WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/CSS/W/140
21 March 2002
(02-1495)
Council for Trade in Services
Special SessionOriginal:  Spanish
COMMUNICATION FROM PARAGUAY
Autonomous Liberalization of Services
The following communication has been received from the delegation of Paraguay with the
request that it be circulated to the Members of the Council for Trade in Services.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. It is important to maintain the momentum of services liberalization through progressive
rounds of negotiations.  For this reason the GATS includes the concept of a built-in agenda.  At the
same time, it is important that countries continue the liberalization process in-between thesenegotiating rounds.  Apart from the reciprocal benefits enjoyed from liberalization carried out in a
multilateral context, both developed and developing countries stand to gain from liberalizing their
service sectors in an autonomous manner in order to enhance competition and efficiency of resource
allocation.  Autonomous liberalization, although undertaken outside of the multilateral arena, should
therefore also be viewed as advancing the goals of  the GATS.  In the view of this delegation, it is
therefore important to encourage and give credit to autonomous liberalization.
2. This paper is submitted for the purpose of contributing to the discussion in the GATS Council
on this subject and in the hope of helping to forge a common multilateral approach to this question.
The paper argues for the establishment of a multilateral framework allowing for the evaluation of
autonomous liberalization measures and provides suggestions as to how the concept of giving credit
for autonomous liberalization may be made operational.
3. Many WTO Members have pursued both voluntary and externally-imposed
1 unilateral
liberalization in the services area. Countries have also pursued liberalization in the context of regional
and bilateral agreements. While these actions reflect progressive liberalization in services in line with
the objectives of the GATS, not all of these measures have been made legally binding and their
permanent application on a MFN basis is therefore not guaranteed. These measures likewise are not
entitled to benefit from the WTO Dispute Settlement Process. On the assumption that theseautonomous trade liberalization initiatives convey real benefits to other trading partners and
contribute to the liberalization of the multilateral trading system, this delegation is of the opinion that
these positive effects should be acknowledged in the GATS negotiations through the development of
a multilateral conceptual framework within which autonomous liberalization measures may be
evaluated and ranked so as to provide a firmer basis for the credit that could be requested by WTO
                                                     
1 Measures which have been part of the conditionality contained in various forms of financial
assistance provided by the World Bank or the IMF.S/CSS/W/140
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Members during the course of the current GATS negotiations.  This framework would serve to
encourage both the binding of such measures as well as further autonomous liberalization.
4. Developing such a framework will provide countries with an incentive to ensure that
necessary policy reforms are not postponed in anticipation of reciprocal trade concessions at a future
date.  It will also encourage WTO Members to bind these autonomous trade-liberalizing measures thatoriginated outside of multilateral service negotiations at the applied level of application.
II. MANDATES
5. Paragraph 3 of Article XIX of the GATS requires that the guidelines and procedures for the
negotiations also "establish modalities for the treatment of liberalization undertaken autonomously by
Members since previous negotiations":
For each round, negotiating guidelines and procedures shall be established.  For the
purposes of establishing such guidelines, the Council for Trade in Services shall carry out anassessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis with reference to the
objectives of this Agreement, including those set out in paragraph 1 of Article IV.
Negotiating guidelines shall establish modalities for the treatment of liberalization
undertaken autonomously by Members since previous negotiations, as well as for the special
treatment for least-developed country Members under the provisions of paragraph 3 ofArticle IV.
Paragraph 13 of the Negotiating Guidelines and Procedures (S/L/93) states that:
"based on multilaterally agreed criteria, account shall be taken and credit shall be given in
the negotiations for autonomous liberalization undertaken by Members since previous
negotiations. Members shall endeavour to develop such criteria prior to the start ofnegotiation of specific commitments."
III. CLARIFYING BASIC CONCEPTS
6. In an attempt to move forward on the above two mandates, this delegation feels that a
common understanding on two basic concepts should be developed namely, on the scope of the
definition of “autonomous liberalization” and on the need to establish an agreed timeframe.
1. Agreeing on a broad definition of “autonomous liberalization”
7. In keeping with the spirit of encouraging pr ogressive trade liberalization in-between rounds
and outside of the multilateral process, this delegation feels that the definition of trade liberalization
undertaken autonomously should be as broad as possible.  Any liberalizing measure should be eligible
for credit provided that it is susceptible of being clearly identified, is carried out within the relevant
timeframes and is bound at the ‘status quo’ level of application.
8. Eligible measures falling under autonomous libe ralization can be viewed as being of three
types:
• Autonomous measures based on the liberalization or improvement of scheduled
commitments;
• Autonomous liberalization measures not based on scheduled commitments that can
be documented and are carried out within the relevant timeframes;
• Autonomous liberalization measures carried out in a regional or preferential context
within the relevant timeframes, provided that a bound commitment is undertaken withS/CSS/W/140
Page 3
respect to these measures at the multilateral level and they are then applied on an
MFN basis.
9. To qualify as eligible measures for consideration under the multilateral guidelines to be
developed for autonomous liberalization, the measures must:
• be undertaken within the relevant tim eframes (that is, in-between the GATS
negotiating rounds, as discussed below);
• be bound at the level of the ‘status quo’, at least by the end of the current GATS
negotiations;
• be applied on an MFN basis.
2. Establishing relevant timeframes
10. Article XIX of the GATS refers to trade liberalization measures carried out "since previous
negotiations”.  In the opinion of this delegation, it is important that a specific timeframe be
established to serve as a reference point for autonomous liberalization carried out in-between  rounds
of services negotiations as opposed to during services negotiations.
11. Therefore, credit for autonomous liberalization currently being discussed should be with
reference to actions undertaken by WTO Members since the end of the Uruguay Round (15 April
1994), including the results of the extended negotiations on financial services and basic
telecommunications, and prior to the start of the current round of GATS negotiations (1 February2000) for developed WTO Members, and prior to the beginning of the requests for the market access
negotiations in the present round (30 June 2002) for developing WTO Members.  Autonomous
liberalization actions carried out before the agreed benchmark date could broadly be considered to be
a part of the previous services negotiations.
IV. BINDING AUTONOMOUS LIBERALIZATION
12. It is worth remembering that in the Uruguay Round, the concept of credit under discussion
was to be applied only to bound tariffs. The Chairman's Guidelines issued in December 1991 were
"aimed at supplementing the traditional GATT appr oach to assessing the value of specific tariff
bindings by individual developing countries with in the Uruguay Round"; and provided "a minimum
level of credit which should be given practical effect in the negotiations where each participant canmake a qualitative assessment of tariff bindings and reductions, including on what constitutes a
meaningful rate of ceiling bindings".
13. In the context of services, it would seem both logical and necessary that WTO Members
seeking credit for autonomous liberalization should bind those measures at the end of the current
GATS negotiating round.  It is in the very nature of multilateral trade negotiations to result in bindingcommitments, thus ensuring the predictability and lasting character of the negotiating outcome.  This
is also the only way to guarantee that such measures will be applied on an MFN basis.  Additionally,
autonomous liberalization measures should be bound at the level of ‘status quo’ application.  This
requirement is what would make it possible to consider the improvement in existing commitments as
falling within the scope of autonomous liberalization.
14. In terms of timing, it is the view of this delegation that bindings may be undertaken at the end
of the negotiating round and carried out once the appropriate negotiating credit has been agreed.S/CSS/W/140
Page 4
V. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF AUTONOMOUS LIBERALIZATION
15. It is critical to determine how the value of autonomous liberalization measures would be
assessed for the purpose of demanding and obtaining negotiating credits for them.  During the
Uruguay Round, the discussions on how to attribute “credit” for autonomous liberalization (in goods)
were linked to the possibility (or not) of designing a mechanism by which participants could assessthe offers to bind tariffs for such autonomous liberalization and thus give credit to developing
countries
2. Benchmarks or yardsticks played an important role in that regard. Offers were to be
compared with the yardsticks or objectives established, and credits granted to participants according
to the proximity of their offers to those yardsticks. The more a country’s autonomous liberalization
action approached a yardstick, the higher the credit.
16. In the context of services negotiations, the main problem that arises is whether such a
yardstick can be constructed .  Such a yardstick or ranking would allow WTO Members the means to
evaluate different autonomous liberalization measures and to compare them in order to discuss the
appropriate negotiating credit.
3. Difficulties in following a quantitative approach
17. A suggestion has previously been put forward to evaluate autonomous liberalization
according to a quantitative approach, based on a formula.  In the view of this delegation, there areserious difficulties inherent in such an approach.   These difficulties include the challenge or near
impossibility of capturing in a quantitative manner all of the different types of possible liberalization
measures, including changes in regulatory requirements along with their varying impact on trade and
their varying economic importance.  Likewise, certain modes of supply might also need to be
weighted more heavily than others as some modes are more economically significant while others aremore sensitive. Nor should each service sub-sector necessarily receive equal weight in this process of
applying a quantitative formula.
18. It is thus extremely difficult to develop a formula that would be nuanced enough to be able to
take account of all the relevant variables and to assign a precise value to each type of liberalized
restriction.
19. The other procedure that has been suggested for the determination of autonomous credit is
that of bilateral negotiations between WTO Members that would take place in a similar fashion to the
request and offer procedure for the negotiation of commitments and which would permit individual
Members to assess the value of a particular liberalized measure for their own economic situation and
respond accordingly.
20. However, the drawback to this approach however is that in bilateral negotiations, the often
unequal economic status of the negotiating partners and the non-transparent nature of the discussionsmeans that weaker trading partners may be at a disadvantage and their autonomous liberalization
measures given little credit.  This is particularly so since the lack of reciprocity in these discussions
would offer little incentive to WTO Members to evaluate autonomous liberalization measures with a
benevolent and generous eye. Thus establishing an ‘objective’ multilateral framework for credit based
on agreed rankings could enhance the liberalizing efforts of developing countries with limitednegotiating leverage.
                                                     
2 Suggestions were made on how to evaluate first-time bindings, ceiling bindings, "high duty" bindings,
"low duty and zero" duty bindings; and the coverage of bindings as a proportion of national tariff lines.S/CSS/W/140
Page 5
4. Developing a ranking approach to evaluate autonomous liberalization
21. It is the view of this delegation that another alternative to this question should be explored,
namely the development of a ranking approach within an agreed multilateral framework to evaluate
autonomous liberalization measures.  Criteria for th e assignment of the ranking could be agreed by
WTO Members, but the rankings themselves would be utilized on an individual basis in the course ofbilateral/plurilateral negotiations.  Such a multilateral framework would establish inter alia , criteria
that could be used to develop rough rankings to allow an evaluation to be made of autonomous
liberalization measures.  The actual assessment of an individual liberalization measure could then be
worked out between the credit-demanding WTO Member and its trading partner(s), based on the
application of these multilaterally-agreed ranking criteria.
22. This delegation suggests the development of a ranking procedure  to be based on the values
obtained from the application of the four different indicators listed below.  The ranking thus obtainedwould give a rough idea of the relative value of the autonomous liberalization action undertaken and
would allow WTO members to request credit on a more objective basis.  These indicators would
include:
• The economic importance of the service sector
Autonomous liberalization carried out in economically more important sectors
representing a larger share of national economic output would receive higher ranking
values than would autonomous liberalization carried out in lesser important sectors.
The economic importance would be measured by the share of domestic GDP
accounted for by the service sector in question.
• The type of service sector in question and its contribution to economic efficiency
According to this indicator, autonomous liberalization measures would receive
ranking values depending upon the relative importance of the sector to economic
efficiency and growth.  Liberalization measures carried out in infrastructure service
sectors (financial services, telecommunicat ions and transport) would receive the
highest ranking values, followed by measures carried out in business-type servicesectors (distribution, professional services, business services, tourism and
environmental services), social-type service sectors (health and education services),
and other services (cultural and recreational services).
• The importance of the liberalized mode of supply
Given the fact that the large majority of services trade is conducted through either
cross-border trade or commercial presence, it would be logical to think that a higher
ranking value should be attached to autonomous liberalization carried out through
either of these two modes.  However, the importance of the liberalized mode of
supply may vary among WTO Members and among service sectors, and therefore it
would be important to establish a consensus on the possible ranking values to be
assigned to autonomous liberalization carried out through each of the four modes of
supply and possibly also by sectors.
• The relative restrictiveness of the liberalized measure.
According to this indicator,  carrying out autonomous liberalization measures with a
highly restrictive impact on trade would receive higher ranking values than would the
carrying out of autonomous liberalization measures with a lesser restrictive tradeS/CSS/W/140
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impact.  A list could be constructed of horizontal and sector-specific barriers to
services trade as grouped into three broad categories according to their presumed
degree of relative restrictiveness:  (i) little or no effect on trade; (ii) restrictive effect
on trade; (iii) prohibitive/highly restrictive effect on trade.  The list would also
include possible combinations of barriers in the case where two or more measures incombination would have a more restrictive effect than measures taken separately.
23. The organization of the list according to the three categories of restrictiveness could provide a
basis for ascribing a ranking value to the autonomous removal of a given measure.  For example, as
shown in Annex I, a value of X could be attached to the removal of measures that fall into category
one, while a value of X+ would be attached to the removal of measures in the second (more
restrictive) category and a value of X++ to those in the third (highly restrictive/ prohibitive) category.
The organization of the list and the values attached to the removal of particular measures placed in thethree respective categories would be indicative of the relative effects on market openness of different
types of liberalizing measures.
VI. TRANSPARENCY
24. The requirements for notification in the current provisions of GATS Article III are an
important means for ensuring transparency but do not apply to the notification of any measure notcovered by specific commitments.  Thus autonomous liberalization measures fall outside of the scope
of current transparency disciplines.  It would theref ore appear to be contradictory to require provision
of information on autonomous liberalization measures and not on other types of non-scheduled
measures.
25. While recognizing that having additional information on the regimes currently in force, both
in developed and developing WTO Members, would assist both service providers and the negotiating
process, this delegation feels that special transparency requirements for autonomous liberalization
measures would not be appropriate.  Requests for credit for autonomous liberalization should be
treated like other requests, in line with the negotiating guidelines and procedures decided upon for the
current GATS negotiating round.  Such requests would therefore normally be destined only to theWTO Member/s from whom credit is requested.  Information on the scope, content, timeframe and
legal basis for the autonomous liberalization measure would necessarily be provided as a part of the
request for credit, along with a rough ranking of the value of the measure as per the sum of the
indicators discussed in the preceding section.  If the outcome of this bilateral/plurilateral negotiation
were successful, transparency would be ensured through the binding of the autonomous measure in
the WTO member’s GATS schedule of commitments.
26. This said, in the view of this delegation, developed WTO Members could agree, in the spirit
of GATS Article IV, to notify their autonomous liberalization measures as a means to facilitate
services trade.  Developing country members could be encouraged to notify autonomous liberalization
measures on a voluntary basis, recognizing that it will  be in their interest to  share information in this
regard that could facilitate plurilateral negotiations.S/CSS/W/140
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Annex 1
Credit for Autonomous Liberalization to be based on the Sum of the following Rankings:3
1. Economic importance of the service sector
Share of DGP Value attributed
 > 10% of GDP 100
 > 5% of GDP 75
 > 1% of GDP 50
 < 1% of GDP 25
2. Restrictiveness of Liberalized Measure4
Effect of measure Value attributed
Prohibitive/Highly restrictive
effect100
Restrictive effect 75
Little restrictive effect 50
3. Nature of the Service Sector5
(contribution to growth and efficiency)
Type of service Value attributed
Infrastructure-type services 100
Business-type services 75
Social-type services 50
Other services 25
4. Mode of Supply6
Mode of supply Value attributed
Cross-border trade, or
Commercial presence:
   --complete liberalization
   --partial liberalization100
75
Movement of persons 50 (?)
Consumption abroad 25 (?)
__________
                                                     
3 Note that the ranking values assigned to each category are indicative only.
4 A listing of examples of autonomous liberaliza tion measures according to their restrictive effect
would need to be agreed in order to make this category operational.
5 Infrastructure-type services include: financial, telecommunications and transport services.
Business-type services include: professional, business, distribution, environmental and tourism
services.
Social-type services include: health and education services.Other services include: cultural and recreational services.
6 It is important to recognize that the modes of supply may have a different relative importance for
different WTO Members.  It would be possible to think of a ranking of modes of supply, possibly by servicesector as well, on the basis of consensus criteria decided by WTO Members, in order to obtain the ranking
values for box 4.