THE NATIONAL ItEGISTER. tremity of 'Spain to the other, he must leave in every pro `. ince Mt overruns from twenty to thirty .housand, if ht wishes to secure his conquests. If he will expect an:. favorable result, he must divide his army ; and of the da ,ger of such an expedient, the fate of i/upont's corps convince biro. Another considerable disadvantage for the enemy is, their not being able to employ a numerous cavalry, ton a scarcizy of forage; for in - the middle of May all the vegetation of the Champa gn country is burned up by the excesNive heat. To what extremities this will reduce les foraging parties may be easily conceived. F ro m the s am e plosical cause they w not even be able to employ tha tiemendous train of artillery, which has had so decisive a,. influence in all their wars. In fact there is nut one coml• try le Europe, where a numerous invading army has , greater obstacles to surmount, a nd le ss p ro b a b i l i ty 0 1 success, if the inhabitants are determined to tesist. Let us now examine what assistance this couutey can ren der the Spaniards, under a military point of view. We will not achert to the number it may he expedient to send II their assistance; nor will attempt to discover the desiana tMn of the expeditions fitting out. But if we make a judi cious use of the military posit ,ons we have in the Mediter ranean, we can always make an important diversion, on several sides, in their favour. c can render them, at the same time, a pass.ve assistance, which may be as eflicaci : °as as the nust a. tine co-operation on our part. We um. only sotlect the greater part of our regular troops now in Englann, anti encamp them opposite Holland or Brabant, with a sumeient number of transports always in readiness, mid the trench will be compelled to keep 50,000 men to protect the menaced points ; whilst the uncertainty of our attack increases the,r alarm and augments our aggrcssise means. We should occasionally embark eight or ten thou sand, and annoy the i rench coasts, which will keep then. in contin tat anxiety from th e a pp re h ens i on o f our ma ki ng a deice nt. but we must not confine ourselves to idle de leretst rations. %%believer a favourable opportunity offers. He; should eflect a lauding, ravage the country. carry ofl the cattle, and lay the whole coast from Calais to Mar seillcs contribution. This proposal may be repug nant. to filo conscientious and humane ; but they do not re flect that false principles of humanity, in a crisis like the present, arc attended with more fatal consequences, and more destructive to mankind, than the most barbarous mode of warfare. }or the French, during a great part of Ma war, having suffered no direct losses, and having con sequently est aped Cie pressure of the calamities they have bro..glit on other states, are more indifferent as to its con timetnce. They have at present no plausible pretext 01 in :inuring against, or resisting the pernicious ambition of The tyrant who oppresses them. But were they to feel in their own houses, or in their own fields, the distresAes alluded to above; were they to be spectators of the de viiatation of their own country, they would raise such cries, as u otA have more effect in restraining the ambition of Eon :p..rte, than perhaps any other event which could ocean It may be objected, that this vigorous retaliation would only tend to increase the animitsity which subsists bet!yeen the two countries. We will not 'answer this objec tion by asking if the French would act in the same manner towards us, had they it in their power.--They certainly woald. as the people of this country are not in the habit of jn.:ifying their actions by the example of thi:t ! rod restless nation, we will rather defend it oa the expediency of disgusting them, bs the misery they mill sutler th - anselves, of their tame acquiescence in the most i!i i 2; .ions projects of their master. They are heartily tired, there is no doubt, of the oppression they labor under. The calamities they would suffer from this new mode of warfare would probably increase their hatred of us bat tti^y would convince them at the same time, more forcibly than any other circumstance, of the ruinous con.' sequences of their abject submission to an immoral tyrant. JITTT We should, however, make a d aereace be. lit,,, t n aerself and the states the cotiyuei..d. Our uesc..nts sty ac confined totally to the former; and by this jud and humane discrimination, we s,ioulri impress on the u. of the French, that me were their enemies from 1, 0 0 inotiv e, but because they were the common entii,. every other state. All this time we have only adverted to the assistance paniards have to expect from this county: Let us • urn our attention to the continent. tit e there het ustria awaking from bet lethargy. Evt ry account .eriiiany and Holland inclines us to believe s:,c egiect the favourable opportunity. Ghe has tie exiii d fate of Prussia before her: in retivintili•• her ani .ncrcases the anxiety .and difficulties of ho will never pardon, should he succcud dgainf,t p '.er troublesome and dangerous nectraiiiy. but ;lit!" reason to believe that the Cabinet of Vienna is so hi 'o her true interests. The Archduke Charles, who is uttered by every patriot in Germany, as the iast prop Austrian, and even German, independence, is toe el, I ghtened to overlook the present advantages. His nienr # patriotism, and abilities as statesman and general, arc iie.- :her sufficiently known, nor appreciated in this count He possesses a decided influence over the minds nf countrymen. He is equally loved by the Hungarian, the ';ohemian, the Austrian, and the Iviorav iani and the sol lier has always felt, and acknowledges the effects of his humane solicitude. The new arrangement of the Austrian army is admirable: it is di' itted into ten corps in imitation of the French. The command of the respective corps is given to generals ofdis • •nguished abilities and great experience. Prince Lichten stein, Counts Bellegarde, klenau, and General Zach, de serve the highest measure of confidence, and enjoy a high reputation in the Austrian army. And as the A e rchiluite harles's patriotic exertions, are no more impeded by t ourt intrigue, or the personal aversion of the fate Lm i.ress, we may conclude that the organ zation of the rest of the army corresponds with the choice of the generals. From these and other circumstances we are coi.vinced, hat Austria will declare war against France before ihe he. ;inning of September, and probably sooner. She spewed P. disposition to resist before she could have received any account of the Spanish insurrection: what influence this sarcumstance will base on her resolution may be easily surmised. And in case of an event of this kind occuring, can Bonaparte expect' from the Princes of the Rhenish cc nfederacy the assistance he received during the Prussian war. If those degraded Princes are influenced by the same feelings and impressions which actnate the generality of men, we may boldly pronounce them to be heartily tired of their state of vassalage. The capricious and ar rogant character of their Protector, with his treatment of .he Pope and of the Royal Family of Spain, must con ince them that their security is precarious. They have :ot forgotten, that, under the Germanic constitution, they enjoyed as much independence as the most ponerful sove reigns in t urope. They cannot fail to contrast the dignity of a Prince of the Roman Empire, with their present de gradation as vassals to an insolent soldier of fortune. Therefore, if Austria knows how to make a proper use of this dissatisfaction, and promises them forgetfulness of th past, she may see them fighting her battles for her, instead of ..o;nbatinp.; under the banners of Bonaparte. Such is the revolution, which a few weeks has eft•cled in the state of Europe. There are none of our reade; - s so luke-warm, or so ignorant of our true interests, as to be i..•.derent to tht security and advantages it holds out to An enlightened policy, with a just indignation at t h e Miquitous treatment of a brave and unsuspecting peop .e, and the strong interest we feel as freemen, at scene g a system of universal oppression likPly to he estra • e all these suggest the necessity of a decided concurr ence ? on •in the part of this country, in favour of the Spanish patriots. 450 17. ranee Coq,' oilier 1) of e the I how. from itot inlo o odes, pain, !re is con- If of en- T JU Our etror remi pave ;her jug' mar met re v II: fox