THE NATIONAL REGIsTED. 594 7 - 7 s litm from eithertd ' the two capitals. Such were th e advantages of as important and de , i ive a nature, as one obtained o n th e which Russia derived from the extent of her territories, mid threshold of the Ftneire. In the latter case, the whole col. the remote situation of her capitals, what should we think, lected force of France would have - Leen met and defeated therefore, of a system of warfare, were it voluntarily adopted; by that of Russia. The enemy, fighting at do immense di s . by which .hey are all sacrificed ? By 'which the enemy is al- , twice from his own country, and therefiae linable to procure lowed to occupy wi.hout opposition all those provinces f or - timely *reinforcements, suspicious of his allies i zl i r i e t n h t a l: , c e bond consierect as the impassable harriers of the e mp ire ? of terror that secured them was dissolved, t And by which, if Moscow and l'etetsborah are not also deli. compelled to evacuate the Duchy of Warsaw, the Prussian vet edinto Its hands, the field of battie is ch 'sett beneath their test holies. and pe: haps those ,of the Confederation of the ,yalls; so that the fate of those cit;es, and perhaps of the Rus- Rhine, which would have instantly fallen asunder, and those ~iarbassonarebv, which might have hem disputed in nun:coons States whose population and resources he now wields t o erudt ba:ties berme the invaders could reoetrate deeper than the his enemies, might have been turned into weapon s o f attac k oueski t: of the land must now he decided in its vvey bosom, against him. At pi esent, the French force is divided, as w t.., e a wound may erns e mortal ? I well as that of the Intasians. The war is become one of co . 1-1 d the Russians. as we conceive it to have been their lumps, not of armies, and. although the numbers of whi c h original hocotiott, been a ble to unite their forces and give 1 they are composed ate considerable, , yet the defeat of battle to the enemy, in the positions which they had selected one or two, or even tin ee of those, and scarcely any in Lithuania, at a shott distance from their &metiers, what mole could be brought to action, would only be a partial would loive been the consequences of victory and those of _and not it remediable discomfiture on the pasta the French defeat?' Noy, , do not shake your head, sagacious reader, at who are plentifully supolied with men by the countries in the idea of NA rot, VON . s being defeated ,at the head of all their rear, and who might remain in a strong defensive ho- Lis troops, in a general . eugagement. Who would not, four sition, until the junction of some of , their divisions, or the years ogo, have smi'ed incredulous at the thought, that our arrival of the new levies should enable them to resume of troops, fugitive at Dunkirk and in Holland, should set the i fensive operations. They would also have it in their power veteran conquerors of the Continent to flight in the Penin- to conceal the extent of their losses, until they' should be sula ? Sioce, then, re have exploded the boasted invinci- repaired from their Continental Allies ; i'vho are now tem bi:ity oT the French, why should the undaunted resolution far removed to judge for themselves, and are debuted by of the Russian soldier, who only quits his post when coin- j the position of the enemy from receiving the salutary anti manded by his officer, swept away by the iron hail of war, or dote to the Imperial Bulletins, contained in the Russian have proved less successful; when numbers were nearly j accounts. The very advanced situation of the French, equal ? Supposing, therefore, the possibility of victory o n which has been represented as of itself sufficient to insure the part of the Russians at that period. its first consequence I their ruin, should a powe,ful expedition land in Germany, woo d have been the immediate depression of that ardent would render that diversion my, oductive of any lasting spit it of rebellion staaetly sweillog around them throughout advantage, unless it were effected on theßussian coasts, either their Pash provinces. The twee of einaocipation would at Riga or between that port and St. Petersburgh. Naao .at once leave vanished away, and even should the French I LEON's sv'tem of warfare is that of sacrificing every minor have console:et; in a -übsequent encounter. they would no point, to the attainment of one single gram' object, upon Prager hare inspired the norulation of the invaded pro- !: which he bears with all his force, secure that whenever that I' vi: ce with that confidence necessary to induce them to rise I' is obtained he . m " 4 c''‘ilv regain the inferior adyan , .e to :risos to join them and thus expose themselves, to the on li loges he may have lost itt other quarters. Thus, in inereifu' vengeance of their Russian masters, s !Mold they ! the present instance, the possession of Moscow, mot the _ : triumph a second time. The next most important !milt destruction of the Russian army, seem the ends which he would hate been the total dissolution of that spell of miohty i has in view: he would therefore sutler an expt•di•ion to a . power, which still chains the Princes of .the Continent in : land, as it has been mentioned,. in Hanover or the irei,ih the. retinue of their oeptassora The wovering iodecision o f i bowing parts, at the distance of goo miles in his rear, with- Sweden would have, ceased at toce, and Denmark and 1 i out detaching a single , division from his grand army. to Pi ussia, threatened .by her forces, would have joined Ilea! I check its progress; for he would he consciou s, that should it against thew common foe. AustriX alone might have hesi- 1 1 , even penetrate to the Rhine and ex , lie insurrections in his tated, and 'allowed some time longer under the baneful in...!': rear, his success against Russia would at once terminate its duence of the foal allinnce she has contracted with thee career, and compel it to 4n hasty retreat. But a . blood of the NAPo 1 EONS; but the ties of interest, when -,! force landed at Riga. or on another point of the Russian o nce (verly, on his oper ations and deridedla seen, would have ultimately i i ! coast, would have a decided influence on and drawn her to the side of confoderated Europe, and the I: on the fate of the campaigu. Ittwould burst at once on gigantic suphit.ou of the French Ruler might at length have 1 the theatre of war, and in a . quarter in which, after cart:- been restrained a' diArmed • •1 riencing several repulses he appears to be now gaining Steels we have bean the chief, and not very distant 1 1 ground. Uniting with the brave division commal!ded b Y conseottei cep.. of a victory gained by the Russians at the 1 Count WITGENsTsw, which now begins to foll ow the r . opening o f the eowaso—Bot would not a triumph on their ~ retrograde 'movement of the whole Russian army, it would pat t be now attended with salt more fortunate results ? We ' enable that officer to resume the offensive; to raise the siege • think not : The continental opittion is now formed and of Riga, repel the left wing of the French, and by his ad fixed on tie relative 'strength of France and Russia, and con- ! stance on their flank, prevent that of their van deeper to tinental Monarchs are not so -e1.0.1 . • •• ~ lc-spirited as to join the ' : wards Moscow, or perhaps weal it back, lest they sid! %inch tl•ey deem feeble against the . should he formed strong. The un• i cut in two in their length, and a junction checked advance of the French, and the contitaued retreat of between B I ERN ADOT t X slut WITGENSTELN with the CMS the liu•sian armies to the • • • set.) gates of Moscow,should be have given . under - General Togas ',sow, which is also retiring from!' b to the•fortiter the character of superior p ower , and t o the a Volhynia. At the date of the last French Bultelina the, Letter that of incompe:ent weakness, .which i ich one triumph moment was most propitious for such a. diversion; but its 1 . 11 0 could not. alter. Neither would that triumph,' if gained, be I was fleeting. The consequences of • the co, tare of 6111°- SEPT. (27.