text: I have already mentioned the question of confidence-building and predictability measures. However, in connection with what we have heard from Ambassador David Smith, I should like to make a few additional comments. Although both parties recognize the importance of developing and practically implementing such measures, there are fundamental differences between them regarding the purpose these measures should serve. We cannot agree with the American side's assertion that such measures should be aimed at fostering a transition to a régime which is more strictly based on defence, because the transition itself leads to the disruption of strategic stability and the undermining of security. It is our conviction that such measures can be useful where they are aimed at enhancing trust and guaranteeing the confidence of the parties in the fact that the obligations they assumed under the ABM Treaty are being complied with. It is quite obvious that without such confidence talking about predictability in the ABM field would be impossible. I have already referred to the fact that there is a certain convergence in the parties' approaches to individual confidence-building and predictability measures. This enables us to continue conducting substantive work at the talks and to seek areas of agreement here. As for the proposals recently submitted by the American side regarding trial predictability measures, which Ambassador Smith also referred to, we are currently considering these proposals. On a preliminary basis I would like to say that, although the idea of trial measures is more and more frequently raised in the preparation of disarmament agreements, at a time when there are fundamental differences between the parties regarding the thrust of predictability measures it would be difficult to implement any trial measures in this field. First of all, we feel, it would be essential to bring the parties' positions closer together 
analysis: The text appears to be a diplomatic statement discussing international relations, specifically disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures. The language used is technical and focused on strategic stability, security, and the implementation of treaties. The context suggests that the topic is related to international relations and global politics, rather than a specific sector like economy or education.