THE NATIONAL REGISTER. Out ging, Constitution, anD tate, PUBLISHED AT NO. 11 ) NEWCASTLE-STREET ) STRAND. No 325„ At the close of the chapter which precedes that intitl4, on the British Constitution, Montesquieu says, "There is in the world one nation, the direct object of whose Consti tution is political liberty. We shall examine the principles oti which it is founded. If good, they will reflect liberty, like a mirror. To discover political freedom in a Constitu tion much trouble should not be necessary. If it can be seen where it lies, if it be once found, why should it be any more looked after." After having discribed tl.e British Constitution, be adds " Harrington in his Oceana has also inquired what was the highest pitch of ft eedom which a Constitution could attain, But it may be said of him, .that he has only sought for a mis taken kind of freedom, and that he has built up Chalcedony. hilst he had the coast of Byzantium before his eyes." • This observation may be justly applied to the Constitu tional Charter substituted by the Parisian Senate to that which had subjected the French to the despotism of a Cor sican adventurer, placed by a faction on the throne which their predecessors had demolished. _ _ • . The folly of the times is to endeavour to perfect the josh *talons established in ages which they denominate ages of ig norance. The founders of British freedom have acted more wisely. They have, as Montesquieu tells us, " found their fine system among the woods of Germany. Our admirable Constitution, rendered sacred by time, and to which we owe the prosperity, the freedom, and the une qualled power which we enjoy, and Europe the recovery of lief independence, has evidently been the model of that which the Senate has proposed to the French nation. But, like Har rington, they have "built Chalcedony with the coast of By santium before their eyes." Political freedom is founded on a wise distribution of the two great powers which rule the State, the Legislative and the Executive. But as it is the nature and continual ten dency of power to increase itself, this distribution should bo made in such a manner as to prevent the encroachments of tire Legislative and Executive upon each other ; and to 'establish that equilibrium which secures political and civil freedom. The new French Constitutional Charter has wisely di vided the Legislative authority into three branches, and has placed the Executive power in the hands of the. King. It has properly limited hip portion of legislative power to the faculty of preventing, leaving that of institutitrg to the two bodies which are intended to represent the nobility and the people. The intent of this division of the Le7,illative power j,n., the British and in the new French Ccn3tittition, i, to kVA Vul. 111. No. CCCXXV. • • '• tution! noranc wisely fine sy Oui to wiii qualle iudept Senate ringtr santiti Pol two g the E dencl made of dr establ freed Tl vided place has facul bodii Pent) TI the POLITICAL DISQUISITION. NEW FRENCH CONSTITUTION. S°l ~/ SUNDAY, APRIL 17, 1814. PRICE Jul. vent the encroachments of the two Powers upon each other. It has produced that effect in England, because the House of Lords, by its origin and the nature of its personal preroga tives, acts as a counterpoise, and would maintain the equili brium, if either the numai chi al or democratical part should threaten to destroy it. Political freedom rests on the pal titioe of the Ler.,islative power; but it must be shmed out being disunited, in . order to avoid the two d a nger ou s shoals of despotism atiedemocracy. What has most contri buted to stNigthen the British Constitution and to render it immoveah?e, is the House of Peels, the link that connects the aristccracy with the king and the people. The authors of the French constitutions' charter seem.to have entirely mistaken the object for which tie)! branch, so essential to the Legislative power in a limited monarchy, has been instituted. Their Senate, by its origin and its he- terogeneous composition, and by the nature of the different prerogatives of its members, although they wear the same title, is more likely to create dissentiont in its own bosom, than to form a link between the two other branches of the Legislative power. This vice, in its primitive formation, is a principle of dissolution more or less distant. The organization of the judicial power in the new French charter is contrary to the Monarchial system. It ought to form part of the Executive, which, however, ought never to xert it, but ought to retain the exclusive tight of notnine, t int,* the judges. By only allowing the King a choice be , tween three candidates presented to, him to till judicial 1 functions, the authors of the new charter have mi,taken the right source of the judicial power, which is a de1e,..3,31,...:t from the civil administration of the Executive. It also appears almost incredible, that is the constitu tional charter of a Monarchical state, there should not only be no established religion, but that it should be deciared, that the ministers of every kind of worship should have the same pay, and receive equal protection. . General toleration may safely exist only in countries in which an established religion forms part f,f the constitution, as in England. I; results from the principle adopted by the French legislators, that the clergy ate not endowed, and eanniit become pro. i prietors. This is a new germ of division in this constitu- I tion, the authors of which do not seem to Lave sufficiently considered the influence of religious opinions, and toe 1 necessity of avoiding the civil broils which they may oc casion. Ilad they inquired into the motives that rtrJsed Eng -I.i lishl Bishops to be admitted into the ll , u:se , f Peer', 3 ' l ; those which closed the [louse of Commons to sectarian mi tnisters, they would have perceived the prop. ic7 (,f tl•Ilt law, ! and would have enacted one of the same kind Ti fancied they would diminish the King's influence 'dirdiniz Bishops from the Senate, but have, on the ~,•:,,,- 'hey bays e by ex. ... 1 contra. y, " • •