference on Trade and Competition also spoke favourably of voluntary peer review in
the wider forum of the WTO and referred to both  the OECD and the TPRM as providing potential
models.9
5. Despite the plethora of statements alluding to the potential value of peer review of trade and
competition policy within the WTO, there has been  a limited amount of concrete analysis of this
institutional mechanism in this context.  This paper, as the first phase of the Joint Group's programme
of work on peer review, sets out to address th e calls for further consideration of the topic by
elucidating upon, and tentatively evaluating, the potential merits and approaches that might beadopted.  To this end, it is structured in two parts, with Part I examining various merits of peer review,
and Part II describing a number of approaches already in use and the main strengths and weaknesses
of each.  Such an examination of peer review is designed to facilitate discussion in the Joint Group on
how to create the institutional arrangements for encouraging dialogue and fostering co-operation in an
area where there is still no broad multilateral agreement.
10
I. MERITS OF PEER REVIEW
A. CONVERGENCE
6. In the past, the Joint Group has emphasised the goal of greater convergence of competition
laws and enforcement practices. Notably, it has set out that "(t)here is agreement concerning the need
                                                     
2 See intervention of the United States, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 80.
3 See intervention of Japan, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy, Report on the Meeting of 10-11 June 1999, 4 August 1999, WT/WGTCP/M/9, para. 27.
4 See intervention of Trinidad and Tobago, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 80.
5 See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, "A Multilateral
Framework Agreement on Competition Policy", 25 September 2000, WT/WGTCP/W/152, p. 10.
6 Convergence, in turn, was identified as one of th e main conduits to achieving coherence between trade
and competition policies, see Trade and Competition Policies: Options for a Greater Coherence , OECD
(2001 a), pp. 16-17.
7 OECD (2001 a), pp. 16-17.
8 OECD (2001 a), p. 26.
9 This conference was designed to discuss ways to strengthen trade and competition policies in the
interests of more open global markets. It brought together OECD countries, 30 non-member countries,academics and representatives of business, trade unions and advocacy groups. The proceedings were publishedas Trade and Competition Policies: Exploring Ways Forward , OECD (1999).
10 As one commentator, Daniel Tarullo, sets out in a paper examining various potential norms and
institutions in the area of global trade and competition policy, when examining this interface "how or whycertain institutional configurations advance or retard agreed policy aims are questions ripe for attention", seeTarullo (2000), p. 478.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 3
to continue convergence work no matter what other steps are taken to improve coherence between
trade and competition policies".11  Benefits of increased convergence in national competition policies
are seen to include lessening trade frictions, confli ct avoidance, facilitating international competition
enforcement co-operation and removing some of the uncertainty and costs for firms transacting
business internationally.
7. As mentioned, peer review has been identified by the Joint Group as a natural stage in
pursuing this convergence exercise. Such reviews are seen to achieve a surprising degree of practical,
informal consensus, and even where that is not the case, to serve a useful purpose by identifying
precise areas of disagreement as well as providing a better understanding of those areas where
convergence is not feasible or desirable.12
8. The OECD experience with peer review may offer a number of insights for achieving
convergence on competition policy matters in the WTO.  Certainly, one commentator has
characterised the OECD Competition Committee as a leading example of a "regulatory/convergence"
approach to the governance of international economic activities in contrast with the
"statutory/adjudicatory" approach of the WTO.13  This regulatory/convergence approach involves a
system of structured international activities through which national laws and regulations are made
more congruent. Notably, and in contrast with statutory/adjudicatory models premised in formalinternational agreement and dispute settlement, it relies instead on extensive contacts and co-operation
between national regulatory officials.  The primary rationale of the approach is that, as a result of
substantial interaction, the beliefs of participants will converge over time.  Theorists explain that such
ongoing discussions furnish ample opportunities for cognitive convergence or "consensual
knowledge" among regulators and thus, "over time, and as a result of substantial interaction andargument, the beliefs of the participants concerning the principles and techniques underlying sound
antitrust regulation may converge"
 .14  Peer review is an important element of this process which,
within the OECD Competition Committee, has achieved a fair amount of success in promoting
convergence on substantive antitrust issues including in a number of non-binding voluntary
recommendations.15
9. For some commentators, such a regulatory/convergence approach "holds the most promise"
for dealing with transnational anticompetitive conduct.16  Others have suggested that in fields such as
competition policy "increasingly the WTO will need to be equipped to fulfil a dispute prevention and
regulatory convergence approach".17  These analyses highlight that exclusive reliance on an
adjudication approach is likely to have clear limitations in areas such as competition policy where
trade problems may at times be due to differences in regulatory approaches rather than protectionist
intentions.18  Peer review, as utilised in the OECD, appears ideally suited to this challenge.19
                                                     
11 OECD (2001 a), p. 17.
12 OECD (2001 a), pp. 16-17.
13 See Tarullo (2000).
14 Tarullo (2000), p. 495. Some international relations theorists categorise cooperation based on shared
knowledge and belief under the heading "epistemic communities", See e.g. Knowledge, Power and InternationalPolicy Coordination, 46 Int'l Org 1 (Special Issue 1992).
15 Notably the 1995 "Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between
Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade", OECD Document[C(95)130/FINAL (July 27-28 1995)]; and the 1998 "Recommendation of the Council Concerning EffectiveAction Against Hard Core Cartels", OECD Document [C(98)35/FINAL (April 27-28 1998)]. The latter, forexample, has led to convergence through the progressive  elimination of statutory exemptions for hard core
cartels.
16 Tarullo (2000), p. 496.
17 Garcia Bercero and Amarasinha (2001), p. 503.
18 Although it should be noted that rigidly defining the WTO as based solely on statutory/adjudicatory
governance does not correspond entirely with the reality of the organization. Apart from the TPRM, the WTOWT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 4
B. T RANSPARENCY
10. One of the main assets of peer review is as a transparency mechanism.  Transparency is key to
the adoption of good economic policies.  The concept of transparency can be traced back to the
literature of public choice, which sets out the basic line of argument that elected officials and civil
servants may become influenced by vested interests ("rent seekers") to take decisions that help such
groups and run counter to the promotion of general public welfare.  Transparency is said to lead to
better decision-making by alerting the public at home to the potential costs and benefits of policies as
well as signalling potentially harmful changes to trad ing partners.  For these reasons, there is "a very
strong case for surrounding all facets of economic policy making with a high degree of transparency
and surveillance".20
11. Achieving greater transparency may be particularly valuable in a trade and competition
context.  For example, one of the main difficulties developing countries have identified in establishingeffective competition laws and policies are markets that are often characterised by high degrees of
concentration and histories of state intervention, which tend to facilitate lobbying by vested interests
against the introduction of new competition.  Furthermore, the disparity in organization and lobbying
power between those who benefit from anticompetitive environments and those who would benefit
from liberalisation limits the effectiveness of competition advocacy.
21  The transparency achieved in
peer reviews could go a long way to mitigating the influence of these vested interests.
12. In this regard, it is instructive to note that Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agreement) describes the objectives of the TPRM as being
to contribute to improved adherence by all Me mbers to the WTO Agreements and hence to the
smoother functioning of the multilateral trading sy stem, "by achieving greater transparency in, and
understanding of, the trade polices and practices of Members".  In practice, transparency has proved
to be one of the most appreciated functions of the review mechanism. An extensive 1999 WTO
appraisal of the TPRM placed special emphasis on this role, concluding that it had "demonstrated that
it had a valuable public good aspect, particularly in its contribution to transparency".22
C. I NFORMATION AND EXPERIENCE SHARING
13. Many WTO Members, including developing countries, have stressed the value of fostering
within the WTO a regular exchange of information and experiences on global competition issues.23
The European Community has proposed that the exchange of information on national laws, practicesand developments "would… help competition authorities to benefit from the experience of others".
24
                                                                                                                                                                    
plays a role in promoting regulatory cooperation in a number of other bodies such as the Council for Trade in
Services, the TRIPS Council and the TBT Committee which all dedicate time to the review of Members'legislation, as well as exchanging views and studies on common regulatory problems.
19 The potential value of OECD approaches for trade and competition policy peer review mechanisms in
the context of the WTO has been alluded to in the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade andCompetition Policy. See, for example, the intervention of Canada at the meeting of 5-6 July 2001 setting out that"the OECD Competition… Committee also offered a useful model for peer review, particularly in an area suchas competition policy where currently there were no broad agreements at the multilateral level",WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 66. William Kovacic of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, expressing personal
views, has also referred to the OECD as providing potential models in this respect, see "The Potential
Contribution of a WTO Peer Review System as a Complement to current Technical Assistance Efforts",presentation made at the WTO Symposium on Trade and Competition Policy, 22 April 2002, Geneva.
20 See Blackhurst (1988).  Richard Blac khurst is a former Director of the WTO's Economic Research and
Analysis Unit.
21 OECD (1999), pp. 14-15.
22 "Appraisal of the Operation of the Trade Policy Re view Mechanism", Report to Ministers, 8 October
1999, WT/MIN(99)/2, para. 4.
23 See WT/WGTCP/W/152, pp. 9-10.
24 WT/WGTCP/W/152, pp. 9-10.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 5
More concretely, this could include  exchanges of experiences on the approaches followed by
competition authorities to anticompetitive practices  with an impact on international trade, on the
competition advocacy role of competition authorities and the review of sectoral exclusions.
14. Peer review of competition policy which impacts international trade could fulfil such a role.
Canada, in an intervention in the WTO Work ing Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy, has highlighted this function noting that peer review could offer "an ongoing,
long-term education and information-sharing experience… across legal cultures, developmental levels
and different institutional or historical settings".25  Certainly, with respect to trade policy more
generally, one major benefit of the TPRM process has been the development of an extensive source of
material on trade policies.  Thus, "the reviews… provide all countries with an independent source of
learning experiences with trade policy at all levels of development".26
15. A novel aspect to the potential value of peer review of competition policy in the WTO is that,
if introduced prior to a multilateral agreement on co mpetition policy, were there such an agreement,
any information and experience sharing may feed into a future negotiation process. It could provide,
for example, a concrete understanding of precursors necessary for enhanced co-operation and how the
fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination, tr ansparency and procedural fairness were being
implemented at national levels.  An analogy could be drawn to the early treatment of services trade inthe WTO trade policy reviews which since 1995 has thrown up a wealth of material on various areas
not yet covered by the GATS Agreement.  As one commentator pointed out with respect to services,
"potentially such information could be useful in the development of an improved GATS framework
when new services negotiations begin...".
27  If introduced prior to a multilateral competition
agreement, peer review of competition policy may also offer the benefit of providing informationrelevant to, and educating negotiators on, country experience concerning the spectrum of elements
which a multilateral competition agreement might entail.
D. I
MPROVED DOMESTIC POLICY -MAKING
16. In addition to the "transparency" function and its underlying public choice rationale outlined
earlier, a variety of other benefits for improved domestic policy-making have been associated with thepeer review process.  In fact, a number of commentators on the WTO trade policy review process
have focussed almost exclusively on its benefi ts for improved domestic policy-making and only
indirectly on the effects for other countries or for the trading system.
28  Two official WTO appraisals
of the TPRM have reached similar conclusions holding that "the benefits for the country under review
are… significant"29 and that "the mechanism has been a catalyst for Members to reconsider their
policies [and]… has served as an input into national policy formulation".30  Members have
appreciated that such reviews help them take stock of their policies on the basis of independentobjective assessment, have strengthened the hand of domestic agencies promoting liberalisation and
helped strengthen inter-agency discussion and co-operation in their own countries.
31 Peer review
specifically addressing competition policy would imply similar benefits.
                                                     
25 Canada, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 65.
26 Laird (1999), p. 757. Sam Laird has acted as counsellor for the WTO Trade Policies Review Division
as well as the WTO Development Division
27 Laird (1999), p. 758.
28Spriggs (1991), Laird and Messerlin (1990) and Banks (1992).
29 "Trade Policy Review Mechanism", Report to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, 22 October 1996,
WT/TPR/27.
30 WT/MIN(99)/2, para. 4.
31 WT/TPR/27.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 6
E. P OLICY EXAMINATION MECHANISM
17. Peer review could function as a policy examination mechanism if there were an agreement on
competition policy within the WTO.  This statement requires important clarification however, as the
primary objective of peer review is seldom enforcement of legal obligations.  The TPRM is
illustrative with the Marrakesh Agreement expressly setting out that the mechanism "is not…intended to serve as a basis for enforcement of specific obligations under the [WTO] Agreements".
Indeed, one of the strengths of peer review is its role as a forum where policies can be explained and
concerns can be expressed on a non-confrontational and non-legalistic basis.
18. Nonetheless, as a corollary to peer review's role  of throwing light on the policies and practices
of countries, it could provide a forum for rigoro us and searching examination of the enforcement
policies in individual countries.  This function has been alluded to in the WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy which set out that "peer review could be aninstrument through which issues that related to enforcement could be discussed in an open and
constructive manner".
32 Thus peer review would provide a forum for national implementation to be
monitored and for Members to voice dissatisfaction with another's enforcement policies. While not a
binding enforcement process, these mechanisms ma y result in increased compliance with competition
policy obligations.  Notably, despite the Marrakesh Agreement's explicit rejection of an enforcementrole for the TPRM, it sets out that via greater transparency and understanding its "purpose… is to
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under
the Multilateral Trade Agreements".
19. When discussing peer review's potential role as a policy examination mechanism it seems
important to emphasise the relationship of peer review with WTO dispute settlement procedures. Inparticular, peer review and dispute settlement are separate and autonomous mechanisms that may, but
need not, stand side by side.  This autonomous character has been highlighted during the WTO trade
and competition policy meetings, with one WTO Member explaining that peer review "clearly was
not a commitment that implied dispute settlement".
33 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement, setting
out the objectives of the TPRM, follows a similar approach, explicitly setting out that trade policyreviews are "not… intended to serve as a basis… for dispute settlement procedures".
20. While it is beyond the scope and intention of this paper to discuss the desirability or
feasibility of applying WTO dispute settlement procedures to a multilateral trade agreement on
competition, it is noteworthy that there is currently a large degree of reticence or opposition to the
application of WTO dispute settlement in this context, and in particular with respect to the review of
individual competition decisions or so-called "patterns of non-enforcement".
34  This reflects, in part, a
belief that competition policy represents a paradigm shift compared to other areas already covered bythe WTO. Notably, competition law tends to involve the application of general statutes to particular
fact situations in complicated, evolving and different market circumstances.
35  Further, economic
thinking and analysis relating to market structures and behaviour changes over time. These features, it
is argued, caution against detailed codification and thus contrasts with the usual efforts of the WTO to
specify rules as precisely as possible in order to increase certainty among nations.36  This latter per se
approach may not be easily transferable to competition law and enforcement which often relies on a
                                                     
32 See interchange between Trinidad and Tobago and the European Community in the WTO Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, set out in the Report of the Meeting of 2-3October 2000, 8 November 2000, WT/WGTCP/M/12, para. 59.
33 European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/M/12, para. 59.
34 For a recent summary of the substantive arguments for and against WTO dispute settlement at the trade
and competition interface, see Garcia Bercero and Amarasinha (2001), pp. 504-6.
35 It is instructive to note in this regard, for example, that the U.S. Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (as revised) are all written in generalterms.
36 Canada, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 67.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 7
rule of reason  approach.37  Hence, as the Joint Group has assessed in the past, "competition cases are
often highly fact intensive and require the application of judgement in the assessment of those facts
and in the decision whether to bring an enforcement action based on the particular circumstances of
each case".38  Consequently, it has been argued that "the WTO dispute settlement system is not
appropriate for the review of particular competition cases because of problems of sovereignty andcomplexity".
39  It has been suggested that peer review, as an ongoing process of policy assessment
and refinement, responds to these concerns and is  also a way of avoiding second-guessing national
enforcement decisions.40  This does not, however, imply that peer review is necessarily an alternative
or substitute for the WTO dispute settlement procedures were further WTO competition obligations
adopted in the future.41
F. T ECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING
21. The Doha Ministerial Declaration's competition chapter lays heavy emphasis on "the need for
enhanced technical assistance and capacity building" for developing and least-developed countries in
this area.42 Within the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy it has been common ground that such assistance is essential for meaningful progress.43  This is
perhaps one of the key areas where a well structured peer review mechanism could add true value.
22. Recent appraisals of the TPRM have found that "several developing and least-developed
country members have found the reviews valuable in providing technical assistance" as well as
capacity building.44  Trade policy reviews of least-developed countries (LDCs) in particular have
increasingly performed a technical assistance function.  Benefits referred to include increasing
understanding of the trade policy structure in place and its relationship with the WTO Agreements,
enhancing better understanding in the countries of the WTO Agreements enabling better complianceand integration into the multilateral trading system  and, in some cases, facilitating better interaction
between government agencies.
45  The reports have also played a critical role in identifying technical
assistance needs.46
23. It has been suggested that peer review in a competition policy context would offer similar
benefits.  For example in the case of developing countries, it could be used to identify possiblecapacity constraints.
47 It has also been suggested that, analogous to experience in the TPRM, there
could be significant synergies between such a peer review process and the provision of technical
assistance.48  One delegation has emphasised the important contribution to capacity building via the
                                                     
37 A per se  rule refers to a practice that prime facie violates a law regardless of whether it actually harms
anyone. The rule of reason doctrine holds that a practice violates a law only if it is an unreasonable restraint of
trade based on economic factors.
38 OECD (2001 a), p. 12.
39 OECD (2001 a), p. 12. Nonetheless, private dispute settlement mechanisms may provide a pragmatic
alternative.
40 Canada, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 67.
41 Some countries have however suggested that peer review could in fact act "as an alternative to the
application of dispute settlement in this area", see for example Trinidad and Tobago, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para.80.
42 See WTO Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, 20 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, paras. 23-25. Ministers emphasised the paramount importance of addressing the
development dimension in the build-up to and throughout the negotiating process mandating that "full accountshall be taken of the needs of developing and least-developed country participants".
43 See "Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to
the General Council", Note by the Secretariat, WT/WGTCP/4, paras. 63, 86.
44 See "Report of the Trade Policy Review Body for 2001", 18 September 2001, WT/TPR/101, para. 10.
45 WT/TPR/101, para. 14.
46 WT/MIN(99)/2, para. 4.
47 European Community and its Member States, WT/WGTCP/4, para. 61.
48 Japan, WT/WGTCP/4, para. 61.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 8
understanding of complex technical issues that arose in this field.49  On the other hand, the time and
resource costs for developing country Members to undergo a peer review process in the area of
competition policy has been raised as a potential area of concern.50
II. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO PEER REVIEW
24. Part I of this paper has outlined a number of potential merits to peer review of competition
policy within the WTO. This next part sets out to examine the lessons that might be drawn from
various peer review processes currently used. It focuses in particular on the WTO TPRM and the
OECD country reviews on regulatory reform undertaken in the Competition Committee as these have
received the most attention as providing potentially useful models. Reference is also made, however,
to other models used in the OECD.51  For each, following a brief description of the review process,
potential strengths and weaknesses for any future peer review of competition policy are identified.
The paper recognises, however, that there are certain fundamental differences in the memberships ofthe OECD and the WTO, such as country numbers , backgrounds and levels of development, which
necessarily limit direct translations of OECD approaches to the WTO setting.
A. T
RADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM (WTO)
25. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) was established in 1989 on a provisional basis
and confirmed by Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement.  That Annex describes the objectives of theTPRM as being "to contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements and, where applicable, the Plurilateral
Trade Agreements, and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by
achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members".
26. In this regard, the TPRM is required to periodically review the trade policies and practices of
all Members.  By the end of 2001, the TPRM had conducted 150 reviews since its formation. The
reviews covered 98 of the then 142 Members, representing around 83% of the share of world trade in
2000.
52 Notably, the increased importance given to the reviews of LDCs has led to 14 such reviews
since 1998.53  The trade policy review programme for the year 2002 proposes 17 reviews54 including
four least-developed countries.55
27. The TPRM has worked relatively well. As required by the Marrakesh Agreement, the
operation of the TPRM was appraised by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) in 1999.  The
appraisal concluded that the TPRM "is functioning  effectively and that its missions and objectives
remain important".56
28. Significantly for the purposes of this paper, while competition issues are not formally part of
the TPRM mandate, increasingly the WTO Secretariat and reviewed countries are choosing to report
on them as they relate to trade in goods and services and regulatory reform.  This culminated in the
                                                     
49 United States, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 80. Also Canada, WT/WGTCP/M/15, paras. 81 and 82.
50 India, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 81.
51 At this stage coverage of peer review mechanisms has been limited.  More comprehensive coverage
may be an aspect of the Joint Group's future work programme in this area.
52 See Annex I.
53 The LDCs reviewed since the establishment of  the mechanism are:  Bangladesh (twice), Benin,
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, Tanzania,Togo, Uganda (twice), and Zambia.
54 The European Union and Japan, on the two-year cycle; Australia, Hong Kong, China,  Mexico, India,
and South Africa on the four-year cycle; and Barbados, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Pakistan, Slovenia,
and Venezuela on the six-year cycle.
55 Haiti, Malawi, Mauritania, and Zambia.
56 WT/MIN(99)/2, section VIII.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 9
Chairman of the TPRB identifying trade-related competition issues as one of the "common themes" to
emerge during the course of reviews conducted in 2001.57  Also, other countries may ask questions
relating to these issues to the extent that they bear on the scope of a Member's commitments.  The
inclusion of competition policy descriptions in the WTO trade policy reviews has been identified as a
valuable informative and educative process.58  This has led to suggestions, including by the Joint
Group, that "one option that WTO members may wish to consider is whether to expand the TPRM
expressly to cover… the application of competition laws and policies, including the impact of
exemptions".59  The value of the following description and analysis is not limited solely to such a
proposal however.
1. Brief Description of the Peer Review Process
29. The trade policy reviews are conducted by the TPRB which undertakes the regular collective
appreciation of the trade policies and practices of all individual Members.  There is a predeterminedrhythm of reviews, with Annex 3 mandating that the four Members with the largest shares of world
trade (currently the European Communities, the United States, Japan and Canada) be reviewed every
two years, the next sixteen be reviewed every four years, and others be reviewed every six years.  A
longer period may be fixed for least-developed country Members.  First reviews are mostly done by
countries volunteering to be reviewed, while second reviews take place within the fixed cycle.
30. The reviews of the TPRB are conducted on the basis of a report prepared by the WTO
Secretariat and a "policy statement" by the Member under review.  The Secretariat report provides the
bulk of the information for consideration by the TPRB on the trade policies of the Member under
review.  The most critical source of information are responses to detailed Secretariat questionnaires
and an early mission to the capital for fact-finding purposes.  These missions include consultationswith Government as well as private enterprises and research institutes.  The Secretariat has sometimes
tried to work largely from published sources, official reports and the internet - an approach which can
reduce the overall time for preparation of a review by about one to two months, but shifts a substantial
burden of research on the Secretariat and can only work effectively where there are adequate
published sources.
31. The structure of the Secretariat reports normally contain a "Summary of Observations" and
four chapters. Chapter I covers the major features of the economy, recent economic developments,
trade patterns in goods and services, evolution of foreign investment, and trade related aspects of the
foreign exchange regime.  Chapter II covers institutional aspects of trade and investment policy
making, including participation in multilateral and regional arrangements, as well as trade disputes
and consultations. Chapter III deals with measures directly affecting imports, exports and production,
while Chapter IV looks at measures by sector (agriculture/forestry/fisheries, mining, industry andservices).  This standardised form helps to ensure  consistency of treatment, and delegates have been
found to value being able to find topics in the expected places across reports.
60
32. The Secretariat progressively submits its draft report to the Government whose policies are
under review for verification and factual content. The Secretariat then revises its text in light of the
Government's comments and finalises the report on its own authority.  To preserve the independenceof its evaluation, the summary observations are not  subject to the same checking process however.
                                                     
57 WT/TPR/101, para. 12.
58 The United States 2001 TPRM examination is indicative. As a United States' delegate commented in
the Working Party on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, during the TPRM process "theSecretariat had invested a fair amount of interest and resources in asking his delegation what was being done in
the antitrust area. It had been a useful learning expe rience for his agency since it highlighted differences in
approaches and perspectives with other jurisdictions", see WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 80.
59 OECD (2001 a), p. 26.
60 Laird (1999), p. 751.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 10
33. At the meeting of the TPRB, the Government whose policies are under review makes an
introductory statement, followed by comments from  two discussants chosen from the Membership to
act on their own responsibility (and not as representatives of their Governments) to stimulate debate in
the TPRB. Subsequent to the discussants' statements, other Members may make statements and raise
questions.  At the end of the meeting the Chair presents concluding remarks.
34. The Secretariat report and the Member's policy statement are published after the review
meeting, along with the minutes of the meeting and the text of the TPRB Chair's concluding remarks.
Critically, at no stage in the process are there formal recommendations on actions to be taken by the
Member under review.
2. Strengths of the TPRM
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building
35. One of the key areas where the TPRM may provide lessons is in its technical assistance and
capacity building functions. As mentioned in Part I, there is an increasing consensus that peer review
is of value for developing countries and LDCs for a number of reasons. In response, the TPRM has
focussed greater attention on inclus ion of LDCs in the review process.61  These efforts appear to be
achieving results, with fourteen of the thirty least-developed WTO Members already reviewed and
four more proposed for 2002.  Another key development in LDC reviews has been a systematicresponse, since 2000, to their technical assistance ne eds.  For example, the review process for a LDC
now includes a three to four day seminar for its officials on the WTO and, in particular, the trade
policy review exercise and the role of trade in economic policy.
62  In addition, the Secretariat report
for a LDC review includes a section on technical assistance needs and priorities, as identified in co-
operation with the Member concerned, with a view to feeding this into the WTO's IntegratedFramework process.  Finally, work on the seminars and the technical assistance section in the
Secretariat reports now involve close co-operation with the WTO's Technical Co-operation Division.
The concerns raised regarding the time and resource costs for developing and least-developed country
Members to undertake reviews have also begun to be addressed, although in a more ad hoc manner.
First, by developed country technical assistance funding for reviews;
63 and second, by support from
the WTO Secretariat which has assisted developing countries at different stages of the process.64
Structured Reports
36. A standardised structured form helps to ensu re consistency of treatment.  Furthermore,
delegates have been found to value being able to find topics in the expected places across reports.
Detail and Analytical Nature of the Reports
37. Despite some early criticism that the Secretariat reports were insufficiently analytical, over
the last five years there has been an increase in an alysis and criticism.  Thus one commentator, in a
comprehensive analysis of the mechanism, notes that the reports have evolved from "largely
descriptive catalogues of countries' protectionist measures into more thorough, incisive and analytical
                                                     
61 WT/TPR/101, para. 13.
62Such seminars have been held in 2001 in the context of the review of Uganda, and during the 2002
reviews of Haiti, Malawi and Mauritania.
63 For example, a trust fund was established in 2000 by the Federal Republic of Germany making
DM1 million available over a four-year period to undertake reviews of developing countries and to improve themechanism to better adapt it to the requirements of developing countries. So far, it has provided funding for the
reports on Madagascar and Uganda and for related expenses in the preparation of the Mozambique review, see
WT/TPR/101, para. 5.
64 Such Secretariat assistance has been provided on request but to date has not been used extensively,
perhaps simply because countries are unaware that such help is availableWT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 11
surveys of trade policies and practices".65  This has generally been seen as one of the major
improvements in the reviews with the associated point often being made that the level of detail is one
of the distinguishing features of the WTO Secretariat reports.66
3. Weaknesses of the TPRM
Limited Resources
38. In another critical evaluation of the TPRM one analyst, formerly of the WTO Secretariat, has
argued that of all the challenges faced by the m echanism "the most acute" relates simply to carrying
out the existing programme of reviews with the WTO Secretariat's current level of resources in light
of both the increasing membership of the organization as well as the expansion of work for each
review since the inclusion of materials on services and intellectual property.67  These concerns
"mainly arising from resource constraints" are argued to already be placing excessive strains on the
TPRM.  Furthermore, the Trade Policies Review division's current level of resource use is already amatter of concern for some WTO Members and, according to certain observers, "the impression is
that they would be reluctant to see any substantial increase in staff".
68
Participation in Meetings
39. A second weakness in the TPRM is the attendance and participation of non-reviewed
countries at some meetings.  For example, in its report to the Singapore Ministerial Meeting inDecember 1996, the TPRB noted that the level of reviewed country representation had not always
been matched by the participation, either in number or level, of other Members of the TPRB.
69  This
remains a concern, with the 1999 WTO appraisal concluding that "steps should be taken to make
review meetings more interactive, with greater participation by Members".70  In general, the
attendance at meetings tends to be related to the number of trading partners with close trade ties,hence the review of smaller and developing countrie s tends to suffer from lesser attendance and thus
undermines a number of the potential merits of peer review for those countries.
Lack of recommendations or prescriptive elements
40. This reduces considerably the technical assistance role of the reports.
Becoming increasingly adversarial
41. A certain "resistance factor" to the review process by Members being reviewed has been
noted by some commentators.
71  This is potentially related to what is seen as an advantage, notably
the increasingly analytical quality of the reports a nd the more in-depth and detailed treatment of the
issues.  These developments appear to have resulted in greater caution by authorities under review and
sometimes longer delays in the provision of materials for the review.  Increasingly, it has been noted
that the Secretariat is confronted with questions such as "(w)hy do you need this information?" or
"(w)hat has this to do with the WTO?".72
                                                     
65 Keesing (1998).
66 Laird (1999), p. 762
67 Laird (1999), p. 761.
68 Laird (1999), p. 762.
69 WT/TPR/27.
70 WT/MIN(99)/2, p. 4.
71 Laird (1999), pp. 761-2.
72 Laird (1999), p. 752.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 12
B. OECD C OUNTRY REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM , INCLUDING REVIEWS OF
COMPETITION POLICY
42. The OECD has been working on regulatory reform for a number of years.  This work is based
on the concept of "regulatory quality", meaning efficient markets and effective governance. The
principle was adopted in the 1997 OECD Report to Ministers on Regulatory Reform, which contained
the OECD's first integrated policy  framework for regulatory reform.  To support this work the OECD
undertakes detailed country reviews of regulatory reform, based on self assessment and peer review.
By the end of 2001, twelve OECD countries had been reviewed under the programme73 with the
review of four more to be released by Spring 2002.74
43. The country reviews of regulatory reform provide another potential model for peer review of
competition policy within the WTO. This is particularly the case where the reviews focus on the role
of competition policy in regulatory reform.
1. Brief Description of the Peer Review Process
44. The framework and approach of each review is based on the OECD's existing regulatory
reform programme.  The core output of the OECD country reviews comes in the form of a final
report. Much like the TPRM Secretariat report, to enhance comparability and reduce costs, each report
has the same structure:  four thematic chapters covering economy-wide policy and institutional issues,two sectoral chapters, and a concluding chapter that presents approximately 70 to 80 concrete policy
recommendations for each country.
75  Again similar to the TPRM, data collection is based on written
responses by the reviewed Government to detailed questionnaires prepared by the OECD. These are
followed by missions of an OECD regulatory reform team to the country to meet with Government
officials, trade unions, business, academia and public interest groups. Country-OECD working levelcontacts for each of the chapters of the review tend to facilitate further ad-hoc exchanges of data and
discussions.
45. A difference, however, is the multi-disciplinary approach to the country review. In particular
each review consists of background reports prepared by experts from five different directorates – the
Public Management Service (PUMA), Economics Department (ECO), Directorate for Financial,
Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs (DAF), Trade Directorate (ECH), and Directorate for Science,
Technology and Industry (STI) - with involvement as needed from other directorates and agencies,
including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Conference of Ministers of
Transport (CEM).  The whole process is overseen by the inter-directorate Secretariat Working Level
Steering Group on Regulatory Reform. Notably, for the purposes at hand, one of the core background
reports examines "The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform" and is undertaken in the
DAF. Titled the "Background Report on the Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform", thesehave principally been prepared by a consultant on behalf of the DAF.  The reports follow the
following standard format: (i) the competition poli cy's historical foundations; (ii) an examination of
substantive issues including content of the comp etition law; (iii) institutional issues such as
enforcement structures and practices; (iv) the limits of competition policy including exemptions and
                                                     
73 Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain
and the United States.
74 Poland, Canada, United Kingdom and Turkey.
75 The chapters break down as follows: Chapter 1. Introduction and Macroeconomic context for
Regulatory Reform (PUMA, ECO); Chapter 2. Government Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation
(PUMA); Chapter 3 . The Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform (DAF); Chapter 4 . Enhancing
Market Openness through Regulatory Reform (ECH); Chapter 5 . Regulatory Reform in Selected Sectors (DAF);
Chapter 6. Regulatory Reform in the Telecommunications Industry (STI); and Chapter 7 . Conclusions and
Policy Options for Regulatory Reform (PUMA).WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 13
special regulatory regimes; (v) an examination of  competition advocacy for regulatory reform; and
(vi) conclusions and policy options.76  
46. A second significant area of contrast to the TPRM is the strong emphasis on a prescriptive
element, including policy recommendations for each country review.  These recommendations are
centred around the "Conclusions and Policy Options" chapter of the report, which revisits the mainthemes of the work and suggests numerous priority policy options for further regulatory reform in the
country as well as assessing their potential benefits and costs.
47. The meeting of the peer review process is organised with the goal of a high level of
interactivity.  To this end, each chapter of the country review is peer reviewed by the relevant
respective committee, such as the Public Management Committee, Competition Committee, Trade
Committee Working Party, or the Committee for In formation, Computer and Communications Policy
(ICCP).  The final report, synthesising the individual chapters, is peer reviewed by an ad hocMultidisciplinary Group of Experts at a separate meeting, bringing together high-level and
multidisciplinary expertise from both the country being reviewed and the OECD.  Hence, the reports
reflect the input and views of all 30 OECD Member governments and the European Commission.
Nonetheless, the final report is independent in that it is published under the responsibility of the
OECD Secretary General, and the reviewed country is not asked to agree with its contents.
2. Strengths of the Competition Policy Reviews
Prescriptive Policy Recommendations
48. Potentially, one of the main strengths of the country reviews of regulatory reform is the use of
policy options and recommendations to improve performance. In the chapter examining the role of
competition policy in regulatory reform these are listed in the final section titled "Conclusions andPolicy Options".  This section, following a frank and critical assessment of current strengths and
weaknesses of the country's competition policies and an analysis of the potential benefits and costs of
competition policy regulatory reform, sets out a number of forward thinking policy options for
consideration.
49. The recent competition policy review of Greece is illustrative.
77  In its assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of Greece's competition policy the report is direct, stating that "competition
policy and institutions have played little role in the process of reforming economic regulations to
stimulate competition".78  It then highlights that the Greek competition authority was forced to spend
an undue amount of time and resources on "trivial" mergers as well as applications for relief against
alleged abuses of economic dependence "unrelated to competition policy".79  Furthermore, it sets out
that while harmful restrictive agreements were common, the competition authority could do "virtually
nothing" about them because it "lacked funds, facilities and personnel" and "was too dependent for itsbudget on the Ministry of Development".
80
50. This critical assessment is matched by a number of concrete policy recommendations to
address them.  By way of illustration, in the review of Greece, these included suggestions to de-
emphasise merger review by setting higher merger thresholds, provide independence of financial
support to the competition authority and expand its resources.81  Significantly, and indicative that such
                                                     
76 See for example, OECD (2000), pp. 170-209.
77 See OECD (2001 b), p. 104; and pp. 198-202.
78 OECD (2001 b), p. 104.
79 OECD (2001 b), p. 104.
80 OECD (2001 b), pp. 198-202.
81 OECD (2001 b), pp. 112-113; and pp. 198-202.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 14
recommendations are of tangible value, all three of these recommendations were adopted in a new
Greek competition law enacted shortly after the review.82
Participation in Meetings
51. In contrast to the TPRB meetings, the participation of non-reviewed countries in the country
reviews undertaken in the Competition Committee is uniformly strong.  This may simply beattributable to the fact that such reviews are on ly one part of the Competition Committee's broader
agenda thus participants are "already in the room".
Competition Committee is a specialist body
52. One of the underlying rationales for the multi- disciplinary approach to  the regulatory reform
country reviews, and in particular the preparation of the background reports in specialist directorates
and then peer review by specialist committees, is that assessing regulatory reform requires specific
knowledge.  The same argument could be mounted for review of competition policy in the WTO.
53. Another more nebulous benefit of a more specialist body, is that participants will get to know
each other well.  This can prove to be an important feature in peer review which is premised on
collegial and open dialogue.  In the context of the OECD Competition Committee, it has been pointed
out that "(t)he… frequent personal contacts also give rise to substantial trust and peer identification
among the national regulators".
83
Voluntary
54. There are both advantages and disadvantages to peer review being voluntary.  One advantage,
however, is that the reviewed country will tend to be  more co-operative during the process.  This may
be reflected in an increased willingness to provide information, respond to questionnaires and even
highlight areas where a country may be encountering difficulty.  Certainly, a notable feature of thecountry reviews of regulatory reform conducted in the Competition Committee is that countries have
openly commented on areas where they are having trouble and asked for advice on ways forward.
This degree of openness is notable in a review process that is highly analytical and at times critical of
the policies of the country under review.  It is a major asset and one that may be beneficial if
reciprocated in peer reviews of competition policy elsewhere.  Currently, there appears to be a broadconsensus within the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
that if a peer review process were to be adopted it would be voluntary.
84
3. Weaknesses of the Competition Policy Reviews
Lack of follow-up
55. Despite the introduction of prescriptive policy recommendations, a potential weakness in the
country reviews on regulatory reform is the lack of follow-up to see what recommendations were
implemented and where the reviews are appreciated or not.85 Lack of follow-up also reduces the
potential "peer pressure" dimension of country reviews. Formal follow -up would, however, entail
additional time and resources for each country review.
                                                     
82 OECD (2001 b), pp. 112-113.
83 Tarullo (2000), p. 495.
84 See for example, Trinidad and Tobago, WT/WGTCP/M/12, para. 59; the European Community and its
Member States WT/WGTCP/W/152, p. 10; as well as OECD (2001 a), p. 26.
85 In practice, some voluntary follow-up has occurred where countries have used their annual reports to
describe what they have done to implement regulatory reform recommendations. This system has clearlimitations, however, as countries rarely self-report where action has not been taken.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 15
C. O THER SELECTED PEER REVIEW PROCESSES (OECD)
56. The policies of OECD countries and selected non-members are also assessed regularly in a
variety of other OECD groups. These incl ude the well-known OECD Economic Surveys,
Environmental Performance Reviews, and the peer reviews of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) Members' Development Co-operation programmes.  The review of trends, policies
and country performances, as well as the use of peer pressure to improve them, is a basic OECD
function.  Each review establishes the effectiveness of current policies, examines selected indicators,
and provides recommendations to help the reviewed country consolidate achievements and make
further progress.
57. In the Economic Surveys , the longest standing OECD peer review programme and the best-
known to the general public, the focus is on the macroeconomic and structural policies that could
boost economic performance on a sustainable basis.  Since its creation in 1961, the major role of the
Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC) has been to examine the economic trends
and policies in individual Member countries of the Organization, with the view to assisting the broad
performance of their economies and issuing policy recommendations to improve that performance.The EDRC has been characterised as "at the core of the so-called "peer pressure" mechanism which isthe essence of multilateral surveillance within the OECD".
86
58. EDRC country reviews are based on in-depth surveys prepared by the OECD Secretariat,
covering both macroeconomic and structural issues.87 The survey follows a general structure of:
assessment and recommendations; recent trends, prospects and macroeconomic policy requirements;
an overview of structural policy developments, key challenges and implementation of structural
reforms; and in-depth structural chapters. The survey has three overall objectives: promoting better
understanding of the country's situation and key challenges; enriching the policy debate, domesticallyand internationally;  and pointing towards ways of improving the country's overall economic
performance. This latter objective culminates in a number of policy recommendations as the survey is
intended as a "forward looking" document, focussing on what authorities can constructively do to
address key policy challenges. In contrast to the Competition Committee's country reviews of
regulatory reform, a notable feature of the Economic Surveys is that they explicitly follow up onrecommendations made by the Committee in previous years (especially on structural matters) and
outline the actions taken, if any, or propose any changes to the earlier recommendations that would be
appropriate for the Committee to adopt.
59. The EDRC Committee's examinations of each OECD economy are conducted on a regular
basis, currently every twelve to eighteen months. They are attended by permanent delegates ofMember countries, sometimes assisted by experts from capitals. For the countries examined, a high-
level and multi-institutional representation is the norm, although the size and composition of
delegations varies from one country to another. To help the Committee carry out its work effectively,
two examining countries are designated for each review. Following country examinations, draft
surveys are revised by the Secretariat in light of comments and recommendations made by theCommittee, as summarised by its Chairman. Amended versions are then officially approved by the
Committee for publication under its own responsibility.
60. During the 1990s, the OECD also undertook Environmental Performance Reviews  of all 30
Member countries, assessing progress towards national objectives of environmental policy and
                                                     
86 OECD Annual Report: 2000 .
87 The macroeconomic material of the surveys includes  an analysis of the recent economic developments
and prospects as well as an appraisal of the monetary and fiscal policy stance against announced governmentobjectives.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 16
sustainable development, as well as complia nce with related international commitments.88  A second
review cycle was launched in 2000. This review programme also focuses upon follow-up and
monitoring of the reviews' recommendations. For these environmental performance reviews,
"importance is attached to feed-back from countries on the use they have made of the OECD
performance reviews…  (t)his feed-back can take the form of formal "government responses", of
informal oral reports by reviewed countries to the GEP (at its subsequent meetings), and will also come
with the second cycle of OECD reviews".89
61. Peer reviews of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Members' Development Co-
operation programmes  are also undertaken by the OECD.  The DAC peer review is prepared by the
Secretariat after visiting development authorities and officials both in the capitals and in the field.
Recent efforts have focussed on assessing agencies' efforts towards internationally agreed objectives
and compliance with selected DAC Guidelines in key development areas. Again recommendationsand suggestions for improvement are extended, and a follow-up is done with the aim of ensuring that
lessons are translated into improvements in the practices of DAC Member's development co-operation
programmes and policies.
Strengths of selected OECD peer review processes
Follow-up to Recommendations
62. In contrast to the Competition Committee's country reviews of regulatory reform, a notable
feature of the OECD Economic Surveys, Environm ental Performance Reviews, and the peer reviews
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Members' Development Co-operation programmes
is that they explicitly follow up on recommendations made by the Committees.  This is seen as
valuable feed-back for the review process more ge nerally as well as contributing to ensuring that
lessons learnt during the review process are translated into concrete improvements.
D. C
ONCLUDING REMARKS
63. This paper has outlined a number of potential merits to peer review of competition policy
within the WTO. It has also highlighted that the various peer review systems currently in use have
potential strengths and weaknesses and thus may provide lessons for any future mechanisms.
64. One possible option for conducting peer review of competition policy within the WTO is to
officially expand the TPRM to cover this interface in greater depth.  While the TPRM has worked
effectively, this paper has noted that its limited resources and more general expertise may not be
ideally suited to competition policy review. These ar guments have already been mooted in the Joint
Group as reasons to veer from "expanding the competition policy dimension of the existing TPRM
because… the resources and expertise… involved in the reviews might not be effective in addressing
competition concerns".90  Concerns that have been reiterated in the WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy where it has been suggested that "one could not
expect to have sufficient discussion"91 and "it was not realistic"92 to suppose that enhanced peer
review in the field of competition law and policy could be achieved solely in the context of the
TPRM.
65. Consequently, a second option that has been alluded to in numerous fora has been to establish
a separate Competition Policy Review Mechanism (CPRM) under the auspices of a competition
                                                     
88 It has also reviewed a few Non-Member countries (e.g. Russia) and supported UN-ECE in launching a
similar programme of environmental performance reviews to include countries of Central and Eastern Europe .
89 See OECD (1997), p. 7.
90 OECD (2001 a), p. 26.
91 Japan, WT/WGTCP/M/9, para. 27.
92 Canada, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para. 28.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 17
policy review body.93 Certainly, one delegation to the WTO has actively promoted a standing WTO
Committee on Competition Policy which would provide the forum for the exchange of national
experience and perspectives on competition policy, including peer review.94
66. As this paper illustrates, were such a CPRM set up it could build on the experience gained
through peer review mechanisms in the WTO and OECD. Tentatively speaking, these may include theenhanced technical assistance dimensions and structured approach of reports adopted in the TPRM.
The advantages of a more specialist body, as adopted in the OECD Competition Committee, have also
been explored.  One identified benefit of a such a specialist body has been the collegial and open
atmosphere that the closer personal contact could achieve – a goal which may also be promoted were
the reviews to be voluntary.  The approach to meetings has also been examined, where it appears that
incorporating reviews into a broader agenda will ensure greater participation.
67. This paper has placed particular emphasis on the potential benefits of including prescriptive
recommendations and follow-up in a review process.  These have been used in the OECD peer review
mechanisms with considerable success.  To do so for peer review of competition policy in the WTO
would mark a considerable change to the approach of the TPRM which does not include policy
recommendations.  To take up the challenge of adopting a more prescriptive approach would allow
peer review to fulfil a valuable technical assistance role in an area of considerable complexity where
many WTO Members still lack expertise and experience.
95
68. At the outset, this paper sets out that competition policy presented a new challenge for the
WTO in terms of approach to be used in promoting international co-operation and convergence. This
suggests that competition policy cannot be readily imported into the WTO system using prior models
and assumptions. Peer review, modelled on the various strengths of the approaches examined in thispaper, appears to offer an option for moving forward.
                                                     
93 OECD (2001 a), p. 26.
94 See European Community and its Member States, "The Development Dimension of Trade and
Competition Policy", 8 June 2000, WT/WGTCP/W/140 and WT/WGTCP/4 para. 61.
95 That said, whether such an approach would be seen as beneficial by the countries under review, once
taken to the level of the WTO with its broader and varied membership, remains a moot point.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 18
ANNEX I
TRADE POLICY REVIEWS 
WTO MEMBERS REVIEWED UNDER GATT 1947 AND WTO PROVISIONS, 1989-2001
Europe/Middle East Asia/Pacific Africa America
Austria1,aAustralia (3)bBenindArgentina (2)b
Bahrain Bangladesh(2)b, dBotswana Antigua and Barbudac, e
Cyprus Brunei DarussalamcBurkina FasodBolivia(2)b
Czech Republic (2) Fiji Cameroon (2)bBrazil (3)b
European Union (5)bHong Kong, China (3)bCôte d'Ivoire Canada (6)b
Finland1,aIndia (2)bEgypt(2)bChile (2)b
Hungary (2)bIndonesia (3)bGaboncColombia (2)b
Iceland(2)bJapan (5)bGhana (2)bCosta Rica (2)
Israel(2)bKorea (3)bGuineadDominicae
Liechtenstein2Macau, China (2)aKenya (2)bDominican Republic
Norway (3)bMalaysia (3)bMadagascarc, dEl Salvador
Poland (2)bNew Zealand (2)bLesothodGrenadac, e
Romania(2)bPakistanaMalidJamaica
Slovak Republic (2) Papua New Guinea Mauritius (2) Mexico (2)b
Sweden1 (2)aPhilippines(2)bMorocco (2)bNicaragua
Switzerland (3)bSingapore (3)bMozambiquec, dParaguay
Turkey (2)bSolomon IslandsdNamibia Peru (2)b
Sri Lanka Nigeria (2)bSt.Kitts and Nevisc, e
Thailand (3)bSenegalaSt.Luciac, e
South Africa (2)bSt.Vincent and the
Grenadinesc, e
Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago
TanzaniadUnited States (6)b
TogodUruguay (2)b
TunisiaaVenezuela
Uganda (2)d
Zambiad
Zimbabwea
28 Members
(33 reviews)19 Members
(42 reviews)27 Members
(36 reviews)24 Members
(39 reviews)
( ) Figures in brackets show the number of reviews completed where this is greater than one.
1Included in EU from 1995.
2Joint review with Switzerland (counted as two Members but one review for statistical purposes).
aReviewed under GATT 1947.
bReviewed under GATT 1947 and the WTO.
cFirst review in 2001.
dLeast-developed Member.
eMember of the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) reviewed jointly with other OECS members.
Number of reviews conducted at end-2001 = 150
Number of WTO Members reviewed =   98 out of 142** (counting EU as 15)
Number of WTO Members reviewed =   74 out of 128** (counting EU as 1)
= 69% of WTO Members** (of which, 28 in Europe, 19 in
Asia/Pacific, 27 in Africa, and 24 in America)
Least-developed WTO Members reviewed =  14
Share of world trade of WTO Members reviewed(2000) (excluding significant double counting and
intra-EU trade) = 83%
** WTO Members as at 26 July 2001.WT/WGTCP/W/244
Page 19
REFERENCES
BANKS, G. (1992)
"The Industry Commission: Australia's Domestic Transparency Institution", IntroductoryRemarks to a special session of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board on Domestic
transparency procedures, Geneva, October.
BLACKHURST, R. (1988)
"Strengthening the GATT Surveillance of Trade-related Policies", in M. Hilf and E.U.
Petersman (eds.) The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and
Economic Aspects, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands.
GARCIA BERCERO, I. and AMARASINHA, S. (2001)
"Moving the Trade and Competition Debate Forward", Journal of International Economic Law .
KEESING, D. B. (1998)
Improving Trade Policy Reviews in the World Trade Organization , Policy Analysis in
International Economics, 52, Washington DC, Institute for International Economics.
LAIRD, S. (1999)
"The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism – From through the Looking Glass", The World
Economy , Vol. 2, No. 6, August.
LAIRD, S. and MESSERLIN, P. (1990)
"Institutional Reform for Trade Liberalisation", The World Economy , Vol. 13, No. 2,
pp. 230-49
OECD (1997)
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: A Practical Introduction , OCDE/GD(97)35,
Paris.
OECD (1999)
Trade and Competition Policies: Exploring Ways Forward , Paris.
OECD (2000)
OECD Review of Regulatory Re form in Hungary: Governance, Paris.
OECD (2001 a)
Trade and Competition Policies: Options for a Greater Coherence , Paris.
OECD (2001 b)
OECD Review of Regulatory Reform in Greece: Governance, Paris.
SPRIGGS, J. (1991)
"Towards an International Transparency Institution: Australian Style", The World Economy ,
Vol. 14, No. 2.
TARULLO, D.K. (2000)
"Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy", American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 94, July.
__________