NATION THE ■ I • -~~.v~ • TIT-I V ISTE • A , • f, _ MO ••••••• 1 f,if ! ,! . ab3o. tins, ConOtituttua. enD SUND AY; NOVEMBER 27, I F! No. 4S. " PRICE Sit PULIFICAL DISQUISITION. NUMBER FORTY-SEVEN• MR ARMY AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS. Transitory c i r emnstancts some times fix the conduct of commu nities; and what was useful only for a season ,becomes time permanent rule of their policfelt y a ki A n . d of prepossess io fter having from x cus t o m, or unexpected su ccess, in favour of some particnlar arrane;ement; self-love, to Ohm. with the suggestions of present convenience and es tablished habits exercise all their influence to persuade them that as undeviating adherence to what was adopted from temporary expediency, or momentary advantages, is the sure foundation of their safety, and the acme of po litical Avisdotn. This obstinate perseverance, in ordinary times, is unattended with danger ; it is productive, on the con trary, of considerable advantages, as it co ncentrates the energies, talents and resources of the state ; and this accumulation of powers gives this unity Of object increased vigour and effect. liet as soon as extraordinary events in tervene, arrangements, which were before advantageous, might be ineffectual to meet the new occurrences ; and, if pertinaciously adhered to, occasion disasters too urgent and unexpected, to be opposed with promptitude and suc cess. This want of versatility, or this incapacity to ac commodate itself to the fluctuation of incidents, has been, almost invariably, the cause of the disappearance of once powerful and enterprising empires. They fell, as soon as they had extraordinary difficulties to encounter, because their means of resistance were calculated only on the scale of ordinary chances. Almost every page in history, ancient and modern, im presses this conviction ; and the eventful occurrences of our time dissipate every doubt of the reality of the obser vations. However one state becomes a victim, and then another, to this blindaes , :anti obstinacy; and those who have the good fortune or the chance to escape, are *limn. silk to the warning, or if ron , :ed for a moment to the ne cessity of a change of condue: - , !hi-4' are frightened, or dis heartened, by the exertions and iaeritices it seems to re quire, or fluctuate so long between resolving and perform ing, that they are seized in the very act of deliberatilig ; and overwhelmed before they had come to a deteriuination bow they shall act. , That this is .no mere speculative opinion, unsupported by the evidence of facts, or formed only from remote deduc tions, we have too "many proofs from what has occarred within the shu,rt, but instructive, space of the last 19 years; and there is not a state, that itaii yielded to the renovated energy and youthful policy of a neighbouring people, 'out aght to attribute its disasters to the infatnatiou of attemp i.:., to i.es,it new rigorous institutior.s , seco nded b y .1c force of opinion and the attraction of novelty, with censtitutions weakened by age, and enervated by invete r.te aler,cs. E . /cry thing about them pointed out the in l;ll.,:ncy of their usual arrangements, and the necessity of •r 170 reesnroq i t wlpicilatc. l 17 •• ; • • e ~ mo t: . ;~.~...: • • '• .... Y"Mt~~yY . .~R ~~ some constitutional. weakness, or restrained by the bias of long-established customs, they still persevered, with the pertinacity of dotage, or the presumption of folly in their fatal delusion. States have not only suffered from an improper, or ina deqnate use of their strength ; but likewise from the mode of displaying it : jest as particular occurrences may induce a people to direct their attention to an augmentation of the navy, in preference to that of the army ; as was the case with the Athenians, in the time of Themistocies. When the exigency of the se rvice became less imperious, they - still continued to cultivate it almost exclusively ; because the brilliant success that attended the first experiment, to gether with the advantages flowing from an extensive corn inerce4 the tributes of the adjacent islands, and the va nity of extending their intluence' from the shores of the Euxine,to those of Sicily, convinced these republicans that an adherence to navkl operations was the secret of their preponderance and security. These considerations powerfsal : eno ugh to seduce a less arrogant people, united with the superiority they acquired from expe rience over their rivals, prevented them from chan ging their policy, when subsquent . occurrences ren dered a change indispensably nece4ary. This is the irre trievable error of States, that they never see the necessity, or the fit season of innovation, till disasters have %hewn its expediency ; and they seldom grow wise, till wisdom is useless. 'elms the delusion continues ; and the Athenians were not sensible of the impolicy of their conduct; till the enemy were masters of their territory, had overturned their Government, and proscribed their principal citizens. This calamity solely originated in the mistaken idea they enter , tained, that from the land side their situation was impreg nable; they therefore considered the army i'secondary oh- Jed, or it was wasted in remote expeditions. For 4 27 years that they contended with their rivals for the supremacy, fortune, it is true, seconded utmost invariably their efl'orts ; but the loss of a single RNA al engag,ement at Aergos Potanios, overturned for ever the dominion of Athens. The errors and fate a Carthage were similar ; and both states serve to show, that what sync, at one time, expedient, and highly politic. may become, in consequence of new occur rences, ineflectual and dangerous. The brilliant success of the Portuguese in the East, and the discoveries of the Spaniards in the New World, together with the immense riches accumulated by the Dutch, in spired the English and French s it l .l an ardent desire of par ticipating in the advantages and reputation of these expe ditions; and commerce and colonies engrossed, for more than a century, the attention of the most powerful nations in Europe. Our decided superiority In these pursuits, together with.the splendour of our naval victories, and the petailiarity of our situation, induced us, as it did the Athe nians and Carthaginians, to direct our attention, almost exclusively, to maritime affairs; and as long as our neigh bours acted on the same principles, and bad the same ob ject in view, age acted in strict conformity to policy, as well as to interest. But the Revelation has eleile an alte -1 r ation in tills. as in 11,:tatt!, otter rice-..iirliia:iu:ei, ..ad the . ~ ..-.. ,‘, , • . .-: , . , N "". 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