It r • 1 94, . . THE NATIONAL ItEG.STER. Imaimm at our coasts sufficiently explained the true reason of . his forbearance. They were seen lined with a naion in arms, rot timidly awaiting the expected foe ; but breathing open defiance, sending her cruisers to chasten his pride, and appal his myriads, and her fleets and armies to reduce Ins 'colonial possessions. We-had become the assailants in a war originally defensive on our part. With an accu mulation of hostile lot ce before us, divisions of which had singly subdued powerfnl states, we enjoyed undisturbed tranquillity, catlied on the trade of the universe, and ex tended the sphere of our dominions. The effect which th prospect of on security and of our might produced, was such as the wisdom of our Statesmen, and the appre hensions of the en my, had anticipated. The conduct and course of the war had displayed in their true light the relativemeans and resources of the two countries. In the plenitude of her power and tie exultation of her pride, Fiance had not been able to inflict a ssraind on any limb of British Empire. In vain had she impressed almost the whole world into her service. The world that had obeyed her through fear, served her with reluctance, and now beheld our opposition with hope, our success with joy. At the hour of unequalled danger, reduced to de fend her own territory with her single means, unsupported, though fighting in the cause of mankind, England had pi-rived the superior magnitude of her resources, and the unconquerable heroism of her population. The offensive operations which she had undertaken showed that instead of wanting protection, she was able to yield it. This im portant point was no sooner ascertained, than Austria, who had laid down the sword only because she saw no Power capable of assisting her effectually, caught a spark of our spirit, and rising in confidence, in proportion as she had sunk in hope, wisely determined to renew the contest whilst the whole force of France was assembled on a distant spot, but rashly hurried to the field before she could be properly supported. She had secured the alliance of Russia, and relied on our co-operation. But ere the Russian armies could have passed their frontiers, and our supplies been shipped, she had sounded the trump of war, untimely warned the FRENCH EMPEROR of his danger, and rushed forward to meet his advancing le gions without considering that she thus encreased the dis tance which separated her troops from her. Allies, and the perils of the campaign. This error occasioned her ruin. France marchedber veterans from her channel coast to the banks of the Danube, ere the Russians had entered the territory they came to protect. Destroyed or captured in the fields of Bavaria which it had invaded, the Austrian army left Austria defenceless, whilst divisions of her Al lies only reached her capital a few days before it was summoned by the conqueror, and sut rendered to his power. After their junction with the weak remains of a numerous army, these auxiliary corps found themselves unable to keep the field, and fell back to the . farthest bounds of Mo ravia, where the main force of the Russian army had but just arrived. There the enemy followed them, and there was fought a battle which seemed to close for ever the destinies of the Austrian empire. - The Russian Autocrat retreated within his dominions by marches regulated by the will of the conqueror, and the descendant of the House of Hapsburgh only obtained the restoration of his heredi tary states, by tke cession of the most valuable and ex tensive provinces. A few months witnessed the opening and the close ofOthe contest. This war, which has justly been termed unfortunate, was so short in its duration, and so decisive in its nature for two reasons. The first, to which we have already J alluded, was the want of systematic and conj-ined tions. Neither time, distances, nor even numbers been calculated. Had prudence _guided the Au! councils, no hostile demonstration should have been until it could be rendered effective by the support adequate auxiliat Tforee. The time which the ltr Would spend in marching to a given point, should been compared with that in which the French reach it. The means which the latter possessed o: veying their troops with increased rapidity on a st emergency, should have been examined, and even caution should have been adopted to prevent the fot th . :! two empires from being assailed and beaten in The second reason is, that this war was waged on th of France by her choicest veteraas both soldiers and manders. The peace of the Continent, and the nat her hostilities towards us, had hitherto rendered the . out of a large number of conscripts unnecessary. V cies only had been filled. The suddenness of the A attack demanded instant opposition, and the Frene peror led all his disposable troops to the field, and 0: new corps to be formed to join him afterwards if nary. At the head of such warriors, and conn against an army chiefly composed of new levies, mutated the war before he had any occasion to c new corps into action. -------- He bad atchieved many triumphs, obtained a cured most important advantages : but he had purl them with the lives of his most valuable soldier former campaigns, he had intermixed his new Levi' a certain proportion of veterans, leaving enough latter to instruct, encourage, and lead on the form! keeping the rest in reserve for future emergencies. arrangement, the loss of men, however great, was r' in its consequences and importance, by falling conscripts, who could always be replaced, whil: who survived, had, by the constant example of the: panions, learned to despise danger, and acquired di+ activity, and experience. The sudden burst of strian war had rendered the usual adoption of th sure impracticable, before he entered into the field advantages which the blind rashness of the Austri mander had placed within his reach, could only be by rapidity of movement. He therefore hurried efficient force into action, without waiting for tl: poration of his raw levies with his experienced An army so composed, commanded victory, wasted by it. At the close of the contest, which ed before his conscripts had overtaken his veteran successful career, he found himself aggrandized tory but weakened in effective strength. Every blood, shed on his side, was precious. Every rn; was a soldier hardened by the toils of successi paigns, versed in all the stratagems of war, an, able to assume the command of armies. The such men was but ill supplied by youths, torn from their homes, and prevented by the speedy tion of the contest, from sharing in its operations, coming inured to hardships and to dangers. Fn period, France began to exchange her real strer that fictitious power, created by the recollection exploits, which overawes the minds of men of tire, and when brought to the test by some dari: shrinks into insignificance, or vanishes away terrors with which superstition invests a corpse. cipient decline of the French military force was by the subsequent war with Prussia, assisted by might of the Russian empire. The former haf • 1 4 2 1,1 Y 11111Mmuml• exer. .s had istrian made, of an Itssians I have could if con- sudden ry pre- Tees of detail. he part corn- tture cf . calling Vacau- ,ustrian ch Em- :)rdered neces- tending he ter- call the and se. rchased 'rs. In ies with • of the )er, and • By this reduced on the ,st those eir com- iscipline, the Au- his mea- d. The ian corn- ! secured his most he incor- I troops. but was happen- ts in their in terri- r drop of lan killed ive cam- id almost place of reluctant • ten - Irina- s, and be- roan that mgth, for m of past )nly for a •ing spirit, like the This in- hastened r the chief td reached