text: 2. Australia holds that it is t,he collective responsibility of all States to worktowards these ends. We note that paragraph 32 of t,he Final Document of the TenthSpecial Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted todisarmanent,, stated t,hat: 'AII States, in particular nuclear-r,reapon States, shouldconsider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclearrdeapons' and the prevention of nuclear war" (see General Assembly resoluEions-L0/2). we take this to mean that while it is imperative that there be directnegotiations between those States nost responsible for the prevention of nuclearwar - namely the nuclear-weapon states - it is also the responsibility of allStates to avoid all armed conflict in order to preclude the possibility oftriggering a nuclear war. ResponsibiliLies can therefore be divided as between:nuclear-weapon States and aIl States. Responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States 3. In view of their special responsibilities, it isnuclear-weapon States Lo pursue policies directed atof escalat,ion to the nuclear level of conflicts which 4. Direct negotiations should be conducted betweenpursuit of the following measures.encumbenE on the avoidance do occur.conflicts and the nuclear-lreapon States inthe of^/40/498EngI ish Page 28 Nuclear disarmanent 5. As Ehe ultimate achievemenE of nuclear disarmament will render nuclear war impossible, this is one of the most important measures to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect Australia fully supports the resumption of bilateral talks belween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a range of nuclear and outer space issues. Nuclear conf idence-building measufes 6. Such measures are again for the nuclear-weapon States to devise, but they could include a whole range of initiat.ives from, for example, regular consultaEions about projected military development,s, to not,ification of all seismic events' including nuclear test.s, to the International Seisnic Centre in the United Kingdon. The Conference on Disarmamentrs ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war and all related natters could discuss and propose Eo the nuclear-weapon States particular measures in this vein. Specific prevention of nuclear war measures 7. Past examples of these include the 1973 United States,/Union of SovieE Socialist Republics Alreement on t,he Prevention of Nuclear lilar and the "hot-line" arrangements between the two super-Powers. There is presumably scope for further measures includinE "hot-line" arrangements between the other nuclear-weaponStates. The Conference on Disarmamentts g5|-@ committee could also have a role in discussing and proposing measures under this category. Negative security assurances 8. Nuclear-weapon States can enhance the prospects of avoiding nuclear war by strengEhening their guarantees not to use or threaten Eo use nuclear vteapons
analysis: The text appears to be discussing international relations, specifically nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. It references the United Nations, the General Assembly, and the Conference on Disarmament, indicating a focus on international diplomacy and cooperation. The text also mentions specific agreements and initiatives, such as the 1973 United States/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, suggesting a historical context. Given these factors, it seems likely that the text falls under the category of international relations, but it is not a clear fit with any of the specific categories listed.