section_path: Theories/Rational choice framework
section_name: Rational choice framework
paragraph_text: Rational choice framework
  
  Game theory, with its foundations in the Walrasian theory of rational choice, is increasingly used in various disciplines to help analyze power relationships. One rational-choice definition of power is given by Keith Dowding in his book Power.
  
  In rational choice theory, human individuals or groups can be modelled as 'actors' who choose from a 'choice set' of possible actions in order to try to achieve desired outcomes. An actor's 'incentive structure' comprises (its beliefs about) the costs associated with different actions in the choice set and the likelihoods that different actions will lead to desired outcomes.
  
  In this setting, we can differentiate between:
  
  This framework can be used to model a wide range of social interactions where actors have the ability to exert power over others. For example, a 'powerful' actor can take options away from another's choice set; can change the relative costs of actions; can change the likelihood that a given action will lead to a given outcome; or might simply change the other's beliefs about its incentive structure.
  
  As with other models of power, this framework is neutral as to the use of 'coercion'. For example, a threat of violence can change the likely costs and benefits of different actions; so can a financial penalty in a 'voluntarily agreed' contract, or indeed a friendly offer.