,e or r' ~- disecrnin for us and for the Swedes, at this unhappy moment, that we should determine, with sound judgment, what can really he done for them, and that we should nut attempt what there is no likelihood we can perform. The real statesmen, who should be called to deliberate on this momentous subject, would first endeavour to re solve the question, Whether Great Britain can afford to Sweden the means of waging an effectual war of defence against the enemies who now assail her ? Were this ques tion, on probable and satisfactory evide►►ce, determined in the affirmative, they would then put forth every effort to accomplish the object. Rut were it on equally good evi dence determined i►► the negative, they would entirely abandon this project, and immediately consider what next could l►e done for this unhappy country. As soon as ever they had, by patient inquiry, satisfied themselves what was the greatest good they could procure for her, abandoning rII other hopeless objects, they would bend their whole powers to accomplish this attainable advantage. To leave, however, this clear and manly course, and to make some feeble and drawling attempts towards the highest °hied, without any satisfictory evidence that they can accomplish any good, ►s the part of common empiric.; of office, and according to the stile in which the affairs of all nations are too commonly managed. France is again about to menace this country with in vasion, and it will be altogether inconsistent with what we owe to our OtVII safety to permit any considerable portion of our forces to leave our own shores. Our East India possessions are already threatened with a formidable arma ment ; and it would be to risk the existence of those splen did dominions to place ourselves out of a condition to send an important reinforcement there on the shortest notice, ichen the marsh eastward of a Russian or French army begins. That we can, in these circumstances, afford an aid to the warlike, but feeble and disunited Swedes, to enable them to resist the force of the Russian Empire, is surely maintained with signal inconsistency by those who only a twelvemonth ago expected from that Empire an etTectual resistance to the gigantic power of France 3 who even now insist that the Emperor Alexander concluded the Peace of Tilsit without necessity, and that he might still have maintained the contest. The mountains and narrow defiles of Finland arc reckoned a powerful barrier. With sty great a superiority of force, however, they might soon be penetrated, But, it unfortunately happens that there is a track along the shores of the Finland (I ulph I of consider able extant, which opposes little resistance to the march of au army, but a number of insignificant rivers. The dangers, however, which threaten Sweden are not all on the side of Russia. That there is a perfect possi bilitt of an invasion by a French and Danish Army from Zealand, can never he denied by those who have main tained that a trench Army mi►;ht have passed from 1101- s'ein to Zealand, a much wider passage, in ►spite of the utmost eflorts of the British Navy I and who on that ground base vindicated the attack on Copenhagen. But indepen dent of this circumstance, a formidable invasion may un- sioestionabl be made from Norway, which supplies 3(1,000 men for the Danish army. It cannot be forgotten that rrp. ago a Norwegian army did mvado.., prevented from 01611;4 porsr•xitm of Gottenbiirg - h by the intervention of Air. Elliott, the British Minister. If it stlemsimpossible to conclude that any effort which this country can safely make, can enable S‘vedeli to w a ge a successful War of Defence against the united attacks of Ithssia, Denmark and France, should these powers be sti mulated to engage obstinately in the contest, the question which nest remains for the considerate statesman to re• solve, is, what is the greatest benefit offer this which Great Britain can procure for her. If the question were about Peace absointels, there non's] he no difficulty in the deli bera.fion; as there is no doubt that l':•rice s, ould be granted to Sweden, upon her own application, probably within t any dirninntion of her ten tory. lint then a conditioa would he annexed to it, that she take part in the Wrr against. Britain ; arid this it is our interest, if possille, to prevent., Now, this it fortunately does not seem altogether impossible, by the prompt evercis,! of wisdom and discre tion, to prevent. Thongh we cannot put Sweden in a condition to defend herself throagh nil leopatds against her nnited and most powerful enennes t we an enaide her 10 assume such an attitude of resistance, as NI ill niA9 tileM we it will not he very easy to overcome her. l'hk ac cordingly it is our duty to do. We stiould, with 1 . ; most. promptitude and energy Rend to the relief of Sweden such titt assistance as we ran rensonhldy spare ; sr" 5 ! 1 ,,p1,1 employ all our wisdom and noisily in stimnlatiar and directing the Swedish Government to call forth in th:7' !rest effectual way the resources of . the country ; and when have placed her in the most complete posture of defence possible, and *hrn her enemies see before them the dif ficulties which they must overcome, then we should open for her a negociation, and then, in all probability, Pi ace for her might be prcienred, and her neutrality mit-net, inviolate. Even with the ltnowledge that they would yid timately subdue her, the sight of real and serious obstacles would weigh deeply with her enemies, and lead them to balance the possible gains with the obvious losses. It may be taken for granted that not one of the hostile parties would wish to see Sweden absolutely subdued, rteept Rus. sia alone. To her the dominion of Sweden, or at least the more important part of it, mould necessarily fall. France, I however, has no inclination to see the power of Russia 1 ag grandised by so very important an acquisition, And as to , Denmark, there are few things of which she has more read son to stand in dread. If Russia were in possession of Sweden, Norway 'Would heroine a very precarious posses• sion, and the command of the Sound must he instantly abandoned. In the state of delence, therefore, which sae have described, there IN every reason to suppose, from the known interests of the hostile patties, that reasonable terms of Peace might be proettred for Sweden. But if we shall foolishly hold out vaponriag pretences of a complwe and absolute defence, and shall encnnraze rweden tee hold the language of defiance and irritation, the eorithined enemy may be urged from the dictates of offended pride, and from the motive of baffling, mortifsine, and cv' posing Britain, to engage in a determined and ext-r -!nitrating warfare. In that ease Ow eonrn of Sweden is sealed, No efforts in the power of th;s..ruuntry, can pr , - I it. 1 . ° 750 THE NATIONAL REGISTER. ..........--.. , •-•--. 0 - -.- -- - - -------- ..,,, - -- - ..,...../.....d. ... . cruelest enemies, instead of performing the service of wise only twenty years ago and discerning friends. It. is of infinite consequence, both Sweden, and was only pri - -• • __ • n I._ - I ~,