text: reduces the stringency and effectiveness so far sought by these inspections. We are convinced that because of the peculiar verification problems posed by chemical weapons, each State party should have the right to request a challenge inspection. Only in this way can all States parties be given the necessary assurance of compliance and the verifiability of the convention be assured. There should be no sites exempted from the challenge inspection regime, if the verification system of a chemical weapons convention is to work. As the experience with our national trial challenge inspections has shown, it is possible to grant access even to very sensitive facilities. We found that "managed access" procedures can sufficiently ensure that sensitive installations and information are protected. Following our experience we would suggest that the concept of "managed access", which has already to some extent been elaborated in the protocol on inspection procedures, be made a focal point of our discussions. In its Working Paper (CD/1012) of 11 July 1990 the United Kingdom presented an analysis of the results of the trial challenge inspections they had nationally conducted at military facilities. We have particularly welcomed this paper because it represents an important input into our negotiations. It should, in particular, stimulate further thinking on the issue of "managed access". CD/PV.571 15 (Mr, von Wagner. Federal Republic of Germany) Furthermore, I wish to point out that it is on the basis of experience gained from our national trial inspections that we fully support the conclusions drawn in the Working Paper of the United Kingdom. In this context I would like to introduce Working Paper CD/1026 (CD/CW/WP.315), which is in front of you, on various verification instruments demonstrated during the Workshop in Munster in mid-June, to which all member and observer States of the Conference on Disarmament had been invited.
analysis: The text appears to be discussing a international agreement or treaty related to chemical weapons, specifically the verification process and the implementation of challenge inspections. The language used is technical and diplomatic, suggesting that the topic is complex and requires careful consideration.