text: Still on the test ban issue, we have for a long time witnessed a situation in which effective multilateral action has been blocked under the pretext that the solution of academic problems of verification must precede the actual negotiation of a treaty. Furthermore, we are told that the mere possibility of non-nuclear countries acquiring an explosive technological capability is more dangerous than the already existing capability of the nuclear-weapon Powers to blow the world up several times over. Such a line of reasoning really means that nuclear explosives are to be considered in a positive light as long as they are in the exclusive control of the developed nations, many of which already possess the capability to detonate a nuclear device at very short notice. Instead, it is the underdeveloped, unarmed nations that are being presented as culprits, or suspects, for trying to master technologies that others would wish to control for ever. One final thought suggested by the issue of the nuclear test ban is this. The alleged need for foolproof verification procedures that would ensure confidence in a future treaty has been used, as I have just said, as a pretext for the lack of actual negotiations. Brazil, for its part, believes that it is just as crucial, for instance, to strengthen confidence in the treaties that are already in force in this field, and which enjoin the nuclear-weapon parties to negotiate the cessation of their tests in all environments and for all time. In the existing treaties, however, there are no verification procedures to ensure that the commitments of the nuclear parties are being fulfilled. Apparently, only the non-nuclear-weapon nations are capable of generating suspicion, since it is only they that are subject to verification and control of their activities. Nuclear-weapon status breeds immunity. MLG/emv A/C.l/40/PV.S 8-10 (Mr. Maciel, Brazil) 
analysis: The text appears to be discussing the issue of nuclear tests and the verification procedures required for a nuclear test ban treaty. The author is criticizing the lack of progress in negotiations and the perceived hypocrisy of developed nations in controlling nuclear technology while prohibiting others from doing so. The text highlights the importance of strengthening confidence in existing treaties and ensuring that all nations, regardless of their nuclear status, are subject to verification and control.