text: intellectual author and who thf, accomplice. 41. The Special Rapporteur ponted out that the courts had tried to settle that Assue in some of their judgements. In the YamashitR case, the United States Supreme Court had held that the order of a commanding officer, or the failure of that officer to give the appropriate instruct..ons to his subordinates, could constitute an aot of complicity. But the question had more often been settlec9 by legislation. Thus, under a number of national laws, an order given by a superior, or the failure of that superior to give an order, were treated as an act of complicity. 42. The question also arose, a8 the Special Repporteur observed, whether counsel or advice which lec¶ a person to commit an offence could be regarded as an act of complicity. In the view of the Special Ropporteur, that would depend largely on the persuasive force of the advice and its effect on the offender’s decision. Instigation or encouragement to commit an offexe were regarded as acts of complicity by certain leyal systems, but not by others. 43. Tho Special Rapporteur etressecl that it was comparatively easy to distinguish between perpetrators and accompltces when dealing with a simple offence such as burglary in which the principal perpetrator was helped by an accomplice to climb over a wall, But where an offence was committed by a group of offenders or was a mass offence, it was difficult to draw the line and there w8s a school of thought which preferred to abandon the distinction between principal and accomplice and to treat all those involved in the crimtJ as participants on the same footing. Many international military courts had taken that position in their ji.dgernents. For ins tame, the Supreme Court of
analysis: The text appears to be discussing legal and judicial concepts related to complicity and criminal liability, specifically in the context of international law and military courts. The language used is formal and technical, indicating a focus on legal and academic discussions.