RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE G/ADP/AHG/W/30
15October 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-4468)
Original: English Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
AdHocGroup onImplementation
TOPIC 1*-ARTICLE 6.5"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION"
TOPIC 2*-THE PERIOD OFDATA COLLECTION
TOPIC 3*-ARTICLE 6.10"SAMPLING"
TOPIC 5*-ARTICLE 5.5"NOTIFICATION OFEXPORTING MEMBER"
TOPIC 6*-ARTICLE 6.2-"HEARINGS"
TOPIC 7*-ARTICLE 6.9-"ESSENTIAL FACTS"
TOPIC 9*-"PROVISIONAL MEASURES"
TOPIC 10*-ARTICLE 9"DUTY ASSESSMENTS"
Paper byCanada
Thefollowing communication, dated 9October 1997, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission ofCanada.
_______________
AdHocGroup onImplementation –Topic 1
Treatment ofConfidential Information andtheProtection of
Business Proprietary Data SetForth inArticle 6.5
WTO Requirements
Article 6.5oftheAnti-dumping Agreement (theAgreement) recognizes thatcertain information
provided byinterested parties during thecourse ofananti-dumping investigation maybeconfidential.
Further, anyconfidential information submitted toaninvestigating authority must beaccompanied
byanon-confidential summary thatissufficient indetail toconvey areasonable understanding ofthe
informationsubmitted.Wheretheinvestigatingauthoritydoesnotacceptaparty’sdesignationofspecific
information asconfidential, theauthority maydisregard suchinformation unless itisobtained from
analternate source.
*Seedocument G/ADP/W/401 fordescriptions ofthenumbered topics.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
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Information accepted asconfidential mustbetreated assuchandnotdisclosed toother parties
totheproceedings.**TheAgreement, however, doesrecognize thatconfidential information maybe
disclosed subject toanarrowly drawn protective order.
Canadian Practice
Canadahasabifurcatedanti-dumpingsystemwherebytheCanadianInternationalTradeTribunal
(Tribunal) hasfinalauthority overmatters ofinjury andRevenue Canada hasfinalauthority overthe
determination ofthemargin ofdumping.***
BothRevenue Canada andtheTribunal require thatinformation designated asconfidential by
theperson providing it,beaccompanied byanon-confidential summary insufficient detail toconvey
areasonable understanding ofthesubstance oftheinformation or,alternatively, thattheperson provide
astatement explaining whysuchasummary cannot bemade;****
Canadian lawprovides Revenue Canada andtheTribunal withthepower todisregard, for
purposes ofaninvestigation, anyinformation designated asconfidential, which isnotaccompanied
**Article 6.5oftheADAgreement states:
6.5 Anyinformation which isbynature confidential (forexample, because itsdisclosure would
beofsignificant competitive advantage toacompetitor orbecause itsdisclosure would have a
significantly adverse effect uponaperson supplying theinformation oruponaperson fromwhom that
person acquired theinformation), orwhich isprovided onaconfidential basis byparties toan
investigation shall, upon good cause shown, betreated assuchbytheauthorities. Suchinformation
shall notbedisclosed without specific permission oftheparty submitting it.17
6.5.1 Theauthorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information tofurnish
non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shallbeinsufficient detail topermit areasonable
understandingofthesubstanceoftheinformationsubmittedinconfidence.Inexceptionalcircumstances,
suchparties mayindicate thatsuchinformation isnotsusceptible ofsummary. Insuchexceptional
circumstances, astatement ofthereasons whysummarization isnotpossible mustbeprovided.
6.5.2 Iftheauthorities findthatarequest forconfidentiality isnotwarranted andifthesupplier of
theinformation iseither unwilling tomake theinformation public ortoauthorize itsdisclosure in
generalized orsummary form, theauthorities maydisregard such information unless itcanbe
demonstrated totheirsatisfaction fromappropriate sources thattheinformation iscorrect.18
Thefootnotes toArticle 6.5areasfollows:
Footnote 17:Members areaware thatintheterritory ofcertain Members disclosure pursuant
toanarrowly drawn protective order mayberequired.
Footnote 18:Members agree thatrequests forconfidentiality should notbearbitrarily rejected.
***ForRevenue Canada, theauthority governing thetreatment ofconfidential information isbased
ontheSpecial Import Measures Act(SIMA). TheCanadian International Trade Tribunal Act(CITT
Act)andtheCITT Rules provide direction respecting thetreatment ofconfidential information bythe
Tribunal.
****Refer toparagraph 85(1)(b) oftheSIMA; paragraph 46(1)(b) oftheCITT Act,andrule15
oftheCITT Rules. These provisions areconsistent withArticle 6.5.1 oftheAntidumping Agreement.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page3
byanadequate non-confidential summary orastatement withexplanation astowhysuchasummary
cannot bemade;*****and
Canadian lawallows Revenue Canada andtheTribunal todisregard information designated
asconfidential where, intheopinion ofRevenue Canada ortheTribunal, thedesignation isunwarranted
andtheparty providing theinformation either fails,uponfurther explanation, tojustify thedesignation
orrefuses towithdraw thedesignation.******
What isConfidential Information?
There isnoprecise definition astowhat constitutes confidential information inArticle 6.5
oftheAgreement orinCanadian legislation. However, Article 6.5doesprovide general guidance
insofar asinformation maybeconsidered confidential, forexample, because:
itsdisclosure would beofsignificant competitive advantage toacompetitor orbecause its
disclosure would haveasignificantly adverse effect upon aperson supplying theinformation
orupon aperson fromwhom thatperson acquired theinformation.
Product-specific information thatcould havesucheffect includes:
costing data,;
domestic andexport salesinvoices;
technical information andproduction processes;
non-published price lists;
non-public financial statements;
customer names, etc.
While parties maydesignate information asconfidential, suchadesignation mustbewarranted
given thenature oftheinformation andthepurpose forwhich itisbeing submitted.
Ineffect, thedetermination whether ornotspecific information isconfidential ismade ona
case-by-case basis.*******
General Procedures inDesignating Information asConfidential
Requests forInformation senttointerested parties during aninvestigation indicate thetreatment
ofconfidential andnon-confidential information. Parties submitting information must designate as
*****Refer tosubsections 86(1) and87(3) ofSIMA andsubsections 47(1) and48(3) oftheCITT
Act. These provisions areconsistent withArticle 6.5.2 oftheAntidumping Agreement.
******Refer tosubsections 86(2) and87(1) ofSIMA andsubsections 47(2) and48(1) oftheCITT
Act.
*******Asimple example involves financial statements from twocompanies thatcover essentially
thesameinformation. Thedifference forconfidentiality purposes, however, isthatoneofthecompanies
ispublic while theother isaprivate company. Forthepublic company, thefinancial statements form
partoftheircorporate report; areport thatisapublic document. Private companies arenotrequired
tomake suchstatements public. Theprivate company canlegitimately argue thattheir financial
statements could reveal information thatwould benefit acompetitor thusqualifying theirstatements
asconfidential.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
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confidential anyportion oftheinformation submitted thattheywishtohavemaintained inconfidence.
Anyinformation notclearly designated as"confidential" istechnically non-confidential.********
Thefollowing requirements must befollowed when submitting confidential information for
purposes ofananti-dumping investigation:
astatement designating thosepartsoftheinformation which should bekeptconfidential together
withanexplanation ofwhytheinformation isconsidered confidential; and
anon-confidential summary oftheinformation designated confidential insufficient detail to
convey areasonable understanding ofthesubstance oftheconfidential information; or
astatement indicating thatanon-confidential summary cannot bemade orwould disclose facts
thattheperson hasaproper reason forwishing tokeepconfidential, together withanexplanation
which justifies theabsence ofthenon-confidential summary.
Anon-confidential summary mustbesufficiently detailed toallow aperson reading ittohave
areasonable understanding ofthesubstance oftheconfidential information itcovers. Thismaybe
donebysubmitting anon-confidential edited version, thatis,acomplete copyoftheactual submission
withtheconfidentialinformationwhited-out,crossedoutorotherwiserenderedindecipherable.Canada’s
experience issuchthatsituations where asummary oftheconfidential information cannot bemade
arerare.
Theacceptance ofadesignation ofinformation asconfidential isdiscretionary andmust
necessarily bemade onacase-by-case basis. Where adesignation ofinformation asconfidential is
challenged bytheinvestigating authority, theparty submitting theinformation maysubmit additional
explanations tojustify theconfidential designation orchange thedesignation suchthattheinformation
isnon-confidential. Canadian authorities reject adesignation ofspecific information asconfidential
when, infact,thatsame information ispublicly available.
Access byCounsel toConfidential Information*********
Intheinterest ofnatural justice/procedural fairness, Canadian authorities havethediscretion
togrant counsel foraparty restricted access toconfidential information. Inessence, suchaccess is
designed topermit counsel foraparty tobeasinformed aspossible when defending theinterests of
itsclient.
Consistent withfootnote 17oftheAgreement, ingranting counsel foraparty access to
confidentialinformationsubmittedbyotherpartiestoananti-dumpingproceeding,restrictionsareplaced
onwhen andhowcounsel mayhaveaccess totheconfidential information aswellashowtheconfidential
information maybehandled. Such restrictions areoutlined inawritten declaration andundertaking
ofnon-disclosure thatmustbesigned bycounsel prior toreceiving theconfidential information, and
normally include thefollowing:
counsel must notdisclose theconfidential information tothirdparties;
********Where information isobviously confidential butisnotsomarked, theissuemaybebrought
totheattention oftheparty submitting theinformation suchthatthestatus ofsuchinformation is
confirmed. However, theultimate responsibility fordesignating information asconfidential restswith
theparty submitting theinformation.
*********Counsel,inrelationtoapartytoananti-dumpingproceeding,isdefinedtoincludeanyperson,
other thanadirector, servant oremployee oftheparty, whoactsintheproceedings onbehalf ofthe
party. InCanadian law,counsel foraparty neednotbealawyer.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page5
where counsel ispermitted totakepossession oftheconfidential information, theymustagree
toguard andprotect theinformation from individuals forwhom access totheconfidential
information hasnotbeengranted;
counsel must notphotocopy orreproduce theconfidential information;
counsel mayonlyusetheconfidential information forpurposes oftheproceedings forwhich
itisgiven; and
where possession isgranted, counsel must return theconfidential information, orprovide a
certification ofdestruction oftheconfidential information attheendoftheproceeding orat
anytimeasdirectedbytheinvestigatingauthoritygrantingaccesstotheconfidentialinformation.
Parties participating inaproceeding submit confidential information inthebelief thatitwill
notbeimproperly disclosed andthatitwillbetreated inamanner thatrespects theprovisions ofthe
written declaration andundertaking ofnon-disclosure. Itisimperative thatcounsel strictly comply
withtheprovisions contained inthewritten declaration andundertaking ofnon-disclosure andanyother
directions issued bytheinvestigating authority. Given thataccess toconfidential information is
discretionary, failure tostrictly comply withtheprovisions ofthewritten declaration andundertaking
ofnon-disclosure oranyother direction issued bytheinvestigating authority mayresult inoneormore
ofthefollowing:
counsel losing access, orbeing denied future access, toconfidential information;
counsel being provided access toconfidential information onlyattheinvestigating authorities
premises;
counsel receiving otherforms ofrestricted access toconfidential information astheinvestigating
authority deems appropriate inthecircumstances; or
theinvestigating authority reporting theviolation ofthedeclaration andundertaking ofnon-
disclosure totheappropriate professional association.
Previous proceedings, forexample, theoriginal investigation ofinjury, maycontain information
relevant toareview ofinjury. Counsel forparties toareview mayalsohaveaccess toconfidential
information fromsuchrelated proceedings. Noaccess toconfidential information isgranted inunrelated
proceedings involving thesame goods orthesame parties.
Asaresult ofareview ofCanada ’santi-dumping law,consideration isbeing given tothe
establishment ofcriminal sanctions andmonetary penalties fortheunauthorized release ofconfidential
information.
Questions
Footnote 17totheAgreement clearly contemplates situations where confidential information
maybedisclosed bytheinvestigating authorities subject tonarrowly drawn protective orders. Are
there Members whose lawsdonotpermit suchdisclosure? Iftheanswer isyes,howcaninterested
parties defend theirinterests inthecontext ofinjury?
Footnote 17totheAgreement doesnotrestrict towhom confidential information maybe
disclosed. Canadian practice istorestrict suchaccess toarms-length independent council foraparty.
ArethereMembers whose lawspermit thedisclosure ofconfidential information topersons other than
independent counsel foraparty suchasexperts foraparty? Iftheanswer isyes,howissuchdisclosure
dealtwithprocedurally inorder toguarantee thattheconfidential information isneither improperly
disclosednorusedforpurposesotherthanthespecificanti-dumpingproceedingsforwhichitisdisclosed?G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page6
Asaresult ofarecent review ofCanadian trade remedy legislation, consideration isbeing
given totheuseofcriminal sanctions andmonetary penalties fortheunauthorized release ofconfidential
information. Canada would beinterested inknowing whether andhowother Members sanction the
unauthorized disclosure, useorhandling ofconfidential information inanti-dumping proceedings.
InCanada,informationdesignatedasconfidentialandforwhichsuchadesignationisnotaccepted
isnotconsidered forpurposes ofananti-dumping proceeding. Canada would liketoknow whatother
Members dowithsuchinformation. Isit,forexample, maintained onthefile/record; destroyed by
theinvestigating authority; orreturned totheparty thatsubmitted it?G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page7
AdHocGroup onImplementation -Topic 2
Period ofData Collection foraDumping Investigation
WTO Requirements
TheAnti-dumpingAgreementdoesnotdefineexplicitlytheperiodofdatacollectionforpurposes
ofananti-dumping investigation (i.e.,theperiod during which export prices should becompared with
normal values forpurposes ofdetermining themargin ofdumping). TheAgreement does, however,
make onerelated reference totheperiod oftimeinArticle 2.2.1.*Inaddition, Article 2.4provides
someindirect guidance respecting thetiming ofexport anddomestic salesusedfordetermining amargin
ofdumping.**
Canadian Practice
Canada operates abifurcated anti-dumping system whereby theCanadian International Trade
Tribunal (Tribunal) hasfinalauthority overmatters ofinjury andRevenue Canada hasfinalauthority
overthedetermination ofthemargin ofdumping.
Canada usesthree different timeperiods forcollection ofdatadepending onthepurpose for
which thedataisbeing collected:
1. ThePeriod ofInvestigation forpurposes ofdetermining theexistence ofdumping
Aperiod, referred toasthePeriod ofInvestigation orPOI,ischosen forexamining subject
exports toCanada. Exports maybedefined asshipments, sales orthephysical entry ofthegoods
toCanada.***Inpractice, thisperiod isnormally oneyearinlength. Thejustification forselecting
*Article 2.2.1 reads asfollows:
2.2.1 Sales ofthelikeproduct inthedomestic market oftheexporting country orsales to
athirdcountry atprices below perunit(fixed andvariable) costs ofproduction plusadministrative,
selling andgeneral costsmaybetreated asnotbeing intheordinary course oftradebyreason ofprice
andmaybedisregarded indetermining normal value onlyiftheauthorities determine thatsuchsales
aremade within anextended period oftime** insubstantial quantities andareatprices which donot
provide fortherecovery ofallcosts within areasonable period oftime. Ifprices which arebelow
perunitcostsatthetimeofsaleareabove weighted average perunitcostsfortheperiod ofinvestigation,
suchprices shallbeconsidered toprovide forrecovery ofcosts within areasonable period oftime.
**Footnote 4:Theextended period oftimeshould normally beoneyearbutshallinnocase
belessthansixmonths .(emphasis added).
**Article 2.4states, inpart:
Afaircomparisonshallbemadebetweentheexportpriceandthenormalvalue.Thiscomparison
shallbemade atthesame leveloftrade, normally attheex-factory level, andinrespect ofsalesmade
atasnearly aspossible thesame time. (emphasis added).
***Forpurposes ofthispaper, theword"exports" willbeusedtodenote shipments, salesorphysical
entry.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
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thePOI,including anexplanation ofthefactors considered, isgiven intheStatement ofReasons (SOR)
issued byRevenue Canada upon initiation ofaninvestigation.
ThePOIisaperiod chosen toaccurately reflect theexporter 'spricing levels toCanada. Its
selection isbased oninformation provided inthecomplaint filedbythedomestic industry, import
statistics, andanyadditional market intelligence thatisavailable toRevenue Canada. Keyfactors taken
intoconsideration inchoosing aPOIthatwillaccurately reflect export selling prices toCanada are:
volume ofsales-thePOImust include asufficient number ofsalestoensure thatexport prices are
nottemporary aberrations oranomalies;
mostrecent information available -POIshould endasclosetothedateofinitiation oftheinvestigation
asisadministratively feasible forboththeexporter andtheinvestigating authority;
nature ofindustry -iftheindustry isseasonal orcyclical, thePOIshould capture salesmade during
theperiod ofhighactivity;
market factors -suchasthecustomized nature oftheproduct, thevariety oftheproducts, thesize
andnumber ofindividual contracts, thetimedelay between award ofcontract andshipment ofgoods,
variations inproduct mixorstyles.
ThePOImustalsorelate totheperiod during which thecomplainants arealleging thatinjurious
dumping isoccurring anditshould besufficiently lengthy soastoensure anaccurate reflection of
theexporter 'sselling prices toCanada.
Thesame POIisgenerally usedforallcompanies andallcountries subject toananti-dumping
investigation. OncethePOIhasbeenchosen, itisnotgenerally changed. However, ifduring thecourse
oftheinvestigation, authorities become aware ofthenecessity forchanging thePOI,allinterested parties
areinformed ofthechange andgiven anopportunity toprovide anyadditional information required.
ThePOImaybelengthened orshortened toaccommodate someofthefactors noted above. Forexample,
ifthere arealarge number ofsalesofmany subject goods, alengthy POImayplace anunnecessary
burden ontheexporter andtheinvestigating authority. Insuchacase, ashorter POImaybemore
appropriate. Conversely, iftheinvestigation involves onlyonecustomized product, there might be
relatively fewsalesofthisproduct overalongperiod oftimewhich could necessitate using alengthy
POIinorder tohaveasufficient number ofsalesthatwould accurately reflect theexporter 'sselling
prices toCanada.
2. Article 2.2.1 Profitability Analysis Period
Inaccordance withArticle 2.2.1, Canada collects datarelating totheexporter 'sdomestic sales****for
purposes ofdetermining whether ornotthesaleprices intheexporter ’sdomestic market maybeused
asthebasis fornormal values. Thisperiod isreferred toastheProfitability Analysis Period (PAP)
andisgenerally a12-month period. Insome cases, ashorter period maybeadopted, butitwould
notbeshorter thansixmonths.*****
****Sales toathirdcountry maybeexamined inplace ofdomestic sales.
*****When determining normal values inrelation toexport salestoCanada, paragraph 15(d) ofthe
Special Import Measures Act(SIMA) requires theselection ofa60dayperiod representing domestic
salesintheexporter ’sdomestic market. Domestic salesoflikegoods during this60-day period areG/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page9
Factors taken intoconsideration inchoosing aPAParebased oninformation contained inthe
complaint filedbythedomestic industry, import statistics andanyother sources ofmarket intelligence
available toRevenue Canada. Such factors include thefollowing:
dateofsalestoCanada,
volume ofsalesoflikegoods inthedomestic market;
stability ofselling prices;
stability ofcosts ofproducing thegoods;
seasonality orcyclical nature ofsales; and
accounting cycles.******
3. TheInjury Investigation
TheCanadian International Trade Tribunal (theTribunal) typically examines activities inthe
Canadian market, aswellasexports totheCanadian market, overa4yearperiod when determining
ifthedumped imports havecaused injury totheCanadian industry.*******Assuch, theperiod subject
totheinjury investigation willinclude: (a)thetimeperiod during which injury hasbeenalleged to
takeplace; and(b)aprevious period forwhich noallegations ofinjury havebeenmade. Comparisons
arethenmade between andwithin thetwoperiods toexamine trends inprices andother market factors
related totheissue ofinjury.
Forexample, aninjury inquiry starting inthespring of1997would collect datafortheyears
1993to1996plusthefirstquarter (January/February/March) ofeachof1996and1997. Insome cases,
ashorter period maybeusedtolessen theburden onquestionnaire respondents. Incases where detailed
pricing andsalesinformation iscollected, datamaybecollected foronlyacouple ofyears butbroken
down intoquarterly ormonthly periods.
Theselection oftheTribunal 'sPOIisdesigned toobtain asufficient number ofdatapoints
forpurposes ofanalyzing trends intheindicators ofinjury. Such indicators include:
domestic market size,
domestic salesoflikegoods,
domestic salesofimported subject goods,
thenusedtodetermine thenormal values inrespect oftheexport sales. ThePAPmaybesub-divided
intoappropriate 60-day periods relating mostclosely tothedateofsaleofthegoods exported toCanada.
******Toreduce administrative burden onexporters, information willusually berequested for
accounting quarters, where possible.
*******Injury,forpurposesofthispaper,includesmaterialinjury,threatofmaterialinjuryandmaterial
retardation ascontemplated byfootnote 9totheAnti-dumping Agreement.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page10
domestic salesofsimilar imported goods from non-subject countries, and
domesticproductionlevels,inventories,capacityutilization,employment,financialperformance,
etc.
Theinformation collected maythenbeanalyzed bytheTribunal andbyinterested parties to
determine trends inthemarket related tothequestion ofinjury.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
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AdHocGroup onImplementation -Topic 3
Sampling Method under Article 6.10
WTO Requirements
Article 6.10oftheAnti-dumping Agreement provides thatwhere there isalarge number of
exporters, producers, importers orproducts making itimpracticable todetermine individual margins
ofdumping, theinvestigation mayconcentrate onthelargest percentage ofgoods fromeachcountry
which canreasonably beinvestigated, oronareasonable number ofparties orproducts using statistically
valid sampling techniques.*
When Article 6.10isused, theimposition andcollection ofduties isguided byArticle 9.4.
which requires thatanyanti-dumping dutyapplied toimports fromexporters orproducers notincluded
intheexamination shallnotexceed theweighted average margin ofdumping determined inrespect
ofsampled exporters orproducts.**Incalculating thisweighted average, theauthorities mustdisregard
*Article 6.10oftheAnti-dumping Agreement states:
6.10 Theauthorities shall, asarule, determine anindividual margin ofdumping foreach
known exporter orproducer concerned oftheproduct under investigation. Incases where thenumber
ofexporters, producers, importers ortypes ofproducts involved issolarge astomake such a
determination impracticable, theauthorities maylimittheirexamination either toareasonable number
ofinterested parties orproducts byusing samples which arestatistically validonthebasisofinformation
available totheauthorities atthetimeoftheselection, ortothelargest percentage ofthevolume of
theexports fromthecountry inquestion which canreasonably beinvestigated.
6.10.1 Anyselection ofexporters, producers, importers ortypes ofproducts made under this
paragraphshallpreferablybechoseninconsultationwithandwiththeconsentoftheexporters,producers
orimporters concerned.
6.10.2 Incases where theauthorities havelimited theirexamination, asprovided forinthis
paragraph, theyshall nevertheless determine anindividual margin ofdumping foranyexporter or
producer notinitially selected whosubmits thenecessary information intimeforthatinformation to
beconsidered during thecourse oftheinvestigation, except where thenumber ofexporters orproducers
issolarge thatindividual examinations would beunduly burdensome totheauthorities andprevent
thetimely completion oftheinvestigation. Voluntary responses shall notbediscouraged.
**When Article 6.10isused, theimposition andcollection ofduties isguided byArticle 9.4,which
states:
9.4 When theauthorities havelimited theirexamination inaccordance withthesecond
sentence ofparagraph 10ofArticle 6,anyanti-dumping dutyapplied toimports fromexporters or
producers notincluded intheexamination shall notexceed:
(i) theweighted average margin ofdumping established withrespect totheselected exporters
orproducers or,
(ii) where theliability forpayment ofanti-dumping duties iscalculated onthebasisofaprospective
normal value, thedifference between theweighted average normal value oftheselected exporters
orproducers andtheexport prices ofexporters orproducers notindividually examined,G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page12
anyzeroanddeminimis margins andanymargins established using factsavailable ascontemplated
byparagraph 8ofArticle 6oftheAgreement.
Canadian Practice
TheCanadian legislation, theSpecial Import Measures Act,hasimplemented Article 6.10of
theAnti-dumping Agreement bygiving Revenue Canada theauthority todetermine amargin of
dumping***based onasample****inrelation tothelargest percentage ofgoods from eachcountry of
thecountries intheinvestigation.*****
Thedecision tosample isjudged onacasebycasebasis using theimport dataavailable to
Revenue Canada atthetimeofinitiation ofananti-dumping investigation. Revenue Canada uses
sampling when itforms theopinion thatitwould beimpracticable todetermine amargin ofdumping
inrelation toallgoods under consideration because ofthenumber orexporters, producers orimporters,
thevariety orvolume ofgoods, oranyother reason.
Attheinitiation ofaninvestigation, Revenue Canada notifies allknown importers andexporters
ofthedecision toinitiate andanydecision thathasbeentaken ontheinvestigation process. The
notification includes anydecision tosample, thesampling methodology, timeframes andtheparties
involved inthesample. When sampling isused, allexporting parties arenonetheless sentaRequest
forInformation (RFI) togiveeachexporter anopportunity tosupply thenecessary dataforcalculating
amargin ofdumping.****** *******
Revenue Canada ’sgeneral objective when sampling istoexamine salesrepresenting 60%of
thetotalapparent volume during theperiod ofinvestigation, although there could becases where the
sample maycover agreater orlesser percentage. Allexporters ofsubject goods notincluded inthe
sample areinformed thattheyneednotsubmit thedetailed information described intheRFI;however,
theymayvoluntarily submit thisinformation forpurposes ofdetermining margins ofdumping. Where
timepermits, voluntary submissions arereviewed andamargin ofdumping isdetermined forthegoods
ofthatexporter.
provided thattheauthorities shalldisregard forthepurposes ofthisparagraph anyzeroanddeminimis
margins andmargins established under thecircumstances referred toinparagraph 8ofArticle 6.
Theauthorities shallapply individual duties ornormal values toimports fromanyexporter orproducer
notincluded intheexamination whohasprovided thenecessary information during thecourse ofthe
investigation, asprovided forinsubparagraph 10.2ofArticle 6.
***Theterm“margin ofdumping ”inrelation toanexporter generally means aweighted average
margin ofdumping.
****Theterm“sample”inthetextshallbetakentomeanthelargestpercentageofgoodsorstatistically
valid samples.
*****Special Import Measures Actsubsection 30.3(1).
******Thisisalsoanopportunity foranyparty tomake representations concerning thecomposition
ofthesample andpresent anyinformation thatRevenue Canada wasunaware ofpriortoinitiation that
impacts theselection oftheparties orproducts tobesampled. Should therepresentations warrant
comment, consideration willbegiven toaltering thecomposition ofthesample inpreparation forthe
finaldetermination decision.
*******Incertain cases, Revenue Canada maycalculate individual normal values.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
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Question
Article 9oftheAgreement deals withtheimposition andcollection ofanti-dumping duties.
Article 9.4relates directly tosampling assetoutinArticle 6.10. Canada would beinterested in
knowing whether Members which haveusedsampling haveuseddatafromco-operative exporters who
were notformally included inthesample todetermine themargin ofdumping forthesample?G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page14
AdHocGroup onImplementation -Topic 5
Notification oftheGovernment oftheExporting Member pursuant toArticle 5.5
WTO Requirements
Article 5.5oftheAnti-dumping Agreement (theAgreement) states:
Theauthorities shallavoid, unless adecision hasbeenmade toinitiate aninvestigation, any
publicizing oftheapplication fortheinitiation ofaninvestigation. However, afterreceipt ofaproperly
documented application andbefore proceeding toinitiate aninvestigation, theauthorities shallnotify
thegovernment oftheexporting Member concerned.
Canadian Practice
Theobligation tonotify thegovernment oftheexporting Member under Article 5.5is
incorporatedintoCanadiananti-dumpinglegislation.Whenawrittencomplaintisdeemedtobeproperly
documented, thegovernment ofthecountry ofexport isnotified inwriting thataproperly documented
complaint wasreceived.*Thedecision whether ornottoinitiate aninvestigation isgenerally made
within 30daysfrom thedateoftheproperly documented complaint notification.
Inpractice, theauthority, Revenue Canada, sends aletter bycourier totheexporting Member ’s
Embassy located inCanada.**
Thenotification requirement ofArticle 5.5iscombined withtheobligation ontheauthorities toavoid
anypublicizing oftheapplication before theinitiation. ItisRevenue Canada ’spolicy, incompliance
withthisWTOguidance,nottodiscussthecomplaintwithpartiesotherthanwiththedomesticproducers.
Where thecomplainant chooses tomake thematter public, Revenue Canada willonlyacknowledge
thatacomplaint hasbeenfiledandwillmake nocomment onthecontents ofthecomplaint norwhether
ornotaninvestigation willbeinitiated.
Questions
ItisCanada ’sexperience thatitdoesnotalways receive notification ofaproperly documented
complaint respecting thealleged dumping ofCanadian goods ascontemplated byArticle 5.5ofthe
Agreement. Clarification oftheappropriate contact points andthetiming ofnotification would be
helpful inensuring thatsuchnotification isreceived.
Inexamining theappropriate timing andcontent ofanotification (i.e., atwhatpoint between
receipt ofaproperly documented complaint andtheinitiation ofaninvestigation), itisimportant to
haveanunderstanding astothepurpose ofthenotification. What doMembers seeasthepurpose
fornotifying thegovernment oftheexporting country prior toinitiation?
*Special Import Measures Act:paragraph 32(1)(a). Thisnotification issentwithin 21daysfollowing
thereceipt ofthewritten complaint byRevenue Canada.
**Revenue Canada recognizes thesignificant importance andsensitivity ofananti-dumping action;
therefore, intheletter tothegovernment oftheexporting Member, Revenue Canada requests thatthe
confidentiality ofthenotification bemaintained bythatgovernment inlinewiththespirit ofthe
Agreement, asanypublication ofanimpending investigation could haveanunnecessary detrimental
effect oninternational trade ifadecision nottoinitiate istaken.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page15
AdHocGroup onImplementation –Topic 6
TheProvision forHearings under Article 6.2
WTO Requirements
Article6.2oftheAnti-dumpingAgreement(TheAgreement)requiresauthoritiesinanti-dumping
investigations toprovide, onrequest, opportunities forallinterested parties tomeetthose parties with
adverse interests sothatopposing views maybepresented andrebuttal arguments offered.*
Canadian Practice
Canada operates abifurcated anti-dumping system. Revenue Canada isresponsible forthe
receipt andevaluation ofanti-dumping complaints, theinitiation ofinvestigations andthepreliminary
determinations ofdumping andinjury. Once thepreliminary determinations aremade, theCanadian
International Trade Tribunal (Tribunal) assumes authority overtheissue ofinjury. TheTribunal has
finalauthority overmatters ofinjury andRevenue Canada hasfinalauthority overthedetermination
ofthemargin ofdumping.
Revenue Canada
Atanytimeduring theinvestigation process, should theinterested parties request ameeting
ascontemplated byArticle 6.2,Revenue Canada would provide theopportunity. Todate,given that
Revenue Canada hasnotbeenrequested toholdsuchameeting, itisageneral impression thatthe
constraints imposed bytheconfidential nature ofmuch oftheinformation, andtheconstraints imposed
bytheinvestigative procedures make sucharequest unlikely.
TheCanadian International Trade Tribunal
TheTribunal, asaquasi-judicial body, hasrules andprocedures similar tothose ofacourt
oflawbutnotquiteasformal. TheTribunal provides forparties withopposing views topresent those
views athearings attended byallparties. Forexample:
Thepre-hearing conference allows theTribunal tohearfromparties andtoresolve procedural
andsubstantive matters prior tothecommencement oftheinjury hearings. Such aconference may
beusedtodetermine, forexample, thegoods, orclasses ofgoods, which willbethesubject ofthe
inquiry. Apre-hearing conference isoptional andmaybeheldattherequest ofaninterested party
ortheTribunal itself. While heldmostly inperson, these conferences maybeheldbyelectronic
teleconferencing, where possible.
*Article 6.2states:
Throughout theanti-dumping investigation allinterested parties shallhaveafullopportunity
forthedefence oftheirinterests. Tothisend,theauthorities shall, onrequest, provide opportunities
forallinterested parties tomeetthose parties withadverse interests, sothatopposing views maybe
presented andrebuttal arguments offered. Provision ofsuchopportunities musttakeaccount ofthe
needtopreserve confidentiality andoftheconvenience totheparties. There shall benoobligation
onanyparty toattend ameeting, andfailure todososhall notbeprejudicial tothatparty'scase.
Interested parties shall alsohavetheright, onjustification, topresent other information orally.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page16
TheTribunal ’sinjury hearings provide fortheconsideration ofthose issues relevant tothe
finaldetermination ofinjury, including thecross-examination/testing ofwitnesses andevidence, and
argument bycounsel.
Questions
Canada would beinterested inlearning ofother Members ’experience withmeetings as
contemplated byArticle 6.2
Regarding theuseofmeetings (hearings) andother forms offact-finding (questionnaires,
submissions, pre-hearing conferences, etc.), haveotherMembers experienced problems inthegathering
ofinformation forpurposes ofananti-dumping investigation?
Regarding theAnti-dumping Agreement Article 6.2requirement togiveparties therightto
present evidence orally, Canada would beinterested inknowing ofother Member ’spractices and
experience inthisarea.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page17
AdHocGroup onImplementation –Topic 7
Provision ofEssential Facts under Consideration
Before Making aFinal Determination under
Article 6.9.-Disclosure ofFindings
WTO Requirements
Article 6.9oftheWTO Anti-dumping Agreement states:
Theauthorities shall, before afinaldetermination ismade, inform allinterested parties ofthe
essentialfactsunderconsiderationwhichformthebasisforthedecisionwhetherornottoapplydefinitive
measures. Suchdisclosure should takeplace insufficient timefortheparties todefend theirinterests.
Canadian Practice
Canada operates abifurcated anti-dumping system. Revenue Canada isresponsible forthe
receipt andevaluation ofanti-dumping complaints, theinitiation ofinvestigations andthepreliminary
determinations ofdumping andinjury. Once thepreliminary determinations aremade, theCanadian
International Trade Tribunal (Tribunal) assumes authority overtheissueofinjury. TheTribunal has
finalauthority overmatters ofinjury andRevenue Canada hasfinalauthority overthedetermination
ofnormal values andexport prices.
Revenue Canada
Revenue Canada informs allinterested parties oftheessential factsunder consideration for
purposes ofthedecision whether ornottomake afinal determination ofdumping. Thefinal
determination ofdumping, incombination withafinaldetermination ofinjury bytheTribunal, form
thebasisfortheapplication ofdefinitive measures. Revenue Canada provides interested parties with
therelevant information, before thefinaldetermination ofdumping, inthree ways:
Revenue Canada issues apreliminary determination Statement ofReasons (SOR). TheSOR
provides, interalia,non-confidential details ofthepreliminary determinations ofdumping andinjury,
addresses representations made toRevenue Canada during theinvestigation where comment iswarranted
andprovides notice oftheimposition ofprovisional measures. Thispublic document isprovided to
allinterested parties.*
Letters areprovided toindividual exporters thatexplain, indetail, thecalculations and
adjustments made regarding company-specific normal values andexport prices based oninformation
received fromtheindividual exporter involved. These letters giveexporters anopportunity toreview
thecalculations involved indetermining theirspecific margin(s) ofdumping. Thisprocess allows
exporters tochallenge thecalculation ofnormal values andexport prices and/or provide additional
information relevant totheirrespective margin(s) ofdumping.
Revenue Canada offers toallexporters (andotherinterested parties) anopportunity toparticipate
inadisclosure meeting withRevenue Canada officials following thepreliminary determination. This
meeting isdesigned toprovide interested parties withanopportunity toaskquestions andtoseekfurther
*Interested parties include complainants, allknown importers andexporters ofthesubject goods
aswellasthegovernments ofthecountries ofexport.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page18
clarification fromRevenue Canada officials responsible forthecalculation ofthemargins ofdumping
andfortheoverall results oftheinvestigation (while maintaining theconfidentiality ofinformation
asrequired).**Should anyadditional information berequired, suchrequirements areexplained and
arrangements made forfollow-up verification meetings. Finally, disclosure meetings areheldassoon
aspossible afterthepreliminary determination inorder totakeintoaccount forpurposes ofwhether
ornottomake afinaldetermination ofdumping anyrepresentations made toRevenue Canada during
thecourse ofthemeeting.
Arguments made inrelation tothecalculation ofnormal values andexport prices areconsidered
byRevenue Canada priortothedecision onwhether ornottomake afinaldetermination ofdumping.
Canadian International Trade Tribunal
TheCanadian International Trade Tribunal (theTribunal) undertakes fourdistinct processes
bywhich interested parties areinformed oftheessential factsunder consideration priortothedecision
whether ornottomake afinaldetermination ofinjury.
TheTribunal Staff Report, which isissued approximately 50days after thepreliminary
determinations ofdumping andinjury byRevenue Canada, isprovided tointerested parties. TheReport,
which isfactual innature, sets-out basic background information (product, markets, trade patterns,
etc.).***Inaddition, itaddresses theinjury indicators outlined inArticle 3oftheAnti-dumping
Agreement.
Inpreparing theStaff Report, Tribunal staffundertake various types ofresearch including
consulting withdomestic producers, importers andpurchasers inorder toobtain ageneral understanding
oftheproducts andmarkets involved andtoanalyse responses toTribunal questionnaires.
TheStaffReport canberevised uptothedaythatthehearings close because ofnewand/or
corrected information submitted byparties.****Thisprocess reflects theview that,iftheReport is
tobeusedbytheTribunal during itsdeliberations, itshould besubject tocomment/testing bytheparties
involved intheinquiry orreview.
Witness statements, which areprovided normally 2to3weeks prior totheTribunal injury
hearings, indicate whatwitnesses intend tostateastheirtestimony.*****These statements willaddress
thevarious issues related tothequestion ofinjury.
**Given thatdisclosure meetings takeplace afterthepreliminary determinations ofdumping and
injury, when theissue ofinjury hasalready beenassumed bytheTribunal, thepreliminary injury
determination isnotdirectly relevant.
***Questionnaire replies fromparties usedtogenerate thestaffreport arepartoftheofficial case
record maintained bytheTribunal.
****New evidence isnormally notaccepted afterthehearings close. However, inexceptional
circumstances neworrevised information maybeaccepted. Thiswould onlyhappen where theother
parties involved intheinquiry haveanopportunity tocomment ontheneworrevised information.
*****Witness statements areoften notformally readduring thehearing, butrather areavailable as
partoftheofficial record. Accordingly, itisnormal practice forawitness, oncesworn-in totestify,
toadopt hisorherwitness statement andthentoanswer questions.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page19
Apre-hearing conference allows parties tomeettoresolve procedural andsubstantive issues
prior tothecommencement oftheinjury hearing. Inrespect oftheessential factsunder consideration
priortothefinaldetermination ofdumping, suchaconference maybeusedtodetermine, forexample,
thegoods, orclasses ofgoods, which willbethesubject oftheinquiry. Apre-hearing conference
isoptional andmaybeheldattherequest ofaninterested party ortheTribunal itself.******
TheTribunal ’sinjury hearings themselves provide fortheconsideration ofthose issues relevant
tothefinaldetermination ofinjury. Interested parties maysubmit information/witnesses which may
thenbetested/cross examined byparties withopposing interests. Injury hearings focus ontheessential
factsunder consideration forpurposes ofthefinaldetermination ofinjury.
Throughout theTribunal ’squasi-judicial process, parties maymake submissions withrespect
totheissue ofinjury focusing onthose factors relevant tothecaseathand. Thisprocess permits all
toknow andcomment ontheessential factsunder consideration prior tothedecision whether ornot
tomake afinaldetermination ofinjury.
COMMENT
Itisimportant thatthepublic document released atthepreliminary determination beas
comprehensive aspossible. Thisallows forthegovernment oftheexporting country tomake more
informed representations. Further, exporters should receive detailed explanations ofthecalculations
related tothespecific margins ofdumping applicable totheircompanies atthetimeofthepreliminary
determination ofdumping (itisourunderstanding thatthisdoesnotalways happen ordoesnothappen
quickly).
******While usually heldinperson, these conferences maybeheldbyelectronic teleconferencing,
where possible.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page20
AdHocGroup onImplementation -Topic 9
Contents ofPreliminary Affirmation Decisions
WTO Requirements
Articles 7and12oftheWTO Anti-dumping Agreement provide guidance regarding thecontents
ofpreliminary affirmative determinations.*While Article 7indicates when apreliminary determination
maybemade, Article 12setsouttherequired contents ofthenotice ofsuchadecision.
Canadian Practice
Canada ’slegislation, theSpecial Import Measures Act,gives authority toRevenue Canada to
make apreliminary affirmative decision respecting dumping andinjury.**Revenue Canada estimates
*Therelevant provisions oftheWTO Anti-dumping Agreement areasfollows:
7.1Provisional measures maybeapplied onlyif:
(i) aninvestigation hasbeeninitiated inaccordance withtheprovisions ofArticle 5,apublic notice
hasbeengiven tothateffect andinterested parties havebeengiven adequate opportunities
tosubmit information andmake comments;
(ii) apreliminary affirmative determination hasbeenmade ofdumping andconsequent injury to
adomestic industry; and
(iii) theauthorities concerned judge suchmeasures necessary toprevent injury being caused during
theinvestigation.
12.2Public notice shallbegiven ofanypreliminary orfinaldetermination, whether affirmative
ornegative, ofanydecision toaccept anundertaking pursuant toArticle 8,ofthetermination ofsuch
anundertaking, andofthetermination ofadefinitive anti-dumping duty. Each suchnotice shallset
forth, orotherwise make available through aseparate report, insufficient detail thefindings and
conclusions reached onallissues offactandlawconsidered material bytheinvestigating authorities.
Allsuchnotices andreports shallbeforwarded totheMember orMembers theproducts ofwhich are
subject tosuchdetermination orundertaking andtoother interested parties known tohaveaninterest
therein.
12.2.1 Apublic notice oftheimposition ofprovisional measures shallsetforth, orotherwise
make available through aseparate report, sufficiently detailed explanations forthepreliminary
determinations ondumping andinjury andshallrefertothematters offactandlawwhich haveled
toarguments being accepted orrejected. Suchanotice orreport shall, dueregard being paidtothe
requirement fortheprotection ofconfidential information, contain inparticular:
(i) thenames ofthesuppliers, orwhen thisisimpracticable, thesupplying countries involved;
(ii) adescription oftheproduct which issufficient forcustoms purposes;
(iii) themargins ofdumping established andafullexplanation ofthereasons forthemethodology
usedintheestablishment andcomparison oftheexport priceandthenormal value under Article
2;
(iv) considerations relevant totheinjury determination assetoutinArticle 3;
(v) themain reasons leading tothedetermination.
**Special Import Measures Act:paragraph 38(1).G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page21
themargin ofdumping ofthegoods foreachcountry andspecifies thegoods towhich thisdecision
willapply. Inaddition, Revenue Canada mustspecify thename oftheimporter inCanada ofthegoods
based ontheavailable information.***Once these decisions havebeentaken, Revenue Canada makes
apreliminary determination ofdumping onlywhere theevidence discloses thatthere isareasonable
indication thatthedumping hascaused injury orretardation oristhreatening tocause injury.****
Atthepreliminary affirmative determination ofdumping andinjury, Revenue Canada sends toall
interested parties aletter ofnotification andaStatement ofReasons, which explains thebasis forthe
decision. Theletters ofnotification arenormally company specific. Forindividual exporters, letters
ofnotification explain thebasisforthemargins ofdumping calculated andprovide specific provisional
dutyinformation (i.e.,provisional normal values, export prices andmargins ofdumping). Inaddition,
theseletters inform exporters thattheymayrequest adisclosure meeting atwhich timeRevenue Canada
officials willdiscuss indetail thepreliminary determination andthecalculation ofthespecific exporter ’s
margins ofdumping.
TheStatement ofReasons isapublic document thatexplains, inanon-confidential manner, thebasis
forthepreliminary affirmative determination. Thedocument issufficiently detailed toprovide interested
parties withafullunderstanding ofthereasons forthedecision, including anymatters offactandlaw
thathaveleadtoarguments being accepted orrejected.
AStatement ofReasons isconsistent withtherequirements ofArticle 12.2.1 andcontains thefollowing
details:
Summary :Thissection states thedateoftheinitiation, theproduct andcountries named inthe
investigation, thecomplainant, andastatement ontheresults oftheinvestigation andthedecision of
Revenue Canada.
TheInterested Parties :Thename(s) ofthecomplainant, theimporters andtheexporters arelisted.
Where thelistofimporters andexporters isextensive, thelistisattached asanAppendix.
Background :Thissection states thedatethatthecomplaint wasreceived, from whom andwhen it
wasnotified asproperly documented. Reference ismade tothedateofinitiation andanyother events
suchasareference totheCanadian International Trade Tribunal onthequestion ofinjury.
Thedefinition ofthegoods: Thisincludes theformal definition ordescription oftheproduct towhich
thepreliminary determination applies, amore detailed description oftheproducts ’specifications and
sizes(ifnotincluded intheformal definition), theproduction processes (where relevant), theapplication
orusesoftheproduct andtheCustoms classification under theHarmonized System.
TheCanadian Industry: Thisincludes thenames oftheproducers andcomplainants andastatement
whether thecomplainants constitute amajor proportion ofCanadian production. Ifthere hasbeen
anychange intheCanadian industry since thedateoftheinitiation oftheinvestigation, thiswould
beaddressed.
***Special Import Measures Act:paragraph 38(1)(c). Thisrequirement isrelated totheappeal
procedures andliability forpayment ofprovisional andanti-dumping duties.
****Special Import Measures Act:subsection 38(1).G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page22
TheCanadian Market: Thissection provides historic information, details ondemand, distribution
channels,estimatesoftheCanadianmarketandtotallevelofimports.AbreakdownofthetotalCanadian
market between Canadian production andimports isalsoprovided.*****
TheResults oftheInvestigation: Thissection states theperiod ofinvestigation, thenames ofimporters
andexporters, asummary oftheresponse ratefrom importers andexporters, thecompanies visited
forverification purposes andasummary ofthemethods ofestimating thenormal values andexport
prices, which includes theselection oflikegoods andspecific methodology (domestic sales, costs of
production andadjustments) generally given foreachcompany. Fornon-cooperating companies, the
specific manner ofapplying Article 6.8(facts available) isexplained. Where sampling isused, details
onthemethodology aregiven.
TheEstimated Margin ofDumping: Thissection gives theestimated percentage ofthetotalvolume
ofgoods thatweredumped, therange oftheestimated weighted average margins ofdumping andthe
overall estimated weighted average margin ofdumping forallgoods andforeachcountry named in
theinvestigation.
TheRepresentations Concerning theInvestigation: Thisisasummary ofthemajor issues andthe
responses given. Therelevant issue(s) intherepresentations received concerning theinvestigation
mayhaveamaterial effect onthedecision; therefore, theStatement ofReasons contains asummary
oftherelevant issue(s), whomade representations andthedecisions taken. Thesummary of
representations made isincluded intheStatement ofReasons togivefurther transparency totheprocess.
TheStatus ofMaterial Injury: Thissection updates theevidence ofinjury contained intheStatement
ofReasons issued atthetimeoftheinitiation oftheinvestigation based onevidence obtained during
thepreliminary investigation period. Issues relevant totheissue ofinjury areaddressed.
TheDecision: Thissection gives theresults oftheinvestigation withrespect tothemargins ofdumping
(i.e.,notdeminimis )andajudgment ontheactual orpotential volumes (i.e.,notnegligible). Itcontains
Revenue Canada ’sdecision thattheevidence discloses thatthere isareasonable indication thatthe
dumping hascaused injury orretardation oristhreatening tocause injury andtheconclusion thata
preliminary determination hasbeenmade.
Future Action: Thissection explains thattheCanadian International Trade Tribunal willexamine the
issue ofinjury forfinaldecision purposes. Itcontains Revenue Canada ’sdecision whether ornotto
impose provisional duties, thecontinuation oftheinvestigation tofinalize thecalculations, timeframes,
therequirements forundertakings, andthedemand forpayment ofprovisional duties. Notice isgiven
thatthedecision willbepublished intheCanada Gazette andthename, telephone andtelefax numbers
andaddress ofacontact person atRevenue Canada arealsoprovided.
Question
Canada believes thatallStatements ofReasons should beascomprehensive aspossible. Canada
would beinterested intheviews andcomments ofother Members onthisissue.
*****Given thenature andthenumber ofparties inthemarket, confidentiality requirements may
besuchthatthese figures arenotdisclosed.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page23
AdHocGroup onImplementation –Topic 10
Duty Assessment under Article 9
WTO Requirements
PartI:Prospective andRetrospective DutyAssessment
TherearetwobasicapproachestodutyassessmentcontemplatedbyArticle9oftheAnti-dumping
Agreement:
AProspective approach establishes normal values andexport prices inadvance ofimportation
ofsubject goods thereby allowing thedetermination oftheamount ofdutyliability atthetimeof
importation. Goods priced atorabove theirspecific normal values donotincur anydutyliability on
importation.*
1. ARetrospective approach applies estimated dutyratesfordeposit purposes. Final dutyliability
isdetermined atsome point afterimportation based onareview ofspecific normal values and
export prices during theperiod inwhich theimportation occurred.
Article 9oftheAnti-dumping Agreement doesnotindicate apreference between theprospective
ortheretrospective methods ofdutyassessment nordoesitprovide detailed rulesrespecting howthese
methods ofdutyassessment aretobeapplied. Accordingly, thechoice andimplementation ofaduty
assessment system islefttoindividual Members.
PartII:Lesser Duty
Article 9alsostates thatitisdesirable thattheanti-dumping dutyassessed belessthanthe
fullmargin ofdumping where thelesser dutywould beadequate toremove theinjury tothedomestic
industry (Article 9.1). TheAgreement doesnot,however, provide anyfurther guidance respecting
theapplication ofalesser duty.
Canadian Practice
PartI:Prospective andRetrospective DutyAssessment
Canada ’santi-dumping dutylaw,theSpecial Import Measures Act(SIMA), states thatananti-
dumping dutyistobecollected onallgoods imported intoCanada inrespect ofwhich theCanadian
International Trade Tribunal**hasmade afinding ofinjury. Toaccomplish this,Canada employs a
prospective method ofdutyassessment.
Revenue Canada administers theenforcement aspects ofCanada ’santi-dumping program.
Revenue Canada establishes prospective normal value andexport price methodologies prior tothe
*Thenormal values established maybespecific toindividual products orgeneral innature. General
normal values maybe,forexample, thedeclared selling priceplusaspecified amount. Export prices
mayalsobespecific orestablished tobethedeclared selling price onimportation documentation
submitted forcustoms purposes.
**Canadaoperatesabifurcatedanti-dumpingsystemwheretheCanadianInternationalTradeTribunal
hasfinalauthority overmatters ofinjury andRevenue Canada hasfinalauthority overthedetermination
ofthemargin ofdumping.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page24
importation ofgoods subject toananti-dumping finding.***Generally, known exporters ofsubject
goods areadvised ofthenormal values applicable totheirgoods inadvance ofimportation.
When goods areimported, Revenue Canada determines whether ornotthegoods are,infact,subject
toaninjury finding. Thecorrect normal value andexport priceinrespect ofthespecific subject goods
arethendetermined****.Ifthesubject goods arepriced atorabove theapplicable prospective normal
value atthetimeofimportation, noanti-dumping duties arelevied. However, iftheexport price is
below thenormal value, anti-dumping duties equal tothedifference between thenormal value and
theexport price must bepaid*****.
Administrative reviews conducted byRevenue Canada, normally onanannual basis, provide
up-dated normal values andexport prices. Exporters mayalsorequest administrative reviews because
ofchanges inmarket conditions which impact onnormal values orforpurposes ofestablishing normal
values fornewproducts. Theup-dated values, which aremade known toexporters attheconclusion
ofthereview, arethenapplied tosubsequent importations.******
Canada ’sprospective system eliminates theinjury caused bydumping inoneoftwoways:
export prices ofsubject goods areincreased bytheexporter toalevelequal totheirrespective
normal values thereby eliminating themargin ofdumping (i.e.,normal value lessexport price);
or
ananti-dumping dutyisassessed equal totheamount bywhich thenormal value ofthegoods
exceeds theexport price.
Theprospective system provides ameasure ofpredictability forexporters andimporters. Unlike
theretrospective approach thatestablishes finaldutyliability sometime afterimportation, exporters
andimporters areaware oftheanti-dumping dutyliability uponorpriortoimportation*******.Further,
byincreasing export prices, theexporter isabletoretain themonies thatwould otherwise bepaidin
***Normal values established byRevenue Canada maybespecific orgeneral innature. Export
pricemethodologiesestablishedbyRevenueCanadaarenormallythedeclaredsellingpriceonimportation
documentation submitted forcustoms purposes.
****Theassessment ofanti-dumping duties ismade within 30daysafterthegoods areimported
(subject tore-determination orappeal).
*****Itisnotpossible inallcases toavoid theapplication ofanti-dumping duties. Forexample,
goods fromexporters whodonotco-operate withRevenue Canada ’sinvestigations arenormally subject
toananti-dumping dutyequal toapercentage oftheexport price ofthegoods. Normally, Revenue
Canada willestablish specific normal values andexport prices where theexporters concerned provide
therequired dataandpermit verification ofthedata.
******Asamatter ofstandard practice, Revenue Canada requests exporters andimporters ofgoods
subject toaninjury finding toadvise Revenue Canada ofprice andmarket changes thatcould impact
onnormal values orexport prices. Exporters andimporters areadvised thatfailure toprovide such
information onatimely basis could result inare-determination oftheir dutyliability when the
information becomes available.
*******Under Article 9.3.1, finaldutyliability inaretrospective system istobedetermined assoon
aspossible aftertherequest forafinalassessment hasbeenmade: normally within 12months andin
nocasemore that18months aftertherequest.G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page25
anti-dumping dutywithout theadditional costs associated withposting asecurity untilsuchtimeas
thefinaldutyliability isdetermined asisthecaseinaretrospective system.
PartII:Lesser Duty
Canada doesnotapply alesser dutyascontemplated byArticle 9.1oftheWTO Anti-dumping
Agreement. However, SIMA doesprovide foraprocess whereby, intheevent ofafinding ofmaterial
injury, representations maybemade totheCanadian International Trade Tribunal (theTribunal) on
thequestion ofwhether ornottheimposition ofananti-dumping dutyinrespect ofthegoods towhich
thefinding applies isinthepublic interest.********
TheTribunal hassetoutprocedural guidelines withrespect topublic interest investigations
which allow interested persons*********andparties toaninjury inquiry maymake submissions tothe
Tribunal addressing matters ofpublic interest and,where warranted, undertake aformal proceeding
ontheissue ofpublic interest.**********
IftheTribunal isoftheopinion thatthere isapublic interest infavour ofthereduction or
eliminationoftheanti-dumpingduties,itissuesareporttotheMinisterofFinancecontainingitsopinion,
withspecific recommendations ontheamount(s) bywhich theduties (ornormal values) should be
reduced, andsupporting reasons.***********Thefinaldecision whether ornottoreduce oreliminate
theduties restswiththegovernment ontherecommendation oftheMinister.
Asaresult ofarecent parliamentary review ofCanada ’santi-dumping law,recommendations
weremade tochange thepublic interest provisions soastoprovide more specific guidance respecting
itsapplication.************
********SIMA: section 45.
*********Personsneednotbepartiestoaninjuryinquiry.Forexample,Canada’scompetitionauthority
has,inthepast,made submissions totheTribunal ontheissue ofpublic interest.
**********TheCanadian International Trade Tribunal ’sGuidelines forPublic Interest Investigations
document isaccessible viatheinternet at:http://www.citt.gc.ca/publicat/pb/english/pubint.htm
***********AcopyoftheTribunal ’sreport shallbepublished intheCanada Gazette.
************Thedocument entitled TheReport ontheSpecial Import Measures ActbytheSub-committee
ontheReview oftheSpecial Import Measures ActoftheStanding Committee onFinance andtheSub-
committee onTrade Disputes oftheStanding Committee onForeign Affairs andInternational Trade ,
Ottawa,December11,1996–isavailableontheInternetat:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/committees352/fine/reports/06_1996-12/fine-06-cov-e.html
Thedocument entitled Government Response totheReport ontheSpecial Import Measures
ActbytheSub-committee ontheReview oftheSpecial Import Measures ActoftheStanding Committee
onFinance andtheSub-committee onTrade Disputes oftheStanding Committee onForeign Affairs
and International Trade ,Ottawa, April 18, 1997 -available ontheInternet at:
http://www.fin.gc.ca/sima/simae.html
Thegovernment further agreed thatfactors thatmight form atestforpublic interest could
include:
significant damage todownstream users;G/ADP/AHG/W/30
Page26
Theparliamentary review alsorecommended thatwhen theTribunal undertakes apublic interest
inquiry, ithavetheoption ofusing alesser dutymethodology toarrive atadutylessthanthatwhich
would represent thefullmargin ofdumping. TheGovernment ofCanada supported bothofthese
recommendations andisintheprocess ofrevising thelaw.
Question
Asnoted above, oneoftherecommendations resulting fromtherecent parliamentary review
ofCanada ’santi-dumping andcountervailing dutylawinvolves allowing fortheuseofalesser duty
methodology incertain circumstances. Canada would beinterested inlearning more about Members ’
experience withthedetermination andapplication ofthelesser dutyapproach intheirdomestic anti-
dumping laws, including anymethodologies usedtomake suchadetermination.
problem ofaccess toinputs duetoimposition ofthefullduty;
restriction ofcompetition indomestic market;
significant impact onchoice oravailability ofproducts toconsumers; and
elimination ofcompetition inthemarketplace.