THE NATIONAL REGISTER. • - • u 'Y Our ftinu, Coniltitution, anb ILatuO. SUNDAY, MAY 21, 1809. No. 73. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. NIOSIBER SEVENTY-ONE. RELATIVE STATE STATE OF SWEDEN, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND. The present state of Sweden is not understood in propor tion to its importance. The people have seldom any at tention for inure than one point or object. This political negligence, however, is not sanctioned by reason. In po litics, as in domestic economy, the grand result almost a!- ways depends upon what in itself appears unimportant. But a few weeks are elapsed, since Sweden, and the Kiln: of SWEDEN, were as much overrated as they are now un derrated. We remember the time, when the common cry, both in Parliament and out, was, that it was equally in cumbent upon the prudence and the genc-osity of the pub lic to pour the whole resources of the kingdom into Swe den, to consider, the Swedish cause as ;he immediate cause of this country, and to fight for Stralsund as for Dover. This clamow, like every popular clamour, secs unreason able, and the Ministry of the day are entitled to lasting praise, that, in giving way to it in appearance, they eluded its absurd extremity in practise. Sir Joey Aloofly was sent to the aid of the King of SWEDUN, but his instructions were discretionary, and he exercised this dis , ,retion so as to return without doing any thing. He saw, in fact, that the state of things was such as not to justify any extraordi nary interposition on the part of England. He saw that nothing was to be done, and he exercised the sumer rudence in Sweden. which he afterwards exercised in Spain, and whiCh perhaps equally saved us in hoth—ta return without making an attempt, where such an attempt could only be fruitless. Immediately upon the present Ministry coming into power, they concluded a treaty offensive and dofensive, with the King of SWEDON, and stipulated to give a monthly trabsidy, in order to keep the Swedish armies in the' field. We cannot but consider that this treaty was a most mate rial error in policy. There certainly are cases in which it ii wise to subsidise, and it even may be .made a question, whether in all possible cases of Continental alliance, it is not better to assist by subsidy than by a proportion of our troops. We can better spare our money than our men. ind under proper application our money may he most ef fieient. But in all questions of subsidizing, the. first. point to be determine:l is, what is the value of the zliipilce and co-operntion.hroci ?Is it worth the price, which is de manded of us in subsidy ? If this question he determined in the negative, it is surety an error in prudence to ptir chase any thing at inure thaa its worth. There will be no end of subsidizing, if subsidies are to be given and mins.; mired according to the wants and wishes of the : partiesto be subsidized. There is a very considerable danger, more over, in the principle of subsidies, lest the too frerineat and liberal practice of them should impair the , re;litary spirit of the country, and deteriorate our reputation at home.and lI.—No. PRICE 9d, abroad. A nation, like an individual, will not be much' respected, who is considered as fighting by his purse ra, ther than by his sword. In point of fact, such a nation would not deserve esteem. The treaty concluded with Sweden offended against both these circumstances. It was an imprudent bargain, and it was made under circumstances, in which it argued that we were proceeding upon a system of purchasing war. Its improvidence has been evinced by its unfortunate result, and should have been anticipated by a due consideration of the relations between France and Sweden. Who for ex ample, with any attention to the relative strength of France and Sweden, would have indulged a moment's ex pectation—either that Sweden could act as any consider• able diversion, or that she could support herself against the concentrated strength of France. Sweden, as separated from Russia, was most perfectly inefficient as to produciO4 any effect upon France. Under such circumstances, it' ja really inconceivable what could : have . induced the present Ministers to conclude such a treaty. It would have been infinitely more wise, and more generous, to have employed their influence on the KING to persuade bin, to consult the interests of his kingdom, and give peace to Sweden, than b/ this pecuniary temptation to encourage him 'to contiLw.p , the war. The King of SWEDEN, in fact, appears to us to have fallen into his present state under two causes i—in the firait place, by his o*n intemperate nature—and secondly , by tb direct impulses and seductions of his allies. nit Brit'i Ministry, in their eagerness to procure co-opeiatipi), hOtt overloOked the important peints,..how far such cu-operao tion could be °limy value s and whether it would not more materially injure others, than benefit ourselves I If the British Ministry, indeed, had duly considered . the actual condition of the kingdom of Sweden, its narrow re= sources, its weak Executive, and its seditious and turbulent aristocracy, they would never have suffered the yeuag ging to have persisted in a war, which could have no other tor. mination than his ruin. They would never hate . Ott otily suffered, but encriii raged him by a pecuniary subsidy, to persevere in a war as hopeless of any favourable issue , as it *as pregnant witt}. mischief. The Ministry on the other band, eager to pro cure an ally, and to keep hiri, seethed most totally to have overlooked the necessary consequences, which must result to that ally himself. We. feel same pain in imputing such selfish and narrow policy to the Government of this coun try ; but under the evident circumstances of the ease, it is very difficult to acquit them.of it. The King of Swains seems to have been encatmtaged iu a course which could have no other tertninatioatban his ruin*. , Nothing appears more • surpriviag than the perfect trig quillity with which MIS Atirolution' has been effected:--• SWeden at present is as i lls if' ribping 11*(1,Opened. Not a voice is heard 'in favour of the king. , 'l'ol - :c3ce is this unanimity on a point which was surely calculated to cr.!' forth the feelings and passions of a'Veliplec and par- _ ticularly of a people so charaqvistieally loyal as Lb.