text: of allegations of the use of novel CW agents and focuses on the need for epidemiological studies and on the type of national infrastructure that might be appropriate to oversee such investigations for a future Canadian national authority. While its general application might seem particularly relevant to longer-term objectives, my authorities hope that it may also prove useful to our ongoing discussions in these negotiations of the problem of novel CW agents. The other development of particular significance that I wish to take note of here is the work that Working Group A has most recently begun on the question of ad hoc verification, based upon the discussion paper that was submitted earlier this month by our Australian colleague. Ambassador Reese. After careful consideration of the various approaches and proposals in this area, my Government has come to the conclusion that the concept of ad hoc verification must be an essential part of the structure that we are trying to develop to ensure the effective verification of the convention. In our view, ad hoc verification offers the most satisfactory means short of challenge inspection of ensuring that facilities relevant to the goals of the convention are subject to appropriate verification. We are therefore particularly hopeful that, early in the summer session, Working Group A will have productive exchanges on this proposal that will lead to the development of appropriate treaty language. In highlighting some of the achievements to date in the 1990 session, I have been very conscious of the need to slight neither the other encouraging developments that have taken place nor the magnitude of the tasks that remain. My primary purpose in addressing these particular items has been to suggest that the momentum of 1989 is being continued and we are making considerable progress towards our ultimate goal. This has been due to the conscientious 
analysis: The text appears to be discussing international diplomacy and negotiations related to chemical weapons, with a focus on verification and infrastructure. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting a context of international governance and treaty-making. The topics discussed are specific to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, rather than any of the other categories.