text: However, the two super-Powers have naintained- a general lel-uctance to discuss andnegotiate on the Treaty in depth in these nultilateral foxums. The issue cfverification has remained. one of the uain but not the only difficulty in the wayof an agreement for a comprehensive test ban. Another difficulty is the arlegedvalue of some continued. testing to maintain the reliability of sirategicstockpiles. Since I9T7 , the United States, USSR and the United. Kinsdom haveconducted separate negotiations on a test-ban treaty. Ttre infornation providedabout these negotiations isu hovever, not substantive. rn the absence of aconclusion of the trilateral negotiations, however, the connittee on Disarmarnenthas been unabfe to conduct detailed negotiaticns on the subject, despite repeatedrequests by the General Assenbly to d.o so, The pxoposal has arso been made narytines, that a moratoriurn be called for all nucr-ear testin6l pending agreemenr on acornprehensive test ban. A study of the comprehensive test-ban issue has beenp"eFared. by the secretary-General rrith the assistance of a group of experts andpresented. to the Conmittee on Di s armarnent (CO/86). 460. fn reporting on the state of their negotiations to the Conntrittee onDi s armartent o the three nucfear-weapon states concerned. have not yet provideddetails of vhat elements of a comprehensive test ban may have been agreed uponamong them. successive resolutions of the Gene?al Assenbly have reflected. theview that a test ban shou-ld. be comprehensive and stop all nuclear tests in all_environments for all tine. The irnportance of a eonprehensive test ban as aneasure to restrain vertical proliferation is the obstacLe it woutd cfeare roqualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon systens by denying opportunities totest new designs for warheads. l+61. Bilateral negotiations between the united states and the ussR resufted inf975 in an interim agreement to prohibit nuclear testing above an explosion yieId.of 150 kt. effective 3l March 1p16. ft was fert by nany that thi.s thresholdtest ban, instead of provid.ing a step towaxds a conrprehensive test ban, hadLegitinized. nuclean testing below the L50 kt. .leve].. This leve1 was, in anycase, high enough to pemit alnost a"11 the nucLear tests vhich the super-powersmigbt need. to continue improving their nuclear veaponry. Although thl agreenentdid not originally add.ress the question of peaceful- nucl-ear explosions, thesewere included., a yea? later, in the ban of tests above the I50 kt. level, TheTreaty has not, however, entered into force, but its provisions seem so fal to haYe been observed.
analysis: The text discusses the topic of nuclear testing and the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The language used is technical and diplomatic, indicating a focus on international relations and security rather than economic or social issues. The text also mentions the potential for qualitative improvement of nuclear weapon systems and the impact on vertical proliferation, suggesting that the topic is closely tied to national security and military strategy.