THE NOME NUGGET
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W. A. and EMILY ROUGHER .Editors
Entered as second class matter October 14. 1943. at the postoffice at
Nome, Alaska, under the Act of March 3, 1879.
Monday, October 14, 1946
.
The Nuernberg Verdiet Is A Beginning
(The Denver Post)
There was no surprise, only sober satisfaction, in the
death sentences awarded the fallen masters of Europe.
Nor could pity be felt for these craven and haggard men
who once sloshed a continent with the blood of inno
cents. In their lifetimes they have sought to extinguish
the commonest principles of humanity; on the gallows
they will be dedicated to a strengthening of those prin
ciples.
We have not forgotten Warsaw, Lidice and Belsen—
but this riddance aims beyond mere retribution. If it
were simple punishment of individuals we sought in the
war crimes trial, it could have been had swiftly and
with no loss of justice. It would not have required ten
months and all the elaborate, full-dress procedure of
Nuernberg.
Nufcrnberg was planned not for us of the generation!
which brought these monsters to justice; it was planned
for history. It was designed as an effort to fix firmly
the laws of mankind the criminal nature of planning
-and waging aggressive war.
It is widely argued that such a principle is not sound
—that there is no precedent for holding individuals re
sponsible for the crimes of government; that, indeed,!
there is no substantial basis in international law for
holding aggressive war a crime; that the victor will al
ways judge the vanquished regardless of rights and
wrongs (thus the “crime” will be weakness, rather than;
aggression); that, facing the certainty of punishment if
defeated, belligerents will go to any lengths of inhu
manity to conquer, etc.
There is a weighty measure of truth to this. As basis
for judgment, the tribunal noted that Germany was a
signatory of the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928, which
promised outlawry of was as an instrument of national
policy in the settlement of controversies—but which did
not make war a crime. A general body of opinion holds!
that aggressive war should be considered a crime, but!
this principle is not to be found in any ratified treaty.
The Kellogg-Briand treaty itself, it could be pointed
out, has been flouted so repeatedly as to have lost its
binding power, if it ever had any.
Justice Robert H. Jackson in a foreword to the book,
“The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War,” by Shel
don Glueck, argues that even tho there may be no legal
or customary basis for punishing an aggressor, “our own
day has its right to institute customs.” That is a remark
able departure from our traditional principle of law
■condemning ex post facto punishments.
Legal arguments on these points may go on and on—
but little sympathy will be lost on the convicted Nazis.
Their lives and freedom are already forfeit on other
counts. The severest penalties are theirs on common
criminal grounds and do not depend on the aggressive
war indictment. Each of the condemned men—with the
exception of Rudolf Hess, who escaped with his miser
able lif e—is convicted either of crimes against human-!
ity or of violations of the laws or customs of war. Almost
•all, in fact, are convicted of both these charges.
And, even tho there wil be long and learned argu
ment on the legality of the aggressive war convictions,
the Nuernberg verdict stands as a starting point for a
new conception in the law of nations.
“Planning, preparing, initiating or waging an aggres
sive war” henceforth is a crime for which a nation and,
more important, its individual leaders, may be held
answerable. The rulers of the world no longer face only
file judgment of the hereatfer.
GHOST ROCKET
Henry Is Persistent
(The Denver Post)
Henry Wallace’s game of footie with the Communists
is getting more intimate all the time. The former secre
tary of commerce, although confronted by Bernard
Baruch with the error of his views, blindly insists that
the United States is responsible for the atomic arma
ments race which he says is under way.
For the present impasse in atomic control discussions,
Wallace flatly blames his own nation. There is nothing
new in his argument; it is identical with that expressed
by Communists and their fellow travelers throughout
the world.
He points to a school of military thinking . . . which
advocates a preventive war on Russia.” The implica
tion is that this view, which he rightly calls “immoral
and stupid,” is widely shared in this country—a wild
distortion. It is a charge frequently made by left wing
opponents of U. S. defensive policy who apparently
would like to see this nation disarmed.
He calls the question of a security council veto on
atomic energy matters “completely irrelevant”—but he
fails to answer why, if it is indeed “irrelevant,” the Rus
sians are so insistent upon its retention.
He argues that the United States must agree to a def
inite schedule for destroying its atomic bomb stocks and
disclosing its atomic “know-how” to other nations, and
that failure to do so is the major impediment to interna
tional agreement. But the fact is that the U. S. plan
clearly envisages such a schedule.
He avers that, in “some respects” the Russian plan
for atomic energy control “goes ever further than our
own plan and is in agreement with the basic principles
of our plan.” This is completely false. The Russian plan,
fundamentally, rests on a simple agreement to outlaw
atomic warfare—without embracing an effective sys
tem of controls and penalties.
But strangest of all is the psychology of a man who—
having been shown his error, as he was by Bernard Ba
ruch—persists in spreading poisonous perversions of
fact, damaging to his nation’s interests. When he wrote
these things in innocence, they could be called error;
when he repeats them, they become lies.
FILIPINOS JOIN IN
CELEBRATING V-J DAY
ANNIVERSARY
Tens of thousands of Filipinos
joined in celebrating the first an
niversary of Japan’s final surren
der on September 2, and paid trib
ute to the guerrilla warriors—
American and Filipino — who
fought secretly during more than
three years of Japanese occupa
tion of the islands to make pos
|Sibel their final liberation.
The part played by the guer
rilla bands was little known dur
ing the war. But the story has
since been pieced together and de
scribed in an article in the Ency
clopaedia Britannica 1946 Book of
the Year. Berkeley Read Lewis,
author of the Britannica article,
and a major in the Ordnance De
partment of the U. S. Army, ob
tained his account through inter
views with U. S. officers who or
ganized the guerrillas, and through
information received from Lt. Col.
Robert B. Lapham, who described
the guerrilla activity on Luzon.
Before leaving Bataan, accord
ing to the Year Book article, Gei
eral Douglas MacArthur sent oi
several groups of officers wit
these instructions — “Dispers
evade the Japanese, and organiz
guerrilla bands.”
“Each unit contained as a nt
cleus a few specialists with train
ing in communications, engineer
ing and the like,” the Britannic
Year Book article continued. “Th
largest group numbered about lit
teen.”
The men had little time for de
tailed instructions. They all km>y
that their primary mission wa.*u
obtain intelligence of the enemy4]
movements and their secondary
mission was to harass the enemj
until concerted action would b<
possible with an American inva
sion of the islands.
The officers assigned to the mis
sion left Bataan a short time be
fore the Japanese came, the Year
Book says. They made their way
! across Manila Bay, to the east and
| northeast of Luzon. As the enemy
i consolidated its position by taking
over small towns and villages, the
American officers spread out “as
thinly as possible” to avoid cap
ture.
; At this point practically the en
| tire native population was poten
| tial guerrilla material, Lewis
, states. The Filipinos were organ
j ized almost automatically. As na
i tive units broke up, under Japan
[ ese orders, the soldiers hid their ^
! arms and ammunition, went home
to don civilian clothes, and wait.
With the organiaztion of guerril
la bands, the soldiers retrieved
their arms and went back to fight
again. Because of this there was
little shortage of ammunition, ac
cording to the Year Book.
Guerrilla units sprang up spon
taneously in this manner through
out the island. But, in the begin
ning, their work was uncoordin
ated. Intercommunication was
their biggest problem. About the
only radio equipment available
consisted of small receiving sets
in native huts. There were almost
no dry batteries and vacuum tubes
for theee sets. Storage batteries
were obtained by salvage or steal
ing from vehicles, the article says.
American officers, number i n g
about three to every 5,000 Fili-^
pinos, relied on native messen
gers.
Radio contact between MacAr
thur’s headquarters and guerrilla
units on the islands of Panay and
Mindanao was first established
late in 1942, Lewis wrote. Then
supplies began to come in by sub
marine. Toward the end of 1943
a contact party, which had come
to Mindanao by submarine, pro
ceeded by sailboat to Samar and
then on to Luzon, where at ar
rived in April 1944. From that
date forward all the major guer
rilla elements were linked by ra
dio and submarine.
The movements of the Japanese
were watched and reported with
out delay. If a Japanese unit
moved from Luzon to Buna,
Americans knew about it almost i
before the movement was com
pleted. The result was that U. S.
forces could forecast Japanese
plans and so decide their own in
vasion strategy, the Book of the
Year article reports.
After U. is. troops invaded Ley
te, warning orders flowed to the
guerrillas, assigning missions and
planning future operations. Dur
ing the first phase of the invasion,
guerrillas collected information
and identified targets for U. S.
planes. Combat action was begun T
by guerrillas the week before the
first landings on Luzon, Lewis
says. This action was partly re
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