WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/MA/W/13
12 November 2002
(02-6190)
Negotiating Group on Market Access Original:  Spanish
MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Communication from Mexico
The following communication, dated 4 November 2002, has been received from the
Permanent Mission of Mexico.
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I. BACKGROUND
1.1 The multilateral trading system has been the leading instrument in the liberalization of world
trade over the past 50 years.  The disciplines negotiated under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
have improved transparency and certainty in the trade of non-agricultural goods in general, while at
the same time helping to achieve further liberalization and to boost competitiveness at the global
level.  However, the future of the WTO depends on incorporating the developing countries, onfavourable conditions, in the growing trade flows, and developing clear and coherent rules that are
more equitable for all Members.  This is why the Doha Development Agenda is so important.
1.2 During the Doha Ministerial Conference, Mexico reaffirmed its commitment to further trade
liberalization and supported the launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
1.3 Accordingly, Mexico is submitting to Members for consideration its proposal concerning the
objectives to be pursued and the modalities to be applied in the negotiations on market access for non-
agricultural products.
1.4 Mexico reserves the right to expand upon or modify the proposal contained in this document.
II. OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
2.1 As stated in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the aim of the negotiations on market access
for non-agricultural products is to reduce tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks,
high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff measures.  These negotiations are to be
completed not later than January 2005.
2.2 During the negotiations, account will have to be taken of the different levels of development
and competitiveness between the developed countries and the developing countries and in the
different economic sectors within each country.  Similarly, as stated in the Doha Declaration, the
subject of special and differential treatment for developing countries must play a leading part in thenegotiations in order to ensure the effective participation of all Members, achieve acceptable balances
in the results of the negotiations and ensure optimum benefits for all.TN/MA/W/13
Page 2
III. MODALITIES
3.1 Mexico proposes that in developing modalities, the following elements be kept in mind:
1. The commitment to complete the negotiations by 2005
3.2 Any modalities adopted for the negotiations must take account of the fact that the Doha
Declaration has established a very ambitious target date considering the limited time effectively
available for the work that needs to be done at the technical level to achieve results acceptable to all
participants, and considering the complexity of th e negotiations themselves, involving a large number
of Members that have never participated in a Round before.  This is a variable which must be borne in
mind throughout the negotiating process:  while compliance with the target date may not be important
per se , it is important for the credibility of the multilateral trading system.
3.3 Consequently, the modalities proposed by Mexico involve the adoption of a pragmatic,
inclusive approach, with objectives that are realistic and attainable within the time-frame established
by the Doha Declaration for achieving results.
2. Tariff reductions
3.4 Mexico proposes an approach based on a formula which relies on an average general tariff
reduction by (X per cent) of the tariff previously bound for the universe of tariff headings.
3.5 To ensure compliance with paragraph 16 of the Doha Declaration, this approach could also be
applied for the universe of products with tariff peaks and high tariffs.  In other words, once thenegotiating group has agreed on a definition for tariff peaks, their universe can be established and an
average reduction of (X per cent) agreed upon, with a guarantee that they will be negotiated.
3.6 This could help significantly to meet the concern for reducing the current gap between bound
tariffs and applied tariffs, thereby decreasing the levels of uncertainty which, at any given moment,could exist in the application of Members' tariff policies.
3.7 A flexible approach such as the one propose d, based on an average general reduction, would
leave room to address certain sensitive issues for the developing countries, enhancing the prospects
for reaching consensus and the viability of the negotiating process itself.
3.8 Moreover, the application of a formula which provides for general reductions would make it
possible, at an initial stage, to enter into full-s cale tariff negotiations, making it that much easier to
comply with the timetable established by the Doha  mandate.  At the same time, a formula would help
to generate a negotiating momentum as rapidly as possible.
3.9 Once a general formula had been applied, the degree of liberalization achieved by Members
could be evaluated, and if deemed necessary, it would be possible to work at a later stage on the basis
of request/offer methods and zero for zero initiatives for negotiated application.
3.10 Finally, the negotiations will be able to take account of cases in which the countries have
gone beyond the trade liberalization agreed during the Uruguay Round, depending on the Group'sdiscussions.
3. Coverage
3.11 In accordance with the Doha mandate, the entire tariff universe would in principle be subject
to negotiation.TN/MA/W/13
Page 3
4. Base rates
3.12 We should start with the current WTO bound tariff levels, since they represent a common
starting-point for Members and do not imply any a priori  concessions.  Moreover, the bound levels
are those that have traditionally been used as a starting-point for previous negotiations.
5. Binding of tariffs
3.13 The starting-point for the negotiations should be the same for all countries to ensure certainty
with respect to the maximum levels that can be applied by each country for each one of the tariff
lines.  Thus, all of the countries will have to comm it themselves to binding the entire universe of tariff
headings for non-agricultural goods as from the implementation of the results of this negotiating
process.
6. Non-tariff measures
3.14 Mexico agrees with what has been said by a number of other Members, namely that non-tariff
measures must be clearly defined and categorized in order to determine which ones fall within the
competence of this Negotiating Group and to decide how they should be treated.
7. Membership
3.15 We must recognize that the growing number of Members participating in the negotiations and
the disparity in levels of development among the different countries and within the countries tends to
slow down negotiations that are already complicated in themselves, so that the idea of using a globaltariff reduction formula is a better option.
8. Special and differential treatment and less than full reciprocity
3.16 Recognition of the principles of special and differential treatment and less than full
reciprocity must be a fundamental part of the process and the results of the negotiations on tariffreduction modalities if we want the process and the results to be economically  and politically viable in
each country.
3.17 Similarly, Mexico is convinced that it would be more appropriate for special and differential
treatment to be oriented towards the possibility of adopting a broad, rather than restricted, approach to
the negotiations instead of setting longer time-limits for sensitive products.  If the principle of special
and differential treatment is not recognized, and the negotiations seek to adopt modalities that are tooambitious, establishing minimum levels of liberalization for each tariff line for the developing
countries, at best the general level of liberalization will tend to be substantially lower, or at worst,
negotiations will be made impossible from the outset.
3.18 It should be recalled that according to paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,
"[t]he negotiations shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least-
developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction
commitments …";  so that it must be recognized th at ultimately, the developing countries will have to
be able to maintain the same level for certain products or apply only minimum reductions to them.
3.19 A flexible rule providing for special and differential treatment as well as less than full
reciprocity must not represent a means for the developing countries to avoid entering into
liberalization commitments or to disregard the Doha mandate.  On the contrary, a flexible rule must
make it possible for those countries to participate fully in the negotiating process.TN/MA/W/13
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9. Environmental goods
3.20 Under the Doha mandate, before launching the negotiations on environmental goods, a
definition must be found for such goods and their coverage must be defined and agreed upon in order
to be able to address the issue.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
4.1 It is essential that we should opt for a modality that would enable us to enjoy almost
immediately the benefits of tariff reductions whil e at the same time maintaining the WTO's credibility
by respecting the time-limits established in the Doha Ministerial Declaration for the completion of the
negotiations.  Likewise, we must bear in mind that Members should be aiming at agreeing on those
modalities by March-May 2002 – after which we will effectively be left with only 15 months ofnegotiations.
4.2 Consequently, Mexico proposes that the current discussions should lead to the establishment
of a formula for the global reduction of tariffs.  This modality would serve several objectives:  it
would lend credibility to the multilateral trading system by ensuring compliance with the establishedtimeframe;  it would generate negotiating momentum;  it would establish consensus by incorporating
the concerns of the developing and least-developed countries;  it would reduce the gap between
applied and bound tariffs;  and it would guarantee the reduction of tariff peaks.
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