text: othermilitarily significant States, forhalting andreversing thearmsrace. 285.Whenever armscontrol anddisarmament inthemaritime domainareunder discussion, somefactors Should beconsidered axiomatic. First,disarmament measures should bebalanced andshouldnotdiminish thesecurity ofanyState. But asnavalforcesarenotindependent ofothermilitary forces, theyshould be considered intheirgeneral military context. Thereisnosuchthingasan independent navalbalance orparity. Disarmament measureS inthemaritime field should thUSbebalanced inthatgeneral sense. Second, thisfactcombined withthe verydiffering geographical situations ofStatescouldrequire multilateral measures ofrestriction fornavalforces andweapons tobenumerically asymmetrical inordertomaintain anoverall military situation inbalance. Third,because of theuniversal natureoftheConvention ontheLawoftheSea,suchmeasures should nottakethelegalformofamendments totheConvention. Theyshould beembodied inseparate legalinstruments inharmony withtheConvention. Fourth, asinall armscontrol anddisarmament, appropriate verification andcomplaints procedures areessential fortheproperimplementation ofagreedmeasureS. 286.JustasthisstUdyofthenavalarmsracehasbeenawide-ranging consideration ofverycomplex issues, similarly thereexists awiderangeof possible measures ofdisarmament andconfidence-building. Somemaybeofgeneral application, whileothers maybeapplicable innarrowcircumstances suchas specific weaPonsystems orinspecific geographical areas. Separately, possible measures thatmayfindfavourinonequarter maynotbeattractive inanother, or perhaps maybemoreacceptable atsomepointinthefuturebutarenotregarded as susceptible tonegotiation atpresent. Thefollowing surveyofpossible measures ispresented asanillustrative, thoughnotexhaustive, listofmatters thatmight heconsidered fornegotiation. Forconvenience, theyaregrouped asfollows: Quantitative restraints; Qualitative ortechnological restraints; I...A/40/535 English Page79 Geographic and/ormission restraints 1 Confidence-building measuresl Modernization ofthelawsofseawarfare. Someofthepossible measures relatetomorethanonegroup. A.Quantitative restraints 287.SincetheWashington NavalTreatyof1922,therehasbeenlong-standing interest inquantitative restraints thatplacenumerical limitsoncertain typesof navalvessels andweapons. Morerecentexamples ofquantitative restraints were thenumerical limitsonballistic missile lsunchers onsubmarines andonmodern ballistic missile submarines agreedinthe1972SALTIInterim Agreement, andthe aggregate limitsonstrategic offensive armssetbythe1977SALT11Treaty. Difficulties withquantitative restraints couldarisefromthesubsequent tendency onthepartofStatestopursuevigorously construction programmes incategories of shipsorweapons notcovered bytheagreedrestrictions. Evenso,quantitative restraints shouldnotbelightly discarded astheyarethemostdirect meansof limiting andreducing thecompetitive accumulation ofarms.Ithasbeensuggested thatquantitative restraints mightinclude: (a)Afreeze onthemanufacture ofnavalnuclear weaponsl (b)Limitations onnumbers ofSLBMlaunchers andnuclear warheads; (c)Limitations ontheintroduction ofnewSLBMsystemsl Cd)Specific reductions inballistic missile submarines andinSLBMs; (e)Prohibition oforlimitations onsea-launched cruisemissiles with nuclear warheads; (f)Specific reductions inon-board tactical nuclear weapons, either by numbers ortypesorbytypesofshiPl (g)Limitations onnumbers ofnavalshipsofmaintypesl (h)Limitation onamphibious capabilities. Itshould beclearly understood thattheGroupofExperts hasnotlistedthese suggestions withaviewtolegitimiZing thecontinuance ofnuclear weapons buton thecontrary offers themasmeansofstarting aprocess ofprogressive andbalanced reductions leading ultimately tothecomplete eradication ofnuclear weapons from navaloperations withintheoverall objective ofgeneral andcomplete disarmament understrictandeffective international control. /...A/40/535 English Page80 B.Qualitative ortechnological restraints 288.Therapidpaceoftechnological advance hasbeenhighlyevident inrecent
analysis: The text appears to be discussing the reduction and control of naval arms and weapons, with a focus on international agreements and treaties. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting that the topic is highly specialized and requires a deep understanding of international law and military affairs. The text also touches on the idea of disarmament and the need for balanced and verifiable measures to achieve this goal. Given these themes, it seems likely that the text is related to the field of international relations and security.