THE NATIONkt cur ding, Conotitution, ant-tato. PUBLISHED AT NO. 11, NtWC ASTLE-STILRET. STRAND. N , • SUNDAY, JULY 25, WM. 991. POLITICAL, ASPECT OF AFFAIRS 1 N THE NORTH. The Armistice, which for a short period has suspended the efYnsion of blood in the North of Europe. expired the With, of thisponth. Opinions are extremely *divided on the probability or imorobabilitv of its being further extended all ad vices from ihe countries occupied by the Allies, repre senting the renewal of hostilities as certain : while accounts from France, and from the countries under her yoke, fondly anticipate the prolongation of the truce, and the ultimate re establishment of Peace. This, .of course, rather indicates the sate of public feeling, than ofpublic information in the respective countries. The Russians and Germans have deep injuries to avenge, they see no safety while the power of the merciless foe remains unbroken, and for them war has no horrors to be compared with the oppression they have ex perienced in peace. France, on the contrary, • and the wretched countries she has enslaved, bleeding at every pore, -and complete!)' exhausted, have no interest whatever in the war, and they naturally expect, or rather they hope, for a peace, as the only means of putting a term to the enormous sacrifices they are daily Compelled to make, to gratify the inordinate ambition of a , nnseless tyrant. We shall not here enter into speculations on this momentous subject, involved as it is at present, in the maze of continental nerciations ; we shall only observe, that the last arrivals from France, yesterday, contain no al'usion whatever of a pacific nature ; and this may afford an ect proof, that even the slender hopes entertained before, had totally vanished. A controversy more within our reach is the question on the advantages which each of the Belligerent parties de rived, or are likely to derive from the Armistice. As the proposition came from BUONAPARTE, he, no doubt, had some important object in view, and this becomes more evi dent, since, to ()Wain it, he consented to abandon a large district of Silesia, and even Breslaw, the capital of that country. His forces in the beginning of the Campaign were greatly superior in number to those of the Allies ; reinforce ment& of troops could not, in consequence, be to him of ma terial importance, especially as the Allies were likely to re ceive during the Armistice a much larger accession of forces than he himself could expect, and thus lessen the nume rical disproportion to which he had been indebted for his (Lillian! successes. Bu; BIJONAP ART E had advanced across the Elbe in an exhausted country with the same rashness which proved so fatal to his army in Russia. He saw the same alarming symptoms which had been the forerunners of his former disasters; his enemies unbroken, retiring in the best order before his superior f roes, and disp'uting every inch of ground with balanced advantages ; in hil rear, swarms 1'o!. VI. No, CCXCI. ,f German patriots had replaced " those clouds of Cossacks" by w'iich his glory hag been so greatly obscured; cutting.his detached parties, and intercepting his convoys. He beOn to feel the want of provisions for that vast multitude, and the country offered no resource. In those circumstances be paused, and acknowledged his embarmssinent by soliciting an'Armisticeoes he had done previous to the evacuation of Moscow. During that interval of repose he expected to be able to collect magazines, to disperse the German pattiots, and to. try what could be effected by the lures of his ma chiavelism, before be again tempted the fortune of war, which he no longer exclusively trusted. He felt, in short, that he had advanced too far from his resources, and, like the wolf recently escaped from the toils, apprehended a snare if he ventured further. The Allies on the other hand, notwithstanding their he roic efforts, felt all the disadvantages of a vast disparity of numbers. The Russian reinforcements were still remote, and the Prussian levies net sufficiently organized. In con tinuing to fall back on those resources, they would have aban doned to the enemy the country between the Elbe and the Oder, which forms the main strength of the Prussian Mo narchy ; fur Spandau was not yet in a state of defence, and the line of the Spree could not, in consequence, have been defended for any length of time. The army of the Crowm PRINCE of SWEDEN was not, moreover, in a state sufficiently effective to take the field in this stupendous warfare; and these weighty consideiatious far out balanced the advantages which BUONAP A RTE might cxpec , flour the Armistice. The Allies knew besides how to appreciate the real value of those advantages. They knew that, during the Armistice, the ex hausted countries which the French occupy would offer them no resources, the harvest not beginning till the middle of August ; provisions for the magazines were, of course, to be brought from a great distance, at a vast expense and no less danger. By ti:e delay of the Armistice they secured fOr the future subsistence of their troops the growing crops of the countries between the ‘ 7 istula and the Oder, and in case of a successful or protracted resistance•even the produce of those between that last river and Elbe. As to the German pa triots, the Allies were well aware that al: the efforts of foreign iegular troops would prove unavailing against the persever ance of patriotic partisans waging a guerilla-warfare in their own country ; expel knee has proved that those views were correct, for since the Artnisiice BLION APARTIS Bulletins have teemed with accounts of corn and rice brought from Bohemia, Hungary, and even from France, and of fruitless marches of columns against the marauding insurgents. Should hostilities be renewed, and of this we have now but little doubt, it is evident that same or greater difficulties to eveu suppr,sing that he meets t BUONAPARTE will have the encounter, in a very short time, 33 with no check, and that the _REGISTER-. Pr rcE 9d