TFr E NATIONAL R MIST ER. of Sir J. Murray ; and that the British 'arms had been more dis. graced than they ever were on any former occasion. That he hail emit an Officer with the intelligence to Lord IVellington ; and he anticipated, under the same command. only a repetition of the sante disasters and deplorable consequences which he had already des. tidied." He (the Deputy JoiLe Advocate) should rest his own charges on the statements of Sir 3 Murray himself; which, how ever, it would be competent to Admiral Hallowell to controvert. Tile third charge, though not contradictory to. was perfectly uncon tieeteii with, the two first. The . first related to the siege of Terra. gi-or and toe delay in raising it, even after, in SirJolist's own formal ni m, the success of the enterprise hail become hopeless. The • ••./,/ wa•, that he had disobeye ' iristruetious isi embarking only a 1 , of his army. and in subsequently disembarking them. The ••iargerl, that the force, when embarked from before Tona l', 4. as embarked in a hurried manner, so as to sacrifice the ob jet.: • •i.,ted out iu Lord ‘Vellington's letter, and to disgrace the , • ••!iiraeter •if the country, by abandoning various trophies to ruachiiay, ialemy. The position of the army was supposed to strong, as to enable the British Commander to operate ag ••t the Hanks of the enemy's force, either immediately or by • is of a naval expedition ; and accordingly isi time mem o randa of 1.. ry 1 Welleigton, these objects were distinctly recommended. By • o• inAroctions he was directed, in the event of being ti lla ble t,, morm Tarragoaa, to get possession of the open port of V.lencia, and to a•ivaiice his position so as to compel the enemy to retire to the others.i.lc or' the Lower Ebro. It' Suelset stod(' he too strong, and Tarragona should still be enabled to hold out, this was the oh jest which Lord Wellington expected to see accomplished. He was also directed to land as far to the north as possible, in order that iiiiclietts lot ce being weakened liv the diversion of' part of it to Tar racoon, the other purpose might be facilitated in its execution. Every thing illustrated the clearness of Lord Wellington's views.— Timislated copies of flies.e instinctions hail been sent hy his Lord. ship to t!e• Doke del Parque. Elio, and Copons.—{here Mr. Lars pent mad theqe irremorandal—They intimated his Lordship's taw prize at the alleged want of artillerymen, particularly as there were the two companies which had been futon,) sufficient at the •torming tit 11 a l.rjns , and expressed the impossibility that existed of advanc ing, further supplies to the Spani; It troops. The nature ot, the entire tome nailer Sir J. M. was *.lescribeil, and time sii..cess of the plan stated to depend on the circumstance of none of the different corps bent:: dispersed. He wits directed to take with him as many cavalry irs•coold be conveyed in the tiansporti, and the rest to remain with the Spanish Generals. General Copons was to lie reinforced from Gantt-art ; and the different armies were to keep lip a eaaatautt coins ninnication. 1:0011 as Tarraemia had Callen. Sir John was to eats. blish the kingdom of Valencia, leaving Don Min tin istliftid with one He should not enter into the question whether Tarragona ought to have been taken, or whether a gineral action ought to have heen fought with Sachet ; but he conceived it to have been quite clear. that if the siege was to be raised, and on the reasons alledged in Sir John's dispatches, the delay which he suttered to intervene ought not to base taken place. The next letter which he should read was Sir John's own account, dated the 7th of Jnly, in the camp, before Tarragona. This letter intimated to Lord ‘Vellineton. that he (Sir J,) had, he feared, undertaken more than be could perform ; .that Sachet had 2 &,000 men at his disposal ; that he had himself bin 19 , 0 00, and of these only 4009 Germans and British that tie could rely' ; that though willing, his army was weak, and in want of clothes and money. 1:v this letter, it appeared. that so early as the '7 . 111 he had desp a i re d o f t h e capture of Tarragona, Had lie imme matelysailed, as directed, for Valencia, the other object was still to be gained. 'l'lle second letter, dated the 9th, mentioned Colonel Prevovt's success in the attack of Fort St. Phillippe, and that the approach to Teo ragona was then impeded; praised the .-:.aeady of Admi ra l H a ll owe ll i n his cooperation ; and stated, that he was informed that Sachet was approaching in groat force. The next, dated on board the Malta, 14th of July, described the neces• city that Gad obliged him to embaik ; Singlet litiving collected about ::3,000 men, and no other alternative being lett hot to fight age. in!ral amain, noiler every disadvantage. awl scarcely the possibility ''s reircat. That the embarkation, it' any longer delayed, might be 14 . .eteiited by a change in the weather, or by the activity of the ("Italy. That he hail, after deducting 2090 men to covet the stores, only 1600 • men to meet an army o f t h e b est Frown soldiers in the service. That, as it was iininag.ihle to stbrin Tarragona, and so munch depended on the safety of his army, he had deemed it prudent to raise the siege, and only regretted that he had not done so at au earlier period. That no blame was imputable to Admiral Hallowell, but that he had thought the risk too great to adopt his auggestiono et waiting another day to bring off his ordnance, the importance of which he dhi not think ought to be put in the scale with the safety of the force under his command.—But why had Sir John, ester receiv ing the information of which he had been in possession for some day., delayed so long.to raise the siege, and even continued to the last hour to land artillery and stores? Another letter of the same date served to shew the fluctuating opinion of the Commander in Chief, and admitted that the enemy had not acted with the expected rapidity. Then followed the dispatch to Earl Bathurst, and a long address to Lord Wellington (in obedience to his Lordship's re (pest), of the progress of the siege, and the whole operations of the corps since the time of disembarkation. All these documents hu (.lr. Larpent) submitted to the Court, tarnished no justification tier the delay of the General in coining to a decision of such vital inniroalt hod' to the satisfy of the army and the ultimate success of the other object of the expedition. Neither did they exculpate his conduct he not returning immediately to Vsleneia, where the French were then reduced to 11,000 men. Sir Jolt had, in filet, in his let- ter to Lord Bathurst, written his own condemnation; for he there ascribed to a misplaced anxiety, the defect of all the plans which he bad been entrusted to execute. Auralter letter to Lord I'l 7 olog:ten contained a Still more detailed statement of all the circumstances which had idiot need Sir J. in the course he had porsned, viz. that there was no point d'appui to which, in case o a reverse, he could retreat; whilst the enemy had strong fortressea behind him, and was lunch superior to him in every respect, except in ()Mueller; that G en. Colons had been linable to athird him any assistance t I and that he had delayed to raise the siege so long in the confident expectation of heinforcements &e. That he had been also disap. ! pointed in the hope of receiving some additional strength from Lard W. Beistinek. and had, under such a combination of disadvantages, taken that step that prudence appeared to prescribe. He then read the statement of Gen. Stich( t's force, as it appeared from the papers of King Joseph, which tell into the hands of Lord Welling. me by which it appeared to amount to ',e,ttr.n) men, of which 1,817 were cavalry. Sir John Murray had be en fully convinced in his oon mind of the impossibility of taking Tarragona, beforche ! had been lauded e 4 honrs. The principal engineer had given hit 1 op:niton that the place could•not be taken in less than 1.-S•or 15 dam 1 and this was a length of time that it would be imprudent to venture to remain there. After he had made Ids res,lution to raise the siege, the days of the 10th aml 11th ought to have been employed I in providing for the embarkation of the artillery and stores, as Weil as of the army. Ott the contrary, it appeared that Sir J. permitted the landing of artillery, ammunition, and stores. as well as of the; army. up to the very moment when be ordered the re-cm ' harkatiim of the troops. Ile had also to state, that the 1 French had not advanced as far as Vendril, but had fallen Iback open' hearing of Sir E. Pellew's. arrival in the Bay .of .Ros • ans. Ile should now proceed to the considersrion of Ow second charge. lAs to the cunduct of Sir J. after the siege was raised, lie oar, been di -1 rected, by his instructions, to return immediately to Videnci., tor tSe attainment of an object specifically pointed out. It seems that Sir 3. was not sulticiendy impressed with the importance of adhering to his instruetions. lie violated both the letter and spirit of those instructions ; for, instead of immediately returning to Valencia, he re-landed the • army at Balaguer on the ISth and 14th of June, and was still in the F neighbourhood when Lord Bentinek arrived on the 17th. The noes. fun then would he, Find he any sufficient motive for this deviation I Iron, his instructions ? If he had obeyed his instructions, he would have been in Valencia on the 17th, whereas 1 e was then at Baisguer. As to the third charge, lie should leave that to the gallant Admiral who • the prosecutor of it. The frets were. however, proved, of a . very i 4 n . ipitate ernbaikation of the army, with the loss ot the artillery and stores. It remained bit Sir John to shew that this precipitation was necessary. Be believed that the fact was also, that Gen. Capons had no notice ot his intention, until the guns were already spiked. and II great part of the army on board. It was impossible fur him to foresee iii what mann-r Sir J. would shape his defence; but from the letters which had been read, ha thought it evident dist lie relied a good deal on the VAll paragraph of Lord Wellitteton's general instructions, would forgive any thing. except having the fate of the next campaign risked by any of the corps of the in o Inch his Lordship said, that he ilrlll v being dispersed. II did nut appear to hum that S ir 3. should have peculialy to himself. 'in t. i w is i i:: l e d red ra t i l h i le i. r p a n p rt pe o n f r O t i l e la i t ns i t i r i t i t s o w io a n s s i i : e a d u ir t e t e i:r e‘ t i he So inivli Gen rats, who, from a too great reliance on the quality of 'Leh- troops, had frequently exposed their divisions to t' e danger of deters. Lord Wel litigt,n conceived that the principal advantage of thy Spanish troops over the Fiench could • oily be from having a superiority of numbers. and he e idled them always to preserve this superiority. How could that paragraph be a defence to hitu fur persevering in the siege ei Tap JAN. 2'2. _.._ • ~..