TILE NATIONA had then no time to express, by a t'dious telegraphic communi cation, what' I meant to convey. We were all busily employed when i' was reported to me that several sail of the line aad fri - gates were coming to our assistance. I don't remember the first -chips that came down, but the Revenge,.! belief, amts the first Tine of battle s hi p. About three several ships came within hail ; I hailed them to anchor, or they would ground, we Insving taken our birth on the edge of the shore. It Y 4 as then falling tide ; several that had anchored opened their fire upon all the ships that were within reach, to wit, the Ville de Varsovie, Aquillon, and Calcutta. I made the signal that the Calcutta had struck, and sent a boat to inform those who were firing at her, that our boat was then on board of her. Upon which, the Indefatigable, and one other, trirned their fire upon the Ville de Varsovie and Aquilon, 1 ordered our people to cease firing; there were then shi p 5 enoug h to destroy the enemy with out the Imperieuse. Our pronle were much fatigned, and therefore rested themselves, with the exception of those sta tioned to repair the rigging. The other ships continied to fire on the Ville de Varsovie and Agoilon, until they :struck, which Vas I think at about six o'clock. The Calcutta. was set o,: fire, and the A qudon and Ville de Varsovie were emploven shii'iing the prisoners. The French were deserting several of their ships, with every boat that belonged to them, and sailing for the Rochefort river. An attempt was intended to have been made to burn the Ocean. Capt. Bligh volunteered his services, ('apt. Maitland regretted that on account of Capt. Bli4les previously having undertaken it, he was denied that opportunity to distinguish himself. I was too much fatigued to undertake it myself; 1 could scarcely stand from excessive fa tigue. They were not so much fatigued. The reason why it was not done, t only learnt since seeing the public dispatch in the papers. As the French had taken their boats to land their people, they were all ashore that night. and the next morning there were two or three chase marees in their stead lightening the enemy's by receiving various articles on board. There was no delay whatever to the best of MN belief, after the signal for assistance alas made upon the part of my Lord Gambier, in ordering vessels to our as sistance ; but had the :mark been made • in the morning, when the tide was falling, until past eight o'clock, and the enemy's ships were all with the exception of two, fast a-ground, the three-decker and two others, as shewn in the chart No. 2, lying close together to the windward, with their masts and yard apparently I rocked, it is my opinion that seven sail of the enemy, iacluding the three-decker, might have been destroy ed with great facility by two sail of the line, assisted by the frigates and smaller vessels ; and it is my opinion, that after the hour of half past 11, when the enemy's two ships lyid remained at anchor until the British fleet weighed, that the frigates Moue, assisted by the snriller vessels, might have destroyed the whole '1 of the above-mentioned ships, the rear of w hich afterwards were attacked. it being then four o'clock, the Court adjourned 611 the next day at nine. SECOND DAVE The Court re-assembled, according to ndinurnineot, at nine o'clock, when Lord Cochrane oai again called in. Q. Did it appear to your Lordship that there was any unne cessary delay on the part of the Commander in Chief, from day light in the morning of the 12th Alnii , when your Lordship made signal " that half the fleet would destroy the enemy," to the time when the Imperieuse and other frigates went in to the attack Of the enemy's skips in the afternoon of tkat (Jay ?—.l. Yes. When I expressed by signal to the Commander in Chief at daylight in the morning, that part of the British fleet tvere enough to.ffiect the destruction of the ettelny, there being the:i old v two sail of the enemy's slips capable iu any degree to resiA an attack, I did expect that an elideavoor would have been matte • on those two ship& from the situations of the enemy, in which they remained, by an attack, by two or three sail of the line, which were quite sufficient for that purpose. The tide and o ind wore, from eight o'clock in.the morning until pa•t twelve, to the blYst of toy recollection, both going; the same way, and the ships of the line, by passing near to the Boyart, and putting their helm a-lee, would have their fore and main-top- being to the mast, have hrou9t their heads to the N. E. which have enabled them to have brought all their guns to bear upon the energy's two ships, which still remained at anchor, until they approached them, or until so far to leeward that theN would have been enabled by putting their helms up, to run noder their stens hetweea the enemy's ships on shore, aid thereby ~~ I a.. • force them to cut and run a-ground, and then effect both their destruction and the destruction of the other vessels which wets on shore, and which I have already stated migit have been de. stro,edhy the endeavours, in my opinion, of two sail of theline, aided by the frigates, at any period previous to half-past eleven in the forenoon of the 12th of April, and by the fri;;.ces a!oile before one o'clock, when the French three.th.cked ship sae nogg to her hawsers, and when the last of her ships began to final, (I speak of the lice of hattle . ships, some of the frigates did not Boat), for the two ships wli had remained at anchor, and cut on the approach of the British fleet, had also grounded, thou .b not until even theta, at twelve o'clock, at half tide—water enough for then, to erect their escape up the middle of the channel, leading to the river Chr.rente. Court—Q. What were the circumstances that induced your . Lord, hi 0 to believe, that from eleven o'clock to one the frigates alone wero capable of destroying - the enemy's snips ?—The help less situation of the enemy, they being a ground, and the sante conviction which led tne afterwards to consider the riskattend ing it exceedingly small.—Q. If in your Lordship's ,judg ment the frigates alone were sufficient to c &et the destruction of the enemy's ships brtween eleven and one o'clock, vv by nigh. they not as *well have performed that service between any period of the morning and eleven o'dock ? A. .At eleven o'clock the British fleet weighed and stood towards the enemy, u here upon the two ships w hich continued still at anchor, cut and vita aground ; the British fleet anchored about half past eleven o'clock ; I was ignorant what my Lord Gambier's plan might be, and, though I concluded that the tires for cooking ha been nut, vet , I imagined that this might possibly 11:1ve h ..11 to give he signal, " something to eat or drink," previous to going into letion, and though I regretted the time that a ppeat ed in my mind to have been already as well as whit ar e were evi dently losing by even half an hour's delay of making onnie kind ofan atta , k by a couple of sai! of the line, or by the frigates only yet I consoled myself in the 'hal his Lgrilship intended a grand blow upon the island, and upon the ships at once; although I. thought this neither necessary, 'n order to el: feet the destruction, or prudent ‘‘i:h the t‘ hole tleot, I could not in any other way account for a proceeding that this er:l:led the helpless French ships to endeavour to make !eir escape un disturbed into the river Charente :—tweive o'clock aril V: no ;oat: signal was made to weigh—h.ilf-pat“ twelve, dill Here fhe Court sup:tested that this clf tail wa. quiteirreickant to the question, and consequent k mtterei the Coat I. to be elf..aeJ. On resuming. his Lordship coniiiittent-1 ordered the rahie tN he hove t;lnOit up and down; the seamei, re:ohi:.ed at :;vt.ir oars; the Etna bomb passed ; i ingotr o, at. I tack was intended to be made ott the .t JIS ( ed, I think, by Captain Chlfrey, that h. 0..- ~ • • .•,1 to no:,,oard lite enemy. I think there way h:'4,4 con► t. ;',l* him, I desired him to go close, and loom diafrly hove the 4i.chot to the bows. The impression upon in v mind wa' •ti tog t , eeti Du sig nal made to indicate:in attack, that no fur- Ayr attack, except that by throwing oas intended. The and most of the other ships, %were pressing sail to torte tin to .wards the Charente, and out of our reach (the Imperteuse) we did not c:Kantente to tire upon the enemy (mil two o'clock, was then only in time by firing upon the Calcutta, to Cu' nwn,„ or to cause the enemy to break (from tits confusion to oaich they were thrown), a hawser that led from her weather port. The same cause (that is. • to confusion of the enemy ) forced the Varsovie on shore, and there!). prevented the escape of these two ships, which were the last, with the exception of the lqui lon, which* vessel, though near, was a little farther op; and they ou board the Aquilon were in such colifusion, that it was up. wards of an hour if,ml an bilf before they could gel, ont• single Zutt Out of the stero.ports of that vessel, the whole of the etie ships of war were at two o'clo.-k itt the position shewn in chart \9. 3, which I shall represent to the cot. - . 1 ; and the British fleet are there put down as it appeared from the I inperi. eitFe, from the anchorage which she took up. and in which an , ehorage she continued until one o'clock, close to the Iloyart shoal, just within the longest drip of shells from her on the Isle D'Aix; nekiret did not fire at :111. The reasons Are, if there any, why tile frigates might not, previous to the hour of half past eleven, attack the enemy, will be found in my preceeding narra tion, wherein it appear; that two sail of the line still coutiuned at anchor until the hour of half pa. 4 eleven, which two ships it apile;:red to my mind, it ttottid ha.e been better to attack, by opposing to them two or three sail of the line, histead of a ;;realer otinibet• of frigates; although it was my opioion, that the frigates themselves would have been quite equal to the task. The enemy's two ships were entyloled all the more-