text: agriculture, through restructured instituttons and incentives, is the cru* of the required doftestic Policy change. Restored levels and more aPPropriate and flexlble forms of offlclal assistance conEtltute the essentlal e:(ternal reguirements. Domestic or efternal pollcies alone are each unlikely to avert the recurrence of future disasteis. There ls, therefore, a Joint responsibility for securing'a better future in AfuLca.n y E. ltilitary expenditure, dilarmaoent and developnent 49. The first half of the Third united !{atlons Develop{Ent Decade wltnessed a new phase of accelerated growth in uorld mllitary expenditures. flhegs expendltures consume scarce resources and alivert them froo productive to non-productive usea in all countries. Significant disarmament ltould release vast resources, even a fraction of nhlch could accelerate development anal the establishoent of a nore sustalnable international economlc and political order.A/40/5l9 English Page24 50.From1980to1984,worldmilitary spending grewfrom$564billion to $649billion (in1980prices), agrowthrateofover3.5percent.Military spending in1983wasOver5percentofworldoutputand27timesaslargeasall ODAprovided bytheOECDcountries inthatyear.Itwasmuchmorethanthetotal valueofgrossfixedcapital formation inallthedeveloping countries combined and aboutthesameasglobalpublicexpenditure oneducation. International tradein armsreached anestimated $39billion in1982,andhasbecomeasignificant share ofexports ofsomeofthedeveloping countries aswellasthedeveloped countries. 51.Globalexpenditure onmilitary research anddevelopment in1980was approximately onequarter ofallexpenditures onresearch anddevelopment. APproximately 20percentoftheworld's qualified scientists andengineers were engaged inmilitary workduringthe1970s1thatnumberisprobably evenhighernow, giventheemphasis byallcountries ondeveloping oracquiring themost technologically advanced weapons available. Military research anddevelopment, withtheirlonglead-times, createuncertainty aboutthefuturemilitary capabilities ofpotential adversaries. Thishasledtothedevelopment byStates ofnewweapons onthe"action-reaction" assumption thatothersarealsoengaged in thisprocess, eventhoughthereisoftennotangible information onthisduringthe earlystagesoftheresearch anddevelopment workonsuchnational projects. The technological armsracehasgreatly complicated theprocess ofriskassessment and increased theefforts neededtocontrol thewholearmsracethrough negotiations. 52.Thearmsraceisobviously irrational fromaglobalpointofview,butcanbe understood asaconsequence ofcountries' concerns aboutthenational security and theirdistrust oftheintentions ofpotential adversaries. Itisintheareaof "confidence-building" thatmuchmoreintensive workfordisarmament shouldbedone, suchasthepromotion ofmutualtrade,cultural exchange, priornotification of military exercises etc.Thiscouldcreate amorefavourable environment for genuine progress inarmsreductions. 53.Although asignificant levelofdisarmament wouldrequire majorconversion or re-deployment ofresources fromtheproduction ofmilitary goodsandservices, some investigations suggest that,asacreator ofjobs,military expenditure isless efficient thannon-military expenditure inthedeveloped countries. Intheless developed economies, thejob-loss effects ofhighermilitary spending maybeeven morefar-reaching, because thesustained emphasis ontechnological sophistication inthemilitary sectordiverts alargeshareofthesecountries' mostskilled
analysis: The text discusses the impact of military spending on the economy and development, and suggests that disarmament could release vast resources for more productive uses. It also touches on the arms race and its consequences, such as the diversion of resources from non-military sectors. The text does not specifically focus on agriculture, forestry, or fishing, nor does it discuss natural resources or environment in detail.