section_path: Philosophy/Doctrine of transcendental idealism/Interpretive disagreements
section_name: Interpretive disagreements
paragraph_text: Interpretive disagreements
  
  One interpretation, known as the "two-world" interpretation, regards Kant's position as a statement of epistemological limitation, meaning that we are not able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, and therefore cannot access the " thing-in-itself ". On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical to the phenomenal empirical object. Kant also spoke of the thing-in-itself or transcendent object as a product of the (human) understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing-in-itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view. On this alternative view, the same objects to which we attribute empirical properties like color, size, and shape are also, when considered as they are in themselves, the things-in-themselves, otherwise inaccessible to human knowledge.