text: 429. Because of this close connexion between peaceful and nilitary developnenrpossibilities, nuclear facilities and international trade in nucl-ler materials aresubiect to a wide range of international controls to provide assurance that nuclearindustries are not being used for d.evelopnent of nucrear rreapons. About 115 statesare parties to the Treaty on the Non-pro1i feration of Nuclear i^Ieapons, under itsterns, non-nucreax-weapon states parties accept a treaty conirdtrnent not to acquirenuclear weapons. They also agree 53/ to apply safeguards administered by thernte'nationaL Atonic Energy agencytAEl ) lo arf their peaceful nuclear activitiesin order to ensure that fissionable naterial is not diverted to nuclear explosivepurposes. !4/ In latin America alJ. States except four have eoonitted themselves bybecoming parties to the Treaty of rlatelor-co .roi to introduce nucr-ear weapons intothe region, This Treaty also provides for a special r6girne of IAEA safeguards. TherAEA also adninisters a separate system of saf-guards whereby states which are notu::d'er safeguards of the non-pro1i feration Treaty can accept safeguards on nuclear 'aterial in specific fecilities or on particular quantities of nuclear naterial.0n1y five non-nuclear-veapon States operate significant nucLear facitities which arenot subject to international safeguard.s. 55/ There have been reports of signifi.cant 51/ SIPRI Year]:cck I O7.7 52/ Table ITI, Final Report of Working Group Fo,r - ieprocessing, plutoni'rn Handling and necycLe, fnternational Nuclear FueJ- Cycle Evaluation. 53/ Sone 60 States have so far signed safeguards agreements r.rith fAEA. l!.,/ Nuclear-weapon States parties to rhe freaty are not required to place theirnuclear facilities r.:nder safeguards. The united. Kingdon and. the united states have,however, voluntarily offered. to accept safeguard.s on non-ndl-itary facilities. Aprincipal obligation under the terms of the beaty for nuclear-reapon states is toreverse the nuclear aros race and negotiate disarmarnent measures. A number ofstates have refused to accede to the Treaty because the obliElations to be assumed bynuclear and non-nuclear-\reapons States are not equal. qq / F-*+ r-.r.i ^ 22J LEJpb; rnura, rsraeJ-, SouthA.frica and Spain- Egypt, which has signed. butnot ratified the Treaty, operates a snalr research Teactor provid.ed unaer sovieisafeguard.s. Spain operates a power reactor Jointly with !'rance. There heve beenreports that Pakistan is constructing an uasafeguarded enrichrnent faeility.Pakistan has stated. that its nuclear prograrnme-is peaceful.A/ 35 / 392Inglish Annex f age _L J4 anounts of weapons grade matel'iaL either roissing, stolen or othervise r:nacccunted for, This is a natter of serious concern r and the view has been erpressed that the IAEA safegus.rds should" cover all nucl-eax facilities. L3O. tn recent years, there has been significant debate about non-ploliferation and the basis of nuclear trad.e. States which are major nuclear suppliers have ad'opted the position that nuclear materials, technology and equipment uhich could be used for development of nuclear reapons shoul-d. not be supplied without the recipient
analysis: This text appears to be discussing the international controls and agreements related to nuclear materials and facilities, with a focus on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The text mentions international trade, treaty obligations, and safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The context suggests that the topic is closely related to international relations, security, and global governance.