338 the Pyrenees, rendeis the arriv forcements hopeless, at the time they are most wanted, and the detaching of small bodies from the capital, useless, as they are• - almost always inter cepted by the Guerrilas. These considerations, no doubt, induced Lord WELLINGTON to endeavour to make Estramadura and Andalusia the seat of offensive operations. For that piirpose the French were driven from the places they occupied on the Portuguese frontiers and the siege of Badajoz, the only fortress in their hands Which could prevent our advaneing towards Seville, was actively commenced. The trenches were opened as close to the town as pos sible, and the bombardment began. Aware of the importance of this place, and desirous by every means in their power to deprive the people of the South of Spain of the point of re-union which the p . resence of a British atuny would offer, the French commanders weaken all their posts in the interior, and were even compelled to.abandon some in-or-det to 'assemble a force su ffi cient to meet ou rs. Yet according to every account which We have re: ceived, they could only bring 22000 men to the field, whilst Marshal BF:ItESFORD carried on the siege of Badajoz at the head (If about 32,0 0 00 men, British, Portuguese, and Spaniards. As he had further offensive operations in view, he did not, like Lord WELLINoroN, remain on the defensive, but hearing of the approach of the enemy, left a strong corps of observation before Badajoz, and tiiarched to meet them and defeat their plan. The detailed accounts at the battle have not yet reached us. According to every report it was most san guinary. The French are said to have lost IZOOO men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the - 8000. Several regiments are stated to have been annihilated, and the two armies to have taken a fresh position in sight of each other with the inten tion of renewing the contest immediately. It is probable, however, that:apprized of the reinforce ments, detached at the same time by Lord WeL -I.INGTON and Ely MASSENA, both Marshal BERESFORD and SOULT will have waited for their arrivals, and • t.hould then the enemy try once more the power of the sword, we trust the result of the action will de cide the fate of the South of Spain, on which that of the whole Peninsula in great Measure depends, and that still brighter rays of glory will beam round 'the military crown of Great Britain. The chief • burden of the war has been rolled to the vicinity of Badajoz, and in the plains of .Extremadura will its • last tremendous shock be felt. It is reported, that a reinforcement of 6000 ca valry and 10,000 infantry, are forthwith to be sent to Portugal. Lord PnoLa is to command tlie ca valry. __.r4.s+. _, L ... _..v~r - • - • - .0" - INTELLIGENCE. NEWS FROM THE ARMIES OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL ARMY OF' PORTUGAL. I iiaie the honour to inform your Highness, that on the 24 May, at day-break, I ordered the body of the army to pass the Agueda, at the-bridge of Rodrigo, and to proceed, the 2tl upon Marialva, the Bth and 9th upon Carpeo, with the reserve of cavalry; the 6th upon Espeja, with the rest of the cavalry. The movement was effected with much order, the advanced poets of the enemy were driven in, and the preparations which they had made to defend the defiles of Marialva, were rendered useless by the passage of the Azava, at Carpi°. This operaziott was executed without much obstacle from the enemy, and theie advanced guard 0 14 squadrons of cavalry, supported by scme hundred of fantassins, with artillery, was warmly treated to beyond Gallegos. The army took the following position : the 9cl corps in the rear and to the right of Gallegos: a division of the Bth on the left (Atha village, which was occupied by the ad vanced pots : the 6th in the rear of Espeja, and the 9th in reserve before Carpi°. The inforniaticin I had relative to the enemy, stated that they occupied, with 40 to 30,000 men, a fine line of battle behied the brook of Onero on a hill whose left, of difficult access , _ ' was sup- ported by Fort Conception; the right, more accessib le, was at Nava de- Avel; the head-quarters at Villa Formosa. Yet thie position of the enemy was not without danger to them, since they had behind their front the rocky bed cif the Coa and but -a single carriage communication, sufficiently difficult, by Castel &int. On the ad, in the morning, the army marched forward, the second corps forming still the right and proceeding upon Ala meda, a division of the. eel:, on the left of that village, and the 6th, with the cavalry, marched from Espeja upon Fuentes d'Onoro. My plan was, to proceed in force on the right of the enemy, and to seize the ceternfunication of Castel Born. In con sequence, and whilst the second and seventh corps, and the di-. vision of the eighth, kept thd centre of the enemy in check, I .proceetled towards the right with the 6th corps pursuing their rear guard, the greater part of which was warmly repulsed in Fuentes d'Onord. This village is hidden by the nature of the ground, and placed in part on the foot of the little hill which the enemy possessed. I hoped to carry it and keep it—l attatiked it, and it was soon occupied. The English General who saw a part of the line cut off• by the occupation of this important post, did nut cease to throw in fresh troops, and he got possession of it. The division Ferey, which was alone employed in this attack, had soon driven the enemy fron► the village. It lost in its turn ; in line, having seen it taken and retaken, I sustained the divisioe with tour battalions of reserve of the division of Marchand, with the 6th corps, and the greater part of the village rema nevi in our hands during the sight. In the mean time they exchang ed some caution in the centre, and they disputed feebly some small posts ; the village of Alameda remained with us. On the 4th, at day-break, the enemy, extremely uneasy at the • • occupation of Fuentes ii' Onor o , which opened us a debozuLe-in the midst of their line, endeavoured in vain to retake it ; they were warmly repulsed; they then filled with troops the avenues of the village, the rocks and walls the• ft:inked is, and ren dered, by all sorts of means, the entire occupation of the upper part of the village very difficult. Hence I saw thet the advantage would cost the army too dear, and I employed myself in the dispositions• necessary for a fresh stuck. I recor noitered carefully the flank of the enemy which were guwec.l by the cavalry and the militia of the county. I found an acces siblegroundbetween Nava de Aval and Posobello,aud I resolved to direct the army thither. The orders were cent oft• the even• tug, and the movements were executed during the night. On the sth, at day-break, the army was placed as follows : The Ist and second divisions of the .'th corps in face Sf Puso bello, having the :td division of the Bth in reserve ; al; the cavairt of she army waited under the orders of General fslontbrun, en the left of the infantry. The troops, placed opposite the right of the enemy, were destined to turn and overthrow it. The 8d division of the 6th corps, occup) hue a part of the village of . Fuentes d'Onoro, and destined to a:tack it again, formed the centre with the 9th corps, which was in the rear and in reserve. On the right was the second corps, the first division of which leaned upon Alameda, and the A had been placed interme diately between that village and Fuentes d Onoro. These corps of the army had orders to favour, by petty attacks, the grand movement of the army, and to manoeuvre in such a mai:- . ner as to unite with it in proportion as it gained ground tipoie the enemy. The village of Pusobello, and the woods that itiek it, were full of English infantry; they were viguruu;ly • attacktd ' by the first division of the 6th corps, and carried by the.bayonet. ' 113 e euerny lest many killed and made prisoners. The three TIIE NATIONAL itEGlslitit al of efficient rein• II FOREIGN ,t• d • I I .