section_path: Historical and philosophical study/Classical antiquity (c. 600 BCE–c. 322 BCE)
section_name: Classical antiquity (c. 600 BCE–c. 322 BCE)
paragraph_text: Classical antiquity (c. 600 BCE–c. 322 BCE)
  
  In ancient India, the Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain philosophical traditions each posited that matter was made of atoms (paramanu, pudgala) that were "eternal, indestructible, without parts, and innumerable" and which associated or dissociated to form more complex matter according to the laws of nature. They coupled their ideas of soul, or lack thereof, into their theory of matter. The strongest developers and defenders of this theory were the Nyaya - Vaisheshika school, with the ideas of the Indian philosopher Kanada being the most followed. Buddhist philosophers also developed these ideas in late 1st-millennium CE, ideas that were similar to the Vaisheshika school, but ones that did not include any soul or conscience. Jain philosophers included the soul (jiva), adding qualities such as taste, smell, touch, and color to each atom. They extended the ideas found in early literature of the Hindus and Buddhists by adding that atoms are either humid or dry, and this quality cements matter. They also proposed the possibility that atoms combine because of the attraction of opposites, and the soul attaches to these atoms, transforms with karma residue, and transmigrates with each rebirth.
  
  In ancient Greece, pre-Socratic philosophers speculated the underlying nature of the visible world. Thales (c. 624 BCE–c. 546 BCE) regarded water as the fundamental material of the world. Anaximander (c. 610 BCE–c. 546 BCE) posited that the basic material was wholly characterless or limitless: the Infinite (apeiron). Anaximenes (flourished 585 BCE, d. 528 BCE) posited that the basic stuff was pneuma or air. Heraclitus (c. 535–c. 475 BCE) seems to say the basic element is fire, though perhaps he means that all is change. Empedocles (c. 490–430 BCE) spoke of four elements of which everything was made: earth, water, air, and fire. Meanwhile, Parmenides argued that change does not exist, and Democritus argued that everything is composed of minuscule, inert bodies of all shapes called atoms, a philosophy called atomism. All of these notions had deep philosophical problems.
  
  Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was the first to put the conception on a sound philosophical basis, which he did in his natural philosophy, especially in Physics book I. He adopted as reasonable suppositions the four Empedoclean elements, but added a fifth, aether. Nevertheless, these elements are not basic in Aristotle's mind. Rather they, like everything else in the visible world, are composed of the basic principles matter and form.
  
  For my definition of matter is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result.
  
  The word Aristotle uses for matter, ὕλη (hyle or hule), can be literally translated as wood or timber, that is, "raw material" for building. Indeed, Aristotle's conception of matter is intrinsically linked to something being made or composed. In other words, in contrast to the early modern conception of matter as simply occupying space, matter for Aristotle is definitionally linked to process or change: matter is what underlies a change of substance. For example, a horse eats grass: the horse changes the grass into itself; the grass as such does not persist in the horse, but some aspect of it—its matter—does. The matter is not specifically described (e.g., as atoms), but consists of whatever persists in the change of substance from grass to horse. Matter in this understanding does not exist independently (i.e., as a substance), but exists interdependently (i.e., as a "principle") with form and only insofar as it underlies change. It can be helpful to conceive of the relationship of matter and form as very similar to that between parts and whole. For Aristotle, matter as such can only receive actuality from form; it has no activity or actuality in itself, similar to the way that parts as such only have their existence in a whole (otherwise they would be independent wholes).