WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/RL/W/63
12 February 2003
(03-0898)
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:  English
SENIOR OFFICIALS’ STATEMENT ON ANTI-DUMPING NEGOTIATIONS
The following communication, dated 11 February 2003, has been received from the
delegations of Brazil;  Chile;  Colombia;  Costa Rica;  Hong Kong, China;  Israel;  Japan;  Korea;
Mexico;  Norway;  Singapore;  Switzerland;  the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,Kinmen and Matsu;  Thailand and Turkey.
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“Substantial Results in Anti-Dumping Negotiations
Key to Overall Market Access Liberalization
and Success of the Doha Development Agenda.”
Senior Officials responsible for trade of Brazil;  Chile;  Colombia;  Costa Rica;  Hong
Kong, China;  Israel;  Japan;  Korea;  Mexico;  Norway;  Singapore;  Switzerland;  the Separate
Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu;  Thailand and Turkey met in Geneva on
5 February 2003 to coordinate action in the negotiations on the disciplines of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
Officials noted that active and intense discussions are taking place in the negotiations and
invited other WTO Members to join them in the pursuit of the objectives set out below.
Abuse of AD Rules Proliferates
The number of anti-dumping investigations and measures has shown a growing trend.  An
annual average of 138 cases were initiated in the 1980’s;  237 in the 1990’s;  330 between 1999 and
2001.  Currently, there are over 1100 AD measures in place all over the world.
We are concerned that a major part of this increase could be attributed to the abusive use of
AD rules against legitimate exports, in order to protect domestic industries beyond responding to
injurious dumping.
Some examples of abusive practices are unwarranted and repetitive investigation on the
same products, different protective measures applied for the same industry at the same time,
unjustified extension of AD duties, and cases intended to disrupt trade.
Many AD Measures Found to be Inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Most of the anti-dumping measures that have been subject to WTO dispute settlement have
been found to be inconsistent with the WTO rules.  Failure to properly implement rulings adopted by
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has further weakened the proper functioning of the rules-based
multilateral trading system.  This situation should be rectified.TN/RL/W/63
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Abusive AD Measures Seriously Affect Market Access and Economic Development
The proliferation of abusive anti-dumping measures serves as a substitute for the trade
barriers that have been eliminated through painstaking negotiations.  The initiation of an investigationalone has significant chilling effects, not only for the companies directly involved, but also on trade in
general.  The administrative and financial burdens for exporters affected by the initiation of
investigations also have a substantial negative impact on business.  This is particularly the case when
the initiation is poorly justified.
Thus, the use of such measures has become a handy tool for protectionism at the expense of
other legitimate economic interests at both the national and international level.  In the importingcountries, abusive AD measures punish downstream industries and consumers due to unnecessarily
higher price; in the exporting countries, competing industries lose markets and export returns.
Of particular concern is the disruptive impact of these measures on developing countries,
whose exporting industries in many cases are highly vulnerable.  Their economic growth and thediversification of exports are hampered by the imposition of anti-dumping measures.
Further Market Access Liberalization Difficult without Substantial Result on AD
The anti-dumping negotiations are closely related to other areas of the negotiations.  Without
improving the disciplines on anti-dumping measures, benefits from further tariff liberalization will be
seriously undermined.  As part of a single undertaking, substantial results in the AD negotiations are a
key component of overall market access liberalization, and are essential for the success of the Doha
Development Agenda.
The Key Objectives of the AD Negotiations
Based on the above mentioned considerations, it is imperative to address the ambiguities and
lacunae in the provisions of the AD Agreement that allow abusive and arbitrary application of anti-
dumping measures.  Clarification and improvement of the rules and disciplines are thus essential to
rectify this imbalance and constitute the central objective of the anti-dumping negotiations.  Specific
proposals will be based on the following three key objectives:
• to improve the rules in order to prevent the abuse and misuse of anti-dumping
measures, keeping in mind that they should be applied only to the extent necessary to
respond to injurious dumping;
• to prevent overly burdensome investigations, taking into account current business
realities, as well as the need to avoid frivolous investigations;
• to improve rules to enhance the transparency, predictability and fairness of anti-
dumping proceedings.
Proposals will consider the special needs of developing countries.TN/RL/W/63
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Anti-Dumping Negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda
- Supplementary Factual Summary-
/g108/g108  WORLD -WIDE INCREASE OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
/g216 The number of anti-dumping cases initiated has shown upward trend.
Average Number of
Anti-Dumping Cases Initiated
1980-1984 135
1985-1989 142
1990-1994 2281995-1999 247
1999-2001 330
(Source: Data set in the US Congressional Budget Office, “Anti-Dumping Actions in the
United States and Around World: An Update” and WTO web site)
/g216 The number of outstanding anti-dumping orders all over the world has increased from 455 as
of the end of 1990 to 1108 as of the end of 2000, increasing by more than double during the
past decade.
(Source: WTO semiannual report)
/g108 Anti-Dumping Cases Subject to WTO Dispute Settlement
/g216 Most of the anti-dumping measures that have been subject to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism have been found to be inconsistent with the WTO Rules.N um ber of A D  M easures i n Place
4558131108
020040060080010001200
As of the end of 1990 As of the end of 1995 As of the end of 2000TN/RL/W/63
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WTO Dispute Settlement Cases on Anti-Dumping
Since the Establishment of WTO (status as of Jan. 2003)
Cases – ADA inconsistency found 15
Cases – ADA inconsistency NOT found    1Panel in process    4
Consultation pending 22
Terminated   3
     (Source: Information collected from WTO web site)
/g108 The Impact of Anti-Dumping Measures
/g216 Misapplication of anti-dumping measures substantially undermines the achievements to
improve market access.  Indeed successive rounds of negotiations have contributed to lowering
the tariff rates for industrial goods, for instance, average tariff rates for industrial goods in
Quads economy is about 5%.  However, average dumping margin is still over 40%.
Average Tariff Rates
Mean bound rate for all products
OECD countries total 15%
 (Source: OECD, “Review of Tari ffs Synthesis Report”, 1999)
Average Dumping Margins
Average dumping margin for all cases
1990-1994 44.5%
1995-1999 44.9%
(Source: Data set in the US Congressional Budget Office, “Anti-Dumping Actions in the
United States and Around World: An Update”)
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