WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  RESTRICTED 
TN/TE/R/8 
13 May 2004 
 (04-2139) 
Committee on Trade and Environment 
Special Session  
 
 
 
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE EIGHTH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN SPECIAL SESSION 
 
19 APRIL 2004 
 
Note by the Secretariat 
 
 1. The Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session (CTESS) held its eighth meeting 
on 19 April 2004 on the basis of the agenda set out in the convening airgram WTO/AIR/2282.  It 
confirmed Ambassador Toufiq Ali as the new Chairman  of the CTESS.  It also agreed to reverse the 
order of business at this meeting, starting with  Paragraphs 31 (iii), 31 (ii) and then 31 (i). 
I. PARAGRAPH 31 (III) – ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES 
2. The United States (US) reverted to a proposal  which it had previously submitted to the 
CTESS under this item, document TN/TE/W/38, entitled Market Access for Non-Agricultural 
Products; US contribution on an Environmental Goods Modality .  While the Negotiating Group on 
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) was addressing the broader framework of issues related to 
market access, the US felt that the CTESS coul d add value on environm ental goods.  Its paper 
proposed a framework that would allow flexibility in defining environmental goods, through the development of a core and a complementary list of goods.  This would accommodate the variety of 
views expressed by participants.  The core lis t would comprise the products on which there was 
consensus, while the complementary list would co mprise products on which consensus could not be 
reached, but for which there was a "high degr ee of acknowledgement" that they could have 
significance for environmental protection, pollution pr evention or remediation, and sustainability.  For 
the core list, the participating Members would be  required to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), or, as appropriate, eliminat e them altogether, within a certain time.  The discussions on NTBs 
could also take place in other relevant WTO bodies.  For the complementary list, however, 
participating Members would be required only to  identify specific products representing a certain 
percentage of the total tariff lines on the list – with that percentage still to be determined, and then 
subject these products to the same reduction or elimination agreed for the core list.   
3. The US believed that Members should strive fo r a core list that was as comprehensive as 
possible, to maximize the positive outcomes for environment, trade, and development, but to the 
extent that consensus could not be reached for particular goods, individual Members could nominate 
these goods for inclusion in the complementary list.   If such an approach were pursued, the CTESS 
would need to develop procedures and criteria for nomin ating products.  In the interest of both clarity 
and practicality, however, the US urged delegati ons to refrain from nominating goods based on 
non-product related process and production methods ( PPMs).  Additionally, it believed that goods 
ought to have at least modest support among a group of Members, as opposed to being simply on the 
"wish list" of a single Member.  The proposal  would also provide additional flexibility for 
participating developing countries, by suggesting that they be require d to eliminate tariffs on a smaller 
percentage of products on the complementary list.   TN/TE/R/8 
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4. The representatives of Canada, Japan, New Zeal and, the European Communities, Norway, 
Thailand and Cuba agreed that the CTESS could add value to the work in NAMA, but stressed that 
the rates of trade liberalization had to be determined by NAMA and not the CTESS.   
5. The representatives of Canada, Australia, Norw ay, Hong Kong, China, Mexico, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Argentina agreed with the US position that it would be best not to use non-product 
related PPMs in the identification of environmen tal goods.  The representative of Norway believed 
that, at least for the time being, the PPM criterion would be difficult to work with, since it would 
involve the setting of new standards and customs cl assifications, which would be time consuming and 
would create definitional uncertainties.  The representative of Canada argued that it would eventually 
become evident to the CTESS that going beyond th e concept of "predominant end use" would be 
problematic. The representative of Switzerland agreed that there could be practical difficulties in 
using PPMs (see statement below). 
6. The representative of Switzerland indicated that there were six questions that had emerged 
from previous discussions:  (1) was how to classify products with multiple end-uses and to deal with 
products whose end-use was not environmentally frie ndly;  (2) was how to deal with the PPM and 
end-use criteria and their implications for the concept of "like products";  (3) was how to deal with the 
fact that the "use" of an environmental good could be of special interest, when for customs policy 
purposes and trade nomenclatures,  goods tended to be classified based on their physical 
characteristics, size, etc.;  (4) was how to deal  with goods produced through cleaner production 
processes and technologies;  (5) was how to upda te the classification of environmental goods over 
time, and (6) was how to deal with the notion of  "environmental friendliness", since goods considered 
environmentally friendly in some parts of the world could be seen as unfriendly in others.  
7. The Swiss Government had integrated "principles of sustainability" in its 
Federal Constitution, and they were to be applie d in all policy fields.  A product could only be 
considered truly "environmental" if its entire life cycle was environmentally friendly.  The life cycle 
approach (LCA) went beyond the PPM issue sin ce a product's performance throughout its life cycle 
(including disposal) had to reflect an Integrated  Product Policy.  The promotion of environmental 
technology in Switzerland was based on the principl es of sustainability and decided on a case-by-case 
basis.   
8. However, Switzerland was aware that a large number of WTO Members were of the view 
that the PPM criterion should not be used.  This w as a legitimate view and Switzerland did not wish to 
re-open discussions on this issue.  Furthermore, it recognized that for the purpose of market access 
negotiations, a definition of "environmental produ cts" based on LCA or on PPMs would create 
practical difficulties.  The application of the PPM criterion at the border would not be easy, and another difficulty would be that there was lack of internationally recognized standards for the LCA of 
products.  Therefore, it supported a more limited defi nition based on product end use.  In that sense, 
the APEC and OECD lists provided a good starting-point for the negotiations.   
9. Switzerland urged participants not to lose sight of the aim of the Paragraph 31 (iii) mandate, 
which was to promote sustainable development thr ough the building of an international market for 
environmental goods and services.  This could contribute to combating global environmental 
problems such as climate change, the loss of biodiversity, the depletion of the ozone layer, the pollution of fresh water resources, land degradation, etc.  Therefor e, all WTO Members had to have 
access to environmental goods and services, for the lowest possi ble price at their border. 
10. In reaction to the US paper, Switzerland argue d that both the OECD and APEC lists would 
need adaptation since they did not offer sufficien t market access opportunities for all Members, in 
particular for developing countries.  It was important to develop a balanced list that reflected the 
interests of developing and developed countries a like.  The proposal to develop a core and a  TN/TE/R/8 
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complementary list was promising and merited furthe r exploration.  It could allow for rigour on the 
core list, and flexibility on the complementary list.   
11. The representative of the European Communities (EC) explained that the EC was seeking a 
balanced outcome, which reflected the interests of al l Members, and which was also ambitious.  It was 
not looking for a simple "window dressing" exercise .  It expressed its suppor t for the two categories 
of "environmental remediation and pollution preventi on" and "clean technologies" proposed in the US 
paper.  However, it wondered if these categories had to stop there, since these tended to include 
products which were only produced in certain parts of  the world.  Other factors could be taken into 
account, such as the low environmental impact of  a product and its renewability.  Thus, it was 
important not to prejudge the outcome of negotiations on this matter. 
12. With respect to the PPM criterion, the EC reminded participants that sensitivity with 
respect to that criterion had arisen in a completely different context – one in which markets were being closed vis-à-vis  products of a certain PPM.  Under Paragraph 31 (iii), however, Members 
were looking at how to open markets for envir onmentally friendly PPMs;  in other words, the 
opposite.  Thus, it wanted delegations to reflec t further on this criterion, which could cover 
organically produced agricultural products, and FSC-certified forest  products.  The EC had been 
reflecting informally on cl assification issues, and whether it w as possible to look for ways other 
than Harmonized System (HS) classification.  In certain instances, labels were already being used to identify products, and it woul d be important not to foreclose these or any other ways of 
identifying products.  
13. The EC was heartened by the conclusion in the US paper that the development of a single list 
would be the ideal solution for the NAMA negotiations .  It was not clear to the EC how a balanced 
result, which took account of the interests of all WTO Members, could be achieved on the basis of 
self-selection.  Furthermore, what incentive would Members have to go beyond a "minimalist 
approach" on the core list, if two lists were to be developed?  The two-list approach could provide 
Members with an incentive to reduce the core list to  a minimum, and push all other products into the 
complementary list where they would not have to commit themselves to reduction.  This would, of 
course, not lead to the environmental benefits th at participants were seeking.  However, the EC 
indicated that it understood that the US had made th is proposal in order to provide greater flexibility.  
It nevertheless believed that flexib ility could be achieved in other wa ys, through for instance different 
levels of commitment and timeframes.   
14. The representative of Hong Kong, China believe d that a broad definition of environmental 
goods, which would provide for goods that were eas ily identifiable at customs, needed to be 
developed for the benefit of all Members.  The US  idea of a dual list offered a practical basis for 
further discussion.  However, together with the representative of Indonesia, Hong Kong, China 
enquired about how the principles of Special and Differential treatment (S&D) and "less than full 
reciprocity" would be applied to the complementary list, and whether they would also be used in 
relation to the core list.  Furthermore, it wondered if these concepts would apply to both end dates and 
end rates of negotiations, and requested clarificati on on the required level of support for the inclusion 
of a product on the complementary list.   
15. The representatives of Brazil, Thailand, Ecuador, Cuba, and Kenya also asked for 
clarification on whether/how the concept of "less th an full reciprocity" would be applied to the core 
list.  The representative of Kenya added that the con cept of less than full reciprocity in the US paper 
would have to abide by Article XXXVI, paragraph 8, of GATT 1947, which states that "the developed 
contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for co mmitments made by them in trade negotiations to 
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the tr ade of less-developed contracting parties."   With 
respect to S&D, the concerns of Hong Kong, Chin a were echoed by the representatives of Mexico and 
Thailand.  The representative of Thailand called for the concepts of S&D and of less than full TN/TE/R/8 
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reciprocity to be applied to all environmental pr oducts, and not just to those on the complementary 
list. 
16. The representative of Japan found work on this pa rt of the mandate to have been slow, and 
felt that there was a need for greater efficiency.  Given the divergent views on environmental goods, 
Japan urged delegations to concentrate on developing  a list.  It had submitted its own list, in which it 
had taken the OECD classification into account, as we ll as certain environmental problems.  Together 
with the representative of Thailand, it enquired ab out the procedures that would be used to reach 
consensus on the core list, and about the concepts of  "definitive consensus" and of the "high degree of 
acknowledgement."   The representative of Ecuador also enquired about the way in which consensus 
would be achieved on the core list, and the re presentative of Switzerland about the number of 
Members that would have to agree to the comple mentary list for a "high degree of acknowledgement" 
to have been achieved.   
17. The representative of Mexico asked the US to clar ify:  (1) whether the year 2010 would be the 
deadline for the elimination or for the reduction of tariffs;   and (2) whether the complementary list 
suggested a plurilateral approach, which would be of concern to Mexico.  The representative of 
Ecuador echoed Mexico's concerns with respect to the setting of a potential end-date for the 
negotiations, which would need to be set in light  of progress in other negotiating groups, as well as 
with regard to the creation of a potential plurilate ral track with regard to the complementary list. 
18. The representative of Korea argued that there we re two approaches currently on the table for 
the identification of environmental goods:  a defin ition-based approach, and a list-based approach.  
Defining environmental goods would be difficult since the concept was still evolving.  Similarly, the 
list-based approach could not work in isolation.  Korea supported the use of the APEC list as a 
starting-point for negotiations, since it had been developed for the purpose of trade liberalization.  Korea supported the US proposal.  The core and co mplementary list approach could lead to the 
production of a workable list through the nomination of products by participants.  In the negotiating 
process, views would eventually converge on the de finition and coverage of environmental goods, as 
had taken place in the OECD.  Korea stressed that  the negotiations should include all WTO Members. 
19. The representative of Canada believed that a single, comprehensive, agreed list of 
environmental goods for tariff reduction or elimina tion would be the ideal result, both to advance 
collective trading interests and to further environm ental goals.  However, the proposal to develop two 
lists of environmental goods, a core list and a comple mentary list, could offer a useful alternative to 
tackling this important sector.  Canada supported a practical, "bottom up" approach to identifying 
environmental goods.  The US proposal was consiste nt with Canada's general approach in NAMA 
negotiations, of providing a dditional flexibility in sectors where agreement was proving difficult.  One 
of the challenges related to the structure of th e Harmonized System of tariff classification, where 
classifications did not, in some instances, differe ntiate between environmental goods and other dual 
or multiple-use goods.  Thus, the US approach st ruck a practical means of  furthering the CTESS' 
overall objectives, while recognizing the challenge of product identification.   
20. The US had tried to encompass a broad range of goods, and had suggested using the category 
of "environmental remediation and pollution preven tion."  Here, Canada belie ved it could be helpful 
to use more specific categories or sub-categories, such as those proposed by APEC, and joined Korea 
in underlining the value of the APEC list as a starti ng-point for work in this area.  Specific categories 
or sub-categories proposed in APEC included ai r pollution control, water pollution control, 
solid/hazardous waste management, remediation/ clean-up of soil and water, noise/vibration 
abatement, environmental monitoring, analysis and assessment equipment, potable water treatment, recycling systems, renewable energy plants, hea t/energy management, and soil conservation.  These 
categories reflected more fully the range of prod ucts in the environmental sector.  In addition, 
consideration could be given to ot her products that Members proposed.   TN/TE/R/8 
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21. The US paper's inclusion of "clean technologies" as another category of environmental goods 
had reflected a willingness to engage in complex is sues.  However, the tasks of clearly identifying 
technologies that were sufficiently "clean," and of identifying the goods embodying those technologies, were daunting ones, and Canada was interested in hearing from the US how it would 
address these issues.  In addition to the two general categories pr oposed by the US for the core list, 
Canada believed that further flexibility could be explored  when selecting goods for the 
complementary list.  It encouraged interested parties to put forward proposals on the specific goods they considered environmental, and which were identifiable through the HS.  The CTESS 
needed to establish a process through which this wo rk could be undertaken, and to eventually turn 
to NTBs.   
22. The representative of New Zealand saw the US approach as a useful starting-point for the 
discussion of definitional issues.  However, he indi cated that New Zealand wished to give further 
thought to the categories proposed by the US for the core list, and did not want to foreclose any options at this stage. 
23. The representative of Australia welcomed the increased focus on Paragraph 31(iii), arguing 
that Paragraphs 31(iii) and (ii) offered the most re alistic prospects for the CTESS' contribution to the 
overall negotiations.  Paragraph 31(iii) negotiatio ns could deliver increased trade with sound 
environment benefits if handled in a sensible manne r.  Australia saw the US paper as useful in 
moving the CTESS' work forward, and was consci ous of the difficulties involved in this area 
since it had participated actively in APEC  and OECD discussions. Together with the 
representatives of Switzerland, Thailand and Argentina, Australia  enquired about the relationship 
between the core list and complementary list and their respective contents.  The representative of 
Australia saw the categories of "environmental re mediation or pollution prevention" and of "clean 
technologies" as a useful basis on which to oper ate, while taking APEC's work into account.  
Since there had been positive engagement in both the recent NAMA and Services Council Special 
Session (SCSS) meetings, Australia argued that the CTESS could contribute to this positive mood 
by putting a work programme in place. 
24. The representative of Norway welcomed the US  proposal, and agreed with Switzerland that 
there were many challenges involved in the identification of environmental goods.  With respect to 
the categories mentioned in the US paper, there wa s a need for sub-categories.  Norway viewed the 
APEC and OECD lists as complementary, but welcom ed the receipt of contributions from developing 
countries.  It believed that focus should initially be placed on the development of a core list, and that 
time would tell whether there was a need for a comple mentary list.  It hoped that all environmental 
goods could receive the same treatment. 
25. The representative of Singapore echoed the view that the Paragraph 31 (iii) mandate could be 
important for the environment and sustainable development.  The US contribution was a good 
starting-point for the negotiations, since it was ambitious but flexible.  It included three elements of 
flexibility:  (1) the development of two separate lists ;  (2) flexibility on the complementary list;  and 
(3) the application of the concept of less than full reciprocity.  The work of the CTESS and of NAMA 
should be viewed as complementary processes.  One group could not hold up progress in another. 
26. The representative of India argued that there was a need for harmony between the WTO's 
overall approach to industrial goods, and its approach to sectoral initia tives, such as in environmental 
goods.  It nevertheless welcomed the discussion tr iggered by the US paper, which it was still 
considering.  Several delegations, such as Canada and Switzerland, had flagged systemic issues which 
needed to be grappled with in these negotia tions, which the CTESS could benefit from discussing 
further.   
27. The representative of Brazil felt that discussions so far had not addressed products of export 
interest to Brazil, since they had focussed on high  value-added products that  unfortunately developing TN/TE/R/8 
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countries did not have a technological or competitive advantage in.  Brazil agreed with other speakers 
that the lack of clarity in NAMA negotiations made  the work of the CTESS difficult on this subject.  
It was concerned that the US had only included high value-added products on its core list.  
28. The representative of Malaysia underlined that it would be crucial for the list of 
environmental goods to reflect a balance of inter ests of both developed and developing Members.  A 
list based on end use criteria could be a possibl e way forward, but would depend on progress in 
NAMA.   
29. The representative of Kenya pointed out that most developing countries were net importers of 
environmental goods.  For these negotiations to  assist developing countries in achieving their 
developmental goals, they would need to strengt hen their industrial capacity, promote technology 
transfer, enhance their competitiveness, enable them to  retain control over their natural resources, etc.  
How would the US core and complementary lists achieve these objectives, particularly since Kenya believed that paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration app lied to these negotiations, and that 
emphasis had to be placed on the export interests of developing countries?  It also enquired about the 
forum in which agricultural environmental goods would be treated.   
30. The representative of Ecuador found the categor ies of environmental goods specified in the 
US paper to be too restrictive, and believed that any categorization reached would need to reflect the 
interests of developing countries, in particular in re lation to natural resources, such as in the areas of 
agriculture and forestry management.  Ecuador  wondered how the US paper would address the 
problem of dual use, and of LCA.  
31. The representative of Indonesia was concerned that the US had only proposed high 
technology products for inclusion on the core list.  Indonesia did not favour the use of the APEC and 
OECD lists as a basis for the core list.  The representative of Venezuel a agreed that the US 
categorization of goods seemed to focus on environmental goods of interest to industrialized 
countries.  It did not address capacity building,  technology transfer, and S&D treatment for 
developing countries.  If participants did not address these issues, then the mandate would not deliver 
sustainable development, but merely market access for developed countries.  
32. The representative of Cuba had no preference for the time being for the APEC or OECD lists.  
With respect to the US' complementary list, C uba questioned why the commitments undertaken under 
that list would only apply to a certain percentage of products, and not to all products as on the core 
list. 
33. The representative of China believed that cr iteria would need to be developed for 
environmental goods, so as to address the problem of  multiple end-use.  Otherwise, consensus on the 
identification of environmental goods would be difficu lt to reach.  It would be inappropriate to use 
clean technology as a basis for the identification of environmental goods.  Like PPMs, this was a 
subjective concept, and would be unhelpful in di stinguishing environmenta l from non-environmental 
goods.  Furthermore, clean technology was an evol ving concept that changed with technological 
progress, and which was defined differently in different countries based on levels of economic 
development and environmental tolerance.  Ch ina wondered how the US proposal addressed the 
concerns of developing countries.  It indicated th at it was currently considering the possibility of 
developing a "common list" and a "development list" from the perspective of developing countries.   
34. The representatives of Thailand, Indonesia, Vene zuela and Canada looked forward to China's 
common and development lists.  The representative of  Venezuela added that his country would be 
keen to participate in a developing country list which included agricultural and forestry products of 
interest to the developing world.  The representativ e of Canada believed that there was a need for the 
CTESS to consider proposals from developing countries.  The limitations of the APEC and OECD  TN/TE/R/8 
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lists had been referred to by a num ber of participants, and while Cana da favoured the APEC list, it 
was open to considering any other lists which participants might put forward in these negotiations. 
35. The representative of the United States responded by saying that two completely different sets 
of positions had been taken at this meeting.  One po sition argued that there was a need for a core list, 
and that participants had to try to be as inclus ive as possible in the mandatory approach;  while 
another position had been to praise the concept of r eciprocity that existed in the complementary list, 
and particularly the notion of self-selection.  What  the US had tried to do was provide a way for the 
membership to be both flexible and ambitious.  It would be responding in greater detail to the 
questions raised at the next meeting of the CTESS. 
36. The representative of UNCTAD indicated that UNCTAD wanted to take the opportunity to 
offer for circulation in the CTESS its Report of the Expert Meeting on Definitions and Dimensions of 
Environmental Goods and Services in Trade and Development , on a meeting that had been  organized 
by UNCTAD in July last year.  At the expert me eting, discussions focused on the following issues:  
(1) trends in the environmental industry in terms of market structure, supply and demand factors and 
trade flows;  (2) environmental goods, more speci fically on issues of definitions and criteria, 
statistical analyses of the OECD and APEC lists , and environmental goods of export interest to 
developing countries;  (3) the various categories of  environmental services, such as  infrastructure 
services, professional environmental services, and services with an environmental component, which required different approaches in the negotiations  as well as on the domestic front;  (4) technology-
related issues, particularly with regard to entire plants and technology systems;  and (5) a range of 
systemic issues which required further analysis, such as subsidies, government procurement,  
emergency safeguards,  regional negotiations,  and linkages between NAMA and the SCSS.  Ways to 
ensure that liberalization efforts at the WTO were commercially, financially and technically viable in 
providing clear developmental benef its were explored, and so was national level policy coordination.
1   
37. To conclude this item, the Chairman proposed  that, to pursue its "monitoring role," the 
CTESS could invite the Chairmen of NAMA and th e SCSS to brief the Committee on their work on 
environmental goods and services.  It was so agreed.  The Chairman also proposed that, at its next 
meeting, the CTESS focus on two aspects of its Paragr aph 31 (iii) mandate:  (1) the clarification or 
identification of environmental goods, where particip ants would be encouraged to clarify/identify 
products which they considered to be environm ental and which fell within the mandate;  and 
(2) information and experience sharing on the NT Bs facing environmental goods, if participants 
would find that useful. He would be consulting informally on these proposals.  
II. PARAGRAPH 31 (II) – INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND CRITERIA FOR THE 
GRANTING OF OBSERVER STATUS 
38. The European Communities presented part of  its new submission, document TN/TE/W/39, 
The Relationship between WTO Rules and MEAs in  the Context of the Global Governance System , 
under this item.  It explained that the ideas that had been listed in Ambassador Yolande Biké's last 
report to the TNC (TN/TE/7) on greater cooperation and information exchange had been addressed in 
the EC's previous submission on Paragraph 31(ii) (TN/TE/W/15).  That submission continued to 
reflect the EC's approach to this part of the mandate .  It was clear that the mandate of Paragraphs 31(i) 
and (ii) was closely linked, and the EC's ne w submission on global governance reflected this 
interlinkage in Part IV, which called for close c ooperation and information fl ow at the national and 
international levels to ensure the mutual suppor tiveness of trade and environmental policies.  The 
objective of Part IV was to develop a shared vision of how interaction at the national and international 
levels could take place between the trade and the e nvironmental communities, including at Secretariat 
level.  This had to be viewed as a part of an approach to improved global governance.  Increased 
                                                      
1The oral statement by UNCTAD was subsequen tly circulated to the CTESS as document 
TN/TE/INF/5. TN/TE/R/8 
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cooperation was necessary for effective synergies to be developed between the work of various 
institutions, such as, for instance, in the way in which the international community dealt with the 
"environmental goods issue" in UNCTAD, UNEP and the WTO.  But, of course, it was also important 
to remember that better coordination would need  to start "at home."  The new EC submission 
attempted to provide a snapshot of what had alr eady been undertaken in various fora on the global 
governance dimension of the CTESS' Paragraph 31 work.   
39. The representative of the United States agreed  that communication and collaboration at the 
multilateral level on trade and environment issues coul d offer significant benefits.  The US expected 
that rapid progress under 31 (ii) could help inform Members' participation in discussions under paragraph 31 (i).  The US had already offered some preliminary ideas in three broad areas:  
(1) Information Sessions, (2) documents exchange, a nd (3) observer status.  Taken collectively, the 
US hoped these elements could comprise an integrat ed approach for increasing contact at multiple 
levels in the WTO-MEA relationship. 
40. The representative of Canada recalled that, in th e past, Canada had tabled its own ideas on the 
application of principles on governance matters.  At  present, participants had to focus on how to 
translate the elements contained in Part IV of the EC paper into specific ideas on information 
exchange, or criteria for observer status.  Under the banner of "mutual supportiveness," the need for coordination and information exchange was important.  The task of the CTESS was to develop efficient and accessible ways to do so , while focusing of the list of ideas in 
Ambassador Biké's report.  There were elements of the EC paper which could also be fruitfully addressed in the regular CTE.   
41. The representative of Australia agreed with th e EC that its paper c overed a "universe" of 
issues, but pointed out that the mandate under Paragra phs 31(i) and (ii) was quite specific.  Australia 
wanted additional clarity on what the EC was seeking under Paragraph 31 (ii), since it was a key demandeur.  The EC's new submission had been disappointing in that it did not present new ideas, and raised the issue of global governance which went beyond the mandate.  Australia was interested in 
how the paper purported to span bot h Paragraphs 31 (ii) and 31 (i), since it believed that it was 
important not to blur the distinction between the two mandates.  Neverthele ss, Australia argued that 
Paragraph 31 (ii) could make an  important contribution to Paragr aph 31 (i).  Together with the 
representative of Chinese Taipei, Australia called for the practical suggestions in Ambassador Biké's 
report to be further discussed.   
42. The representative of Brazil believed that Paragra ph 31 (ii) could deliver a useful outcome on 
the WTO-MEA relationship – a relationship whic h was already solid.  Ambassador Biké had 
summarized many of the proposals that had been pr eviously presented, but for a positive outcome to 
be achieved it would be necessary to enhance the capacity of developing country negotiators who 
worked on trade and environment issues, thr ough for instance joint WTO/UNEP/MEA technical 
assistance and capacity building projects.  The represen tative of Colombia also welcomed the ideas in 
Ambassador Biké's report, in particular with respect to joint technical assistance.  
43. The representative of Argentina indicated that the ideas proposed in paragraph 25 of the EC 
paper had been the ones which the CTESS had been exploring since the beginning of the negotiations.  
However, the EC had added in that  paragraph that information exch ange in the context of dispute 
settlement would be needed.  Arge ntina saw the Paragraph 31 (ii) ma ndate as being institutional in 
nature.  It did not relate to dispute settlement, particular since the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) already contained provisions for the consulta tion of experts.  With respect to the CTE's 
Singapore Report which was referred to in the EC pape r, Argentina wished to point out that ministers 
had agreed to that report under a broader mandate.  Therefore, the report was not relevant to the 
specific mandate with which the CTESS was dealing, a nd in that sense, it agreed with Canada that the 
right forum for the EC's paper was the regular CTE.  The representative of Mexico supported 
Argentina's comments on paragraph 25 of the EC paper.  TN/TE/R/8 
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44. The representative of Japan agreed with Part IV of  the EC paper, and with the need for closer 
co-operation and information exchange.  With respect  to the suggestions in Ambassador Biké's report, 
the usefulness of Information Sessions had been confirmed, and specific discussions were now needed on their frequency and form.  Dividing MEAs in to groups, and organizing the Sessions around 
specific themes would be useful.  Furthermore, MEAs  which had attended these Sessions in the past 
had to be given priority for observer status.  The Secretariat could also prepare discussion papers in 
advance of Information Sessions. 
45. The representative of Switzerland welcomed the pursuit of both components of the 
Paragraph 31 (ii) mandate, information exchange and the granting of observer status.  Switzerland 
believed that this mandate could he lp prevent conflicts between the WTO and MEAs from arising.  It 
argued that the mechanisms for information excha nge that had been developed by the WTO, UNEP 
and MEAs in the past few years had been useful a nd had to be pursued on a permanent and structured 
basis, while maintaining flexibility.  In its last  submission, Switzerland had presented certain ideas on 
how to organize Information Sessions more efficien tly, and to promote information exchange, through 
means such as the Internet. 
46. Switzerland believed that the granting of observe r status could contribute to a better mutual 
understanding of the WTO and MEA systems.  It had previously proposed a set of flexible criteria 
based on Annex 3 of the Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings 
of the General Council .  These included:  one, that decision s be made on the basis of a written 
request and on a case-by-case-basis;  two, that an MEA Secretariat requesting observer status have 
a "direct interest" in the Doha negotiations on envir onment;  and, three, that reciprocal treatment be 
granted.   
47. On "direct interest," Switzerla nd believed that the applying MEA should:  (1)  demonstrate 
its capacity and willingness to co ntribute substantially to C TE and/or CTESS discussions;  
(2) demonstrate its active contribu tion to the general debate in areas of relevance to trade and 
environment;  (3) demonstrate its involvement in tr ade-related projects, for example, in private or 
public partnership initiatives.  For instance, the Basel Convention had formed a partnership with 
eleven of the most important mobile phone manufacturers, such as Nokia, Eriksson and others, on environmentally sound product ma nagement, which addressed the desi gn, production as well as the 
disposal of mobile phones.  The applicant would otherwise have to be involved in trade-related co-operation projects;  and, (4) should provide any other information that demonstrated direct interest.  An MEA applying for observer status would not have to fulfil all of these requirements, 
since they were only guidelines.  The representat ive of Colombia supported the suggestions made 
by Switzerland.  However, together with the representative of Mexico, Colombia argued that it was 
best to only invite MEAs on an ad hoc basi s to the CTESS, until criteria were elaborated. 
48. The representative of Venezuela commented on the concept of sustainable development, 
which had been extensively referred to in the EC paper.  In paragraph 3 of the paper, a reference 
was made to Principles 4 and 7 of the Rio Earth Summit, but these could not be considered in 
isolation from the broader context in which they were  agreed.  Principle 7 was again referred to in 
paragraph 13 of the paper in relation to tech nical assistance and capacity building, and in 
paragraph 20 a reference was made to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD).  Venezuela wondered whether the EC wanted to  discuss these issues under the Paragraph 31 
mandate?  It saw Paragraph 51 of the Doha Decl aration as being the more relevant Paragraph. 
49. The representative of Norway agreed with ot her delegations that it would be useful to 
institutionalize and better organize MEA Information Sessions in the WTO.  Norway saw merit in 
several of the ideas listed by Ambassador Biké, in particular with respect to focusing Information 
Sessions on certain themes.  It agreed with the EC  that national policy coordination was of paramount 
importance.  The need for institutional co-ope ration had been emphasized by the CTE in its 
Singapore Report and at WSSD, and this had to be  kept in mind in Paragraph 31(ii) discussions. TN/TE/R/8 
Page 10  
 
50. The representative of Cuba expressed concern a bout the institutionalization of various forms 
of co-operation, since at the moment, the CTE and CTESS enjoyed a certain amount of flexibility, 
which had to be maintained. 
51. The representative of New Zealand indicated that his delegation wished to pursue the 
practical and pragmatic elements of the EC paper wh ich tended to relate to Paragraph 31 (ii), although 
not exclusively.  It agreed with the EC that Paragr aphs 31 (i) and 31 (ii) were linked.  It supported 
many of the elements addressed in the EC paper, including that MEAs were important in the development of a common approach to global e nvironmental problems, re quiring multilateral and not 
unilateral solutions.  It also agreed with the ob servation that the competence for developing measures 
to achieve environmental objectives rested with ME As, just as the WTO had competence for pursuing 
trade objectives.  Equally, it believed that fair and ope n trade had a crucial role to play in promoting 
sustainable development. 
52. One of the key points that emerged from this was the observation that environment and trade 
objectives were not mutually exclusive.  New Zealan d suggested, therefore, that the problem was not 
necessarily in the rules themselves, but rather, the focus had to be on finding ways to ensure that 
mutually supportive outcomes flowed from these objec tives.  In this vein, it welcomed the opportunity 
presented by the EC paper to examine the pragmatic a nd practical steps that could be taken to achieve 
this. 
53. In particular, New Zealand supported a clo ser examination of the following elements 
identified in the EC paper:  (1) enhanced inform ation exchange between MEA Secretariats and the 
WTO;  (2) the granting of observer status for MEA Secretariats in the WTO;  (3) enhanced 
coordination at the national level be tween trade and environment officials;  (4) greater recognition of 
the need to take into consideration WTO obliga tions when crafting trade measures in MEAs;  and 
(5) a recognition that when problems arose over trad e measures in MEAs, the parties to the MEA in 
question should seek to resolve their differences in that  context, rather than in the WTO.  In addition, 
within the WTO framework, there were ways other than formal dispute settlement, which could assist 
in the resolution of such problems. 
54. The representative of the European Communiti es was pleased that there was support for 
greater co-operation and information exchange, an d believed that the Committee could benefit from 
further discussing the concrete ideas contained in Ambassador Biké's repor t.  Many delegations 
seemed to have welcomed the idea of institutiona lizing MEA Information Sess ions, and of organizing 
joint technical assistance activities.  The EC reas sured Australia that it was seeking a concrete 
outcome on this part of the mandate, but that that outcome had to be underpinned by a common 
vision.  Furthermore, whereas Argentina had indicat ed that dispute settlement was outside the scope 
of the mandate, the EC pointed out that New Ze aland had referred to c onflict resolution in its 
intervention.  Thus, there was room for a useful de bate on this issue.  While the EC understood that 
the Singapore Report had been agreed in a different c ontext, it did not believe that the subject matter 
under discussion had progressed very much since then , and felt that the Report could usefully be 
reaffirmed.  TN/TE/R/8 
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III. PARAGRAPH 31 (I) - WTO RULES AND SPECIFIC TRADE OBLIGATIONS IN 
MEAS 
55. The European Communities reverted to its new submission, document TN/TE/W/39.  It 
explained that the WTO's mandate under Paragraph 31(i) had to be vi ewed in a broader context - a 
"global governance" context, for the relationship be tween specific trade obligations (STOs) in MEAs 
and WTO rules would, in the end, be determined  by the Members' vision for the interrelationship 
between different bodies of law.  The principles proposed by the EC drew on the work of the WSSD, the work of UNEP, and the CTE's Singapore Report.   
56. The representative of the United States indicat ed that the US was ready to continue 
Paragraph 31 (i) negotiations on the basis of the cons ensus that had been reached in the CTESS on the 
need to establish a firm, factual and analytical fou ndation for any possible results.  She recalled that in 
February 2003, the US had suggested a way forward on Paragraph 31 (i) that would focus on delegations' practical experiences.  It had suggested that, first, other delegations provide their views 
on examples of STOs;  second, that the CTESS fo cus on those that appeared to be consensus 
examples;  and third, on that basis, that individual  delegations be invited to  share their experiences on 
the negotiation and implementation of these STOs in  light of WTO rules.  Many delegations had 
supported this approach.  It was pleased that the EC  did not see its current paper as a substitute for the 
practical work that the CTESS had been doing.  It would be premature for the CTESS to address broad, overarching, concepts and principles.  Abst ract concepts would not advance the work of the 
Committee. 
57. The representatives of Malaysia, India, Hong Kong, China, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Australia, Brazil, China, Ecuador, and Indonesia ar gued that the "global governance" approach and 
principles proposed by the EC fell outside the Paragraph 31 (i) mandate, and could prejudge the 
outcome of the negotiations.  The representative of I ndia also reminded participants that in her report 
to the July 2003 TNC, Ambassador Yolande Biké had stated that "there seemed to be a general sense 
in the CTESS that it is premature to discuss poten tial results, " and hoped that that observation would 
be heeded.  It looked forward to more analytical  work on the "real issues" underlying Paragraph 31 (i) 
negotiations. 
58. The representatives of Malaysia, China, Australia, India, Brazil, Indonesia and 
Hong Kong, China wanted a continuation of the an alytical work which had been started in the 
CTESS.  The representative of Hong Kong, China fe lt that more general discussions would run the 
risk of widening the mandate to regional envir onmental agreements (REAs), to the rights of non-
parties under MEAs, and to trade obligations which were not specific.  The representative of Canada 
noted that, to date, focus had been placed on the specific provisions of a core group of MEAs - an 
analytical track along which Canada hoped to conti nue.  Canada was attracted to the informal idea 
that had previously been suggested of considering STOs by type or cluster.  The representatives of 
Brazil and Ecuador suggested that the EC separate its proposals under 31 (i) and 31(ii) for greater 
clarity in future, and the representative of Ecuador added that the governance principles raised in the 
EC paper would best be addressed under Paragr aph 51 of the Ministerial Declaration. 
59. The representative of Singapore agreed with many of the references made in the EC paper to 
the CTE's 1996 Singapore report, to the WSSD and to  Appellate Body rulings.  No-one could dispute 
the importance and necessity of MEAs, that multilate ral environmental policy should be made within 
MEAs, and that MEAs and the WTO were equal bodi es of law.  However, Singapore wondered if the 
governance principles exceeded the parameters of the mandate. 
60. The representative of Cuba added that if glob al governance were to be discussed in the 
CTESS, than the democratization of international ec onomic institutions would also need to be taken 
up, and so would greater transparency vis-à-vis  developing countries in decision-making.  Cuba 
believed that the discussion of STOs in MEAs had not  been concluded, and that further work was TN/TE/R/8 
Page 12  
 
required, especially since there were non-trade measur es that affected trade (in particular developing 
country trade).  Having said that, Cuba appreciated the fi rst EC principle, which called for avoiding 
unilateral action. 
61. In terms of more specific comments on the EC  paper, the representatives of India and Egypt 
argued that the EC governance principle that referred to the necessity of MEAs, and which argued that 
the negotiation of MEAs was itself a guarantee agains t discrimination, had not taken into account the 
way in which MEAs were implemented.  The ma nner in which agreements were negotiated and 
adopted was not correlated with the manner in which they were implemented.   
62. The representative of India added that, in its reference to the Gasolin e case, the EC had stated 
that the Appellate Body had affirmed that WTO rule s would not be interpreted in "clinical isolation" 
from other bodies of public international law, but the EC then added the words "including MEAs" - 
which the Appellate Body had not said.  The re presentatives of India, the Philippines, and Egypt 
argued that the Appellate Body had only referred to  public international law in the context of treaty 
interpretation, and were puzzled by the EC's refe rence to MEAs.  More specifically, the representative 
of Egypt stated that the Appellate Body's statement in Gasoline had been made in the specific context 
of GATT Article XX(b), in reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties . 
63. The representative of Australia also qu estioned the EC's interpretation of the Gasoline  
dispute.  Article 1(1), Appendix 1, and Article 3( ii) of the DSU, as negotiated, reflected a very 
conscious decision by WTO Members on the scope of the DSU, on the role of customary rules of interpretation, and on the role of public interna tional law in WTO dispute settlement.  The EC's 
interpretation of Gasoline  disturbed the agreed balance.  The representative of Brazil associated 
himself with the comments made by India, the Philippines and Australia on the Gasoline  
jurisprudence.  
64. The representative of Australia also wondered a bout the reference in paragraph 31 of the EC 
paper to the development of "substantial linkages"  to underpin mutual supportiveness.  Australia 
believed that the relationship between the WTO a nd MEAs was well understood already, as had been 
spelled out in various ministerial declarations by MEAs and the WTO.  It questioned the need for any 
"substantial linkages," particularly when, as was r ecognized in the EC paper in paragraph 34, there 
had been no conflicts between MEAs and WTO rules.   This very encouraging statement from the EC 
was at the heart of why Australia believed that there was a need to tread carefully, and to not 
manufacture solutions to problems that discussi ons continued to show did not exist.  The 
representative of Ecuador also enquired about th e way in which the EC envisaged "substantial 
linkages" to be made between the WTO and MEAs. 
65. The representative of the Philippines stated that the EC principles ran the risk of casting aside 
one treaty in favour of another, and establishing th e primacy of MEAs.  While MEAs were indeed 
responsible for developing measures necessary to achieve their environmental objectives, including 
trade measures, parties to MEAs that were WTO Members had a responsibility to act consistently 
with WTO rules, for instance, to  comply with the WTO necessity test and with GATT Article XX.  
The Philippines recognized the importance and necessity of MEAs, but did not believe that trade-related measures were the only mean s of achieving environmental objectives. 
66. The representative of Indonesia indicated that  the references made in the EC paper to 
sustainable development were misleading, in the sense that whereas the term had three components 
(economic development, social development and envir onmental protection), the EC had failed to 
address its socio-economic dimension. 
67. The representative of Korea indicated that the discussions on this mandate had demonstrated 
that a "one size fits all" solution would not work.  Multiple approaches had been suggested to define 
the relationship between WTO rules and STOs in MEAs.  It was important at this stage to make  TN/TE/R/8 
 Page 13 
 
 
discussions more conclusive, and there was a need to summarize the positions presented by Members.  
A summary could lead to a more result-oriented a pproach.  Korea believed that the EC paper provided 
new momentum to the CTESS' disc ussions under this item.  While Korea was flexible on the global 
governance approach proposed in the paper, it wonde red whether:  (1) the EC was interested in 
negotiating global governance principles for the WTO-ME A relationship;  (2) the EC was planning to 
elaborate more specific operating guidelines under these principles;  and whether (3) in the context of 
Paragraph 31 (ii), the EC intended to negotia te procedural guidelines for increased national 
co-ordination between trade and e nvironment officials, and if the CTE was the appropriate forum for 
this.  The representative of India also asked for a response to these questions. 
68. The representative of Venezuela asked if the EC intended to negotiate global governance 
principles in the CTESS.  There was no real consis tency in the principles which the paper referred to, 
and no clear desire to negotiate.  For instance, the Rio principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibility" had been mentioned, but was the EC willing to give that principle binding force in the 
WTO?  The representatives of Australia and C uba put the same question to the EC.  The 
representative of Egypt welcomed the references made  in the EC paper to the principle of "common 
but differentiated responsibility," and to technology transfer and financial assistance, but wondered 
how these issues would be addressed under Part V of the EC paper, which was on MEAs and the 
WTO being equal bodies of law. 
69. The representative of Chinese Taipei agreed  with the first two governance principles 
proposed by the EC.  Chinese Taipei nevertheless felt that, while MEAs were more competent than 
the WTO on environmental matters, the mandate s poke of "STOs," on which the WTO was the more 
competent institution.  With respect to the re maining three principles of the EC, it requested 
clarification on their rationale.  The "deference" principle suggested by the EC could be applied 
indiscriminately, leaving great scope for interpretation.  Therefore, it would not necessarily resolve conflicts.  In paragraph 17 of its submission, the EC had suggested the adoption of the CTE's 
Singapore Report recommendation which stated that:  "in case of disputes over trade measures applied 
pursuant to an MEA, parties to the MEA in question should consider settling th eir difference s in that 
forum."  Given that many MEAs did not have effi cient and effective dispute settlement mechanisms, 
which compared to the WTO's, Chinese Taipei wond ered whether this suggestion would deliver real 
benefits.  In other words, would it re ally be followed by parties to MEAs? 
70. Chinese Taipei was certain that most WTO Me mbers, including the EC, appreciated the 
harmony that currently existed between MEAs an d the WTO, in the sense that no MEA-related 
conflicts had arisen in the WTO to date.  In fact , it was hard to imagine how a party bound by an 
MEA, that was also a WTO Member, could deny the trade obligations required by MEAs under the 
WTO system.  Nevertheless, trade measures mandate d by MEAs, such as the import prohibition on 
ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol , could violate some of the basic principles of 
the GATT, in particular Article XI on quantitativ e restrictions.  There was no guarantee that the 
implementation of such a trade obligation would necessarily pass the tests of GATT Article XX.  
Therefore, it was important not to deprive WTO Memb ers of their rights to challenge the undesirable 
implementation of trade obligati ons in MEAs, even though such disputes would be unlikely.  
Chinese Taipei also wished to re mind Members that the mandate did not  apply to non-parties to MEAs.  
It concluded by enquiring about the nature of th e final instrument which would embody the EC's 
"governance principles." 
71. The representative of Norway agreed that it was important to discuss definitions and the 
various concepts included in the Paragra ph 31 (i) mandate, but to also address the 
relationship/interface between different international organizations and treaties.  As that interface was 
growing, it was important to ensure that different sets of rules were mutually supportive.  Norway had 
previously presented to the CTESS principles to  guide the WTO-MEA relationship which were 
similar to the EC's.  These principles had alr eady become guidelines in the field of trade and 
environment, and could be reaffirmed through the negotiations.  MEAs were a good tool to use in TN/TE/R/8 
Page 14  
 
addressing environmental problems – they had obvious benefits, and it followed from the "deference" 
principle that international organizations had to wo rk in their primary area of competence.  However, 
strong interlinkages necessitated cooperation at both th e national and internationa l levels in order to 
enhance mutual supportiveness between internationa l trade and environmental policies.  In this 
context, it was encouraging that WTO Panels and the Appellate Body were increasingly taking into 
consideration relevant MEAs;  in other words, th ere was no "clinical isolation."  As to how such 
positive developments could be built on, obvious me ans included increased contact between the WTO 
and MEA Secretariats, mutual access to each other's negotiations as observers, and the opportunity for 
trade and environment officials to participate in WTO and MEA negotiations of relevance to them.  
National coherence could also be enhanced. 
72. The representative of Argentina agreed with  the EC on the importance of protecting the 
environment and of honouring the commitments made  by the international community.  Argentina 
also agreed that MEAs were the right forum for environmental policy making.  However, it 
questioned the statement made in paragraph 16 of th e EC paper that MEAs should be responsible for 
deciding on the measures needed to achieve th eir environmental objectives, including on trade 
measures.  It pointed out that other measures, such as technical assistance and capacity building, could 
be important for the environment.  Furthermore, the concept of "deference" referred to in the EC 
paper seemed to be one-sided, with the WTO needi ng to show deference to the MEAs, but not the 
opposite.  For instance, the EC was suggesting in paragraph 13 of its  paper that since MEAs were 
negotiated and agreed to by consensus in a multilatera l context, then that would, in itself, act as an 
effective guarantee against protectionism.  Furthe rmore, in paragraph 17, whereas the EC was 
suggesting that environmental diffe rences should be settled in MEAs, it was not suggesting that trade 
differences be settled in a trade organization.  In paragraph 30, it also stated that environmental 
measures should only be subjected to the test of "arb itrary or unjustifiable discrimination," and not to 
the least trade restrictiveness test.  All this  appeared to be giving primacy to MEAs.  
73. The representative of Canada explained that, like the EC, it viewed the EC paper as a 
complement, not a substitute, for the methodology th at the CTESS had pursued to date.  There was 
certainly room to consider the role  of general principles in the exam ination of STOs as they arose.  
However, it would be useful if the CTESS could identify a more direct link between its technical examination of STOs and the consideration of th e principles that informed them, within the 
Paragraph 31 (i) mandate.  Cana da agreed with the EC that environmental problems demanded a 
cooperative, multil ateral solution.  The EC paper stated that because MEAs were negotiated in a 
multilateral context and agreed to by consensus, this acted as an effective guarantee against 
protectionism.  What was assumed, but left unsaid in  that statement, was that the res ponsibility actually 
rested with governments when they negotiated MEAs to ensure the mutual supportiveness of trade and 
the environment. 
74. Similarly, to give meaning to the impor tant notion of common but differentiated 
responsibility, or what the WTO called S&D treat ment, which were related concepts, Members 
needed to ensure coordination between their trad e and environment ministries, as well as economic 
development and international cooperation ministries.   That was the way to ensure that mutual 
supportiveness had tangible benefits.  Coherence had to start at home, which linked back to 
Paragraph 31 (ii) on information exchange, and the observership qu estions in the CTE and CTESS for 
MEAs and other relevant groups.  Canada agreed that when trade and environment conflicts emerged, 
due consideration had to be given to countries' wi shes as expressed in MEAs.  However, both MEAs 
and WTO agreements had to be interp reted in a mutually supportive way.  It was a "two-w ay street", as 
others had stated. 
75. The representative of Switzerland was of the view that the principles mentioned in paragraph 7 
of the EC paper were important for a coherent func tioning of the trade and environment systems.  The 
first principle of multilateral approaches and solu tions to global environmental goods was widely 
recognized.  Switzerland also agreed with the second pr inciple in the EC paper, but wished to remind  TN/TE/R/8 
 Page 15 
 
 
participants of the importance of UNEP, which was a central pillar of the United Nations system.  It 
had an important coordinating role to play  in this field, which had been reaffirmed by the 
Global Ministerial Environment Forum which took pl ace from 29 to 31 March 2004 in Jeju, in the 
Republic of Korea.   
76. With respect to the third and fourth principl es, paragraphs 27 and 30 of the EC paper had 
rightly referred to the need for mutual supportivenes s and deference and to the fact that there should 
be no hierarchy between the two sets of law.  This  was a view that Switzerland had always supported, 
and which needed to be operationalized through fu ndamental legal principles on the interpretation and 
application of treaty rules.  Policy  formulation and legal interpreta tion in MEAs and the WTO should 
not be undertaken in isolation.  So far, no c onflict between the WTO and MEA rules had arisen.  
While this was encouraging, this  did not mean that it could not occur in future.  Therefore, practical 
steps to ensure coherence and f acilitate interaction were required.   In June 2002, Switzerland had 
discussed three possibilities.  One, th at the dispute settlement mechanism settle the issue;  two, that an 
amendment to GATT Article XX be made, or;  three,  that an interpretative decision be adopted.  
77. While the first option was applicable immediat ely, why had Ministers agreed to the Doha 
mandate if nothing further was required?  Some qu estioned whether there was a need to clarify the 
WTO-MEA relationship given that the A ppellate Body had done so in the Shrimp-Turtle  dispute.  
Switzerland did not believe that the Shrimp-Turtle  dispute had addressed the WTO-MEA relationship; 
it had only clarified the conditions on the basis of  which national environmen tal protection measures 
could be taken.  Furthermore, dispute settleme nt decisions were specific to the disputes under 
consideration, and did not  provide the required security and pr edictability.  The drawback of the 
second option was that a modification of GATT Article XX, to include principles for the co-existence 
of the WTO and MEA systems, was that it was not realistically achievable.  Therefore, Switzerland favoured the development of an interpretative deci sion which could be used in dispute settlement.  
This would neither add to nor diminish Members'  obligations.  In terms of the way forward, 
Switzerland was not convinced that an  experience exchange would suffice. 
78. The representative of the Europ ean Communities responded to many of the questions posed.  
On whether the EC intended to renegotiate the Rio principles, or principles which trade ministers had 
accepted on other occasions, it explained that that was not the intention.  Rather, the objective was to 
agree on what had already been agreed in other fora, or on other occasions, including WTO jurisprudence, so as to create guiding principles.  With respect to Korea's question on how the EC intended to ensure domestic policy coherence, the EC explained that it was not its intention to develop 
guidelines for national policy making.  On the question of "governance principles" being outside the 
mandate, the EC reminded delegations that it ha d been an active particip ant in the analytical 
discussions that had taken place in the CTESS.  Howe ver, it had stated from the very beginning that it 
wished to come back to concepts underlying this debate, and the previous Chair had recognized that 
the discussions would follow two tracks.  
79. With respect to its interpretation of the Gasoline  dispute, the EC explained that India had 
misread the EC paper.  The EC was not claiming th at the Appellate Body had said "including MEAs." 
The correct quote was included in the footnote to pa ragraph 29 of the EC paper, which read: "The 
General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law."  While there 
was no reference to MEAs, the EC disagreed with th e contention that public international law did not 
include environmental law.  On the issue of MEA "implementation" and the fear that the EC would 
give a blank cheque to any measure taken under an MEA, the EC explained th at it was neither aiming 
for a blank cheque nor for one-way deference.  Th e EC was also showing deference to the WTO in 
the MEAs in which it participated.  On Chinese Ta ipei's question on the final instrument in which 
principles would be embodied, the EC argued that more discussions were required prior to the 
identification of that instrument.  It added that an analytical discussion could not be held in the 
absence of some indication of what needed to be achieved.  TN/TE/R/8 
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80. To brief the CTESS on recent developments in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), the  representative of the CBD inform ed the CTESS that the seventh meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention (COP-7 ) had been held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 
February 2004;  and that following the entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 
September 2003, the first meeting of the Parties to  the Protocol (COP-MOP 1) had taken place back-
to-back with COP-7.  A number of  decisions adopted by COP-7 had made explicit reference to the 
WTO as a collaborating partner, or could otherwise be relevant to WTO work.  With respect to the CTESS' work on paragraph 31 (i), a decision on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing was 
taken.  At WSSD, governments had called for acti on to "negotiate within the framework of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to 
promote and safeguard the fair and equitable shari ng of benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources."  Following up on the WSSD's  request, the COP had decided to launch the 
negotiation of an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing based on 
agreed terms of reference regarding the natu re, scope, elements and modalities of such an 
international regime. 
81. The COP mandated the existing ad hoc Open-e nded Working Group on Access and Benefit 
Sharing (ABS) to negotiate the international re gime, with the aim of adopting one or more 
instruments, legally binding and/or not binding, to  effectively implement the provisions of Article 15 
(on access to genetic resources) and Article 8(j) of the Convention (regarding the protection of 
traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of  indigenous and local communities).  The COP 
requested the Executive Secretary to make the necessary arrangements fo r the Working Group to 
convene twice before its next mee ting and to report on its progress at the meeting that would be held 
in the first half of 2006.   
82. The COP specifically invited the WTO - among ot her organizations - to cooperate with the 
Working Group on ABS in elaborating the internationa l regime.  One of the elements to be considered 
by the Working Group for inclusion in the internatio nal regime, which related directly to the work of 
the WTO and its TRIPs Council, was the issue of disclosure of origin/source/legal provenance of 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in  applications for intellectual property rights.  
The TRIPs Agreement and other WTO agreements were  also included in a list of existing instruments 
and processes whose relevant elements would be co nsidered by the Working Group.  For a complete 
overview of the decision, the CBD invited the CTESS to consult Decision VII/19, which would be made available on the web site of  the Convention, <www.biodiv.org>. 
83. With respect to the Cartagena Protocol on Bi osafety, as of 16 April 2004, there were 91 
Parties to the Protocol.  The Protocol aimed to ensu re an adequate level of protection in the field of 
the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs).  It addressed the requirements for the identification of LMOs in the documentation accompanying their transboundary 
shipment.  In order to avoid an unnecessary burde n on exporters, the first meeting of the Parties 
decided to integrate identification requirement s for LMOs for food, feed and processing in 
commercial invoices or other relevant existing documen tation systems.  It also invited Parties and 
other governments to take measures to apply, as appropriate, the OECD's Unique Identifier for 
Transgenic Plants to cover the information require ments.  At the same time, a group of technical 
experts was established to further elaborate the in formation requirements.  This group would also 
address the threshold for adventitious presence of LMOs.  As the CTESS knew, the advance informed 
agreement procedure (AIA) was a core component of th e Protocol.  It would en able Parties of import, 
prior to the first intentional transboundary move ment of LMOs, to make informed decisions on 
whether or not to allow their import for intentional introduction into the environment.  The meeting of 
the Parties adopted procedures and mechanisms to facilitate decision-making by Parties of import, in particular by those encountering difficulties in the decision-making process.   
84. The meeting of the Parties also adopted a me dium-term programme of work up to the fifth 
meeting of the Parties.  According to this progra mme, the second meeting, to be held in June 2005,  TN/TE/R/8 
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would consider the clarification of the issues invol ved in risk assessment and management, and would 
consider the development of guidelines and a fram ework for a common approach to risk assessment 
and risk management.  Furthermore, the second meeting would address coope ration and information 
exchange on any socio-economic impacts of LMOs, es pecially on indigenous and local communities.  
The meeting recognized the need for, and advantag es of, providing general guidance to Parties to the 
Protocol on how to handle transboundary movements of LMOs with non-Parties, and of facilitating 
the participation of non-Parties in the Protocol pr ocess.  Under the guidelines adopted by the meeting, 
each Party to the Protocol would, inter alia , notify or ensure prior notification of exports of LMOs to 
non-Parties, and would apply its domestic regulatory fr amework consistently with the Protocol, or the 
advanced informed agreement procedure of the Prot ocol, or a comparable procedure, as appropriate, 
in importing LMOs from a non-Party.  Non-Parties were encouraged, inter alia,  to adhere to the 
provisions of the Protocol on a voluntary basis, in particular to the provisi ons regarding the advance 
informed agreement procedure;  risk assessment;  risk management;  and handling, transportation, 
packaging and identification of LMOs. 
85. Finally, the meeting also set out rules and pr ocedures for compliance.  These procedures and 
mechanisms would be simple, fac ilitative, non-adversarial and coopera tive in nature.  Their operation 
would be guided by the principles of transparency , fairness, expeditiousness and predictability, and 
would pay particular attention to the special need s of developing countries.  A compliance committee 
was established, composed of 15 members serving  in their individual capacity.  They were nominated 
by Parties and elected by the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol.  A full term would cover a period 
of four years. 
86. The representative of the Convention on Intern ational Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) explained that  CITES had organized a technical workshop on Wildlife 
Trade Policies and Economic Incentives  that was held in Geneva between 1 and 3 December 2003, 
with the financial support of Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Economics and Trade Branch 
of UNEP.  This was in accordance wi th the decision of the COP at its twelfth meeting.  Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the WT O, NGOs and academia were all present at the 
meeting, and there were two working groups.  Th e recommendations of these groups were contained 
in a document on the CITES website, at <www.cite s.org> (document no. 11 of Standing Committee 
50).  This document would be transmitted to the thir teenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to 
CITES, which would take place in Bangkok between 2 and 14 October 2004.  The recommendations 
dealt with a methodology for undertaking wildlife trade policy reviews on a voluntary basis by 
interested countries, and a list of possible economi c incentives they could consider as they conducted 
this type of review.  The Standing Committee t ook note of the Report, and invited interested 
governments to participate in the review, and asked the Secretariat to transmit the documentation to 
the Conference.   
IV. OTHER BUSINESS  
87. The Chairman indicated that he would explor e possible dates for the next meeting of the 
CTESS, which would take place prior to the June 2004 TNC.2  The June TNC would be followed by a 
General Council meeting in July.  
88. The CTESS agreed to renew the ad hoc invitations issued for this meeting to the next meeting 
of the Committee.  The representatives of Japan a nd the European Communities expressed their wish 
to see the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) reinvited to meetings of the CTESS, but 
the representative of Malaysia indicated that its mandate from capital on this matter had not changed, 
and that it was concerned about the definition of an "MEA."  No consensu s was reached on inviting 
the ITTO to the next meeting of the Committee.  
__________ 
                                                      
2 The next CTESS meeting was subsequently scheduled for 22 June 2004. 