section_path: Manager profile/Tactics
section_name: Tactics
paragraph_text: Tactics
  
  One of the most successful managers of his generation, Luis Enrique's incisive and direct football featuring quick transitions from defense to attack, though reliant on the front three of Messi, Suárez and Neymar, was in sharp contrast to the possession-heavy approach of Barcelona managers immediately prior to him. Statistically, Luis Enrique's Barcelona, in his first two years at the club, were better than Guardiola's: Comparatively his team had scored more goals and conceded fewer, had a higher win percentage and won competitions at a similar rate. Guardiola hailed them as the best counter-attacking team in the world.
  
  In his first two seasons at the Camp Nou, Enrique fielded a 4–3–3 formation. Results improved after he stopped changing his starting eleven. The team's creative outlet was the wings with Neymar and Messi as inside forwards flanking Suárez, a departure from their usual playing style. Ivan Rakitić played a pivotal role in transitioning defense to attack, and Andrés Iniesta 's influence withered, while Xavi, the club's captain, reduced to a part-time, substitute role. With overlapping full-backs offering width, Neymar and Messi often drifted in-field, encouraging midfielders, Rakitic and Iniesta, to move into channels and attack in and around the box. In his third and final year, struggling for form and results, the manager switched to a 3–4–3 offense morphing into a 4–4–2 defensive shape, reminiscent of Antonio Conte 's Premier League winners Chelsea more than Johan Cruyff 's Dream Team, with Messi at the top of a midfield diamond, acting as chief play-maker, and Sergio Busquets, the sole holding defensive midfielder, responsible for breaking the first-line of opposition press. The system favoured Neymar in particular, who played as a left forward, often cutting inside to link with lone striker Suárez, or to create an overload in the final-third sharing creative responsibilities with Messi. This change in formation was instrumental as they overcame 0–4, the biggest first-leg deficit in Champions League history, by defeating PSG 6–1 in the second-leg; however, the physical and tactical discipline required to sustain a 3–4–3 proved controversial.
  
  Enrique continued to favour 4–3–3 for Spain, and at times the riskier 3–4–3 when the situation demanded, with the sole defensive midfielder in the pivot being the only commonality. Lacking the front three he had at Barcelona, his football retained positional and vertical aspects, though with box-to-box central midfielders, like Koke or Pedri, offering attacking thrust while the center forward dropped deep to bring wide forwards into play, accompanied by overlapping full-backs who offer width. Whilst pressing oppositions high-up, the center forward, usually Álvaro Morata, screened the opposition defensive midfielder as wide forwards engaged opposition center backs. Spain's defensive midfielder, often Busquets, tracked the run of opposition attackers when they dropped deep, sometimes pressing higher than the team's other central midfielders. In possession, Spain usually started playing out from the back, to draw the opposition in, with Thiago Alcântara or any other central midfielder, dropping alongside Busquets to help progress the ball forward. Should the opposition press aggressively, the full-backs linked up to offer additional passing options as the center backs go deep and narrow. Wide forwards made diagonal runs into the midfield to link play with those in front of them. Once the ball was progressed out of the defense, they adjusted their attacking rhythm to match the opposition's defensive structure, either opting for a speedy transition against a higher block or relying on a more positional approach play against a lower block. To mix it up, Spain initially played short passes in the defensive-third before playing long to the center forward who then attempted to bring outfield runners in to play. Wing play was used to stretch opposition and create spaces infield or create crossing opportunities, especially against compact defenses.
  
  "I do not treat all of my players the same, just as I do not treat all of my children the same. I have negotiated things with the players. On some things I have been permissive and on some I have been demanding. There are some rules that everyone must follow. That is one of my principles."
  
  Known for his brave and fearless management style, Enrique is quick to remove any influence that undermines his authority. Reports of his altercation with Messi at Barcelona and with Totti at Roma, both of whom wield considerable power at their respective clubs, being prime examples of that. His flexibility in adopting different playing styles, while at odds with the possession-based style synonymous with Barcelona, furthered this narrative, as he continued to remain unfazed in the face of criticism and pressure. Royal Spanish Football Federation president Luis Rubiales, on the back of three consecutive unsuccessful tournaments, appointed him to curb ill-discipline and complacency in the squad, stating: "We are looking for an incontestable leader, who sets out the path, and nobody then strays from that path."
  
  One of the most successful managers of his generation, Luis Enrique's incisive and direct football featuring quick transitions from defense to attack, though reliant on the front three of Messi, Suárez and Neymar, was in sharp contrast to the possession-heavy approach of Barcelona managers immediately prior to him. Statistically, Luis Enrique's Barcelona, in his first two years at the club, were better than Guardiola's: Comparatively his team had scored more goals and conceded fewer, had a higher win percentage and won competitions at a similar rate. Guardiola hailed them as the best counter-attacking team in the world.
  
  In his first two seasons at the Camp Nou, Enrique fielded a 4–3–3 formation. Results improved after he stopped changing his starting eleven. The team's creative outlet was the wings with Neymar and Messi as inside forwards flanking Suárez, a departure from their usual playing style. Ivan Rakitić played a pivotal role in transitioning defense to attack, and Andrés Iniesta 's influence withered, while Xavi, the club's captain, reduced to a part-time, substitute role. With overlapping full-backs offering width, Neymar and Messi often drifted in-field, encouraging midfielders, Rakitic and Iniesta, to move into channels and attack in and around the box. In his third and final year, struggling for form and results, the manager switched to a 3–4–3 offense morphing into a 4–4–2 defensive shape, reminiscent of Antonio Conte 's Premier League winners Chelsea more than Johan Cruyff 's Dream Team, with Messi at the top of a midfield diamond, acting as chief play-maker, and Sergio Busquets, the sole holding defensive midfielder, responsible for breaking the first-line of opposition press. The system favoured Neymar in particular, who played as a left forward, often cutting inside to link with lone striker Suárez, or to create an overload in the final-third sharing creative responsibilities with Messi. This change in formation was instrumental as they overcame 0–4, the biggest first-leg deficit in Champions League history, by defeating PSG 6–1 in the second-leg; however, the physical and tactical discipline required to sustain a 3–4–3 proved controversial.
  
  Enrique continued to favour 4–3–3 for Spain, and at times the riskier 3–4–3 when the situation demanded, with the sole defensive midfielder in the pivot being the only commonality. Lacking the front three he had at Barcelona, his football retained positional and vertical aspects, though with box-to-box central midfielders, like Koke or Pedri, offering attacking thrust while the center forward dropped deep to bring wide forwards into play, accompanied by overlapping full-backs who offer width. Whilst pressing oppositions high-up, the center forward, usually Álvaro Morata, screened the opposition defensive midfielder as wide forwards engaged opposition center backs. Spain's defensive midfielder, often Busquets, tracked the run of opposition attackers when they dropped deep, sometimes pressing higher than the team's other central midfielders. In possession, Spain usually started playing out from the back, to draw the opposition in, with Thiago Alcântara or any other central midfielder, dropping alongside Busquets to help progress the ball forward. Should the opposition press aggressively, the full-backs linked up to offer additional passing options as the center backs go deep and narrow. Wide forwards made diagonal runs into the midfield to link play with those in front of them. Once the ball was progressed out of the defense, they adjusted their attacking rhythm to match the opposition's defensive structure, either opting for a speedy transition against a higher block or relying on a more positional approach play against a lower block. To mix it up, Spain initially played short passes in the defensive-third before playing long to the center forward who then attempted to bring outfield runners in to play. Wing play was used to stretch opposition and create spaces infield or create crossing opportunities, especially against compact defenses.
  
  "I do not treat all of my players the same, just as I do not treat all of my children the same. I have negotiated things with the players. On some things I have been permissive and on some I have been demanding. There are some rules that everyone must follow. That is one of my principles."
  
  Known for his brave and fearless management style, Enrique is quick to remove any influence that undermines his authority. Reports of his altercation with Messi at Barcelona and with Totti at Roma, both of whom wield considerable power at their respective clubs, being prime examples of that. His flexibility in adopting different playing styles, while at odds with the possession-based style synonymous with Barcelona, furthered this narrative, as he continued to remain unfazed in the face of criticism and pressure. Royal Spanish Football Federation president Luis Rubiales, on the back of three consecutive unsuccessful tournaments, appointed him to curb ill-discipline and complacency in the squad, stating: "We are looking for an incontestable leader, who sets out the path, and nobody then strays from that path."