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W« tliM-ftilay. f i llMJiOy 1H l!HH
I lif' < ilirtilifl, Itfilln Hark
t My Mill m l Novel )
fi is dim* oil i«» f111#I a paiallel to modern history lor
Mu- puhih alIon 14y lla- depni!i||‘id of stale of the rap
I ill e»l do< HimId s dealing wiih Ihesholl lived Na/i Sov
lei piii 1 la i sliip Hail Was Usheied In with I he Itihhcn
1io|» Molotov pael of Mf'lll
h'ov«'i ninenls do not customarily r*o out ol then way
lo expose, as the Mulled Slides fpivei iltueiil has now
done, I lie |_m Is»!y skeletons in I la* close| o| 11 “friendly"
tuition
Usually sia h dot ninenls, hnwevei conn* by, are care
fully hurled away in archives and kepi there for a tfen
elation oi even it century unlit they have Inst all their
eonleinpoi uneoiis sl|.piifit ant e and until all lilt* princi
pals have passed fioin I la* scent*
Itowrvei, we are not living ill noimal limes We arc
living in times in which the once clear distinctions be
tween “won" and "peace" have become extremely
him i etl
< eilalnly it would I it * hi i etching even tlx* extremely
flexible language of diplomacy to tin* breaking point to
desetihe Kiihhia at llilh momenl an a "friendly” nation.
Koi many muntlih the polit y which Itussla has pur
sued toward Iht' 1111iI<mI Slab's has not been friendly hut
dltdiuclly and sharply hostile Short of employing ac
tual miitai y measures, Itussia lias been engaged m an
unceasing offensive against the west and particularly
against tli»* I hided Slates as the most powerful nation
in I lu* west
There lias hero no liinlt to the falsifications ol Aiuet‘1
«ait motive*, aim* nml aspirations which the Kceudin
ami Ms spokesmen have constantly indulged in. At the
same time, those spokesmen have sought to persuade the
world that Itussia is a knight in shining armor, moved
only hy high idealism uml full of the milk of human
kindness
The Na:l Soviet documents should help set this high
ly distorted record straight Although dealing with
events that, in some instances, took place nearly a dec
ade ago, tin* documents have a startling contemporane
ousness The Stalin of today is the same Stalin who
toasted llltlci in August, PJktll
The Molotov of todas is the same Molotov who with
brutal cynicism made a deal for the butchery of Poland,
who allowed himself no twmges of conscience m barter
ing peoples ami nations tn the Baltic region and the Bal
kan*. as though they were so many herds of cattle, who
congratulated the Germans on the capture of Warsaw
and, playing a ruthless game of power politics, did not
even lendet lip set \ tee to moral principles
tt (i this same Mimitov who now accuses the Vnited
States oi hem* in league with the Nails in Germany
ami in pursuing an imperialistic course.
The xn;nthcant tact is that since the destruction of
N&'A power the policy which Russia has pursued has
been only the continuation and extension oi the policy
i%t ruthless expansion upon which she embarked in 1939.
when tin* moment for such a course seemed propitious.
Siguificantlv. it was not the Naib hut the Russians
who made the* tust mow that ted ultimately to the Rib
hrutiop Moioto\ pact ami did so in full awareness that
mi attack b\ Germany mi Poland was imminent.
‘inhere w *n tv' tv sure* *oo low lost between tht* part
ners. The\ viouble^ressed each other at every turn*
w he new. the epport units presented itself But in this
as in other resvvvts, as the documents abundantly re
veal. ihe\ acted like two of a kind
Stable French t»inl. Vital to KKP
vtN IVUuer Uv'vt. 3r Korean Oorrespcixient)
ON VITA* PKNRCH PROBIJRM over which the
WHAT'S UP. THERE T
-i
United States can do little more than pray is the ques
tion of French government stability, which is vital to
reconstruction of this country and to the success of the
Marshall plan for Kuropeon recovery.
Because of the structure of the fourth French repub
lic there is little than can be done about the problem.
Tlie only thing that keeps a government stable here
seems to be continued improvement, or good times, and
even then the slightest whiff of foul wind might throw
it over.
Also it is true as soon as a French government comes
to power, it loses some of its popularity. The Schuman
government can serve as an object lesson in that line.
Late last November the Communist call for a general
strike caused the fall of the Ramadier government. Af
ter the usual haggling, the Schuman government of
Popular Republicans, Socialists and Radical Socialists
took power.
At first, throughout non-Communist circles, there
was great joy, for the new government quelled the
strike in short order—aided by the unwillingness of the
majority of French workers to follow the Communists’
particular brand of politics at that time. But at the
strike’s end, the government promised wage increases,
and higher cost of living allowances.
French prices went up, and so did French tempers.
Then, in December and January, the government
brought forth its new supertax-forced loan plan, which
would hit the farmers, businessmen and professional
people. The Communists opposed it bitterly, and the de
CSaulle groupe offered to support only a plan that would
provide for a 5 per cent tax rise rather than the propos
al 20 per cent excess levy.
When the noses were counted, the Schuman govern
ment won out in its program, but with a loss of thirtv
three votes in the chamber of deputies. This meant that
33 of the 339 deputies who supported the Schuman gov
ernment in the beginning had fallen by the wayside
somehow And in the end. if any government cannot
persuade such wavside-fallers they are forced to yield
to another group.
The narrow vote (306-273^ by which the Schuman
government won its victory on the tax question does not
represent a “crisis” in the French cabinet. But it repre
sents a situation which might turn into a crisis, and that
is where the difficulties come.
The Schuman government’s plans call for three fac
tors in long-range planning. First, this government be
hoves that it must institute fiscal reforms, for a: present
there are four French tax gathering agencies—a svstem
which has evolved from the time of Napoleon with lit
tle or no change To consolidate these into one efficient
agency would take at least six months.
Secondly, the government wants to begin administra
tive reforms* in both colonial and heme administration.
This would reduce the number of civil servants materi
ally and would cut the budget cost of physical govern
ment. It would take from two to three years to acvom
. C. --S -
F.nally. the Schuman govern
ment believes that for reconstruc
tion the nationalized mdustr.es
must be rendered much more ac
countable and efficient They
would do th^s by a series of leg.s
lative acts which would take an
unknown length of ’..me
But the po.nt is that no French
government can undertake such
actions when it s unsure. It would
do no good to reform the fiscal
system if the next government
made drastic changes, nor to beg.n
administrative reform if a new
government is expected to mod.fy
them in a short time.
To some extent, this appears to
follow the line of reasoning of de
Gaulle and the Rally of the French
People—who demand a strong ex
ecutive form of government. But
actually, the Schuman government
does not want this. It wants mere
ly enough confidence to keep in
power, and to work out this sys
tem. If their programs work, they
may get it.
Passport to
Freedom
(By Dorothy Thompson)
On Jan. 30, the birthday of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, I thought
of a memoial to him, which he cer
tainly would have approved. It
would be, in his name, an act of
penance for policies which were
forced upon him, bringing unut
terable human woe. It would be a
move, in morality, to fulfill the
wartime pledge of four freedoms.
And it would solve the problem
perplexing the international refu
gee organization, which is consid
ering every means, except the sim
ple, obvious one, of solving it.
What is a "displaced person"? A
displaced person is unique from
the rest of humanity, not * in his
needs and dreams, skills and am
bitions, but in one particular only:
He lacks a piece of paper. It is
monstrous—when one thinks of it
—but nobody is really alive in to
day’s world, nobody can work,
found a home, live like other peo
ple, unless he is attached to a
piece of paper. That piece of paper
is the certificate of a government
that he exists, and without it he
does not exist. It is a passport.
Therefore I suggest that there
should be issued to all the persons
in Europe who have been render
ed homeless, reduced to non-exist
ence by the inhuman policies of
government, a Roosevelt passport,
bearing on its cover Roosevelt’s
portrait, his promise of the four
freedoms, and valid without fur
ther visas for every civilized coun
try in the world. By this. I mean
every country which affirms the
rights of man as a human individ
ual. That includes the United
States. Britain and the common
wealth. the western European
states, the Latin American states.
I then suggest that a non-inter
est-bearing fund ahall be set up
for the purpose of issuing to hold
ers of these passports a loan of not
more than SS00. to be repaid with
in fire years. And therewith the
Places cf their confinement shall
he opened and they simply shall
be allowed to go.
There will be no more jobs for
bureaucrats, card catalogers. com
■nrrees. or^anuations. no more
continuing appropriations — nc
"note problems a: all No one * -1!
“} ■ * to re ?o ..i a salary to consrJ*
er how to place'* ihe displaced
£■*<' A -11 place h.mself. just as
-ou and l placed ourselves and aU
our ancestors placed themselves
They arH fo. {tad a country, a job
and become persons instead o!