section_path: History/2021–present/VVS role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
section_name: VVS role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
paragraph_text: VVS role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine
  
  On 24 February 2022, the VVS was deployed in support of the invasion of Ukraine. The VVS had reportedly deployed about 300 combat aircraft within range of Ukraine. Aircraft have also been deployed in Belarus for sorties over Ukraine.
  
  On 25 February 2022, Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed several aircraft and set a Russian airbase on fire in the Millerovo air base attack.
  
  On 13 March 2022, Russian forces launched cruise missile attacks on Yavoriv military base near the Polish border.
  
  As of 20 March 2022, it was claimed that VVS carried out at least 1403 airstrikes on Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion.
  
  The VVS has generally been noted by its relative absence from the invasion and has as of 25 March 2022 failed to subdue Ukrainian air defenses or the Ukrainian Air Force. It has, as of 1 April 2022, also failed to achieve air supremacy. Failure to achieve this has been attributed to the lack of SEAD operations on the part of the VVS likely due to the lack of flying hours for Russian pilots as well as the lack of dedicated SEAD units and precision-guided munitions within the VVS. These weaknesses have been compounded by the mobility of Ukrainian air defenses with the extensive use of MANPADS as well as NATO reportedly sharing early warning information with Ukrainian forces. According to the Ukrainian MoD, as of 16 March 2022, the VVS has also suffered at least 77 aircraft losses, however only 12 were verified by independent sources at the time.
  
  In the first six months of the campaign, Russia's air war was largely a failure. An American intelligence analyst said that less than 40% of the 2,154 missiles fired by Russia hit their targets, such as the Zatoka bridge which sustained over eight air attacks before being disabled. The VVS reportedly flew over 20,000 sorties in the war, fewer than 3,000 of which entered Ukrainian airspace, possibly due to fear of Ukraine's sustained air defense.
  
  The VVS has struck civilian targets during the invasion prompting an International Criminal Court investigation in Ukraine. Notably, during the battle of Mariupol it struck a hospital as well as a theatre.
  
  Russian pilots in Ukraine are having to use civilian GPS units "taped to the dashboards".
  
  On 19 September US Air Force General James B. Hecker said that Russia had lost 55 military aircraft due to being shot down by Ukrainian air defenses since the start of the invasion. He credits this success to the Ukrainian use of SA-11 and SA-10 air defense systems. As the US doesn't have these systems getting new missiles from European allies is a "big ask" from Kyiv. Russian airplanes increased their operations due to the September 2022 Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive. This was due to several factors including changing front lines, former safe territory is now held by the enemy. Or because they were under pressure to provide closer ground support.
  
  On 8 October 2022 the chief of the VVS Sergey Surovikin became the commander of all Russian forces invading Ukraine.
  
  On 10 October 2022 the VVS re-commenced the bombardment of cities like Kyiv and especially energy infrastructure like electricity grid facilities. The large-scale coordinated attacks also hit Kharkiv, Kryvyi Rih, Lviv, Dnipro, Ternopil, Kremenchuk, Khmelnytskyi, and Zhytomyr. The oblasts of Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zhytormyr, Kirovohrad were attacked on this day. When, by 17 October, these energy infrastructure attacks continued unabated the western media labeled the delivery system "kamikaze drones", and Ukrainian president Zelensky called this "terrorizing the civilian population". By 23 October (not yet two weeks) 40% of Ukrainians were without electricity and/or water.
  
  Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian infrastructure again intensified with the deployment of the UMPK (unified gliding and correction module) bomb kits since early 2023, which allowed to Russian Air Force convert dumb Soviet-era aerial bombs into a precise ammunition. UMPK bomb kits are being particularly used with general purpose FAB-250, FAB-500 and FAB-1500 aerial bombs containing highly explosive warheads. These glide kits greatly increase range and also add an element of guidance, allowing Russian bombers, namely the Su-34, to execute aerial attacks from safer distances without entering areas covered by Ukrainian air defense systems. According to Ukrainian General Ivan Havryliuk, since start of 2024 year, Russian aviation dropped over 3,500 of these bombs on Ukrainian positions.
  
  During the conflict, the VVS lost one Il-22M Airborne Command Post and five helicopters (three Mi-8, one Mi-35M, and one KA-52) as well as one damaged Mi-8. Two of the destroyed Mi-8s as well as the damaged one were Russia's newest Mi-8MTPR-1 Electronic Warfare variants. Up to 29 crew were killed, assuming the aircraft were fully manned, but the VVS has not released casualties. Wagner lost at least five vehicles during hostilities, but it is unclear how many can be attributed to VVS actions. Reports indicated that the Russian Armed Forces were failing to stop Wagner's momentum toward Moscow when a political resolution to the rebellion was announced. The U.K. Defense Intelligence reported that the Il-22M was a particularly high value asset, being one in a fleet of only 12 special mission aircraft, and that its loss could have an impact on the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
  
  On 1 June 2025, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) struck at least two airfields, those being Olenya air base, in the Arctic, and Belaya air base in Siberia, destroying rows of Russian strategic and nuclear capable bombers. Ukrainian sources claimed further strikes at Diaghilev air base and Ivanovo air base, claiming to have destroyed "more than" 40 Russian aircraft including the A-50, Tu-95 and Tu-22 M3. According to the Financial Times, the damaged and destroyed aircraft made up around 20% of Russia’s operational long-range aviation fleet. Many of the aircraft types affected, such as the Tu-95 and Tu-22M3, have not been produced since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, making them exceptionally difficult to replace.