• . The official accounts of the battle of Albtrera are at last arrived. Rumour had wandered but lit tle from the truth. When immense armies crowd the field, and the whole might of contending em pires is brought into action, the flood of human blood seldom surpasses that which on the 16th ult. dyed the plains of Estransadura. Although the total of the allied and hostile force which fought on that memorable day did not exceed fifty thousand men, the collected loss of both parties amounted to no less than 15,000, or nearly one-third of the whole. The honour of many ‘nation's seemed at stake. The Spaniards and Portuguese, who formed the two-thirds of the Allied Army, had to emir late British valour, so often displayed in their cause, and now a witness to, as.well-as a sharer irt . ther exertions. The different corps of the Confe deration of the Rhine, which composed the largest portion of SouLT's army, led on b some of the most distinguished regiments of France, also felt the powerful spell of emulation, and the numbers that fell in the space of the few hours the battle lasted, prove that on both sides the most determined courage was displayed, and the most strenuous efforts made to obtain the victory. But Marshal /I,IRESFOItto had to contend, not only with hostile bravery, but with veteran skill and experience— qualities in which the Portuguese and Spanish di visions of his army were still necessarily deficient. His courage, however, and ,his activity supplied the place of experience, and ultimately wrenched from the enemy the triumph which for, a short time they fancied they had won. Led, perhaps, by the wish of affording the Spaniards an opportunity of re deeming their military fame, obscured by the con duct of their Generals at the battle of Barrosa, Marshal BERESFORD stationed them in the post of honour ; and entrusted them with the defence of some heights which " raked and entirely command ed our whole position," and which thus formec!,the most important point in our line. Strict prudence might have required that he should have placed less confidence in troops which, although brave, were not equal to our Own either in Vioki CLXXX. might depend Alta. Ing In his expectations he was, however, deceived ; not by any cowo.rdice on their part, but because none but British troops throughout Europe can sustain the first impetuous onset of the French, led on by skilful officers. After a courage ous, but flutless resistance, the Spaniards were driven from the heights, and our whole posi- • tion being raken and commanded by the enemy, it became necesvry either to alter it, and fall back, or to retake tel hills that had been lost, under even greater disadvantages than those . under which the enemy laboured in their attack 'upon them; for we had to meet troops flushed with their momentary success, and therefore more likely to defend what they had acquired obstinately. But even here the want of experience of the Spaniards encreased our difficnkies, and in a great measure contributed to occasion the heavy loss in British killed and wounded which, we experienced. It appears, by the fact of a body of Polish lancers being able to turn our right, and to form, undiscovered, behind the British columns destined to carr y the heights, that the Spanish Commanders, whose troops originally composed our right wing, had forgotten to place detached pickets of eavairy, in advance, and on their flanks, to observe the Movements of the enemy. For had the precaution, always used by expe rienced officers, been ern . plOyed, it would have been impossible for the Polish lancers to penetrate so far undiscovered, and our men aware of their approach would have met and defeated their charge, as every other 'made openly by the - French cavalry. Owing to this unfortunate omission, the Polish lanceri (who are strictly speaking Cossacks, armed with a spear fastened with a thong of a convenient length to their wrist, which they dart before they come within reach of the bayonet, and draw back with the thong after inflicting a wound), 'Were mistaken for Spaniards , and onl y known as enemies, when the point of \their spears was felt, and when the brig!tde which they had attacked in the rear had been broken, and th erefore rendered almost totally . incapable of resistance. • ths increated disadvantages • ' • 6 • .. .• .- • s •\ • • ' 116 . 6 ... `6: :, 411: • ? •o i• , . A . • . , .•.• • • • ... •• - ...• . , .. A .“ . 6 . . '.'- . ' " : t;: - ..a - - - _ . • ....._____ 15 .... - r k Itina,optiturion , anb t.. 1001 . ~ - 4 ._ ' N° ISO 4 - SUNDAY JUNE 9 1811 • P,Aucz 911 4 _ _. ..., , ___, 1 ...__________,......._____ • - _____________ .. 4...... LITICAL DISQLIIVTION. or discipline ; but' he thought the high feeling of "i national honour, nalliVal to Spaniards, would nerve , " No. 166. their arms, hid make them irresistible, when they ' should find that the very fate of the Allied Army THE BATTLE Or ALBUERA. might depend on their maintaining their position. FerSoll.llll . 11.14cie •• v..- -- -- - ~ . , - ,F‘.. •• withstanding ",I), fir . .„.. , - 4 A • .... • .4; , ''-- 4 -.- 41 4$ ,K • : , .:: '.. 'i:.• p ‘:.-, L4 tti so-. 71 .r,~,~ ~., ._ s ,