MI ME! EMI THE. NATIONAL • - • - Our fling,. ConOitutibn, aim tattlii% N° 172. NDAY,, APRIL 14,1511. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. r - - No. 169. to NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, tartßoß OF FRANCE, KING OF ITALY, PROTECTOR OF TUX CONFEDERATION OF , Tur. RHINE, NIFMAI OR OF swirzza ,LAND, AND EDITOR OF •ineMoNltzvß. Mrorrry'Stn-4 see by the last . numbers of your Paper, that whilst your Imperial. heart nverfloWs With exultation at the birth of your son, and-with bitterness at the retreat of your army from Portugal, and the defeat of your heroes at Barrosa; your Imperial pen is not idle. In former years, when your legions met with the least disaster, you Fastened to the field of action, in order, by your yresence and exertions, to repair their losses and turn the fate of war. Now you follow a different plan. The trophies 'which we erect - with our swords,. you demolish with your pen, 'and satisfied with blinding the present generation :of slaves that own your power and tremble, you. are regardless of the contempt which .posterity mug . feel for your im positions on•the credulity of your confiiipararies. For be not deceived ; your strictwes, perishable like your usurped authority, will not outlive your mortal existence. You will then cease, to be the general eye and ear of the Continent, and nations blessed with returning sight and freedom, will perceive all your deformity, and heap curses on your memory. In one of your late Moniieurs, you give us is an extract of the Correpondence of the Army of the South of Spain, of the sixteenth of March, in which your Generals describe the pretended victory which they boast of having gained in the vicinity of Chiclana, and which is already inrolled by fame on the list of our triumphs, under the name of the X.attle of BarrOsa. You pursue the subject in an other number, and on the 4th of April, favour us with some notes on Lord LIVERPOOL'S Letter to the LORD MAYORS on both of which it is now my intention to offer some comments, In the usual spirit of Gallic exaggeration, your well taught military Reporters swell the Allied force which landed at Algesiras, and part of which defeated your former Valet - de Chambre, Vlc-rort, to 18,000 men, whilst they sink his to only 6000. This was done no doubt, in consequence of the regulations which you have laid down in order to Vol. IV. . • REG ISTER. , • 10 . ... t •r b'.. ,% • • i Pnrct . 9d _disguise defeats and improve Victories, and the breach of - which, had they not • geed 'scrupulously obeyed, would have been severely visited on their heads.- I shall therefore content myself : with setting the world right on this important point. The force which contended with your eight thousand veterans, consisted of three thousand Britons. Your General boasts that he surrounded them, and we acknowledge that Ws superiority of numbers nearly enabled him . to carry that plan into es ecu tion. But what were the consequences of this vain attempt ? Our Commander, at a distance from . his allies, who did not share in the dangers and glory of the battle, remained undismayed. He saw your battalions thicken on the hills, and formed his little army of heroes into columns of attack in the plains. Confident in the overpowering weight of their numbers, he saW your warriors rush to meet our bayonets, and. almost instantly beheld their flight. Your eagles . clropped conerered at him - feet, your Generals 'fell into his power, and our colotirti 'waved . triproplaut on those heights so lately darkened by your threatening myriads. ißut. you exclaim, " Was it not your plan to raise the siege of Cadiz, and to take all the French lines in their rear, while an attack was to be made on the works before Cadiz by the garrison of that place ? At the same time the ships of w ar and gun-boats were to threaten debarkations on every point. BAL. LASTEROS was to march uPon Seville, and an insur. rection was to break out in the mountains of Ron. 4.1 a, which town was also to be attacked. This vast project has, however, been totally defeated.". I hitherto gave you and your dill and military Officers credit for an acuteness of 'sight which pierced easily into the motives of political mea. sures and military operations,' but heitAt seems to have been turned' into blindnesiAlf your Commanders thought that we had fdritted the plan you describe, or if they had received any secret advices which might lead to such a' belief, how could they be so neglectful of your interest, and their duty as to make no preparation to frus. trate our success? They sugered us to land quietly, in a town which was lately in their possession, and which they might have occupied anew in order to, prevent our troops from obtaining a footing on that part of thefeninsula.. Instead of resisting our ad. they,abandoned the posts whicirthey octupl.o .r.. ~ - ♦ a •• • \ • ,