section_path: Regulation of external borders/Border checks
section_name: Border checks
paragraph_text: Border checks
  
  All persons crossing external borders—inbound or outbound—are subject to a check by a border guard. The only exception is for regular cross-border commuters (both those with the right of free movement and third-country nationals) who are well known to the border guards: once an initial check has shown that there is no alert on record relating to them in the Schengen Information System or national databases, they can only be subject to occasional 'random' checks, rather than systematic checks every time they cross the border.
  
  Previously, EEA and Swiss citizens, as well as their family members enjoying the right of free movement, were subject only to a 'minimum check' when crossing external borders. This meant that their travel document was subject only to a 'rapid' and 'straightforward' visual inspection and an optional check against databases for lost/stolen travel documents. Consultation of the Schengen Information System and other national databases to ensure that the traveller did not represent a security, public policy or health threat was only permitted on a strictly 'non-systematic' basis where such a threat was 'genuine', 'present' and 'sufficiently serious'. In contrast, other travellers were subject to a 'thorough check'.
  
  However after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, at a meeting of the Council of the European Union on 20 November 2015, interior ministers from the Member States decided to 'implement immediately the necessary systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, including on individuals enjoying the right of free movement'. Amendments were made to the Schengen Border Code to introduce systematic checks of the travel documents of EEA and Swiss citizens, as well as their family members enjoying the right of free movement, against relevant databases when crossing external borders. The new regime came into force on 7 April 2017.
  
  Where carrying out systematic checks against databases would have a disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic at an external border, such checks may be relaxed if, on the basis of a risk assessment, it is determined that it would not lead to a security risk.
  
  In 'exceptional' and 'unforeseen' circumstances where waiting times become excessive, external border checks can be relaxed on a temporary basis.
  
  Border guards carry out the following procedures when checking travellers who cross external borders:
  
  As shown by the table above, because many procedures are optional, border guards have discretion in deciding how rigorously they check travellers at external border crossing points. As a result, the length of time taken to perform checks differs between Schengen countries. Under the previous regime (whereby those with the right to freedom of movement were subject only to a 'minimum check'), an entry check for an EEA or Swiss citizen took around five seconds on average in Italy, whilst in Norway, on average it took around 1 minute. The disparities in checks on third-country nationals (who are subject to a more thorough check) are even greater. For example, an entry check for an Annex II national takes around 15 seconds on average in Greece, whilst it takes three to five minutes on average in Slovakia. Similarly, an entry check for an Annex I national on average lasts around 30–60 seconds in the Netherlands, whilst in Latvia, it lasts around two to five minutes on average.
  
  After the new regime came into force on 7 April 2017, significantly longer waiting times were reported at numerous external border crossing points, especially as it was just before the Easter holiday. Travellers entering Slovenia from Croatia (which was not yet part of the Schengen Area) had to wait several hours as Slovenian border guards systematically checked the travel documents of all travellers (including those with the right of free movement) against relevant databases. The Prime Minister of Slovenia, Miro Cerar, acknowledged that the situation was 'unacceptable'. In order to alleviate the long queues, the systematic checking of travel documents of those with the right of free movement against relevant databases was temporarily suspended from the evening of Friday 7 April 2017 until the end of the weekend. However, the following weekend, long queues re-appeared. The Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković, criticised the situation, calling it 'unsustainable', and expressed concern about the impact on tourism (which accounts for 18% of Croatia's GDP). The President of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, sent a formal letter to the European Commission to voice her concern about the effect of the new regime on border checks. At a meeting held on 29 April 2017, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, Cerar and Plenković agreed that, moving forward, the systematic checking of the travel documents of those with the right of free movement against relevant databases would be suspended at land border crossing points between Croatia and Slovenia if the waiting time exceeds 15 minutes (with 'targeted checks' being carried out instead). Long queues were also reported at external border crossing points in Greece, where the leadership of the Hellenic Police (which is responsible for border checks) decided to suspend, for a period of six months, the systematic checking of travel documents of those with the right of free movement against relevant databases (with the exception of the Kipoi land border crossing point with Turkey, due to security concerns). Greece was particularly affected by the implementation of the new regime as Greek identity cards were not machine-readable at that time, which meant that border guards had to enter the holder's information manually into the computer system to check the relevant databases if a Greek citizen presented an identity card instead of a passport. Similarly, long waiting times were reported at external border crossing points in France and Spain. Finland, Hungary and Italy also issued notifications suspending systematic checks at some external border crossing points. In July 2017, Greece submitted a request to suspend the systematic checking of travel documents of those with the right of free movement against relevant databases for a further period of 18 months, due to 'infrastructure shortcomings and increased traffic at 12 airports across the country'.
  
  When carrying out checks at external borders, border guards are, by law, required to respect the dignity of travellers (particularly in cases involving vulnerable persons) and are forbidden from discriminating against persons based on their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
  
  External border controls are located at roads crossing a border, at airports, at seaports and on board trains. Usually, there is no fence along the land border, but there are exceptions like the Ceuta border fence, and some places at the eastern border. However, surveillance camera systems, some equipped with infrared technology, are located at some more critical spots, for example at the border between Slovakia and Ukraine, where at some points there is a camera every 186 metres (203 yards).
  
  All travellers entering and leaving the Schengen Area by general aviation or on a pleasure boat have to make their first point of entry/final point of departure in an airport/ aerodrome or a seaport that is designated as an external border crossing point. By way of derogation, travellers on board a pleasure boat are permitted to make their first port of call at a port that is not designated as an external border crossing point if they notify the port authorities and obtain authorisation from the border guards. In practice, however, this is a loophole hard to check, and large-scale drug smuggling using private boats has been uncovered. Along the southern coast of the Schengen countries in the Mediterranean, coast guards make a substantial effort to prevent private boats from entering without permission.
  
  At many external border crossing points, there are special lanes for EEA and Swiss citizens (as well as their family members) and other lanes for all travellers regardless of nationality. At some external border crossing points, there is a third type of lane for travellers who are Annex II nationals (i.e. non-EEA/Swiss citizens who are exempt from the visa requirement). Although Andorran and Sammarinese citizens are not EEA citizens, they are nonetheless able to use the special lanes designated for EEA and Swiss citizens. Since 1 January 2021, British citizens are no longer permitted to use the EEA/Swiss lanes.
  
  Some external border crossing points can only be used by certain travellers. For example, the border checkpoint in Veľké Slemence, Slovakia (on the border with Ukraine) can only be crossed by pedestrians or cyclists who are EEA, Swiss or Ukrainian citizens. The border checkpoint in Ramoniškiai, Lithuania (on the border with Russia) can only be crossed by residents of Lithuania and Russia; all other travellers (including EEA and Swiss citizens not resident in Lithuania/Russia) cannot use this border checkpoint. Similarly, the border checkpoint of Pededze-Brunishevo, Latvia (on the border with Russia) is only open to Latvian and Russian citizens. The Narva 2 and Saatse border crossing points in Estonia (on the border with Russia) can only be used by residents of Estonia and Russia. The border checkpoint in Połowce -Pieszczatka, Poland (on the border with Belarus) can only be crossed by Polish and Belarusian nationals. In 2016, as a temporary measure for 180 days, the two northernmost border checkpoints of Raja-Jooseppi and Salla on the Finland–Russia border could only be crossed by Finnish, Russian and Belarusian citizens (as well as their family members); all other nationals, including non-Finnish EEA and Swiss citizens, were not permitted to use these border checkpoints. Further, the border crossing points of Haapovaara, Inari, Karttimo, Kurvinen, Leminaho and Parikkala (as well as the railway crossing point of Imatra) are only open to Finnish and Russian citizens.
  
  The additional obligations imposed by European law on national border authorities when it comes to processing travellers who are third-country nationals (e.g. the obligation to stamp their travel documents) should not prevent the development of automated border control systems which are made available to such travellers. As shown by the examples listed above of automated border control systems which have been developed at external border crossing points of the Schengen Area, national border authorities have been able to adapt the design of their automated border control systems to allow third-country nationals to make use of them. One solution is to have a border guard physically positioned next to the automated border gates who can stamp travel documents where required: this approach has been adopted by the Finnish Border Guard at the automated border gates in Helsinki Airport, where eligible users (who are required to receive a passport stamp) include holders of Australian, Canadian, Japanese, New Zealand, South Korean and United States biometric passports, and in the Port of Helsinki, where eligible users (who are required to receive a passport stamp) include Russian citizens, who are required to scan both the biodata page and the visa inside their passport, then to step into the gate for a facial image and fingerprint recognition, and after the gate opens to approach a border officer to have their passport stamped. The Portuguese Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras has also adopted the practice of positioning a border guard for stamping next to the automated border gates in Lisbon Airport where eligible users (who are required to receive a passport stamp) include holders of Angolan and Brazilian passports and holders of diplomatic/service passports. This approach has also been adopted in Italy, where eligible users of eGates include holders of Australian, Canadian, Israeli, Japanese, New Zealand, Singaporean, South Korean, United States and Vatican biometric passports. A similar but slightly different solution has been adopted by the Dutch Royal Marechaussee at the Privium iris recognition automated border gates at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (where eligible users include registered EU/EEA/Swiss citizens, US citizens who are Global Entry members, and all nationals who are holders of diplomatic passports), as well as by the German Federal Police at the ABG Plus iris recognition automated border gates at Frankfurt Airport (where eligible users include registered EU/EEA/Swiss citizens and US citizens who are Global Entry members: when eligible third-country nationals use Privium/ABG Plus, after their iris is scanned and verified, a different gate/door/turnstile opens to that for EU/EEA/Swiss citizens and the third-country national user is directed to a lane which leads them to the front of the queue for manual passport checks at immigration desks, where the border guard stamps the user's passport. Another possible solution would be to design the automated border gates to print a paper slip with an entry or exit stamp on it, as well as the user's name and travel document number, whenever the user is a traveller who is subject to the requirement to have their travel document stamped.
  
  Sometimes, external border controls are located on non-Schengen territory. For example, the French Border Police operates border checks at juxtaposed controls on travellers departing the United Kingdom for the Schengen Area before they board their train or ferry at St Pancras International, Ebbsfleet International and Ashford International railway stations, as well as at the Port of Dover and the Eurotunnel Folkestone Terminal.