  
  
JOB/AG/237  
22 July 2022 
(22-5569) Page: 1/8 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session   
 
  
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE IN SPECIAL SESSION (COA -SS) 
21 JULY  2022 
Oral Report  by the Chair person , Ambassador Gloria Abraham Peralta  
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.  MC12 was a great success for the WTO . It demonstrated the ability of the WTO to deliver results 
for people across the world, including with the adoption of an historic agreement on fisheries 
subsidies . This was also the case in the area of food and agriculture, with the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity and the Decision on the Exemption of 
WFP Food Purchases from Export Prohibitions or Restrictions.  
2.  But these undisputable successes do not hide the fact that considerable work remains to be done 
in the agriculture negotiations, initiated more than 20 years ago, to continue the process of 
agricultural trade reform in the WTO.  
3.  The absence of an outcome in the agriculture negotiations reflects the recognition by the WTO 
Membership that the remaining gaps on several critical issues were too wide to be bridged in  the 
short time left before or at the Ministerial Conference . As disappointing as this was, we should 
nonetheless acknowledge that, in the months preceding MC12, Members had already undertaken a 
great deal of intensive work ; improved their understanding of  each other's positions ; and achieved 
good progress in some areas.  
4.  The way in which negotiations resume in the coming months would be important, as it will set in 
motion the trajectory of negotiations towards the next Ministerial Conference . In my view, Me mbers 
should be guided by two complementary principles:  
a. Keep the past in mind : build on the work undertaken thus far, and keep in mind the 
experience garnered;  
b. Re-think the future : engage actively with one another to explore new approaches that 
could help us make progress, thereby overcoming the obstacles that have stymied the 
negotiations in the past.  
5.  My objective today is to take stock of the progress made since I was appointed as Chair of the 
CoA Special Session exactly two years ago, on 2 1 July 2020, an d to conclude with a few comments 
on the possible way forward, based on my experience in this role.  
6.  Let me start with a quick recap of our process for the past two years.  
7.  Despite the logistical constraints resulting from the COVID -19 pandemic, I engaged in a 
consultation process with Members and groups of Members in the weeks following my appointment,  
before  launching an intensive Facilitators -led topic -by-topic process in autumn 2020.  
8.  This process lasted from October  2020 until June 2021. It was technical in nature and led by 
agricultural counsellors who organized consultations in various formats under my guidance . I also 
held regular open -ended CoA Special Session meetings during this period to ensure transparency JOB/AG/237  
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  and provide Members with an oppo rtunity to introduce new submissions and ideas . This period 
provided Members with an opportunity to improve their understanding of the issues at stake, and 
reflect on what could constitute the elements of an agricultural outcome at MC12.  
9.  I subsequently cir culated in June 2021 a first report which sought to point the way forward in the 
negotiations , in document JOB/AG/202 . A second, text -based phase of the negotiations started in 
September  2021, following the circulation at the end of July 2021 of my first d raft text for a possible 
outcome on agriculture at MC12 , in document JOB/AG/215 . 
10.  The period between September and the end of November  2021 was very intense . I held many 
consultations in various formats, including open -ended meetings, consultations at techn ical level 
with large groups of Members to examine the text and possible drafting alternatives, and 
consultations at a more political level to facilitate the identification of possible landing zones by 
Members.  
11.  I circulated on 2 3 November  a revised draft t ext in advance of the Ministerial Conference that 
was due to start on 3 0 November  (TN/AG/50).  
12.  Following the last -minute suspension of the Ministerial Conference due to the spread of a new 
COVID -19 variant, the negotiations resumed in the beginning of 2022 and intensified in May and 
June. During this period, before the opening of the Ministerial Conference, several Green Room 
consultations were held by the Director -General and myself ; no fewer than four open-ended 
meetings were convened, on 31 May, 4 June, 8 June and finally on 1 1 June; a nd three successive 
sets of draft texts were circulated, in documents WT/MIN(22)/W/17, WT/MIN(22)/W/18 and 
WT/MIN(22)/W/19.  
13.  In total, for the past two years, Members introduce d 40 written submissions of different kinds, 
and we held 23 informal CoA Special Session meetings, 17 dedicated sessions on PSH and SSM, 
20 small group horizontal consultations (including green rooms), and 70 topic -by-topic consultations 
in various formats . In total, we held close to 130 meetings, in addition to bilateral consultations and 
Members' direct engagement with each other . In summary, we undertook significant work over the 
last two years . In my view, we could usefully build on this work rather tha n to let it go to waste.  
14.  Let me now turn to my topic -by-topic assessment, but before doing so, I wish to underline that 
progress will only be possible on the basis of new inputs and creative ideas from Members, taking 
into account the new negotiating envir onment in which we are operating.  
2  TOPIC -BY-TOPIC ASSESSMENT  
2.1  Domestic Support  
15.  Let me start with Domestic Support.  
16.  Times of crisis and new challenges, such as the COVID -19 pandemic, conflicts and climate 
change, underscore the importance of updating domestic  support disciplines . Strengthened 
disciplines are needed to limit the use of the most trade -distorting forms of support, while at the 
same time providing adequate policy space to deal with unpredictable events such as health crisis, 
conflicts,  and their i mpact on food availability.  
17.  The Domestic Support pillar has been at the heart of the agricultural negotiations since they 
began in 2000, as confirmed by the tabling of numerous submissions on this topic than in other 
areas . As a result, it is also the area  where, for both developed and developing Members, the 
expectations for an outcome have been the greatest.  
18.  But the importance of the pillar goes hand -in-hand with the sensitivities that surround it . Despite 
the strong agreement on the need to address trade -distorting domestic support, the views of 
Members differ sharply on : how to achieve this objective ; the potential of different support 
categories to distort trade (and therefore which categories of support should be included and how 
they should be treated) : a numerical target (for example 50 % reduction) and the associated timeline 
(for example 2030) ; and the sequencing of reform steps (e.g., whether AMS above de minimis 
should be addressed first, or whether all categories should instead be addressed  in parallel).  JOB/AG/237  
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  19.  This is to say that while finding a solution to this issue is not easy, it is necessary, and I believe 
also doable . The current rules allow trade -distorting domestic support entitlements that far exceed 
the actual support levels for most Mem bers. Since 2001, the growth in trade -distorting domestic 
support entitlements measured by AMS and de minimis  has increased from USD 322 billion  to 
approximately USD 740 billion  in 2016 ; it has continued to increase ever since and could potentially 
reach a pproximately USD 2 trillion by 2030 if left unchecked , according to some sources.  
20.  The steady increase in entitlements will remove incentives for reform or put pressure on 
Governments to increase support and create a potential subsidy competition that only those with 
large treasuries can prevail . This would be in no one's interest - not in the interest of those who 
cannot win the subsidy competition, but it is also not in the interest of those who could, because 
that money could be better spent elsewhere.  
21.  Since expenditure remains below total entitlements, it should be possible to carefully establish 
commitments to reduce trade -distorting domestic support entitlements without any major 
immediate impact on the policies used bearing in mind the special circumst ances of Members.  
22.  The main challenge is to agree on how trade -distorting domestic support entitlements should 
be reduced, by how much and how ( i.e., in parallel or in what sequence) . Different principles and 
factors to be taken into account have also been suggested, such as the principle of proportionality 
in terms of contributions, product specific support, and support by farmer, by hectare or 
"destination" meaning domestic consumption or export) . In this context, a proper introspection of 
the policy space  that Members effectively need to pursue their legitimate policy objectives that in 
many cases have evolved over time would be valuable.  
23.  But it is not just about the limits . A better implementation of the current criteria for the different 
categories of su pport and a revision of these criteria have also been suggested by many Members . 
Improving transparency and monitoring, on all categories of domestic support, is also critical to 
making progress . It has also been highlighted that any reform should also con sider characteristics 
of Members' agricultural sectors, non -trade concerns and levels of development.  
24.  There are concrete proposals that have been put forward on which Members can build , and with 
the right mix of creativity and political will, I am convince d there is a way forward to reduce 
trade -distorting support and level the playing field in order to update the rules to enable them to 
address effectively current challenges and improve the efficiency and fairness of agricultural 
markets.  
25.  It would be very useful if Members could consider agreeing on three key elements : (i) a general 
objective or goal similar to reduce trade -distorting domestic support by a certain percentage within 
a defined timeframe ; (ii) the capping and reduction of overall entitlem ents to trade -distorting 
support, with possible differential treatment of different categories of support , and (iii) concrete 
modalities and timeframes.  
26.  While negotiating a target may be a priority for some Members, it is my considered view that 
what is ne eded are clear modalities to further discipline trade distorting, with clear timelines . This 
reform is long overdue . By reducing the most trade -distorting forms of support, Members would free 
up resources that could be better used to support farmers in a l ess distorting and more sustainable 
way, thus contributing not only to food security today but also to food security tomorrow.  
2.2  Market Access  
27.  The Market Access file continues to remain important in the agriculture negotiations, both from 
the perspective of potential benefits that the expected tariff liberalization would bring for 
engendering a robust and open agricultural trading system, and importantly also for achieving an 
overall balance in an agriculture outcome . Simultaneously, in view of  the high political sensitivity 
associated with undertaking tariff liberalization for several Members, there has not been serious 
engagement among Members on tariff reduction modalities for several years.  
28.   Against this background, Members have had limited engagement on the Market Access pillar 
focusing  on the one hand  targeted outcomes on select transparency -inspired market access 
elements to form part of an incremental agriculture package and , on the other hand , simultaneously JOB/AG/237  
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  reflecting on a holistic appr oach to kickstart negotiations on core market elements, including tariff 
reduction modalities.  
29.  As regards transparency, Members ' focus has been to harvest outcomes on elements such as 
transparency of changes in MFN applied tariffs without altering the core  tariff commitments in 
Members' schedules . Similarly, on tariff reforms, the efforts have primarily focused on agreeing on 
a negotiating framework containing basic principles and parameters to undertake such reforms . On 
both these aspects, there have been written submissions by Members or group of Members.  
30.   I believe that any future efforts to reinvigorate the market access negotiations might continue 
to follow the above indicated two -pronged approach . I must also acknowledge that this conversation 
might al so need to tackle the political issue of linkages, both within and outside the agriculture 
negotiations . Some innovative thinking might be necessary to make progress on this complex 
negotiating file , while also dealing with the associated political challen ges. 
2.3  Export Competition  
31.  Most of the discussions on Export Competition have focused on the issue of transparency, in 
particular to ensure an effective implementation and monitoring of the December  2015 Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition . 
32.  These transparency -related issues being addressed in the negotiations include possible ways to 
enhance the Nairobi Decision monitoring process based on existing requirements, a possible update 
of the G/AG/2 notification requirements with a view to streamli ning them , or a possible update of 
the content of the export competition questionnaire.  
33.  Some of these issues have also been discussed in the context of the regular Committee on 
Agriculture (CoA), in particular during the second triennial review of the Nair obi decision.  
34.   I have welcomed Members' efforts to ensure  that these two processes remain mutually 
supportive . In my view, transparency enhancement should indeed be considered overall as an 
ongoing process . Members should consider continuing the technical work initiated in the months 
preceding MC12 focusing on concrete ways to improve transparency building on existing 
requirements, with due account of developing country Members' capacity constraints , and with the 
support of the Secretariat.  
35.  The pace of the negotiations on the more substantive elements should continue to depend on 
Members' assessment of the adequacy between existing disciplines and current practices and their 
impact on markets . This assessment should be based in particular on available inform ation collected 
through the transparency mechanisms in place.  
2.4  Export Restrictions  
36.  Turning to Export Restrictions, the overlapping crises of the pandemic and conflicts have 
highlighted once more the importance of an open and predictable agriculture trading system.  
37.  In this context, and after months of unrelenting efforts, Members succeeded in reaching an 
agreement at MC12 on the exemption of WFP humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions . 
This outcome on a topic that had been discussed for more than  10 years in the agriculture 
negotiations was warmly welcomed by the global community, particularly the WFP, as it would 
facilitate its work by saving time, reducing costs, and ensuring that critical humanitarian relief 
reaches the world's most vulnerable . It also shows that, with sufficient political will and a spirit of 
pragmatism, the WTO can achieve meaningful multilateral outcomes to address current challenges.  
38.  Another well -received outcome at MC12 was the Ministerial Declaration on the Emergency 
Respo nse to Food Insecurity, whereby WTO Members, among other things, reaffirmed the 
importance of not imposing export prohibitions or restrictions in a manner inconsistent with relevant 
WTO provisions . In addition, Members resolved to ensure that any emergency  measures introduced 
to address food security concerns, such as export restrictions, shall minimize trade distortions as far 
as possible ; be temporary, targeted, and transparent ; and be notified and implemented in 
accordance with WTO rules . Members further  recognized the need to take into account the impact JOB/AG/237  
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  of such measures on other Members, including developing countries, and particularly 
least-developed and net food -importing developing countries.  
39.  While these outcomes are a step in the right direction, mu ch remains to be done under the topic 
of export restrictions . As you may recall, in various interventions at CoA S pecial Session  meetings 
during my tenure as Chair, many Members have underscored the critical need of providing adequate 
and timely informatio n in relation to export restrictions through the relevant WTO transparency 
mechanisms, especially in crisis situations.  
40.  Some Members have underscored the urgent need to improve implementation of the existing 
transparency rules and to explore ways of enhanc ing them in view of Article 12 of the  Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA) , while others have indicated difficulty in accepting any new transparency 
obligations considering the capacity constraints of several developing Members.  
41.  Going forward, discussions on thi s topic would have to balance these different views . To this 
end, Members could consider engaging in further analytical work to assess what happened during 
the ongoing crises, so as to better understand the issues and challenges at stake.  
42.  Such analysis cou ld be followed by an exchange of views among all Members on the options 
available to them to improve the situation, based on past inputs and on the experiences acquired in 
recent years, from the perspectives of both exporting and importing Members includin g NFIDCs, and 
taking into account the capacity constraints of developing Members.  
43.  It is my hope that Members' resolve to ensure WTO -consistency of export restrictions, as 
manifested in the MC12 Ministerial Declaration, would galvanize Members into active e ngagement 
in charting a way forward on this important issue.  
2.5  Cotton  
44.  On Cotton, Members will find detailed reports on the respective developments in the 
trade -related and development -related aspects since MC11 in the two respective reports by the WTO 
Director -General in documents WT/MIN(22)/5 and WT/MIN(21)/5/Rev.1 – WT/GC/238/Rev.1 – 
WT/CFMC/DG/9/Rev.1.  
45.  As stressed on many occasions, the C -4 and many other Members consider cotton as a priority 
in view of its critical role for the socio -economic develo pment and livelihoods of many people, 
particularly in LDC Members.  
46.  The importance of cotton in the negotiations was recognized by the General Council more than 
15 years ago when Members agreed that cotton " will be addressed ambitiously, expeditiously, and 
specifically, within the agriculture negotiations".1 
47.  And yet, despite all the efforts by my predecessors and myself, the discussions in recent years 
on cotton specific trade -distorting domestic support, which constitutes the core issue in the 
negotiations  on cotton, have been characterized by a low level of engagement and, little, if any, 
movement . This has created a sense of disappointment amongst the proponents.  
48.  A fresh approach is needed, and this may require a candid exchange between the proponents 
and other key players . A better understanding of the existing state of play regarding cotton support, 
including through presentations on domestic policies and complementary analytical work , could also 
be envisaged to better inform these negotiations.  
49.  The othe r issues related to cotton do not appear to be controversial . There is general agreement 
on the importance of transparency and readiness to enhance it, building on the existing enhanced 
cotton dedicated mechanisms that have demonstrated in recent months th eir agility with the 
organi zation of several information sessions on the impact of COVID -19 on the cotton sector.  
50.  Finally, cotton -related market access and export competition have not been the subject of any 
specific concern under my tenure, and developmen t assistance work under the Director -General's 
 
1 WT/L/579.  JOB/AG/237  
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  Consultative Framework Mechanism on Cotton has remained very active, including in the field of 
cotton by -products and cotton -related value addition.  
2.6  Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)  
51.  Deep divergences among Members, principally on the issue of linkage between market access 
and the SSM, have not permitted serious technical engagement on this issue since the launch of the 
dedicated session process pursuant to the Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
52.  The proponents have consistently argued for an SSM to address import surges and price declines 
independently of the market access negotiations . They also consider that having access to an SSM 
is necessary to protect small and vulnerab le farmers against global price volatility risks and to 
remedy negative effects of subsidized imports.  
53.  The non -proponents consider the SSM to be intricately linked to the impending tariff 
liberalization in the ongoing market access negotiations and have co nsistently argued that an SSM 
should not potentially reverse existing market access commitments.  
54.  In my view, there is no alternative to deepening technical engagement on this file covering 
several thematic areas typically associated with a trade remedy mec hanism like the SSM, including 
product coverage, triggers, remedies and treatment of preferential trade . I also sensed a possibility 
of technical engagement among Members to explore an SSM as a countervailing instrument to 
address subsidized imports, howev er, this idea has not been sufficiently supported by submissions 
and the existing state of technical engagement.  
55.  Both the proponents and non -proponents need to understand each other's positions and 
concerns in order to make progress on this technically com plex and politically sensitive issue.  
2.7  Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH)  
56.  Let me now turn to Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes (PSH) . It has probably been 
the most challenging issue to address in the overall agriculture negoti ations due to the persistent 
wide differences in Members' positions.  
57.  It remains a priority issue for the proponents who stress its usefulness as a tool for addressing 
food security and rural livelihoods . While the Interim Solution adopted at the Bali Minis terial 
Conference2 remains valid for programmes that existed as of 2013, efforts to find a permanent 
solution ha ve been elusive . The mandated deadline of 2017 was missed, and the positions of 
proponents and non -proponents have not evolved since then . The proponents consider that a 
permanent solution is long overdue and have urged Members to adopt one that is simple, efficient, 
and broader in scope in terms of programme and product coverage . Public stockholding has attracted 
renewed attention following the outbreak of the COVID -19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine.  
58.  While Members recognize the role of PSH programmes as a tool to support food security and 
acknowledge the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial mandates, the non -proponents have continued to 
express the ir concerns about market price support beyond the Uruguay Round commitment levels 
and the potential unintended consequences on trade and food security of other Members . These 
Members have therefore insisted on parallel progress on domestic support, and for  more information 
on actual use of PSH programmes . Safeguards and transparency provisions are considered crucial 
by them . Several Members have also underscored that PSH programmes represent one tool among 
many to ensure food security, and that the least tr ade-distorting measures should be used.  
59.  Both sides have legitimate concerns they seek to address . Despite many ideas and recent 
proposals, Members did not succeed in narrowing the gaps in time for MC12 . In the run -up to MC12 
initially planned for December  2021, it became increasingly evident that it would be difficult to agree 
on a permanent solution by then and several ideas were put forward for an intermediate step . These 
ideas looked notably at expanding the Bali Interim Solution to include LDCs and othe r Members, 
with and without time limits or quantitative limits on procurement.  
 
2 As clarified by the General Council Decision of 2014.  JOB/AG/237  
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  60.  With the postponement of MC12 to June 2022, some more time was gained . Two new proposals 
were submitted on 31 May – one (JOB/AG/299) by the African Group, the ACP, and G33 membe rs, 
and the other by Brazil (JOB/AG/230) . The first proposal suggested a change in the methodology 
for calculating market price support, assumed compliance of PSH programmes with relevant AoA 
limits in respect of all support provided under them, and extension of the coverage to all foodstuffs 
and to all PSH programmes of developing countries . It also allowed exports from stocks for the 
purposes of international food aid, for non -commercial humanitarian purposes or when requested 
by NFIDCs and LDCs, or  any Member facing food shortages and higher food inflation . Transparency 
provisions were simplified as compared to the Interim Solution and the safeguard provisions required 
that stocks do not substantially distort trade.  
61.  Brazil submitted another proposal  which suggested the exemption from MPS calculation support 
provided by LDCS, NFIDCS and countries listed by the FAO as "requiring external assistance for 
food" . This exemption would only apply if the exports of that product in terms of its market share in  
global exports were below a certain threshold and the value of the procured amount remained below 
a certain percentage of value of production.  
62.  Regrettably, it was not possible to find a way to narrow the positions based on either of these 
proposals in the  short time available before MC12 . It goes without saying that more work will be 
needed to find a solution to this issue which would strike a careful balance between all the views 
expressed by Members – proponents and non -proponents.  
2.8  Transparency  
63.  Let me no w conclude with  a few words on Transparency.  
64.  Transparency is a cross -cutting issue that relates to each of the seven substantive topics . It was 
introduced only recently in the negotiations as a separate element of a possible broader package.  
65.  Transparency i s also a topic addressed in the regular CoA as part of the review of the 
implementation of commitments and under specific mechanisms stemming from subsequent 
Decisions on topics such as TRQ administration or export competition . It is not by chance  that the 
proposal was made before MC12 to launch a work programme within the CoA to review, update and 
streamline as necessary existing  transparency provisions.  
66.  Past discussions have demonstrated a shared willingness to enhance transparency to the benefit 
of all, including through streamlining and making more effective existing requirements . It therefore 
seems that progress should be possible through a case -by-case technical and pragmatic approach, 
fully taking into account the capacity constraints by developing co untry Members and supported by 
the Secretariat.  
2.9  Reflections on post -MC12 work  
67.  Let me now add some reflections on post -MC12 work . I have already addressed substantive 
issues and would like to add four additional points which could guide future work if Members consider 
them helpful:  
(i) Evidence -based negotiations help to build trust and take informed decisions : Therefore, 
as much as possi ble, more accurate and timely information should be submitted to the 
Secretariat, whether as notifications or as responses to the questionnaires, taking into 
account the different capacities of Members . In this respect, I support initiatives such 
as the Do mestic Support tool put forward by Canada and other Members . Organizing 
events with outside speakers on issues of relevance can also be useful.  
(ii) Do not throw out the champagne with the cork : Do not throw away the good work done, 
but instead build on it goin g forward . There is a goldmine of ideas that ha ve been put 
forward which could be of use to Members as they seek to make progress.  JOB/AG/237  
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  (iii) Focus on the big picture : The big picture includes old and new challenges such as food 
security and climate change, therefore also changing policy objectives and policies . 
There are different trade -offs that may have to be made, notably for the limited use of 
natural and financial resources . Focusing on one concept or policy tool only will make 
us miss the big picture.  
(iv) Find and use different ways to brainstorm and work with each other : In this respect, I 
support the idea of a retreat to brainstorm ideas and consider the different issues under 
negotiation from new angles . But it should also look at our negotiating process es; what 
works, what doesn't work, and why ; and what other avenues could be explored.  
68.  While you are preparing for your next first step towards MC13, it is indeed crucial to reflect on 
past experiences and bring this new thinking to construct a successful p ath to MC13 avoiding past 
mistakes and dead-ends. The first step is to agree on where you want to go and how . As Alice said, 
"If you don't know where  you're going,  any road will get you there ." 
3  CONCLUSION  
69.  As today is my last meeting, I would like to conclude by thanking you all for your hard work and 
for your support over the past two years . These two years been very enriching and rewarding . I am 
very pleased with the results of MC12 and confident that Members will be able to deliver an 
agricultural o utcome in the near future . I therefore call upon you to redouble your efforts and I 
would like to finish this statement by quoting Mahatma Gandhi who said " Satisfaction  lies in the 
effort, not in the attainment . Full effort is full victory ." 
70.  I would like t o acknowledge the hard work of the Secretariat team ! And also that of my Mission 
team, who have worked twice as hard to enable me to fulfil my commitment to the CoA -SS process.  
__________  