section_path: Jurisdiction
section_name: Jurisdiction
paragraph_text: Jurisdiction
  
  The jurisdiction of a qadi was theoretically coextensive with the scope of the law that he applied. That law was fundamentally a law for Muslims, and the internal affairs of the non-Muslim, or dhimmī s, communities living within the Islamic state were left under the jurisdictions of those communities. Islamic law governed dhimmī s only with respect to their relations to Muslims and to the Islamic state. In actual practice, however, the jurisdiction of a qadi was hemmed in by what must be regarded as rival jurisdictions, particularly that of the maẓālim court and that of the shurṭah.
  
  The maẓālim was a court (presided over by the supreme ruler himself or his governor) that heard complaints addressed to it by virtually any offended party. Since Islamic law did not provide for any appellate jurisdiction but regarded the decision of a qadi as final and irrevocable, the maẓālim court could function as a kind of court of appeals in cases that parties complained of unfair decisions from qadis. The maẓālim judge was not bound to the rules of Islamic law (fiqh) or, for that matter, to any body of positive law, but he was free to make decisions entirely on the basis of considerations of equity. The maẓālim court thus provided a remedy for the inability of a qadi to take equity freely into account. It also made up for certain shortcomings of Islamic law, for example, the lack of a highly developed law of torts, which was largely because of the preoccupation of the law with breaches of contracts. In addition, it heard complaints against state officials.
  
  The shurṭah, on the other hand, was the state apparatus responsible for criminal justice. It too provided a remedy for a deficiency in the law, namely the incompleteness and procedural rigidity of its criminal code. Although in theory a qadi exercised a criminal jurisdiction, in practice, that jurisdiction was removed from his sphere of competence and turned over entirely to the shurṭah, which developed its own penalties and procedures. What was left to the qadi was a jurisdiction concerned mainly with cases having to do with inheritance, personal status, property, and commercial transactions. Even within that jurisdiction, a particular qadi's jurisdiction could be further restricted to particular cases or types of cases at the behest of the appointing superior.
  
  The principle of delegation of judicial powers not only allowed the supreme ruler to delegate those powers to a qadi but also allowed qadis to further delegate them to others, and there was, in principle, no limit to that chain of delegation. All persons in the chain, except for the supreme ruler or his governor, bore the title qadi. Although in theory, the appointment of a qadi could be effected by a simple verbal declaration on the part of the appointing superior, it was normally accomplished by means of a written certificate of investiture, which obviated the need for the appointee to appear in the presence of the superior. The appointment was essentially unilateral, rather than contractual, and did not require acceptance on the part of the appointee to be effective. It could be revoked at any time.