/it those that were unprotected, and to pass secretly in the rear I of tie Russian divided corps, most of which might then have been surrounded and overpowered singly. It was, at the same time, evidently unfit for attack or defence ; for the vast expansion of force was too great to allow of that sudden eon ceetration requisite to assail or to oppose an advancing ene my. It was therefore no more than, what we have no doubt it was intended to be, a position of watch, taken on the out skirts of the empire, to ascertain the march and intentions oi the French and that information once obtained, to be changed for stronger posts pre% iously selected a little way deeper in the interior of the country, where a resolute and decided stand was to be made. This plan was prudent and wise. It promised to enable the Russians to avoid the first violent impetus of the French which had prostrated at once the collected force of Prussia, and to meet their attacks when the caution ne• essary to be used in advancing through an enemy's country, and the difficulty of proem ing provisions, would have compelled them to divide the concentrated mass with which they intended to assail the Russian centre into various columns, separated from each other by the numerous s which the land opposed to their march, and there fore ex osed to be defeAed singly, and, at all events, pre yen ed from making a simultaneous effort against the strong positions occupied by their opponents. Aware of the inten tions of the Russians, NAPOLEON attempted to turn them to his own advantage, and although he failed in his grand ob ject, partly succeeded in the second which he had in view At his arrival on the Ru sian frontiers he first ascertained the position of his adversary, and saw that it was one, at the time, of great weakness. AL EX ANDER'S extensive line form ed a cre cent sitni!aE to hat in which a Spanish fleet is gene rally d.sposed on a day of battle, and which our immortal NELSON first taught how to defeat, by breaking at two seve 'al points through the line. NAPOLEON found himself in the I. concavity of the Russian semicircle, the immense extent of which left him no cause to fear for his flanks, during his ad vance Against the centre, as the wings were too distant to close upon his rear. Ile therefore divided his whole army into two columns of attack, crossed the Niemen at two r ows. and rushed against the Russian centre and right wing, with a rapidity which he hoped would enable bim to break through them, before they could carry their plan of retreat into execution, or at least render that retreat dafiyult and dis,,rderly, and expose sonic of the retiring coe, , s to capture or to destruction. The Russians were too mach on their guard- however, not to perceive and coun teract his deign. They fell back with a degree of precipi tation, equal to that of his advance, and in excellent order, but the continuance of his progress, and his unabated speed, occasioued a necessary opening of their line, which, although not penetrated, parted at several points itiNts retreat. Thus was the army of Prince BAGRATION separated from the Main body under the Commander in Chief, BARC LAY DE To IL!, and thrown into Volhvnia, whilst the right wing • iet ted through Courland, and the centre evacuated Lithu nisi and re-crossed the Dwitia. This unexpected separation, although f: ons - the • steadiness of the troops, and the skill and activity of their Commanders, unattended with any diaster, tendered the execution of the whole of the Russian plan impossible, and compelled them to retreat much farther than -they had originally intended. Instead of englging; the enemy In front of %Vilna, or on the left hank of the Dwina, or at West of defending the positions which they had fortified Wore baud on theeright bank of that river, they were ob liged. to direct all their . exertions to effect lug a re-union of their armies, which in their divided 'trite were unable to stand against main body of the French. That this is SF PT. so. the sole reason whir i tednced them to evacuate such an v •xt , nsive portion of t l e fins, •n empire. aud even part o f au•sia proper, l,eyond SIDOIM eviden t not onl from 'IIC rebated declarations of ;heir commanders, that as soon as Prince BAGRATIO and (;eneral BARCLAY DE Tot.Li should have united, they would act on the offensi , e ; but from the numerous advantages v:hich Their retreat has pkced in the hands of the enemy, ‘vbi.h we sh , 11 ex! lain, along with the dangers to which be is. exposed should a power ful expedition land in his rear, in on next, when we shall close our view of this interesting and important subject. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. RUSSIAN BULLETINS. FROM TIIE ST. PEFERSIIURG GAZETTE, No 64. OFFICIAL , WARLIKE INTELLIGENCE. The Commander •in-Chief of the Armies ; Barclay de Tills", informs his Imperi , 1 Majesty, that the Adintant-General Baron Winzingerode has transmitted to hint the following Report : " I esteem it rny duty to inf.rin year Excellency. that I have forted the enemy to abandon Welish. Uswat, nod the suburbs of Surasch. I have already sent strong patroles to Newel, and consequently the [own of Welickyc Luki. and the St Petersburg toad, are now secure. "The report which was spread of the enemy having pushes) into this neighbourhood in great force, proved to be false. The whole of his joint force is'asserubled at Witepsk, and he has hithert 3 only sent hither strung detachments of cavalry to spread terror, but chi' ff celect provi sions tor his army, of which they are in ext:etue w&a. Prisoners ate &lily sent into me. The Conmoundcr-in•Chief, Barclay de Tully, has transmitted the foi -1 sviiig report, dated Aug. 15:— " I have the happine‘s to inform your Imperial Mi , j , sty, that the enemy, harassed by die detachment of Major Geller -I i;nron Winzinge rode, from the side of Welish, and Alajor-General Kra.. tow having with his detachment got on his flank, has withdrawn himself from Po ets hja, Hod concentrated his force at Rudna ; and my .igkt Bank being by this menus secured, I have marched for , ards with the wis le ormy, and on the 2d of August took a pi,si•ion at ihe village of Wol kowa, where my right wing leans on the Kasplen lake, and 1 have the river Wedra in front. The 2d army was to have taken position at Nadwa, but having received intelligence of the enemy has ine cros . ed the Dnieper at llubrowka , in great numbers, towards Loedy, Prince Bagrothion ordered the Sevemb corps, sunder the c,,tum.ind of Lietite. nani-General Rajowski, to cross over to the left bank of the Dnieper to reinforce Major-General Newerowski. who wa; stationed at Kras• now with a detachment ; the rest of the tr-ops of the 2d army have this morning taken possession of Nadu a. In the course of lust night, intelligence arrived, that the enemy, after having left Rudua anti ;_iosna, was mareliinj for Ltibowitcliy. On account of this circum stance, the rentablin! , part of the second army. which is at present at Nadwa, will this day march to Katau, on the left bank of the Dnieper, and the sixth corps will ccupy Much, a. All the light troops, undo r the command of GenerM Platoll, assisted by the detachment under dm 1- command of Count Pakten, are in pursuit of the enemy on the road to Lubowitschy. According to my last reports, the advanced guard of the first army have take.n about 150 men, of different tanks, prisoners." TTIF, NATIONAL RFCTSTFR. FRENCH p. 4 EUS. REPORT OF THE PRINCE OF SCHWARZENBERG TO TUE PRINCE M AJOR-GENERA L. Kohl'', Aug. 14, 181'2. MONSEIC NFtn-1 beg your Most Serene Highness to ol acquaint t h Majestyts gesty the Emperor, that the army of Tormasoff, whihad ken a position beyond I lorodczna, and Podubnie, was attacked on the 12th by th .t which I have the honour to command, beaten and pursued on the I:ith beyond Kohryn. The enemy suffered a los s of 3,000 men in killed and wounded, be sides 500 prisoners. Under cover of the night of the 12th, he with drew all his artillery beyond the Aluchawetz, and we could only take iron him some cais.oons. Our heads o f columns arrived at Kobryu lOn the 13th, an hour after mid-day : the enemy's troops crowned the heights on the left-bank. On the arrival of the intantry, I eau etl thq bridge to be re-established , a nd a p ortion of the ground beyond it to be occupied ; but - he enemy di.playing a monerous infantry, and my ,1 troops being much fatigued, I was not able to push hint forward mo e