text: regard. to nuclear weapons as a possible addition to the South African nilitaryforces. Because of the extrene dangers pertaining to such weapons, they take on especially ominous d.irnensions in the hands of a r6gime desperate to preserve itsprivileged position and detenrined to fight off every attempt to eradicate the apartheid system, For such d.esperation particuJ-arly invites irrational- responses, mi.scalculations , and extreme initiatives. The foll-owing presentation of the possibJ-e incentives and disincentives for South Africa's acquisition of nuclear veapons slunmarizes the vievs presented. in various analyses on this topi.c. 63, South Africats acquisition of nuclear veapons wou-ld not be inconsistent with the preceding posture of rrtightening the laager'r. 98/ Wotwitfrstanding its superior conventional armaments, South Africa nnight try to justify its possession of nuclear veapons as a deterrent" Moreover, by possibly intinidating other African Governments, nuclear weapons could also help to support extend.ed involvenent and intervention el"sewhere in the re6ion. fn turn, one means of projecting an image ofpotential desperation in defence of r'rhite supremacy wou-Id- be to test and deploy a rudimentary nuclear force, And not ]east of a11, by acquiring nuclear weapons it roight be thought possible by leaders of South Africa to demoral"ize black South Africans, lessening the risk of internal rmrest " and to buttress the morale of white South Africans concerned by the heightened. threat and their growing international isolation, 99/ 5L+, Acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons, none the 1ess, also would carryvith it important risks ancl costs" not least of vhi.ch vou]-d be stilt greater diplomatic and. political isolation, the grave prospect of complete and. comprehensive United Nations sanctions, an increased legitimacy for intervention against SouthAfrica by extra-regional rni].itary forces, and the loss of a possible bargainingchip for preserving at least rnininal ties wiLh the llest. 100/ Tn light of these costs, rnany analysts be.lieve that, vere it to 'tgo nueIear",, South Africa voul-d stop
analysis: The text discusses the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa, highlighting both the incentives and disincentives. The incentives include the possibility of deterring opponents, intimidating other African governments, and demoralizing black South Africans. The disincentives include the risks of diplomatic and political isolation, United Nations sanctions, and the loss of a bargaining chip. The text is primarily focused on the political and strategic implications of nuclear weapons, rather than their economic or environmental impact.