section_path: Organisation and structure/Ideology
section_name: Ideology
paragraph_text: Ideology
  
  According to the International Crisis Group, Salafism has been a core unifying principle of al-Shabaab, although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders. In particular, al-Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims, linking Somali expansionism and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide. Academics have also noted the influence of non-Salafi Islamic movements in Somalia on al-Shabaab.
  
  Following its pan-Islamist political outlook, incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed by al-Shabaab as part of a wider American-sponsored war against Islam. For instance, al-Shabaab denounced the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia as a "Zionist-Crusader aggression", in which the United States "unleashed its 'hunting dogs' in Ethiopia and Kenya" by deploying "the world's crusader forces" to counter the rise of the Islamic Courts Union. However, this globalist framework is not universal within the group, an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fostered factionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base is fiercely expansionist, and sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia, or, more ambitiously, inside so-called Greater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.
  
  However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi- Qutbist terms; and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government, which, lacking a basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy. Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a Takfiri interpretation of the principle of al-wala' wal-bara' (lit. ' loyalty and disavowal '), insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived as apostates.
  
  A major component of al-Shabaab's ideology is Islamic expansionism which is incorporated into its Pan-Islamist cause. Ummah themes warning Somalis of the plots from international NGOs, " Christian Crusaders " (United States, Ethiopia, AMISOM) and their collaborators are a regular feature of the movement's propaganda. During the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, al-Shabaab positioned itself as a staunch expansionist militia under the Islamic Muqawwama (resistance coalition) of the Islamic Courts Union, taking the most hardline stance against the invading "Christian crusaders". After the collapse of the ICU in 2007, al-Shabaab launched its own independent insurgency, gaining popular support from Somalis for defending the country from American imperialism and foreign occupation. Al-Qaeda began enhancing its co-operation and support to al-Shabaab during this period, which enabled the movement to establish itself as the strongest military power in Southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab regards Somalia's Federal Government as an illegitimate " apostate " entity backed by foreign invaders.
  
  The group has persecuted those individuals belonging to Somalia's small Christian minority; whom it accused of aiding the agenda of foreign " Crusaders " to " convert Somalis to Christianity ". In 2009, al-Shabaab destroyed a Sufi shrine and its associated graves; asserting that over-embellishing burial sites into shrines is incompatible with Sharia. Al-Shabaab has clashed with the pro- AMISOM Sufi militias of " Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a ". In addition, its statements have expressed anti-Zionist sentiments, and the group claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.