text: upon to provide information about the precise time, location and yield of their nuclear tests. This information should be given soon after the nuclear test and be passed on to our respective national seismology divisions. It would help them considerably in their research. CD/PV.568 8 (Mr, Wagenmakers, Netherlands) My third subject today is chemical weapons. Regrettably, we have to admit that negotiations on chemical weapons do not progress with the speed which we all desire. Perhaps this is inevitable, perhaps not. I would like to see it more philosophically, as a fact of our negotiating life in the CD. The achievement on a total ban of chemical weapons should indeed be the highest priority of this Conference. The Netherlands would therefore like to offer some suggestions for speeding up the negotiations. In our view, the negotiations at this moment hinge on two major and interrelated issues, i.e. challenge inspections and routine inspections. Challenge and routine inspections are the two pillars which support one and the same basic structure which we all strive for: compliance with a chemical weapons ban. Challenge and routine inspections, including ad hoc verification, not only complement each other, but are also strongly interrelated. The more encompassing one system is, the less often we need the other. We believe that the present "rolling text" pivots upon the concept of challenge inspections: the solution to this issue, which will mainly consist of the development of adequate procedures for managed access, might well put many other remaining problems into another, more benevolent light. My delegation is therefore very pleased with the conclusion of the British Minister of State, William Waldegrave, that in the view of the United Kingdom there is no site so sensitive from the national security viewpoint that some 
analysis: The text appears to be a diplomatic document discussing international negotiations on nuclear tests and chemical weapons. It highlights the importance of providing information on nuclear tests and suggests ways to speed up negotiations on a total ban of chemical weapons. The document mentions specific issues such as challenge inspections, routine inspections, and verification procedures. Given the context, it is likely that the document is related to international security and disarmament.