fts w THE NATIONAL REGISTER,. best blood of the country. It is a consolation, however gratifyiag to our fselings as individuals, and which belongs to us as a great and powerful nation, that if the bigotry, the weakness, or even the cowardice of the Spaniards make them inseneill,: to the value of liberty, or render them in competent to the task of con:4tiering it, we have shewn " shat Britons can do for others in such a cause, and we have exhibited to Europe avid to the ssorld, what may be expected, when satiated with the plunder of the Continent, the unsatisfied tp-ant shall ohiig.e us to defend the lust spot On which Liberty can make a stand. The tedious interval which elapsed betveen the defeat of the French in Portugal and the e.rrival of Sir A. WELLES :A-A- in the heart of Spain, seemed not only to carry dm appointment to our hopes, but actually to have excited in this country fears for the safety 9f our brave army, and our Journalists were even contending about the propriety of our evacuating the Peninsula altogether, nay more, were even disputing the practicability of our succeeding in the a!tempt, when the dispatches of Sir A. WELLESLEY an nounced one of the most important and brilliant victories 1 - shich has ever been achieved by British valour. A victory whi-cle carries us back to those heroic days when on the Mains of Cressy, or of Agincourt, the strength of our ar ;Lies, not wont to he measured by vumerical calculation, or if it were, one Englishman was considered as a match for at least three Frenchmen. It does not appear that our oftilors have degenerated, and the battle of Talavera has told the Ts rant a tale which his vanity will lint ill brook, that twenty-three thousind English con even now thrash' more than twice that number of his veterans troops, only giving them elbow room and fair play. .an whatever point of view we consider this glorious' victory, its consegnences, both immediate and remote, af ford us tile most satisfactory prespccts. We may consi sksr it as a decisive proof of what may be effected by Bri tish courage, under proper direction., and unencumbered with the efforts of allies. For certaWy we cannot observe., without surprise and vexation,, the situation of the Spanish -army, of 35 ,00 0 men, almost wholly occupied with looking o n, whilst their owe dearest interests were at stake. It would be folly to affect to disguise "'awn ourselves, that if Sir A. Vlieeersecy could have depended upon their valour An discipline, he would certainly have employed sonic of that large body in a situation which threatened the exist .ence of his whole army. If we were even in doubt of this, dots not the circumstance of the Preach being allow f.:d to retreat in good order, confirm and establish the damning fact beyond all controversy ? What ! is it pos sible to believe that 35 or 36,000 men, unbroken by the fatigues of an engagement, would have suffered a routed army, harrassed by the labour of a bloody engagement, and dispirited by defeat, to retreat in goof: order, if they were neither cowards nor traitors ? The thing is im possible, we can neither credit it, or impose upon ourselves any thing in time shape of a belief of it. It is true Sir ARTHUR 'WELLESLEY says « the Spanish Com mander in Chief, his Officers, and troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, and those or them which were engaged did their duty, but the ground which they occupied was so important, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement on the 4efi of the ene my, whilst be was engaged with us." AUG. 20. Manifested a disposition indeed! ipc ground anti front au difficult 1 Is there a military man in the kingdom who can be imposed upon one moment by such unaccountable stuff? It is an insult of no ordinary na;.:.; re which is otf,!red to the understandings of the public to imagine they can be deceived by such barefaced prevariotion. But what does all this amount to ? why Oat he was either afraid of their cowardice or their treachery—and as a matt of judgment well as spirit, he k)dopted the only chanco left for success or even safety, and has detailed the fact like a Statesman rather than like a General; if he really did wile This sentence. The Spanish Army seem. to have adopted the cunning policy of engaging the two powers who have chosen to make their country the scene of confLict, to plunge Oto trcubled waters, (accordingg to the proved)) while itself takes the sure part of holdini; the rlotkesof the swimmers. It would appear from this view of things that we de precate any further interference in the business of Spain. This indeed would seem to be the most obvious line of conduct, if our determination were to be taken from a superficial view of our present relations with that Country. It must be ncknowledged that we are not equal to the de fence of Spain, if she will not defend herself; and it strikes home to •the honour and feelings of every Englishman, that men who will not fight for their liberties on 4 Sunday are not fit to enjoy them during the rest of the week.— But it is not. merely with relation to the Spaniards, hut to ourselves and this rest. of Europe that we arc to consider the subject. Mr. LozuE somewhere speaks of persons who arc to be called men of one idea. They Tee one step only at a titre, and cannot recognize the second till events bring it forward.—Such men cannot embrace even in thought the colossal danger of the extended despotism of France, or the extent of the sacrifices that we ought to make to lessee its amount and to keep it at a distance.---Politics re quire a cool head and an extclioive eye; they must be viewed with temper as to their immediate state, and with foresight as to their oltericr consequences, for as . in war there is seldom room for second mistakes, it is the same in politics in most cif its deeper and more important cases. Viewing the situation of Spanish affairs through the medium of our hopes, we have been disappointed that our exertions have not proved more serviceable to them and to Europe, but taking into our consideration not only the evils which have been prevented, but the possibility of affording our . assistance so as to erect a barrier against their extensions, we arc more inclined to cherish the idea of what may be done, than of what has been already ef fected, and to do this we arc urged by eyery motive and consideration that can arise out of the present situation of the Continent. It is a saying in fabulous philosophy that serpens non fit draco, nisi seipentem devoratteril, and am bition, (which whether it is lowly and creeping, or high crested and rampant is always deadly,) is a monster of the same kind. BUONAFAATE is continually enlarging his power, and is growing more and more terrible, in propor tion to the quantity of prey he devours; and what appears still worse, and calls upon us to oppose him till we are driven back even to our own shores for their defence, is the cir cumstance that the Tyrant of the Continent has at length succeeded in converting conquest into traffic by making