RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/AG/R/31
27 August 2002
(02-4577)
Committee on Agriculture
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE ME ETING HELD ON 28 JUNE 2002
Note by the Secretariat1
1. The Committee on Agriculture held its thirty-first regular meeting on 28 June 2002 under the
chairmanship of Dr. Magdi Farahat of Egypt.  The agenda of the meeting as contained inWTO/AIR/1836 was adopted.
P
ART I:  T HE REVIEW PROCESS
A. MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS UNDER THE REFORM
PROGRAMME :  ARTICLE 18.6
(a) Australia:  United States – Operations of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) with
respect to certain commodities;  swap of CCC sugar stocks for Certificates of Quotas
Eligibility
2. With respect to wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton and corn, Australia inquired about the
proportion of total production that the CCC took title to between 1998 and 2000, as well as the
proportion of production for each of these commodities that was exported.  In addition, Australia
requested details of the swap of CCC sugar stocks for Certificates of Quotas Eligibility (CQEs),
including the volume of sugar stocks and CQEs involved; the total budgetary cost of acceptance of the
sugar stocks by the CCC and subsequent swap of the sugar stocks for CQEs, and the market value of
the exchanged CQEs.  Australia also sought clarification whether this would be a temporary or
ongoing programme and whether it would be notified as a new domestic support programme.
3. The United States provided data (Attachment 1 to this report) on the operation of the CCC
with respect to wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton and corn, and on the proportion of production of these
commodities that had been exported.  Regarding the swap of CCC sugar stocks for CQEs, the
United States informed that the USDA had exchanged 104,431 tonnes of raw cane sugar for CQEs
that represented 160,714 tonnes of raw cane sugar.  The cost to the CCC of obtaining the raw canesugar that had been exchanged for CQEs was approximately US$39 million, or about 17 cents per
pound (the loan rate of 18 cents minus a 1 cent forfeiture penalty).  The cost to the CCC of
exchanging raw cane sugar for CQEs was estimated at US$42.6 million; namely, the acceptance cost
of US$39 million plus storage.
4. The United States further stated that the market value of the CQEs was not known.  The
United States explained that the certificates had no monetary face value and were denominated by the
quantity of sugar that might enter the United States under the tariff quota with the certificate.
Therefore, the market value was negotiable and varied from country to country depending on freight
and quality considerations and from day to day depending on futures prices.  The CQEs for sugar
                                                     
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO.G/AG/R/31
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tender required participants to offer to exchange CQEs, representing at least 5,000 tonnes of sugar, for
sugar stored by the CCC in Florida.  The USDA's decision to accept or reject an offer of CQEs was
based solely on the quantity of CCC sugar that had been requested in return.  The United States noted
that a decision had not yet been made to conduct another tender and that the sugar programme had
been accounted for in its domestic support notification.
(b) Brazil:  United States – Payments to cotton producers
5. Brazil reverted to the US responses at the previous Committee meeting and sought additional
information concerning the amount of support granted annually to cotton producers in the years 1992,
1993 and 1994.  Brazil requested clarification on the nature of programmes/measures under
programmes to limit production, direct payments not exempt from reduction commitments, the
methodology of calculation, as well as the supporting data.
6. In addition, Brazil inquired whether total payments to cotton producers in the amount of
US$2.311 billion in the marketing year 1992 referred to the payment decided in 1992 or the payments
received by cotton producers in 1992.  Brazil was interested in what year was used for the purposes of
Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement on Agriculture.
7. Brazil also wondered why the amount of payments granted by the United States to the cotton
producers during 1992 to 1994 did not match the figures contained in the table on Government
Payments by Crop Year on page 6 of the docu ment entitled "Upland Cotton - Summary of 2000
Commodity Loan and Payment Program" published by the USDA in June 2001.
8. To clarify which programmes/measures had been included under direct payments under
production-limiting programmes in the years 1993 and 1994, the United States stated that deficiencypayments had been made under the cotton programme.  Direct payments for cotton made under
programmes to limit production (deficiency payments) for 1993 (fiscal year 1994 – 1 October 1993 to
30 September 1994) were US$827 million and for 1994 (fiscal year 1995) were US$21 million.  On
the methodology of calculation, the data provided were net budgetary outlays to cotton producers
made by the CCC.
9. The United States stated that the cotton user marketing payments and loan deficiency
payments concerned measures, under the direct payments, that were not exempt from reduction
commitments in the years 1993 and 1994.  User marketing payments were US$149 million and
US$88 million, and loan deficiency payments were US$290 million and US$55 million for 1993
(fiscal year 1994) and 1994 (fiscal year 1995), respectively.  The data provided concerned net
budgetary outlays to cotton producers made by the CCC.
10. The United States also stated that payments were made in 1992 under the same programmes,
namely, deficiency payments, user marketing payments, and loan deficiency payments.  The CCC
also ran the commodity loan programme, which involved loans and repayments, with additional
receipts and expenses associated with running the programme.  Specifically, during the fiscal year
1993, net budgetary outlays for deficiency payments amounted to US$1,235 million, for user
marketing payments US$114 million, and for loan deficiency payments US$288 million.  Netbudgetary outlays associated with the loan programme were US$674 million.  The data provided
concerned net budgetary outlays to cotton producers made by the CCC.
11. Regarding total payments to cotton producers in the amount of US$2.311 billion, the
United States explained that the data provided were net budgetary outlays to cotton producers made
by the CCC during fiscal year 1993.G/AG/R/31
Page 3
12. In response to the question on what year the United States was using for the purposes of
Article 13(b)(ii) of the Agreement, the United States replied that it had made no decision with respect
to Article 13(b)(ii) and pointed out that it had provided data requested by Brazil for the period
covering fiscal year 1993.
13. Regarding the discrepancy in data, the United States explained that its data concerned fiscal
year net CCC outlays while the source cited by Brazil used a crop year basis.  The United States
further pointed out that the information requested by Brazil was available at the USDA Internet
address at www.fsa.usda.gov/dam/bud/bud1.htm .
(c) Canada:  China – Inquiries regarding entities to which tariff quota allocations have been made
14. Canada referred to the headnote to China's tariff quota schedule, which stated that "Inquiries
on the entities which received the allocation can be made to the State Development PlanningCommission which shall provide the information within 10 days."  Canada noted that it had requested
this information in writing on 22 April 2002 and despite having raised this matter bilaterally with the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Canada had not received a response.  Canada
asked when China would provide the names and addresses of those companies that had received quota
allocations for wheat and canola oil.
15. China replied by providing data on tariff quota allocation for wheat and rape-seed oil
(Attachment 2 to this report) clarifying that for statistical classification reasons, China did not have
information on canola oil.  China indicated that the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC)
was in charge of quota allocation and allocations were made on first-come, first-served basis.  The
information containing names of end-users which received the quotas and the quota volume each ofthem obtained was considered to be company commercial secrets, and without prior approval of the
end-users concerned, the SDPC was not in a position to provide this information to the public.
16. Canada clarified that the Canadian exporters wanted to contact importers who had the ability
to import these products and reiterated its hope that China would make this information available as
specified in the headnote of China's Schedule.
17. China undertook to convey the Canadian concerns to the SDPC in the hope of obtaining
approvals from enterprises to make their contact information available at the next Committee meeting.
18. Argentina echoed the Canadian concerns and registered interest in obtaining the contact
information of enterprises which had the right to import under quota.  Argentina pointed out that when
quotas were distributed, there should be an administrative text publicising the sale and announcing the
results, and inquired whether China had done this in the case of quotas.  The United States noted that
its trade data had not shown any substantive exports of US products to China but was encouraged bythe Chinese replies that it had allocated the quotas.  The United States hoped that exports would begin
soon.
(d) Canada:  United States – Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act 2002 and its
implementation in relation to US domestic support commitments
19. Canada expressed concern about a number of provisions of the FSRI Act 2002 in relation to
the US domestic support commitments.  Canada noted  that the Under-Secretary for Farm and Foreign
Agricultural Services, JB Penn, had been widely quoted as saying that the direct payments under the
new legislation, totalling $5.2 billion, would be classified in the Green Box.  Canada's understanding
of how these payments were determined and their relationship to other forms of support suggestedthat these payments should not be classified as exempt measures.  Given Canada's view that thisG/AG/R/31
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support would more properly be assigned to the Amber Box, this significantly increased the risk that
the United States would breach its WTO domestic support ceiling.
20. Canada inquired about the process the US administration envisaged for implementing
Section 1601(e) of the FSRI Act, including whether this provision would be further implemented
through regulations and if so, when these regulations would be developed, and whether there wouldbe an opportunity for Members to provide comments.  Canada also noted that Section 1601(e) called
for the US Secretary of Agriculture "to the maximum extent practicable, make adjustments in the
amount of such expenditures".  In addition, before making any adjustment, the Secretary was required
to report to Congress on any determination that expenditure adjustments were required, and on the
extent of the adjustment to be made.  Canada inquired about what it meant that adjustments should be
made to the maximum extent practicable and wh ether there were any legal impediments to the
Secretary exercising her authority to adjust expend itures in a timely manner to ensure compliance.  In
light of the fact that the annual domestic support commitment must be met each year, Canada inquired
about how the United States intended to monitor expenditures during each reporting period so that
action, if necessary, could be taken within the reporting period to ensure the United States complied
with its annual commitment level.
21. Canada also pointed out the notification requirements which stipulated that Members
introducing a new support measure, or making modifications to an existing measure for which
exemption was claimed, should notify them as far as practicable before such measures were adopted
and in any event within 30 days of adoption.  Canada noted that the President had signed the FSRI
Act of 2002 into law on 13 May 2002, and that some of  the provisions had taken effect immediately,
while others were to be implemented at the start of the next crop year or fiscal year.  Considering thatsome of these crop years started as early as 1 June 2002, Canada asked whether the United States
intended to submit Table DS:2 notifications for any new or modified exempt measures and if so, when
and for what programmes.
22. The United States replied that the USDA was reviewing the entire farm bill legislation to
determine where regulations were needed and indicated that proposed measures to implementSection 1601(e) of the FSRI Act were under consideration.  With respect to the recently enacted
statutory authority, proposed measures to implement it were under consideration within the executive
branch of the US government.  The United States fu lly expected to continue to act in conformity with
its WTO domestic support commitments.  The United States indicated that as provided in
Section 1601(b) of the FSRI Act of 2002, a determination made by the Secretary of Agriculture under
Section 1601(e) was final and conclusive and that Section 1601(e) conferred upon the Secretary of
Agriculture full authority to make necessary adjust ments to expenditures.  The USDA expected to put
in place a process to permit ongoing monitoring of domestic support spending that would allow the
Secretary of Agriculture sufficient time to take appr opriate action to ensure that the United States did
not exceed allowable levels for trade-distorting domestic support.
23. With respect to its notification obligations, the US Government intended to submit
appropriate Table DS:2 notifications in a timely manner.  The United States pointed out that all newprogrammes would require implementing regulations and that the United States would notify the
WTO as appropriate.
24. In response to questions on how the direct payments and counter-cyclical payments would be
notified, the United States stated that it would notify the WTO as appropriate, and added that in the
past, the US Government had notified domestic support programmes on a crop year basis.
25. Canada reiterated its question about when the regulations to implement the Section 1601(e)
might be forthcoming and whether Members would be able to provide comments as the regulations
were being developed.  In light of the full authority given in Section 1601(e) to the Secretary ofG/AG/R/31
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Agriculture to adjust payments to remain within  US commitment levels, Canada continued to wonder
about the intention of the phrase "to the maximum extent practicable".  Canada also emphasised its
deep concern about the levels and types of support being provided and about the public statements
from senior US officials to the effect that direct payments might be included in the Green Box.
Canada expressed its intention to continue to monitor the implementation of the Act and could beexpected to raise further questions in the Committee.
26. Brazil welcomed the Canadian initiative to request further clarifications from the
United States regarding the FSRI Act.  Brazil highlighted that the questions posed by Canada
addressed specific points regarding the compatibilit y of the FSRI Act with the WTO not only in terms
of the limits of expenditures, but also on the more fundamental questions regarding the classification
of policies and the adequacy of disciplines.  By stretching the provisions of the Agreement on
Agriculture to the limit, the FSRI Act had shed light  on the need to address a number of loopholes in
the Agreement during the negotiating process.
27. With respect to the so-called "circuit-breaker" provisions, Brazil expected that the measures
under consideration would be made effective.  Howe ver, in Brazil's view, it was almost impossible to
keep the actual level of budgetary expenditures below the final bound total AMS, since the Current
Total AMS depended on the performance of a number of economic indicators including levels ofproduction and prices.  Highlighting the requirement to notify within 30 days, Brazil noted that if the
United States were capable of tracking its own performance so accurately, it would only be fair to
expect more timely notifications to the Committee in the future.
28. Brazil noted that it did not support the view that direct payments fell under the provisions of
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Annex 2 of the Agreement.  Brazil argued that as a result of the decision toupdate the base acres for the payments, these payments were no longer related to past production
decisions, and hence there were doubts as to whether such payments continued to be decoupled.
Updated base areas in themselves provided incentives  to farmers to increase their level of land usage.
As a consequence, by re-coupling payments and production decisions, they fell outside the scope of
the relevant provisions of Annex 2.  Furthermore, the sheer volume of these payments correspondedto a fairly substantial share of the value of production at farm gate.  Estimates indicated that current
AMTA payments corresponded to 10 to 18 per cent of the value of production.  In some crops, such
as rice, this share could be as high as 50 per cent.
29. The representative of Brazil stressed that it was difficult to believe that such high levels of
support would not generate income and wealth effects, thus making farmers less averse to risk.  Brazil
noted that it did not suffice to claim that a direct payment generated non- or minimal trade distorting
effects to make them automatically exempt from reduction commitments.  Moreover, policiesoriginally conceived as non-distorting, in the presence of a farm policy inclined towards distortion,
would also become distorting.  Brazil indicated that during the negotiations on domestic support, it
would vigorously pursue this matter with a view to improving the criteria for the classification of
payments in the Green Box.
30. Brazil stressed that if the counter-cyclical payments, aimed at making the market loss
assistance payments of the last four years permanent, were contingent upon commodity price
performance, they should be notified in the Amber Box.  Brazil would not accept their classification
as a "non-product-specific payment".  Although the Agreement on Agriculture did not set out explicit
criteria for the distinction between product-specific and non-product-specific payment, in Article 1(a)
of the Agreement reference was made to "non-product-specific support" as being "provided in favourof agricultural producers in general".  The fact that target prices were defined for only nine
commodities spoke for itself, as only those farmers planting these products would be eligible for
receiving the counter-cyclical payments.  Brazil emphasised that it would pursue this question whenG/AG/R/31
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actual notifications were made and spare no effort during the negotiations to design better disciplines
to avoid creative use of the existing loopholes in the Agreement.
31. Several delegations shared the concerns expressed by Canada and Brazil.  While being
encouraged that the Secretary of Agriculture and the executive branch would put in place the
necessary measures to ensure that the US commitm ents were respected, the EC highlighted that this
authority was passed to the executive branch, which indicated that even the United States had doubts
whether the United States would be in a position to respect its commitments in the absence of a
corrective action of the executive branch.  The EC shared concerns regarding monitoring of the Act
on a timely basis as well as the effect of updating the base areas of direct payments.  As a result, there
was an element of re-linkage in the sense that farmers might be induced to cultivate specific crops to
be in a position to receive payments in the future when the base areas were further revised.  The EC
suggested that the United States give due consideration to classifying these payments appropriatelyunder the Amber Box.  The EC also shared Brazil' s analysis on how the counter-cyclical payments
should be classified and pointed to US insurance programmes as not being properly classified at
present.  The EC urged the United States to consider classification of these measures so as to give no
doubt that they were acting in complete accordance with the Agreement on Agriculture.
32. Argentina shared the concerns of Canada and Brazil and stressed that even if the FSRI Act
kept domestic support at the level of Uruguay Round commitments, it would still be in contradiction
with the mandate of the Doha Declaration to  substantially reduce domestic support.  The
representative of Australia was concerned about the policy direction, the level of US support for
agriculture and the ability of the United States to deliver the assistance under the FSRI Act within
their WTO obligations.
33. In the view of Australia, the United States had not provided adequate answers to give the
Committee a clear indication on how the United States would ensure consistency with the WTO.
Australia stressed the importance of knowing how the United States would be implementing the Act
to remove uncertainties in world agricultural markets created by the passing of the Act.
34. New Zealand associated itself with the concerns expressed earlier about the depth and breadth
of payments under the FSRI Act and stressed the importance of the examination of the Act in the
Committee on Agriculture, and of adhering to the re quirement to notify not only as appropriate but on
a timely basis and fully consistent with WTO rules.  Uruguay echoed the concerns about the way in
which the provisions of the Act would be put into  effect and the consistency with the Uruguay Round
commitments and urged the United States to provide, promptly, the notification of these measures.
Chile and Paraguay both expressed concerns about the repercussions of the FSRI Act on other
Members.
35. Japan registered its concerns over the direction of the US agricultural policy, which might not
be in line with the reform process of other Members.  Japan also shared the concerns of other
Members, especially regarding the compatibility  of the FSRI Act and its implementation with US
domestic support commitments.  Japan urged the United States to provide the necessary information
and notification within the appropriate timeframe and to clarify the relevant points.
36. The Philippines, speaking on behalf of Indonesia and Thailand, was concerned that the US
decision was taken at a time when Members had reaffirmed commitments to further the reform in
agriculture, including substantial reductions in domestic support.  The Philippines recalled that at
Doha many developing countries had joined forces with the US to achieve a very focussed result and
a mandate to advance and improve world trade in agriculture.  However, the uncertainties behind theFSRI Act did not make for a very healthy environment in agricultural trade.G/AG/R/31
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37. China believed that the FSRI Act would run against agricultural trade liberalization and
would have serious consequences for the ongoing negotiations.  China had an interest in discussing
this issue again at the next meeting of the Committee.  Sharing Members' concerns about the
substantial increases in the US domestic support, India stressed that the Act was contrary to the spirit
of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Doha mandate.  India urged the United States to ensure thatthey remained within their WTO commitments.  Me xico supported the view that the FSRI Act ran
counter to the Doha mandate to pursue agricultural reform and requested that this item be discussed at
future meetings of the Committee.
38. The United States took note of Members' concerns.  The United States clarified that the issue
of how these programmes would be notified was currently under consideration.  If the US had
considered all of these programmes to belong in the Green Box, the "circuit-breaker" provision would
not be part of the Act.   The USDA would monitor expenditures to ensure that the US remained withinits WTO commitments.  The United States also indicated its readiness to answer any questions from
Members regarding the FSRI Act in future meetings of the Committee.
(e) New Zealand:  United States – CCC sales of skim milk powder for conversion to casein;
dairy import levy
39. New Zealand noted that following a field trial for the conversion of skim milk powder to
casein launched by the CCC in October 2001, the USDA had recently announced the sale of
136,000 tonnes of skim milk powder (non-fat dry milk) stocks from the CCC for conversion into
casein/caseinates.  The price of the skim milk powder would be set by tender.  New Zealand inquired
whether the programme launched last year had moved beyond a field trial and, if so, what the criteriawere to determine whether the field trial provided sufficient benefits for the USDA to maintain a
permanent programme.  New Zealand was also interested  in the results of the field trial, in particular,
the release price at which skim milk powder could be converted to casein and compete with casein
imports and whether the release price was below both past and present CCC purchase prices.  New
Zealand also wondered under what WTO Agreement and provisions the United States intended tonotify this programme and the subsidy it provided to producers of casein or caseinates.
40. New Zealand noted that the FSRI Act amended the Dairy Promotion and Research Program
and required imported dairy products to pay an as sessment equivalent to domestic dairy products.
New Zealand was of the view that extending the assessment to imported dairy products appeared
inequitable and would result in little or no bene fit for dairy importers.  US restrictions on dairy
imports meant that promotional programmes would not increase the volume or value of imported
dairy products.  Most of the promotional funds were spent on fluid milk that was not imported, andcheese and butter imports were limited by tariff quotas.  There were also practical difficulties in
applying an assessment to the widely assorted range of dairy imports.  In these respects, New Zealand
was interested in how the United States would ensure that the assessment on imported dairy products
was implemented in a manner that was consistent with WTO commitments.  Specifically, how would
the United States ensure that imported dairy products were treated and promoted in the same manneras domestic dairy products and how would importers be assured of adequate representation of their
interests in administering the programme.
41. The United States replied that the Food Security Act of 1985 (1985 Farm Bill) had authorised
a programme to convert CCC stocks of non-fat dry milk into casein.  While the programme was long
dormant, on 22 October 2001 the CCC issued a Notice announcing the opportunity to participate inthe field trial.  The field trial was determined to  be a success in that powder greater than 24 months
old was converted to casein that was judged to be suitable for commercial market applications.
Conversion rates were roughly three pounds of  non-fat dry milk to one pound of casein.G/AG/R/31
Page 8
42. The United States indicated that the programme had moved beyond a field trial.  On
23 May 2002, the CCC announced on its website an invitation for competitive offers for the purchase
of CCC stocks of non-fat dry milk to manufacture casein and a bid process would establish the price
for sale of CCC non-fat dry milk for restricted use in making casein.  During the first offering, all bids
were rejected due to insufficient prices.  The CCC expected to make a second offering in July 2002.The United States indicated that there had been no sales and no programme expenditures to date and
no decisions had been made on what notifications, if any, would be appropriate for this programme.
43. With respect to questions regarding the dairy import levy under the FSRI Act 2002, the
United States pointed out that implementing legislation for the dairy import assessment was in its
early stages and that the Act itself required implementation in a manner consistent with US trade
obligations.  The United States indicated that  the USDA would post the proposed regulation,
comments on that regulation, and final regulation on the following website:www.ams.usda.gov/dairy/dairyrp.htm.  The United States clarified that the legislation provided for
importer representation on the National Dairy Board, and stated that initially, the Secretary ofAgriculture would appoint two members represen ting imported products.  Every three years
thereafter, the number would be adjusted if necessa ry to reflect changes in the volume of imports
relative to domestic production of dairy products.
44. New Zealand emphasised that its questions to the United States reflected the growing
concerns that US dairy commitments continued to be implemented in a transparent manner and
consistent with the WTO.  Australia considered the US reassurances on transparency and importer
representation to be useful but it would continue to monitor this scheme.  The EC shared New
Zealand's concerns with respect to the implementation of the dairy import levy.
(f) New Zealand:  Venezuela – Import licensing
45. New Zealand underlined that its traders were still experiencing difficulties in gaining access
for dairy products to the Venezuelan market, in pa rticular, problems with transparency and timeliness
of the tariff quota administration regime.  New Zealand had raised these concerns bilaterally at therecent World Food Summit in Rome and obtained a confirmation that Venezuela had established a
central commission to investigate the concerns expressed by many Members with respect to
Venezuela's import licensing regime.  Hoping that this longstanding issue would now be resolved,
New Zealand sought details on the terms of refere nce for the commission, how it would carry out its
work and when the commission's results would be available.
46. Regarding the import licensing system notified by Venezuela under G/AG/N/VEN/22,
New Zealand also requested confirmation whether the system would remain in force during thesecond half of the 2002 quota year.  New Zealand also noted that at the Committee meeting in March
2002, Venezuela commented that it had opened 50 per cent of the total quota volume for licence
allocation. New Zealand sought confirmation that licences for the entire quota had been allocated (and
when the allocation occurred) and what percentage of the quota had been allocated to historical and
new importers.
47. Venezuela replied that the Inter-ministerial Commission was established by Decree 988,
dated 29 June 1999. This Commission was provided for in the resolutions establishing the quota
administration regime and was responsible for expressing a favourable opinion in order for the
Ministry of Agriculture and Land to issue import lic ences.  The Commission approved the granting of
import licences if the requests fulfilled conditions set out in the official notices.  The system notifiedin G/AG/N/VEN/22 was in effect and would remain in force until further notice.
48. Venezuela indicated that to date, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land had allocated the
following dairy product quotas:  (a) 40 per cent of  the total quota volume for whole milk, 94.4 perG/AG/R/31
Page 9
cent of which was allocated to traditional importers and 5.16 per cent to new importers;  (b) the total
quota volume for skimmed milk was exceeded;  and (c) 86.39 per cent of the total quota volume for
cheese.  Venezuela provided detailed information concerning licence allocations (Attachment 3 to this
report).  This information was also available on the web page of the Ministry of Production and Trade.
49. New Zealand commented that it appeared that the review commission was not a new but an
already existing commission, which might suggest that Members would not see a significant change
in the current procedures.  This was of great concern to New Zealand as it had a detrimental effect on
trade.
50. The United States supported New Zealand as it also continued to have licensing difficulties in
the Venezuelan market.  The United States requested confirmation of whether the Inter-ministerial
Commission referred to by Venezuela was new or the same commission in charge of issuing licences
in the past.  If it were new, the United States was hopeful that it would be better able to providetransparency in licensing operations.  The EC, Chile and Peru were also interested in the details of the
Venezuelan system while Uruguay expressed its concerns regarding the lack of improvement in
access and issuing of licences, especially with respect to cheese.
51. Venezuela undertook to follow up with the commission with a view to ensuring transparency
and expediting the issuing of licences.
(g) United States:  China – Tariff quotas;  export subsidies
52. The United States expressed concerns with respect to China's agricultural tariff quota
administration, which appeared to have resulted in lost market opportunities for US and other Member
exporters.  China had included restrictive conditions to its TQ allocations, including processingrequirements, re-export requirements, discretionary licensing, and trading rights limitations.
Consequently, China had yet to import significant quantities of wheat, corn, rice, soybean oil and
cotton since becoming a WTO Member.
53. The United States noted that China's allocation of TQs was significantly delayed this year.
Despite bilateral requests for information, the United States was awaiting basic facts related to TQallocations.  The United States expressed willingness to work with China to ensure that these issues
would be addressed to accommodate market access this year, and to improve the allocation process
for imports during coming years.
54. The United States requested that China provide information on TQ allocation, including the
quantities of TQs allocated for wheat, corn, rice, soybean oil and cotton;  the distribution of
allocations for trade through state trading enterprises and entities other than state trading enterprises;
and the identities of end users that have received TQ allocations.  The United States asked forclarification on what steps China was taking to ensure that its TQ administration did not continue to
impede access to the Chinese market.
55. The United States was also concerned that China might still be subsidizing its corn exports in
spite of its commitment to eliminate export subsidies upon accession to the WTO.  It appeared that
China was exporting government corn stocks through state trading enterprises at world market pricesthat were below domestic prices in China and below procurement prices.  The United States sought
clarification concerning these corn exports, including whether the Government measures  associated
with these corn exports were consistent with China's WTO obligations.
56. In its reply, China provided data on TQ allocation, including the information on allocations
for state trading enterprises (STEs) and non-STEs (Attachment 2 to this report).  On TQG/AG/R/31
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administration, China replied that it had not and would not use TQ administration as a means to
impede access of TQ products to the Chinese market.
57. With respect to questions about export subsidies,  China replied that it fully abided by its
accession commitments and had not provided any export subsidy to agricultural exports.  China
indicated that it exported corn at world market prices and noted two factors that might havecontributed to a gradual reduction of corn export prices.  First, several Government Notices relating to
agricultural products had been published such as "The Notice on Exemption of Large Agricultural
Products, such as Cereals and Cotton from Railway Construction Fund" that reduced the operating
costs for enterprises.  These measures were not targeted at export products, hence they were consistent
with China's WTO obligations.  Second, in face of the fierce competition on domestic and overseas
markets, Chinese exporting enterprises were st reamlining their operations, modernising their
management, and reducing costs.  China reassured Members that there were no government subsidiesinvolved.
58. The United States reiterated its request for contact information of end-users that received
quota allocations.  It appeared to the United States that the end-users would be interested in having
their names and addresses made available to exporters.  The United States also reiterated its interest in
the explanation of the price differential between the world market prices and domestic prices for cornin China.
59. Argentina asked whether the enterprises that received permits had in fact used them, i.e.
whether imports had been made under the licences.  Australia supported Argentina's request, and
together with New Zealand emphasised a systemic interest in the responses provided by China.
Canada echoed the US request for identities of the end users. Thailand and Japan expressed specificinterest in information on rice TQ allocation.
60. China stated that the information containing names of end-users which received the quotas
and the quota volume each of them obtained was considered to be company commercial secrets, and
without prior approval of the end-users, the Stat e Development Planning Commission was not in the
position to provide this information to the public .  China undertook to take the US request to the
capital with a view to trying to persuade the end users to make their contact information publicly
available.
B. 
REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS
61. The Committee reviewed the following notifications as listed in the agenda:
(i) on the administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1):  from
El Salvador (SLV/10), European Communities (EEC/1/Add.2, 3/Add.1, 14/Add.1,
15/Add.1), Korea (KOR/33) a nd Switzerland (CHE/13/Add.2) ;
(ii) relating to imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2):  from
Czech Republic (CZE/36), Hungary (HUN/26), Iceland (ISL/20), Israel (ISR/23),
Korea (KOR/34), Slovak Republic (SVK/32) and Switzerland (CHE/26);
(iii) in the context of the special safeguard (Tables MA:3 to MA:5):  from Korea
(KOR/35), Chinese Taipei (TPKM/1 and TPKM/2);
(iv) relating to domestic support commitments (Table DS:1):  from Australia (AUS/41),
Honduras (HND/10), Hungary (HUN/28), Iceland (ISL/19), India (IND/2), Japan
(JPN/72), Korea (KOR/31), Poland (POL/46) and Turkey (TUR/14) ;G/AG/R/31
Page 11
(v) relating to new or modified domestic support measures exempt from reduction
(Table DS:2):  from Australia (AUS/42) ;
(vi) relating to export subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1 to ES:3):  from Hungary
(HUN/29), India (IND/3) and United States (USA/39) .
62. Specific points raised with respect to the notifications listed above and the responses thereto
are summarized in Part I of the Annex to this report.
C. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE
(a) Notifications in respect of which no questions have been raised in advance
63. The Committee took note of the following notifications, which had been circulated in advance
of the date on which the notice convening the present meeting was issued but in respect of which no
questions had been raised by that date under the Committee's Working Procedures:
(i) on the administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1):  Chinese
Taipei (TPKM/3);
(ii) relating to imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2):
Morocco (MAR/22) and Panama (PAN/6);
(iii) in the context of the special safeguard (Tables MA:3 to MA:5):  Czech Republic
(CZE/37), European Communities (EEC/37) , Hungary (HUN/27), Japan (JPN/73 and
JPN/75), Morocco (MAR/23), Panama (PAN/5), Poland (POL/47, POL/48 and
POL/49), Slovak Republic (SVK/33), Switzer land (CHE/27), United States (USA/38)
and Uruguay (URY/23);
(iv) in the context of domestic support commitmen ts (Table DS:1):  Morocco (MAR/24),
United Arab Emirates (ARE /5) and Uruguay (URY/18);
(v) on export subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1 to ES:3): European Communities
(EEC/36), Georgia (GEO/1), Honduras (HND/9, HND/11, HND/12), Israel (ISR/25),
Japan (JPN/74), Korea (KOR/32), Moro cco (MAR/25), Peru (PER/5), Slovak
Republic (SVK/34), Switzerl and (CHE/25), United Arab Emirates (ARE/4), and
Uruguay (URY/22).
(b) Notifications circulated or made available after the notice convening the meeting was issued
(G/AG/1, paragraph 9 refers)
64. The following notifications were subject to prelim inary review and are to be reverted to at the
next meeting for substantive review in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Committee's Working
Procedures:
(i) on the administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1):  from
Switzerland (CHE/13/Add.3) a nd United States (USA/40)
(ii) on imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2):  from Poland
(POL/51) and Switzerland (CHE/28);
(iii) on special safeguard (Tables MA:3 to MA:5): from Switzerland (CHE/27/Rev.1 and
CHE/29);G/AG/R/31
Page 12
(iv) on domestic support commitments (Tables DS:1 and DS:2):  from Cuba (CUB/19),
Estonia (EST/6 and EST/7) and Europe an Communities (EEC/38 and EEC/39);
(v) on export subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1 to ES:3):  from Poland (POL/50).
D. P OINTS CONCERNING NOTIFICATIONS RAISED AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS (G/AG/R/2,
PARAGRAPH 14 REFERS )
65. There was no discussion under this agenda item.
E. C OUNTER NOTIFICATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 18.7
66. The Committee took note that no counter-notifications had been received under Article 18.7
of the Agreement.
F. O THER MATTERS RELATING TO THE REVIEW PROCESS
(a) Deferred replies to questions raised under the Review Process
67. One deferred reply to a question raised at the March 2002 meeting of the Committee was
received from Australia with respect to its domestic support notification G/AG/N/AUS/38
(G/AG/R/30, page 35, refers).  The reply is summar ised in Part II of the Annex to this report.
(b) Overdue notifications
68. As had been agreed at the March 1997 meeting of the Committee (G/AG/R/10, paragraph 10
refers) the Secretariat made available a room document, dated 28 June 2002, showing the current
status of compliance with the notification obligations.
69. Argentina emphasised the need for Members to submit notifications in a timely manner, and
especially the notifications on domestic support comm itments in view of the fact that information
contained in these notifications would have a great impact on the negotiations in the Special Session.
(c) Addenda to Table MA:1 notifications
70. The Chairman recalled that the WTO Ministerial Conference had endorsed the
recommendation that the Committee keep under review the implementation of the December 2000
decision of the General Council on the administration of tariff quotas (WT/L/384, paragraph 1.1,
refers).  The understanding was that this decision should not place undue new burdens on developing
countries (WT/GC/M/62, paragraph 14, refers).
71. The Committee noted that the following Members administering tariff quotas had submitted
the requisite Table MA:1 Addenda:  Australia (G/AG/N/AUS/1/Add.1);  Canada(G/AG/N/CAN/ 2/Add.2, 6/Add.1, 10/Add.1, 19 /Add.1);  Czech Republic
(G/AG/N/CZE/Rev.1/Add.1);  European Communities (G/AG/N/EEC/1/Add.2, 3/Add.1, 14/Add.1,
15/Add.1);  Hungary (G/AG/N/HUN/1/Add.1, 5/Add.1, 8/Add.1, 13/Add.1 & 18/Add.1);  Japan
(G/AG/N/JPN/1/Add.1, 8/Add.1, 23/ Add.2, 57/Add.1);  Latvia (G /AG/N/LVA/ 1/Add.1);  New
Zealand  (G/AG/N/NZL/1/Add.1);  Norway (G/AG/N/NOR/1/Add.1);  Thailand
(G/AG/N/THA/38/Add.1); and the United St ates (G/AG/N/USA/2/ Add.3 and 34/Add.1).
72. The Chairman urged those Members administering tariff quotas which had not yet done so to
provide Addenda to their MA:1 notifications in  accordance with the General Council Decision in
WT/L/384.G/AG/R/31
Page 13
G. I MPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 10.2 OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
73. The Chairman recalled the Committee's recommendations with respect to the implementation
of Article 10.2 in G/AG/11, Section A, paragraph 4, which was approved by the Doha Ministerial
Conference.
74. The United States pointed out that it was clear that countries would not be able to conclude
negotiations on agricultural export credits at the OECD.  The United States recalled its position as
stated at the Special Session meetings and emphasised its commitment to the negotiation of specific
disciplines in this area as expeditiously as possible.  To complement the ongoing negotiations, the
United States suggested that a questionnaire (hard copy distributed in the Committee and
subsequently by fax) be used to gather information regarding export credit guarantee programmes.
This information could subsequently be used in negotiations of modalities.  The United Statesundertook to provide to the Secretariat a sample of the questionnaire with information on its
GSM-102 programme with a view to making it ava ilable to Members (subsequently distributed by
fax).  The United States pointed out that specific items in the questionnaire concerned the terms that
should be negotiated.  The United States encouraged all Members who operated export credit
guarantee programmes to fill out the questionnaire and make the information available to Members,via the Secretariat, preferably before the next regular Committee meeting, so that as negotiations
proceeded, Members would have as much information as possible about the various programmes that
were currently operating.
75. Argentina welcomed the US initiative as it would bring greater transparency and advance
progress in negotiations but expressed concern about a possible shifting of discussions from theSpecial Session, where they rightfully belonged, to the regular Committee meeting.  While agreeing
with the US assessment of the prospects of the OECD negotiations in this area, the EC expressed
concern about reverting to this issue in the re gular Committee meeting, arguing that these were
technical discussions that should take place in the Special Session.  With regard to the questionnaire,
the EC pointed out that once the information was provided by the United States, 95 per cent ofexisting programmes would have been notified.
76. While reserving comments about the format of the questionnaire, the representatives of
Canada, Brazil, New Zealand, and Australia welcomed the initiative as a complement to the
negotiations and as an exercise in exchange of information.  They highlighted, however, that it would
be unacceptable if it were to slow down or detract from the development of disciplines on export
credits in the negotiations.  In light of a clear need for more information in this area, New Zealand
stressed that this exercise would only be useful if major players filled out the questionnaire and urgedMembers to do so.
77. The United States reassured Members that it had never had an intention to delay the
negotiations in this area.
78. The Committee took note of the US initiative.  The Chairman encouraged all Members to
complete the questionnaire and provide the Secretariat with a copy.
H. O
THER IMPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES
79. The Chairman pointed out that there were seve ral implementation-related issues, in addition
to those already under action, in respect of which the Committee would have to submit a follow-up
report to the General Council following the regular meeting of the Committee in September.  TheChairman recalled that matters already under action included:  (i) the NFIDC Inter-Agency Panel
which had just finalised its report for submission to the General Council (since issued as WT/GC/62 –
G/AG/13);  (ii) the question of further addenda to the Table MA:1 notifications on tariff quotaG/AG/R/31
Page 14
administration which had been under regular review by the Committee;  and (iii) the implementation
of Article 10.2 on which further discussions were continuing.  The other implementation-related
issues which needed to be followed-up as appropriate concerned food aid and technical assistance
under the NFIDC Decision, namely Sections B-I and B-II of the Committee's G/AG/11
recommendations as approved by the Doha Ministerial Conference.  The Chairman suggested that areport on these two items, prepared on his own responsibility, be submitted to the General Council
following the Committee meeting in September.
80. Sri Lanka requested clarification on the possible substance of the Chairman's report.  While
recalling the proposals put forward by the group of developing countries, Sri Lanka noted that the
Committee had not engaged in substantial discussion on these items.  As it was not clear whether
these proposals had been accepted by the Members, Sri Lanka requested that the Chairman hold
informal consultations on these items prior to the September meeting of the Committee.
81. The Chairman indicated that food aid and technical assistance would be on the agenda of the
Committee meeting in September and encouraged Members to prepare for a substantial discussion.
The Chairman undertook to hold, prior to the Committee meeting, open-ended informal consultations
on these items.
P
ART II:  O THER MATTERS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE COMMITTEE
A. P REPARATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION
OF THE PEOPLE 'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
82. The United States recalled that China's WTO Protocol of Accession gave the Committee on
Agriculture and other bodies a specific role in developing the basis for the General Council's
transitional review mechanism later this year.  The United States stressed that the Committee was
specifically tasked with reviewing China's impl ementation of a number of commitments.  Therefore,
the Committee should establish a practical and pragmatic timeline for developing the information and
receiving the notifications necessary to conduct China's transitional review so that it could accomplishits task at the September meeting.  The Committee should focus on the timing of specific information
to be provided, including information on current and planned measures on domestic support, export
subsidies, tariffs and tariff quotas.  The development of these guidelines should also take into account
the time necessary for translation and circulation.  The United States proposed that a date of 26 July
be established for Member questions to China and that China provide a response and relevant
documentation by 2 September, so that Members could prepare for the September meeting and the
Committee could provide a report to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG).
83. China reiterated its position expressed in other WTO committees that as a new Member,
China took its membership seriously, was willing to fulfill its obligations and attached great
importance to paragraph 18 of its Protocol of Accession.  China underlined having made efforts in
preparation for the transitional review and, with understanding and support of WTO Members, China
was determined to do its utmost in trying to overcome the practical difficulties in this regard.  Chinastressed that it had no more obligations than what  had been stipulated in paragraph 18 and any attempt
to increase China's obligations would be rejected.  Since paragraph 18 already established guidelines
on the frequency, procedure, scope and substance of the transitional review, China felt that it was
inappropriate for any subsidiary body of the WTO to renegotiate the terms of such review.  China
considered that such review could take place at the last regular meeting of each subsidiary body in agiven year and that once the date was fixed and the review was put on the agenda, the WTO
Secretariat could advise China of these preparations.  China welcomed Members to raise relevant
questions well in advance of the review.  China highlighted that it was also entitled to raise its
concerns to other Members who maintained restrictions against imports from China which wereG/AG/R/31
Page 15
inconsistent with WTO rules.  China hoped that this dialogue would result in a better implementation
of commitments by all Members and greater trade between China and the rest of the world.
84. The United States pointed out that the objective was not to renegotiate China's obligations but
to ensure transparency and predictability in the procedures so that the CTG could carry out its
obligation to review China's implementation.  The Unite d States recalled that the last meeting of the
Committee on Agriculture in 2002 was on 21 November and that of the CTG on 22 November, and
that this would not allow sufficient time for the Committee on Agriculture to prepare the required
report to the CTG.
85. China reiterated its position that it could not agree on the 2 September deadline proposed by
the United States but was prepared to consult.  However, the consultation should not prejudge the
outcome nor aim at establishing a clear timelines for the preparations of the review.  China stated that
it welcomed Members to raise relevant questions well in advance of the review.  If other Memberswished to send questions by 26 July, China had no objection to that.
86. The representative of Cuba was doubtful that the date could be fixed at this stage, recalled
that discussions on this item were also held in other subsidiary bodies, and suggested that the Chair
should hold consultations and that a supervisory body or the General Council could help in taking a
decision on this issue.
87. Noting that there appeared to be no disagreement on the 26 July deadline for submission of
Members' questions to China, the Chairman undertook to consult informally on the issue of
preparations for the review.  The consultations would be held without prejudice to the outcome and
taking into consideration the schedule of meetings as well as the need to respect the obligations
undertaken by China in its Protocol of Accession.  The Chairman undertook to report as appropriate tothe Committee on the outcome of these consultations.
B. M
ATTERS RAISED UNDER "OTHER BUSINESS "
Date of Next Meeting
88. The next regular meeting of the Committee on Agriculture will be held on
26 September 2002.  The airgram convening the meeting and containing the draft agenda will be
issued on Monday, 16 September 2002.G/AG/R/31
Page 16
ANNEX
Page
Part I Review of notifications by the Committee on Agriculture on 28 June 2002
(i) administration of tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:1):   El Salvador
(SLV/10), European Communities (EEC/1/Add.2, 3/Add.1, 14/Add.1,
15/Add.1), Korea (KOR/33) a nd Switzerland (CHE/13/Add.2) ;17
(ii) imports under tariff and other quota commitments (Table MA:2):  Czech Republic
(CZE/36), Hungary (HUN/26), Iceland (ISL/20), Israel (ISR/23), Korea
(KOR/34), Slovak Republic (SVK/32) and Switzerland (CHE/26) ;19
(iii) use of the special safeguard (Tables MA:3 to MA:5):   Korea (KOR/35), Chinese
Taipei (TPKM/1 and TPKM/2);25
(iv) domestic support commitments (Table DS:1):   Australia (AUS/41), Honduras
(HND/10), Hungary (HUN/28), Iceland (ISL/19), India (IND/2), Japan
(JPN/72), Korea (KOR/31), Poland (POL/46) and Turkey (TUR/14) ;27
(v) new or modified domestic support measures exempt from reduction (Table DS:2):
Australia (AUS/42) ;44
(vi) export subsidy commitments (Tables ES:1 to ES:3):   Hungary (HUN/29), India
(IND/3) and United States (USA/39) .46
Part II Deferred replies to questions raised at previous meetings
(i) relating to domestic support commitments:  AUS/38 (G/AG/R/30, page 35,
refers)47
Attachments
1 United States’ Response to Australia’s Request for Statistical Data 48
2 China's TQ Allocation for the Year 2002 49
3 Venezuela – List of Import Licences for Dairy Products Granted in 2002 50
4 G/AG/N/US A/39  -  US Food Aid July/June 2000/2001 56G/AG/R/31
Page 17
ANNEX – PART I
Review of notifications by the Committee on Agriculture on 28 June 2002
Summary of specific points raised and responses thereto
Table MA:1 Notifications
El Salvador    G/AG/N/SLV/10       Tariff Quota Administration   (Table MA:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand - Justification for collecting revenue in
excess of the in-quota tariff for cheese that may arise
from public auctioning system.
Efforts undertaken to remove the domestic
purchasing requirement in the allocation of cheese
quota.El Salvador undertook to provide replies as soon as
possible.
European Communities     G/AG/N/EEC/1/Add.2, 3/Add.1, 14/Add.1, 15/Add.1
Tariff Quota Administration   (Table MA:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada - Information on TQs on which deposits on
import licences were required, fees charged for each(as expressed per kilogram or per tonne) and
conditions to be met by importers to have their
deposit reimbursed.The EC requires for several of its TQs that a
guarantee is lodged ensuring respect of specificdispositions related to the management of these
quotas. The lodging of guarantees is intended to
optimise quota allocation or its use. The guarantee isreleased if the participants have carried through theprocedures for quota alloca tion and used the allocated
quota quantities under the required conditions.
The main reasons for requiring a guarantee are:
• Ensure actual importation during the period of
validity of the import licenses
• Guarantee the quality of the imported product
• Ensure the good faith of the traders and avoid
speculation
• Ensure that traders transmit all information
needed for the quota management
The detailed information can be found in the
Annexes to the notification  G/AG/N/EEC/1/Add.2-
EEC/3/Add.1-EEC/14/Add.1-EEC/15/Add.1 of 14
June 2001, submitted follo wing the General Council
Decision WT/L/384.G/AG/R/31
Page 18
Korea    G/AG/N/KOR/33      Tariff Quota Administration   (Table MA:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia noted that its capital had forwarded a
statement, not a question.No response necessary to the statement.
Switzerland      G/AG/N/CHE/13/Add.2    Tariff Quota Administ ration (Table MA:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada - Details of Swiss tender system, and whether
the system operates differently for TQs for livehorses, live bovine animals, and potato products.
For TQ for "animals for slaughter; meat mainly
produced on the basis of coarse fodder", rationalebehind changing the TQ share allocation period from
one month to two weeks and results expected from
this change.In the case of live horses and bovine animals, as well
as potato products, tariff qu ota shares are allocated by
auction.  The Federal Office of Agriculture issues aninvitation to tender before the end of the quotaperiod. Any bidder may, within the limits of the
quantity put out to tender, submit a maximum of five
bids at different prices and for different quantities.The tender price corresponds to the price offered.
The system operates in a similar manner for the three
products.  However, the tariff quota share allocated
before and during the quota period is as follows (per
cent): 50/50 for horses, and 70/30 for bovine animals.As far as potato products are concerned, the entirequota is allocated before the beginning of the quotaperiod.
The fact of not allocating the entire tariff quota
before the beginning of the quota period allowsaccount to be taken of import requests during thesame period, thus making a fairer distribution amongpotential importers possible. The differences betweenpercentage shares allocated before and during the
quota period are explained by  the specific features of
each of the markets concerned.
In the case of horses for breeding, importer breeders
obtain tariff quota shares for stallions and mares
listed in the herd book of a recognised breeding
organisation.  Shares are allocated as needed.
The transition from the tariff quota share allocation
period of one month to one of two weeks between2000 and 2001 is designed mainly to achieve greater
flexibility in matching supply with demand, and is
also linked to a process of administrativesimplification. From 2001 onwards, theadministration of the tariff quota "animals forslaughter;  meat mainly produced on the basis ofconcentrated fodder" is similar in terms of the length
of the share allocation period to the tariff quota
"animals for slaughter;  meat mainly produced on thebasis of coarse fodder".G/AG/R/31
Page 19
Table MA:2 Notifications
Czech Republic   G/AG/N/CZE/36     Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand - Explanation for the continued quota
underfill for a number of TQs, in particular, thoserelating to meat of bovine, meat offal, milk and
cream, butter, and potatoes.
In light of previous explanations for quota underfill,
many TQs appear unnecessary.  Encourages a move
to a tariff only regime at the in-quota tariff rate.Reasons for underfill mentioned previously continue
to prevail and include little demand for imports,general decline in demand, lower domestic prices and
changes in consumer habits.
No plans to move to a tariff only regime at the in-
quota tariff rate.
Hungary      G/AG/N/HUN/26       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States - Explanation for low fill rate for many
products, including for bovine animals and meat,honey, jams, beer, barley, maize, leguminous
vegetables, preserved vegetables, fruits, meat, and
mushrooms.Hungary is a competitive agricultural producer and
exporter of a broad range of agricultural products.As a result, consumers and the processing industry
rely heavily on domestically produced products.
Significant imports take place only out-of season orin case of severe production losses.  The success ofprivatisation in the processing industry, utilisation ofconcessions granted to traditional trading partnerswithin the framework of free-trade agreements and
small differences between in- and out-of-quota rates
very often play a role as well.
Argentina - In light of claims of being an efficientexporter, whether Hungary uses export subsidies.Question does not relate to the utilisation of TQs.
Hungary uses export subsidies on very narrowlydefined products - much less than permitted in termsof product coverage or budgetary outlays. Theproducts listed in the US question did not benefit
from export subsidies in 2001, nor do they in 2002.G/AG/R/31
Page 20
Iceland      G/AG/N/ISL/20       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand - Explanation for a zero import level
under the minimum access tariff quota for butter.
Follow-up question by New Zealand – whether
Iceland would consider moving to a tariff onlyregime at the in-quota tariff rate for butter.The minimum access quota for butter has been duly
advertised but failed to attract interest fromimporters.  The reasons for this may relate toconsumer preferences as Icelandic butter differs fromits foreign equivalents and its quality and taste is
much appreciated by Icelandic consumers.  Importers
may also find the prospect of importing butter at in-quota rates relatively unattractive in relation todomestic prices, which have come down since thebase period.
Iceland's implementation of its minimum access tariff
quotas is consistent with its scheduled commitmentsunder the WTO.  While different administrationmethods have been debated, no change in the presentadministration regime is foreseen in the immediatefuture.
Follow-up comment by Argentina - Domestic pricesmay be lower as a result of overproduction due tohigh domestic support.  Moreover, high levels of
domestic support may be undermining the minimum
access commitment.
United States – Explanation for the low fill rate forabout 40 per cent of products, including for meat andedible offal of bovine, swine, sheep, and poultry;cereal flours, groats, and grains; cucumbers, animal
fats and oils.As highlighted on the cover page of the notification,
a number of products relevant to Iceland's currentaccess commitments are not subject to any quota orother administrative system upon import, only
applied rates of duty that are equal to or lower than
the corresponding in-quota tariff.  In these instances,market demand is the sole determinant of importlevels. Iceland's agricultural sector has, for example,contracted since the base period, with acorresponding impact on imports of cereals and
grains for feed purposes.
With respect to vegetables, these quotas areadministered seasonally without quantitative
restrictions, meaning that demand dictates the importquantities. Applied rates of duty are within the quotacommitments, and during some months they mayactually be zero. Import opportunities today farexceed those of the base period, but actual imports
can fluctuate substantially between years, depending
on domestic supply. Domestic producers have inrecent years been increasing their share of the marketalongside advances in greenhouse production
techniques.G/AG/R/31
Page 21
Iceland      G/AG/N/ISL/20       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd) The minimum access quotas in question have been
duly opened and advertised but the import levels areas indicated in the notification.  The reasons for thisinclude favourable domestic prices in relation toimports at in-quota tariff levels, stringent sanitary
regulations to protect the excellent situation in
Iceland with respect to animal health and a markeddownturn in the interest to import meat productsowing to increasing consumer awareness with respectto food safety, compounded by unfortunate epidemics
abroad such as BSE and FMD.
Israel      G/AG/N/ISR/23       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States – Explanation for the low fill rate for
edible fats and oils products.United States stated that it had received a reply from
Israel referring to its similar response previously that
these products were subject to tariff-only treatment.
Korea      G/AG/N/KOR/34       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia – Quantity of beef imported under the new
tariff-only arrangements.In 2001, Korea imported 180,631 tonnes of beef on a
customs clearance basis. (Data Source: Statistical
Yearbook of Foreign Trade , Korea Customs Service,
2001.)
New Zealand – Explanation for the large number ofunderfilled TQs in 1999 and 2000 for:
Meat of bovine, whey powder Since late 1997, the financial crisis has caused an
adverse effect on exchange rates, national incomesand prices of imported agricultural products.Although this situation has improved since 1999,decreased demand and increased import prices
continued to adversely affect the fill rates of the
products.  In 2000, however, most of the TQ wasutilised.
Other milk and cream
GarlicUnderfill was due to the lack of demand.
In 1999, increased imports of substitute products
including frozen garlic adversely affected the fill rate
of garlic.  In 2000, however, most of the TQ wasutilised.G/AG/R/31
Page 22
Korea      G/AG/N/KOR/34       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand (cont'd)
Onions, ginger
Sweet potatoesUnderfill was tied to low domestic prices that led to a
decrease in demand for imports.
Even though sweet potatoes were imported on a first-
come, first-served basis, there was no import demandfor the product.
New Zealand - Where there have been minimal orzero imports under the TQ, inquires if Korea wouldconsider moving to a tariff only regime at the in-quota tariff rate or below.As explained above, underfill resulted from market
conditions and the Government did not take anyimport restricting measures.  Korea is notconsidering, at this stage, moving to a tariff onlyregime.  Korea believes that it is more appropriate to
deal with this issue in the ongoing negotiations.
Slovak Republic      G/AG/N/SVK/32       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia - Inquires about major suppliers in 2001 of:
Poultry (ex 0207 )
Wine of grapes (2204)
Ethyl alcoholMajor suppliers were:
China, Czech Republic and the EU
The EU, Bulgaria and Hungary
The EU, the Czech Republic and Croatia
Australia, New Zealand: Explanation for quota
underfill for:
Live sheep and meat of sheepMeat offal
Milk and cream, yoghurt, butterGenerally, low interest from foreign exporters was a
reason for the underfill.  The Slovak Republic doesnot take any actions to limit TQ fill.  Recalls thatimports were also taking place within bilateralpreferential quotas.
Both of these commodities are export-oriented items.
Domestic production as well as sales increased in2001 and prices were declining at the same time.
The domestic market in bovine animals was
stabilized and oriented to domestic suppliers.
These products, except butter, were imported from
partners from the Customs Union, the CzechRepublic and other neighbouring countries, and thus
respective imports are not included in TQ fill volume.
In addition, domestic producers and exporters arecompetitive since production and exports of thesecommodities increased during the last year andconsumption has stagnated.  Therefore, there was lowdemand to import milk products from other territories
than the Czech Republic.G/AG/R/31
Page 23
Slovak Republic      G/AG/N/SVK/32       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia, New Zealand (cont'd)
Potatoes Sufficient domestic crop.
Switzerland      G/AG/N/CHE/26       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States - Reason for the underfill for fresh
apples, pears and quinces in 1999.The tariff quota commitment for 1999 was
15,800 tonnes of fresh apples, pears and quinces.
During that year, Switzerland imported effectively
11,866 tonnes of these fresh fruits, the quota fill ratehence was at about 75%. For 1998 and 1997, the fillrates were 115% and 106%, respectively.
The main explanation for the relatively low fill rate
for 1999 lies in the 1998 yield. Indeed, 1998 was a
year of extraordinarily high yields in apples and pearsin Switzerland: Harvests were at 156% for apples and163% for pears compared to the average productionlevel in the years 1990-1999. The high yields led to
unusually low prices and as a result production
became more competitive even allowing for someexports. Stocks of fresh apples harvested in 1998lasted up to fall 1999, and some of them had to bedestroyed thereafter. Consequently, importing freshfruits, particularly apples, was less attractive than in
previous years and the result was the relatively low
fill rate for 1999.
The fill rate for apples, pears and quinces in 1999 isstill 8 percentage points higher than the simpleaverage fill rate of 67% calculated for all TQsadministrated by WTO Members (see Secretariat
background paper TN/AG/S/6).G/AG/R/31
Page 24
Switzerland      G/AG/N/CHE/26       Tariff Quota Fill (Table MA:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd)
Reason for the underfill of the TQ for coarse grainsfor human consumption in 1999.The tariff quota commitment for 1999 was
70,000 tonnes.  The imports for the same year were at35,795 tonnes.  The three coarse grain types forhuman consumption are: barley, oats and maize.
These products are used as a basis for processed food
for human consumption, for the famous SwissMuesli. In this context it is also worth mentioningthat there is hardly any domestic production of suchgrains for human consumption for quality reasons.
As notified in the Table MA:1 notification
G/AG/N/CHE/13/Add.1, authorized importers aremills that process grains for human consumption(residual parts being processed into feedstuff). Thereis no quantitative limitation for such imports whichcan be imported at the TQ rate.
Although the import price for mills, including the
tariff, is lower than 1) the domestic prices for similarfeedstuff coarse grains and 2) the import price ofsubstitute products which are not subject to a TQ (forexample processed Muesli), mills process less and
less coarse grains for human consumption.
The first explanation for this phenomenon is that,
since 1995, import quantities of processed Muesli, aswell as other products of the same type andpreparations containing rolled grains and mixed
rolled grains, are increasing strongly and steadily. We
observe a substitution of imported coarse grains forhuman consumption by processed grains and similarproducts. The second explanation is that theconsumption of Muesli and similar products isdecreasing at the expense of exclusively imported
breakfast cereals. Consequently, the underfill is
entirely due to lack of demand for importedunprocessed coarse grains for human consumption.G/AG/R/31
Page 25
Tables MA:3 to MA:5 Notifications
Korea    G/AG/N/KOR/35     Summary of Special Safeguard Actions (Table MA:5)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand - Concerned that volume-based
notifications have not been presented to theCommittee despite safeguard action being taken for
the years 1999 and 2000 as set out in Korea's
Table MA:5 notification.
Notes that safeguard action, both volume- and price-
based has been taken on products for which tariffquotas were administered.  Based on Korea's
Table MA:2 notification regarding TQ fill rates,
many of the quotas subject to safeguard action havenot been filled – yet imports have been affected byspecial safeguard action. Explanation requested ofhow this could have occurred when Article 5 of theAgreement states that additional duties can only be
levied on out-of-quota imports.Korea thanked New Zealand for its comment.
The in-quota imports have not been affected by SSG,
and additional duties were levied only on out-ofquota imports.
Chinese Taipei     G/AG/N/TPKM/1     Volume-Based Special Safeguard (Table MA:3)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia – Notes that the trigger for the
implementation of the volume-based specialsafeguard for oriental pears is set at 415 tonnes;  and
for shaddock, persimmon, betel nuts and dried day
lilies the trigger is set at zero tonnes.  Explanation ofwhy consumption for all five products in the year2000 was lower than in 1999.The decline in consumption of oriental pears,
shaddock, persimmon, betel nuts and dried lilies was
due to the recession of the economy.
New Zealand – Notes disappointment that out of five
products with volume-based special safeguard action,four have a trigger level of zero tonnes.  Inquires
about  additional duty imposed and volume of trade
for each product.
Notes that the safeguard has been enacted on items
where the tariff quota is not yet filled.  Commentrequested on why importers would choose to importout of tariff quota given the high over-quota tariff
rate and the additional safeguard duties.Until 14 June 2002, there were no out-of-quota
imports of betel nuts and dried lilies.  The SSGadditional duty was imposed only on three out of five
items notified, including oriental pears, shaddock,
and persimmon.  The additional duty was one-third ofthe out-of-quota rate.  The volume affected was asfollows: oriental pears - 1,222 tonnes;  shaddock –60 tonnes;  and persimmon - 15 tonnes.  Although thequota is not yet filled, due to the large gap in price
between international and domestic products,
importers are still able to import at the out-of-quotarate and the additional SSG rate if they do not hold
in-quota certificates.
United States - On four products with a trigger level
of zero tonnes, inquires whether the minimum accesstariff quotas for these products were implemented
and whether the safeguard on imports under the tariff
quota will be applied.Chinese Taipei has already administered TQs on
shaddock, persimmon, betel nuts and dried lilies. The
SSG will be applied only to out-of-quota imports.G/AG/R/31
Page 26
Chinese Taipei     G/AG/N/TPKM/2     Price-Based Special Safeguard (Table MA:4)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd)
Notes trigger prices for special safeguards on pork
belly and offals and chicken meat and offals andinquires whether the special agricultural price-basedsafeguard on imports under the tariff quota will be
applied.Chinese Taipei does not apply the price-based SSG
on the items of pork offal and chicken offal.  The
SSG will be applied only to out-of-quota imports.G/AG/R/31
Page 27
Table DS:1 Notifications
Australia   G/AG/N/AUS/41      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
AMS
De minimis exemption for support for sugar
Canada, United States – Inquires about the value of
production for sugar.The gross value of sugar production in 2000/01 was
$A683 million (ABARE Australian Commodities,Dec. 2001).  This information was included inST/DS:2 but was inadvertently recorded as the value
of production for lamb. A corrigendum will be
submitted to replace the word "Lamb" with "Sugar"in ST/DS:6, p.19.  The level of support provided tosugar in 2000-01 accounted for 2.4 per cent of thevalue of production and therefore was below the de
minimis level.
Food and Fibre Chains Program and New Industries Development Program
Japan - Explanation of the kind of changes made to
the two programmes to justify classification as non-
product-specific.Payments under both the New Industries
Development Program (NIDP) and the Food and
Fibre Chains (Chains) Program are made directly to
grant recipients. The NIDP assists in strengtheningthe capability of Australian agribusiness in thedevelopment and commercialisation of newagribusiness products, services and technology. The
NIDP provides funding assistance matched dollar for
dollar with the applicant for "pilotcommercialisation" of new agribusiness products,technologies and services.
The Chains programme assists in improving businesscompetitiveness and better meeting customerrequirements by facilitating the uptake of innovativesupply chain practices. Principal funding activities
include implementation of business and marketing
plans, closer definition of each part of the chain,identification of superior competitive chain
performance.
We recognise that these programmes do not fit theAnnex 2 para. 2 criteria which relate to marketing
and promotion services programmes in the sense thatsuch programmes "shall not involve direct paymentsto producers or processors". Following furtherexamination of the programmes a corrigendum willbe submitted notifying the programmes as Annex 2
para. 5 "direct payments to producers". This is on the
basis that the programmes have no or minimalproduction and trade distorting effects and thatpayments to producers are not related to production,prices or factors of production, including in any yearafter the base period. In other words, the programmes
meet the criteria of para. 6 (b) to (e). In fact, in the
case of NIDP payments are generally made torecipients at the pre-commercial stage.G/AG/R/31
Page 28
Australia   G/AG/N/AUS/41      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Japan (cont'd)Another consideration in the notification is to whom
the payments are made. Payments are not necessarilystrictly made in favour of agricultural producers.
They may be to business entities consisting of
farmers or of other individuals. For transparencyreasons and due to the small value of total payments(A$1.32m for both programmes) we have notified thewhole programme.
A corrigendum to the Table DS:1 will be issued
shortly.
Domestic Market Support Scheme
Japan – Notes that the "Domestic Market Support
Scheme" for manufacturing milk administered by the
Commonwealth Government, as well as the pricing
and production control through drinking milk quotasadministered by state governments, were abolished in2000, and the production and marketing of milk inAustralia has been liberalized.  Notes that the "Dairy
Structural Adjustment Program (DSAP)", which was
newly notified in Table DS:1, was introduced as acompensation measure, and was three times higherthan the AMS in 2000.  Explanation requested forhow long the DSAP was planned to be maintained
and what the budget amount was.A major, and unique, deregulation has been
undertaken by the Australian dairy industry. From
1 July 2000, all State and territory governments
repealed legislation governing the pricing andsourcing of drinking milk at the farm-gate.  At thesame time federal regulations coveringmanufacturing milk were removed. Milk pricing had
already been de-regulated at the retail level.
To assist farmers and dairy communities to adjust to
this totally deregulated market environment a federalDairy Industry Adjustment Package (DIAP)
consisting of three sub-programmes (Dairy Structural
Adjustment Programme (DSAP), Dairy ExitProgramme (DEP), Dairy Regional AssistanceProgramme (DRAP)) commenced on 1 July 2000.Under DSAP farmers receive payments based ontheir milk production in 1998/1999 and these
payments will be made on a quarterly basis over eight
years.  The DSAP payments will continue at the levelset out in Supporting Table DS:7 over this timeperiod.  In addition, a supplementary dairy structuraladjustment payment was made in 2001-02 and will
be notified in the next Table DS:1 notification.G/AG/R/31
Page 29
Australia   G/AG/N/AUS/41      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Japan (cont'd) The level of support in the 2000-01 notification
appears higher than that notified previously in1999-00 because of two reasons.  First, the level ofsupport in 1999-00 was much lower than in normalyears as the previous Domestic Market Support
Scheme was being phased-out and in addition, in
terminating this scheme it was necessary to deductfrom the support level any stocks on hand on which alevy had been paid on the milk input at 30 June 2000.The levels of such stocks were also significantlyhigher in 1999-00 than in previous years.  The second
reason is that the method of providing support is now
different and as a result the amount of support is fullyreflected in the AMS calculation.  However,importantly the real economic level of support for theAustralian dairy industry has declined in line withde-regulation.  The OECD percentage producer
support estimate for milk virtually halved between
1999 and 2001 for Australia, dropping from 15% to8%.  To put this level of support into perspective, theequivalent OECD milk producer support estimate forJapan in 2001 was 75%, that is, 9 times higher than in
Australia.
Honduras   G/AG/N/HND/10      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada – Notes that some measures for which
Honduras claims exemption under Art. 6.2 do notseem to be input subsidies or investment subsidies of
the kind stipulated in Art. 6.2.  Inquires whether
Honduras considers the possibility that some of thesemeasures may meet the criteria for exemption underAnnex 2 Green Box.
Any programmes reported as exempt for the first
time in HND/10, whether under Annex 2 or Art.6.2,
would need to be notified also in an ad hoc
notification as per Art. 18.3 of the Agreement onAgriculture.Honduras is studying the suggestion to see if it would
be appropriate to shift certain internal measures from
Table DS:2 to Table DS:1.G/AG/R/31
Page 30
Hungary     G/AG/N/HUN/28      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Green Box
Canada – Notes that several "assistance programmes"
in Supporting Table DS:1 were not reported in the1995 Table DS:1 notification nor included in theAGST tables.  Requests Hungary to submit a TableDS:2 notification for those new or modifiedprogrammes in 1996, 1997, and 1998, showing their
compliance with Annex 2 criteria.Hungary intends to submit a Table DS:2 notification
for all assistance programmes for which exemptionfrom reduction commitment is claimed and whichwere not reported in the 1995 Table DS:1 notification
or the relevant AGST table.
AMS
Canada, New Zealand – Notes that market pricesupport for apple, wine, rye and triticale was reported
for the first time in Supporting Table DS:5 for 1997and 1998.  Inquires about the source of externalreference prices for these products.  If the years1986-88 were not used for the external reference
prices, requests an explanation.For apple, wine, rye and triticale reference prices
were established in conformity with para. 9 of Annex
3, that is on the basis of the average f.o.b. unit valuefor these products during the years 1986 to 1988.
Adjustment for inflation
Australia, Canada, New Zealand – Notes that the
scheduled commitment levels can not be altered and
the adjustment for the influence on excessive rates ofinflation should be on the level of domestic supportprovided.  While Article 18.4 provides scope forMembers to give due consideration to the influenceof excessive inflation on the ability of any Member to
abide by its domestic support commitments, there is
no provision to adjust for exchange rate movements.Article 18.4 is silent on the way an inflationary
adjustment should be made.  Hungary does not see
any major difference in legal or methodological termsin whether AMS commitment levels or current AMSlevels are adjusted.  Perhaps Hungary's approach ismore practical and logical from the point of view of
planning domestic support expenditures.  But
Hungary would have no problems in using the second
approach in future notifications.  As to the threenotifications on the agenda, the Current Total AMS ifadjusted for inflation is HUF 3.5 billion, 3.1 billionand 22.9 billio n for 1996, 1997 and 1998,
respectively.
Australia – Reason for use of the exchange rate toadjust for inflation when domestic support is
provided in local currency.
United States - Criteria used for determining the
point at which inflation rates are considered
"excessive".
New Zealand - Notes that Hungary uses the
depreciation of the HUF against the USD as a
surrogate for inflation and requests a comparisonbetween the depreciation of the HUF against theUSD and a national measure of inflation such as a
consumer or producer price index.As to the use of exchange rates for the purposes of
inflationary adjustment Hungary's choice has to do
with the need to capture only the excessive elementof inflation. Hungary defined it as the differencebetween the rate of national inflation and the OECDaverage. In order to further limit the scope ofadjustment, Hungary chose the rate of depreciation of
the national currency which kept lagging behind
national inflation even if adjusted by the OECDaverage.  For example, if for 1996 Hungary used datainflation , the figure for commitment levels would beHUF 227 billion, and if adjusted with the OECD-average, the figure would be HUF 155 billion.
Instead, Hungary took HUF 119 billion, which means
only partial compensation for inflation, amounting toabout 50 per cent.  The respective figures for 1997would be HUF 260 billion,  170 billio n, and 140
billion;  and for 1996, the figures would be HUF 285
billion, 188 billion, and 155 billion.G/AG/R/31
Page 31
Hungary     G/AG/N/HUN/28      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Australia - Requests details of domestic inflation
rates.National inflation rates were:
Year Consumer price
index in Hungaryadjusted with theOECD-average
(%)Consumer price
index inHungary
(%)
1989 10.5 17.0
1990 21.7 28.9
1991 28.5 35.0
1992 17.8 23.0
1993 18 22.5
1994 13.8 18.9
1995 22.4 28.3
1996 18.1 23.5
1997 13.6 18.3
1998 10.5 14.2
Australia, Canada – Suggests that Hungary should
adjust its Current Total AMS rather than its AMS
commitment levels. Requests Hungary to provide its
Current Total AMS for 1996, 1997 and 1998calculated correctly from unadjusted externalreference prices, and also the rate of inflation (not therate of exchange rate change). Requests details of
steps taken to reduce distorting support from the level
shown for 1998, when the Total AMS commitmentwas exceeded.With regard to the adjustment of external reference
prices, Hungary considers that it acted in full
consistency with the relevant provisions of the
Agreement, namely para. 9 of Annex 3 and thereforeit does not see any need for revising the notifications.
Follow-up comments by Canada, Australia -Concerned that the commitment levels and reportingof commitments were adjusted on an ad hoc basis byMembers.  While there is a provision for theCommittee to take account of the excessive levels of
inflation, there is no provision for Members to
unilaterally rewrite their commitments. Thedistinction between the two should be maintained.Hungary's commitments have not been unilaterally
revised. It is clear from the notification, where thecommitment levels are unaltered. Hungary simplyprovided (in a footnote) data to help Members givedue consideration the effects of excessive rates of
inflation as required by Article 18.4.G/AG/R/31
Page 32
Iceland   G/AG/N/ISL/19      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Green Box
Public stockholding for food security purposes: sheepmeat programme
Australia – Notes Iceland's previous statement that
payments will be reduced to ISK 225 million in 2000.
Given that expenditure in 1999 was ISK 369.5
million, requests clarification on how this targetwould be met.
Explanation of how this projected reduction of
around 40% in public stockholding for food security
purposes for sheepmeat could be reconciled with a
programme which is being notified as being in placefor food security purposes.
Whether the programme should more appropriately
be notified as AMS.Iceland informed the October 1996 meeting of the
Committee that payments to the storage scheme
would be reduced in increments up to the year 2000,
when ISK 225 million was to be allocated to theprogramme.  By and large, this plan has held, withISK 227,5 million being allocated to the scheme inthe year 2000.  The fact that our policy has been toreduce payments to this programme does not in any
way detract from its conformity with the criteria set
out in para. 3 of Annex 2.  With respect to thisprogramme, the slaughter season in Iceland isunusually short and the stockholding programme is inplace to secure annual supply between slaughter
periods.  Our policy in recent years has been to
extend the slaughter period over a greater period oftime to reduce the need for stockholding payments,so this is entirely a logical development.
Australia correctly points out the amount allocated tothe scheme in 1999, i.e. ISK 369.5 million, and thisamount is higher than in previous or subsequentyears.  Actual payments to stockholding in 1999
amounted to ISK 225 million, but an additional ISK
144.5 million were placed on the National Accountsin 1999 to balance the books with respect toimplementation of the Agreement for the years 1995-
1998.G/AG/R/31
Page 33
Iceland   G/AG/N/ISL/19      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand - Confirmation if the s heepmeat
programme is a new programme and explanation ofhow it meets the criteria set out under Annex 2,
para. 3.This is not a new programme and it has been
included in previous notifications.  The policy of theIcelandic Government has been to provide as muchfood security through domestic production as
practicable and as stipulated in prevailing agreements
between farmers and the Government on agriculturalproduction.  Due to Iceland's relatively unkind climate
in agricultural terms, the sheepmeat productionseason is short and centered on the summer months.Icelandic sheep are kept indoors during winter. Most
slaughtering takes place in autumn, during a period
lasting only a few weeks, making the supply of freshlamb seasonal.  These support measures for publicstockholding for food security purposes aremaintained to guarantee supply of sheepmeat duringany given year between slaughter periods.  As part of
a food security programme identified in national
legislation, these measures meet the criteria set out inAnnex 2, para. 3.  They are based on Law no.99/1993 on the production, pricing and sale ofagricultural products and sheepmeat productionagreements concluded on the basis of this law, which
inter alia  stipulates food security as a basic objective.
Each such agreement contains a food security plan orprojection, set out as predetermined targets withrespect to the amounts to be allocated annually topublic stockholding for food security purposes for the
duration of the agreement.
Decoupled income support – direct payments to farmers
New Zealand – Notes Iceland's statement during
review of ISL/14 that farmers are required to keep
sheep on the farm to become eligible for the direct
payments and that in order to qualify for the right toreceive full direct payments, the number of sheepkept on the farm must be at least 60 per cent of thenumber allowed on the farm. Comments thatpayments under this programme appear to be
production-linked.  Requests an explanation of how
this programme meets the fundamental requirementsof Annex 2 - that measures have no or at mostminimal trade distorting effects or effects on
production.Direct payments to sheep farmers under the notified
programme are in conformity with the criteria laid
down in Annex 2.  The payments are decoupled from
production, involving fixed, non-transferrable directpayments to each eligible farm.  Sheep farmers areentitled to full direct payments whether they producesheepmeat or not, but they at least need to be sheepfarmers and thus the requirement of sheep ownership
is not illogical.
Unless an eligible farmer participates in a
government-sponsored afforestation, soilconservation or other specific environmentalprogramme, payments are reduced should he ownless than 0.6 winter-fed sheep in relation to each
sheep production unit attached to his farm.  The
number of sheep production units is fixed and basedon historical quota volumes, not production, prices orfactors of production in any year after the baseperiod.  In the present regime, these units simplyserve as a necessary reference point to target the
support measures at sheep farmers, and the
conditions concerned are placed as an instrument ofIceland's regional policy.G/AG/R/31
Page 34
Iceland   G/AG/N/ISL/19      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand (cont'd) Participation in an afforestation, soil conservation or
environmental programme qualifies a sheep farmer toreceive full direct payments irrespective of thenumber of sheep he may possess, even if that number
is zero.
Livestock compensation payments
Canada - Explanation of how this programme meets
the criteria of para. 8 of Annex 2.  If this is a newprogramme, inquires whether Iceland will submit a
Table DS:2 notification explaining how it meets the
criteria in para. 8, in particular, what the referencemargin is and how much of a loss occurs before a
producer becomes eligible for a payment.The question relates to payments from the
Agricultural Emergency Fund, most of which havebeen allocated to compen sate for damage caused by
frost to cultivated grassland and pastures, as well as
loss of livestock due to natural catastrophes ordisease, such as in pigs, poultry or fur animals.  Theprogramme has been in force for years and conformsfully to para. 8 of Annex 2.  The Fund only
compensates for major losses or damage that is not
covered by general insurance policies purchased bythe agricultural sector and cannot be compensated byother means, in accordance with the provisions ofLaw no. 55/1992 on disaster insurance.  With respectto specific criteria, an evaluation is made on a case-
by-case basis prior to any payments being made, inter
alia with respect to conformity with Annex 2.
AMS
Adjustment for inflation
Canada – Notes that the drop in the value of the
Iceland krona (ISK) against the Special DrawingRights since 1988 largely corresponds to the
accumulated inflation since 1988, effectively
removing any justification for Iceland's further"inflation adjustment" of the external reference price.With a Current Total AMS of 133.7 million SDR in2000, against a commitment of 130.1 million SDR,
Iceland exceeds its commitment.  Information
requested on the steps taken by Iceland to complywith its AMS commitment.Iceland does not agree with the assertion made by
Canada that the adjustment that was made lacks
justification.
The calculation of market price support stipulated by
notification requirements is in effect simple.  Theworld market price per kilo of a product is deductedfrom the domestic price and the outcome ismultiplied by the domestic production.  Iceland's
mistake in the AGST tables was to transfer the world
market price from SDR into Icelandic krona at thebase period exchange rate.
When we calculate the market price support todayusing the external reference prices found in ourAGST, we are calculating the price in different kronawith far less value.  We therefore need to transfer the
old krona, which was more valuable than the krona is
today, into present krona if there is to be any sense incalculating the market price support.  The simpletransfer of the Current Total AMS in Icelandic kronainto SDR does not address this imbalance in the
market price support calculations.G/AG/R/31
Page 35
Iceland   G/AG/N/ISL/19      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada (cont'd) Iceland understands that there may be differences of
opinion with respect to how this particular problemshould be dealt with.  For this reason, Icelandsubmitted a dual Table DS:1 notification, one
inflation adjusted and the other not.  Iceland is of the
view that it is within the boundaries of the AMScommitment level when market price support iscalculated in the only way it can have any meaning.
United States – Requests Iceland's inflation rates andthe criteria that were used to determine that they were
"excessive" in the year being notified.Drew attention to a document Iceland submitted in
the context of the Analysis and InformationExchange process of the Committee in October-November of 1998 in document AIE/42.  This paper
clarifies the issue, which in reality revolves less
around inflation than currency devaluation.  Inessence and by mistake, Iceland's external referenceprices were expressed in Icelandic kronur in ourAGST tables and not SDR as had been the intention.Given the currency development since the base
period, leaving the external reference prices
unadjusted distorts the market price supportcalculations and renders them more or lessmeaningless.  It is this imbalance in the calculationsthat we have sought to redress by issuing a dual
notification, presenting both the inflation adjusted
and non-adjusted scenarios.
Follow-up question by Canada – Expresses similarconcerns as with Hungary's notification HUN/28.  Inthis case, however, the issue appears to be thedoubling of production that was being supported inIceland (particularly pigmeat and poultry).  It appears
that a larger volume of production continues to be
supported and as a result, Iceland's domestic supportcalculations show that it is exceeding iscommitments.  The explanation provided by Icelandto rewrite the commitments to change that outcome
does not persuade Canada.G/AG/R/31
Page 36
India   G/AG/N/IND/2      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
AMS
EC – Explanation of how the price for wheat at
US$264/tonne is established.The external reference price for wheat was
established on the basis of the CIF average unit pricefor the years 1986/87-1988/89 (monthly statistics offoreign trade collated by the Director General ofCommercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S),India).  The external reference price as per DGCI&S
data was Rupees 3,540 per tonne.  The external
reference price was calculated at US$264 per tonneby using the average exchange rate for the period1986/87-1988/89 at Rupees 13.409 to a US$.
New Zealand - Whether India provided any form ofmarket price support for pulses, groundnuts, rapeseedand mustard taria, cotton, soybean, tobacco, jute andsugar cane.Market prices for these commodities were higher
than the intervention prices.  Therefore, no marketintervention in these products was resorted to duringthe period under notification.
Japan   G/AG/N/JPN/72      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Green Box
Environmental programmes
United States - Explanation of the specific
mechanism by which payments are made toencourage the "growing of any plants".The conversion programme from rice production to
other crops, which is aimed at keeping the balancebetween supply and demand of rice, is at the sametime aimed at preventing the adverse effects onenvironment caused by suspending  rice planting.
This is an area payment to farmers who convert their
rice production methods in such a manner as to
maintain paddy fields in environmentally soundconditions.
The farming activities to achieve this purpose include
growing plants other than rice and proper
management of paddy fields without growing any
plants.  The payments are made to farmers who carryout such farming activities in accordance with "theImplementation Plan for Production Adjustment" that
is established by each farmer.G/AG/R/31
Page 37
Japan   G/AG/N/JPN/72      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd)
Whether  payments are specific to the crop producedor based on the area planted.
Explanation of how these  payments relate to the
criteria that payments be limited to the extra costs orloss of income involved in complying with theprogramme.The amount of payments is not specific to the crop
produced. It is based on the area planted.
This programme is designed to compensate part of
the extra costs or loss of income resulting from
growing plants other than rice or maintaining paddyfields without growing any plants, in line with thegovernment policy objectives of keeping supply anddemand of rice balanced as well as maintainingenvironmentally sound conditions. The amount of
payments is therefore within the limits of extra costs
or loss of income.
Explanation of the specific mechanism by whichpayments are made to dairy farmers to "tackle
environmental problems".
Explanation of how these payments relate to the
criteria that payments be limited to the extra costs orloss of income involved in complying with theprogramme.This programme is aimed at providing grants to dairy
farmers who conduct appropriate livestock manure
management, which will contribute to the
maintenance of sound environmental conditions.
The grants are paid to comp ensate for any extra costs
incurred to dairy farmers who manage and utilize
livestock manure in accordance with the
Administrative Order stipulated under certainlegislation titled "the Law Concerning theAppropriate Treatment and Promotion of Utilizationof Livestock Manure".
To carry out environmental management in
accordance with the said Law, dairy farmers arerequired to appropriately treat livestock manure andutilise it as compost.  This payment is designed tocompensate part of the extra costs resulting fromsuch activities as producing compost and spreading it
over farmland or grassland.  The amount of payment
is therefore within the limit of extra costs.
AMS
United States - Details of the compulsory,simultaneous selling and buying of imported rawsugar and the use of the funds that accrue to the state-
trading agency.Where raw sugar is imported at a price lower than
certain threshold price determined by thegovernment, the so-called "adjustment levy" ischarged, which is collected by the Agriculture andLivestock Industries Corporation (ALIC), a quasi-
governmental body.  This "adjustment levy", together
with certain governmental grants directly paid to theALIC, constitute financial resources of the fund,which is used for the purpose of the ALIC operating
scheme of simultaneous selling and buying of sugar.G/AG/R/31
Page 38
Japan   G/AG/N/JPN/72      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd) This scheme works as follows:
The fund enables the ALIC to purchase domestically
refined sugar made from domestic sugar beet or
sugarcane at a certain price, and then, simultaneously
sell it at a price lower than the purchase price.  Thefund compensates the margin of this buying andselling operation, which in effect enables domesticsugar refining companies, which use domestic sugar
beet or sugarcane as raw materials, to purchase such
domestic raw materials at higher prices than wouldbe the case otherwise.  As such, the simultaneousbuying and selling works as a scheme to indirectlysupport farm prices of domestic sugar beet and
sugarcane.
Thanks to this scheme, domestic sugar refiningcompanies are able to purchase domestic raw
materials from farmers at a higher price, while beingable to place their refined sugar products on thedomestic market at a price competitive with refinedsugar products made from imported raw sugar.  Inthis context, the functions of the ALIC are two-fold.
First, through simultaneous buying and selling, the
ALIC compensates this negative margin incurred todomestic sugar refining companies.  Second, in orderto finance this compensation, the ALIC collectsadjustment levies as part of bound tariffs imposed onimported raw sugar.  Since the functions of the ALIC
are limited as such, we do not consider the ALIC's
operation in this context to constitute a state-tradingenterprise.  In any event, since fiscal year 2000, theALIC scheme of the simultaneous selling and buyingof domestically produced sugar has been abolished.The negative margin incurred to domestic sugar
refining companies is now compensated by the grant
directly paid to those companies by the ALIC.Adjustment levies now constitute part of financialresources of this direct grant.
Whether these funds equal the subsidy given to thefarmers.The adjustment levies are not directly paid to
farmers, but constitute part of the fund for thepurpose of compensating the negative marginincurred to domestic sugar refining companies.  It istrue that the size of the fund is arranged to finance
such compensation operation, whose ultimate
purpose is to support farm prices of domestic sugarbeet and sugarcane.  However, since this scheme iscomplicated, it cannot be said that the size of the fund
equals the subsidy given to the farmers.G/AG/R/31
Page 39
Japan   G/AG/N/JPN/72      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States (cont'd)
Details of the potato and sweet potato purchase priceson a starch-equivalent basisThe purchase price of starch made from potatoes is
104.0 thousand Japanese yen per kg, and thepurchase price of starch made from sweet potatoes is
133.6 thousand Japanese yen per kg.
In Japan's Table DS:1 notification (JPN/72), these
prices of starch constitute the basis of  calculating thelevels of farm price supports for potatoes and sweetpotatoes, by way of using co-efficient, as mentioned
in the footnotes of the said notification.
Korea   G/AG/N/KOR/31      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
AMS
Loan interest subsidy for livestock farming
Australia - Notes Korea's response at the 20th meeting
of the Committee that the interest subsidy was a formof non-product-specific support and that in the latestnotification, loan interest subsidies continue to be
separately notified as product-specific support for
pigmeat and chicken industries.  Requestsclarification on which livestock industries hadreceived interest subsidies and the share of the totalinterest subsidies received by each of the livestockindustries, and reasons why the loan interest subsidy
for livestock farming should not be notified as
product-specific support for beef.This is a non-product-specific programme.  Under
this programme, all livestock farmers are eligible fora loan provided at a low interest rate, irrespective oflivestock species.  Therefore, subsidy data on each of
the different livestock is not available.  As mentioned
above, it is not a product-specific programme forbeef.  The loan interest subsidy for pigmeat andchicken are product-specific programmes differentfrom the Loan Interest Subsidy for Livestock
Farming.G/AG/R/31
Page 40
Korea   G/AG/N/KOR/31      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Beef subsidy for quality improvement and proliferation
Australia - Explanation of each element of the
subsidy, including support provided for improvingHanwoo beef quality, new calves, calves up to 250kg(feeder calves), older cattle or cattle greater than
250kg.There are two programmes in the subsidy for quality
improvement and proliferation: the CastrationEncouragement Program and the HanwooProliferation Encouragement Program.
The Castration Encouragement Program is
implemented to improve beef quality, but it does not
favour Hanwoo beef only.  Under this programme, in
2002 payments were made on castrated steers at therate of 200,000 Won per head. No specific subsidywas provided for new calves, calves up to 250Kg(feeder calves) or older cattle or cattle greater than250Kg.  But under the Hanwoo Proliferation
Encouragement Program, payments were made on
cows giving birth to more than 3 calves.  From the 3
rd
calf to 4th calf, 200,000 Won per head was provided
and from 5th calves, 300,000 Won per head.
Whether Korea provides support for opening ofspecialised Hanwoo meat shops and if so, how is this
notified in the domestic support notification.Korea provided support for specialized Hanwoo meat
shops until 2001.  After the UR negotiations, Koreaimplemented various programmes to improve
underdeveloped agricultural marketing.  As part of
the programmes, support was given for livestockretail facilities including specialized Hanwoo meatshops and specialized imported beef shops.  Thesupport was aimed to equip facilities and to improvesanitary conditions of the shops.  Therefore, it was
notified under the category of "structural adjustment
assistance provided through investment aids" asstipulated in Annex 2 para. 11.  It is no longerprovided as of 2002.
New Zealand - Explanation of the large increase inbeef subsidy for quality improvement and
proliferation and details of conditions required in
order to receive this subsidy.In 2000, in addition to the existing Subsidy for High
Grade Beef, the Hanwoo Proliferation
Encouragement Program and the Castration
Encouragement Program were newly introducedresulting in an increase in beef subsidy.
Under the Hanwoo Proliferation Encouragement
Program, payments were made on cows giving birth
to more than 3 calves.  For the 3
rd and 4th calves,
100,000 Won per head was provided, and from the 5th
calf 200,000 Won per head was paid.G/AG/R/31
Page 41
Korea   G/AG/N/KOR/31      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
New Zealand (cont'd) Under the Castration Encouragement Program whose
purpose is beef quality improvement, payments weremade on castrated steers at the rate of 100,000 Wonper head.
As for the Subsidy for High Grade Beef which was
abolished in 2002, payments were made on beefwhich was graded above a certain level.  If it wasgraded A1+ or A1, producers received 150,000 Wonper head.  If it was graded B1+ or B1, producers
received 100,000 Won per head.
Canada – Notes Korea's zero deficiency payments tobeef in 2000.  Refers to the 2001 OECD Monitoring
and Evaluation report (p. 105) which indicates thatthe "calf breeding stabilization scheme" couldprovide deficiency payments of up to 250,000 wonper calf (US$221) in 2000, covering more than
200,000 cows.  Explanation of how this was
accounted for in ST/DS:6.Under the Calf Production Stabilisation Program, the
difference between the stabilisation price and the
market price of the calf is paid to a breeder.  In 2000,the stabilisation price and the deficiency paymentceiling were respectively 900,000 Won and 200,000Won per head, but no payment was made because the
market price for calf was above the stabilisation
price.
Calculation of external reference prices
Canada, New Zealand - Explanation of how the fixedexternal reference prices for pigmeat and garlic weredetermined, with reference to Annex 3, para. 9 sinceno external reference prices were provided for theseproducts in Korea's AGST tables.Since no relevant data for Korea were available, data
from other countries were used to determine the fixedexternal reference prices.
In the case of pigmeat, China's average export price
during the base period was used. The f.o.b. priceswere converted to c.i.f. prices by being multiplied by
1.12. In the case of garlic, Japan's average c.i.f.
import price during the base period was used. In bothcases, the base period is 1986-1988 as stipulated inAnnex 3 para. 9. (Data source: FAO Statistical
Databases, www.fao.org )G/AG/R/31
Page 42
Poland    G/AG/N/POL/46      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
AMS
Australia - Whether the Current Total AMS notified
as US$329.3 million is correct, given an exchangerate of US$100=PLN434.64 and total AMS ofPLN1461.25 million.The current total AMS should be 336.2 million US$.
"Eligible production"
New Zealand – Notes the Korea beef panel report
(WT/DS161/R) which states that eligible productionfor the purposes of calculating market price supportshould comprise the total marketable production that
is eligible to benefit from market price support, even
though the proportion of production which is actuallypurchased by a governmental agency may berelatively small or even nil.
Requests clarification of Poland's response to the US
about "eligible production".  Notes that "eligible
production" for common wheat was zero in calendaryear 1999 and 3,221,000 tonnes in calendar year2000.  The eligible production of other products hassimilarly changed from year to year.
Notes Poland's earlier reply that "eligible production"
was that which was purchased by the state agency.Clarification on how Poland's definition of "eligibleproduction" reflects the outcomes of the Korea beefpanel.In the response to US question posed during the
review of POL/37, Poland explained that the systemof intervention had two distinct features.  First, therewas a quantity limit for intervention purchases which
was set usually, for example for wheat, in April of
every year.  The period of intervention buying is setfrom July to October.  Second, intervention does notguarantee minimum price for all producers.  Theagency responsible for intervention does not havemonopolistic rights on the market.  Other operators
on the market conclude their transactions at prices
lower than intervention price.  In 2000, the limit forintervention on the wheat market was set at3.3 million tonnes and in the notification indicated alevel of 3.221 million tonnes.  Since the difference is
marginal, the notification reflects properly the
intervention system.  In the future, Poland would notexclude the possibility of calculating "eligibleproduction" equal to the limit of intervention
purchases.
Poland drew attention that both elements were
discussed in the panel report. The panel stated that
the particular design and operation of the pricesupport mechanism had to be taken into account indetermining "eligible production".G/AG/R/31
Page 43
Turkey    G/AG/N/TUR/14      Domestic Support (Table DS:1)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
AMS
Australia, Canada, New Zealand – Notes that Turkey
violated, for the 4th year in a row, its domestic
support commitments on sugar beets with an AMS of40.93% (far in excess of de minimis  provisions).
Notes Turkey's statement in June 2001 that sugar beetprices will be determined under free market
conditions in 2002.  Confirmation of a new law being
implemented and an explanation of why Turkey hasnot brought its sugar arrangements into compliance,when it intends to do so, and what steps will be taken.Turkey confirmed that the law introduced in April
2001 to determine sugar beet prices under freemarket conditions as of 2002 had been adopted.  Year2001 was the last year for the support in sugar beetsand for the new harvest, in September 2002 theTurkish Sugar Company will not set any support
price and the price will be determined by market
conditions.
Australia, Canada – Notes that regardless whether thesugar industry is state-owned or privately owned, thelevel of market price support must be included in the
calculation of the Current Total AMS and is subject
to limitation. Wonders why the notation "no privatebuyer" was relevant to the notification of the level ofmarket price support.In our notification we use the term "no private buyer"
because the only buyer of sugar beet in Turkey is (orwas) the state-owned Turkish Sugar Company (the
1986-1988 average reference price for sugar beet is
low which affects the calculation results).  On theother hand, we wanted to be in conformity with ourconsolidated list in which data are provided as "noprivate buyer" and also with our previous
notifications.
Australia – Requests Turkey to make available acopy of the domestic support table in Turkish Lira for
all years to date.
Explanation of the basis on which the quantities
eligible for support were calculated and who made
the decisions.Domestic support in Turkish Lira for the year 2001 is
available and Turkey undertook to provide the
information.
These quantities are set by:  Turkish Grain Board for
cereals, Turkish Sugar Company for sugar beets andTEKEL for tobacco by taking into account the
procedures and commitments of Turkey under the
Agreement.
Canada – Notes that the Agricultural ReformImplementation Project 2001-2004 appears toprovide payments to farmers and other support,possibly meeting Annex 2 criteria.  Inquires why no
support related to this project is reported.Turkey developed the Agricultural Reform
Implementation Project (ARIP) to phase out currentproduction oriented support and to replace it byincome support payments during the 2001-2004period. During the last year, there were some projects
to test the applicability of direct income support
system under ARIP and some programmes wereinitiated in December 2001. Thus, this will bereflected in the 2002 notification. On the other hand,there were no programmes in progress under ARIP
for the year 2001.
According to OECD monitoring for 2001, Turkeyprovided input subsidies on fertilizers, pesticides, and
seeds, milk premiums per litre, as well ascompensatory and deficiency payments for tea,cotton, sunflower, soybeans, olive oil, and tobacco in2001.  Explanation of why support under these
measures is not reported.These input subsidies were provided under Article
6.2 of the Agreement to the low income or resource
poor producers. According to the ARIP, this inputsubsidisation system was abolished in 2001.G/AG/R/31
Page 44
Table DS:2 Notifications
Australia    G/AG/N/AUS/42    New or Modified Domestic Support (Table DS:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada – Notes notification of 11 new programmes.
Requests additional information on how these
programmes meet the threshold criteria in the
subcomponents of the relevant paragraph (e.g., baseperiods, reference periods) and how the amounts ofdirect payments to producers are calculated.
Japan - Regarding the Central North East South
Australia Farm Assistance Program (CNEFAP) and
the WEST 2000 Plus Program:
- details on what the "neutral and objective criteria
clearly spelt out in law or regulation" are, withwhich both the Central North East region ofSouth Australia and the western Division ofNSW have been designated as disadvantaged
regions.
- clarification on steps taken to limit the payments
to "the extra costs or loss of income involved in
undertaking agricultural production in the
prescribed area".
Regarding the Assistance to producers in Exceptional
Circumstances Areas in the Central Highlands and
Southern Midlands Municipalities of Tasmania to
maintain breeding stock:
- explanation on how the programme meet the
specific criteria of Annex 2, para. 8, includingsteps taken to ensure that the specific
requirements are met.Australia's agricultural policies are targeted at
building business and risk management skills,
encouraging innovation, developing leaders who can
assist industry to self determine their future, placingfarmers, processors and other players in the supplychain in strategic alignment, and working inpartnership with regional and local communities toaddress natural resource management and wider rural
issues. In essence our approach is to try to ensure that
government intervention in the market place isstrategic and works with, and not against, marketsignals.
Payments under the 11 new and modified
programmes are targeted to the activity, needs based,
time-limited and unrelated to production levels orprices and therefore meet the Green Box fundamentalcriteria of being non or minimally production andtrade distorting.  For example, payments may be
made to recipients such as community or other
groups (Annex 2 para. 2) or directly to producers(Annex 2 paras. 5-13) for activities such asaddressing particular environmental problems (ACTRural Conservation Fund, Great Artesian BasinSustainability Initiative) and adjustment issues (Farm
Help, Dairy Exit).
The Development Incentive Scheme (Queensland)
Japan - Clarification of the "defined and fixed baseperiod".
Considering that the Programme is aimed at
promoting construction of irrigation facilities,wonders if it would not be more appropriate to notifyit under para. 2, Annex 2 (infrastructural services).These payments do not meet the general criteria for
para. 2.  Although the payments are for
infrastructural services, these payments are madedirectly to producers.  In terms of para. 6 criteria, thesupport is time-limited, and targeted in this case tothe activity of providing a set contribution to the costof on-farm water storage.  In other words, payments
to producers are not related to production, prices or
factors of production, including in any year after thebase period.  Applications may be made during thelife of the programme, with payments made in three
equal instalments.G/AG/R/31
Page 45
Australia    G/AG/N/AUS/42    New or Modified Domestic Support (Table DS:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Follow-up question by Canada - Reiterated request
for information regarding:  fixed and defined basedperiod with respect to the Development IncentiveScheme, as it appears more as a programme to
contribute to on-farm infrastructure, which would not
automatically fall under the Green Box. EncouragesAustralia to provide information on how theseprogrammes meet the specific criteria of the specificsub-paragraphs of Annex 2 under which they are
being claimed.Undertook to provide more data at a later date.G/AG/R/31
Page 46
Tables ES:1 to ES:3 Notifications
Hungary   G/AG/N/HUN/29    Export Subsidies (Tables ES:1 and ES:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
Canada - Confirmation that the 2000 export subsidy
outlays for "White cream cheese" were HUF 45
million.
Explanation of why these outlays were permitted to
surpass Hungary's outlay commitment level.Hungary confirmed that the 2000 export subsidy
outlays for "White cream cheese " were
HUF 45 million thus exceeding the outlay
commitment level as contained in the Schedule.Between 22 October 1997 and 31 December 2001 awaiver (WT/L/238) had been in force by virtue ofwhich, under strict terms, Hungary was allowed toprovide export subsidies in excess of its scheduled
commitments.  These terms had been fully abided by.
India   G/AG/N/IND/3   Export Subsidies    (Tables ES:1 to ES:3)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
United States - Justification for introducing export
subsidies that are not identified by commodity in
India's original schedule of commitments.
Irrespective of India's answer to the question above,
requests India's confirmation that these subsidieshave been eliminated in conformity with Article 9.4and Article 1(f).India has not introduced any new export subsidy
scheme within the meaning of Article 9.1 (a) to (c)
and (f).  The subsidies notified in IND/3 for the
period 1996-2001 are covered under Article 9.1 (d)and (e) and in accordance with provision ofArticle 9.4.  In its schedule of commitments, Indiahas reserved the right to take recourse to the subsidiesindicated in the notification, in view of the
dispensation given under Article 9.4.
United States   G/AG/N/USA/39   Export Subsidies    (Tables ES:1 and ES:2)
Points raised by other Member s Response by Notifying Member
EC – Notes notification of quantities of food aid
granted in 2000. Requests clarification (per
commodity):  under which programmes (PL 480,
416(b) etc) the food aid was provided, what were thequantities of food aid for the 3 main destinations, andhow much of the food aid was provided in fully grant
form.The United States replied that they were in the
process of disaggregating the data to answer the first
two questions.  Regarding data on US food aid in
grant form, 90.5 per cent of food aid was provided infully grant form.
Further details are provided in Attachment 4 to this
report.G/AG/R/31
Page 47
ANNEX – Part II
Deferred Replies to Questions Raised at Previous Meetings
(i) relating to domestic support commitments:  G/AG/N/AUS/38 (G/AG/R/30, page 35, refers)
Emergency Management of Animal Disease Incursions
Canada - Compliance with the specific criteria of
Annex 2, para. 8(a):  determination of productionloss:  clarification of the nature of the production
loss.The Emergency Management of Animal Disease
Incursions programme notified in AUS/38 refers tothe outbreak of Newcastle disease in chicken in 1998.Newcastle disease is listed by the OIE as a List A
disease which means it has the potential for very
serious and rapid spread, irrespective on nationalborders and its of serious socio-economicconsequence.  In this instance the response involved"stamping out" or eradication of the bird populationin affected areas.  For aff ected farmers the production
loss is 100 per cent.  The compensation payments to
producers are calculated on the market value of thenumber of stock destroyed during stamping out andany property destroyed.  Other payments made underthe programme, but not to producers, include the costof disease surveillance and destruction and disposal
of the stock destroyed.G/AG/R/31
Page 48
Attachment No. 1
United States' Response to Australia’s Request for Statistical Data
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) acquired by loan  forfeiture the following percentages of wheat,
rice, soybeans, cotton (extra long staple and upland), and corn in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
1998
(per cent)1999
(per cent)2000
(per cent)
Wheat 0.4 1.3 0.6
Rice 0.0 0.1 7.3
Soybeans 0.1 0.4 0.2
Cotton 0.0 0.0 0.4
Corn 0.1 0.3 0.3
The United States exported the following percenta ges of total production of wheat, rice, soybeans,
cotton (extra long staple and upland), and corn in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
1998
(per cent)1999
(per cent)2000
(per cent)
Wheat 41.1 47.4 47.5
Rice 46.6 48.2 41.9
Soybeans 29.4 36.7 36.3
Cotton 30.9 40.0 39.3
Corn 20.3 20.5 19.5G/AG/R/31
Page 49
Attachment No. 2
China's Tariff Quota Allocation for the Year 2002
Unit:  million tonnes
PRODUCTTotal Quota
VolumeQuota Allocated
for Ordinary
Trade( FCFS)Quota reserved
for Processing
TradeQuota Receiving
Entities
Wheat8.468
  ST:  7.621
  Non ST:  0.8478.218 0.25 212
Corn5.85
  ST:  .978
  Non ST:  1.8725.65 0.2 258
Rice3.99
  ST:  1.995
  Non ST:  1.9953.7325 0.15 165
Soybean Oil2.518
  ST:  0.856
  Non ST:  1.6622.318 0.2 273
Cotton0.819
  ST:  0.27
  Non ST:  0.5490.319 0.5 128
Rape-seed Oil0.879
  ST:  0.299
  Non ST:  0.580.779 0.1 160
Source:  State Development Planning Commission of ChinaG/AG/R/31
Page 50
Attachment No. 3
Venezuela – List of Import Licence s for Dairy Products Granted in 2002
List of Import Licences for Skimmed Milk
Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 60.00 United States 26/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 36.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.09 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 18.00 Australia 05/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 25.00 Uruguay 23/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 25.00 Spain 28/05/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 200.00 Poland 10/04/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 500.00 United Kingdom 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 100.00 Ireland 02/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 100.00 Ireland 02/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 76.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 76.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 76.00 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 125.00 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 88.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 76.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 202.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 151.20 New Zealand 22/03/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 252.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 252.00 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 25.00 Spain 24/04/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 100.00 22/03/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 100.00 Poland 18/04/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 101.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 60.00 Poland 09/05/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 50.00 New Zealand 12/06/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 73.00 Ireland 19/06/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 36.00 Australia 25/06/20020402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 32.00 France 25/06/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 32.00 France 25/06/2002G/AG/R/31
Page 51
Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 32.00 France 25/06/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 32.00 France 25/06/2002
0402.10.90 Skimmed milk powder 16.00 Australia 25/06/2002
TOTAL 3,942
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture and Land, Di rectorate-General of Agricultural MarketingG/AG/R/31
Page 52
List of Import Licences for Milk
Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 224.49 New Zealand 17/01/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 1008.00 New Zealand 19/02/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 783.53 New Zealand 19/02/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 350.00 Argentina 05/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Belgium 25/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 300.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Argentina 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 300.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Argentina 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Uruguay 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 300.00 Uruguay 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 75.00 Ireland 04/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Ireland 04/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 12.00 New Zealand 09/05/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Argentina 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Argentina 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 09/05/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Denmark 09/05/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Denmark 09/05/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Denmark 09/05/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 New Zealand 04/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 64.16 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.40 New Zealand 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Ireland 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 92.00 Ireland 22/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 125.00 Belgium 22/03/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 45.85 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 27.60 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 15.90 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 5.55 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Belgium 22/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Belgium 22/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Belgium 22/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 629.07 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.40 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 1462.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 151.20 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 1915.20 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 303.00 New Zealand 18/04/20020402.21.99 Milk in powder 24% 252.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.99 Milk in powder 24% 152.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0402.21.99 Milk in powder 24% 152.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002G/AG/R/31
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Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 258.00 Ireland 04/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 32.28 Spain 08/03/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Ireland 23/04/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 110.00 Argentina 23/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Argentina 23/04/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 10/05/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 10/05/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 10/05/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 250.00 Uruguay 10/05/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 80.00 New Zealand 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Belgium 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Belgium 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 New Zealand 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Ireland 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 80.00 Belgium 14/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Argentina 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Germany 18//06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Germany 18/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Germany 18/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 64.00 Belgium 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Ireland 19/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 73.63 Ireland 19/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Belgium 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Argentina 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 510.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 127.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 1008.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 353.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 756.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 178.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 605.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 76.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 76.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 51.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 101.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 76.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 47.00 France 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 53.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 24% 529.01 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 50.00 Ireland 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Argentina 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Argentina 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 100.00 Argentina 12/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 255.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 255.00 Denmark 12/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 278.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 202.00 New Zealand 13/06/2002
0402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 705.00 New Zealand 13/06/20020402.21.19 Milk in powder 26% 150.00 Ireland 13/06/2002G/AG/R/31
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Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0402.21.11 Milk in powder 26% 200.00 Germany 13/06/2002
0402.21.11 Milk in powder 26% 110.00 Germany 13/06/2002
TOTAL 28275.27
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture and Land, Di rectorate-General of Agricultural MarketingG/AG/R/31
Page 55
List of Import Licences for Cheese
Code Product Volume MT Country of origin Date of issue
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 115.2 New Zealand 20/02/2002
0402.90.10 Dairy raw material 153.60 New Zealand 03/04/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 57.60 New Zealand 03/04/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 153.60 New Zealand 03/04/20020406.90.10 Dairy raw material 57.60 New Zealand 03/04/20020406.90.10 Dairy raw material 134.40 New Zealand 03/04/20020406.90.10 Dairy raw material 38.40 New Zealand 03/04/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 09/05/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 08/05/20020406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 09/05/20020406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 09/05/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 09/05/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 09/05/20020460.90.90 Dairy raw material 38.00 New Zealand 07/05/20020406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 38.40 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 New Zealand 18/04/20020406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 18/04/20020406.90.90 Dairy raw material 19.20 18/04/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 57.6 19/06/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 134.4 19/06/20020406.90.10 Dairy raw material 57.6 New Zealand 19/06/20020406.90.10 Dairy raw material 153.6 New Zealand 19/06/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 43.20 New Zealand 19/06/2002
0406.90.10 Dairy raw material 151.20 New Zealand 19/06/20020406.90.20 Cheddar cheese 1.00 United States 08/05/20020406.90.30 Cream cheese 2.16 United States 18/01/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 03/04/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 03/04/20020406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 03/04/20020406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 03/04/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 17.08 United States 03/04/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 17.08 United States 03/04/20020406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 17.08 United States 03/04/20020406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 17.08 United States 03/04/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 17.08 United States 03/04/2002
0406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 23/04/20020406.10.00 Philadelphia cream cheese 13.24 United States 23/04/20020406.90.90 Processed cheese 1.2 France 18/02/20020406.30.00 Processed cheese 50.00 United States 16/05/2002
0406.30.00 Processed cheese 50.00 United States 16/05/2002
0406.30.00 Processed cheese 76.00 New Zealand 18/04/20020406.30.00 Processed cheese 128.00 New Zealand 18/04/20020406.30.00 Processed cheese 76.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0406.30.00 Processed cheese 121.00 New Zealand 18/04/202
0406.30.00 Processed cheese 29.00 New Zealand 08/05/20020406.40.00 Dutch Gouda cheese 3.02 Holland 16/01/20020406.90.20 Monterrey Jack cheese 1.00 United States 06/05/2002
0406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 36.00 United States 09/05/2002
0406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 27.00 New Zealand 18/04720020406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 41.00 New Zealand 18/04/20020406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 41.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 41.00 New Zealand 18/04/2002
0406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 36.00 United States 09/05/20020406.20.00 Mozzarella cheese 36.00 United States 05/02/2002
TOTAL 2,537.62
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Land, Directorate-General of Agricultural MarketingG/AG/R/31
Page 56
Attachment No. 4
G/AG/N/USA/39  - US Food Aid July / June 2000 / 2001
Title I Sales
(MT)Grants
(MT)Total
(MT)
Wheat 150,933 2,213,760 2,364,693
Sorghum 0 45,281 45,281
Rice 135,026 168,250 303,276
Vegetable oils 7,530 357,728 365,258
Non-fat dry milk 0 24,204 24,204
Other milk products 0 450 450
Total 293,489 2,809,673 3,103,162
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