, • • • , . . .. . . ; . • A. 't a . • • • '• fe .... ... , . . , . . ~....;.' - ... - . . . , .. . . ~ . . . TnE NATIOIIr • REGIWITR. - ~,' Cur Wag, 1 a* Laths. PLIBL ISbIED AT NO. 11, NEWCASTLE—STREET. STRAND. SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 11313. POLITICAL DIS2UISITION. STATE OF THE WAR. There are occasions when the pressing crowd of im portant events necessarily diverts the mind of the observer from the causes which produce them ; political speculations are suspended in the bdstle of the battle, and the considera tion of futurity is lost in the anxiety for the present. In our preceding numbers we have examined the constant, the terrible effects of the revolutionary spirit in Europe, and we are far from having exhausted the subject : but the recent occurrences of a war by which the fate of Europe is to be scaled for centuries, imperiously calls our attention to the sanguinary theatre of gigantic warfare. The natural and avowed object of BUONAPARTE'S first military operations on the re-opening of the campaign was the occuphtion of Breslau and Belli') ; and so confident was be of success, that those events were fondly anticipated by his most confidential agents. By the occupation of those two capitals he would have given to his arms a lustre of which he stands so much in need, in the present circum stances, to dazzle his enemies, his reluctant vassals, and his discontented subjects; by thus possessing himself of the countries between the Elbe and the Oder, he would have stripped the Prussian Monarchy, which he has doomed to destruction, of the provinces , which constitute its principal strength, and he would have approached his blockaded gar risons on the Oder, and on the Vistula, which still threaten the independence of Prussia and even of Russia itself. In pursuance of these objects, early after the expiration of the Armistice, he set out himself from Dresden, towards Breslau, at the head of his best troops, to attack Gene ral Ikuc nen, who commanded the Allies in that quarter, and who, having anticipated that movement, had traversed the ground declared neutral by the Armistice, and taken a position an the Bober, to cover the capital of Silesia. In the mean time a combined movement of all the troops of the Lower Elbe was to put him in pOssession of Berlin, which was covered by the CROWN PftittcE of SWEDEN, at the head of 110,000 men, in a strong position on the Spree, and supported by the fortress of Spandau. The French Generals taking the course of the Elbe as the basis of their military operations advanced towards Berlin by convergent marches : GIRARD from Magdebourg, OUDINOT and Vic- TOR from Bayreuth, and DAVOUST from flamburgh. In the mean time BUON AP ART E in person arrived on the Bober, and, according to his own account, forced the pas sage of that river in his way to Breslau, and obtained some trifling advantages. But while thus incautiously advancing to new conquests, he was unexpectedly recalled by an im pending danger which threatened his own personal ruin and that of the army he had with him in Silesia. Vol. VI. No. CC.XCIX. Parcz 9d• Immediately after the Armistice, sixty thousand Prussians and Russians joined the army in Bohemia, and, crossing the Elbe in that country, the combined forces, by rapid marches, suddenly appeared before Dresden, on the left bank of that river, and in the rear of Buot4AP ARTE. Had this bold and masterly manoeuvre bean crowned by the takingof Dresden. there would have been an end to the war ; for the retreat of BooK A PART E and his army would have been completely and irrevocably cut off. He, however, got notice of this move• ment from some spies, just in time to avert the danger, and, by a march of one hundred and twenty miles in four days, threw himself into Dresden with one hundred thousand of his best troops, the day before the attack, leaving MAC noNA t.D to defend the passage of the Bober. In the preceding num• ber we have offered some observations on the unfortunate failure of that attack, but our object at present is to take a general view of the state of the campaign of which it forms so important a feature, and without recurring to the circum stances of the sanguinary conflict, we shall notice its princi pal consequences. The movement of . the Allies npon Dresden in such coml. dei able forces, although ultimately unsuccessfuliss its princi pal object, bad still considerably deranged the plans of Be ONA• PARTE. The corps be had sent early to observe_ the defiles of Bohemia were no longer adequate to that object ; a new dislocation of troops became necessary to make head against • a formidable enemy on that vulnerable side, and accordingly the 2d corps and the Ist, under VANDAMME, were with. drawn from the army on the Lower Elbe, which was to ac against Berlin, whilst the greatest part of the troops Buos A PARTE bad withdrawn from the army on the Bober were di verted from the attack on Breslau to he employed on the same service. We shall see in the sequel the effect produced on the operations of those armies by that diversion horn Bohemia, but we shall, for the present, limit our observations -to the movements in that quarter. BUONAPARTE, in Lis Bulletin of the Both of August, an nounced that on the 28th, 29t!i, and - Both, his army had fol lowed up their success against the enemy retreating into Eo. hemia; that 66 VANDAMME bad, on the 29th, taken a posi4* tion on the mountains of that country, established himself there, and had sent several corps of light troops to scour the country, obtain intelligence of the enemy, and seize his ma• •gazines." In the Bulletin of the Ist September, which we insert, we find that the very. same Vaxp AM nr e, on t h e very same dav, was attacked, beaten, and killed by the Allies, with -the avowed loss of six thousand men and thirty pieces of can non ! so much fur the veracity of the Bulletins and Inc de pendance that can be placed on them. But this is not all ; and we strongly suspect from the expressions of that Bulletin itself, notwithstanding its studied obscurity, that ti e corps, commanded by VANDA.MME, is not the on:y one ►1 ruin and itself, notwithstanding its studied obscurity, that ti e Ist coips, commanded by VANDA.II:',IE, is not tile 911:y 01IC w No. 299.