k , •^Agur tine, anb titb3s. .t • ~: TM ' ' r,., • " THE NATI av e A REGISTER : • ,tution PRICE 9d. although abio; SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 1811. 0 1,ITIC4L DISC, No. 169. , SPAIN. It is impossible to look at the present tittiation of rmies in the South of the Peninsula, without feeling a deep conviction, that the fate of ;he war will speedily be decided in the neighbotzrhood of Badajos. Indeed this fortress is become the key of Estremadura, without which we cannot attempt to penetrate into that. province, and deprived of which, the enemy, in the reduced .state of their troops in Spain, cannot resist our progress. As long as the attention of our whole army was occupied, either on the, not them frontiers of Portugal, or in its ;wrench mc nts before Lisbon, by the force under IIIAS . SEN3 before it had experienced any considerable reduc tion, the possession of Badajos was not of s•) much importance to the French as it bas now become. They wanted, then, no fortress to protect the freintierS. of the South of Spain, which were threat el*bi tr vnemnr.,"luld'ltlie.caliettre - rsf - Dtteijiis only became advantageous or necessary when, in order to effect a diversion in favour of MASSE` A, SOUIIT in vaded:the Alentejo. The late events •of the war have. produied a total change. The flight of the grand French - army out of Portugal, and its defeat at - Duas Casas, compelled &MA' to retrace his steps; at the same time it enabled Lord WELLING.- TON to divide his troops, and to form in the South a force sufficient to act on the offensive. Threatened in his .turn, SOULT retreated into Estremadura, and Badajos became the shield of that Province. Conscious of its increased importance, the French Commander provided it With a strong garrison, in order that it might check our advance, ivhilst he should collect reinforcements and form an army nu. therous enough to meet airs on the field, and to give the French arms= opportunity ofrecovring the glory and fame they had lost. Albuera witnessed the migh tsf conflict, and the completo defeat of his best troops and his intentions. Yet he knew the object was too important to be abandoned without a second struggle. He knew that if l3adajos was suffered to fall, our army, reinforced from the main body in the ncrth, would rapidly advance towards Seville. He fore saw that in that case the siege of Cadiz must be raised, and the kingdom of Grenada Pol. IV. CL241:X,117 perceived that these lutely nececessary, would only serve to create new difficulties and dangers ; for the raising" of the siege , of Cadiz must be attended by the invision of An: dalusia by our troops and the Spaniards in that quarter ; and the evacuation of the kingdom of Grenada by an immediate insurrection of the people. At the same time it was evident that if Vicron re:. mained before Cadiz and our army proceeded to- Seville, Sotwr would be too weak to defend that city, and would be compelled to fall back upon the capital, thus leaving VicTott and the troops in Gre nada cut off from any communication with Madrid* or with France, and reduced either to force back their way through superior numbers, at the same . time maintaining an incessant contest in the rear or like General DUPONT to surrender prisoners of war. In order, if possible, to avert these threaten ing perils, SOULT, it now appeal-s, has collected reinforcements from every quat ter whence troops could be detnched, without so far' %veal:ening WO garrisons, to which they tikOnged, as; to encourage the people to take up arms. He has also beerr joined by some battalions horn MiteSENA'S army, and at the head of a force, fully equal, if not su perior, to that • under Lord WELLINC-rox's co:v. mand, is now advancing a second time to attempt the relief of Badajos, and by our overthrow, to secure the possession of the South of Spahr, which now entirely depends On the issue of the next battle. For should he meet with a fresh defeat, ,it woula be impossible for him to delay any longer the sur render of Badajos; and all the dangers which we have already enumerated 'kvould cease to be pro spective. They would to upon him, and th 6 other French divisions in the South of the ?enin.- sula with even greater effect than before as theit weight would be encreased by his new disasters o and his ability to resist them proportionably 414114 niched. Once driven froth the Smith of Spain, the French would invainattempt to Maintain themselves in the capital. Their losses, which mtist then t onsist . not Only of the men killed, Wounded, or taken pri soners on the field, but of the whole of Arivrtnt's divisions; would be too great to be speedily repaired* whilst the impulse given to the hatiottal mind would create fresh armies in those provinces still occupied by the enfeebled enemy,- and ere the artiVals if they could be frintiml? . . evacuate 1111 W, litlireelli.satio 9 ". • 4.- -. :,- • : . --' --. za • .. irl . . • . •:-. ...: . v • . , • . ' 11 -:, •t - -.4:-1 - • _ ... h .....„ , 1/442,_•,.7 s