text: kindofissues, interalia,through interesting contributions byscientific andtechnical experts. Thecontributions ofexperts shouldbeassystematic andstructed aspossible. Thedelegation had,therefore, proposed thatan expertgroupbeestablished toassisttheworkoftheCommittee. 41.Another delegation inthepresentation ofitsexpertgaveitsviewonnew technologies foreffective non-nuclear defences against strategic ballistic missiles. Itstatedthatitwouldbeunwisetodiscriminate inarmscontrol accords infavourofnuclear defences andagainst non-nuclear defences. This iswhythisstateseeksinitsbilateral negotiations tofacilitate the co-operative transition toincreasing reliance onsuchdefences. To facilitate thistransition andopenness, ithasproposed thefollowing four ideasintheDefence andSpaceTalks:first,asideoughtnotdeploy large-scale defences withoutfirstengaging inthreeyearsofdiscussions with theothersideonspecific measures foraco-operative transition. Inthese discussions thesidescouldaddress suchquestions asthepurpose and architectures, andplanned paceandscale,ofintended deployments, and confidence-building measures; second, theABMTreaty's permissive rightsfor testing certain typesofadvanced, space-based defences shouldbe acknowledged. Inthisregardthisstatehasprovided anassurance tothe othersidethatitstesting couldnot,byvirtueofstrictlimitsonthe numberofABMtestsatellites, constitute aprohibited deployment ofdefences; third,treatyconstraints onspace-based ABMradars anddevices whichcan substitute forthem,whichareusefulforadvanced defences, shouldbe dropped; fourth, thesidesshould implement nowaseriesofpredictability measures thatwouldbringgreater openness andthusreducetheriskoffuture technological surprise. CD/1034 page18 42.Onedelegation statedthatthecreation anddeployment ofsuchABM systems andtheplacing ofweapons inouterspacecouldleadonlytothe undermining ofstrategic stability andareduction inthelevelofsecurity, becauseitwouldinevitably leadtocompetition inthefieldofbothstrategic defensive armsandstrategic offensive weapons -inotherwords, anarmsrace onanewandevenmoredangerous level. Thiswouldinevitably alsoleadto thedestruction offundamental international agreements intheareaofar~ms control. Stability andsecurity inourtimecouldonlybereciprocal andwere achieved notbythecontinuation ofthearmsracebutratherthrough the consistent reduction ofstrategic offensive weapons together withstrict limitations onstrategic defensive systems, abanontheplacing ofarmsin outerspaceandtheexpansion ofconfidence-building andpredictability measures. 43.Various delegations wereoftheviewthatconsideration shouldbegiven tothequestions oftheprotection ofsatellites. Somedelegations considered thatattempts toestablish aprotection regimebasedonacategorization of satellites wouldgiverisetomanydifficulties andadvocated thegranting of immunity toallspaceobjects without exception, withtheunderstanding that spaceweapons wouldbesubject toanunconditional ban.Otherdelegations wereoftheviewthatcertain distinctions shouldbemadeforthepurpose of immunizing satellites andvarious possibilities werementioned intermsof theirfunctions, purposes andorbit. Inthisconnection, somedelegations heldthataprotection regimecalledforimprovements inthesystemof registration ofspaceobjects topermittheidentification ofthenature and missions ofprotected spaceobjects. Somedelegations stressed inparticular thatimmunity shouldnotbeextended tosatellites thatperform military missions. 44.Onedelegation, inanexpertpresentation, described thelegalregimefor outerspaceasgeneral, precarious andunevenly ratified. Itconsidered that anyprovisions limiting orprohibiting weapons oractivities wereonly exceptions tothepossible useofouterspaceonthebasisofself-defence and thattheprinciple ofpeaceful useonlyexcluded aggressive usesofspace. To improve thepeaceful usesofouterspace,itdeemedparticularly important to utilize theverification potential offered byouterspaceandtostrengthen thesecurity ofspaceactivities. Inthisrespect, itrecalled itsproposal foranAgencyfortheProcessing ofSpaceImages (APSI)putforward in1988. Sinceitconsidered thatthediversity ofASATsystems madeitpractically CD/I034 page19 impossible todesign asinglecomprehensive prohibition regime,that delegation reaffirmed thatitwasnecessary tocodifytheprinciple of
analysis: The text appears to be discussing international relations, security, and space-related issues, specifically focusing on the development of new technologies for non-nuclear defense and the potential risks and challenges associated with these advancements. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting that the text is likely from a diplomatic or international organization context.