section_path: Public image/Polls and rankings
section_name: Polls and rankings
paragraph_text: Polls and rankings
  
  In a June 2007 public opinion survey, Putin's approval rating was 81%, the second-highest of any leader in the world that year. In January 2013, at the time of the 2011–2013 Russian protests, Putin's rating fell to 62%, the lowest since 2000. In a context of increased diplomatic isolation and international sanctions on Russian officials prompted by the Russo-Ukrainian war, Putin's approval rating reached 87% in August 2014. In February 2015, based on domestic polling, Putin was ranked the world's most popular politician. In June 2015, Putin's approval rating climbed to 89%, an all-time high. Observers saw Putin's high approval ratings in 2010s as a consequence of improvements in living standards, and Russia's reassertion on the world scene during his presidency. Putin was also highly popular in some non-Western countries, such as Vietnam, where his approval rating was 89% in 2017.
  
  Despite high approval for Putin, public confidence in the Russian economy was low, dropping to levels in 2016 that rivaled the lows in 2009 at the height of the global economic crisis. Putin's performance in reining in corruption is unpopular among Russians. Newsweek reported in 2017 that a poll "indicated that 67% held Putin personally responsible for high-level corruption". Corruption is a significant problem in Russia.
  
  In October 2018, two-thirds of Russians surveyed agreed that "Putin bears full responsibility for the problems of the country", which has been attributed to a decline in a popular belief in " good tsar and bad boyars ", a traditional attitude towards justifying failures at the top of the ruling hierarchy in Russia. In January 2019, the percentage of Russians trusting Putin hit a then-historic low—33%. In April 2019 Gallup poll showed a record number of Russians, 20%, willing to permanently emigrate from Russia. The decline was even larger in the 17–25 age group, "who find themselves largely disconnected from the country's aging leadership, nostalgic Soviet rhetoric and nepotistic agenda". Putin's approval rating among young Russians was 32% in January 2019. The percentage willing to emigrate permanently in this group was 41%. 60% had favorable views of the US (three times more than in the 55+ age group). Decline in support for the president and government is visible in other polls, such as a rapidly growing readiness to protest against poor living conditions.
  
  In May 2020, amid the COVID crisis, Putin's approval rating was 68%, when respondents were presented a list of names (closed question), and 27% when respondents were expected to name politicians they trust (open question). This has been attributed to continued post-Crimea economic stagnation but also an apathetic response to the pandemic crisis in Russia. Polls conducted in November 2021 after the failure of a Russian COVID-19 vaccination campaign indicated distrust of Putin was a major contributing factor for vaccine hesitancy, with regional polls indicating numbers as low as 20–30% in the Volga Federal District.
  
  In May 2021, 33% indicated Putin in response to "who would you vote for this weekend?" among Moscow respondents and 40% outside Moscow. A survey released in October 2021 found 53% of respondents saying they trusted Putin.
  
  Observers see a generational struggle among Russians over perception of Putin's rule, with younger Russians more probably to be against Putin and older Russians more likely to accept the narrative presented by state-controlled media in Russia. Putin's support among Russians aged 18–24 was only 20% in December 2020.
  
  Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, state-controlled TV, where most Russians get their news, presented the invasion as a "special military operation" and liberation mission, in line with the government's narrative. The Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to employ information only from state sources or face fines and blocks. The Russian media was banned from using the words "war", "invasion" or "aggression" to describe the invasion, with media outlets being blocked as a result.
  
  In late February 2022, a survey conducted by the independent research group Russian Field found that 59% of respondents supported the "special military operation" in Ukraine. According to the poll, in the group of 18-to-24-year-olds, only 29% supported the "special military operation". In late February and mid-March 2022 two polls surveyed Russians' sentiments about the "special military operation" in Ukraine. The results were obtained by Radio Liberty. 71% of Russians polled said that they supported the "special military operation" in Ukraine.
  
  When asked how they were affected by the actions of Putin, a third said they strongly believed Putin was working in their interests. Another 26% said he was working in their interests to some extent. In general, most Russians believe that it would be better if Putin remained president for as long as possible. Similarly, a survey conducted in early March found 58% of Russian respondents approved of the operation.
  
  In March 2022, 97% of Ukrainians said they had an unfavorable view of Putin, and 98% of Ukrainians—including 82% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine—said they did not believe any part of Ukraine was rightfully part of Russia. A poll published on 30 March in Russia saw Putin's approval rating jump, from 71% in February, to 83%. However, experts warned that the figures may not accurately reflect the public mood, as the public tends to rally around leaders during war and some may be hiding their true opinions, especially with the Russian 2022 war censorship laws prohibiting dissemination of "fake information" about the military. Many respondents do not want to answer pollsters' questions for fear of negative consequences. When researchers commissioned a survey on Russians' attitudes to the war, 29,400 out of 31,000 refused to answer. The Levada Center's director, stated that early feelings of "shock and confusion" was being replaced with the belief that Russia was being besieged and that Russians must rally around their leader. The Kremlin's analysis concluded that public support for the war was broad but not deep, and that most Russians would accept anything Putin labeled a victory. In September 2023, the head of the VTsIOM state pollster Valery Fyodorov said in an interview that only 10–15% of Russians actively supported the war, and that "most Russians are not demanding the conquest of Kyiv or Odesa".
  
  A poll by the independent organization Levada, which was conducted on 22–28 June 2023, showed that 42% of respondents would vote for Putin in the 2024 presidential election. A public opinion poll by the state-owned institution VCIOM, which was conducted in November 2023, found that 37.3% of respondents would vote for Putin. According to a VCIOM poll conducted in early March 2024, 56.2% of respondents would vote for Putin.
  
  The director of the Levada Center stated in 2015 that drawing conclusions from Russian poll results or comparing them to polls in democratic states was irrelevant, as there is no real political competition in Russia, where, unlike in democratic states, Russian voters are not offered any credible alternatives and public opinion is primarily formed by state-controlled media, which promotes those in power and discredits alternative candidates.