"1 THE NATIQNAL REGISTER. eur Zing, Conotttution, anD Labs. PUBLISHED AT NO. 357, STRAND, COP.NER OF EXETER 'CHANGE SUNDAY, SEPTENI 13ER cd, 1812. PRICE 9d. No. 247. POLITICAL DIS.2UISITION. RUSSIAN %VAR FA PtE : ITS A;)V A WAGES, DISADVA GI SJ AND PROBABLE ISSUE Whilst prosperity attends our arms the western part of Europe, and British valour has hoisted in the capital of Spain the signal for continental independence, let us turn our anxious looks to the north. It is there, the battle must be fought, which will decide the fate of half a world. It is there, our triumphs must be fertilised. Whatever he their magnitude, they must prove ultimately barren, and even the complete emAncipation of Spain would be a mere successful but temporary diversion, if the Russian Power, which, even in time of peace, alarms France, and detains half her force in the north to guard against the sudden changes of its po licy, be entirely overthrown in the present contest. Freed from all apprehensions in that quarter, the reflux of the French armies would then inundate the Peninsula anew, and we and our allies should, we fear, have fly.lght and conquered in vain. llo‘y important is it, therefore, that we should yield effective assistance to Russia, not only by active opera tions in Spain, but by adding British courage and numbers to any expedition which may be preparing to act in the rear of the French, on, a point selec►ted, not because it may re store the momentary possession of Court domains, but be cause it may enable us so to intercept the communications of the enemy as to reduce him, during the approaching winter, to snit ve in Russia, or to abandon, with his conquests, the in fluence which he possesses over the other northern Powers, and his long cherished hope of universal dominion. If we honestly wish to redeem the independence of mankind, let us fight for that alone. As soon as any motive of private interest may be traced in our actions, the cause in which we engage is lost. 'l'o weigh maturely and impartially the chances of the Doithern campaign, the advantJges or disadvantages of the plan pursued by the contending parties, and the probable issue of the war, will form the three-fold object of the fol lowing disquisition. ittssia, it is now known, bad long and justly contem plated a renewal of hostilities with France as the only means of regaining her commercial prosperity and her national in dependence. The blindness to her own interests, which IsTi Aeo I . EoN's promises had created at Tilsit and at Erfurth was dissipated by the want of their fulfilment; and, because ALEXANDER did not share with him one half of enslaved Europe, he undertook to become her deliverer. Magnani mity and public spirit breathed therefore no life into his councils. Individual perils and disappointed ambition made him put on his armour; and his attitude of defiance, assumed oitginaily to extort by intitnidation the rich bribe withholden from Dina, at length revived iu his mind that consciousness Yoh V. No. CCXLVII. of his own power, and that longing after entire independence, which is the natural result of it, and which, ever since the beginning of 181 t, made him plan the present war. In the autumn of that year, as we are informed by a public breach of State secrets, Russia fiist communicated her intention to our Government, as also her resolution of awaiting the at tack of the enemy within her Polish frontiers, provided we should carry on the war in the Peninsula with so much vi-. gour as to render it impossible for him, without endanger ing his footing in Spain, to recall any portion of his troops from the Pyrenees to the Niemen. The agents of France. had, however, long been intimately acquainted with the most secret resolves of Russia, and at the time Luborouski delivered the object of his private mission, the march of French troops from every part of France, Spain, and Ger many, to the Vistula, was incessant. Although the possibi lity of preventing the French from encreasing their force in Poland, out of their army in Spain, no longer existed t.► the same extent, measures were immediately adopted to check the continuance, and to take advantage of that practice. Reinforcements were sent to our Commander in the Penin sula, with directions to commence offensive operations, as the diminution of the French troops and the augmentation of his own had entirely changed their relative situation. Ex peditions were fitted out to facilitate his advance by drawing the attention of the enemy from the interior to the coasts; and this enlargement of our system not only produced glori ous and important advantages, but compelled several Fiench divisions, hastening to the north, where their presence is so much wanted to repair the waste of a most sanguinary war, to march hack and re-enter Spain. The intended diversion has therelthe proved most effective; whilst Russia, who relied on our exertions and our success, no sooner perceived the consummation of her hopes begun by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and our triumphant progress in Spain, than she re called her Ambassador from Paris and war commenced in the North. Fully aware of her perils, and not blinded by that self-con fidence which had hurried her neighbours into instant ruin, she had, during the two preceding years, collected and dis ciplined immense armies, which she did not rashly send forth to attack the enemy in the seat of his strength. She mar shalled them within her own frontiers, and, at the opening of the campaign, presented a living bulwark of at least three hundred thousand men, extending from the Baltic, in a semi circular direction, with its concavity outwar,s, to the southern bounds of the Duchy of Warsaw, at a short distance from Cracow. This disposition was necessary, as the vast extent of frontier exposed to the enemy might, if unoccupied through out, have enabled him by making false demonstrations at the guarded points, to throw the main force of his army through -