section_path: Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
section_name: Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
paragraph_text: Sudanese civil war (2023–present)
  
  On 15 April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and RSF broke out after RSF mobilised in cities across Sudan. Fighting was reported at the presidential palace and army headquarters.
  
  The conflict resulted in RSF being designated as a rebel group by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On the day of the clashes, which included the Battle of Khartoum, both sides claimed control over Khartoum and Merowe airports and other sites.
  
  On 17 April 2023, the United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo held talks, and Dagalo agreed to a 24-hour armistice beginning on 18 April 2023 to ensure the safe passage of civilians and the evacuation of the wounded.
  
  Another 72-hour nationwide ceasefire was announced to begin at midnight on 24 April 2023. The United States and Saudi Arabia had mediated the truce on humanitarian grounds. The fighting had caused the deaths of more than 500 people by 25 April 2023, and thousands were injured. The Rapid Support Forces were supported by the Libyan militia leader Khalifa Haftar and the United Arab Emirates. Footage of thermobaric shells captured by the Sudanese military suggested that the weapons were supplied by the United Arab Emirates; Egypt had sent military support to the Sudanese army. On 1 July 2024, the RSF took full control of Singa. This surge in violence caused many civilians to flee towards Gedaref in eastern Sudan. On 30 June 2024, the army also targeted 17th Infantry Division headquarters, General Intelligence Service (GIS) buildings, and the guesthouse. The RSF's dominance extended over the entire city, including the deserted headquarters of the Sudanese Army's 65th Brigade. The RSF also secured the Blue Nile Bridge, hinting at a possible expansion towards al-Dinder.
  
  The RSF has tried to re-employ officials from the pre-war civilian administration. But many civil servants have escaped both to avoid the fighting and having to work with RSF military personnel. This lack of effective RSF administration, alongside the complexity of Sudanese ethnic tensions and alliances shaped by the fighting, have seriously undermined Hemedti 's ambition to transcend his warlord persona.
  
  A report by The Wall Street Journal revealed that mercenaries were becoming a tool for foreign actors like the UAE and Egypt for attaining a strategic advantage in the Sudan war. In November 2024, Colombian fighters were seized from Darfur and were later identified as recruits of an Abu Dhabi-based firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG). The military contractors were hired through a Colombia-registered recruitment firm, International Services Agency (A4SI). They were first taken to the UAE, then to Benghazi in Libya, and were finally deployed to Sudan. The Colombian recruits were "duped" to support the UAE's efforts in bolstering RSF's position in the war.
  
  In February 2025, RSF and its allies signed a charter in Nairobi, Kenya, to form a parallel " Government of Peace and Unity " to govern RSF-controlled areas, potentially splitting Sudan further. On 21 March, SAF retook the presidential palace in Khartoum, which now stands as a symbolic victory against the RSF. On 26 March, SAF declared Khartoum "free" from RSF, completing the drive-out after nearly two years of occupation.