,:,. R-.-r-r--P--- . • ~- ~" ~T +r--r ~- THE NATIONAL ' far Xting, Constitution, mat Eats: rk r . PUBLISHED AT NO. 357, STRANS, CORNER OF, EXETER 'CHANGE. SUNDAY, NOVEMI3EIt 15. 1812. Nn. ().55. ~ POLIFVAL \IMO F Tti E P P ESENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN CA M A few weeks only have elapsed since we followed with anviety and apprehension the march of the French legions toloscow. NVe dreaded, not so much the capture of that c i!y, as C , e effects which it was likely to produce, jaging ft-ii the infl.tencc of former disasters, on the mind of the Irssiao Emr rto R. We did not think it could prove other lea. fatal to the successful issue of the war, than by leading to an imn , diate pea e, and provided ALEXANDER should • retail irtnness enough to resist the offers which we stated we nail no doubt BUONA P ART E would make (and the event r.ved our surmise right), we were disposed to consider struction of the antient capital of Russia as beneficial the cause cif the Empire. This opinion was confirmed by Or sea: cell" hoped for resolution of AL r.X AND R. When nd th tt a'ivc at last to his true interests, he rejected pusillanimous counsels of fear, and disregarded the pro-- ••, of the enetny to the heart of his dominions—when •aw that, instead of suing for peace, he prepared with in ‘Ased energy for war—when we beheld the spirit of the ( .'yple rising with superior strength from the midst of dis ;slers, and with augmented affectionjor a. Government en deared by mutual dangers—wheu we perceived the Russian Cenerals, umbsinaved by the audacity and successful ma axiivres of the enemy, resuming the offensive at the time he he had reduced them to the helpless state of frigi l'" and the Russian Armies, powerfully reinforced, closing irotaal hint, and threatening at seve.al points his communi cilioits with Poland, our hopes revived, and we began to In ik with renewed confidence for a more successful issue to f.t campaign These hopes, as they were not founded on clime:lea! anticipations, authorised by the wishes of the heirt :done, not by the evidence of reaslu, have not been dis a;:puinted. In the short peliod of a month, the whole face cf 1 . 1:: war has changed. Relying on his former fortunes, and - Ilging from the timidity of other nations that shrunk be !,:e his rashness, NA rot, eotsr cut his way to 'Moscow, through iaughter and desolation, to dictate terms of peace from the Losom of that capital. Anticipating rest from their labours, and abundance for the winter, his soldiers fouud . thenrelves on their arrival in that city, obliged to contend with an armed population, and an ocean of flames." They over powered the former, and severely chastised them for their lan iotism ; but the latter, though ultimately checked, had deprived them of their expected shelter and provisions.— In vain did Vey rake the ruins of consumed palaces; in vain did they proclaim to the world, that the resources they had •;.ved were sufficient for their support. A little month after, an l before their boasts hzd been forgotten, they have been VOl. V. No .'CC.XLV. compelled, either by the want of magazines, or the harassing ae;ivity of the ltussiari divisions, •to rebnquish their prey and for the first time 'has a capital been relieved from the g: asp of BUON AP ART E, otherwise than by a treaty, disad— var,tt;cous and dishonourable to the invaded. It is true, that the circumstances under which this. deliverance has. been cfl'ected, are not yet perfectly known; but it is clear, that should it even prove temporary, it would he attended with consequences of the most benefical natuie, for it must inspire every Russian peasant and warrior, with a degree of confidence &put' to their patriotism, and which cannot fail to render their exertions still more spirited, and consequently more likely to be crowned whit ultimate success. !n the ab,ence of official details the causes that have led to the abandonthent of Moscow by the Trench, have been variously stated. We shall consider the different opinion% that have prevailed on this subject, and point out their plausibility or improbability. By some it has been supposed, that BUONAPARTE, con.- vinced of his inability to maintain himself at such a dis tance from his other armies during the winter, had pre. tended in his Bulletins . tlias it was his intention not to relinquish Moscow, only in.ordet to deceive his antagonists. and to secure an unino:ested retreat from that city. For that purpose he is said to have made demonstrations indicative of a prolonged stay, whilst be was secretly preparing for hie departure. Thus„ his ordering VICTOR to meet him with his army from Smolensk° was only intended, it is asserted, to alarm the Russians and prevent - their advance whilst he fell back, and, by his junction with that commander, ob tained a superimity of force too decided not to make it. impossible for his opponents to act on the offensive. In support of this supposition it is urged that, embarrassed by the fear of discouraging his subjects and -allies by his sudden retreat from the capital of Russia, and aware of the necessity of keeping his intention concealed, he however contrived in his last Bulletins to prepare the public mind in France .to expect such an event. In these be contradicted his former statements Aspecting the extent of the city rescued from the flames, and reduced it from •a third to• one-tenth, evi dently too - snuff. a portion to contain an army 'of nearly 100,000 . men, who could not, safely encamp in the fields., under the unwonted severity of a Russian winter, and must therefore be expected to seek other quarters. These, be added, could not be entered in less than twenty , days,. from which it was inferred that he would lead back his army to Smolensko or Witesnk,a march, which at that reriod of the year, could not be effected in a shorter - The mention made of the standards, Madonas and other curiosities found in the Kremlin, having been sent to Par i , , also eller a belief that . he had hastened to ncurelbe feU..rc: .... 44 :ouragect ',43akiling REGISTER. PRICE 9a; _ . - - . . . • . _.. '....!t: ' •• • : • • •. . . . . . . . . . • • . .. 1___.............k. _