text: possesses nuclear forces which cou1d, if necessary' be used independently ' 337. These considerations explain why the debate on stratery within the United Kingdon is today generally bouna up *itn ntlurlti" d'efence and vhy the United Itingdorn alnost never publicly dissociates itself from the main ]ines of thought stated $ithin NATo. 5. lluclear doctrines of France 338" France holds that nucfear ueapons are, in tbe final analysis ' national veapons ' The Governmentts L97? tr"lhite Paper on national defence states that: "Unless vital interests are at stake, the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons has absotutefy no credibility "' In any event " the exclusivel-y nationaL €ng essentiatly defensj-ve "rt."""i"t of-deiterrence is evident here " ' If they /tbe United States s.:nd the s."i.i u"ioa7 recognize obi ectively tbat d"eterrence between then will be effectlve onty when t-tt"it ttttionul sanctuaries are directly threatened-, it must t" "on"fr]O"a that the defence of l.trestern Europe will not u..lot.ti"tirv benefit from Arnerican deterrence" ' ll8/ 339. The main idea of French deterrence - the weak deterring the strong - is that the weak must have the neans to inflict upon the strong a punishment proportionate tothevaluethatdefeatingtheveakrepresentsfoltheStrong.IntbeFrench viewu therefore, the deter"rence of a medium nuclear power is credibl"e even if the size of its strategre nuclear forces could not at all be compared to ttre size of the forces of the suFer-Powers ' l+8/ Livre blanc sur 1a dSfense nationale, Tome I ' 1972" p' d'A/35 /392 English Annex Pada II?
analysis: This text appears to be discussing the nuclear strategies and doctrines of France, as well as its relationship with NATO and the United Kingdom. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting a focus on defense and military policy. The text also touches on the concept of deterrence, which is a key aspect of nuclear strategy.