THE NATIONAL E 4't IST 0. tir Itllls, eattzlitution, anD PUBLISHED AT NO. 11, NEWCASTLE•STREET STRAND. N°. SUNDA-Y. N 0 V EMBER 13, 1814 PH7CF: 9d. POLITICAL 01.:2LrISITION. POLICY OI• MASI 1. The adoption of Russia as a preponderating Power in the European polit;cs has been, comparatively speaking,' of a re , ent date. It has hecn effected in such a manner as, ap- paren:l , , to make the other Powers unaware of the disnosi . • tions that actuate her government. At former periods an . unwillingness has been shown to allow these dispositions the gratification (heir possessors have sought. This unwilling tress w ns sh o wn by this country in 1791, and Catherine felt exceedi!•gly chagrined by the interruption we offered to the march of Potemkin towards Constantinople. But nothing could divert that Monarch, nothing has since been able to di . yell her successor, from pursuing such measures as would lead to the filling up the great outline of emoire sketched by the hand of Peter. In endeavouring to fill up this outline, Russia has acted 11 with prudence and intelligence; and this prudence and intel ligence, have been accompanied by a constant reference to.i a great scheme of national agglandizement, as l;nourablet to the projectors, as it will bk useful to their subjects— • To carry these schemes into effect; Russia has uniformly afforded patronage to talent, and offered an asylum to genius: whencesoever it has arrived. Can you be useful to us, and are von willing to be so? This, and this only, is the question pot to the ingenious forci;ner, the instant he sets his foot on Russian ground. So intelligent as to be aware of the Socratic precept, that ‘re are wise only in proportion to the consciousness we pos sess of out own ignora:ice, the Russian Monarch seeks know ledge whet ever it is to be found. Of this sort of feeling we have recently witnessed a splendid example in the conduct of the Emperor Alexander. Recollecting the benefits derived to his empire in it. earlier period;, from the visits of Peter to the different countries of Europe, Lis object appeared to be to make his snjouruing among us as useful to it in its more platuie stages of existence. To communicate these blcs-lr,gq, Alexander is a most ap propriate channel. His conduct at Park is not to be for aotton. In the moment of success he did not forget that that success arose out of one of those accidents which but rarely happen. Of course his conduct was marked by mo deration, and instead tf pa.ading himself as a conqueror be spattet cd with the gewg::ws of rank, he led there, com paratively speaking., the te of a private gentleman; his object we repeat, at pears to have been, to lender his visit of essential u., , e to his country. One of :he means by which he pro poses to effect this poi pose appears to be so to aggr Vol. VII. No. GCCILXI V. Iy~dud..l~t,~%~ r~ ." '`v~ :~ empire as to remove those impediments that au inclenr..- mate Las placed in,the way of its advancement. His lea , :ng• 01...ject appears to be so to place his bound.ay as to continue his influence in European politics, and at the same ';me enable himself to carry into effect his ulterior views or Tui.lcev. Pos seqsing a taste foreign to the geneial character of Sov , ..reiems, we find his first attent sanctioned by the popular feelii}g iti most countries—the restoration of Poland. flis tenacious ad herence to this plan, and his possession of that country with an army of 80 or 100,000 men, give him the surest prospect of success. Aided by the national spirit of Poland, and this spirit most especially roused by the circumstance i f the (so called' ) con- ' queror of the conqueror of Europ, being 'heir resto: er, l I,ill, we have no dt.pubt, succeed in uniting Poland to litts •i 1 by tics of the Most powerful and politic nature. His possession of that country, and with the assent. of its inhabitants, will enable him to check the north of !;ermany as well as Austria. The dislocation of the German empire (the original scheme of Napoleon ! ; which has been effected the independencd crf its diffrent electorates, &c. wi!! . a prospect of her divisions still remaining great and her t.• :on impracticable. The north is divided a• much by,dispositioo: as by boundaries, and we much question whether the prop set? accession of territory to Prussia will not afford inerelced causes of dissention. Hetice, on the north of Germany, Russia cart only look, as upon a country divided against itself. As to the south, she has there to behold Bavaria and Wir temliurg influenced by France, and Austria weakened, es sentially weakened by her own conduct in Itz.ly. This con duct will, we have no doubt, give rise to the independence of that country ; and, if such alp-rneac;ure takes place, and Russia is successful on the Danube, it is very certain that will be effectually cramped; an,l that Alexander.will, tiler lie has organized Poland, (which will be the work for tl.e winter months) proceed to regain the ground he his lost in &c. There appears every pros;)ect of succes s attending him in his attempt. The subject is interesting, and particularly so to us, as a naval power. To create a navy is the object of Russia, Jri'l the most effectual way to obtaiil,success, is her !7o session Constantinople. On this sul,*t...mtn•tr ~as been .yvitten, though little has been read. Among other write-s Mr. Leckie stands conspicuous; a circumstance which induces us to close this essay with his ideas on the subject. " Mark the situation of Turkey 1809): actually in pos " session of Moldavia and Wallachia, there is nothing r ; ore vent their (the Russians) passing the Danube and ent?Tirl " Bulgaria whenever they please; there is not a fortress to " stop them from thence to Adrianople, which is an open I town, nor froth thence to the walls of Constantinople." ~: