7,i7-711E NATIONAL REGISTER e C'... _ Our king, gimotitution, RAD IL attl. N° 179. , PRICE 9Z , •. }. I .~ ~ ~L SITNDAY, JUNE 2, lfil 1. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. No. 165. WAR IN IN THE PFNINSUI.A. The war in the Peninsula flames forth with addi tional vigrur. The important movements per formed in the month of March, Which terminated in the evacuation of Portugal ,by the French, seemed to have brought the campaign to a close. Expelled from the northern, they were fast retiring from the southern provinces of that kingdom, and strong hopes were entertained, that the renewal of hostilities would take place in the heart of Spain, where the enemy once opposed by a regular and victorious army, and harrassed on every side by the Guerillas, vbuld find it impossible to maintain an extended footing. MASSFNAIS retreat, however, has only proved the prelude to a mcra active kind of ope- rations, and the most sanguinary battles. Con- scious that if he did not prevent the entrance of Lord WttLtsarint's army ii to Spain, but suffered the seat of war to be transferred into that cou-ncry, the spirit of patriotism would bdrst forth with renewed energy in the provinces which now bear ,the yoke but impatiently, and supported by the . presence and courage of our warriors, as well as the skill of their Commander, would rise too high to be once more subdued, BUONAPARTE ordered retreating Generals to bring the fate of the war to an issue, and by a series of desperate actions either to ruin our army, or perish in the attempt. In consequence of these commands, the existence of which cannot be doubted when we compare the late supineness of the French Mar.hals, when the advantages of numbers was on their side, with their sudden activity when they had been reduced to little more than half their former strength, MASSENA and SoULT traced back their steps. They . had both left the two most important fortresses in the present state of the war, surrounded by our troops. Almeida and Badajoz, although strongly garrisoned, could not long defend themselves, as, cut off from the possibility of receiving any sup plies, the very strength and numbers of their garri kons formed their weakness. Aware of its . situation in this respect, and never forgetting that one of the Di-a duties of a General is to spare a u his soldier's blood, Lord WELLINGT V. C 1.2 "..X.141C. to employ against Almeida no other weapon than hunger, whilst lie spread the greatest part of his army, as a shield on the hills that "‘:e the frontiers of Portugal. Had hi intended to enter Spain from that quarter, he would have adopted oler means to reduce that fortress more speedily. But as he conceived it improper to invade a province where he should immediately fall in with another fortified place, and where the enemy was posted in the midst of his strength, being able to collect reinforcements from. every neighbouring town, and even, without much loss of time, from France, he contented himself with preparing to repel every attempt which might be made for the relief of Almeidt and directed offensive operations to be carried on in a quarter where they were likely to meet with the greater success. We have already seen how effectually arid gloriously his Lordship defeated the reinforced I`,lAsm:NA in his desperate endea vours to open a communication w ith, and to throw fresh supplies into Almeida. The subsequent escape of its gairison through the darkness of n;ght, and with the assistance of skilful guides by whom it was enabled to avoid our pests, wiiiist 1-14 fortress in our possession, is an additional proof oa the complete disappointment of MASSENAIS inten tions, since what he could not effect by the force of arms, he was compelled to resort to secret wiles, to execute, and even then, but partially accom plished. Let us now consider the different charac ter of the campaign on the southern frontiers of Portugal. The French force in the South of Spain is divided into numerous corps of moderate strength, stationed at a considerable distance from each othqr, and scarcely able to repress the incessantly threatened r ising of the extensive and populous provinces which they are intended to overawe. It is therefore evident, that if menaced by a British army, they must abandon a large portion of the country which they occupy, to be able, by the junction of their scattered forces, to oppose our progress. But in so doing they necessarily remove from the minds of the natives the dread which alone keeps them in subjection, and open a wide field for patriotic enterprise, as well as for any operations which our troops at Cadiz may perform, by being on the undefended coasts, and attacking tr. At the same time their distance frow • ; -*ZVI w -~;sl 1 iseless wart coed , 'ON det i • rea '.,)•;.- - - 92 ' r-) . ~.. , .)`"% i f a : 1 '........ z i a ,5..- , • rm, by being nd attacking listance from m ;;