I • • 1!" V; `, I , 7 , 3 . 1 • .is ,7 • v. • . TE •• .4 Our ging; onititution, ann iathst. PUBLISHED AT Ito. ii NEWCASTLE-STREET, STRAND. No. 339. S SUNDAY; JUNE 11, 1815. PRreig 9d. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. OPENING AND PLAN or VW CAMPAIG'N. The grand political juggle is now accomplished. The ale ruiral CiAleges of France, the Representatives of the peo..le. the Dtputations frOm the Army and Navv, and all the au:ho , ities of the empire, have accepted the Ness Ciinstitu tiolia. Act, received Napoleon's oath of fidelity, and pledged their own The Atismiq of the Field of May has been more splendid than its programme announced; and if the loyalty of the French nation was previously betrayed by fear and treachery, its senses have now been dazzled and its enthusiasm i , omentarily awalcenod, by a display of pomp and rnagnificente csle;siated to seduce Hie imagination and to re call the most brilliant fictions of ancient romance. The eCeci of such exhibitions on the French character, is greater than it is generally imagined. Had Louii XVIII. given his people the spectacle of a coronation, his tights would have been considered as established, and he would have found hands to def nd them. and not merely hearts to pity his nisfortunes. The prevalence of perfidious councils alone can have induced him indefinitely to postpone that cere mony, in order to leave the crown more accessible to his artful rival at his intended return. Armed with revived influence, but conscious that unless supported by fresh incentives, the public fervour may quickly cool, Buonaparte seems resolved to seize this mo ment ti trust the capital to his Ministers and place himself at the head of his armies. He has probably already reached his head quarters, and the firing said to have been heard be tween Dunkirk and Ostend may have taken place to announce his arrival. At such a crisis,when we stand, as it were, on the rid4e of battle, what can be more interesting than to mark the approach of two mighty hosts and calculate their opera tiops That Buonaparte will be the assailant, we entertain but little doubt His interest is to anticipate the union of all the Allied faces, and by some brilliant enterprise, to give at its very co , iiinencement a complexion to Cie war, which %ill animate his adhclents at home and discourage the Royalists. A success over the Allies would produce more effec• the insorgents in the Knuth and West, than an army of Sn non met) eml , at.led against them ? Will he then rush at once itlto Belgium, and endeavour to increase Vol. 7 7 14 No. C‘;CLIX.X V.ll. rity by the destruction of our army ? No ; he will respect our troops; not only because their valour has been tried, but because he is well acquainted with the tactics of their com mander. Were Buonaparte to invade the Low Countries. the Duke of Wellington would avoid a battle and fall back. All the strongplaces are well garrisoned, and were the engine fo pursue his advance, he vrouid be compelled to weaken his artny in order to invest them. The farther be should proceed, the more he would be enfeebled ; whilst •ur cotn mander, retiring by his right toward the Rhine, would join successively the Prussian, the Germatt, the Austrian and Russian troops, in a word the whole mAs.s of the Attie:, whose march to the line of action would be consirierahly shortened, and who would easily overpower in opponent thus placed with reduced strength - at their mercy. Bat :t will he said, the people of Belgibm Might Hs* in favour of Auonaparte; Would not this give sufficient Lplendcur to his first operations to answer the purpose of a dash, and a sufficient increase of force to compensate for the corps detached from his army ? We reply no. — To advance after a battle would prove him victorio , “s to advance before one, rash. Besides, certain of beinK compelled to retreat as soon as he should have reached the concentrated power of the Allies, disgrace would follow too soon on momentary advantage, not to reduce his credit and the hopes of his friends to a far lower scale than at the opening of the campaign. The support of the pt of i t of Belgium would he nothing without the possession of the for tresses of that country, all of which would require a long and uninterrupted siege. lie would even forfeit that support for ever, when it would be found that he was forced to desert those who had ta'..en up arms in his cause. In s tead of eY• ecuting, therefore, he would only have counteracted all h's own designs, and greatly decreased, if not annihilated, every possibility of success. Where then will his f‘ , Ft attack b made? Will it be directed against the Prmi..lans who oc cupy the countries between Belgium and the Rhine, and in that case, might not their commander adopt the *a:ire plan as the Duke of Wellington, and retire before the invaders ? It is not impossible that Buottaparte should nlake his effort in that quarter ; and three reasons support that suppo• sition. First, Marshal Blucher, who c onmatiO s th e 14 1134 _ sians, possesses more courage th.lo discretion. Repeatedly, during the last campaign, he es posed his who:e army to &- kr., and was cnly extricated by the und.touted valuer his poputa- t;tructi • (s'P ••= ...~. .Ir4a.r,