section_path: History/Syrian civil war
section_name: Syrian civil war
paragraph_text: Syrian civil war
  
  After the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the Ba'athist state conscripted able-bodied men, mostly youth, into the regime's military. Fearing mass defections in military ranks, the Assad regime preferred to send Alawite recruits for active combat on the frontlines, and conscriptions disproportionately targeted Alawite regions. This has resulted in a large number of 'Alawite casualties and immense suffering to Alawite villages along the Syrian coast. Many younger Alawites were greatly angered by the Assad government, held the government responsible for the crisis, and increasingly called for an end the conflict via reconciliation with the Syrian opposition and preventing their community from being perceived as being associated with the Assad government.
  
  In the early days of the Syrian civil war, many Alawites felt compelled to back Assad, fearing that a rebel victory would lead to a slaughter of the Alawite community, especially as the conflict took on an increasingly sectarian cast. In May 2013, pro-opposition SOHR stated that out of 94,000 Syrian regime soldiers killed during the war, at least 41,000 were Alawites. Reports estimate that up to a third of 250,000 young Alawite men of fighting age has been killed in the war by 2015, due to being disproportionately sent to fight in the frontlines by the Assad government. In April 2017, a pro-opposition source claimed 150,000 young Alawites had died. Another report estimates that around 100,000 Alawite youths were killed in combat by 2020.
  
  Many Alawites feared significant danger during the Syrian civil war, particularly from Islamic groups who were a part of the opposition, though denied by secular opposition factions. Alawites have also been wary of the increased Iranian influence in Syria since the Syrian civil war, viewing it as a threat to their long-term survival due to Khomeinist conversion campaigns focused in Alawite coastal regions. Many Alawites, including Assad loyalists, criticize such activities as a plot to absorb their ethno-religious identity into Iran's Twelver Shia umbrella and spread religious extremism in Syria.
  
  Alawite villages and neighborhoods were targeted by Islamist rebel attacks during the war. These include the Aqrab, Maan and Adra massacres, the 2013 Latakia offensive, the Homs school bombing, the Zara'a attack, and the February 2016 Homs bombings.
  
  While many Alawites were Assad loyalists throughout the civil war, the Baathist regime faced increasing discontent in the war's later years from Alawite-dominated areas. By 2023, some Alawites had criticized the regime for its corruption, economic mismanagement, and disregard for civil liberties. During a rapid offense in November and December 2024 by opposition forces fighting the Assad regime, thousands of Alawites fled the city of Homs ahead of the capture of the city; those who left headed to coastal Tartus Governorate. Upon the fall of Damascus and collapse of the Assad regime days later, Alawite communities continued to express uncertainty about their future, although fears receded somewhat because the opposition forces did not target Alawites after capturing Homs.