~. AUGUST 21. ' ~ ;}~ -. ~. . .- 7. • , • • sn Nominisiral all the state . ~ VIP g THE NATIONAL REGISTER. • might otherwise be ill-received on account of their singu larity and novelty. The popular prejudice inclines to nu merous armies; and it will be no easy task to refute an opinion sanctioned by unparalleled success and the moss brilliant victories. The numerous armies the Republic maintained in the years 179 S and 4, when it had to contend against Spain, holland, the Stales of Italy. Austria, the Empire, Prussia, and Great Britain, induced the multitude, and even per sons who laid strong claims to judgment and ingenuity, to believe that this force had never diminished. The con clusion was as absurd as to expect from the wheel of a BUIS the same, velocity of motion during a common wind, as it received from a storm. The impulse of the Revolu tion had ceased, and it was expected, %hen every trace of it excited discouraging reflections, that it would continue to produce the same effects. This is reasoning in a very novel maniier, and notwithstanding its palpable inconsis tencies, we forsee the number of objections we will have to encounter in opposing it. The obstinate adherence which most men feel to MI elerate prejudices, will not, however, discoure,te us from asserting, that the French have been guilty of as great rodomontade in their military etats, as the three states already mentioned. We hope likewise to prove, not by ingenious suppositions, but by the strong testimony of facts, that their military establishment is nut RALF AO numerous as they give out themselves, and is generally believed by others. if we can shew this clearly and satisfactorily, he importance is manifest, and we will bud ourselves fully rewarded by the beneticinl influence it cannot fail to have on the result of the present contest. As early 113 the year IE4O, the writer first began to en tertain very considerable doubts relative to the amount of the French Army. He was then in the south of Germany ; and his doubts were confirmed by the conversation he had with well-informed Frenchmen, who held a high rank in the army of Moreau. These doubts were entirely removed by the d.fficulties which Bonaparte had in collecting an army to attack rlelas in Italy. It is certain that the French army did not amount, at the time the battle of Marengo was fought, to 200,000 men. Moreali's army, after the two divisions he sent to reinforce that of Bonaparte in Italy, eons sled of between 60 and 70,000, and that of the latter to about 60,000. The rest of the French army was very incons derable ; and in fact none was necessary in Holland or along the coasts of the Channel, after the ill-success of our Expedition to the Helder, and the dissatisfaction expressed by the Emperor Paul against our Court and that of 'sienna. After the peace of Luneville, Bonaparte began to augment the army, as much as the exkausted state of the finances would permit; and it was placed on the Inost respectable footing it had been for several years in 1805. According to the etat of that year, published by the Minister of War, it amounted to 607,611, Nix. 6,262 .guards. 1,930 general stall, 441,561 infantry, 52,584 artillery, 62,983 cavalry. 15,691 gent d'arvies, 13,950 veterans, and soine free corps consisting of 6,722. An immense force! and twice more than the 'toluene had in the. moat splendid epoch of their history. But we believe oar readers will not require a long train of argumentation, to be induced to believe that their army did not amount to that number; the only diffecence of opiuion, therefore, which we may have will proceed from Our attempting to utduee it to less than half that sum. It we agree with reg ard to the falsehood of thi s o ffi ci a l state ment, it will no t he so difficult to expose the whole system of falsehood and dissimulation, which is a principal trait iu the policy observed by Bonaparte. As soon as this fact is acknowledged, we are justified in feeling an equal diffidence with regard to his official statements relative to the finances, lumber of conscripts, &c. Let us now examine if the etats of the French army are not as false and exaggerated as those of the three State' , above -mentioned. But we must make a material discrimi nation. Th e exaggerations of the French are not an effect of vanity and folly, but a characteristic f ilrrre in Hour. pirte's systems. ity this pusapwas display of his military . . . resources, he expected to strike a terror into all the Hates of Europe, and to convince them how lodes, rasistanco would he to such an army. Let. us sow see how tar th• armies he employed against Austria and Russia in the year 1805, will agree with the etat he published in the beginning of the same year. Bonaparte long foresaw 'th'e coalition fornliog spinal him by this country, the Emperors sa nder and FrAnciik -In or d er to convince the French, revers that this event . • was unexpected; he gave orders that the artily 'collected st lloulo,,.rne, Brest, and Holland; should eneark in order to make. the vaunted invasion of England. Ile had two ob jects in vicw when he made this gasconade. He wanted UP convince the French that this project was capable of exe cution; and thus save his owu.reputation ; whilst he hoped to prevent our Government from sending immediate assist' ance to the Allies. His second object was to make his sold dters, a hom he knew to feel the greatest repugnance and apprehension to a meeting with our seamen; enter with greater alacrity on a Continental War. The wary Lisurper was not mistaken in his expectations. He kept the soldiers confined for about five or six days on board the vessels destined for this grand Expedition ; and when they went informed that the perfidy of the Austrian Government obliged them to defer their vengeance against the tyrant* of the ocean, they gave unequivocal proof of their joy at being employed on any other service, than that of attempt ing a descent on our shores. They, therefore, proceeded with greater alacrity than they would have otheraise done, to attack the Austrians and Russians on the Banks of the Danube. The terror they felt at the possibility of a rena contre with our mariners, outweighed every consideration and though they by no means forgot their former :II sucw• cess against Suwarrow, this circumstance was trifling ha 'their opinion, compared to the danger of being exposed to the thunder of our navy. As we had an opportunity of -procuring at that time an exact amount of three corps oft that army, we hope to be able to form a satisfactory eon' elusion as to the amount of the w hole. This army, with which Conaparte intended to oppose Mack and the Russians. consisted sit first of eight corps, to which a ninth was afterv;ards added. When Miramar* corps passed through Cologne, the writerinippened to be iii that city, and as he was infinitely acquainted with the mayor and one of his adjuncts, he had an opportunity of knowing precisely its amount. It consisted of .18,000 French and 6000 Dutch, the hitter commanded 13 unao n• ccau. The whole corps, cavalry, infantry, ant v, and bayed the course of three days. No by . Jaggage, pai in _ cc, esistake could occur as to their number, because orders wereestry day received at the mayoralty, to provide quarters for those who were to arrive on the following. He had in like manner an opportunity of ascertaining the amount of Bernadotte's corps, having spent a considerable time in Cassel, after it had passed through that city. From e ay intelligeuce be received during his stay there, he is !ed to believe that it did not amount to more tban.l4,ooo, though the Newspaper published in that city made it consist of 17,500. The.ainouat of Nhy's corps he received from one of his Aide de Camps, with whom be lodged in the same inn, at Frankfort ou the Mayne, a short time after the peace of Presburgh. If his statement may be relied on, it consisted of somewhat more than 40,000. We have thus the amount of three corps, making altogether about. 61,000 men. If we take the same proportion for the other five corps, we shall find that the army, commanded by Bona. parte in person, consisted of about 100,000. %%rhea we re. ih.et that it 'WIN joined by the troops of Bavaria, Wurtein.• bee;, and Baden, and had to contend with only 70,000 Alistrians conducted by a Mack, we will find it more than. adequate for overrunning, Austria. However, very •far from thinking we under-rate its number, we ere rather in clitled to b;lieve we estimate it too high. It surpassed any force the Allies could opitose to it as much in number, as it did in celerity of operati'm and oep •riority of skill on .1 c part of the Generals. BonvArte may be a very greet , .1 . 1 i 1 I I 6f. __ .~ • 1 • • , • , / • TIMID MEM .