section_path: Background
section_name: Background
paragraph_text: Background
  
  Coastal Syria, and especially the Latakia Governorate, has historically served as the heartland of Syria 's Alawite community, a minority religious group which is considered an offshoot or a sect of Shia Islam, which comprises around 10% of the entire Syrian population. The Assad family, which ruled Syria for decades, belonged to this religious minority, giving a small number of its members positions within the regime (especially those members who were closely tied to the Assad family and those members who served in the loyalist Shabiha militias and were involved in organised crime such as the Captagon trade), while it was suppressing dissent in the community and it was also portraying itself as the defender of minorities against the Sunni Muslim majority. However, the Assad government under Bashar had increasingly become unpopular among Alawites due to its corruption and the economic collapse.
  
  Following the fall of Assad in December 2024, Alawi stronghold Qardaha (the Assad family hometown) was "the first place the opposition factions headed for, just 24 hours after entering Damascus. An opposition delegation met with prominent Alawite figures there and returned with a statement of support from them," according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
  
  After the establishment of a transitional government under then- Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emir Ahmed al-Sharaa, a "mosaic" of new security forces was installed across the region by the new government, including: the more disciplined and professional General Security units of the former Syrian Salvation Government 's HTS-controlled Ministry of Interior in the most heavily minority-dominated areas such as Latakia and Jableh in Latakia governorate; Military Operations Command units (including some Islamist foreign fighters) which were pulled out of the cities to rural areas in late December due to their lack of restraint, one unit of Fursan Sharqiyah fighters affiliated to the Turkish-backed SNA, deployed in Tartous; and local factions returning to hometowns from which they had been displaced during the civil war, e.g. in Salamiyah, Talkalakh, Qusayr, and Homs city. Servicemen from Assad's armed forces, including volunteers and conscripts, returned to their hometowns, making settlements with the new security services to gain civilian status.
  
  In mid-December, HTS sources stated that armed criminals who were connected to the old regime were involved in looting and lawlessness in the coastal region. HTS units were ambushed by Assad loyalist militias. The HTS-led security forces launched a campaign to disarm these groups and to get temporary IDs affording them protection as civilians.
  
  There were demonstrations in support of the old regime on 25 December, and sectarian slogans were posted by both sides, in Latakia in the early days after the fall of Assad, as well as reports of disinformation fuelling sectarian tensions. The same day, there were ex-regime militias ambushed security forces in the Tartous countryside, to which HTS special forces responded with a three-day operation, focusing on Khirbet Maazah (home to many former regime loyalists), which involved considerable use of force including shoot-outs and alleged looting, the first of a series of clashes between government forces and pro-Assad loyalist holdouts, particularly in regions with significant Alawite populations.
  
  On 17 February, al-Sharaa made a symbolic visit to Latakia as part of a national tour, meeting with local dignitaries from various sects.
  
  The Jerusalem Post reported that the new administration had been restructuring state apparatus through widespread dismissals of officials, many of whom came from the Alawite community. According to Alawite activists, members of their community had experienced targeted violence and persecution since Assad's fall, particularly in rural areas of Homs and Latakia Governorates. The Post said that, despite al-Sharaa's public commitment to inclusive governance, no formal meetings with senior Alawite representatives were reported, in contrast with the administration's documented meetings with leaders from other minority groups including Kurds, Christians, and Druze. In addition, several reports of mass-distributed flyers filled with hate speech against Alawites alongside the filmed destruction and vandalization of Alawi religious shrines had been reported since December 2024.