text: missiles. There are still some differences in the two sides' approach to "suspect site" inspections. We believe that the basis for resolving this problem exists, but further efforts are needed. As you know, during the Wyoming ministerial meeting last September the two sides signed an agreement on principles for implementing trial verification measures. Such measures are being worked out, agreed upon and implemented in particular in regard to the conduct of a series of on-site inspections. Their purpose is to ensure maximum confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of the verification mechanism being developed. Here in Geneva the Soviet and American experts have already conducted an experiment on the tagging of strategic offensive weapons. In accordance with the agreed schedule heavy bombers were shown yesterday to American experts in the Soviet Union, to be followed after some time by the nose cone of a heavy ICMB of the SS-18 type and an SLBM of the SS-N-23 type. In turn the American side will show Soviet experts the nose cone of an ICBM of the MX type, heavy bombers and a Trident-2 SLBM. CD/PV.553 17 (Mr. Nazarkin. USSR) There is a convergence of positions on the issue of mobile ICBMs. The sides have finally agreed on imposing limitations on these systems. The remaining differences relate essentially to the methods for applying such limitations and verifying compliance. At the heart of this problem is the need to find and agree on an optimum balance between, on the one hand, preserving the survivability of mobile ICBMs, and, on the other, considerations of reliability verification of compliance with the limitations on these systems. Of course verification of mobile systems is more difficult than verification of fixed systems. However, mobility contributing to greater survivability should not be ensured at the expense of less complex 
analysis: The text appears to be discussing a diplomatic agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the verification of nuclear weapons and mobile ICBMs. The language used is technical and focused on the specifics of the agreement, indicating a high level of detail and expertise. This suggests that the topic is related to international relations, security, and arms control.