text: to attach conditions to this fundamental obligation to meet its own needs, the very foundation of our negotiations will crumble and the nature of the convention will be changed. The convention will then at best be an instrument for quantitative restrictions or for CW non-proliferation. If the above-mentioned argument prevails, it will provide any State possessing chemical weapons and CW production facilities with a handy pretext for retaining a certain quantity of its stockpiles and production facilities, thus subjecting the numerous non-chemical-weapon States to a perpetual threat from chemical weapons. Obviously, this will either preclude the possibility of concluding the convention or lead to a convention of a discriminatory and unequal nature. Here another closely related and important matter should be addressed, that is, the question of banning the use of chemical weapons. It is common knowledge that the prohibition of use constitutes one of the fundamental obligations under the future convention. Without this there will be no complete prohibition to speak of. It is precisely for this reason that since 1985 article I of the draft convention has contained the explicit obligation that "each State party undertakes not to use chemical weapons", to which no objection has been raised from any side. We have noted the reference to non-use in the recent United States-USSR joint statement, and we welcome this. However, in the multilateral consultations on the mandate of the CW Ad hpc Committee, there was downright rejection of the same reference, which cannot but make people feel puzzled. Its implications are even more disquieting when viewed together with the proposal that a portion of chemical weapons and their production facilities should be retained. Against this background, the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries solemnly stated on 15 March that "the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit 
analysis: This text appears to be a diplomatic negotiation document discussing the terms of a convention related to chemical weapons. The language used is formal and technical, indicating a focus on international relations and diplomacy rather than a specific sector or industry. The text also touches on issues of international security and disarmament, which suggests a connection to humanitarian aid and relief, as well as international relations.