text: non-parties oftheConvention. ThatStatejudgesthattheConference on Disarmament isnotthecompetent bodytodiscuss amendments and thatthistask fallsproperly withinthemandate oftheCommittee onthepeaceful usesof outerspace. Inparticular, theConvention hasprovisions foramending, which statesparties canimplement atanytime,andaproblem withtheRegistration Convention hasbeeninitsimplementation ratherthaninitsprovisions, as onlyabout35stateshaveratified theConvention. Thedelegation madean appealthatallstateswithouterspaceprogrammes should becomeparties. Somestatesfailedtoregister theirspaceobjects orwaitedseveral years before doingso.Thedelegation stressed thatsomeoftheverycountries pressing forchanges totheRegistration Convention haveeitherbeennegligent intheirreporting orarenotparties totheConvention andwidespread adherence totheConvention isfarmorelikelytostrengthen itthanpiecemeal attempts toredefine itsterms. Thedelegation didnotsceanyneedfor additional reporting requirements orvoluntary enhancement ofthe1975 Registration Convention asArticle IVofthatConvention makesadequate provision foradditional voluntary reporting anditisnotatallclearthat additional reporting wouldserveasmeasures tobuildconfidence. Italso notedthattheissueofdebrisinspacebelongs elsewhere thaninthe Conference onDisarmament. 54.Referring toitsproposal concerning declaration thatweapons havenot beendeployed inouterspaceonapermanent basis, onedelegation explained thattheinitiative, whichwasaimedatgenerating aclimate ofconfidence in CD/I034 page23 thefieldoftheprevention ofana~sraceinouterspace,continues tobea validinitiative asexperts andanalysts concurintheconclusion thatforthe timebeingnoweapons havebeendeployed inthespaceenvironment. The delegation, underscoring thepolitical natureofsuchunilateral declarations, recalled thattheyhavebeenrecently agreedinthebilateral negotiations between thetwomajormilitary Powers, todealwithveryspecific issueareas inwhichthecomplex natureoftheelements tobeverified makenecessary the resorttomanifestations ofapolitical commitment inordertomakeprogress. 55.Somedelegations recognized theimportance ofverification inthecontext ofmeasures toprevent ana~sraceinouterspaceandconsidered thatit shouldbepossible toassureverification ofcompliance withagreements tllrough acombination ofnational technical meansandinternational procedures. Otherdelegations notedthattheOuterSpaceTreatycontained someverification provisions. Anumberofdelegations wereoftheviewthat verification functions shouldbeentrusted toaninternational bodytoprovide theinternational community withanindependent capability toverify compliance. Reference wasmadetotheproposed international satellite monitoring agency andtointernational co-operation fortheuseofEarth monitoring satellites fortheverification ofa~slimitation anddisa~ament agreements. 56.Onedelegation, inanexpertpresentation, analysed thedifferent existing andpossible ASATsystems. Itnotedthattheefficiency ofsuch systems depended onthespeedoftheiroperation, ontheirdiscretion, on theircollateral effects andonthereplacement capacity ofthetargets. It drewattention totherelationship between ASATandABMsystems. Itdescribed possible ASATtechniques (fragmentation, kinetic ordirected energyweapons) aswellastheconstraints whichsomeofthemwouldface(disturbances, need foraccuracy, targeting, checking ofresults...)Italsoenvisaged possible passive andactivecounter-measures toASATsystems. Itstressed the difficulties inverifying apossible banonASATweapons aswellasin defining thescopeofsuchaprohibition. Itconcluded thatsometechnical financial orstrategic constraints coulddissuade ASATdeployments morethan legal no~s; co-operative measures suchasaspacecodeofconduct could however favourtheconclusion ofagreements inthisfield. Inanother expert presentation, thesamedelegation recalled itsproposal foranInternational Trajectography Centre, designed asamanagement instrument fora confidence-building andtransparency regime, whichwouldcollect dataonspace CD/I034 page24 objects provided bytheirusersandcalculate trajectories inordertowarn usersincaseofpotential incidents. Thiscouldserveaselements in evidence ofgoodfaithifincidents occurred. Toillustrate boththe prospects offered bysuchaproject andtheconstraints whichitwouldface,
analysis: The text appears to be discussing international agreements and treaties related to space exploration and disarmament, with a focus on verification and confidence-building measures. It also touches on the issue of debris in space and the potential for nuclear weapons to be deployed in outer space. The language used is technical and diplomatic, suggesting that the text is part of a formal negotiation or discussion between countries.