text: has becorne a rnore frequent-Ly menLjoncd option. As has alre6dy been pointed out, \nuerr-- rh^ riqk ^f ^er..1--.ior "npl,ec +rrcrv ontr'.on based on nucl-ear dete"rence by denial- an extremely rjsky venLrrre"Al35 /392 Eng1i sh ,fnnex Page 102 293" Loctrincs of nuclea:' deterrence have been cril,icized not only for involving r.macceptably high risks and holding populations hostage, but afso for treating the conCuct of nuclear war as if computers rather than hr.rman beings r,rere in decision* making positions, for buifding upon an inherentl_y unstable balance and, last butnot least, for the ]ack of acceptable sol-utions in case of failure of deterrence, 2!\" Very sophisticated cloctrines of deterrence have been questioned with referenceto their relation to reatity. A prerequisite for their effectiveness |as been saidto be tha.t their main features must be mutually understood by the States concerned and that decision-makers and actors should act "at ional-ly, Although the conceptof deterrence lies at the basis of the relationship betveen the super-Powers, itis difficuft to state with any degree of certalnty vhether they have accepted. the existence of each other's doctr:ines and rihether there exists a nutual understandingof the basic concepts. Some analysts even say ',,hat the doctrine professed by one side might dialectically produce the opposite d.octrine on the other side, 3I/ Itis evident that the tvo super-Powers follow each other's strategic thinking r,riththe closest attention " 295" It' has often been questioned vhether deeision-makers and. others inwolved- in asituation which subjecr,s people to the ex+.rene-Ly he€.aXr stTess thaL decisions onthe conduct of a nuclear war vould nost likely produce, vould act efficiently and accor,ling to Lhe lredeternined rules of a doctrine. Experience from various fleldsof human activity, especially in conducting war, points to the possibil-ity that misbakes are often comaitted and that behaviour not infrequently tends to beeratic in such circumstances.
analysis: The text appears to be discussing a complex topic related to international relations, specifically the concept of nuclear deterrence and its implications. The language used is technical and formal, indicating a focus on academic or professional discourse. The text does not mention economic development, natural resources, agriculture, or other categories related to the physical world. Instead, it seems to be exploring the theoretical and strategic aspects of nuclear deterrence, which suggests a connection to international relations, politics, and security.