Orr. S. ports was added the battery of Melklet vs, most favourably situ ated on a portion of a perpendicular dike at one of the ell.:►sys of the river. In this position, rendered celebrated twos centuries ago by the offensive works of the besiegers, our :re:rules re-pre-; ; duced those very ',mine wotks for our' defence; planted strong woo d e n posts, collected boats, and prepare& them in a . mignaer! to prevent their being sunk, and ferniest a double boom under the protection of the forts and batteries of the Cross, klelkhays, Pearl, St. Philip, and St. Mary. Behind this boom,-and beyond the point where ships, in:ere der to double the Cape of Fort St. Plailip,areeiblketi•to describe • a curve in the Scheldt, three men of war were stationed, w • }rOse treble batteries commanding the passage Would have assailed the enemy in frost, whilst his flanks and‘rearlvtoetti have been can nonadcd by the forts and batteries on both banks of the river. llighe: . up, Forts Isabelle and Ferdinand, supported by the Imperial battery, fermed a t►ird defensive.litte; - whichet was 51eet...v.1.1-y to break through, in order to approach the fleet and dock i—rds, which -e*-ht have been farther secured by sinking yesseis in the• River that might have been raised again after the sioge—a last means of tearing from the grasp of the English a prey i:e.v might have though'. almOst in their power. Supposing all these difficulties to have been 'conquered, the fortified tows. and citad•:! of Antwerp still remained, and it would have required the greatest exertions on the part of the enemy have attacked a :rave garrison, protected by good works, and resolved to defend itself like the garrisons of Genoa and.Mayence, that hi, to fight without its walls, and to contend obstioately, in the midst of inundations, for 'each of the numerous natural posts with which Antwerp is surrounded. To this system of defence, the threatening dispositions of the English only served to inspire us with the bold determination of 'adding new ones. Three batteries were, by command of the Prince, erected under the fire of the enemy ; the one at the Point of Doel, another in the ruins of the old Fort of Frederick Henry, and the third between that fort and Lillo, in the elbow which the dike forms near the creek of Blawgaeren. such were the means of defence employed to secure Antwerp, its dock-yards, sand its fleet. We must, however, acknowledge, that time would bare been wanting to finish those immense preparations on every point, and that hostile fortune might have granted some haomeu lary advantages :o the English, had they, on the 19th of August, Made their attack, and displayed all their means with the pru dime and boldness indispensably necessary to meet such ditficul ties, and such adversaries. But even this was foreseen. De fensive positions were marked in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, , to he taken by the army, which received daily reinforcements, and measures had been planned, in conformity with the Emperor's commands, to cause the very progress of the enemy to become a snare, 'b Which he would be separated from his ships, and the• punishment of his temerity would have been more complete and 1. 'memorable. Every day of delay rendered the attack more difficult, and its success more doubtful. New legions followed those which a first call had created ; and French warriors, rushing in from every part, displayed that unanimous resolution, which saved them at 'the hour of misfortuee, of never. suffering the enemy to invade their territory. Reinforcements of troops and artillery arrived incessantly. The first inundations were effected, and the others prepared. Labourers . and Means of conveyance grew every day snore nuMeroutt; and the soldiers beheld with complacency the p:•ogress of works which covered the Scheldt with forts, batte ries, add b00m5... , Every day it became more probable that the naval forces Of the enemy would not attempt to penetrate through the sinuosities af•the river, is defiance to all the obstacles raised againitthern, and With a total disregard of the danger they would run of having . their retreat - cut of. It was, therefore, likely that the English Would begin by attempting to destroy the defen ces'o► the two banks . ; that the only asearis of effecting this pur pose would be to attack our army ; and that they would not be able to resist the shock of the forces destined to attack them at the moment and in the 'confusion of their landing, which, if de layed, would prove still mute difikult. Every thing sheared the enemy wavering in his plans; misin formed, or mistrustful; confounded at the sight of unforeseen ob stacles-; spending is reconnoitering the time witseh served to increase them, and losing with the opportunity the will of at tacking us. His boats employed in sounding the channel •f the Scheldt, proved that be was not acquainted with its windings. 11 is eon-bouts assailing every night with rockets the batteries erecting at Duel, and in the ruins of the Fort of Frederic Henry, did not check the construction of these works, In which we sp. proachelt to bid him defiance. In a wok), although the collect. 637 ed ships-at • Ilatz mide sonn- otTensive demonstrations, they were such at ;lotto announce ;he tram:port or landing of ony consider abie•cilt.pstf troops,' with its artillery, across the arm of a wide river, on a psonklsekseted•before hand and defended by an army. InfOttnation, - however, founded on these demo:nor:lions, led us tovikelievenvetikilintes, but especially on the.22:l of August, thitt theen4Mis intention was really to land ; and the Prince of C - bryo annjuiteed — the approach;ag attack in the order of thelitty, - as : air!oitlinaiyAevent, long expected by the array.— Every thing.Was4tietrbut until the 28th of August, bola& raid cannonlarrlis t thro.w.n .4 the enemy's gun-boats avtinst the bat jeries of bend and rieuerie Henry,• a fire of musketry agaiwt the hikes,' vaid iikrhar,:es of artillery, and trilling engagements bf-utstiroirs,* were phe only hostilities comtnitted uy ttte . 'When losing, with the hope of an easy victory, the wish of give credit to the rumou r s attaekiog our army, the enemy, if we circulated in Zealand, attempted to devise means of sending fire ships and rnfernal machines against the booms and the fleet, and closing' the Scheldt by sinking into iti deepest c:laraels vesqls filled with stones, or whole blocks of stone work. We might have entrusted the rapid current of the river with the care of opening new channels r'br our ships, by removing or des: roving these vain obstacles, but ransu'res equally prudent and hold were taken to seize and wreck these floating mines ; and our navy, in retaliation, increased the number of his fire ships, itt order to fight the eremy with his own weapons, and with offen sive means which the number and collection of his vessels would have rendered more destructive. Convinced, at last, that their miserable attempts, after the pompous display of their Expedition, would only draw shame and ridicule upon tlt , ir arms, the Eoglish seemed to intend to carry their forces to other parts well prepared to oppose them. They threatened at once Holland, ere countries of It vist and Axel, the island of Cadsand, and the coast of Flanders. But on the side of Holland they would have met Geueral Gratien's division on its return from the North of Germany, and the Dutch population in arms to defend their King, their cnniary, and their allies. In the counties of Hulst, Axel, and Cadsand, an army created whilst the enemy menaced Antwerp, a%.aited him under the orders of Marshal Duke of Cornegliano ; and on the same line with the army, the First Inspector of Engineers had put all the towns of Dutch Flanders, and on the coast from Hulst to Nieuport beyond the reach of danger. Whatever be the point of their attack, the Prince of Ponte Curve, placed at Antwerp, in the centre•of the line, could follow and defeat them with his army. Every thin. , skewed them that France a n d H o l • land were capable of repelli ng their attacks. The prospect of so many obstacles increased by the sickness prevalent in his army, caused the enemy to prefer the disgrace of a retreat to that of a defeat. His lust demonstrations had no other object than to conceal the evacuation of his sick and artil. lery. The island of Beveland and fort of Betz were abandoned,. As early as the 29th of August, 150 sails, several men of war, frigates, and cutters, had come down to Flushing; a few days later the rest de.ceoded the Scheldt. On the 4th of September no sa il was se e n before Ratz. our gun.hoats took possession of that fort, and in a few hours restored it to the Dutch trunpi he. longing to the corps of General Durnoncears. Such is the result of this grand Expedition ! In order to dimi nish the disgrace with %shit:it it has been attended, the English will undoubtedly exaggerate the importance of au easy conquest (Flushing). But Europe will see, by their own acknowledge ments, that they have missed the principal ends of their Expe. dition. Their allies will reproach them with having sacritred the adsttatage of the common cause to their commercial avidity. The wish of adding to their naval force by the capture or de. 'traction of a few ships; the vaia hope of shutting a river that rivals the Thames, have outweighed, in their consideration, and in the midst of the great events which took place in Austria and Spain, the interest of their allies. Were, not besides, the National Guards, which twenty years ago conquered them under the walls of Dunkirk, equal to the task of defeating their de signs? Should Spain be t he sooner tranqailliked—sh - ould Austria hasten the signature of peace,,Europe will, this time, owe these blessings to England. To her France Is Indebted fur the pre sent opportunity of displaying her passer against an unexpected attack, and proving that a single nail of the Emperor to twenty of his departments, is sufficient to raise, in less than a, month, one hundred thousand warriors against his enemies, without de taching a man from his armies, which were fighting at a distau .e of 100 miles from the potat oftittask. *THE NATIONAL REGISTER..