TH4 piATIONAL REGISTER. con.:,,ostiote ; leave us the dreadful alternative, to conquer or perict t 'This iitheconVictiOn we ought to im press upon our minds, whenever we take the utility of our isures, or the application of our resourees, into con sieeratton. This impression, we believe, is general ; but reiterated Itsappoiutments have prevented its• full operation, and di- Terted , its tendency. Hence originated the belief, that the 'very principle of our policy must have been fundamentally 'wrong, when merely its application was defective. That the system itself was erroneous, because the partial and impeded operation did not answer the proposed effect. It is iuconceivable with what levity and precipitation men of sense imbibed this error, and bow they could propose, contrary to.the experience of every age and country, the adoption of defensive, in preference to offensive measures. The policy of. FA BlUi l the cunetator, suited the panic which the first victories of HANNIBAL had diffused ; but the bold resolution of the elder SCIPIO was better adapted to the genius al.d institutions of Rome. We strongly de precate the idea of preserving our military force, for the event of a possible struggle upon our own shores : a simi lar occurrence supposes the loss of our naval consideration, and the inefficitey of the remedy to obviate the evil I We NV . Oilltlask, of w;iat, avail would our regular army be to us, sn such au evelit, scaite..ed as it is over our immense pof. iiessluns ; every citizen must then be a soldier ; and if the i;eople are aniniate.d with such feelings, and defensive pu iicy he thought expdient, we should instantly disband one Half of our military force ; litriband our resources for a similar contin , cesicy, and thus decrease our enormous six lienditure. It is drivelling in the extreme to keep up a vast and expensive establishment for a dubious advantage, and remote objects. When the great question of our in dependence is about to be decided, it is not the regular aiiny, but. the collected force, moral and physical, of the leountry, which can disconcert. the boldnes, and rep! the Teiteratca attacks of the invaders. There may be an ap parent, prudence in keeping - a ready organized force, to -meet the first impression of the enemy, in case of an in vasion ; hut nothing can be more deceitful than to trust solely to its cflicacy ; for the enemy is too wary to hazard the descent, until the subjugation of the Continent, and I the immensity of his preparations, give hint a decided su -leriority in that kind of force. When things are arrived at such a cris'is, it is only the intense ardour and united senti;nent of an armed population, which call repel and confound a repetitioa of desperate and formidable assaults. But our army may, in the interval , be usefully employed in obstructing the developement and consolidation of the enerN's des'gns upon the Continent : and thus defer, or cornpretely baffle the possibility of employing his undivided strength and attention against ourselves. In order to com prehend what might be done to that 'effect, had we acted upon a larger scale, we will point out the consequences of our partial diversions, and shall prove, that our contracted and partial interference has rendered the most material, tiervice to the Allies, and prevented the Tyrant front being, it this motrient, master of Europe.—ln order to show the truth of this observation, we will take a retrospective ;Tie* of 'our three last. expeditious; and of the state of Europe duriag that interval. Our first Exrditiov!, nottvi;hvtanil;ng the infamy of the trieqmoa sipc#3 Cintra, and the calamities which at- .. ~.., 15. Leaded bir o Moose's retreat, was of vital athaniage _ to the Spaniards, as it compelled the enemy to detach the. greater part of his army in pursuit of ours. Bad this powerful diversion not been effected, the concentrated force of the Usurper, after the capture of Madrid, might have borne down every obstacle, forced the passes of the Sierra Morena, and appeared, in less than two months, before the gates of Seville, Cirthageni, and Cadiz. The movement of Sir Jona' Moone's Wee disconcerted the execution of that• project, and placed literally hors de combat one third of the whole force of the enemy. Soo LT'S and Nzios corps, which, at the commencement of the por• snit, amounted to about 56,000 men, were, by disease and hunger, reduced to absolute. skeletons. Our diversion certainly saved Spain for that season. ft is the height of absurdity to deny. that we made no painful sacrifscesupon. the occasion. But is the operations of war, it is not so much the loss, as the attainment of the object, which to be considered. With our diminutive force and tardy co-operation, we, nevertheless, prevented the French front becoming, at that time, masters Of the Peninsula. Our second Mxperlition preserved Portugal; drove Scutt from that kinplom ; raised the character of our army at the battle of Talavera ; ►rrevcnted 13136WAPARTE from drawing a single detachment from the Peninsula ; liberat ed Gallicia, the Asturias, Leon, and the -greater part of Catalonia ; and had no inconsiderable influence upon the Vaud making in this moment by Austria. Had we made no efforts in Spain ; had -We rejected co.operatiun as impoli tic;—detrimental to us, and useless to our allies, it is pro bable that E tIONAPA 11TE would 'have assailed Austria with his collect)_.?! force, leaving only a small corps to act on the defensive in Spain. For that purpose 50,000 men mould have sufficed to cover Madrid, occupy Barcelona and Pampeluna, and preserve a communication with France. But by our interference, feeble as it has been, we have forced him to reverse his usual line of couduct and pol:cy. it is the interest, and has been the invariz.;ble custom of that dangerous and active man, never to make extraordi nary eflbrts at the same time, in two different places. He suspended his attack against one power, until he had completed the destruction of the other. We have corn s paled him to abandon, or deviate considerably from this policy. His collected force would have annihilated Aus. tria ; and, haviug finished there the work of destructiOn i might have returned, aml borne down, with .the violence of a mountain inundation, every obstacle . which the Spa niards could oppose to his progress. Before the end of this year he naig-ht realise his vaunted Menace of planting his eagles on thettowers of Lisbon and . Cadiz. The evecu tion of that promise is, at least, deferred; and who knovfe what events may occur to•protract it siiH longer. Our expedition to the Scheldt bore the same feature of misconduct in the projecting and management : acid pro duced, however, a great sad henificiai result, it forced the enemy to collect a large force, which he would - other. wise have detached to Vac Danube, or Tagus; and thus given the French army, in-either gearter, a preponderat ing accession of force. Our Expeditions, comparatively trifliog. as they have been, and defective in a variety of re= spects, have forced the tyrant to abandon his favourite policy, and to divide his armies and attention between the Danube, the Tagus, and the Scheldt. We have thus gives Austria au opportunity of continuing the war with a greater I —.dal