THE NOME NUGGET
Published Monday, Wednesday and Friday by The
NOME PUBLISHING CO. .
Nome, Alaska
Telephone: Main 125 P. O. Box 618
W. A. and EMILY BOUCHER . Editors
*1.50 PER MONTH $16.00 A YEAR
Entered as second class matter October 14, 1943. at the postoffice
at Nome, Alaska, under the Act of March 3, 1879.
Monday, January 5, 1948
A Big Difference
(Rocky Mountain News)
MANY PEOPLE seem to think that “economic plan
ning” and “planned economy” are two names for the
same thing. They aren’t.
Economic planning, good or bad, is something every
body does. If you figure out a way to save money, that’s
an economic plan—usually a good one.
If you decide to risk spending more than you earn for
a while, hoping to make up for it later, that’s also an
economic plan—often a bad one.
Successful business firms give much thought to eco
nomic planning; less successful ones, not so much. Busi
ness associations, labor unions, farm organizations all
engage in economic planning.
So, of course, does the federal government. It should!
plan its activities in such a way as to contribute most!
to, and subtract least from, the people’s welfare. (Its:
success in this effort is not always complete).
But a panned economy is an economic plan made for
the people by government, and substituted for the peo
ple’s planning.
The planned-economy theory has a lot of appeal. Mil-.
lions of people, doing their own economic planning, are
bound to make many mistakes. So, it is argued, why
shouldn’t government make a master plan for every-j
body, and eliminate the mistakes?
But we think there are fatal flaws in this theory. A
few hundred men in government, who would make the
master plan, wouldn’t be wiser than everybody.
They, too, could make mistakes and the consequences
could be disastrous. But millions of people, planning for
themselves, don’t all make the same mistakes* at the
same time. And their errors tend to cancel each other!
out.
Furthermore, if even wise planned economy is to
work, the people must conform to the plan. Suppose
some of them don’t want to. How can they be brought!
into line—unless by government power to tell them!
what they must make, where they must work, what they'
can sell or buy? And then what becomes of individual
freedom?
We have seen individual freedom go down in the
planned economies of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and
Communist Russia. We see Britain trying to reconcile
freedom with planned economy.
We see America, not with perfect conditions, but with
far higher living standards than any other country has
even attained, and with this world’s best hope for sav
ing individual freedom.
We have made mistakes in our individual economic
planning, but we haven’t yet made the tragic mistake of
adopting a planned economy.
.
We’re In Palestine Up To Our !\eeks
(Denver Post)
BEHIND THE BLOODY VIOLENCE touched off by
the partition of Palestine there is shaping a distinct
threat to American interests in the larger conflict be
tween Russian totalitarianism and western democracy.
The movement of events is forcing for the first time
a more general realization of the fact—long apparent to
many students of world affairs—that Palestine is not
a remote and isloated issue.
Zionists, intent only on their objective of a Jewish
national state, have hitherto maintained there would
not be any deep or widespread violence in Palestine if
their aims were granted. The opposition would be con
fined to “a few Arab sheiks,” who could not command
a mass following—so the Zionist argument ran. They
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were confident that Haganah, the well-trained Jewish
underground army, would be able to control the situa
tion.
But now the Zionist tune has changed. The expres
sion of Mrs. Samuel W. Halprin, president of Hadassah,
women’s Zionist organization, reflects the new line.
Speaking at a “Victory day” reception in New York,
Mrs. Halprin declared that “the world has the respon
sibility to provide arms and equipment” to defend the
new Jewish state against “Arab provocateurs.”
The Zionists are right, of course. The world, through
its United Nations, has decreed the partition of Pales
tine. Hence it is up to the world to enforce the decision.
But it will come as a shock to many Americans to real
ize the extent to which this necessity involves the
United States.
Most Americans, so far as they had any feelings on
the question, were motivated by sympathy for the
homeless and persecuted Jews. There was also a large
measure of simple indifference—“Palestine is so far
away; let the Jews have it; it needn’t worry us.” But
the realization is dawning that Palestine may well
worry us for a long time to come.
The fact is, if the conflict in Palestine grows into out
right warfare, as the Arabs have solemnly threatened,
the United States may be confronted with a difficult de
cision. We may either have to send in troops or surren
der our position in the middle east to Russia.
Article 106 of the United Nations charter requires the
five permanent members of the security council to con
sult on joint action to maintain the peace. If the United
States and the western members should decline to join
Russia in policing Palestine, Russia might send in
troops on her own motion. In either event, Russian
forces would be established in one of the world’s key
strate'gic spots. Indeed, the certainty it would lead to
trouble and justify her intervention may account for the1
Russian’s surprising vote in favor of partition.
Americans reluctant to send forces to Palestine might
like to paraphase the Communist chant of the days be
fore Germany attacked Russia: “The Yanks aren’t com
ing!” But if the violence in Palestine runs its threatened
course we may have little choice.
The five-nation Palestine commission is meeting at!
Lake Success to make a preliminary study of the prob
lems of implementing the partition order. Next month
it will go to Palestine to survey the situation at first
hand. Its tasks will be difficult at best; and, with Arab
obstruction, they may be nearly impossible. But it is'
upon the effectiveness of this commission that present
hopes depend.
Purposely, the membership of the commission was
held to small nations not immediately connected with
the great-power conflict. But, inevitably, they will find
Russia and the United tSates looking over their shoul
ders as they work. The United States must give the
neutral commission its fullest support, bending every
effort toward a peaceful solution without the necessity
of forceful intervention.
Why Russia Balks
(By Barnet Nover)
The important thing about the
latest—and it may the the last—
sessions of the council of foreign
ministers is not that it failed but
why it failed.
The developments leading up to
the complete smashup of the con
ference are too well known to re
quire elaboration.
From the beginning to the end
Russia and the western powers
found themselves in complete op
position on all matters of major
significance.
They were miles apart on the
subject of the Austrian settlement,
on the future of the Saar, on the
problem of Germany’s eastern
border, on the question of the
sharing of the financial burdens
created by the occupation of Ger
many, above and beyond all on
the Russian demand for 10 billion
dollars in reparations to be paid
out of current German production.
As long as mere was me sngnt
est hope of making any progress in
the direction of a German and an
Austrian settlement, the western
powers were willing to keep the
conference going. After three
weeks of futile discussions they
decided no such hope existed.
By that time, too, they had be
come sick and tired of hearing
Viacheslav Molotov repeat over
and over again the same impossi
ble demands, the same crude
propaganda, the same obvious
distortions and perversions of the
truth that Soviet spokesmen have
been indulging in against the
western powers for some time.
The mystery is why Molotov—
or rather the Kremlin from whom
he gets his orders—persisted in
this truculent and uncompromis
ing course, a course certain to
widen the gulf between Russia
and the west.
If the Kremlin's objective was
to drive a wedge between France
and the Anglo-Saxon powers or
between Great Britain and the
United States, Molotov's tactics
must be written down as a com
plete failure.
If Molotqv’s purpose was to in
timidate those powers into making
concessions to the Soviet Union, it
is obvious that it had no such re
sult.
Messrs. Marshall, Bevin and
Bidault never budged an inch in
the face of the Russian foreign
minister’s insults and accusations.
The law of diminishing returns
has begun to operate in the mat
ter of Russia’s threats. This is
borne out not* only by the course
of the negotiations at London but
also by what has happened in
Prance and Italy.
Significant signs of resistance
to Russia’s tactics of intimidation
have even begun to appear in
notably Poland and Czechoslova
kia.
Certainly the failure to get any
kind of an agreement at London
will not ease the economic stresses
and strains in the Soviet Union bv
increasing the volume of repara
tions from Germany.
The drastic devaluation of the
Russian ruble, which the S viet
government has just carried out,
is a sign of political strength—
only a powerful regime complete
ly master of the situation, at home
could have carried it out—but «Is >
of economic weakness.
It means that Russia’s recovery
has, to put it mildly, not reached
the point where the supply .1
goods produced or imported is
equal to the demand. If anything,
the extent of the ruble’s devalua
countries behind the iron curtain,
tion indicates that the gap is v •*•*/
much greater in Russia than in
*