text: spring session of the Conference on Disarmament. My statement today will not deal with the question of chemical weapons; let me point out, however, that Austria has finalized and will submit to the Conference before the end of the spring session a comprehensive report on an Austrian national trial inspection. CD/PV.550 4 (Mr. Ceska, Austria) Nuclear weapons were invented several decades ago and have since become a fact of life. Nuclear weapons do exist, and we can therefore not realistically expect a return to the status quo ante. What matters under present conditions, however, is their non-proliferation as well as their gradual reduction. Nuclear weapons always involve risk, even if they are meant as a deterrent only. It is therefore logical to keep the number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons as small as possible. Any further spread would increase the risk and make the world less safe. On a global strategic scale the deterrent of second strike capability has worked so far, and has indeed been a stabilizing factor. Whether this deterrent has prevented a major military conflict which otherwise would have taken place is an interesting question which nobody can definitely answer. There is no need to do away with this system as long as it cannot be replaced by anything better. The deterrent of second strike capability and strategic arms reduction do not exclude each other. The concept of second strike capability relies first and foremost on its predictability, in the sense that the other side must be totally certain that a first strike will immediately entail a counterstrike. This, however, does not require the presently existing quantities of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a second strike capability can be maintained at a much lower level. The risk inherent in nuclear weapons is linked not only to the number 
analysis: The text appears to be a statement made by Austria to the Conference on Disarmament, discussing nuclear weapons and their implications. The focus is on the non-proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as the concept of second strike capability. The language used is formal and diplomatic, suggesting a discussion of international relations and global security.