text: Special Rapporteur’s analysis, They felt there was no ,,dformity in compensation awarded by arbitral tribunals for unlawful arrest or imprisonment and for grief and indignity and that it was overoptimistic to believe, as did the Special Rapporteur in his report, that relatively uniform solutions could be assumed to exist. It was also felt by Borne member6 that the Special Rapporteur had perhaps relied too much on fragmented municipal, decisions and had generali6ed them. The absence of such uniform rules, these members felt, did not of course prevent the Commission from establishing such standards if it deemed it possible, necessary or wise to do so. They, however, did not feel it was appropriate to do so and preferred the deletion of “moral damage” from paragraph 2, 364. Some other member6 did not dispute the possibility of awarding compensation for “moral damage”. They thought that on theoretical ground6 “moral damage” did not belong in paragraph 2 on pecuniary compensation since it could not be economically assessed. They agreed that the tendency of judges and arbitrators wa6 more often to try to assess non-patrimonial damage in terms of it6 economic or material aspects or consequences, which could serve as a basis for calculating compensation, such as in the Wrf~-Ctin~J and in the &dtanifs cases. They agreed that in instances of death or physical injury, as in cases of detention, etc., it was relatively easy to 866866, in pecuniary terms, the damage to be compensated. But they found it practically impossible to do so in cases of mental suffering, such as - 199 -humiliation, shame or degradation. They did not intend to imply that, in such cases, the injured person should not claim satisfaction, but treating such satisfaction as reparation by equivalent was not true to the principle that reparation by equivalent was of an exclusively compensatory nature, For that
analysis: The text appears to be discussing a legal issue related to compensation for human rights violations, specifically in the context of unlawful arrest or imprisonment, and the assessment of "moral damage" as a form of compensation. The language used is technical and legal, with references to arbitral tribunals, municipal decisions, and the principle of reparation by equivalent. This suggests that the text is related to human rights and international law, rather than a specific economic or social issue.