   
  
TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
11 July 2019  
(19-4606) Page: 1/7 
Negotiating Group on Rules  Original: English  
 
A CAP -BASED APPROACH  TO ADDRESSING CERTA IN FISHERIES SUBSIDI ES  
Submission of Argentina, Australia, the United States and Uruguay  
Revision  
The following communication, dated 11 July 2019 , is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation s of Argentina, Australia, the United States and Uruguay . 
 
_______________  
 
 
This revised proposal for a cap -based approach attempts to address questions and concerns raised 
by a variety of Members and incorporates the following key changes:  
 
• In response to con cerns about the use of export data and its inclusion of aquaculture, this 
updated proposal removes export data as a parameter for assigning the tiers.  
• In response to questions regarding government fisheries authority expenditures for fishery 
management and  enforcement, this updated proposal clarifies the types of government 
outlays that would not fall within the scope of the cap.  
• In response to concerns that the cap could inadvertently allow Members to continue harmful 
subsidies, this revised proposal makes  clear that Tier 1 Members would be encouraged to 
prioritize reductions for harmful subsidies, while allowing flexibility to maintain subsidies 
that encourage sustainability of the fisheries sector. In response to the unique 
circumstances of Tier 1 Members  with historically low or no subsidies, this updated proposal 
would extend the option of a default cap to such Tier 1 Members and exclude them from 
reduction commitments.  
• In order to address a variety of concerns, including that the default cap value was n ot 
realistic and did not provide a reasonable alternative to engaging in a request -offer 
negotiation, the default cap value has been raised to $50 million.  
• In response to Members ' questions regarding potential changed circumstances in the 
future, this upda ted proposal adds a procedure for making adjustments to a Member 's cap 
schedule due to such changed circumstances.  
• In response to concerns about locking in the status quo, we have clarified that the review 
mechanism envisaged (in addition to ad hoc request s for adjustments to Members ' 
scheduled caps) would include a review every five years of the overall operation of the cap -
based approach, including further reductions and adjustments to Members ' schedules.  
 
_______________  
 
 
1. While Members appear to broadly agree on the need to prohibit subsidies contributing to 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and overfished stocks, significant differences of 
view persist in the Negotiating Group on Rules (RNG) on addressing subsidies that may contri bute 
to overcapacity and overfishing, in particular subsidies for boat building and operating costs, such 
as for fuel. This also appears to be an area where Members of all levels of development see the 
need for some flexibility in order to operate or maint ain programs to support their fishermen, 
including in small scale and artisanal fisheries. A potential approach that would impose meaningful 
constraints on subsidies while at the same time responding to these repeated calls for flexibility TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  could entail neg otiating Member -specific subsidy caps, expressed in monetary terms, and in certain 
cases phasedowns. Such an approach would be based on the following parameters.  
 
• Subsidies in excess of a Member 's cap would be prohibited.  
• Subsidies that support IUU, fish ing beyond national jurisdiction (see text proposal in  
RD/TN/RL/91 ), and subsidies for fishing that negatively affect overfished stocks would 
be prohibited, notwithstanding a Member 's subsidy cap. The cap is intended to supplement 
such prohibitions.  
• Membe rs would also commit to maintain fisheries management and conservation 
measures, so as not to contribute to adverse impacts on their fisheries resources.  
• A cap would be without prejudice to the rules and disciplines contained in the GATT 1994 
or the SCM A greement.  
 
2. The modalities of such an approach would include the following elements:  
 
Baseline subsidy notification and additional information . As a first step, and consistent with 
Article  25.3 of the SCM Agreement and Subsidy Committee practice1, all Mem bers would establish 
a baseline for a subsidy cap by submitting an up -to-date fisheries subsidies notification 
(i.e., covering the most recent two years). Critically, the value of any subsidies given must be 
provided if available, even if only a reasonable  estimate. Government agencies ' expenditures for 
fisheries management and enforcement would not be included in Members ' caps. 
 
Member -Specific Subsidy Caps/Default Cap . Taking into consideration this information, Members 
would establish individual Member l imits (or "caps") on such subsidies that would be reflected in a 
Schedule to the agreement. In order to take into account the specific circumstances of Members, 
a three -tier approach that is representative of Members ' respective contributions to global mar ine 
capture production could be pursued, based on the following parameters.  
 
• In order to determine the tier in which a Member falls for the purposes of subsequently 
negotiating and establishing subsidy commitments, tiered commitment levels  would be 
based on a three -year average of FAO marine capture production for the most recent 
representative period for which data are available, 2015 -2017.  
• Tier 1 : Members that account for 0.7% or more of global marine capture production would 
be required  to negotiate with other Members, on a request -offer basis, individual "subsidy 
caps" in monetary terms to be reflected in a Schedule to the agreement. However, Tier 1 
Members that have historically low or no subsidies, may wish to accept the "Default Subs idy 
Cap" value of $50 million annually. Members in Tier 1 that opt for the Default Cap would 
not be required to reduce their subsidy programs over time .  
• Tier 2 : Members that account for more than 0.05% of global marine capture production 
(but less than 0. 7%, per above) would also have the option to negotiate a cap, based on 
the recent subsidy information provided, or to accept the same "Default Subsidy Cap " value 
of $50 million  annually.  
• Tier 3 : Members that account for less than 0.05% of global marine capture production 
would not be required to schedule a cap.  
 
Reduction Commitments . In order to ensure a fair and balanced outcome that fulfils the Ministerial 
mandate, any Member in Tier 1 that does not choose the Default Cap would also be required to 
reduce its subsidy cap over a negotiated period of time at a rate commensurate with its overall 
level of subsidization, meaning that those Members with the largest subsidy caps would also be 
expecte d to undertake the largest subsidy cuts. In addition, Members are encouraged  to prioritize 
reductions for any harmful subsidies over time, while retaining flexibility to maintain subsidies that 
encourage sustainability of the fisheries sector. During the r equest -offer negotiations, consideration 
would be given to the nature of a Member 's fisheries subsidy programs, and to situations in which 
a Member has historically notified relatively small fisheries subsidy programs. Additional 
consideration should be gi ven to incentivizing Tier 2 Members that voluntarily reduce their cap 
(e.g., with priority technical assistance).  
 
Transparency : Tier 1 and 2 Members would need to maintain up -to-date fisheries subsidy 
notifications in order to continue to benefit from th eir cap. Tier 3 Members would also need to 
maintain up -to-date fisheries subsidy notifications in order to maintain their exempt status.  TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  Review mechanism : The agreement would include a review mechanism, so that Members ' caps 
(and Tier levels) can be revie wed and, as appropriate, revised, over time . For example, Members 
would monitor marine capture production data to identify any changes in individual Members ' global 
shares of marine capture production that would shift a Member from one Tier to another . In 
addition, Members could agree on a procedure for Members in Tier 1 or Tier 2 seeking adjustments 
to their cap on the basis of changed circumstances to notify such adjustments to [the Committee] 
for positive consideration, and which could be finalized and a dopted within a short period of time 
(for example, 60 days) if no objection is raised . Finally, five years after entry into force of the 
agreement, Members would also undertake a review of the overall operation of the cap -based 
approach as part of a built -in review of the new fisheries disciplines as a whole and negotiate any 
further reductions or adjustments, as necessary. Subsequent reviews would occur every five years.  
 
3. To implement the approach outlined above, the RNG would establish a clear process an d 
associated time frame for negotiating subsidy caps in order to include these caps in a schedule as 
part of the final agreement:  
 
• Spring 2019 : For the purpose of RNG negotiations, Members notify existing fisheries 
subsidies programs consistent with Artic le 25.3 of the SCM Agreement (notwithstanding 
the SCM Agreement notification deadline of 30 June).  
• Summer 2019 : Members falling in Tier 1 and Tier 2, should they opt to do so, engage in 
request -offer negotiations regarding subsidy cap and reduction commit ments, as 
appropriate . Members in Tier 1 and Tier 2 wishing to use the Default Cap would notify their 
intent to do so to the WTO Secretariat.  
• Autumn 2019 : Members negotiate and finalize subsidy cap and reduction schedules.  
 
4. In order to facilitate Members ' review and understanding of this proposal, the Table in the 
Annex sets out relevant FAO marine capture production for the periods 2015 -2017, and 
Tier designations under the principles outlined above.  
 
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  TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  ANNEX I  
Revision  
MEMBERSHIP TABLES AC CORDING TO MARINE CA PTURE PRODUCTION AND  TIERS  
(FAO FISHERIES AND A QUACULTURE INFORMATI ON AND STATISTICS BR ANCH  
ONLINE QUERY, ACCESS ED 23 APRIL 2019.)  
Notes on Categories :  
 
Members : Entries reflect FAO nomenclature and data, except to  the extent adjusted to correspond 
to official WTO Member names. They do not necessarily reflect the cosponsors ' nomenclature or 
recognition of specific jurisdictions.  
 
Tiers: See explanation in Paragraph 2 above. WTO Members with no marine capture reported in 
the FAO database are designated by default as Tier 3 and denoted 3* in the table.  
 
Marine Capture Production:  Marine capture data from FAO does not include aquaculture nor capture 
from inland waterways. FAO defines capture production as excluding aquaculture and mariculture. 
It reflects wild catch of aquatic species from "nineteen major marine fishing areas with their 
adjacent seas; and Oceans/suboceans (suboceans are cl imatic belts within oceans.) ". Consistent 
with FAO 's "State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture " report and initial data presented by the 
Secretariat to the NGR, data were generated to exclude the categories "aquatic plants ", "whales, 
seals, and other aquat ic mammals ", and the subcategory for alligators and crocodiles. All other 
aquatic species are included, such as crustaceans, molluscs, finfish, and FAO 's "miscellaneous " 
category, which includes items such as sea urchins and turtles. (FAO Fisheries and Aqu aculture 
Information and Statistics Branch online query, accessed 23 April 2019).   
 
 
WTO Member  Production (MT):  
Average Marine  
Capture,   
2015 -17 Prod.  
World  
Share  Tier 
Tier 1 – 26 Members, sorted by Marine Capture World Share  
China  13,789,343  17.30%  1 
Indonesia  6,183,529  7.76%  1 
European Union1 5,328,002  6.68%  1 
United States2 4,981,511  6.25%  1 
Russian Federation  4,410,954  5.53%  1 
Peru  4,230,066  5.31%  1 
India  3,643,852  4.57%  1 
Japan  3,235,552  4.06%  1 
Vietnam  2,953,673  3.71%  1 
Norway  2,231,634  2.80%  1 
Philippines  1,848,794  2.32%  1 
Chile  1,734,146  2.18%  1 
Malaysia  1,512,608  1.90%  1 
Korea, Republic of  1,449,522  1.82%  1 
Morocco  1,381,140  1.73%  1 
                                                
1 Includes FAO data for Aruba, Bonaire/S.Eustatius/Saba, Curaçao, French Guiana, French Polynesia, 
French Southern Terr., Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, New Caledonia, Réunion, Saint Barthélemy, 
Saint Martin, Sint Maarten, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and Wallis and Futuna  Is. 
2 Includes FAO data for American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and 
US Virgin  Islands.  TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  WTO Member  Production (MT):  
Average Marine  
Capture,   
2015 -17 Prod.  
World  
Share  Tier 
Mexico  1,363,052  1.71%  1 
Thailand  1,316,457  1.65%  1 
Myanmar  1,185,237  1.49%  1 
Iceland  1,183,032  1.48%  1 
Chinese Taipei  828,242  1.04%  1 
Canada  821,951  1.03%  1 
Argentina  781,586  0.98%  1 
Ecuador  668,866  0.84%  1 
Bangladesh  621,283  0.78%  1 
Mauritania  587,703  0.74%  1 
South Africa  566,080  0.71%  1 
Tier 2 – 46 Members, sorted by Marine Capture World Share  
Namibia  506,132  0.63%  2 
Brazil  478,096  0.60%  2 
Angola  469,540  0.59%  2 
Sri Lanka  436,190  0.55%  2 
Senegal  434,181  0.54%  2 
New Zealand  427,511  0.54%  2 
Nigeria  408,587  0.51%  2 
Pakistan  373,354  0.47%  2 
Turkey  340,459  0.43%  2 
Oman  294,722  0.37%  2 
Papua New Guinea  276,148  0.35%  2 
Ghana  261,845  0.33%  2 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of  239,715  0.30%  2 
Mozambique  209,796  0.26%  2 
Cameroon  200,127  0.25%  2 
Sierra Leone  200,000  0.25%  2 
Australia  174,765  0.22%  2 
Yemen  155,518  0.20%  2 
Panama  139,081  0.17%  2 
Hong Kong, China  138,507  0.17%  2 
Maldives  133,267  0.17%  2 
Seychelles  122,763  0.15%  2 
Cambodia  120,638  0.15%  2 
Tunisia  113,788  0.14%  2 
Madagascar  107,963  0.14%  2 
Egypt  105,785  0.13%  2 
Belize  103,160  0.13%  2 
Guinea  100,000  0.13%  2 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  83,873  0.11%  2 
Ukraine  73,233  0.09%  2 
United Arab Emirates  73,000  0.09%  2 
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of  68,071  0.09%  2 
Solomon Islands  65,118  0.08%  2 
Côte d 'Ivoire  60,993  0.08%  2 
Tanzania  60,232  0.08%  2 TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  WTO Member  Production (MT):  
Average Marine  
Capture,   
2015 -17 Prod.  
World  
Share  Tier 
Colombia  58,583  0.07%  2 
The Gambia  55,852  0.07%  2 
Georgia  55,599  0.07%  2 
Uruguay  54,237  0.07%  2 
El Salvador  51,281  0.06%  2 
Vanuatu  50,324  0.06%  2 
Suriname  45,398  0.06%  2 
Nicaragua  45,059  0.06%  2 
Republic of the Congo  44,932  0.06%  2 
Fiji 41,764  0.05%  2 
Guyana  39,859  0.05%  2 
Tier 3 – 64 Members, sorted by Marine Catch World Share  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  27,308  0.03%  3 
Cabo Verde  25,438  0.03%  3 
Cuba  21,892  0.03%  3 
Togo  21,004  0.03%  3 
Gabon  20,000  0.03%  3 
Mauritius  19,666  0.02%  3 
Benin  17,095  0.02%  3 
Kenya  16,268  0.02%  3 
Haiti  15,910  0.02%  3 
Qatar  15,026  0.02%  3 
Bahrain, Kingdom of  15,000  0.02%  3 
Costa Rica  14,700  0.02%  3 
Guatemala  14,370  0.02%  3 
Jamaica  13,617  0.02%  3 
Trinidad and Tobago  13,064  0.02%  3 
Dominican Republic  12,954  0.02%  3 
Liberia  12,536  0.02%  3 
Honduras  10,553  0.01%  3 
Brunei Darussalam  9,509  0.01%  3 
Samoa  9,450  0.01%  3 
Guinea -Bissau  6,550  0.01%  3 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  6,366  0.01%  3 
Albania  6,203  0.01%  3 
Kuwait, the State of  4,586  0.01%  3 
Antigua and Barbuda  3,165  0.00%  3 
Grenada  2,602  0.00%  3 
Saint Lucia  2,090  0.00%  3 
Djibouti  2,085  0.00%  3 
Tonga  1,586  0.00%  3 
Barbados  1,564  0.00%  3 
Macau, China  1,500  0.00%  3 
Israel  1,324  0.00%  3 
Singapore  1,203  0.00%  3 
Montenegro  895 0.00%  3 
Dominica  861 0.00%  3 TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2  
 
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  WTO Member  Production (MT):  
Average Marine  
Capture,   
2015 -17 Prod.  
World  
Share  Tier 
Jordan  277 0.00%  3 
Armenia  - 0.00%  3* 
Botswana  - 0.00%  3* 
Burkina Faso  - 0.00%  3* 
Burundi  - 0.00%  3* 
Chad  - 0.00%  3* 
Eswatini  - 0.00%  3* 
Kazakhstan  - 0.00%  3* 
Kyrgyz Republic  - 0.00%  3* 
Lao People 's Democratic Rep.  - 0.00%  3* 
Lesotho  - 0.00%  3* 
North Macedonia  - 0.00%  3* 
Malawi  - 0.00%  3* 
Mali - 0.00%  3* 
Moldova, Rep. of  - 0.00%  3* 
Mongolia  - 0.00%  3* 
Nepal  - 0.00%  3* 
Niger  - 0.00%  3* 
Paraguay  - 0.00%  3* 
Rwanda  - 0.00%  3* 
Switzerland  - 0.00%  3* 
Uganda  - 0.00%  3* 
Zambia  - 0.00%  3* 
Zimbabwe  - 0.00%  3* 
Afghanistan  - 0.00%  3* 
Bolivia, Plurinational State of  - 0.00%  3* 
Central African Republic  - 0.00%  3* 
Liechtenstein  - 0.00%  3* 
Tajikistan  - 0.00%  3* 
Total for all WTO Members with 
reported data  77,305,081    
Total, Non -Member countries & 
territories  2,404,902    
Global Total  79,709,983    
 
 
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