226 ed, and allowed us to open a communication between the Continent and the Island -of Leon. Not satis-; fied with yielding up so many important advantages which might have been long and resolutely defend ed, they - retired to the neighbourhood of Chiclana and thus exposed to the Most imminent danger, according to your own account t‘ 100 pieces of can non, 60 gun-boats and immense magazines„ bag gage, hospitals, &c. which, had they fought at a greater distance from that town, they would have had time to remove out of our reach in case they should have been defeated. Yet you neither brand th mas cowards, nor threaten to try them as trai tors. Had it been our intention to organize a ge neral- insurrec.tion in Andalusia, they afii)rded us every assistance in their power by withdrawing their troops from every part of the country which was very likely to rise in our support, and yet you deem their conduct entitled to the warmest praise. May I not fairly deduce from this forbear ance *on your part this natural conclusion, that you were conscious our plans were of a different nature from what you represented them to be, and there fore passed no censure on your officers for not coun teracting operations rind designs which existed only in your own.. imagination. I will now remove the veil from your sight, and that of your subjects, and reveal. the true nature of our plan, which you will then find has been crowned with the most complete success. MASSENA at the head of 110,000 men, if we are to credit his own account, had entered Portugal, and untaught by the severe defeat he ex perienced at Busaco, had followed our retreating urn y to the pnsitiops which Lord WELLINGTON'S foresight had tendered impregnable ; and disap. pointed in his d: earns 4'f congneq, remained an idle -witness of the klissolittipu of hi 3 army through de sertion, want, anti diSe.:so. Unable to proceed, he -was eclualiy unieillil b ., „; to fall back, as the preserva tion (f his Lune and the safety of the Spanish IrsurPer depended un Li:. maintaining his position, or compelling our army to reimbark. He received reinforcem%nts, but they were not sufficient to en able him to resume offensive operations. It was rteces!:ar, in order ts, produce any effect on our lines, that thy' ravv.s Fhonid be crossed and demonstra tions made in ihe Alentf,:ro. But the passage of this riyer WAS Tendered impossible by the line of batteries erected. by Lord WEI.LINGTON on its left Wuk, and the possession of Abrantes by the allied forces.. The Duke 0f....04:,N1AT1A. was therefore re called from Andalusia, : and ordered, after reducing tjie Spanisli,'Kiiiti.o4eit on the borders of Portugal, to - reftietiaithibuOti*Ole Alentejo to the left bank of • the Tagos t : and .thus. aciiitate its passage. by. MAS et'S army. These ores were obeyed. SOULT Tilt . NATIONAL REGISTER. withdrew from . geVille * all the force that could be spared, and invested Badajoz. Had this fortress syeedily surrendered, the progress of this division must have been rapid, and rendered the fate of the Campaign doubtful. An expedition was planned at Cadiz, by a powerful diversion to frustrate SOULT 7 S intended operations, and c - orrip'er him tp divide his troops, and send a strong detachment to assist or relieve the Thike of BELLI:No. This design would have been carried into instant execution, had not the state of the wind and weather prevented, for several days, our transports from, reArAing their dqs tinatiop. Our troops and their allies, however, landed, and your scattered garrisons tied before them, and collected in the vicinity of Chiclana, where, strengthened by thy corps stationed at Vic- Tort's head-quarters, they manfully awaited the approach of three thousand Britons, and only ran away when they found that use had not blunted the points of our bayonets, leaving in our hands two Generals, several hundred soners, six pieces of cannon, one eagle, and the field strewed with wounded and dead. The defeated Marshal instantly sent a dispatch to the Duke of DALMATIA stating the amount of his loss at 3500 men, and requesting immediate assistance. This dispatch which was intercepted by our allies, did not reach SOULT in time to prevent the fall of Ba 7 dajoz ; but the intelligence of our victory, received after he had become master of that place, and Cam po Maior, and when the Alentejo lay open before him, instantly checked his progress. His advancing at such a moment, might have arrested MAS.. SENA'S flight, by alarming our pursuing ar my and .forcing it to weaken itself by sending detachments to the left bank of the Tagus, Yet the apprehensions which our brilliant success had created for the safety of Seville and all Andalusia, outweighed every other consideration in his mind, and he evacuated Campo Major, left a small garrison in Badajoz, and moved towards Seville, abandoning MASSENA'S army to its, fate, and thus completing its ruin. This was the object of our expedition, and I. trust you are not so dead to every sense of truth, as not to .feel, although you may (dill deny that we have completely attained it. Your's undauntedly, JOHN BULL. It would seem from , the following extract .of.; letter from Sicily, that MURAT has not abandoned his projects against that • island • " FFP, RU RY RAT is building boats very fast on the 'coasts of his own kingdom. I suspect we shall have Warn} work in the spring : he intends to have a very great superiurity of gun-boats. We are .building rtaluubts, forts, towers, batteries, awl cutting canals in every quarter. The army i:, as healthy as it can-be ;• not one twentieth part of it in the hospital." .Five tsail bf the line, and about 250 transports, may be, hourly.expcetedfrom Lisbon, as they were to sail from the Tagus for Enzhin.4l a few days after the packet that has arrived. I r w