~~.t--:. .~ `".;~„~ THE NATIONAL Nn. 355. POLITICAL DIS2UISITIOIf. • THE CO N GRESS. From the contents of the French papers just arrived, it ;horrid appear that, so far as the aggrandizement of Austria. Prussia, :Ind Piedmont are concerned, this body has at last done something. The provinces of Austrian Poland are definitively annexed to the Austrian Empire; Saxony to Prusssia and Genoa to Piedmont. So much for the princi ple of the status ante bellum. France loses Belgium, but 'Piedmont . gets Genoa—France loses Belgium, but Prussia gets 9axnnv.--France loses Belgium, but Austria gets part of Poland, retains Venice, Sce.—France loses Belgium, but N: foyer is elect, d into a kin g dom —Fiance loses Belgium, but Sweden gets Norway—France loses Belgium, but Den road( gets Pomerania—L-Fratice loses Belgium, but the Duke of Saxe-Wevmar gets part of Saxony. We fear that this ar, rangement will prove but atemporary one, and that the loss of so much country will infuse into the minds of the people of France, such a degree of restlessness, as to produce, ere no long space of time shall have elapsed, a new, powerful, and, in her state of mind, an effectual irruption towards the Rhine. • We arc led to this opinion, by the total silence An the' sub . - ject of the aggrandizement of Bavaria and- of W irtembetg; by a knowledge of the•state of Italy; ..by a,c9nNiction that it is only necessary for an army of 9.0,000-Frenchnien to 'set foot across the APpenines, to advance without llifficuky the i xt remity of that counts v. • The connection, the hang,, natural, and new become per. manent connection of Bavaria with France, her possessing an almost equal degree of influence in Suabia, together with a prospect of regaining Tier influence in Italy at the -very first onset of the war, will unite in operating to produce it. But the partition of Saxiany, a partition which .w s e are convinced " cannot, will not, come - to good," is • anothe event, the result of which will increase her prospect of suc cess. What ate the motives to action in Ifussia, we know not • —nothing on ►he subject of her aggrandizement is said'. No thing farther on the subject of Poland. It is surely to be expected that Prussia gives . up the Duchy of Warsaw, but nothing, we repeat, is said on the subject, so that r e are yet.ia the daik as to the objects of Alexander. But, while on, the subject of Prussia, we cannot but recollect a scheme of Frederic the Great to got Holland, and thus erect himself into a naval •power. The prospect of that Monarch was to indemnify the douse of Orange . I'n Poland. However, the proposal was reject- " London, and tlie result we now all know. Val. VA bio.,4 I CC,KLXr.. • IP • go 0 .1 1 i ' • .0% •• 7. .„ j ec.te 4 in. <‘c :‘` i.. ' . . •••..:,,5..., REGISTER. Our iting, Cousltitution, an Laths. PUBLISURD AT NO. 11, NEWCASTLE•STREET, STRAND. - .7- or. • SUNDAY, NOVEMBER - 20, 1814. PRTCE 9d. . The prospects - arising from this system, we do not like to contemplate. There is an incoherence and inconsistency in the scheme, that we think will prove self-destructive to it, and,. at 'the same time, an ample field is left for tbe diplo matic npeiations of France. Talleyrand has not ,been idle; and, while the 'military springs .o& that country have been restoring to their usual state of elasticity, he has been cm ploYed in communicating to all the parts of hei:diplornatic administration their wonted activity.. With.the loss.of Belgium • he will route France ; with the partition of Saxony .he witl operate in the centre of Ger. many .with the non-aggrandizement of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, he will re-obtaki bli footing in the more southern parts; with the dissatisfiedstate of Italy he will endeav o ur to *re-estahliAi the influence of France in that country. This, however, calls fo'cibly to our recollection he lead ing article of the Gazette de Bourbon, alias the Times, of yes terday. This article commences with a sort of sketch of the situation of Murat : of course, it begins with an abuse of him, and a declaration that his talents are of a mediocre complexion ; but we are astonished to find that Buonaparte is quoted as the authority for this incapacity of Murat. With all due submission to the Typographical Sc vereign of Print ing House Square, we think that Murat chewed a great de gree of prudeLce in his conduct subsequent to what is called, :IA with propriety, the decielvP campaign of 1812. fte went as_far as MosecAs, and,.from that instant he appears•to have determined on -web measures as would secure his own 'safety and protect the lives of his subjects. Now, with sen sible men, we strongly suspect that Murat's prudence will be deemed infinitely superior to Duonaparte's talents; for there is no doubt if Buoriaparte had been satisfied with retiring • behind the Rhine immediately after the decisive campaign of 181'3, he could there have treated'with every possible ad vantage. At that m•ment he held all the fortresses on the Elbe, on the Oder, and on the Vistula, and possessed such a territory, as would enable him, in the event of any negotiation, to secure to himself the continued possession of Belgiuni and Italy. • Now, we repeat that, under such circumstances, we do not think Murat either an incapable or imprudent Sovereign, and consequently not half so much so as Buonaparte. The Editor of the Ga:ette de Bourton expresses . a convic tion of there being some weight in the idea of his having on foot a regular army of 90,000 men and a militia of 60,000 that can soon be embodied ; but he expresses little fear at the threats of his partizans, that he may become the head of a re volutionary party in Italy. He is incapable,.says the Editor, - and however popular he nay be in Naples, his conduct in . 1798, in shooting 22 persons who had oppposed him in his M,m when acting under Buonaparte will prevent his name . . •• •