.~ I ..i~ IWr..,aPM 931 E NAITIVINALL ItiEGISTER. Our Sing, Con sti tit tion, anD tatDS. •ak . ot PUBLISHED AT NO; 11, NEIVCASTLE-STILEET I STItAND. No. .183. Prirr. Pdl SUNDAY, APRIL 30, 1815. POLITIG4L DIS QUIS ITIO N. WAR. The veil Is at last removed, and the hopes and fears of teankind on the great question of peace or war, are re duced to a state of certainty. The magnitude of our mili tary and financial preparations, and the march of the Allied troops, would alone have been sufficient to dispel all doubt, bad not the declarations of our Ministers in cessantly revived it. An alternative was still left, we were told, and anticipation was checked. The purpose could not be to keep this nation in the dark ; for ere a country is plunged into a contest in which her very exist ence may be affected, it is the duty of her executive Ser vants to warn her of her peril- and take her sense, before they pledge her to encounter it. Powerful must have been the motive which outweighed this consideration. It will probably be found in the policy of concealing from the enemy that he was regarded as such, until a sufficient force should be assembled to give full and decisive effect to the principle of hostility. Had the line of conduct which Europe intended to adapt been openly acknow ledged at an earlier period, all' fear of provoking war, by preparing to repel attack, would have been dismiised by the French Government ;- and its superior activity might have enabled it to anticipate upon the Allies the blow which they meditated against itself. This is the best excuse which can be brought in justification of a course of secrecy, which otherwise might have been considered as trifling with the sentiments, the interests, and perhaps the destinies of a people. As the mask is now dropped, and irreconcileable enmity to Napoleon and the French Army has been avowed by Lord Castlereagh in the name of all the Allied Powers, it is but reasonable to suppose that their preparations are completed, and that they are deter mined by instant exertion to compass their objects, the dethronement of the French Ruler, and the extinction of that army whichr is represented by his Lordship to " be panting for plunder." War is therefore inevitable. The ear may now hourly expect its first pea!, and the eye,may watch for the rising glare of desolation. But let it not be imagined that the struggle will be slight in its nature, li mited in its course, or confined in its duration. When the Powers of the earth are in arms, and the spirit of ven geance rankles in every heart; when it is become a ques tion, not only of national glory and independence, but of political existence on all sides; when opposite quarters of the world rise in mighty contention, and the South springs in all the ardour of her sone, to roll back the invasion of the North and the F.sist the clash must be terriblel Y• 1. VII, No. . 1‘1 : 1:? the convulsions violent and protracted. Whatever may be the first seat of devastation, the flood Nvi!l soon burst its bounds, and sweep over the fairest part of Europe. Whet.* and by whom the first blew will be struck is still uncer. tain. 44 if France," said Lord Castlereagh, " will not join the rest of the world to obtain and establish the gene ral security, then let the seat of the war be in France her- self as the reward of her imbecility and subserviency. If the French army think that they must be set loose again— that it is au injustice done them to arrest their career. and the rapidity of their promotion to rank and fortune, Eu rope must teach them, that if they are so fond of war, th.'y shall hare war; not in the way in which they like it, but in the mode in which the Allied Pbwers think proper to wage it." The necessity of war being once admitted, the truth of these propositions becomes self-evident. But, mot withstanding the bustle of the Allies, and the vast ettoto of their preparations, is it not still possible that - they' should be the assailed, and not the assailants ? Nay, 'lava. they not already been attacked, and in a quarter preitwant with the most imminent danger ? The war which it was in tended to fix in France, has already crossed the Alps, and set all Italy in a blaze. The advance of the Neapolitans to the Po, the proclaimed independence of Italy, the' flight of the petty Sovereigns which the inipolicy of the Allies had restored, instead of uniting all Italian hearts in the same cause by granting them the object of their ardent wishes, a national existence, have already most materially weakened the Coalition, and delayed the period when it can act on the offensive. Had not these events happened, the Austrian armies would by this time havelreached the Rhine, and an imposingforcc might perhaps be moxing within the French frontiers. But, at the mostsritical period, Austria has been obliged to march the troops intended for the Rhine to Lombardy, and their place must be supplied by the Russian army, the arrival of which, on account Of the increased distance to which it had been removed, must be at least a fortnight or three weeks later them would have been that of the Austrians, had not the progress /of Murat, and the insurrections by which he is supported, diverted their course. Is it not possible that Napoleon may profit by the present weakness of the Allies on the Rhine, and anticipating the arrival of the Russians, may contrive to begin the war on the right bank of that river, instead of waiting for attack within the frontiers of France ? In that. case what would be the conduct of those small states with which that part of Germany abounds, and who have not had hitherto suf ficieepower or sufficient honesty to refuse siding with the for the time? Might they not give an example o Ny; 14s;;1 Tr~:J/ ^ -.;