  
  
WT/TPR/G/408/Rev.1  
28 May 2021  
(21-4417) Page: 1/52 
Trade Policy Review Body   Original: English  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
REPORT BY  
QATAR 
Revision  
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by Qatar  is 
attached.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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Contents  
1   THE GENERAL POLICY CONTEXT  ................................ ................................ ..................  4 
1.1   Overview  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  4 
1.2   The Emergence of a New Economic Context  ................................ ................................ .... 4 
1.3   Qatar's Main Policy Responses  ................................ ................................ .......................  5 
1.3.1    Qatar Second National Development Strategy  ................................ ..............................  5 
1.3.2    Development of Domestic Markets  ................................ ................................ ..............  7 
1.3.3    Investment Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 8 
1.3.4    Labour Conditions  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9 
1.3.5    Labour Laws  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 11 
2   MAIN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ................................ .............  14 
2.1   Overview  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 14 
2.2   Macroeconomic Performance  ................................ ................................ ........................ 14 
2.3   Agriculture and Food Security  ................................ ................................ ...................... 17 
2.4   Fiscal Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 18 
2.5   Monetary Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 20 
2.5.1    Inflation  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 22 
2.6   Foreign Direct Investment  ................................ ................................ ........................... 23 
2.7   Preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup  ................................ ................................ .....23 
2.7.1    Sports Facilities  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......23 
2.7.2    Infrastructure  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 24 
2.7.3    Doha Metro  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 25 
2.8   Capital Markets  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 26 
2.8.1    Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism  ................................ .28 
2.9   Tourism  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 29 
3   TRADE POLICY REGIME  ................................ ................................ .............................  32 
3.1   Overview  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 32 
3.2   Trade Policy  Objectives  ................................ ................................ ............................... 32 
3.3   The General Authority of Customs  ................................ ................................ ................ 33 
3.4   Customs Procedures  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...33 
3.4.1    Changes in Export and Import Procedures  ................................ ................................ ..34 
3.4.2    Trade Facilitation Measures  ................................ ................................ ....................... 34 
3.4.3    Anti-Smuggling and Customs Security  ................................ ................................ ........ 35 
3.4.4    Customs Valuation  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...35 
3.4.5    Valuation Dispute Resolution  ................................ ................................ ..................... 35 
3.4.6    Customs Agreements  ................................ ................................ ............................... 35 
3.5   Rules of Origin  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 36 
3.6   Trade Remedies  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 36 
3.7   Foreign Investment  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....36 
3.8   Investment Promotion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .38 WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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3.8.1    Investment Promotion Agency Qatar  ................................ ................................ .......... 39 
3.8.2    Qatar Free Zones  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....40 
3.8.3    Media City  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 42 
3.8.4    Higher Education  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....42 
3.9   Export Promotion ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 43 
3.10   Double Taxation Treaties  ................................ ................................ ........................... 43 
3.11   Intellectual Property  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..44 
3.12   Competition Policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....45 
3.13   Procurement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 46 
3.14   Electronic Commerce  ................................ ................................ ................................ .47 
4   TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 48 
4.1   Bilateral Trade -Related Agreements  ................................ ................................ .............. 48 
4.2   The Gulf Cooperation Council  ................................ ................................ ....................... 48 
4.3   The World Trade Organization  ................................ ................................ ...................... 50 
4.3.1    Disputes  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 51 
5   REFERENCES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  52 
 
 
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1  THE GENERAL POLICY CONTEXT  
1.1  Overview  
1.1.  Since its last Trade Policy Review, Qatar has had to deal with a continuously evolving economic 
and political landscape, both at the global and the r egional level. Some of these new trends reflect 
a shift in market fundamentals, including regulatory changes, whilst others are more specific to 
particular situations that, in some cases, are still unfolding. In response to this, Qatar, under the 
leadershi p of H.H. the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani , continued to develop  its foreign 
economic policy, including a realignment of its trade policy framework to the emerging realities on 
the ground. This included  expanding Qatar 's export and import markets, establishing new shipping 
routes, developing domestic markets, implementing further trade facilitation measures, supporting  
and promoting foreign investment into the country, opening trade offices in the capital cities of key 
trading partners and continuing to complement the multilateral trading system through regional and 
bilateral cooperation agreements, amongst other initia tives. In this sense, the various situations 
faced by Qatar since 2014  (described in Section 1.2) led to the develop ment its policy toolkit in order  
to meet its strategic development goals as well as its global commitments.  
1.2.  The events of June 2017 created some challenges in the immediate aftermath. The situation, 
nonetheless, served to strengthen the authorities ' resolve to move forward with Qatar 's development 
agenda. Moreover, as time passed, Qatar 's economy, particularly its institutions and policy space , 
not only weathered the situation but, in fact, came out much stronger because of it. In fact, the 
challenges fast -tracked change through, revamped and streamlined regulations and oversight 
practices, created priorities, focused public policy to more acti vely manage existing resources and —
just as importantly —created the need to actively manage and mitigate risk.  
1.3.  At the same time, Qatar 's long -term human, social and economic development goals continued 
to be firmly grounded in the objectives set forth in th e Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2030). This 
document remains the fundamental policy framework for the country 's strategic socioeconomic and 
human development. It thus provides the guiding principles for all policy initiatives, including trade. 
The detail s of QNV 2030 may found in the 2014 TPR government report.1 
1.2  The Emergence of a New Economic Context  
1.4.  Several events explain the change s that have taken place  in the policy space since 2014 . First, 
the 2015 Paris Agreement, which Qatar ratified on 23 June 2017, included several commitments 
towards reducing the world 's carbon footprint.2 As a result, and aware of the bridge role that gas 
plays with renewable energies,  Qatar Petroleum (QP) completed several projects such as CO2 
reinjection projects at Ras La ffan, recovery of the Jetty Boil -off Gas during LNG loading operations, 
flare reduction and energy efficiency enhancement projects which are under operation. Moreover, 
QP is undergoing project to further reduce GHG emissions in the existing as well as new projects 
such as North Field Expansion Project. QP also entered into a strategic joint venture with companies 
specialized in renewable energy production to produce around 1 ,600 megawatts in Qatar. In this 
sense, Qatar has made gas and its related products the main tool in its strategy to combat the 
effects of climate change. Consistent with this, a nalysts continue to expect gas to be the only fossil 
fuel to grow beyond 2035.3 QP exports around 77 million tons of LNG per annum.   
1.5.  Secondly, the UK 's 2016 decision to leave the EU, which came into force on 31 January 20 20, 
created some  uncertainty to Qatar 's trade and investment regime  as no legal bilateral investment 
or trade framework is in force as of December 2020 . In effect, on the one hand, it opened t he policy 
space with the UK, one of Qatar 's closest trading partners (Q AR 10.4 bn in trade flows in 2018), 
enabling the possibility of extending bilateral trade and investment  flows. On the other hand, 
 
1 Qatar' s 2014 Government report. Viewed at: https://www.wto.org . WT/TPR/G/296/Rev.1 . 
2 These are: (i) holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 C above pre -
industrial levels, pursuing the limit of no more than 1.5 C above pre -industrial levels ; (ii) developing capacities 
to deal with the adverse consequences of glob al warming without threatening food production ; and 
(iii) financing of low greenhouse -gas emissions and climate -resilient development. Article 2 of the Paris 
Agreement.  
3 For example, see McKinsey & Co. (2019). Global Gas and LNG Outlook to 2035. Viewed at : 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil -and-gas/our -insights/global -gas-and-lng-outlook -to-2035# . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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however, as at December 2020, open questions remained regarding the UK's future trade relation 
with the EU, also one of Qatar's main trade partners .  
1.6.  Third, on 5  June 2017,  a de-facto sea, air and land blockade was imposed on Qatar as 
Qatari -flagged ships and airplanes were banned from using some  sea routes a nd airspace whilst the 
only land access to Qatar was also shut down. This included attempts to prevent ships carrying 
Qatari goods from crossing their territorial waters. The trade flows with the blockading countries at 
the time were significant, totalling  QAR 24.9 bn. During this time, Qatar continued to honour its 
commercial obligations.  
1.7.  Qatar also left OPEC in January 2019 as part of its strategic repositioning in world energy 
markets. In effect, international gas markets have also undergone important tr ansformations with 
two major downturns since 2014 (see graph below) and increasing competition in the Asian markets, 
Qatar's major export market. For example, Australia more than doubled its natural gas production 
during the period under review, going from  55.3 bcm in 2014 to 113.9 bcm in 2017. Furthermore, 
in May 2020 spot LNG prices in Asia reached their lowest level since 1992 (USD 2.03/mmbtu), 
although they have since recovered. Currently, however, most of Qatar 's LNG to Asia is sold on 
longer -term cont racts index linked to the oil price, which fell in 2014 but has been relatively stable 
since (apart from a temporary collapse induced by the COVID -19 crisis) . 
Major Natural Gas Reference Prices  
Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%)  
 
Source:  IMF. 
1.3  Qatar's Main Policy Responses  
1.3.1   Qatar Second National Development Strategy  
1.8.  The Qatar Second National Development Strategy 2018 –2022 (QSNDS) was developed under 
a markedly different context than the one accompanying the first Qatar National Development 
Strategy 2011 –2016.  Indeed, whereas the first development strategy was premised against the 
assumption of an average oil price of USD 86 (the actual average price was USD 88), the QSNDS 
faced much lower prices.4 Average oil prices during 2017 -2019 were USD 52.8, USD 68.3 an d 
USD 61.4 respectively (USD 40.5 in 2020, up to September). Gas prices experienced a similar 
 
4 IMF (2017). Qatar. Selected Issues. IMF  Country Report No. 17/89.  
-100-50050100150200
2005M1
2005M7
2006M1
2006M7
2007M1
2007M7
2008M1
2008M7
2009M1
2009M7
2010M1
2010M7
2011M1
2011M7
2012M1
2012M7
2013M1
2013M7
2014M1
2014M7
2015M1
2015M7
2016M1
2016M7
2017M1
2017M7
2018M1
2018M7
2019M1
2019M7
2020M1
2020M7Major Natural Gas Reference Prices
Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%)
TTF Natural Gas Forward Day Ahead, Netherland Indonesian LNG in Japan
HH Natural Gas Spot Price, Louisiana
Source : IMF%
Period Under ReviewWT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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decline during this period. The situation led to pressures on the government's budget whilst, at the 
same time, it created the need to develop a policy framework to diversify the sources of fiscal income 
and incentivise private sector investment.  
1.9.  In spite of the challenges , Qatar continued its efforts to achieve the objectives contained in the 
QNV 2030 document around  its four themes (human , social , economic and environmental 
development).  Moreover, t he QSNDS ' objectives were aligned with the goals and targets contained 
in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development , as per each  relevant sector. To this effect, the 
then Ministry of Development Planning and Statis tics (precursor to the current Planning and 
Statistics Authority) published two assessment reviews, one in 2017 and the other in 2018 , that 
contained a review of Qatar 's progress in achieving its sustainable development objectives.  The 
QSNDS also served to  provide a transparent evaluation of the various ongoing development 
processes as well as single out the principal shortcomings, at the sector level, in achieving the targets 
set out the in the first National Development Strategy.  
1.10.   The Ministry of Developm ent Planning and Statistics led efforts to prepare the QSNDS with 
the participation of ministries and other government bodies as well as  the private sector and civil 
society and educational institutions. The preparation process was followed  by discussions with the 
cabinet and , ultimately, the country 's leadership. The following table provides the main areas 
contained in the QSNDS.  
The Qatar Second National Development Strategy, 2018 -2022  
Area  Description  
Policy Focus  - On people, as all recommendations and objectives were focused on the population, work 
and sustainable development as one of the pillars of the second strategy.  
- To determine development priorities and then the programs and projects necessary to 
achieve them . 
- Clarity and realism of the strategic results and specific objectives.  
- Clarity of roles and responsibilities in government bodies responsible for implementing 
programs and projects.  
- Closer links between the strategies, plans and budgets available to them.  
- Establishment of an integrated monitoring and follow -up system to assess the strategy's 
performance and implementation through indicators so that reports on the progress can 
be submitted that include lessons learnt.  
- Modernizing and developing the public administration that bears the burden of 
implementing the strategy.  
- Establishment of a clear and comprehensive coordination mechanism within the sector and 
between the sectors and entities involved in implementing the strategy.  
Priorities  - Sustaining economic prosperity through economic infrastructure development, economic 
diversification, private sector development and natural resource management.  
- Promoting human development through the provisions of a comprehensive and integrated 
health ca re system, quality education and training and an efficient and committed 
workforce.  
- Achieving good social development through social protection, public safety and security, 
cultural enrichment and sporting excellence.  
- Achieving sustainable development that  preserves the environment.  
- Enhancing global partnerships for development by enhancing Qatar's role at all regional 
and international levels, scaling up the international partnerships, enhancing Qatar's 
regional position and contributing effectively to bui lding peace as well as regional and 
international security.  
Success 
Factors  - Efficient use of natural resources (oil, energy, and water).  
- Updating and amending legislation to keep up with ongoing needs and developments.  
- Maximizing the true partnership betw een the public and private sectors.  
- Improving the skills of workers in the Qatari labour market.  
- Financial sustainability, continuing to rationalize expenditures and increase the efficiency 
of expenditures and revenues towards funding development programs and projects.  
- Scaling up the coordination and communication among all development partners.  
- Exerting efforts to build planning capabilities and increase performance quality and 
achievement by scaling up human and institutional capabilities; developing capa bilities of 
planning and quality departments at the state level in order to improve the level of results 
and outputs and reduce the possibilities of wasted resources and time.  
- Optimizing investment to create a catalyst for building and maximizing work and 
achievement values.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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Area  Description  
Development 
Challenges  - Modernization and preservation of traditions  
- The needs of this generation and the needs of future generations  
- Managed growth and uncontrolled expansion  
- The size and the quality of the expatriate labour force and the selected path of development  
- Economic growth, social development and environmental management . 
Source : PSA, originally published by the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics in 2018 . 
1.11.   QSNDS also contains sector -specific development strategies, mainly focused on Qatar's 
critical  economic sectors —that is,  manufacturing, the professional and scientific services , finance , 
logistics , tourism and Information Communication Technologies . The document also contains 
development str ategies for security and safety, cultural enrichment,  and sporting excellence.  
1.3.2   Development of D omestic Markets  
1.12.   Qatar's initial policy response to the challenges created during the period under review 
included coordination across sectors and agencies to sec ure food and water supply, the continuation 
of major infrastructure projects, including preparations for the 2022 World Cup and, in general, limit 
the scope of economic disruptions. To this end, Qatar Development Bank (QDB) played a prominent 
role in provi ding funding to local companies since 2017, almost of all them to Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). Since 2014, QDB disbursed a total of Q AR 10.6 billion  towards productive 
activities (49.3% since 2017).  
1.13.   QDB merged with Enterprise Qatar in 2014 in order to streamline the country's support to 
local companies and undertook several strategy reviews thereafter. The 2018 strategy review 
focused its developmental efforts to strengthen local production and encour age import substitution. 
Its offer currently includes a host of financial and advisory products that are available to all Qatari 
companies, including those formed through joint ventures with foreign investors.5 Whilst QDB 
remains sector agnostic, it has i dentified 23 strategic sectors to the government, including 
agriculture, livestock and fisheries, manufacturing (excluding upstream oil and gas), healthcare and 
services, amongst others.  
1.14.   Critical to Qatar's policy response was the coordination between QDB and Qatar's Public Works 
Authority (Ashghal). In effect, since mid -2017 Ashghal began to face serious difficulties importing 
construction material from all countries as many carriers used ports in neighbouring countries, 
particularly in the UAE, to transhi p cargoes to Qatar. The government took advantage of the fact 
that Hamad Port had already become operational by this time and thus coordinated the importation 
of material directly to Qatar. Qatar Port Management Company (Mawani Qatar) launched five direct 
shipping lines between Hamad Port and the Ports of Sohar and Salalah in Oman, Nava Shiva in India, 
Izmir in Turkey and Karachi in Pakistan. The total number of shipping routes increased to 23 routes.  
1.15.   In addition to this, in July 2017, Ashghal launched the Ta'heel program in conjunction with 
QDB to accredit national companies to provide them with the opportunity to work as a supplier, 
mostly of construction material, in Ashghal 's pipeline of projects. As a result of these initiatives, the 
following products now supplied by Qatari companies to projects managed by Ashghal  include 
acoustic material, pipes and accessories, ready -mix concrete, air handling units, aluminium profiles, 
autoclaved aerated concrete, automation and SCADA system integration, blinding wir e black 
annealed, cement, electrical LV panels, gantries and cantilever and steel and stainless -steel 
fabrications, amongst others.6 
1.16.   Another area of close cooperation involving QDB was with Qatar Rail (QRail) in order to finalize 
the construction of Doha Metro. In effect, the  prohibition on import ing materials manufactured in 
and/or transhipped through some  specific countries  had an immediate effect on QRail's operations. 
Indeed, the  majority of construction materials and equipment for the Doha Metro and L usail Tram 
projects were then being delivered across the Bu Samra land border, many having been previously 
delivered by ship to the Jebel Ali Port in the UAE. As was the case with Ashghal, close collaboration 
with QDB led to the development of SMEs that be gan supplying QRail with construction material, de 
facto substituting for material that was being previously imported. The remaining material was 
 
5 See https://www.qdb.qa/en/products -services  for further details on QDB 's products and services.  
6 The complete list of product categories supplied to Ashghal through th e Qatari Ta 'heel program can be 
found in : http://www.ashghal.gov.qa/en/Services/Pages/ApprovedMaterialHome.aspx . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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delivered directly to Qatar (either by sea or by air). The changes proved to be  successful  as the 
Metro Doha w as delivered on time in May 2019 . 
1.17.   The situation  also deepened Qatar's commitment to developing domestic agricultural markets 
with QDB also playing a central role to this end. In fact, since 2014 QDB has disbursed 
QAR 135 million  towards agricultural and fi sheries initiatives (33.7% of these since mid -2017). In 
addition to this, the Ministry of Municipality and Environment (MME) in coordination with the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) launched two program mes to facilitate the distribution of locally  
produced agricultural products, i.e. the Outstanding Product (launched at the end of 2016) and Qatar 
Farms (launched in 2018).7 The first one was developed to facilitate the distribution of domestically 
produced agricultural produce in coordination with all consumer cooperatives throughout the 
country. The second program me was set up to encourage high -end agricultural production. The 
number of Qatari farms that participated in the Outstanding Product program me went from 12 in 
2016 to 130  in 2019 with production increasing from 24 ton nes in 2016 to 2,200 ton nes in 2018. 
Overall, during 2014Q1 –2019Q2, agricultural value -added (including forestry and fisheries) 
expanded at a compounded quarterly growth rate of 1.9%.8 Total production was es timated at 
around 66,000 tons in mid -2019 (see Section 2.3 for a further description of the initiatives 
undertaken).9 
1.18.   Qatar also continued to deepen its trade relations in spite of the evident challenges created 
by the situation  — now resolved  — thus allo wing it to be connected now to more than 90 countries 
through direct flights whilst hosting a state of the art port (Hamad Port, the largest in the region) 
and airport (Hamad International). This is complemented by Qatar's strong political and economic 
ties with a number of countries across the globe, including the United States, the EU, the Russia n 
Federation  and China. Moreover, a significant number of companies that had previously served Qatar 
from regional countries, established Qatari companies to serv e Qatar's domestic markets as well as 
other adjacent markets, such as Iraq. 
1.3.3   Investment Policy  
1.19.   Investment promotion was one of the key policy areas pursued in response to the various 
events during the period under review. In effect, Qatar's investment regim e was amended to make 
it more attractive across all sectors as was legislation covering special economic zones. Some of the 
measures introduced included the reduc tion of  rental value s by 50% in logistics areas within the 
Special Economic Zones during 2018 -2019 whilst exempting  new investors altogether if building 
permits were obtained before 31  January 2018 . Other such measures included deferring industrial 
loan instalments for a period of 6 months for owners of productive industrial enterprises and 
requiri ng ministries and government agencies to buy local products 100% if they comply with 
approved standards.  As at end 2019, the number of existing industrial establishments registered in 
MOCI's  Industrial Register included 862 industrial establishments with a total investment of 
approximately Q AR 295 b n until the end of 2019 (see Sections 1.3.2 ; 2.3; 2.6; 2.8; 3.7 and 3.8 for 
a description of the measures undertaken).10 
1.20.   Furthermore, the authorities also sought to deepen investment flows wi th several countries. 
For example, a Memorandum on Investment Cooperation and Bilateral Trade Relations was signed 
with Oman on January 2018, followed by t he Qatar -Oman Entrepreneurs Forum held in Doha , on 
11 April 2018 . Bilateral investments reached Q AR 5.5 bn by later 2017, up from Q AR 3 bn in 2016. 
Qatar also helped develop the Port of Swaken in Sudan, at a cost of USD 4 billion , besides promoting 
agricultural investment in the country as well . 
1.21.   In addition to this, the Qatar Chamber continues to organize seminars, conferences and 
meetings to promote and facilitate private sector investment.  More than 52 trade delegation visited 
 
7 Ministry of Municipalities and Environment (2019). Information viewed at: 
http://www.mme.gov.qa/cui/index.dox?siteID=2 . 
8 Planning and Statistics Authority (2020). National Accounts. Viewed at: 
https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/pages/default.aspx . 
9 Reuters (2019). Viewed at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us -gulf-qatar/with -cows-chickens -and-
greenhouses -qatar -takes -on-regional -boycott -idUSKCN1T6165 . 
10 Lusail Newspaper (2020). Issue No. 1383 of 13/02/2020 . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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Doha during this time with ongoing cooperation discussion  with Ethiopia , New Zealand, the Kuwait 
Chamber . Several exhibitions in Doha were lined up for early 2020.  
1.3.4   Labour Conditions  
1.22.   Since 2009 Qatar has made significant  efforts to protect expatriate workers  from forced 
labour. To this end, it  ratified , through  Decree No. (10) of 2009, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime and its Annex on the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children.  Pursuant to this, the authorities  have signed  
36 bilateral agreements and 13 memoranda of understanding with the governments of migrant 
workers' countries so as to provide them with legal protection before they are recruited. 
Furthermore, the MADSLA provides the embassies of migrant workers ' countrie s with lists of licensed 
recruitment agencies in Qatar so that recruitment is carried out according to the stipulations of the 
law both in Qatar and in the countries of origin. The Ministry also oversees recruitment agencies on 
behalf of other government entities  and inspects them to ensure that the expatriate workers are not 
exploited. If necessary, the MADSLA can impose penalties  that may include closing the office and 
revoking the license.  The ILO has recognised these efforts and thanked the authorities for the 
measures and procedures taken to protect the rights of the expatriate workers.  
1.23.   Qatar established Qatar Visa Centres (QVC) with the objective of facilitating visa procedures 
and implementing best practices (fair employment program) in the countries where most migrant 
workers come from, so far, covering Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, India and the 
Philippines. New QVC s will be opened in Tunisia, Kenya and Ethiopia. QVCs were established in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior ( MoI) to ha ndle recruitment procedures, including 
fingerprint and medical examination, prior to the arrival of workers in Qatar. The process enables 
the worker to read the employment contract correctly in his mother tongue and sign it electronically 
while still in th eir country prior to his travel. It ensures there is no contradiction between the 
employment 's offer announced by the recruitment agencies in the countries of origin and the legal 
contract terms. All services provided by the QVCs are electronic and paid fo r by the employer through 
bank transfers.  
1.24.   Qatari statutes contain severe punishments for human trafficking. To this end, Law No. (15) 
of 2011 includes penalties that start from seven years of imprisonment and a fine of no more than 
QAR 250,000  to fifteen y ears of imprisonment and a fine of no more than QAR 300,000  if the victim 
is either a woman or a child .11 The National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking (NCCHT), 
which was established under the Ministerial Decision No. (15) of 2017 to act as the na tional 
coordinator to monitor, prevent and combat human trafficking , adopted National Plan for Combating 
Human Trafficking 2017 -2022 in June 2019. Moreover, the authorities have  taken a number of 
measures to prevent and deter  human trafficking in cooperati on with the U.S. embassy in Qatar , the 
FBI and the UN Regional Office for Drugs and Crime  as well as organised awareness  campaigns  and 
distributed literature  aimed at migrant workers  to inform them about their rights. Qatar also provides 
shelter to victims of human trafficking  under the supervision of the NCCHT .  
1.25.   The Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs ( MADSLA ) raises 
awareness of workers' rights through different publications, media campai gns, online content and 
ground activities, amongst others. To this effect, 12  workshops were held in 2018 and 2019 to inform 
migrant workers and employers of their rights and duties as stipulated by the law.  At the same time, 
training programs have continu ously been held for government officers regarding migrant workers' 
issues . In 2016, the Best Communication Initiative was launched with the aim of provid ing migrant 
workers in Qatar with access to internet applications in order to enhance their effective i ntegration 
into the digital community and become part of the "Smart Qatar" vision . The initiative also aims to 
facilitate migrant workers ' access to information, keep them inform ed about relevant  laws, their 
rights and responsibilities during their stay in  Qatar, enable them to benefit from the e -government 
services provided by the relevant ministries as well as  communicate with their relatives back home.  
1.26.   Occupational safety and health (OSH) are another priority policy objective. Pursuant to this, 
the autho rities implemented a number of measures to develop internal capabilities including 
implementing training courses in cooperation with the Administrative Development Institute, the ILO 
International Training Centre in Turin and international experts.  Moreove r, Qatar's  OSH policies and 
practices were  developed through support from public and semi -public  authorities in Qatar and the 
 
11 Law No. (15) of 2011, Article 15.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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UK as well as  international technical experts. The process aligned OSH  legislation and standards, 
streamed data collection  and pro vided  analysis on accidents and occupational diseases.  As at early 
2020, Qatar is reviewing the ILO's Convention No. 155 ( on Occupational Safety and Health and Work 
Environment).  
1.27.   Since 2014, Qatar signed a number of  Memoranda of Understanding to enhance cooperation 
and develop domestic practices aimed at protecting labour standards. The initiatives led to 
cooperation with the Netherlands in the field of inspection and organising awareness campaigns . 
With Switzerland , on the other hand, Qatar cooperate s in the field of migrant workers  whilst doing 
so with Sweden  in the field of inspection and awareness campaigns and social responsibility in the 
hospitality sector.  Furthermore, during 2018-2020, Qatar signed a technical  cooperation agreement 
with the ILO to strengthen national legislation and practices and align them with international labour 
standards. This has included capacity building with workers and employers to ensure they are aware 
of their fundamental rights and  obligations . 
1.28.   Labour standards in Qatar improved significantly during the period under review. For example, 
there is now a four-tier auditing system for companies involved in delivering infrastructure projects 
related to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. These proc esses —which will be part of the tournament 's legacy 
once it is concluded —were launched by the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy (SCDL)  in 
2014, through Edition 1 of its Workers' Welfare Standards (WWS). The SCDL's four -tier auditing 
system sits at th e heart of the WWS and prescribes the following: self -audits by contractors; SCDL  
inspections and audits; external independent inspections and audits by SCDL 's external monitor 
(Impact t Ltd, which publishes an annual report with its findings ) and inspectio ns and audits carried 
out by the MADLSA. The SCDL  audits 100 % of all main contractors and other contracted parties, 
which encompass accommodation and construction site inspections, together with ethical 
recruitment audits. These contractually binding stand ards, which are aligned with Qatari labour law 
and based on more than three years  of development and collaboration with local and international 
stakeholders, are mandatory for all contractors working on 2022 FIFA World Cup  projects. The WWS 
mandate contrac tors to ensure compliance by their subcontractors as well. The SCDL 's WWS are 
included in all contracts issued by the SCDL.  
1.29.   The SCDL  produced an updated set of standards in 2016, strengthening the requirements 
based on its experience over the previous two years. This was done in consultation with the business 
community and numerous civil society groups, including Human Rights Watch, Am nesty 
International, Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI), Engineers Against Poverty, 
Humanity United and the International Labour Organisation. In 2018, additional bulletins were 
included, enhancing the health, working and living conditions for people working on SCDL  projects . 
1.30.   As at February 2020 , the SCDL had spent 55,178 hours on 14,210  audits and inspections  
whilst implementing several  measures to enforce its standards, namely : implementation of 
rectification plans at the contractor's cost, pa yment suspension, contract termination, reporting to 
MADLSA and blacklisting when ever required.  The SCDL  also pre-approves other contracting parties 
before a main contractor brings them to work on SCDL -projects. At the time, the  SCDL had received 
890 other  contracting parties'  requests, approving 675, rejecting 78 and with 23 in process.  
1.31.   The SC DL's Workers' Welfare programme led to several ground -breaking initiatives designed 
to improve the workers ' living standards , including a Universal Reimbursement Sche me aimed at  
paying back illegal recruitment fees charged to workers before travelling to Qatar. As at 
January  2020, 238 contractors ha d agreed to pay back over USD 30.4 million to 45,594 workers 
over a 12 -36 months period to both SCDL and non -SCDL workers.  The government of Qatar has 
implemented other legislative reforms that have led to safer and fairer standards for workers, 
including initiatives such as wage protection system , the scrapping of exit permits and a n 
announcement of a  minimum wage to be intr oduced later on in 2020.  
1.32.   The Workers' Welfare Forums (WWF) —a safe environment in which workers can raise a wide 
range of issues through their democratically elected representatives —continues to build momentum . 
The WWFs amplify workers' voices and inform ev ery aspect of workers' welfare improvement efforts 
to further support the SC DL's four -tier auditing system. All grievances are directed to the SC DL, who 
ensure rectification by contractors. The WWFs have been highly effective , cover ing more than 
19,000  SCDL workers and 10,000 non -SCDL workers. The MADLSA and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) have studied this SC DL model with a view to implementing it across Qatar.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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1.33.   The SCDL also commissions a  survey of its workers' annually, p roviding approximately 10% 
of the workforce with a platform to anonymously share facts and opinions on key matters such as 
contracts, work environment, remittance and pay, life in Qatar, and accommodation amongst others. 
The surveys are carried out indepen dently by Qatar University's Social and Economic Survey 
Research Institute (SESRI), a centre dedicated to providing sound and reliable data to guide policy 
formulation, priority -setting, and evidence -based planning in the social and economic sectors. The 
surveys are designed and carried out by the SESRI field experts in accordance with the highest 
scientific and ethical standards, with an assurance provided to respondents that their answers would 
be confidential and presented in an aggregate format. High-level findings report that workers are 
generally very satisfied with the SCDL programme, receive adequate training and are satisfied with 
their rights.  
1.34.   Health and safety are also  key priorit ies for the SCDL . More than 38,000 workers have so far 
been register ed under an innovative integrated electronic medical records system. This initiative 
addressed the need for workers to have a single medical record that any health practitioner could 
access. Moreover, t he SCDL mandates annual medical examinations through close collaboration with 
its contractors  whilst deliver ing comprehensive health checks in partnership with the Qatar Red 
Crescent across all projects . As at February 2020, the approach had led to comprehensive medical 
examinations for almost 28,000 workers  and will continue until all workers have been assessed. This 
process is expected to  profile the SCDL workers ' health needs whilst  identify ing issues that required 
further investigation or treatment.  
1.35.   The SC DL also works with other  partners to ensure health and safety, notably Hamad Medical 
Corporation, Qatar International Safety Centre, Weill Cornell Medicine - Qatar and the global trade 
union Building and Wood Workers' International (BWI). These collaborations include: (i) partnering 
to ensur e that  all SCDL  workers receive appropriate training on the skills required to carry out their 
roles, including behavioural -based safety trainin g; (ii) a pilot nutrition project launched in 2017, 
where clinical researchers examined workers' health, diets and general awar eness of the importance 
of nutrition , developed an awareness campaign and ultimately provid ed final recommendations to 
improve nutrition and menu options on site and in accommodations ; (iii) integration of mental health 
awareness and treatment options, eng aging relevant partners in improving accessibility to 
psychiatric treatment and counselling ; and (iv) designing a comprehensive pathway for all workers 
and clinicians on SCDL projects. The SCDL has collaborated with BWI to conduct joint health and 
safety inspections  since 2017 with t he SC -BWI Joint Working Group (JWG) manag ing inspections 
and reporting obligations. The JWG also facilitates training and reviews the SC DL's grievance 
mechanisms, in cluding the WWFs. JWG Annual Reports were published in 2018, 2019 and 2020.  
1.36.   In 2019, the SCDL collaborated in the largest -ever study into the effects and mitigation of 
heat stress , commissioned by the ILO and MADLSA and carried out by the FAME Lab . The stu dy 
monitor ed 125 construction and agricultural workers across 5,500 work hours and two sites , which 
included the Al Rayyan Stadium. Research found conclusive evidence that when comprehensive 
mitigation strategies are implemented t hen occupational heat stra in levels in Qatar are low. The 
SCDL employs such mitigation strategy , which include cooled and shaded rest areas every 
100-200m, ventilated and air -conditioned rest areas, water stations with cool water and rehydration 
salts every 300 -400m, mandatory wate r bottle for each worker, training for workers and medical 
staff on the effects of heat stress and dehydration, robust medical care plans for all workers, and a 
strong focus on worker empowerment and self -pacing on site —all managed closely by teams of 
health and safety professionals on site. In addition t o the heat stress study, the SC DL introduced a 
bespoke range of cooling workwear  capable of reducing thermal skin temperature by a maximum of 
8°C. Over 12,000 suits were distributed  across five sites during  the 2019  summer , with more to 
follow suit throughout 2020.  
1.3.5   Labour Laws  
1.37.   Since 2014 Qatar introduced significant changes to its labour laws with the aim of improving 
living standards and the rights of migrant workers in Qatar. Most contractual employment re lations 
are governed under the provisions of Law No. (14) of 2004, as amended (Qatar's Labour Law). The 
exceptions are basically within the public sector as the law does not apply to public ministries, public 
institutions and corporations and the companies  formed under Qatar Petroleum, amongst others. 
Law No. (3) of 2014 provides further details on the exemption to the Labour Law, most of which 
includes publicly -owned companies, in whole or partially.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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1.38.   Law No. (21) of 2015  — which regulates the entry, exit a nd residence of expatriates in Qatar  
— abolished the sponsorship system, i.e. the kafala system, and replaced it with a contractual 
employment relationship  system. The aim was  to grant legal rights to expatriate workers without 
discrimination, including the right to change employment, leave the country and the right to reunite 
with family members, amongst other areas.  
1.39.   Law No. (13) of 2018, in particular, amended Article 7 of Law No . (21) of 2015 to grant most 
workers the right to exit Qatar, temporarily or definitively, without an exit visa. The law does grant 
employers, nonetheless, the right to submit a list to the MADLSA with the names of up to 5% of 
their workforce requiring the m to obtain an exit visa before leaving. In practice, the list typically 
covers staff with fiduciary responsibilities in publicly -owned companies. In this sense, the MADLSA 
has published specific criteria on these exemptions, which apply to "CEOs, financia l officers, directors 
responsible for overseeing a company's day -to-day operations and directors of information and 
communication technologies ". Employees not allowed to leave Qatar against their will can bring their 
dispute to the Expatriate Exit Grievanc es Committee, an entity within the MoI, which must respond 
within three working days.  
1.40.   Confiscation of expatriate workers' passports could lead to sanctions of up to Q AR 25,000 
(Law No. (21) of 2015 ). To address the situation, t here is effective coordinatio n between the MADLSA 
and the MoI to ensure that expatriate workers ' passports  are not confiscated  with all complaints in 
this regard being  referred to the Public Prosecution. Some of the investigation undertaken resulted 
in fines and imprisonment whenever the fines were not paid . Furthermore, a  number of companies 
have been prosecuted for violating the provisions of the Labour Law, including failure to comply with 
restrictions on working hours, not granting a compulsory day off, or not paying overtime.  
1.41.   Law No. (18) of 2020 amended Law No. (14) of 2004 to introduce several key changes, 
including the abolition of the No Objection Certificate. The probation period was set to a one -time 
maximum of six months for each employment. The new law also sets the procedu res to be followed 
in order to switch jobs in Qatar, including, the requirement of letting the employer know in writing, 
time for notice periods (one month for employment lasting less than two years, two months 
otherwise), the compensation to be paid in ca se a worker changes job during the probation period 
(the new employer must compensate part of the recruitment costs as well as the air ticket to a 
maximum of two months of the worker's basic wage).  
1.42.   On the other hand, the Council of Ministers approved a draft law on October 2019 to regulate 
the minimum wage  in Qatar, which will come into force in March 2021. The draft law forces  
employers to pay a basic minimum wage for workers, provide food and adequate housing , including 
for the domestic workers . The proje ct also include s the establishment of a minimum wage committee 
that would propose periodical amend ments in line with changes in the cost of living.  
1.43.   Law No. (1) of 2015 amended certain provisions of the Labour Law and Ministerial Decree 
No. (4) of 2015  in order to protect the right to be paid for workers covered by the Labour Law (the 
provisions are known as the wage protection system). In this case, employer s are legally required  
to transfer the wage to the employee's account in one of Qatar's  financial ins titutions. In addition, a 
mechanism to electronically check compliance with the law was put in place to control for potential 
violations. Sanctions for delay s in the payment of wages  can include up to one -month imprisonment 
and a fine of not less than QAR 2,000 and not more than QAR 6,000 as well as a suspension from 
all engagements with the MADLSA . In this case, companies would be also prevented from obtaining 
any new further work permits.  
1.44.   The la w now recognizes the right to reunion with family members by workers covered under 
the Labour Law. In effect, Article 8 of Law No. (21) of 2015 states that competent authorities can 
grant residence permit s to the spouse of the resident worker s and the male children up to 25 years 
of age that  did not complete their university studies as well as their  unmarried daughters . The law 
also allows the competent authority the right to waive the age limitation and grant resident permits 
to the resident worker´s paren ts if deemed reasonable. Resident permits may also be granted to 
the spouse and children of a Qatari married to a foreigner, including the non -Qatari spouse's parents.  
1.45.   New regulations were introduced to create an expeditious and effective dispute resolution  
mechanism rather than waiting for the standard legal  arbitration  process, which  typically adheres to 
established  legal procedures and deadlines, often result ing in the worker's return to his or her home WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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count ry before receiving due payments.  To address this, Law No. (13) of 2017 established  the 
Workers ' Dispute Settlement Committees  whilst Cabinet Resolution No. (6) of 2018 stipulated their 
operating procedures. In cases of disputes regarding  the enforcement o f the law or the employment 
contract, the case must first be present ed to the competent department within the MADLSA, in  which 
case, all  the necessary measures to resolve the dispute amicably are taken within a period not 
exceeding seven days. If the parties are satisfied with the decision of the competent department, it 
is documented and the agreement has  executory force. If the dispute is not resolved or the worker 
or the employer is not satisfied with  the resolution of the competent department, the dispute is 
referred to the Workers ' Dispute Settlement Committee , which must then make a decision within a 
period not exceeding three weeks . The Committee 's decision is immediately enforceable . 
1.46.   A Workers ' Support and Insurance Fund  was established by Law No. (17) of 2018  to secure 
workers ' financial  payments in cases where the company bec ame insolvent and was unable to pay 
the workers . In this manner, the law now provides for a mechanism to avoid procedures t hat may 
take time and affect the workers ' payment obligations towards their families or others. It also aims 
to ensure expedition of payment at the end of worker 's service and facilitate the procedures of the 
worker s' return to their home country, as the Fund also serve s both private sector workers and 
domestic workers. If necessary, t he Fund has the right to  recover any due amount from the employer 
through legal means. The payments made by the Fund are awarded by Labour Dispute Settlement 
Committees  (also created by Cabinet Resolution No. (6) of 2018), which include a judge appointed 
by the Supreme Judicial Council and two officials from the MADLSA.  
1.47.   Ministerial Decision No. (21) of 2019 implement ed the provisions of Chapter 13 of the Labour 
Law, which  stipulate that employers and workers are to  choose representatives  in companies with 
30 or more employees. To this end, Joint Labour Committees were established by law in  entities 
covered by  the provisions of the Labour Law  to include an equal  number of  representatives from 
both parties with the objective of  organis ing the work, means of production, training programs, risk 
prevention, improving compliance with occupational safety and health rules, developing the workers ' 
general culture and con sidering the individual and group disputes to settle them amicably.  
1.48.   Qatar's labour  laws do  not contain any form of sex-based discrimination. In fact, Article 93 of 
the Labour Law stipulates that "The working women shall be paid equally to men where they pe rform 
the same job and shall have the same training and promotion opportunities ". The Labour Law has 
also granted working women the right to m aternity leave with full payment for a period of 50 days, 
without reduction  of any other leave  to which they are e ntitled, a n hour of breastfeeding every day 
for a period of one year starting from last day of her maternity leave  and p rohibit s the employ ment 
of women in hazardous occupations or forcing  them to work in times other than those specified by 
a decision of t he Minister.  
1.49.   To ensure compliance of employers with working women 's rights, Article 98 of the Labour Law 
also stipulates that the employer may not terminate the employment contract of a female worker 
due to marriage or maternity leave, and the company may not notify her of the termination of her 
employment contract during th ese leave s or send her a notification of the termination of her 
employment contract during vacation.  
1.50.   Law No. (15) of 2017 also provides legal protection for domestic workers, especially women 
domestic workers, in line with the provisions of ILO's Convention No. 189 on decent work for 
domestic workers . The law prohibits the employment of people  under eighteen years of age  
regardless of gender , sets the maximum daily working hours, and stip ulates the worker 's right to 
weekly and annual paid leave, travel tickets, end of service benefits, health care and decent housing, 
compensat ion for work -related injuries and allows the worker to terminate the employment contract 
during its validity in case of abusive  treatment by the employer. The law also stipulates that  Labour 
Dispute Settlement Committees are to prioritize quick dispute resolution processes so as to en sure 
that the employees obtain their rights and dues promptly . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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2  MAIN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Overview  
2.1.  Qatar 's economy continued to diversify away from oil and gas  with the proportion of non-
mining and quarrying activities going  from 44% of GDP in 2014Q1 ( measured in nominal terms) to 
66% in 2 020Q1 . In 2020, the Covid -19 crisis led to a steep decline of 26.3% in Qatar's international 
trade flows during the first half of the year, which, not only raised the capture of non -mining and 
quarrying activities to 7 6% of GDP by mid -year but also led to the biggest quarterly economic 
contraction in Qatar´s recorded economic history in 2020Q2. The crisis has so far led to changes in 
budgetary assumptions as well as the implementation of proactive government policy resp onses to 
support private sector companies as well as the resident population. In this sense, the authorities 
remain committed to undertake further policy measures as needed as well as support the 
development of a vaccine and "make it affordable in a fair way to the neediest countries ".12 
2.2.  The shift experienced throughout the period under review, moreover, was sustained by the 
combination of persistent multiplier effects stemming from increases in capital expenditure (ongoing 
since at least 2014), fisca l consolidation, abundant liquidity and increased private sector activity.13 
Since 2014, GDP growth was mainly sustained by non -mining and quarrying activities, which 
expanded at an average quarterly rate of 4.1% (4.8% prior to the COVID  crisis) whilst min ing and 
quarrying activities contracted at a 1.1% rate during the same period. The expansion reflected 
significant increases in service provision related to accommodation and food, tourism, the completion 
of major infrastructure projects and an important i ncrease in import -substitution activities after mid-
2017, mostly in construction materials and agricultural products. Capital markets also expanded as 
foreign investors significantly increased their presence in Qatar Financial Centre (QFC). Gas exports, 
nonetheless, continue to be Qatar 's major source of export revenues with ongoing exports to Japan 
and other Asian countries, which makes up about 30% of the total market share, in addition to 
recently signed agreements to export gas to Bangladesh, Turkey, Au stria and Kuwait.  
2.2  Macroe conomic Performance  
2.3.  Average quarterly GDP growth during 2014Q1 -2020Q2 was 1.9% (2.3% before the pandemic) 
in spite of a consistent slowdown that went from an average of 5.3% in 2014 to 0.8% in 2019. 
Initially, the local economy was able to absorb the 2014 -2016 drop in hydrocarbon prices as well as 
the first effects of the diplomatic rift in 2017.14 However, world gas prices deteriorated significantly 
after that —e.g. the Japan LNG price contracted by 61% between Jan/2018 and Sep/2020  — leading 
to an average quarterly expansion in GDP of 1% during 2018 -2019.15 As a result of this decline 
(apart from the period between mid -2016 to end -2017) GDP growth was mostly driven by 
non-export activities  — in fact, average quarterly contribution fr om the mining and quarrying sector 
during 2014 -2019 was -0.4% whilst that of the non -mining and quarrying sector was 2.3% ( -0.5% 
and 2.7% prior to the pandemic respectively).  
2.4.  In 2019, real GDP growth was held back due to slowdown in the hydrocarbon sector  albeit  the 
non-hydrocarbon sector expanded by 1.3% on a year -on-year basis. Within the non -hydrocarbon 
sector, with the except ion of  manufacturing, most of the other key sectors registered positive 
growth. The manufacturing slowdown can be explained in par t by the fact that a good part of these 
activities are derivatives of the hydrocarbon sector. Consumer confidence also retracted by 0.9% in 
early 2019 as compared to the five -year with authorities expecting a sharp turn around as the effects 
of the Covid -19 crisis subside. The following table provides Qatar 's main macroeconomic indicators . 
 
12 H.H. the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (2020). Shura Council Speech. Viewed at: 
https://www.shura.qa/en/Pages/General -Secretary/Amir -Speeches/49th -Session -Opening . 
13 IMF (2019). Qatar Article IV Consultation.  
14 IMF (2019). Qatar Article IV  Consultation.  
15 IMF (2020). Commodity database. Viewed at: http://www.imf.org . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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Main Macroeconomic Indicators , 2014 -2019  
(Real g rowth rates, unless otherwise indicated ) 
 2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019a 
GDP, real ( 100 =2013)  4.0 3.7 2.1 1.6 1.5 -0.2 
 Private Consumption  8.0 7.6 7.0 4.4 4.6 5.3 
 Government  8.9 1.5 -10.9 -6.1 5.4 4.6 
 Gross capital formation  11.3 1.6 22.5 1.3 0.6 -0.3 
 Stocks  -11.9 193.9  -56.1 -28.3 1312.3  55.8 
 Exports  0.3 -1.0 -4.2 0.6 4.2 0.5 
 Imports  6.4 -9.2 4.8 -2.9 3.9 2.5 
Mining and Quarrying  -0.6 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 -1.9 
Non-Mining and Quarrying  9.8 8.5 5.3 3.8 3.2 1.1 
Employment (million)  1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Unemployment rate (%)  0.19 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 
CPI (index, 100 = 2018)  95.3 97.4 99.6 99.9 100.0  99.1 
FX (USD/Q AR) 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 
Government balance (% of GDP)  14.5 -0.7 -9.2 -6.6 2.2 1.1 
Gross government debt (% of GDP)  24.9 35.5 46.7 49.8 48.6 57.0 
Public budget (% of GDP)    4.0  3.8  4.2   
Current account balance (% of GDP)  24.0 8.5 -5.5 3.8 8.7 6.8 
       
Additional Item s:       
Population ('000)  2,216  2,434 2,618 2,725 2,760 2,799 
Average Qatari oil price per barrel (USD)    65.6  65.6  65.6   
a Preliminary.  
Source:  PSA. 
2.5.  The impact of the COVID -19 pandemic so far is hard to underestimate, as has been the case 
across most of the globe. The first two quarters of 2020 saw a drop in real GDP growth of -0.04% 
and -6.1% respectively, down from a quarterly average of 1.5% in 2019 . Moreover, albeit imports 
experienced an important contraction of 9.7% in nominal terms during the first half of 2020, it has 
been exports that have taken the brunt of the ongoing crisis. Indeed, these, which had been declining 
since 2018Q4 when they peak ed at Q AR 97.1 billion, faced a steep drop in energy prices at the 
beginning of 2020, mostly associated to a decline in world energy demand and a then oversupply of 
world oil markets. As a result, Qatar's exports reached Q AR 53.5 billion in 2020Q2  —a 44.9% 
contraction since the end of 2018.  
2.6.  In spite of all these challenges, past and recent, the authorities continue to pursue 
macroeconomic stability through a combination of policies designed to mitigate  potential risks arising 
from either oil price fluc tuations , volatility in global demand for Qatar's  export products  and/or  
increas ed regional geopolitical risk. These include: (i) the implementation of a value -added tax and 
amendments to several existing taxes (including the fuel tax) ; (ii) supporting the  Qatari Riyal by 
ensuring stability of the monetary base , large cash reserves at Qatar Central Bank (QCB) and active 
risk management of Qatar Investment Authority's (QIA) portfolio, amongst other specific measures ; 
(iii) supervision of domestic banks to en sure compliance with international standards on capital 
adequacy, liquidity ratios  and cash transfers assurance ; (iv) ensuring that a healthy level of liquidity 
in the financial system is maintained (the liquid -asset-to-total-asset ratio was 29.7% as at Ju ne 
2019)16; (v) improving coordination  between fiscal and monetary authorities ; (vi) greater oversight 
on trade flows ; (vii) continuing to improve the domestic business environment, particularly to 
provide incentives to foreign investment ; and (viii) conti nuing to pursue long -term social and 
economic development goals through ongoing infrastructure development.  
2.7.  Gross capital formation expanded significantly in 2016 to almost 49% of GDP, up from 37% in 
2015, supported by ongoing infrastructure development pr ojects. The expansion resulted on a 
quarterly average contribution to real GDP growth by the construction sector of 1.7% during 2015 
and 2016 (see below). On the other hand, trade's contribution to GDP growth rebounded in 2018 
once alternative shipping rou tes and import markets were found. However, the non -mining and 
quarrying sector's contribution declined markedly after mid -2017. In effect, it went from a quarterly 
average of 3.1% to 0.9% after it notwithstanding the continuation of major construction pro jects, 
 
16 IMF (2019). Qatar Article IV Consultation.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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whilst mining and quarrying's contribution remained subdued throughout almost the entire period 
under review.  
Sector Contribution to Real GDP Growth  
 
Source:  PSA. 
2.8.  The regional situation  also led to a downgrade of Qatar's credit rating to AA -/Aa3 by all three 
rating agencies and  placing it on the credit watch list with a negative outlook . This, in turn, 
immediately increased the  cost of insurance on Qatari sovereign debt  although the  negative s tatus 
was reversed to stable in 2018 , after the government 's general policy  shift allowed the Qatari 
economy to overc ome the initial shock.17 This was accompanied by increased government spending 
and the withdrawal of part of its deposits abroad to support  the local banking system . In this line, 
QCB supported the banking system with an estimated USD 38.5 billion (23% of GDP) to compensate 
for the USD 30 billion associated to capital flight and investors exiting Qatar  in the first two months 
of the crisis . 
2.9.  Monetary authorities responded decisively and proactively to ensure that any potential risks 
stemming from the regional challenges were  effectively contained.  As a result, t he balance sheet of 
the banking sector recorded a compounded annual growth rate of a round 9% during 2014 -2019, 
supported by annual average growth of close to 10% in credit. The banking sector also remained 
well capitalized during the period with ample liquidity. Moreover, l oan delinquency remained one of 
the lowest among st its GCC peers a nd profitability has been healthy. The capital market has also 
turned the corner, barring for the initial reaction to regional challenges in 2017 . 
2.10.   Qatar's overall trade flows were also disrupted temporarily it was estimated that both exports 
and imports di d contract for two straight quarters whilst substitute routes and imports markets were 
found. The break in normal trade flows around 2017 was reflected in the current account with a 
surplus of 3.8%  of nominal GDP  in 2017  after a deficit of -5.5% in 2016. T he surplus continued in 
2018 (8.7% of GDP) and was expected to decline slightly in 2019 (to 6.8%) as the effect of import 
substitution policies gained traction. Going forward, the authorities expect the current account 
balance to reach 5.1%  and 5.7% i n 2020  and 2021, respectively, although these estimates may be 
affected by the ongoin g COVID crisis.  
 
17 Moody 's (2018). Viewed at: https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys -changes -outlook -to-stable -
from-negative -on-ratings -of--PR_386630 . 
-8%-6%-4%-2%0%2%4%6%8%10%
2014 Q1
2014 Q2
2014 Q3
2014 Q4
2015 Q1
2015 Q2
2015 Q3
2015 Q4
2016 Q1
2016 Q2
2016 Q3
2016 Q4
2017 Q1
2017 Q2
2017 Q3
2017 Q4
2018 Q1
2018 Q2
2018 Q3
2018 Q4
2019 Q1
2019 Q2
2019 Q3
2019 Q4
2020 Q1
2020 Q2Contribution to real GDP Growth -Production Side
Agriculture Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing Power & Utilities
Construction Trade
Transport Leisure and food
ITC Financial and insurance
Real Estate Professional services
Public Administration Education
Social Work Arts and Entretainment
Households (FISIM)
Import Duties GDP
Source : PSA-7%-5%-3%-1%1%3%5%7%
2014 Q1
2014 Q2
2014 Q3
2014 Q4
2015 Q1
2015 Q2
2015 Q3
2015 Q4
2016 Q1
2016 Q2
2016 Q3
2016 Q4
2017 Q1
2017 Q2
2017 Q3
2017 Q4
2018 Q1
2018 Q2
2018 Q3
2018 Q4
2019 Q1
2019 Q2
2019 Q3
2019 Q4
2020 Q1
2020 Q2
Mining and quarrying Non Mining and quarrying GDPSector Contribution to Real GDP Growth
Contribution to real GDP Growth
Mining & Quarrying v/s Non Mining & QuarryingWT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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Trade Flows and Real GDP  
 
Source:  PSA. 
2.3  Agriculture and Food Security  
2.11.   Qatar´s agricultural sector was at the centre of the initial response to the challenges of 2017. 
In effect, several policy initiatives were undertaken to support the pri vate sector in its efforts to 
ensure the continuity of country's food supply at the time. None of these, however, led to 
amendments or changes to the sector's core legal framework. In this sense, the sector's legal 
arrangement continues to be based on Laws  No. (4), (1), (1), (1), (4), (8), (14), (24), (24) and 
(25) of 1983, 1985, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2010, respectively.18 The 
framework also includes the Implementation Rules of Laws No. 4 of 1983 as well as No. 1 of 1985.  
2.12.   Several technical regulations  were enacted during the period under review. The main ones 
were: Guidelines for the Production of Organic Foods, Materials to Be Used as Soil Conditioners, The 
General Mechanism for Licensing Vegetable , Animal and F ish Product ion Projects  and The Mechanism 
for Using Farms for Commercial Activities . An additional directive was also enacted to streamline 
and facilitate the electronic exchange of documentation between the Ministry of Municipality and 
Environment (MME) and food pro ducers. The MME is the sector's regulator and agricultural policy 
coordinator. In 2019, it created the Food Security Department to oversee and regulate the 
implementation of the government's food security strategy (see below).  
2.13.   Qatar's agricultural strategy seeks to increase  agricultural production in areas that meet three 
conditions: (i) Qatar has comparative advantage s in their production ; (ii) their output is not 
appropriate for long -term storage ; and (iii) production does not deplete the country's groundwater  
sources. As a result, the country's supply of goods not meeting all three conditions has been ensured 
through the development of strategic inventories built through imports. This includes wheat, rice, 
corn sugar and froze n poultry, amongst others.  
2.14.   As was the case in other areas of the economy, policy initiatives allowed Qatar to overcome 
the significant initial difficulties of 2017 , which included lack of animal feed and materials used in 
agricultural production. Th e MME i mplemented an  emergency plan that included  coordination with 
Qatari  companies and farms to incentivise  them to increase domestic production . The consultations 
undertaken led to several positive outcomes for the sector, including a reduction in import 
compe tition (e.g. chilled broiler chicken and dairy products ), an increase in consumer demand for 
national products  and the expansion in domestic production of agricultural products . 
  
 
18 The English version of all of these laws can be found in Al Meezan at : 
https://www.almeezan.qa/default.aspx?language=en . 
-15%-5%5%15%25%35%45%55%65%75%85%
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
2016Q4
2017Q1
2017Q2
2017Q3
2017Q4
2018Q1
2018Q2
2018Q3
2018Q4
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2Exports and Imports
Percentage of GDP, nominal (%)
Exports Imports
Source : PSA-8%-6%-4%-2%0%2%4%6%8%
80%85%90%95%100%105%
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
2016Q4
2017Q1
2017Q2
2017Q3
2017Q4
2018Q1
2018Q2
2018Q3
2018Q4
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1
2020Q2Trade Flow as Proportion of nominal GDP
Percentage and real GDP growth rate (%)
Real GDP Growth (R) (Exports + Imports)/GDP (L)
Source : PSATrade Flows and Real GDPWT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
- 18 - 
 
Annual Agricultural Production in Qatar  
Produce  Pre-2017  Post-2017  
Domestic Production 
(000 tonnes)  Sufficiency 
Ratio  Domestic Production 
(000 tonnes)  Sufficiency 
Ratio  
Vegetables  55 20% 74 27% 
Dates  28 84% 30 86% 
Animal Feed  95 44% 115 54% 
Dairy Products  60 28% 230 106%  
Fresh Chicken  11 50% 28 124%  
Red Meat  8 13% 10 18% 
Table Eggs  4 14% 9 28% 
Source : MME. 
2.15.   The difficulties faced by the private sector also led to a renewed effort to address the longer -
term challenges to ensure food supply in Qatar. To this end, the MME led a cross governmental effort 
that culminated in a comprehensive policy, i.e. Qatar National Food Security Strategy 201 8–2023.19 
The strategy rests on the fulfilment of four strategic pillars, i.e. : 
• International trade and logistics . The aim, in this case, is to ensure that "trade routes are 
diversified so risk -exposure is limited " and that contingency plans exist for alternative routes in 
case of need ; 
• Domestic self -sufficiency . The aim in this area is to develop an efficient agricu ltural 
production based in Qatar and to develop a regulatory framework to provide incentives for 
investment in agricultural production ; 
• Strategic reserves . The objective is to develop an "adequate but sensible " food reserve 
capacity that can act as a buffe r in times of crisis that includes both inputs and outputs ; 
• Domestic markets . The aim is to be create the conditions, including the necessary regulations, 
to move food around the country as efficiently as possible and with minimal waste . 
2.16.   Several food -secur ity projects were launched for private sector investors that include d the 
supply  of rented farmland  for an annual feed QAR 2,000 per hectare. Some of the initiatives  to be 
made available for investors are : 10 projects for the production of vegetables in greenhouses with 
an annual production capacity 21,000  tonnes for the ten projects , 4 projects for the production of 
green fodder with wastewater treatment with an annual production capacity around 17,000  tonnes 
for the four projects , 2 projects for the production of organic fertilizers with an annual production 
capacity around 12,000  tonnes per year for the two projects , 2 projects for the production of 
concentrated fodder with an annual production capacity ar ound 50,000  tonnes per year for the two 
projects , 2 projects for the production of camel milk with an annual production capacity around 
3,000 tonnes per year for the two projects, 2 projects for fish farming with floating cages with a 
production capacity a round 2,000 tonnes per year for the two projects and a shrimp farming project 
with an annual production capacity around 1,000 tonnes per year.  
2.4  Fiscal Policy  
2.17.   The Ministry of Finance (MoF) , which  manages fiscal policy on behalf of the Government , 
underwent a n important restructure during the period under analysis. A miri Decree No. (77) of 2018 , 
in recognition of the growing importance of non -oil revenues for Qatar, including the Value -Added 
Tax (VAT), transformed the MoF's Tax Department into the General Tax Authori ty (GTA), a separate 
legal entity dependent on the MoF (Article 2). The Decree also established  the GTA's  mandate , 
specifically, tasking it with implementing the provisions of all tax -related laws, regulations and 
decisions, propose draft legislatio n as needed and undertake research on tax related issues in 
Qatar.20 Furthermore, Amiri Decree No. (10) of 2019, on the other hand, also introduced organization 
changes to the MoF, including the allocation of further responsibilities over Qatar's domestic 
economic activities.  
 
19 MME (2020). View ed at: http://www.mme.gov.qa/pdocs/cview?siteID=2&docID=19772&year=2020 . 
20 For further details, see https://gta.gov.qa . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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2.18.   Three additional tax -related regulations came in to force during the period under review. Law 
No. (24) of 2018 provides new exemptions from corporate tax  — which remains at 10%  — for 
activities in key economic sectors and special economic zones. It also introduces a number of 
administrative amendments to  support taxpayers in managing their tax affairs . Law No. (25) of 
2018, on the other hand, introduced a selective tax, i.e. an excise tax, on some  health -damaging 
products , including a 100% tax on tobacco and its derivatives as well as on  energy drinks and  a 
50% tax on sugary drinks.  The law on the Value -Added Tax (VAT) was also drafted but has not come 
into force yet as the authorities continue to evaluate the optimal market conditions for its 
introduction. In any case, the authorities foresee  that the VAT , which is expected to be set at 5%,  
will have  a minimal role in financing the budget . 
2.19.   During this time, the MoF also continued to develop the country's capital markets. To this 
end, Qatar enhanced its already strong financial position by tap ping the inter national bond market 
in April 2020, the first country in the region to do so since the outbreak of the COVID crisis and the 
slide in oil prices . In fact, it issued public debt for USD 10 billion, which had an over 4x 
oversubscription, with a geographically  diversified investor 's base , highlighting the market's 
confidence in Qatar 's credit profile.  
2.20.   The aforementioned mentioned issuance was part of larger strategy developed by the MoF to 
manage public debt and underpinned by several factors. First, the state 's debt issuances are used 
as benchmarks by local State -Owned Enterprises and the private sector that serve to anchor prices, 
something that is particularly important for QP, which is currently undertaking a massive expansion. 
Second, budget surpluses get dispersed between the two state reserve vehicles – the central bank  
and the QIA. As the proceeds of the issuances are considered cashflow surplus, and not budget 
surplus, they are kept with the MoF 's Treasury and not transferred to the reserve vehicles. Th erefore, 
cashflow surpluses from issuances provide the MoF with funds for contingency spending – which the 
MoF prefers to have regardless of  the cost. Finally, historically, Qatar issued bonds even during 
periods of massive surpluses , not just during perio ds of stress,  with the intention of making its paper 
know to investors . In general, the MoF — which intends to maintain the current debt management 
strategy  — monitor s debt markets for opportunistic issuances, especially during periods of low 
interest rate  environment . 
2.21.   The development of an active domestic debt market in Qatar is expected to have  far-reaching 
benefits for the country's capital  markets infrastructure. It will help to attract institutional investors 
as well as encourage  local investors to bet ter manage their asset allocation process , thus, providing 
an incentive to retain capital in the country. A well -developed debt market will also allow companies 
to diversify their sources of funding and reduce the cost of borrowing.  Moreover, the authoriti es 
expect that by developing the local capital market monetary policy transmission will be facilitated 
thus supporting the local financial market's development. The lengthening of the maturity profile of 
Qatar's debt issuance will also encourage the emerge nce of a risk -free yield curve across the term 
structure. In turn, the risk -free benchmark rate will help in the pricing of other financial instruments.  
2.22.   On the other hand , Qatar 's fiscal accounts remained under control during the period under 
review despit e the decline in energy price experienced during 2014 -2015 and the effects of the 
regional rift  since mid -2017. In fact, the situation did not affect the MoF's strategic plans or goals 
for economic growth and diversification . Indeed, prior to the onset of the COVID  crisis in early 2020, 
analysists were of the view that the government 's fiscal position had continued to strengthen based 
on expenditure consolidation  and higher energy prices, starting in 2016.21 The expenditure 
consolidation efforts, in particu lar, led to more streamlined and efficient outlays as well as tighter 
control over the government 's finances . 
2.23.   Since 2014 the authorities faced repeated challenges from the revenues side as declining 
energy  prices led to  fiscal deficits in 2015, 2016 and 2017  — e.g. 6.6% of GDP in 2017 .22 To address 
this, various measures were implemented including the reduction and reprioritiz ation of  public 
expenditure  as well as increas ing efficiency in public spending. At the same tim e, the  MoF took 
several steps to enhance non-oil revenues  — which started increasing in 2017  — thus contributing 
to the expansion in the government's fiscal space . The remaining deficit was financed using buffers 
available with the MoF's  Treasury and debt tools.  
 
21 IMF (2019). Article IV Consultation. Washington, DC.  
22 IMF (2019). Article IV Consultation. Washington, DC.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
- 20 - 
 
2.24.   Qatar remains committed to further fiscal consolidation and is working to implement several 
initiatives to this end. These include constrained expenditure (in response to low energy prices), 
contained growth of public sector payroll, rationalization  of pub lic investment, continued growth of 
non-hydrocarbon revenues, which includes  the introduction of excise taxes , streamlining both capital 
and current  public expenses, mobili zing non -oil and gas revenues via improving the tax 
administration system,  streamlining and upgrading tax regulations, and facilitating and easing tax 
procedures and management. As at end 2020 , the process ha d succeeded in meeting its stated  
purpose.  
2.25.   Going forward, Qatar is well placed to respond effectively to the lower oil price environment, 
a position underpinned by three current factors: the ongoing fiscal consolidation process, the decline 
in the publicly -financed CAPEX spending as major projects for World Cup 2022 have either finalized 
or are about to finish and the combinatio n of a strong market appetite for Qatar's credit profile with 
opportunistic debt market issuances. As a result, the fiscal balance is expected to record larger 
surpluses over the medium term as spending on major projects is anticipated to decline gradually  
and hydrocarbon revenues are expected to remain steady as output remain relatively constant. 
Public subsides remain in place and, thus, continue to be part of current public expenses. Post 2024, 
as the first phase of the North Field LNG production expansion comes online and public expenditure 
stabilizes, the fiscal balance is expected to improve significantly. To achieve fiscal sustainability 
Qatar is reviewing the possibility of adopting and developing fiscal management tools through whi ch 
it can identify and reap fiscal benefits and justify the resources it would invest in a systematic way.  
2.26.   The assumptions underlying Qatar's 2020 budget, however, had to be reviewed in light of t he 
combination of the current  oversupply of oil (October 202 0) and  the plunge in demand due to 
COVID -19 crisis . To this end, the price of crude oil  assumed for 2020's budget was revised  to USD 
40 per barrel , down from the original assumption of USD 55 per barrel (same as 2019).23 This is 
expected to put some strain  on the fiscal account, particularly, in light of Qatar's decisive response 
to the COVID crisis. Indeed, t he response includes comprehensive fiscal and monetary measures to 
support the affected sectors (including hospitality, tourism, retail, commercial co mplexes, logistics) 
as well as to enhance liquidity of the banking sector. The following measures  were implemented :  
1. Postpone Q AR30 billion (U SD 8.24 billion) in unawarded contracts on capital expenditure 
projects . 
 
2. Allocate Q AR 3 billion (U SD 0.82 billion) in guarantees to local banks to provide soft loans 
(without commission and fees) for affected companies to support salaries and rents . 
 
3. Roll out a stimulus package of Q AR 75 billion (U SD 20.6 billion)  to the private sector to 
support and provide f inancial and economic incentives . 
 
4. QCB to implement measures t o encourage banks to postpone private sector loan instalments 
and obligations for six months . 
 
5. Direct QDB to postpone instalments of all borrowers for six months . 
 
6. Ask public Qatari entities  to increase their investments in the stock exchange by 
QAR 10 billion (U SD 2.7 billion) to support Qatar's  capital markets . 
 
2.5  Monetary  Policy  
2.27.   QCB, which has supervisory and monetary policy responsibilities in Qatar, was established by 
Amiri Decree No. (15) of 1993 and its activities are mainly regulated by Law No. (13) of 2012. Since 
2014, QCB's Financial Stability and Risk Control Committee (FSRCC) became fully operational and 
is assisted by two sub -committees, one focused on financial stability an d the other one on 
supervisory issues. The Committee coordinates macroprudential monitoring activities and 
assessments undertaken by the relevant departments. Further, to facilitate the safekeeping and 
management of securities and other financial instrumen ts, the Qatar Central Securities Depository 
(QCSD) was established in 2014.  
 
23 Shura Council (2020). Viewed at:  https://www.s hura.qa/en/Pages/General -Secretary/Amir -
Speeches/49th -Session -Opening . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
- 21 - 
 
2.28.   QCB also established a new unit focusing on FinTech and a new department focusing on 
cybersecurity in response to the economy 's growing reliance on E -commerce and financial 
technol ogical innovation. It created a new financial inclusion committee as well, an idea that was 
highlighted at the Council of Arab Central Bank Governors ' Meeting in April 2016. The growing 
importance of data management also meant an increasing focus on this a spect and following a 
thorough internal assessment, a department on data management  was established in 2019. At the 
same time, recognizing the important of human resource as a key ingredient of central bank 
operations, the human resource department was reo riented to ensure a dedicated and active focus 
on the issue.  
2.29.   QCB's de facto monetary policy objective is to keep the value of the Qatari Riyal stable against 
the US dollar (fixed since 2001 at Q AR 3.64 per one US dollar). To this end, the use of the QCB 
lending rate has served effectively to manage monetary policy whilst the required reserve ration 
remained fixed at 4.5% throughout the period under reviewed. In a wider sense, QCB maintained 
an active policy stance during the period under review. During 2014 -2017 QCB issued many 
regulations to banks to adopt -Basel III - guidelines, which include, capital adequacy with all its 
pillars, liquidity coverage ratio, net stable funding ratio, and leverage ratio. Furthermore, it also 
provided support to domestic syst ematically important banks requiring capital buffers, and recovery 
plans. During 2017, instructions were issued to banks to update the framework of measuring and 
controlling large exposures as per the latest Basel guidelines. In late 2017, it launched in 
coordination with Qatar's other financial regulatory authorities, the Second Strategic Plan for 
Financial Sector Regulation (SSP2). During 2017 -2018 QCB also issued guidelines to conventional 
banks and Islamic banks to implement the new accounting standards , IFRS 9 and AAOIFI 30 starting 
from the beginning of the financial year 2018. In December 2019, it announced the adoption of the 
implementing regulations to Law No.  20 of 2019 on Anti -Money  Laundering and Combating Terrorism 
Financing.  
2.30.   The development of the bond market is one of the key strategic objectives for QCB. In effect, 
the secondary bond market is developing over time through short - and long -term instruments, which 
in turn, has ensured better transmission of monetary policy, and in the process, st rengthened the 
mechanism of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. It has also supported the banking 
and financial system by enhancing domestic banks ' balance sheet liquidity position, in line with 
international best practices.  
2.31.   QCB responded ac tively to the political regional challenges of 2017 . To this end, it moved to 
ensure that an adequate level of liquidity was preserved in the financial system at all times, 
maintained close and continuous monitoring to address any potential financial disru ption and kept 
the market informed of all QCB actions. It was subsequently found that both the banks and the 
financial markets responded successfully to the se challenges. The IMF reaffirmed this as it 
highlighted the economy 's successful absorption of the negative shocks created by the 2014 -2016 
decline in oil prices and the adverse regional landscape .24 In particular, the Committee for Crisis 
Management, which operates within QCB, was instrumental in providing guidance to the  financial 
sector as economic and financial situations evolved at the time. In -depth discussions with financial 
sector participants were frequently undertaken to ensure a close and continuous assessment of their 
strengths and weaknesses in order to address  any potential financial stability concerns. At the same 
time, the launch of the SSP2 in November 2017 also represented an integral part of the authorities ' 
long-term strategic realignment. To this end, it explicitly included maintaining financial integrit y as 
a strategic goal (which previously had been considered under other objectives) as well as promoting 
financial inclusion and financial literacy.  
2.32.   In 2020, the authorities announced an economic package of Q AR 75 billion for the private 
sector in response  to the evolving Covid -19 pandemic. Consistent with this and to safeguard financial 
stability, QCB also undertook several key policy measures such as lowering its key policy rates, 
providing additional liquidity to all banks operating in Qatar at a zero co st. QAR 3 billion in guarantees 
were also allocated to local banks to mitigate the impact of the most critical short -term payment 
obligations by the private sector. The postponement of repayment of loan instalments , including 
from QDB,  due as well as the i nterest/return on those loans for the affected sectors, and cancellation 
of POS fees and ATM withdrawal fees, amongst others. Relevant guidelines were also issued for 
 
24 IMF (2019). Article IV Consultation. Washington, DC.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
- 22 - 
 
non-banking entities such as finance and investment companies, consultancy companies and 
exchange houses. The instructions were placed on the QCB website for wider public dissemination.  
2.33.   Several milestones were achieved during the period under review. Besides the development 
of the FSRCC 's capabilities  — in line with international best practice s — QCB established the 
Renminbi Clearing and Settlement Centre in 2015, the first of its kind in the Middle East, as a hub 
for settlement and clearing transactions. On the other hand, the publication of the SSP2 highlighted 
the close cooperation with othe r domestic financial regulators. Other important developments 
included the enactment of the revised Anti -Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing 
law (AML/CFT) and the accreditation to the Qatar Credit Bureau as an accredited local operating unit  
by the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (see Section 2.8.1 for further details on the 
AML/CFT). Another important landmark was the launch of the Qatar Interbank Offered Rate, thus 
meeting a long -standing market need by providing a reference point  for banks borrowing unsecured 
funds in the local wholesale banking market and promoting a more active interbank market in the 
country. The gradual development of the bond markets since 2014 has been an important 
development as well as it has served to tra nsmit signal and enhance the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE) also upgraded from frontier to emerging market status by MSCI, 
Standard and Poor 's and Dow Jones (S&P) and FTSE Russell since 2014. Recently QCB launched the 
Qatar Mo bile Payment System (QMP) and issued Rule Book/Guidelines containing Mobile Payment 
Instructions in 2020.  
2.34.   In 2019, the Qatar Credit Bureau was accredited by the Global legal Entity Identifier 
Foundation as an authorized Local Operating Unit for the local a llocation of legal entity identifiers. 
This is expected to  further enhance transparency in the financial sector by allowing stakeholders to 
clearly identify each entity in financial markets and enable better assessment of macroprudential 
risks. Two other d evelopments are important in this regard. First, the Credit Bureau initiated 
issuance of credit reports with FICO credit scores. Second, keeping in view of the economy's 
changing dynamics, the Credit Bureau also added members from the telecom and automobil e 
financing sectors. In term of international raking, Credit Bureau expanded its credit coverage during 
the recent past, including more companies ' information which led to increase the credit coverage 
scoring in the Doing Business report (World Bank, 2020) . It also  deepen ed the availability of credit 
information . Going forward, QCB is  working towards a strategic expansion of the Credit Bureau's 
activities, exploring the introduction of credit scores for the SME sector.  
2.5.1   Inflation  
2.35.   Qatar's inflation dynamics d uring the period under review were largely dominated by 
international hydrocarbon prices  — gas prices in particular  — and some domestic price imbalances. 
In fact, as average gas prices declined during 2014Q2 and 2016Q4  — at a compound quarterly 
growth rate of -7.6%  — inflation followed suit, going from 2.9% to 1.7% in the same period.25 After 
that, the synchronicity was lost as domestic price considerations overtook inflationary pressures. 
Ample availability of Commercial Real Estate and housing space, coupled with a decline in the cost 
of international tourist packages and airfares, triggered an adjustment process starting in 2017 that, 
coupled with declines in transport and communications, put downward pressure on the CPI. Whilst 
the real estate  adjustment is still ongoing, the authorities expect the CPI to expand slightly to 2.1% 
in 2020 and 2021.  
 
25 Average international gas prices were calculated by the Amsterdam TTF, Indonesian LNG  and Henry 
Hub prices.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
- 23 - 
 
Quarterly Inflation and International Gas Prices  
 
Source: PSA, IMF.  
2.6  Foreign Direct Investment  
2.36.   Qatar's net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (inward minus outward flows) remained 
significantly negative at a quarterly average of Q AR 4.5 billion (USD 1.2 billion) during 
2014Q1 -2019Q4. In effect, average quarterly outward flow outstripped average quarterly inward 
flows by an average multiple of 5. 3, thus leading to a total of Q AR 103.2 billion (USD 28.4 billion) 
in outward flows during the period under review with a total of Q AR 4.1 billion (USD 1.1 billion) in 
inward flows during the same period.26 Interestingly, outward FDI flows were in tune wit h GDP's 
cycle for most of the period under review, particularly after 2017 (correlation index of 0.63), whereas 
inward FDI flows were not. In effect, most of the inward flows are associated to ongoing construction 
activities and, thus, not linked to the ec onomy's cycle.  
2.37.    QIA continued to build its investment portfolio during the period under review . In doing so it 
continued to diversify risk in different markets, sectors and types of activities, basically covering the 
entirety of the investment spectrum. QI A also has exposure in Qatar through investment in 
companies operating in QFC (see Section 2.8 for further details on QFC).  
2.38.   The authorities noted that they continue to monitor the impact of Brexit on the UK economy . 
QIA continued to invest in the UK  as it still believe s that the UK remain s an attractive destination 
for long -term investment . In consequence, it continue s to seek new opportunities in several sectors 
including infrastructure, technology and energy . 
2.7  Preparations for the 2022  FIFA World Cup  
2.7.1   Sports Facilities  
2.39.   The SCDL is responsible for delivering  the sporting facilities for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Its 
board, which was restructured in 2018 through Amiri Decision No. (2) of 2018, is led by H.H. the 
Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, H.H. th e Personal Representative of the Emir, H.E. Sheikh 
Joaan bin Hamad Al Thani, H.E. Sheikh Mohamed bin Hamad Al Thani (its Managing Director) and 
H.E. the Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa Al Thani. The board also includes the Ministers of 
Finance, C ulture and Sports, Development Planning and Statistics, Transport and Communication, 
 
26 QCB (2020). Foreign Direct Investment Flows Report.  
-60-40-200204060
-2.0-1.00.01.02.03.04.0
2014Q1
2014Q2
2014Q3
2014Q4
2015Q1
2015Q2
2015Q3
2015Q4
2016Q1
2016Q2
2016Q3
2016Q4
2017Q1
2017Q2
2017Q3
2017Q4
2018Q1
2018Q2
2018Q3
2018Q4
2019Q1
2019Q2
2019Q3
2019Q4
2020Q1CPI and Average Gas Price*, growth (q -o-q, %)
Inflation (L) Ave. Gas Price (R)
Sources : PSA, IMF%
*: Includes Netherlands TTF, Indonesian LNG and HH%Quarterly Inflation and International Gas PricesWT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
- 24 - 
 
Municipality and Environment and the President of Qatar Football Association. Moreover, the core 
senior management remains largely unchanged since 2010  — in fact, a number  of the most senior 
people on the team were part of Qatar 's successful bid in 2010. The development of young talent 
also remains a focus as Qatar ensures the tournament leaves a legacy.  
2.40.   The SCDL's strategic plans are supported and aligned with those of oth er governmental 
entities responsible for infrastructure development in Qatar. Because of this, the immediate adverse 
impact of the regional challenges was quickly overcome as the authorities encouraged domestic 
production of construction material whilst ac tively seeking for alternative import markets (see 
Section 1.3.2 for further details). The Government's efforts to successfully and quickly establish new 
shipping and air routes also helped to limit long -term impacts or delays in any of the delivery 
timeli nes. In this sense —and in spite of the situation —Qatar remains committed to delivering a FIFA 
World Cup that is truly regional in nature.  
2.41.   All eight tournament venues will be ready by 2021 as the projects continue to progress on 
schedule and budget  with some of them having already been completed. In effect, the first venue 
to be inaugurated was Khalifa International Stadium, which opened its doors in May 2017 five and 
a half years ahead of the tournament's kick -off. After that, the Al Janoub and Education C ity 
Stadiums were completed in April and December 2019 respectively. By the end of 2020, Qatar will 
have six tournament -ready venues, with Al Rayyan, Al Bayt and Al Thumama Stadiums all being 
completed. None of these stadiums will be located more than 75 k m from each other. Also, i n a first 
for a FIFA stadium, Qatar's 40,000 -seat Ras Abu Aboud Stadium will be completely dismantled 
following the tournament. This is possible thanks to the venue's unique construction, using shipping 
containers and modular seat ing. These and other constituent parts of the stadium will then be used 
in other sporting or non -sporting venues. Most venues also feature modular designs to allow excess 
seating to be removed and donated post-2022.  
2.42.   In fact, Qatar's sporting infrastructure  is already widely used by communities in the country . 
Each venue has tailored legacy plans that suit the local communities to ensure they are used long 
after the tournament. The legacy plans for each venue were developed after thorough consultation 
with t he local community, ensuring they met the needs of those that will use the venues before and 
after the tournament. Many venues include both sporting and non -sporting facilities in legacy -mode, 
with some including schools, mosques, wedding halls and retail spaces within the stadium and their 
surrounding precincts post 2022.  
2.43.   Qatar is also working towards a Global Sustainability Assessment System (GSAS) certification 
for all stadiums to ensure that the most environmentally friendly practices and materials are  used. 
To this end, Qatar launched  a joint sustainability strategy with FIFA and will be the first to host a 
fully carbon neutral tournament. As part of the initiative, the stadiums' designs were developed to 
reduce both the waste generated during producti on of stadium components and that created onsite 
during construction . Renewable and low -energy solutions are also incorporated  wherever possible, 
making stadiums energy self -sufficient and even powering other facilities.  
2.44.   The venues have been undergoing strict technical and operational preparedness testing as 
well. On the one hand, several tournaments have already been successful ly hosted as trial -runs, 
e.g. the 2019 Arabian Gulf Cup and 2019 FIFA Club World Cup,  whilst evaluations are underway. 
These include certifying that stringent standards, built into the contracts, have been met prior to 
handover, testing the stadiums' prepa redness through matches at various capacities, that 
appropriate materials were used to meet sustainability criteria, that health and safety plans are in 
place and tested and that structures are compliant with civil defence standards. The authorities 
expect  that all unfinished and/or missing work will be addressed as testing progresses.  
2.45.   Procurement is still ongoing, mostly focused on the final stages of delivery.27 
2.7.2   Infrastructure  
2.46.   Qatar's preparations for the FIFA World Cup moved forward in spite of the event s that marked 
the period under review. To this end, Ashghal continued to develop Qatar's core infrastructure, i.e. 
expressways, local roads, public buildings and flood prevention infrastructure as well as the 
 
27 Further information can be found from https://www.qatar2022.qa/en/opportunities/procurement . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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Intelligent Transportation System and the Publi c Realm Beautification programme. The agency also 
built bus stations, depots and the park & ride sites that will complement the Doha Metro whilst 
completing the "cool paving " pilot road project in 2019  — an initiative to reduce solar radiation from 
the asp halt through the use of cryogenic material. In fact, since 2014, Ashghal completed 771 km 
of the new roads network, 151 new or upgraded interchanges, 200 bridges and underpasses, 853  km 
of footpath, cycle ways and shared paths, 3,400 km of foul sewer proje cts, 6,700  km of new local 
roads and 5,100 km in drainage projects.  
Ashghal's Completed Projects and Obligations in 2019  
 Type of Project  Number of Projects 
Completed  Total Value (Q AR billion)  
Completed Projects  Roads and Infrastructure  34 4.2 
Buildings  18 5.3 
Obligations  Roads and Infrastructure  44 9.9 
Buildings  4 0.12 
Source:  Ashghal . 
2.47.   Ashghal has a number of signed obligations for 2020, totalling QAR 32.8 billion in roads and 
infrastructure projects and QAR 4.8 billion in building projects. Since 2014, the agency  revamped 
its project management capabilities whilst streamlining its procurement process (see Section 3.13 
for further details on its procure ment practices). Furthermore, it adjusted its strategy to ensure that 
the circumstances witnessed in mid -2017 are not repeated. This included collaboration with other 
agencies to encourage local companies to become suppliers of construction material (see 
Section  1.3.2 for further details) as well as reaching out to institutions and private sectors in 
previously untapped import markets to ensure a steady flow of imported construction materials. The 
case of bitumen is a case in sample as new import markets we re sought and found.  
2.7.3   Doha Metro  
2.48.   The Doha Metro came into service for the public in May 2019 and, as at early 2020, it covered 
around 100 km through three lines and 27 stations spanning from Al Wakrah to Lusail. Ridership at 
this time was around 150,000 per  day with over 13 million having travelled since opening day. The 
delivery of this first phase, moreover, was done on time and on budget. Phase two of the network 's 
development will introduce a fourth line and extensions to the current lines that will incl ude 
60 additional stations. QRail, the agency tasked with the delivery of the Doha Metro, is also 
responsible for two other major projects, i.e. the Lusail Tram and the Long -Distance Rail.  
2.49.   QRail 's strategic guidelines are provided by the Ministry of Trans portation and Communication  
(MoTC) —created through Amiri Decree No. (16) of 2014  — with operational decision -making kept 
within the company. Its board is chaired by the Prime Minister, H.E. Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa Al 
Thani and includes, amongst others, Q Rail's Managing Director and CEO H.E. Eng. Abdulla Abdulaziz 
Turki Al Subaie, Ashgal's president H.E. Dr. Eng. Saad Ahmed Al Muhannadi and the Secretary 
General of SCDL, H.E. Hassan Abdulla Hassan Al Thawadi. QRail 's strategic goals include the cost 
efficient and timely delivery of the railway programme, following international best practices for 
safety, security and health. To this end, c onstruction standards , rules and regulations  for Doha Metro 
are on European and U .S. Standards . 
2.50.   The regional challenges  created some minor initial disruption as the majority of the 
construction materials and equipment for the Doha Metro and Lusail Tram projects were being 
delivered across the land border, much of it after having been delivered by ship to the Jebe l Ali Port. 
The principal impact on the Doha Metro was on fitouts and mechanical escalators. However, the core 
infrastructure for the phase one delivery of the project was already in the country. Furthermore, 
materials began to be delivered directly to Qat ar as QRail worked with its contractors to identify and 
overcome potential delays. Some of the solutions included sourcing alternative suppliers (many from 
China and Iran), finding alternative supply routes, and expediting shipments. Measures taken also 
include the following:  
• The creation of a task force to quickly identify and resolve bottle necks in the supply chain ; 
 
• QRail stepped into the Supply chain to contact multinational suppliers working across all lines, 
e.g. Siemens, Schneider, NAFFCO , to obtain  commitments to support the schedule ; WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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• Promotion of import substitution through BACS equipment assembly, GRG panel fabrication and 
steel manufacture ; 
 
• Fast Track approvals - Face to face workshops enabling subsequent Qatar Civil Defense approvals 
for altern ative materials ; 
 
• Air freight were used for critical materials to maintain the schedule on critical pilot stations ; 
 
• Control rooms were established to provide visibility of blockages in the supply chain and, thus, 
prepare timely corrective measures to protect the schedule ; 
 
• Project management consultants were brough on board to gather accurate data to re -sequence 
work to  absorb delays and to support the design and build contractors and subcontractors ; 
 
• Specific customs clearance support was established in Oman through Al Milaha.  
2.51.   QRail also implemented ad -hoc procurement procedures to allow for quick deployment of 
resource s to the key areas of the supply chain (further details can be found in Section 3.1 3). 
2.52.   Doha Metro's success so far depends primarily on its integration into the overall public 
transport landscape in Qatar. In fact, at  the end of last year, Doha Metro demon strated its 
capabilities during  the Arabian Gulf Cup and the FIFA Club World Cup by transporting around one 
third of the spectators —peaking on Qatar National Day  when more than 330,000  people chose to 
travel through the Metro system . Going forward, Q Rail expect s to continue to grow ridership further 
when integration with other modes is further improved . 
2.8   Capital Markets  
2.53.   Qatar Financial Centre  Regulatory Authority  (QFCRA) regulates and provide oversight over 
Qatar's onshore financial centre  — i.e. QFC.  To this end, QFCRA and QFCA continuously updated 
their legal and regulatory environment since 2014 to ensure adherence to global best practices.  
QFCRA and QFCA Main Legal Provisions – 2014 -2020a 
Year Rules and Regulations  Amendments  
2014 - Interpretation and Application Rules  
- Banking and Business Prudential 
Rules 
- Principles Rulebook  
- Asset Rules  - General Rules  
- AML/CFT Rules  
- Collective Investment Scheme Rules  
- Insurance Mediation Business Rules  
2015 - Islamic Banking Business Prudential 
Rules  
- Conduct of Business Rules  
- Insurance Mediation Business Rules  - General Rules  
- Company Regulations  
- Company Rules  
- Captive Insurance Business Rules  
2016 - Foundation Regulations  
- Investment Club Regulations  - Collective Investment Scheme Rules  
2017  - QFCA Tax Regulations and Tax Rules  
- QFCA Trust Regulations  
- Insolvency Rules  
- Tax Rules  
2018  - Banking Business Prudential (Liquidity Risk and 
Miscellaneous) Rules  
- Individuals (Assessment, Tra ning and Competency) 
Rules  
- Islamic Banking Business Prudential Rules  
- Interpretation and Applications Rules  
2019 - Investment Management and 
Advisory Rules  
- Customer and Investor Protection 
Rules  
- Customer Dispute Resolution 
Scheme Rules  
- Collective Investments Schemes 
Rules  - General Rules  
- Captive Insurance Business Rules  
- Insurance Business Rules  
- Insurance Mediation Business Rules  
2020  - QFCA Rules  
a All QFC norms can be found in https://www.qfc.qa/en/Pages/default.aspx . 
Source : QFCRA and QFCA . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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2.54.   Two other regulators —QCB and Qatar Financial Markets Regulator (QFMA) —also oversee and 
provide legal norms for activities carried out by QFC -registered entities. QFMA, in particular, provides 
oversight and regulatory guidance to capital markets and securities tradin g in Qatar.28 To avoid 
inconsistencies, the authorities work in coordination to ensure that all three regulatory frameworks 
are consistent between each other. Since 2014, the following decrees, issued by QCB and QFMA, 
directly affected companies operating from the QFC.  
Main QCB -QFMA Norms Affecting QFC Entities – 2014 -2020a 
Year QCB QFMA  
2014  - Rules of Licensing and Regulating Depository  
- Mergers and Acquisitions Rules  
- Selling Rights Issue Rules  
- Margin Trading Rules  
2015 - Corporate Governance Guidelines  
- Controls on Banks Marketing 
Insurance Products Provided by 
Insurance Companies  
- Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives 
Contracts  
- Corporate Governance Guidelines  - Listing Rules for Real Estate Investment Funds' Units  
- Capital Adequacy Standards for Fin ancial Services 
Companies  
- Ownership of Shares in Listed Companies on QSE 
2016 - Increase of QMR  
- Implementation Regulations on the 
Ceilings and Conditions of Ownership 
of Banks' Shares listed in the QSE  
- Squaring Positions for Foreign 
Currencies   
2017 - Granting Credit Facilities in Foreign 
Currency Inside and Outside Qatar  
- Implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution on AML/CFT 
Regarding Freezing Funds  
- Banks' Borrowing from Local and 
International Markets  
- Liquidity Provider and Market Maker 
Activity  - Rules of Companies' Conversion into Public 
Shareholding Ones for Listing in the Financial Market  
- Market Maker Rules  
- Operational Procedures of Exchange -Trade Funds (ETS) 
[Covered Short Selling Procedures (CSSP)]  
- Rules of the Employees' Incentive Shares Scheme in 
Listed Shareholding Companies Through Owning Shares 
in the Listed Company  
2018 - Executive Regulations to Measure 
and Control Large Exposures  
- Fixed Assets Revaluation  
- Trading in Bitcoin  - Omnibus Code for L isted Funds  
2019  - Listing Rules for Funds' Units  
- Governance Code for Listed Funds  
- Financial Services Rulebook  
- Margin Trading Rules  
a All QCB and QFMA regulations can be found in http://www.qcb.gov.qa/English/Pages /Default.aspx  
and https://www.qfma.org.qa/english/Pages/default.aspx , respectively.  
Source:  QCB and QFMA . 
2.55.   QFC was directly affected by the regional challenges as financial companies and institutions 
from some countries were ordered to withdraw their funds from Qatar. As a result, non -resident 
deposits declined significantly, thus creating funding challenges that, fortunately, did not lead to 
banking liquidity drying out than ks to other QFC financial institutions filling the void. Furthermore, 
QFC censured some financial institutions involved in attempting to manipulate the Qatari Riyal 
off-shore exchange rate. Successful court rulings and the effective exit of some financial institutions 
from QFC's platform removed the dangers posed by these actions.  As at early 2020, leading Qatari 
companies continued to conduct most of their financial transactions through the QFC, ensuring 
continued stability, at the same time, reducing thei r investments' exposure to geopolitical risk . The 
Covid -19 pandemic is expected to have a minor short -term impact on Qatar's capital markets 
although long -term trends will likely unfold for the next few years.29 
2.56.   QFCA announced a new corporate strategy at t he beginning of 2019 with a new focus on New 
Emerging Belt Initiative (NEBI) countries, i.e. strategic partners geographically close to Qatar and 
with good government -to-government relations. These included Kuwait, Oman, Turkey, Pakistan 
 
28 QFMA (2020).  Information viewed at: https://www.qfma.org.qa/english/Pages/default.aspx . 
29 KPMG (2020). Potential impact of Covid -19 on the Qatar economy. Doha.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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and India. Promoti onal activities and partnerships with other finance -related institutions led to an 
increase in the number of companies investing in Qatar. QFC also expanded its marketing efforts to 
attract investment from new sectors, such as: FinTech, asset management, c apital markets and 
Islamic finance. These combined efforts led to a significant increase in the number of firms operating 
in QFC (more than 30% growth in 2019), of which 5 FinTech companies were licensed in 2019.  
2.57.   Moreover, since the formal establishment o f QFC's Financial Sector Office in 2018 through the 
end of 2019, 8 regulated asset management and investment services firms came onboard QFC's 
platform. In total, 10 new asset management companies and one bank (CQUR Bank) came onto 
QFC's platform since 201 4. None of these companies are listed, and nearly all of them being asset 
management firms. Epicure Investment Management, in particular, established itself with an initial 
capital of Q AR 1.8 million in 2018 and it is now slated to manage Q AR 25.5 billion by the end of 
2020. Just as importantly, the overall number of firms operating in QFC increased from 170 at the 
end of 2014 to 816 as at end of 2019.  
2.58.   QFC has also extended its approved activities beyond the financial sector. For example, FIFA 
chose QFC as its establishment platform for its local organizing committee for the 2022 World Cup, 
a fact that will see much of the organization of the tournament being carried out from the QFC. The 
authorities are also currently reviewing the QFC Law to extend the QFC Court's jurisdiction to 
non-QFC entities wishing to use the court, particularly for dispute resolution processes. This is 
particularly the case for companies operating in Qatar's free zones.  
2.59.   Since its last review, Qatar moved to allow Real Estate Inves tment Trusts (REITs) to operate 
in the country as regulated QFC firms. However, provisions are still being arranged between QFC 
and the Ministry of Justice to enable foreign investors to own real estate in non -designated zones in 
Qatar (see Section 3.7 for  further details on the foreign investment law). It is expected that the 
arrangement will facilitate the development of QFC's REITs regime in Qatar, thus leading to an 
increase in liquidity going into the Qatari real estate market. The authorities expect t hat this change 
in the law will posit an expansion in demand that can support the absorption of Qatar's current 
supply of space across all real estate asset types.  
2.60.   The authorities expect that Brexit will prove beneficial for QFC as UK -based investors seek 
the benefits of its on -shore taxation regime, amongst other things.  
2.8.1   Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism  
2.61.   Qatar updated and expanded its AML/CFT legislation since its last review. Law No. (20) of 
2019, which replaced Law No. (4) of  2010, expanded the definition of possible offences with a more 
general approach rather than listing specific breaches. In particular, the Law now does not make a 
distinction between foreign, domestic and international organizational politically exposed pe rsons 
(PEP). The new framework was the outcome of a review undertaken by Qatar's National Anti -Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Committee, led by QCB, with the aim of bringing domestic 
legislation in line with global practices, including standards set forth by the Financial Actional Task 
Force (FATF).  
2.62.   Law No. (20) applies to both financial institutions and designated non -financial businesses 
and professions (DNFBP). However, financial institutions and DNFBP operating within QFC, whose 
oversight fall s under the authority of QFC Regulatory Authority (QFCRA), remain subject to the 
QFCRA's AML/CFT Rules 2010. These rules, which were drafted in accordance with the principles and 
practices normed by Law No. (4) of 2010, were also updated to bring them into  line with FATF global 
recommendations and standards.  
2.63.   One of the important changes introduced by Law No. (20) is the requirement for all financial 
institutions and DNF BP to implement a risk -based approach to AML/CFT risks and to carry out risk 
assessments.  The risk -based approach can be applied to customer due diligence and systems and 
controls but does not apply to maintenance of records and reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Furthermore, the law requires customer due diligence to be undertaken in certa in circumstances, 
including when business relationships are stablished. To this end, Article 11 of the Law requires 
proper identification of the customer and any person acting on behalf of the customer, identification 
of the beneficial owner, obtaining inf ormation and understanding the nature of the business 
relationships and/or transactions and obtaining information and understanding the ownership and WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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control structure of corporate clients. Article 13 requires an enhanced customer due diligence 
investigati on in the case where there is an elevated risk of money laundering and/or terrorism 
financing and/or a transaction involving PEP or customers residents in, or incorporated in, higher 
risk jurisdictions.  
2.64.   The new stature also requires financial institutions and DNFBP to develop their own internal 
risk assessments and risk -based internal policies, procedures and controls, proportionate with their 
risk profile based on country, client and transactional risks. Transactions and attempted transactions 
that might r easonably be deemed suspicious must be reported to Qatar's Financial Information Unit 
within three days. Moreover, records are to be kept for at least 10 years. QFCRA's AML/CFT rules 
will be amended in the near future to reflect the new extended period of record keeping. The Law 
stipulates that breaches of the law can carry financial sanctions that may be as high as 
QAR 100 million.  
2.65.   QCB announced in December 2019 that it had adopted the implementing regulations of Law 
No. (20).  
2.9  Tourism  
2.66.   Qatar received 2.1 mi llion visitors in 2019, a 17% increase compared to 2018. In fact, v isitor 
arrivals increased most significantly among European nationals (by 29%) nationals of the Americas 
(by 27%) and nationals from other Arab countries (by 21%). GCC nationals, on the oth er hand, also 
increased , by 17% , whilst those coming from other Asian countries, including Oceania, increased by 
8%. African nationals visiting Qatar increased by 1%. According to the UN World Tourism 
Organization, visitor expenditure in Qatar during 2014-2018 increased at a compound annual growth 
rate of 4% , reaching USD 5.6 billion in 2018.30 
2.67.   At the end of 2019, the tourism sector had over 27,000 keys, roughly equivalent to 
32,000  rooms (room key supply having expanded by 5% during 2019 -2018). Despit e the increase 
in room supply, however, demand also expanded substantially (up by 15%), resulting in a 9% 
increase in occupancy rate. Whilst average room rate was down by 2% across all hotels and hotel 
apartments, revenue per available room did increase by  7% in 2019, compared to 2018. Moreover, 
the sector's infrastructure development, which includes another 13,000 keys by 2022, has led the 
authorities to expect that there will be enough hotel space for everyone attending the 2022 FIFA 
World Cup, regardless  of income.  
2.68.   The Covid -19 pandemic had a severe impact on Qatar's tourism as air travelling came to a 
near halt during the first six months of the pandemic and countries put measures to curb the spread 
of the virus. The economic impact on the sector is hard  to quantify yet but initial estimates suggest 
significant pressures on recurrent revenues as occupancy rates plummeted.31  
2.69.   The sector's regulatory framework was overhauled in 2018. Amiri Decree No. (74) of 2018, 
which replaced Amiri Decree No. (36) of 201 4, established the National Tourism Council (NTC), 
created on the recommendations of the new Qatar National Tourism Sector Strategy (QNTSS) 
2017-2023, approved by the Supreme Council of Economic Affairs in the second half of 2017. Article 
3 of the said Dec ree states that the NTC's objectives are: (i) the implementation of the National 
Tourism Strategy in a manner that promotes the potential of Qatar's tourism sector, including 
regulations and promotion both in Qatar and elsewhere; (ii) improve the tourism e xperience in 
Qatar ; and (iii) show the "civilizational, cultural, artistic and touristic " characteristics of Qatar. The 
Law also tasks the NTC to develop public policy for the tourism sector as well as supervise and 
monitor activities, promote the developm ent of private -public partnerships, develop the criteria used 
for the promotion of events in Qatar, establish companies or investment projects to participate in 
existing companies or project (inside and outside Qatar), enter into Memorandums of 
Understandi ngs with any legal entity, issue the directives related to the development of the touristic 
experience, coordinate policy initiatives with other Ministries and propose draft legislation and 
express opinions on tourism issues as required, amongst others.32 The authorities established three 
companies under the umbrella of the NTC to implement the sector's strategic objectives —i.e. Qatar 
Tourism Promotion Company, the Qatar Tourism Development Company and the Qatar Business 
 
30 UNWTO (2020).  Viewed at: https://www.unwto.org/country -profile -inbound -tourism . 
31 KPMG (2020). Potential impact of COVID -19 on the Qatar economy. Doha.  
32 Law No. (74) of 2018. Article 3 . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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Events Company  — but they are not op erational yet. The authorities expect the sector's total 
economic impact  — i.e. direct, indirect and induce contributions  — to be equivalent to 7.9% of 
headline GDP by 2025 (11.4% to non -mining GDP by the same year).  
2.70.   The NTC's board is chaired by the Prime  Minister, H.E. Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa Al Thani and 
it includes the Secretary General of NTC, the Ministers of Culture and Sports, Transport and 
Communication and Commerce and Industry as well as the Chairman of Katara Hospitality, the 
Secretary General  of the SCDL, a representative of Qatar Museums and the Director of Qatar's 
Government Communications Office. Amongst other things, it is tasked with regulatory 
responsibilities for the sector and the NTC, including alignment with the general economic 
development guidelines set forth by the QNV 2030 and QSNDS .33 
2.71.   The different challenges experienced during the period under review fast -tracked existing 
strategic plans but did not alter them. The QNTSS was launched in 2014 which, amongst other 
things, sought t o diversify the country's tourism offering and increase the sector's contribution to 
GDP by 2030 by working with public and private stakeholders in planning, regulating and promoting 
a sustainable and diverse tourism industry. To this effect, QBIC Tourism,  i.e. an incubator specialized 
in the tourism sector, was launched in coordination with QDB to support local start -ups focused on 
tourism.34 The New QNTSS was set forth in 2017, thus establishing the general guidelines for the 
sector's development. To this  end, the blueprint guiding the country's tourism sector development 
during 2018 -2023 identified six geographic zones across the country, tying each to product themes 
based on geographic characteristics. These are: urban and family entertainment, business events, 
culture and heritage tourism, coastal and dessert tourism and sports and recreation tourism. The 
strategy's main objective is diversification of products, services and of source markets in order to 
support the sector's sustainability and continued growth. The strategy goes through periodic reviews 
to adapt it to emerging realities on the ground.  
2.72.   The sector 's principal regulations are as follows:  
Tourism's Core Regulations  
Regulation  Description  
Amiri Decree No. (74) of 
2018 Replaces Amiri Decree No. (36) of 2014 and establishes the National Tourism 
Council  
Amiri Decree No. (75) of 
2018 Establishes membership in the NTC 's board. Complemented by Amiri Decree 
No. (3) of 2019.  
Law No. (20) of 2018  Repeals Law No. (6) of 2012 and establis hes a new regulatory framework for 
the tourism sector. In particular, it expands oversight to festivals and tour 
operators, focuses regulatory oversight on the tourism experience and on 
development of tourist areas. It also provides incentives to investmen t in 
those areas.  
Law No. (21) of 2018  Regulates business events. The law expands the oversight of tourism activities 
to business visits by licensing exhibitions and conferences as well as the 
organizers of exhibitions and conferences. The law also focuses on the 
business tourism experience and grants incentives to attract investment to 
this niche.  
MOCI Decision No. (380) of 
2018 Establishes the Qatar Business Events Company. It tasks the company with 
the responsibility of managing government -owned exhibition and conference 
centres  and overseeing their development. The law puts in charge of providing 
incentives to attract international exhibitions and conferences as well.  
MOCI Decision No. (381) of 
2018 Establishes the Qatar Tourism Promotion Company. The company, a private 
Qatari joint stock company, is tasked with managing the country 's destination 
marketing and promotional operations abroad, including opening branches of 
the company in the main markets.  
MOCI Decision No. (382) of 
2018 Establishes the Qatar Tourism Development Company. The company is tasked 
with developing areas of land designated for tourism activities and marketing 
them to the private sector for investment. The company is also tasked with 
undertaking tourism proje cts that are not profitable for the private sector but 
that may be important for the development of Qatar's tourism asset portfolio.  
Source:  NTC. 
 
33 Law No. (74) of 2018. Article 6 . 
34 Further information on Qatar Business Incubator Centre —QBIC—can be found in 
https://www.qbic.qa/en/ . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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2.73.   A revised grading and classification system for hospitality establishments was introduced in 
2016. The update d system ensures enhanced consistency in the application o  f— and adherence to  
— quality standards. It also incorporates present -day practice standards, such as service levels and 
sustainability. The authorities expect that the revamped system leads to the  emergence of a more 
diverse, service -oriented, sustainable and environmentally friendly hospitality sector. Moreover, an 
electronic licensing system was introduced in 2017 to streamline processes for hotel establishments 
that included the application of l icenses and license renewals. The e -licensing system was expanded 
a year later to include other tourism facilities, business event organizing offices, tourism activities 
and events, tour guides and tourism transportation. Currently, the system allows estab lishments to 
complete procedures required to apply, amend, renew or cancel a tourism licence whilst permitting 
more efficient monitoring and evaluation by the authorities.  
2.74.   Another policy initiative aimed at supporting the development of Qatar's tourism sec tor was 
the introduction in 2016 of a free 96 -hour transit visa, thus, doubling the amount of time available 
for passengers on a stopover. The online platform to process and issue the e -visas was launched in 
2017 through the coordination of NTC (then Qatar  Tourism Authority), Qatar Airways, the MoI and 
VFS Global. So far, the system has greatly eased visitor access to Qatar with a more efficient and 
transparent visa application system with standardized fees. Furthermore, visa waiver policies were 
introduced  in 2017 that, by 2020, covered nationals from more than 90 countries.  
2.75.   During 2018 -2019, six representative offices were opened in three of the world's largest 
visitor source markets —China, India and Russia n Federation . The NTC now has offices in a total o f 
10 markets, including Turkey, SE Asia and China (Beijing, Shanghai), Hong Kong, China, the U nited 
States, Italy, Germany, France and the U nited Kingdom . The move was part of the authorities' efforts 
to expand and diversify Qatar's traditional source visi tor markets after 2017.  
2.76.   The tourism sector has had a number of successes since 2014. Chiefly amongst these are:  
• Significant increases in visitor arrivals, particularly amongst European nationals (up 56% since 
2014) and nationals of the Americas (up 41% during the same period) ; 
• In September 2018, the World Tourism Organization ranked Qatar the most open country in 
the Middle -East (8th in the world) in terms of visa facilitation according to its visa openness 
rankings. This marked a 71% improvement since 2014, when it ranked 177th; 
• +Qatar, a unique program that enables airline passenger to experience Qatar with a one -night 
stopover when  transiting through Doha, was launched in 2017. Amongst other things, the 
program avails Qatar Airways transit passenger with a free 96 -hour transit visit and a one -night 
hotel stay for USD 28 at a 5 -star hotel (USD 23 for a 4 -star one). In 2019, nearly 80 ,000 people 
had participated in the +Qatar program ; 
• Cruise tourism has gained traction since the inauguration of Doha Port in 2017. The 2018 -2019 
cruise season experienced a 105% growth in the number of cruise ships and a 121% growth in 
the number of visit ors. The 2019 -2020 season saw over 60 cruise ships and 207,000 visitors ; 
• The Business Events subsector expanded robustly with an annual average of rate of 44% during 
2014-2019. Over this period, Qatar hosted 545 international conferences and events (148 in  
2019 alone) ; 
• NTC joined UFI's (the Global Association of the Exhibition Industry) roster of Diamond Sponsors 
in 2018 and signed an accompanying five -year framework agreement with regional exclusivity 
aimed at developing the exhibition industry in Qatar an d connecting it to the industry's fastest 
growing markets ; 
• Sports tourism also gained traction during the period under review. In effect, Qatar hosted close 
to 80 sporting events and world -level competition across disciplines per year. This includes, the 
World Championships in Athletics (2019), the first ANOC World Beach Games (2019), the FIFA 
World Cup (2022) and the FINA World Swimming Championships (2023).  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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3  TRADE POLICY REGIME  
3.1  Overview  
3.1.  Since its last Trade Policy Review Qatar continued to  make  important strides to deepen its 
participation in the multilateral trading system whilst maintaining  its obligations  to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The authorities' response to the different challenges faced during the period 
under review made  extensive use of the WTO's institutions, legal mechanisms, practices and 
disciplines. Trade facilitation, diversifying import markets, streamlining process, making use of 
dispute resolution mechanisms and enhanc ing transparency and predictability of its foreign 
investment regime became crucial policy objectives. In this sense, the difficulties faced by Qatar 
since 2014, rather than choking the local economy, acted as policy catalyst that served to push 
through institutional and policy change.  Ultimately, m ost of the initiatives undertaken by the 
government to provide continuity and mitigate risk ended up advancing the country's economic 
development and diversification agenda as set forth in QNV 2030 and QSNDS.  
3.2.  The COVID -19 pandemic created the need to devel op time -sensitive responses. To this end, 
the authorities enacted several measures and allocated funds to ensure continuity of food security, 
health provision and consumer protection ( Section 3.2). Most of these measures are expected to 
remain in place until the effects of the pandemic subside.  
3.3.  During this time, a uthorities also developed investment promot ion capabilities and sought to 
import substitute some key products, mainly construction materials and agricultural goods, as part 
of Qatar's larger develo pment agenda. In effect, as per H.E. Ali bin Ahmed Al Kuwari, Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, "Qatar is reviewing its policies and developing laws to protect intellectual 
property rights and facilitate trademark and patent registration. Through these po licies, the 
government seeks to empower local manufacturing companies that employ IT tools, biotechnology 
and artificial intelligence in production ". Furthermore, "Qatar has also opened its real estate sector 
to foreign investors by easing restriction on p roperty ownership ", whilst bringing legal certainty to 
its private public partnership (PPP) regime.35 The MOCI also launched an initiative to create a unified 
definition of SME in Qatar through which it seeks to facilitate economic policy formulation. In this 
manner, the authorities continue to place trade policy at the core of Qatar's overall economic 
development agenda, a view reaffirmed by the events of the last three years.  
3.2  Trade Policy Objectives  
3.4.  Qatar's main trade policy objectives ar e to enhance trade facilitation, foreign investment and 
export promotion. In effect, they envision these goals as necessary complements to the country's 
economic development and diversification objectives, as envisioned in the QNV 2030 and QSNDS 
documents.  Pursuant to this, "significant measures to attract foreign investment " were taken during 
the period under review as were various initiatives to update the customs regime.36 Authorities also 
sought to promote diversification by continuing to invest in huma n resource development, PPP and 
streamlining legal procedures. QDB also continued to provide support for local SMEs including its 
various export promotion programs. These actions and initiatives are seen as enabling policies for 
the country's economic dive rsification efforts, to be financed in part through its export revenues.37 
3.5.  Qatar's National Food Security Strategy also envisions trade policy as one of its strategic 
pillars.38 In effect, the strategy seeks to ensure that Qatar's "food import strategy is resilient against 
potential trade shocks and disruptions and that Qatar can quickly react to the loss of trade partners 
or a drop in self -sufficiency ".39 The strategy has the goal of establishing three to five substitute 
 
35 H.E. Ali bin Ahmed Al Kuwari (2020) , Interview with Oxford Business Group. Viewed at: 
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/interview/game -plan-ali-bin-ahmed -al-kuwari -minister -commerce -and-
industry -transformative -initiatives -bolster . 
36 Government Communication Office (2020). Economic Policy. Viewed at: 
https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/focus/economic -policy/ . 
37 H.E. Ali bin Ahmad Al Kuwa iri, Minister of Commerce and Industry, as found in GCO 's economic policy 
statement. Viewed at: https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/focus/economic -policy/ . 
38 Ministry of Municipality and Environment (2 020). Food Security Department. Qatar National Food 
Security Strategy 2018 –2023. Viewed at: 
http://www.mme.gov.qa/pdocs/cview?siteID=2&docID=19772&year=2020 . 
39 Qatar National Food Security Strategy 2018 –2023.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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import market for each commodity by  2023, with the share of top 2 import partners covering around 
50% (in the case of achieving five import partners) to 70% (in the case of three partners).  
3.6.  Qatar enacted temporary trade -related measures to mitigate the effects of the Covid -19 
pandemic as we ll.40 Specifically, measures regarding trade in goods included: (i) custom duty 
exemption on f ood and medical supplies  for a period of six months, provided that the savings were 
passed onto local consumers ; (ii) ongoing  inspection campaigns to control prices and prevent 
monopolistic practices ; and (iii) measures to r estrict  hoarding of surgical masks and other medical 
supplie s, including rationing  and price controls . Measures affecting trade in services included: 
(i) closure of educational institutions and implementation of online classes ; (ii) change in working 
hours, including retail shops ; and (iii) closure of non -essential businesses. The authorities also 
implemented an economic stimulus package through the Central Ba nk, Qatar Development Bank 
and the Ministry of Finance (see Section 2.5 for further details).  
3.7.  The government has also expressed concerning regarding trade -deterring measures as of result 
of the pandemic, particularly, regarding the use of safeguard measure s, increase in tariffs, shipping 
costs and supply -chain disruptions. The MOCI was working to on an economic impact assessment of 
the COVID -19 pandemic in Qatar and its effects on the country's strategic development goals as 
stated in the QNV 2030. The repo rt is expected to be published soon.  
3.8.  Qatar is at the beginning of the process to develop a formal trade policy framework through 
the engagement of international consultants . The authorities also continued to develop their 
institutional capacity, particularly at the MOCI, throughout the period under review.  
3.3  The General Authority of Customs  
3.9.  Since Qatar's  last review, The General Authority of Customs (GAC) was established  as an 
independent legal entity  through Amiri Decree No. (37) of 2014 to replace  the General Directorate 
of Customs. The Authority has 16 administrative units, including departments specialized in the 
application of customs policies and systems, several tasked with overseeing cross border flow of 
goods into Qatar and logistical matter s. In particular, the restructure included the creation of three 
key departments: (i) The Department of Planning and Quality ; (ii) The Department of Operations 
and Risk Analysis ; and (iii) the Department of Anti -Smuggling and Customs Security.41 
3.10.   The GAC's predecessor had created a strategic plan for the agency covering the 2013 -2016 
period that had been aligned with the strategic goals contained in QNV 2030 and, specially, with 
those of QNDS 2011 -2016. The agency restructure in 2014, coupled with the ongoin g work to 
support the development of the QSNDS 2018 -2022, led GAC to update their strategic plan. In the 
new plan, key performance indicators were introduced within the context of specific time periods 
with emphasis placed on improving efficiency in the us e of overall resources, developing academic 
and administrative capabilities and improving human resources. The GAC's strategic goals are: (i)  to 
develop institutional capabilities, including its human resources; (ii) to protect societal and 
environmental s ecurity whilst reducing customs fraud; (iii) to follow the latest global practices to 
meet customers' needs ; and (iv) to become a core factor in the creation of a catalyst investment 
environment.42  
3.4  Customs Procedures  
3.11.   Qatar's general customs law, i.e. Law No. (40) of 2002, was not amended during the period 
under review and, thus, continued to follow GCC Customs Law. However, a revised draft law is being 
prepared to meet Qatar's commitments to the provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
In additi on to this, t he GAC, in coordination with other agencies, enacted a number of regulations 
aimed at facilitating its procedures. The main decrees were:  
• Chairman 's Decision No. (12) of 2015 . The measure updates operational aspects of the 
process of customs v aluation of imported goods contained in Qatar´s Customs Law (Law 
 
40 MOCI (2021). The Efforts of the State of Qatar in Facing the Effects of Covid -19 on the Qatari 
Economy . Doha . 
41 For further details, see http://www.customs.gov.qa/eng/index.php . 
42 General Authority of Customs (2020). Viewed at:  http://www.customs.gov.qa . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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No. (40) of 2002, as amended) such as procedures, time limits and disputes, amongst other 
areas ; 
 
• Administrative Circular No. (76) of 2015 . The regulation describes the procedures to apply 
the international export -import document, i.e. ATA Carnet ; 
 
• Chairman 's Decision No. (7) of 2016 . The Decision covers the terms and conditions of 
practicing the profession of customs clearance ; 
 
• Chairman 's Decision No. (8) of 2016 . The regulation describes the operations of customs 
warehouses for vehicles ; 
 
• The Minister of Finance 's Decision No. (9) of 2017 . This Decision establishes the charges 
on customs services provided by the GAC ; 
 
• Executive Order No. (1) of 2018 . This measure disciplines the controls and procedures 
applied on goods imported to be re -exported ; 
 
• Administrative Circular No. (3) of 2019 . The regulation describes the procedures to apply 
the international Road Transport Card (TIR Carnet) ; 
 
• Administrative Circular No. (75) of 2019 . The measure regulates the acceptance of 
commercial invoices issued by non -export or production country without need to provide a proof 
of relationship between the seller and producer of goods.  
3.12.   Furthermore, the Authority also created a green list of Qatari importers , i.e. a list of importing 
companies that are subject to only around 30% to 40% of the ir imported goods. The companies on 
the list are those that have not been red flagged  for major concerns. The rest of companies' imports 
are subject to comprehensive checks. In general, all merchandise coming into Qatari ports, airports 
and land ports are subject to inspection regardless of the port of origin.  
3.4.1   Changes in Export and Import Procedures  
3.13.   The regional situation created several challenges for the GAC. Indeed, the rapid shift to new 
import markets meant that the volume of goods passing through air and sea ports increased 
significantly as the land crossing was closed. To handle the increase in imports, the GAC 
implemented several temporary measures to facilitate importation and the cost of clearance for 
imported goods. For example, requiring original  documentation only, including health certificates, 
was relaxed. Rather, importers were allowed to submit paper or electronic copies, even after the 
deadlines establish by existing regulations. Non -significant differences in shipment documentation 
were als o dismissed, e.g. the importer's name, the source's name, the port of loading, arrival, 
amongst others. Strategic goods, including raw materials and food, were also granted special 
procedures until the situation is normalized.  
3.14.   There were no changes to exp ort procedures during the period under review.  
3.4.2   Trade Facilitation Measures  
3.15.   The GAC concluded several Service Level Agreements (SLA) with other governmental agencies 
to streamline the issuing of technical, health and environmental approvals on imported good s.43 The 
collaborative efforts are aimed at improving services provided at customs ports, reducing release 
time and the cost of importing and exporting. The Authority also developed processes to handle the 
submission of documentation over the internet such  as a program me to collect financial claims from 
customers electronically. It now also accepts electronic certificates of origin and import invoices 
originated in countries with which Qatar does not have preferential agreements.  
3.16.   The GAC is also working to develop other customs program mes and procedures on an ongoing 
basis to facilitate processes and encourage investment. These include: (i) an import to re -export 
system; (ii) acceptance of electronic certificates of origin and electronic certification of inv oices 
 
43 The principal institutions were the Mini stries of Public Health, Municipality and Environment and the 
General Authority of Specifications and Standardizations.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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associated with imports; (iii) accepting commercial invoices issued from a non -export or production 
country; (iv) the use of private customs warehouses; (v) updating the customs refund process; 
(vi) the use of the ATA Carnet; (vii) the implementation  of a new risk management system; 
(viii) industrial exemptions; (ix) the implementation of pre -clearance of shipments ; and (x) the use 
of authorised economic operators.  
3.17.   The Qatar Customs Clearance Single Window , known as Al  Nadeeb , was aligned to respond 
to the various challenges and shifts in strategic directions undertaken by the GAC during the period 
under review.44 The single window coordinates services with shipping lines and agents, government 
entities to exchange information , courier and pos t services, airport operators and vehicle dealers. 
The system, which is the GAC's main gateway for importers and exports, can be reached directly 
through the GAC's website or the Government's e -government platform, Al Hukoomi.45 
3.4.3   Anti-Smuggling and Customs Security  
3.18.   The GAC developed working protocols with the Public Prosecutor's Office with the aim of 
requesting that criminal proceedings be initiated in cases of smuggling in order to ensure accuracy 
and speed of transfer of information between the parties o n possible offences. The Authority also 
signed two Memorandums of Understanding, with Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities46 
and the Qatar Financial Centre, to streamline Qatar's anti money -laundering and terrorism finance 
efforts. Furthermore, a n electronic program  — called Iqrar  — was also launched to collect information 
provided by travellers going through customs ports regarding money transferred in their possession. 
The aim of the program is to register, document and transmit that information  to the Financial 
Information Unit, Qatar's agency in charge of receiving, analysing and disseminating information to 
combat anti money -laundering and terrorism finance (see Section 2.9 for further details on Qatar's 
AML/CTF policies).47 
3.4.4   Customs Valuation  
3.19.   The customs valuation methodology did not change during the period under review and 
continues to depend on the customs assessment methods contained in the WTO Customs Valuation 
Agreement (implementation of Article VII of the GATT).  
3.4.5   Valuation Dispute Resolu tion 
3.20.   The valuation dispute resolution process did not change during the period under review. To 
this effect, importers continue to have the right to appeals decisions made by the GAC at two levels. 
The first one is the administrative objection within the G AC, including the competent departments, 
the committee for determining value or the GAC Chairman). The second level of appeal is through 
an independent judiciary body, i.e. courts of law (see the Government's 2014 TPR report for further 
details).  
3.4.6   Customs A greements  
3.21.   The GAC signed several customs agreements since 2014 . These are:  
New customs agreements with since 2014  
Agreement  Date  Legal Instrument  
Istanbul Convention on Temporary Admission (A), (B1)  2015 Decree No. (12) of 2015  
International Road Transport Agreement 1975  2018 Decree No. (12) of 2018  
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement  2017 Decree No. (81) of 2017  
Unified Arab Customs Cooperation Agreement    
Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 
Customs Affairs Between the Government of the State of 
Qatar and the Government of the Republic of Turkey  2016  
 
44 For access to Al Nadeeb, see http://www.customs.gov.qa/eng/QCCSW.php . 
45 For ac cess to Al Hukoomi, see https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/homepage . 
46 See website at: http://www.raca.gov.qa/Arabic/Pages/default.aspx . 
47 For further details, see http://www.qfiu.gov.qa/ . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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Agreement  Date  Legal Instrument  
Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 
Customs Affairs Between the Government of the State of 
Qatar and the Government of the Republic of India    
MoU in the Field of Professional Re -Training and 
Professional Skills Development Between the General 
Authority of Customs in Qatar and the Customs 
Committee in the Republic of Azerbaijan   Memorandum of Understanding  
Source:  The General Authority of Customs.  
3.5  Rules of Origin  
3.22.   Qatar continued to apply the processes stipulated in Decision No. (21) of 2011 during the 
period under review. In this sense, the regional challenges did not lead to changes in the rules 
applied.  
3.6  Trade Remedies  
3.23.   The General Secretariat of the Gulf Co operation Council (GCC) notified the WTO of the 
issuance of the unified anti -dumping and compensatory measures for GCC countries. The measures 
were implemented in Qatar through Law No. (10) of 2013 on Anti -Dumping and Compensatory and 
Preventive Measures f or the Countries of the GCC.  
3.24.   Law No. (10) of 2013 was not amended during the period under review.  
3.7  Foreign Investment  
3.25.   Qatar amended its foreign investment law in 2019  to enhance foreign participation and bring 
transparency and predictability to its existing  procedures . To this end, Law No. (1) of 2019, whose 
executive regulations are set by Ministerial Resolution No. (44) of 2020, repealed and replaced Law 
No. (13) of 2000 to, amongst other things, extend foreign participation to all sectors  — except banks 
and insurance companies (apart from cases allowed by the Council of Ministers) and commercial 
agencies  — as well as provide assurances in all processes  and make investment incentives available 
to foreign investors. The new law, in particular, brings legal c ertainty to dispute resolution processes 
and the application of permits.  
3.26.   As a general rule, foreign investors can undertake any activity in Qatar subject to them doing 
so in partnership with at least one Qatari person or legal entity and that they do not o wn more than 
49% of the share capital incorporated in Qatar. However, exceptions to the 49% limit may be 
obtained from the MOCI that can lead up to 100% foreign -ownership of the shared capital of a Qatari 
company. In some cases, licenses from other governm ent agencies may be required as well. The 
new law also allows foreign companies to register a branch in Qatar for the purpose of undertaking 
contracts concluded with a Ministry, government authority, public body or institution, or private 
company in which the states owns a share. Foreign companies can also establish trade 
representation offices without a Qatari partner for the purpose of promoting activities and 
introducing new products and services to the domestic market.  
3.27.   A foreign investor can apply for more than 49% ownership through the Invest in Qatar centre 
at the MOCI; this can be done either online or in paper. This one -stop window then forwards the 
application to the relevant departments, after which the law stipulates that the MOCI has 15 days  
to issue a response. Applicants are required to submit, amongst other documentation, a business 
plan proving that the added -value and knowledge transfer contained in the prospective investment. 
Preference is given to investments that add value to the loca l economy, that are aligned with the 
objectives stated in QNV 2030, introduce new technologies and that provide training for Qatari 
nationals.  
3.28.   The new investment law, moreover, does not override other special laws and regulations on 
foreign investment in Q atar. As a way of example, Law No. (19) of 2005, which regulates the practice 
of the engineering in Qatar, continues to require that Qatari shareholders own at least 51% of the 
shared capital in local engineering consultancy companies. However, an engineer ing company 
licensed to provide services outside its own country can establish a branch in Qatar without a Qatari 
partner, provided that it meets all relevant legal requirements. Article 25 of Law No. (1), moreover, WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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states that the provisions of the law do  not apply to companies engaged in the extraction, utilization 
or management of natural resources under a concession or a special contract nor companies licensed 
by Qatar Petroleum nor, in general, companies owned by the State of Qatar or a public authorit y. 
Furthermore , the stipulations protecting foreign investment in Qatar through  ratified bilateral 
investment treaties  will also prevail over the provisions contained in Law No (1) of 2019.  
3.29.   Qatar's foreign investment regime also includes investment in QFC (see Section 2.8 for further 
details on QFC's regulatory framework). Foreign investment in QFC is allowed for both regulated 
activities, i.e. financial services requiring close supervision to ensure prudential soundness and 
proper conduct of business, and non-regulated ones  — for example, consulting, IT, legal and media 
services, amongst others. Foreign ownership of investments in QFC may be up to 100% as well.  
3.30.   Qatar's foreign investment regime now also allows for non -Qataris persons and legal entities 
to own real estate in Qatar, including land, buildings, structures, residential units and detached units 
in residential complexes. Indeed, Law No. (16) of 2018 states that non -Qataris may have freehold 
ownership and usufruct rights (leasehold rights for 99 yea rs) in designated areas in Qatar, approved 
by the Council of Ministers upon recommendations from the Ministry of Justice's Committee for the 
Regulation and Use of Non -Qatari Ownership. Freehold ownership areas for non -Qataris include West 
Bay Lagoon, The P earl Qatar, Al -Khor Resort, Rawdat Al Jahaniyah, Al Qassar, Al Dafna, Onaiza, Al 
Wasail and Jabal Theyleeb. Areas where non -Qataris can lease real estate for 99 years include 
Msheireb, Fereej Abdelaziz, Doha Al Jadeed, New Al Ghanim, Al Rifaa, Old Al Hitmi , Aslata, Fereej 
Bin Mahmoud, Rawdat Al Khail, Mansoura, Fereej Bin Dirham, Najma, Umm Guwailina, Al Khulaifa, 
Al Sadd, Al Mirqab Al Jadeed, Fereej Al Nasr and the Doha International Airport area.  
3.31.   Law No. (1) also provides a series of incentives to foreign  investors. The main ones are:  
• Tax exemptions. A five -year exemption on corporate income tax for foreign -owned 
companies deriving income from sources in Qatar may be granted by the Ministry of Finance 
as per Article 36 of Law No. (1) (the tax is currently set at 10% by Law No. (24) of 2018). 
An extension of the initial period may be granted by the Council of Ministers. The Council 
may also, upon the Ministry of Finance's recommendation, grant preferential tax rates for 
specific sectors and activities. Artic le 4 of Law No. (24) of 2018 also grants tax exemptions 
to foreign investors' profit shares in listed companies, investments with units listed in 
financial markets and derived from trading securities ; 
• Customs duty exemptions. Foreign investors are exempted from customs duties on imported 
machinery and equipment necessary for the establishment of their project. Raw and semi -
manufactured materials that are necessary for industrial production but not avail able in the 
domestic market are also exempted from customs duties ; 
• Allocation of land. Article 8 of Law No. (1) states that land may be allocated to foreign 
investors through lease or usufruct, in accordance with Law No. (16) of 2018 on foreign 
ownership o f real estate in Qatar;  
• Favourable remittance conditions. Foreign investors can make transfers pertaining to their 
investments, including investment revenues, proceeds from the sale or liquidation of 
investments, amounts awarded  as the result of investment  disputes and compensation 
resulting from expropriation;  
• Right to transfer shares. A foreign investor can transfer the ownership to any other investor, 
Qatari or otherwise, or assign ownership to a national partner in the case of partnerships. 
In such case s, Law No. (1) stipulates that the transferred investment would continue to be 
treated under the same stipulation of Law No. (1). Except for general partners, new 
investors' financial liability extends only to the amount that they have invested in the 
comp any (Law No (11) of 2015, Qatar's Commercial Company Law). General partners, 
however, are jointly and personally liable, along with the other general partners, for all of 
the company's debts, irrespective of when the debts were incurred ; 
• Due process in the  case of expropriation and compensations. Article 13 of Law No. (1) 
stipulates that foreign -owned investments in Qatar shall not be subject to expropriation, 
either directly or indirectly, unless it is in the public's interest, implemented in a non -WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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discrim inatory manner and in return for a prompt and reasonable compensation in 
accordance with the same legal procedures that would apply to the case of Qatari citizens 
and companies.  
3.32.   The Council of Ministers may, upon recommendation from the MOCI, grant investm ent 
incentives and benefits beyond those contained in Law No. (1).  
3.33.   Law No. (1) also stipulates that a foreign investor can own up to 49% of the share capital of 
Qatari joint stock company listed in the Qatar Stock Exchange subject to the MOCI's approval 
(Article 7). This limit can be extended upon a recommendation by the MOCI and approval by the 
Council of Ministers.  
3.34.   Law No. (1) also provides legal certainty in the case of disputes by granting foreign investors 
the right to agree to settle disputes through arbitration in all cases other than labour disputes (in 
the case of labour disputes, the process is disciplined as per the specifications of Law No. (13) of 
2017, as amended). Qatar ratified the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) in 2003. Furthermore, Qatar has been a member of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes since 2011 and, by extension, 
enforces international arbitration in disputes between an investor and th e State. To this end, 
Article  34(1) of Law No. (2) of 2017 (on the Issuance of the Arbitration Law in Civil and Commercial 
Matters) stipulates that "an arbitration award, irrespective of the country in which it was issued, 
shall acquire the status of res judicata  and be enforceable according to the provisions of this Law ". 
3.35.   Foreign investors may also choose to invest in Qatar through PPP, whose legal framework is 
regulated through Law No. (12) of 2020. The terms and conditions of such contracts are determine d 
by the stipulations of this law and all other Qatari laws, with the exception of the State Financial 
Systems and the Public Procurement Laws. In consequence, foreign investors would need to enter 
a partnership with a Qatari person or legal entity in acco rdance with the provisions of Law No. (1) 
of 2019 .  
3.36.   Law No. (12), notwithstanding the above, seeks to encourage competition, increase private 
sector participation in major infrastructure projects and encourage the public sector to adapt new 
strategies that  decrease public expenditure whilst increasing efficiency in project delivery and 
management. The law foresees six modalities: (i) allocation of land to be developed by the private 
sector through a lease or granting usufruct rights ; (ii) build -operation -transfer ; (iii) build -transfer -
operation ; (iv) build -own-operate -transfer ; (v) operation and maintenance ; and (vi) any other 
arrangement as determined by the Council of Ministers.  
3.37.   The law stipulates that each PPP will require the for mation of a Project Committee that will 
include representatives from the contracting authority, i.e. any public agency wishing to use any of 
the PPP modalities, representatives of the State Audit Bureau and a special PPP unit from the MOCI. 
Winning bids wi ll depend on the Project Committee's recommendation and final approval by the 
Prime Minister. In general, Qatar's foreign investment regime is already aligned to this type of 
contract as similar investment modalities have been used by Kahramaa (Qatar Elect ricity and Water 
Authority) and Ashghal.  
3.8  Investment  Promotion  
3.38.   Since 2014 Qatar has expanded its trade promotion presence and activities. To this end, 
commercial attaché offices were opened in London, Paris and Washington, DC with the operations 
of Qatar's representative office to the WTO in Geneva being revamped as well. The attachés' 
activities are actively coordinated with the MOCI and Qatar's main investment promotion agencies. 
The Investment Promotion Agency Qatar (IPA), in particular, partly implements  its own promotion 
strategy through the attachés' offices.  
3.39.   In general, Qatar is being promoted as a regional distribution hub from which markets of 
sizeable internal demand can be supplied from. This relies, in part, on Qatar's fluent and positive 
relation ships with several countries located in surrounding regional markets, in and outside the GCC, 
as well as its state -of-the-art port and airport infrastructure, safety and investment -friendly 
regulatory framework. In fact, in 2019, the World Economic Forum r anked Qatar 29 in the world in WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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terms of competitiveness.48 The primary sectors targeted for promotion in Qatar are services, 
industrial and logistics although the authorities' efforts are not limited to these. The attachés' offices 
also work to ease Qatari  investment abroad whenever it is required, particularly at the initial stages 
of the investment cycle.  
3.40.   During the period under review, Qatar's Commercial Register Law (Law No. (25) of 2005) was 
also amended to facilitate registration and renewal. The Comm ercial Registration Department at the 
MOCI is required to respond to the applicant's request for registration on the same date of 
registration, subject to all the required documentation having been properly submitted.  
3.8.1   Investment Promotion Agency Qatar  
3.41.   The IPA is the government's main foreign investment promotion agency in Qatar. It was 
launched in July 2019 following a decision from the Supreme Council of Economic Affairs  —in 
May 2019 — having been incorporated in Qatar Financial Centre. The agency thus ope rates through 
QFC laws and regulations (see Section 2.7 for further details on QFC's regulatory framework).49 
3.42.   IPA's board includes representatives from several ministries and agencies, including the Prime 
Minister's Office, the MOCI, the Ministry of Financ e, Qatar Free Zone Authority (QFZA), the Ministerial 
Group for the Promotion of the Private Sector, Media City, QFC and QSTP. IPA coordinates its offering 
and strategy with the Ministry of Finance for budget matters (both for internal operations and 
incent ives available to prospective investors) as well as the MOCI, QFC, QFZA, QSTP  and Media City 
with regard to licencing of companies.  
3.43.   IPA's vision is to secure sustainable investments into Qatar to drive the country's knowledge 
economy and its process of div ersification. Its mission includes the promotion and marketing of 
Qatar as an investment destination, in line with QNV 2030 and QSNDS' goals of attracting and 
facilitating investments that posit the development of home -grown skilled labour with high 
value -added impact on the economy.  
3.44.   IPA's strategy rests on three pillars. At the sector level, it seeks to attract investments into 
tourism, advanced manufacturing (including chemicals and electronics), infrastructure (including 
Public Private Partnerships and r eal estate), agriculture and technology development. A second 
sector focus includes financial and professional services, entertainment (including sports) and 
logistics. In terms of regions, IPA's promotion efforts are geared towards the United States ; China; 
France ; Germany ; Russia n Federation ; and Turkey as a primary focus with Canada ; India; Italy; 
Japan ; Singapore ; Republic of Korea ; United Kingdom ; and Malaysia as a secondary target. Finally, 
the profile of investors sought is primarily mid to large investors with a secondary emphasis on 
SMEs. Both Tier 1 and 2 investors are targeted with an equal focus on both new and existing 
investors. By 2026, I PA expects to achieve an FDI stock (measured as a proportion of GDP) in line 
with international benchmarks.  
3.45.   The 2022 World Cup has also been incorporated in IPA's overall promotion strategy. In fact, 
IPA hosted a delegation of potential Pakistani investors  in early 2020 that included the official 
manufacturer of Adidas' footballs. IPA has also engaged Russian companies involved in the 2018 
World Cup that are seeking to expand their operations into the 2022 event in Qatar.  
3.46.   IPA's institutional strategy is bas ed on Qatar's evolving value proposition, its areas of 
sustainable growth and long -term investment trends, thus, coordinating Qatar's offer for potential 
foreign investors, including both financial and fiscal incentives (namely on corporate tax rates). Thi s 
includes access to development funding and support from Qatar Development Bank if done through 
a majority Qatari -owned company. So far, three companies have invested in Qatar through 
interaction with IPA —these are, Unilever, Dogus Group and IQ Capital.  
3.47.   Since its inception in mid -2019, IPA has achieved several milestones. In particular, it is now 
fully operational ( e.g. key personnel in place with main processes and tools completed ). It has also 
followed over 200 investor leads, having signed three Memoran dums of Understanding with the 
above -mentioned investors, and continuing to facilitate interaction between domes tic stakeholders 
 
48 WEF (2019). The Global Competitiveness Report 2019 . Geneva.  
49 For further details on QFC 's regulatory framework, refer to 
http://www.complinet.com/qfcra/display/index.html .  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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and potential investors . In November 2020, it signed an additional MoU with UBS to establish a 
wealth management operation in Q FC. In terms of marketing, IPA now has an operating brand 
platform and complete communication playbook and has participated in 11 major events, including 
promotional activities in Malaysia, Turkey, Russia n Federation  and Switzerland, France and Kuwait.  
3.48.   In addition to facilitating investments and providing business intelligence data, IPA supports  
investors with Qatar's  incentives regime available through  various business and licensing platforms. 
In this sense , the incentives landscape spans four synergistic categories , i.e. regulatory, support, 
fiscal, and financial. Amongst the principal incentives are (see Sections 3.7, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 for 
further details):  
• Double Taxation treat ies with 60+ countries ; 
 
• No restrictions on capital repatriation ; 
 
• No quantitative quotas on imports ; 
 
• No income tax on salaries ; 
 
• Open  immigration and employment rules to support the import ation of labour ; 
 
• Minimum wage and wage protections  laws; 
 
• Strong financial and banking sector to support transactions ; 
 
• Access to most public business and administrative services via e -Government platform 
(Al Hukoomi) . 
 
3.49.   IPA has signed tree bilateral investment promotion agreements. These are, with the Malaysian 
Investment Development Agency, with the Turkish Investment Office and the Russian Investment 
Agency. It also has an additional agreement under consideration with Business France.  
3.8.2   Qatar Free Zones  
3.50.   QFZA administers two Free Zones (FZ) in Qatar, i.e. Ras Bufontas (a 400 hectares sight next 
to Hamad International Airport) and Um m Al Houl (a 3,000 hectares area next to Hamad Port). 
These Free Zones are regulated by Law No. (34) of 2005, as amended by Decree Law No. (21) of 
2017. These amendments included several key changes; in particular, the law:  
• Established Q FZA as a financial and administrative independent authority  that report s 
directly to the Council of Ministers ; 
 
• Establish ed the Q FZA Board and related Governance  Board ; 
 
• Introduced a  new definition of FZ, consistent with the definition used by the W orld Customs 
Organization  (revised Kyoto Convention Specific , Annex -D); 
 
• Stipulates the  provisions under which the Q FZA can register and license companies within 
the FZ without restrictions on foreign ownership percentage or foreign currency transfer 
inside and outside Qatar (subject to compliance with QCB regulations) ; 
 
• Introduced  provisions under which  QFZA can regulate employment within the FZ  subject to 
compliance wi th minimum requirements provided by the State Labo ur Law and related 
international conventions ; 
• Introduced p etition and dispute resolution mechanisms brought against QFZA's decisions to 
suspend or cancel licences;  
 
• Stipulated a list of goods prohibited fro m entering FZ aligned with Law No. (40) of 2002 
(Customs Law ); 
 
• Placed regulatory oversight with QCB regarding banking and financial activities in the FZ ; 
 WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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• Reinstates t ax and customs duty exemptions for companies operating in the FZ . 
 
3.51.   QFZA's board is chaired by H.E. Ahmad Bin Mohammed Al Sayad and includes representatives 
from QFC, Qatar Petrochemical Company, QInvest, QP, the MoI, CRA, Al Khalij Commercial Bank 
and AKCB Finance Ltd. The Board is responsible for developing, regulating a nd managing the FZ  
under its jurisdiction. QFZA's strategy seeks three goals  — i.e. pursue partnerships with promising 
companies of all shapes and sizes, with a particular focus on those operating in key sectors where 
Qatar has a strong value proposition , offer top -of-the line infrastructure, a range of globally 
competitive incentives, and lands right next to the airport and seaport  and s erve as a one -stop shop 
for companies setting up in Qatar . 
3.52.   The FZ are open to any type of economic activity, subject to r egulatory compliance, with 
special emphasis on high -value added manufacturing. So far, companies from the following sectors 
have been approved by the QFZA to start operations : ICT, logistics and warehousing, energy and 
environmental technologies, industria l products and services, automotive and transport equipment, 
marine activities & services, aerospace and aviation activities, food and beverages, pharmaceuticals 
and medical devices  and professional and business services . Retailing activities will be inclu ded in 
the future.  
3.53.   Branches and limited liability companies incorporated under QFZA's jurisdictional law can 
operate in the FZ. Moreover, whilst branches continue to operate under their original companies' 
management rules, management of those incorporated  under QFZA's legal framework are regulated 
by QFZA's Company Regulations(2018).50 The criteria considered by the authorities in the approval 
process include their contribution secur ing supply (including the local market), the skilled to unskilled 
labour ratio, the operation 's anchor value, the degree of innovation undertaken by the company, the 
company 's operational soundness with export -orientation being a plus.  Amongst other benefits,  all 
QFZA -approved companies enjoy 0% corporate tax for renewable 20 -year periods and 100% foreign 
ownership with full capital repatriation.  
3.54.   Licensing procedures for companies operating within QFZA'a jurisdiction are also being 
streamlined. The law also st ates that appeals may be filed within 15 days of notification in cases 
where QFZA where licenses have been suspended or terminated. In that case, the governance board 
has a month to provide a justified response. If no response is provided after one month t hen the 
appeal is to be considered as accepted and the company may resort to a dispute resolution centre 
within three months.  As at April 2020, the jurisdiction of the Qatar International Court and Dispute 
Resolution Centre (QICDRC), which operates within the QFC, had been extended to companies 
operating under the QFZA. This is based on an agreement between QFZA and QFC  — with full legal 
certainty pending legal approval by the authorities  — in order to grant the same access to the court 
to all of Qatar's pr eferential zones. Procedures within QICDRC are conducted in English and 
enforceable within the state of Qatar.  
3.55.   QFZA has so far approved around 100 projects from different companies, including global 
brands and anchor companies. Almost half of these have co mpleted registration and licensing 
requirements with the remaining still ongoing through the process. As at April 2020, companies  
licensed for manufacturing projects have not started their operations yet  but are actively working 
towards operationaliz ing their activities.  
3.56.   Qatar has two additional FZ, i.e. QFC and the Science and Technology and Technology Park 
(see Section 2.7 for further details on QFC). The Science and Technology and Technology Park, 
which operates under Qatar Foundation, signed a Memorand um of Understanding with QFZA "to 
oversee, regulate and support the research development and entrepreneurship efforts to foster the 
establishment of a sustainable knowledge -based economy in Qatar ".51 The collaborated is to focus 
on supporting research, dev elopment, innovation and entrepreneurship based on common areas of 
interest, particularly the ICT sector. The initiative includes training programs, information sharing 
and joint promotion events.  
 
50 Company Regulations (2018) may be downloaded from https://fza.gov.qa/wp -
content/uploads/2019/08/FZA -Companies -Regulations.pdf . 
51 QFZA (2020). Viewed at: https://fza.gov.qa/ . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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3.8.3   Media City  
3.57.   Media City (MC), which was established under Law  No. (13) of 2019, is being developed for 
all types of media to operate in an ecosystem crafted for the creative industry. Global brands in 
media and related technologies are incentivised to make Qatar their destination of choice for local 
and regional act ivities. Covering a wide spectrum of media players including television, print, film, 
social media, music, radio, out -of-home and applicable technologies, MC builds on Qatar's well -
known footprint in news, sport and entertainment. The resulting creative cl uster will enhance the 
local industry creating employment and business growth. Moreover, MC will provide a competitive 
licencing regime for companies and individuals, within a tailored platform that provides —
proactively —access to local and regional markets . MC will incubate technologies through investments 
that enable and accelerate the local and regional media industry. In this sense, MC is positioned to 
attract aspiring talent, inspiring storytelling, prominent content providers, advanced technologies 
and ambitious businesses to prosper in the region.  
3.58.   The law allows MC the right to grand licenses, permits and approvals to individuals, companies 
and other entities, regulate business and activities inside MC, conduct research and consultancy 
work to support regulations and promotion of the media, provide administrative, logistic and 
technical services to licensed companies, establish business incubators and establish a media 
investment fund.  
3.59.   Companies and individuals licensed under MC are offered competitive incentives tailored to 
the media industry. Primarily, an ecosystem of creative freedom within ethical guidelines will allow 
media brands to operate to their maximum potential. Secondly, co mpetitive Free Zone benefits 
including 0% corporate tax for 20 years with renewability, 100% foreign ownership and full capital 
repatriation will be provided. The activities expected to be carried in MC, as prescribed by the law 
(Article 5), include  commis sioning and production of digital media content, provision of technologies 
for production, data management and revenue generation, developing and maintaining digital 
platforms , issuing, publishing and distributing print media and use of online platforms to  both 
develop and distribute media and use of social media.  
3.8.4   Higher Education  
3.60.   Qatar has invested heavily to develop its national educational system since the 2002 
education reform. Since then, authorities have sought to develop education as one of the count ry's 
core pillars of socioeconomic development, in line with QNV 2030 and QSNDS. To this end, the role 
of foreign educational institutions has been  — and continues to be  — key for the establishment of 
Qatar's overall knowledge base.   
3.61.   Eight foreign universi ties have campuses located in the Education City campus, which falls 
under the administration of Qatar Foundation. These are: Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar, 
Georgetown University in Qatar, Northwestern University in Qatar, Texas A&M University at Qat ar, 
University College London Qatar and Virginia Commonwealth University School of the Arts in Qatar, 
Weill Cornel Medicine -Qatar and HEC Paris in Qatar. The institutions, which must be registered in 
Qatar's Commercial Registry, offer around 350 academic p rograms at different levels and are 
overseen by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), which was created through 
Ameri Decree No (9) of 2016. Other primary and secondary educational institutions complement the 
educational offer at Education  City. Collectively these institutions offer 168 undergraduate programs 
and 131 postgraduate programs, including 95 masters and 36 doctoral programs.  
3.62.   Investors seeking to establish a higher education institution in Qatar must, in partnership with 
a foreign  university, approach the MEHE. The approval for licensing and accreditation from the State 
of Qatar is conditioned on several factors, including the university 's ranking in any of the major 
global ranking systems of higher education and a feasibility study justifying the need for the 
proposed academic offer in Qatar. Furthermore, the institution to be set up in Qatar must be a 
branch of an accredited university a nd "apply the methods of review and self -evaluation to its 
resources and educational programs " as well as be "subject to the same procedures and academic 
accreditation system as its parent company ".52 Licenses must be renewed every three years and 
includes , amongst other things, on campus visits and self -study reports used to determine the 
 
52 Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2011). Procedures for Licensing and Accreditation of 
Private Higher Education Institutions in the State of Qat ar. WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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degree of compliance with standards and conditions. A bank guarantee of Q AR 100,000 must also 
be submitted to the MEHE throughout the licensing period.  
3.9  Export Promotion  
3.63.   Since 2014, Tasdeer, QDB's export support program me, expanded its offer to export -oriented 
companies. In effect, besides its existing export finance and insurance programs (see Qatar's 2014 
TPR Government report for further details), it now includes a devel opment program called Tasdeer 
Development. Through it, companies have access to several publications, i.e. trade report, export 
and free trade agreements guide s and market studies , as well as workshops, export readiness and 
matchmaking programs as well as Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) . The export readiness program, 
in particular, was set up to fill knowledge gaps within non -hydrocarbon SMEs seeking to export 
goods and services whilst the EEN gives local companies access to distribution networks in more 
than 65 countries.53 
3.64.   Tasdeer  continues to organize exhibitions and activities aimed at export -oriented Qatari 
companies  as well as facilitates access to the International Trade Centre's (ITC) tools, such as the 
agency's Trade Map and its global trade helpdes k. Access to these tools has proven valuable to local 
companies as it has facilitated their understanding of technical requirements, customs duties and 
market intelligence, amongst others. Moreover, a s part of its e -commerce initiative, Tasdeer also 
trains  companies to position and market their products on international  e-commerce platforms . 
3.65.   Since Qatar's last TPR, a total of 348 Qatari companies benefited from Tasdeer's overall 
support activities. Of these, 36 did so through export finance, 52 through expo rt insurance with all 
Qatari companies going through Tasdeer's development initiatives. Tasdeer's portfolio of export -
oriented companies includes more than 350 companies who are already exporting or on a position 
to start exporting immediately.  
3.66.   Historicall y, the GCC markets have been the Qatari SMEs' default export markets. During the 
period under review, however, Tasdeer realigned its strategic goals to include other target markets 
in North and East Africa as well as East Asia in order to allow domestic ex port-oriented manufacturing 
companies to maintain their level of production. Furthermore, Tasdeer also started to promote 
service -providing SMEs in foreign high -tech exhibitions and fairs. To further enable export activities, 
it deepened its institutional channels of cooperation with other Qatari agencies in charge of 
overseeing export activities such as the Customs Authority, the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and freight forwarders.  
3.67.   Tasdeer also continued its close cooperation with the ITC during the period under review. To 
this effect, according to the ITC, the impact of Tasdeer's activities was estimated at USD 150 per 
every USD 1 spent, a figure higher than the global average of USD 87. This was also reflected in 
Qatar's general export numbers, e.g. growth of non -hydrocarbon exports for the period 2011 -2018 
was 19%, on a compound annual growth rate base, whilst the number of regular exporters increased 
from 42 in 2011 to 112 in 2018. Moreover, Tasdeer was recognized as the 2018 Best Trade 
Promoti on Organization by ITC under the category of Best Use of the Partnership.54 
3.10  Double Taxation Treaties  
3.68.   Qatar continued to negotiate bilateral double -taxation agreements with countries around the 
world.  The following provides a list of those that were either signed since 2014 or than came into 
force since 2014.  
Countries with which Qatar has signed double taxation treaties with since 2014  
Country  Date of Signature  Entry into Force  
Portugal  12/12/2011  4/4/2014  
Bermuda  10/5/2012  10/5/2017  
Brunei  17/1/2012  26/8/2016  
Fiji 17/6/2013  1/1/2014  
Kazakhstan  19/1/2014  5/4/2015  
 
53 For further details, see https://www.qdb.qa/en/Pages/Tasdeer -Development.aspx . 
54 Viewed at:  http://www.intracen.org/news/Winners -of-2018-World -Trade -Promotion -Organization -
Awards -Ghana -Nigeria -Qatar/ . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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Country  Date of Signature  Entry into Force  
The Gambia  18/11/2014  - 
Ecuador  22/10/2014  1/11/2016  
Kyrgyz  Republic  1/6/2014  4/5/2015  
Nigeria  28/2/2014  8/3/2016  
Latvia  26/9/2014  1/6/2015  
Kenya  23/4/2014  25/6/2015  
Paraguay  11/2/2018  - 
Ukraine  20/3/2018  - 
Argentina  19/4/2018  - 
Ghana  13/11/2018  - 
Somalia  13/12/2018  - 
Turkey  18/12/2016  31/12/2016  
Spain  10/9/2015  6/2/2018  
South Africa  6/3/2015  2/12/2015  
Japan  20/2/2015  30/12/2015  
Source:  MOCI . 
3.11  Intellectual Property  
3.69.   Qatar's legal framework on intellectual property (IP) covers almost all the fundamental areas 
of IP protection. This includes trademarks, patents, copyrights, trade names, geographical 
indications and industrial designs and models, pr otection of trade secrets and layout designs for 
integrated circuits. In addition, Law No. (17) of 2011, prohibits the entrance into Qatar of products 
that violate IP rights protected by Qatari law. To this end, the law entrusts the GAC to take all 
necessa ry measures to prevent the entrance of such products. The law also protects the rights of IP 
rights holders in Qatar, establishes procedures and appropriate instances for dispute resolutions, 
transit goods, parallel imports and products received from count ries with which Qatar forms a 
customs union (in practice, the GCC only). The law also allows rights holders to register all data 
related to his/her rights with the GAC.  
3.70.   Qatar's efforts to develop its knowledge -based economy have included the development of  
the necessary institutional and legal framework to encourage innovative activities. To this end, t he 
MOCI is responsible for implementing Law No. (17) as well as enforcing Qatar's intellectual property 
laws, including regulations on trademarks, patents an d copyrights. It is also tasked with coordinating 
Qatar's commitments with both the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization  (WIPO).  
3.71.   Law No. (9) of 2002 protects trade indications, trade names, geographical and industrial 
designs and templates.  The provides the basic legal framework for trademark protection, including 
registration procedure, duration and renewal of protection, transfer of ownership of a registered 
trademark, nullifications, cancellation and renunciations as well as collective tr ademarks, amongst 
other aspects. Geographical indications are protected by law even if they are not registered in Qatar.  
3.72.   Law No. (7) of 2014, on GCC trademark  protection , repealed and replaced Law No. (18) of 
2007. The new law maintains the principles and guidelines contained on trademark protection at the 
GCC level and includes general procedural aspects on trademark registration in Qatar —which can be 
done electronically through the MOCI 's website  — as well as provides operational definitions.55 In 
particular, Law No. (7) covers registration procedures, trademark protection, transfer of ownership, 
cancellation of a trademark registration, licensing contracts, collective and control trademarks, 
stipulations on rights enforcement and sanctions to i nfringements of the law.  
3.73.   Qatar ratified the Patent Cooperation Treaty  (PCT)  — through Decree No. (36) of 2011  —
whilst providing legal protection to patents through Law No. (30) of 2006 . Efforts were made since 
2014 to streamline the process of patent regis tration resulting in an electronic registration process 
through MOCI 's single window service website  since 2017.56 Through it, applicant s can file the 
documentation under either the PCT or the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 
A full description of the patent registration process can be obtained from the MOCI.  
3.74.   Qatar is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Protection (Paris Acts of 1971) since 2000. In Qatar, copywrite and neighbouring righ ts are protected 
 
55 Law No. (7) of 2014. Ar ticle 1, Issuance Articles  
56 For further details see https://services.mec.gov.qa . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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by Law No. (7) of 2002. The law permits the use of protected works for the purpose of teaching as 
long as it is not for profit and all sources, and creators, are quoted. Furthermore, moral rights for 
Qatari protected work are "imprescripti ble and perpetual " with the creator's association with a work 
considered by law to be sustained forever even if the author sold the rights to a work. The law 
protects areas such as architectural works constructed in Qatar, artistic work incorporated in a 
building constructed in Qatar, audio -visual work whose producer is headquartered in Qatar, national 
folklore, photography, Qatari authors published inside or outside Qatar and works delivered orally 
such as sermons, lectures, addresses or hymns.57 
3.75.   Law No. ( 6) of 2005 provides legal protection for integrated circuit designs. The law stipulates 
the conditions under which designs are protected in Qatar, the conditions for registration with the 
MOCI and procedures for dispute resolutions regarding infringements of the law.  
3.12  Competition Policy  
3.76.   Qatar's competition law continues to be regulated by Law No. (19) of 2006 (Competition and 
Anti-Monopoly Law) and MOCI Decision No. (61) of 2008, which provides details and clarification on 
the Law (see Qatar's 2014 TPR Gover nment Report for further description of Law No. (19)). 
Additional provisions regarding Qatar's competition framework and merges and acquisitions for any 
company operating in Qatar are stipulated by Law No. (11) of 2015 (Commercial Companies Law), 
Law No. ( 1) of 2019 (Foreign Investment Law) whilst Qatar Financial Markets Authority's Merger and 
Acquisition Rule 2014 provides guidance in the case of the financial sector  (see Section 3.7 for 
further details on Qatar's Foreign Investment Law).  
3.77.   Oversight and enf orcement Law No. (19) are undertaken by MOCI's Competition and 
Antimonopoly Committee. The Committee is tasked with maintaining databases and integrated 
information about economic activity, receiving reports on potential violations of the law, coordination  
with similar authorities in other countries concerning matters of mutual concern, issuing a periodic 
bulletin containing the Committee's resolutions, recommendations, procedures and measures, 
preparing an annual report on the Committee's activities and fu ture plans and proposals and 
expressing its view on draft laws and regulations pertaining to competition and prevention of 
monopolistic matters in Qatar.58 
3.78.   Law No. (19) is quite general in scope and provides core legal guidelines, including procedural, 
covering all economic activities in Qatar. Because of this, some areas have not been specified as 
legal provisions yet, e.g. jurisdictional thresholds, whilst in other cases, supporting measures define 
the rules and processes involved, e.g. , market thresholds  in the case of an acquisition of 40% or 
more are covered by Article 288 of the Commercial Companies Law.  
3.79.   The main substantive criteria considered by the authorities in the case of transactions is that 
of market control or influence, for which economic tes ts on the desirability of the transaction are 
considered. A request for approval for a transaction to acquire assets, equities or usufructs, shares 
or mergers and/or acquisitions in a manner that may create market control or influence has to be 
lodged with  the MOCI. The law provides a time frame of 90 days for the authorities to respond, after 
which if no response is provided, it will be deemed as approved (Article 10, Law No. (19)). Decisions 
can be appealed within 60 days in the appropriate Administrative  Court.   
3.80.   Law No. (19) is currently operational with 68 cases having been processed under the law 
during 2014 -2020. A case in point is that of the after -sales service market in the automobile sector. 
The Committee undertook an investigation into potential a nti-competitive practices after receiving 
information regarding common market practices. The ensuing investigation found that these 
practices violated competitive practices in the meaning of Articles (3) and (4) of the Competition 
and Anti -Monopoly Law. Ni ne corrective measures were published by the Committee intended to 
introduce competitive practices and, in some instances, break -up de-facto monopolies.  
3.81.   Qatar also has a sector -specific competition framework for the ITC sector. In effect, in 
response to the stipulations of Law No. (34) of 2006 (Chapter 9 of the Telecommunications Law) 
and the Policy Statement of June 2014, the Communications Regulatory Aut hority developed a 
competition framework for the sector. The framework includes, a statement of competition policy, 
 
57 Law No. (7) of 2002. Article 2.  
58 Law No. (19) of 2006. Article 8.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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an explanatory document, a market definition and dominance designation for ex -post competition 
policy investigation and a description on how  complaints are processed.59 The general principles and 
definitions used in this framework are broadly aligned with those of Law No. (19), including, but not 
being limited to, the definition of anti -competitive practices, abuse of dominant position, merger s 
and transfer control and remedies for infringements of the law. In some areas, the ITC competitive 
framework is much more specific than is Law No. (19), specifically, in the areas of abuse of dominant 
position, the type of agreements that may be deemed a s limiting competition (horizontal/vertical 
agreements) and procedural aspects of the investigations carried out.  
3.13  Procurement  
3.82.   Qatar reorganized its general procurement framework in 2015 with the objective of 
introducing greater efficiency to the process. I n effect, Law No. (24) of 2015 (Tenders and Auctions 
Law) superseded Law No. (26) of 2006 and with it, several legal measures were enacted to 
implement the law. Amongst the key ones are, Council of Ministers Resolutions 22 of 2016, 18 of 
2018 (which amends  Article 8 of Law No. (24) on the tendering method to be used in the case of 
emergencies), 16 of 2019 (Executive Regulations of Tender and Auctions Law), 22 of 2019 (on the 
ceiling value of contracting by practice or direct award without submission). The l aw applies to all 
government entities except Qatar Petroleum, QIA, the armed forces, the police and other entities in 
the case of confidential contracts.  
3.83.   The main changes introduced by Law No. (24) were: (i) the abolition of the Central Tenders 
Committee ( CTC) and, consequently, the decentralisation of the tendering process ; (ii) streamlining 
the process to resolve tender disputes ; (iii) permitting the use of two -stage tendering ; and 
(iv) exempting SMEs from the performance bonds requirements and payment gu arantees. Under 
the previous law, tenders below Q AR 5 million were administered by Tender Committees within each 
governmental entity; everything else was handled by the CTC. Under the new law, on the other 
hand, each regulated government entity is allowed to create its own tender committee, whose 
members must include representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the State Audit Bureau. By 
doing this, the authorities expect to introduce efficiencies in the handling of specialist subject 
matters. On the ot her hand, the law allows the Ministry of Finance to set up as many dispute 
resolution committees as necessary to address all disputes as long as each committee is presided 
by a judge.  
3.84.   The introduction of a two -stage tendering processes also represents a si gnificant departure 
from the previous regime. In effect, besides the other 4 methods permitted by the law, i.e. limited 
tender, practice, competition and direct contract (Article 2 of the Tenders and Auctions Law), the 
two-stage approach allows closer coll aboration with the contraction/supplier in the definition of the 
scope of work as well as the beginning of the service provision whilst the details of the scope are 
fully worked out. The authorities expect that by involving contractors/suppliers from an ea rly stage, 
they can better understand the project's refinements and scope before going into the brunt of the 
work to be delivered. The law also seeks to increase SME participation in the domestic procurement 
market by fully (or partially) waving the formal  requirements on performance bonds and payment 
guarantees, subject to the tender committee's approval and a commitment by QDB on financial 
assurances on behalf of the tendering SME.  
3.85.   The cases of Ashghal and QRail are two cases in point. Ashghal developed its own de-facto 
practices to separate their procurement market by size of projects with the aim of providing access 
to local companies. This include d breaking up big procurements packages into smaller one s that 
could be provided by local companies. The pro curement process has three steps  —first (pre -tender 
and preparation of documentation), second (research and award) and third (preparation and signing 
of contract). Two types of tenders are used, i.e. public tenders, which includes advertisement, and 
limite d tender, i.e. by invitation. Direct commissioning is also used to purchase materials or to carry 
out initial service work, as well as in cases of monopoly of supply, technology or licensing. Bids are 
evaluated using one of two methods: either the bids' fi nancial value is divided by the number of 
technical points or, alternatively, technical and financial points are allocated with a possible 
maximum of 70 (for the technical part) and 30 (for the financial part). The final stipulations of the 
 
59 CRA (2020). Documents Related to CRA 's Competition Framewor k. Viewed at: 
https://cra.gov.qa/en/document/documents -related -to-cra-competition -framework . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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contracts under go a final round of documentation and negotiations verification to ensure the 
contract's validity.  
3.86.   QRail, on the other hand, selected a design and build procurement model based on an 
amended form of the 1999 FIDIC Yellow Book . Bidding was based on  invitati on due to time 
considerations and to  focus the search  only those bidders that were most capable and most likely to 
successfully deliver the project  on time . The process went through four stages: (i) shortlisting 
through expressions of interest and pre -qualification ; (ii) release of formal tender documentation to 
selected bidders, followed by clarification and submission of tenders ; (iii) tender evaluation, 
recommendations to and approval by the General Tender Committee ; and (iv) final negotiation  and 
award.  Foreign bidders were usually (but not always) required to achieve a minimum level of local 
participation in their joint ventures  with the amount of local participation var ying between packages.  
3.87.   In order to  remain on target with existing deadlines, QRail also used a fast -track approval 
process to tender their work. The contractors first identified all materials manufactured in countries 
with standing export prohibitions to Qatar and proposed alternatives. Th is exercise was completed 
in a matter of weeks. The proposed alternatives were assessed by a dedicated QRail task force 
against QRail's functional and technical requirements. Additional resources were applied to reduce 
review and assessment periods from 28  days to 5 days. In some cases, special teams were deployed 
to the manufacturing sites to assess them for suitability, also within a matter of days and weeks. 
Expedited transportation and customs clearance measures were introduced to reduce lead times for 
alternative materials.  
3.14  Electronic Commerce  
3.88.   Electronic commerce in Qatar is regulated through Law No. (16) of 2010, which stipulates, 
amongst other things, the conditions under which agreements are to be concluded electronically, 
including the technical pro cedures to be followed, electronic signatures, the need to obtain customer 
consent for electronic marketing material to be distributed and procedures to safeguard signatories' 
information. Enforcement and oversight of the law is the responsibility of the M oTC. 
3.89.   Since 2014, the E -commerce market continued to expand in Qatar with estimated B2C and 
B2B markets of USD 1.2 and USD 1.43 billion respectively in 2015. To support the sector's 
development, the MoTC  published in 2015 the Qatar National E -Commerce Roadmap 2015, a 
national policy document that was subsequently updated in 2017, that serves as a policy guideline 
for the sector.60 Furthermore, postal services were liberalized in 2016 to improve the last -mile 
delivery in the E -commerce value -chain. By 2017, the cost of implementation of a digital payment 
gateway had halved with the introduction of local and regional Payment Service Provides in the local 
market. In that same year, the MoTC launched Qatar's E -Commerce Information Portal 
(http://www.ecommerceqatar.qa/ ) to facilitate information to both businesses and consumers.  
3.90.   The authorities published E -Commerce Guidelines in 2018, focusing on technical aspec ts, 
security, user experience, website design and terms and conditions. In order to further create the 
necessary conditions for E -Commerce to expand in Qatar, the MoTC also launched Qatar's 
E-Commerce Trustmark (Theqa) in 2019. The Theqa trust programme se eks to boost confidence in 
the local E -commerce ecosystem by certifying the legitimacy of websites against criteria set by the 
MoTC, thus, bringing transparency to E -commerce activities in Qatar.  
 
60 Ministry of Transport and Communications (2000). Viewed at: 
http://www.ecommerceqatar.qa/assets/ecommerce -2017-en.pdf . WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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4  TRADE AGREEMENTS  
4.1  Bilateral  Trade -Related A greements  
4.1.  Qatar does not have formal bilateral trade agreements. Instead, it has two types of 
trade -related agreements, i.e. the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (RPPI) 
Agreements and the Economic, Commercial and Technical Cooperation (EC TC) Agreements (see 
Qatar's 2014 Government Report for a detailed description on what these agreements cover, 
Section  4.1). The following table lists the RPPI Agreements signed by Qatar during the period under 
review.  
RPPI Agreements Signed by Qatar Since  2014  
Country  Date of Signature  Entry into Force  
Angola  08/09/2019  - 
Benin  05/05/2018  - 
Uganda  01/05/2018  - 
Togo 30/04/2018  - 
Ukraine  20/03/2018  Not in force  
Paraguay  11/02/2018  Not in force  
Sierra Leone  05/02/2018  - 
Guinea Conakry  21/12/2017  - 
Ethiopia  14/11/2017  - 
Singapore  17/10/2017  In force  
Argentina  11/07/2016  Not in force  
Kyrgyz  Republic  08/12/2014  Not in force  
Gabon  05/11/2014  - 
Liberia  21/05/2014  - 
Kenya  23/04/2014  Not in force  
Source:  MOCI  
4.2.  The ECTC Agreements signed by Qatar since 2014 are as follows:  
ECTC Agreements Signed by Qatar Since 2014  
Country  Date of Signature  Entry into Force  
Angola  08/09/2019  - 
Zimbabwe  08/05/2018  - 
Benin  05/05/2018  - 
Poland  05/05/2018  - 
Uganda  01/05/2018  - 
Togo 03/04/2018  - 
Sierra Leon e 05/02/2018  - 
Guinea Conakry  21/12/2017  - 
Ethiopia  14/11/2017  - 
Mexico  24/11/2015  - 
Gabon  05/11/2014  - 
Kyrgyz  Republic  03/06/2014  - 
Liberia  21/05/2014  - 
Kenya  23/04/2014  - 
Source:  MOCI  
4.3.  Consultations are ongoing  with the UK to put in place a legal framework to substitute the legal 
mechanisms in place under EU law . 
4.2  The Gulf Cooperation Council  
4.4.  Qatar maintained an active participation in the activities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
during the period under r eview. The MOCI worked to support three key initiatives at GCC level:  
• To finalize the requirements of the GCC Customs Union . The MOCI  worked in 
coordination with the relevant authorities to implement all decisions issued within the 
framework of the Coopera tion Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, by activating all joint 
work mechanisms and operationalizing them with the objective of  removing all obstacles to 
complet e the Customs Union ; WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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• To complete the Gulf Common Market . The initiative, which was launch ed at the Doha 
Summit 2008, has been actively supported by Qatar both before and after its announcement. 
To this end, t he MOCI continued to work  to create the required regulatory framework and 
establish coordination channels amongst the concerned authoriti es. Moreover, it worked to 
facilitate economic activities undertaken by the citizens of the Cooperation Council countries 
and ensure good conduct of procedures in this regard ; 
• To establish a unified food security network in the GCC States . The initiative, which 
was launched by the GCC's Trade Cooperation Committee, is actively supported by Qatar. 
In this regard, the MOCI  worked in coordination with the concerned parties to identify views 
and opinions on the extent of the possibility of achieving the goals s et forth by the initiative  
— these are, to create  an integrated food security system between the states of the Council 
and to secure  adequate food stocks in times of crisis . The issue is still being studied by the 
competent technical committees within the framework of the Cooperation Council . 
4.5.  The MOCI also  participated in the extraordinary meetings held within the framework of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf to discuss the economic effects of the spread of 
the COVID -19 in the GCC. Th e meetings, which were held through visual communication technology , 
were used to review the efforts of Cooperation Council Member States to address th e pandemic and 
the precautionary actions and measures that they have taken so far. The events in which th e MOCI 
participated were: (i) participation in the first and second extraordinary meeting s of the Trade 
Cooperation Committee  (held on April 2  and April 16 , 2020  respectively) ; (ii) participation in the 
meeting of the commodity flow team (held on April 20, 2020 ); (iii) s ubmission of  a report to the 
Council of Ministers  on the meetings' outcome ; and  (iv) report to the General Secretariat of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf Stat es on the  economic and commercial initiatives undertaken 
by the State of Qatar in response to  the challenges associated to  the spread o f the COVID -19. 
4.6.  The following table describes Qatar's participation during 2017 -2020 in the framework of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. To this effect, Qatar has participated in the 
periodic Ministerial Committee s meetings o n Trade and Industrial Cooperation , the preparatory 
meetings of the Committee of Trade and Industry Agents in the Gulf states as well as  the specialized 
technical committees . 
Qatar's Participation in GCC Meetings  
Year Meeting  
2017 - Second meeting of the Technical Committee for Intellectual Property, held during 18 -19 
December,  in Riyadh.  
2018 - Meeting (56) of the Trade Cooperation Committee , held on November 21, in Kuwait.  
- Meeting (17) to discuss the unified competition law project in the GCC states, held during 
3-4 October in Kuwait.  
- The meeting of the unified trade law project , held during 8 -10 October in Kuwait.  
- The first meeting of the Committee on Combating Commercial Fraud to discuss the executive 
regulations of the Law (Regulation) to Combat Commercial Fraud, held during 15 -16 October , in 
Kuwait.  
- Meeting (24) of the Gulf Common Market Committee, held during 17 -18 September , in Kuwait.  
- The second dialogue on trade and investment between the GCC and the EU, held on June 29, in 
Brussels.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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Year Meeting  
2019 - Meeting of the Committee on Trade (57) and Industrial (45) Cooperation held on May 1, in 
Musca t. 
- Meeting of the Committee on Trade (58) and Industrial (46) Cooperation held on Novem ber 14, in 
Muscat.  
- The preparatory meeting for the Undersecretaries of the Ministries of Commerce (48) and 
Industry (37) , held on April 30, in Muscat.  
- The preparatory meeting for the Undersecretaries of the Ministries of Commerce (49) and 
Industry (38), he ld on October 31, in Riyadh  
- The meeting (18) to study the unified competition law project in the GCC states, held during 
18-19 March , in Riyadh.  
- The third meeting of the e -services task force, held from 25 -27 August, in Riyadh.  
- Meeting (19) to study the un ified competition law project in the states of the Council, held during 
15-16 September , in Riyadh.  
- The second meeting of the Committee on Combating Commercial Fraud, held during 
15-17 October , in Riyadh.  
- The first meeting of the e -commerce task force, held during 1 -2 April , in Riyadh.  
- The meeting of the Gulf Common Market Committee (25), held during 13 -14 March 2019, in 
Riyadh.  
- The meeting of the Gulf Common Market Committee (26) , held on June 16, 2019.  
- The meeting of the Gulf Common Market Commi ttee (27), held during 8 -9 September, in Muscat.  
- The first meeting of the working group to study the amendment of the patent law, held from 
15-17 July, in Kuwait.  
- The second meeting of the working group to study the amendment of the patent law, held during  
26-28 August, in Riyadh.  
- The sixth meeting of the committee responsible for entrepreneurs and innovation for small and 
medium enterprises, held during 17 -18 September, in Riyadh.  
- The meeting of the task force in charge of reviewing the unified laws and re gulations, held during 
9-11 April , in Riyadh.  
- The joint meeting of the task force in charge of reviewing the laws and regulations in the GCC 
states to review the unified law for consumer protection in the GCC countries, held during 
26-28 March , in Riyadh.  
- The first meeting of the e -commerce task force, held from 1 -2 April , in Riyadh.  
- The first meeting of the task force in charge of studying the situation of the Gulf Organization for 
Industrial Consulting, held during 12 -13 June , in Muscat.  
- The second meetin g of the task force in charge of studying the situation of the Gulf Organization 
for Industrial Consulting, held during 22 -23 September , in Muscat . 
- The first meeting of the Executive Office of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, held on 
25 December in Muscat.  
2020 - The second meeting of the Executive Office of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, held 
on 30 January.  
- The third meeting of the Executive Office of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, held 
on 2 April, in Muscat.  
- The (77th) meeting of the Customs Union Committee, held from 22-23 January , in Riyadh.  
- The second meeting of the working group on stud ying aspects related to E -commerce, held during 
26-27 January, in Riyadh.  
- The (21st) Meeting of the trade law commission to complete the study of the unified competition 
bill (system) in the Council Countries, held during 17 -19 February, in Riyadh.  
- The mee ting of the Gulf Common Market Committee (28) , held during 5 -6 February in Riyadh.  
- The first meeting to study the commercial mortgage (system) bill , held  during 2 -3 March, in 
Riyadh.  
Source:  MOCI . 
4.3  The World Trade  Organization  
4.7.  Qatar seeks to continue to de epen its engagement with the WTO. To this effect, it continues to  
actively participate in several areas of discussions since 2014. Concretely, it expressed views on the 
future functioning of the WTO Appellate Body  (AB) regarding Rule 15, the 90 days deadli ne to 
complete its review, the meaning of municipal law as a matter of fact under international law, the 
limits of provisions 17.2 and 17.3 to provide the AB with the right to engage in advisory opinions, 
the use of adopted panel and AB reports in creating  precedent as well as the need for WTO 
Membership to exert supervision on the limitations of the AB's functions. Qatar also joined other 
WTO members in the proposal to launch a selection process of the Appellate Body members .61 
 
61 WTO (202 1). Document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.1 9. WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1  • Qatar  
 
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4.8.  Qatar participated in  several plurilateral initiatives  such as the friends of e-commerce, micro 
medium and small enterprises and the joint initiative on services domestic regulation . Qatar  also 
participated in discussion within the TRIPs Council (public -private collaborat ions in innovation – IP 
Commercialization, (IP/C/W/657) ) and the General Council (on a decision to establish procedural 
guidelines for WTO Councils and Committees addressin g trade concerns,  (WT/GC/W/777/Rev.5) ). 
Qatar also supported the proposal for Disci plines on Export Prohibitions and Restrictions in the 
Post-Bali Work Programme (JOB/AG/41) . 
4.9.  On the work concerning investment facilitation for development , Qatar stated its full support 
for the WTO Structured Discussion on Investment Facilitation for Development.62 Moreover. it views 
the Streamlined Text to be the appropriate framework to further develop the required disciplines in 
the multilateral framework. It also views the establishment of rights and obligations under a special 
and differential treatment regime for least -developed and developing countries as key to establishing 
such framework. Furthermore, Qatar is of the opinion that agreeing on the scope of an Agreement 
on Investment Facilitation for Development in order to avoid unnecessary burdens of other 
investment related matters and that disciplines are developed in order to safeguard transparency 
and ensure streamlined and rapid administration of all investment procedures. Qatar also stated 
that it favours a one -stop window approach to provide domestic coordination as well as establishing 
a Committee on Investment Facilitation as a platform for sharing experiences and lessons learnt in 
implementing the future Agreement.  
4.10.   Since the onset of the Covid -19 pandemic, Qatar has also  actively participated in various 
initiatives to tackle this challenge. In particular, it participated in the discussions on the joint 
ministerial statement regarding the role that the multilateral trading system can play in combating 
the pandemic, particu larly in maintaining the focus, transparency and temporary nature of 
potentially trade restrictive measures aimed at protecting health as well as ensuring that global 
agricultural supply chains continue to function normally.63 Qatar also stated the view th at the 
international trading system will be key to the post -pandemic economic recovery. Qatar also joined 
a group of M ember States in calling to mainta in a free and stable trade in agricultural and food 
products in the context of measures to combat the Cov id-19 pandemic  as well as a call to not impose 
export prohibitions or restrictions on food stuffs purchased through the UN's World Food 
Programme .64 
4.3.1   Disputes  
4.11.   Since 2014 Qatar participated in 14 disputes either as a third party or a respondent, some of 
which are still ongoing, whilst in four cases it requested consultations as a complainant. In 
January  2021, Qatar asked the Dispute Settlement Body to halt work in accordance with 
Article  12.12 of the DSU in regard to  one of these consultations.65  
  
 
62 WTO (202 1). Document INF/IFD/RD/51.  
63 WTO (202 1). Document WT/GC/212/Rev.2.  
64 WTO (202 1). Documents WT/GC/208/Rev.1, WT/GC/208/Rev.2, G/AG/30/Rev.1, G/AG/30/Rev.2, 
WT/GC/W/810/Rev.3 and TN/AG/46/Rev.3.  
65 WTO (202 1). Document WT/DS526/6.  WT/TPR/G/ 408/Rev.1 • Qatar  
 
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