text: composition ofthearbitral tribunal andthearbitral procedure weretobe measured. TheCommission requested theDrafting Grouptoconsider whether that understanding wasclearly expressed bythecurrent wording ofthesubparagraph. Subparagraph (b)(i) 291.Divergent viewswereexpressed astotheappropriateness oftheprovision. Underoneview,theprovision should bedeleted sinceitdeclared asapplicable to thequestion ofarbitrability thelawoftheStatewheretheawardwasmade.That solution wasnotappropriate inviewofthefactthattheplaceofarbitration mightnotbeconnected inanywaywiththetransaction oftheparties orthe subject-matter oftheirdispute. Thesolution wasnotacceptable inthecontext of article 34sinceadecision tosetasidetheawardhadeffectergaomnes. 292.Underanother view,theprovision should beretained without thatoranyother conflict oflawsrule.Itwasstatedinsupport that,whiletheconflict oflaws rulesetforthintheprovision wasnotappropriate, non-arbitrability hadtobe maintained asagroundforsetting aside.Itwasnotedthat,iftheentire subparagraph (b)(i)weredeleted, thequestion ofarbitrability would,incertain legalsystems, beregarded asamatterconcerning thevalidity ofthearbitration agreement (undersubparagraph (a)(i»andbyothersasamatterofpublicpolicy of"thisState" undersubparagraph (b)Hi). 293.Underyetanother view,theprovision should beretained initscurrent form. Itwasstatedinsupport thatdeletion oftheentireprovision oroftheconflict oflawsrulewouldbecontrary tothen~ed -forpredictability andcertainty inthat important issue.Itwasnotedthatparties couldinfactachieve thatgoalby __selecting asuitable placeofarbitration and,chue,thegoverning law. 294.TheCommission, afterdeliberation, adopted thelatter viewandretained the provision initscurrent form. Subparagraph (b)(H) 295.Itwasproposed thattheprovision should bedeleted sincetheterm"public policy" wastoovagueandbecauseitdidnotconstitute ajustified groundfor setting aside,whileitmightbeappropriate inthecontext ofarticle 36. 296.Indiscussing theterm"public policy", itwasunderstood thatitwasnot equivalent tothepolitical stanceorinternational policies ofaStatebut comprised thefundamental notions andprinciples ofjustice. Itwasnoted, however, thatinsome common lawjurisdictions thattermmightbeinterpreted as notcovering notions ofprocedural justice whileinlegalsystems ofcivillaw tradition, inspired bytheFrenchconcept of".::o..;:r..;:d..;:r..;:e...-.p..;:u;;;;b;;;;l.=,i.::,c", principles of procedural justice wereregarded asbeingincluded. Itwasobserved thatthe -57-divergence ofinterpretation mighthavecontributed totheaboveexpressed concern thatthelistofreasons inparagraph (2)didnotcoverallserious instances of procedural injustice (seeabove,para.277). 297.TheCommission, afterdeliberation, wasagreedthattheprovision should be retained, subject todeletion of!thewords"oranydecision contained therein", whichweresuperfluous. Itwaslunderacoodthattheterm"public policy", whichwas usedinthe1958NewYorkConvention andmanyothertreaties, covered fundamental principles oflawandjustice insubstantive aswellasprocedural respects. Thus, instances suchascorruption, brtlberyorfraudandsimilar serious caseswould constitute agroundforsetting laaide,Itwasnoted,inthatconnection, thatthe wording "theawardisinconfliqt withthepublic policy ofthisState" wasnotto beinterpreted asexcluding ins~ances oreventsrelating tothemannerinwhichan awardwasarrivedat. Suggestions forwidening thescqpeofparagraph (2) 298.Afterhavingexamined the9rounds contained inparagraph (2),theCommission continued itsconsideration oftheaboveconcerns andsuggestions astothe restrictive listofgrounds (above,paras. 277-278). Itwasagreedthatthelist ofgrounds shouldretainitsexclusive character forthesakeofcertainty. 299.Thus,considering whether anygroundshould beadded,divergent viewswere expressed astotheneedforsuqhaddition. Underoneview,therewas aneedfor addingwording tosubparagraph (a)(ii)whichwouldcoverinstances ofserious departure fromfundamental prin~iples ofprocedure. Underanother view,therewas aneedforestablishing aseparate regime, providing foraconsiderably longer periodoftimethantheoneset fforthinarticle 34(3),forsuchcasesasfraudor falseevidence whichhadmaterially affected theaward. 300.Underyetanother view, th~rewas no needforanyaddition inviewofthe understanding agreedtobytheCommission asregards thegroundsetforthin subparagraph (b)(ii).Inreplytothesuggestion forallowing aconsiderably longerperiodoftimeinwhichtoapplyforsetting asideanawardonthegrounds
analysis: The text appears to be discussing the composition and procedure of an arbitral tribunal, specifically the grounds for setting aside an award. It touches on the importance of predictability, certainty, and the need for clear rules in international arbitration. The language used is formal and technical, suggesting a focus on legal or regulatory matters.