section_path: Safety concerns/Equipment hazards/Reliability
section_name: Reliability
paragraph_text: Reliability
  
  The March 1966 Gemini 8 mission was aborted in orbit when an attitude control system thruster stuck in the on position, sending the craft into a dangerous spin that threatened the lives of Neil Armstrong and David Scott. Armstrong had to shut the control system off and use the reentry control system to stop the spin. The craft made an emergency reentry and the astronauts landed safely. The most probable cause was determined to be an electrical short due to a static electricity discharge, which caused the thruster to remain powered even when switched off. The control system was modified to put each thruster on its own isolated circuit.
  
  The third lunar landing expedition, Apollo 13, in April 1970, was aborted and the lives of the crew— James Lovell, Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise —were threatened after the failure of a cryogenic liquid oxygen tank en route to the Moon. The tank burst when electrical power was applied to internal stirring fans in the tank, causing the immediate loss of all of its contents, and also damaging the second tank, causing the gradual loss of its remaining oxygen over a period of 130 minutes. This in turn caused a loss of electrical power provided by fuel cells to the command spacecraft. The crew managed to return to Earth safely by using the lunar landing craft as a "life boat". The tank failure was determined to be caused by two mistakes: the tank's drain fitting had been damaged when it was dropped during factory testing, necessitating the use of its internal heaters to boil out the oxygen after a pre-launch test; which in turn damaged the fan wiring's electrical insulation because the thermostats on the heaters did not meet the required voltage rating due to a vendor miscommunication.
  
  The crew of Soyuz 11 were killed on 30 June 1971 by a combination of mechanical malfunctions; the crew were asphyxiated due to cabin decompression following the separation of their descent capsule from the service module. A cabin ventilation valve had been jolted open at an altitude of 168 kilometres (104 mi) by the stronger-than-expected shock of explosive separation bolts, which were designed to fire sequentially, but in fact had fired simultaneously. The loss of pressure became fatal within about 30 seconds.