a t i/ 1 X I'. 03 :~ - - THE NATIONAL REGISTER . . h, o co,;.vin, and by a stron g ; position. They were • Harked 104, nrd- the by 13 cannon in the late of Aix towards ;Ito 11. ly.si , ! , .‘ the mortars on that The frigates were stritioaleil to t he 14. of then), apparently for the purpose of flttoking the island on ti.! , other side of them, and as a protec tion ggaiiist boats or Ere vessels. Between Aix and the Buoyart I do not know of any shoal. The water is nut steep 4t kit, but shelves grail off toward? the hathcor. . Q. At w hat ,ti-tanee frill.. the enemy was tha.British squadron milord on Ole t.ve.aitn; of tae 11th of April, immediately previ ous to the attack I,v the fire ships; and what ; was his streugth Was the situation in your judgment properly chosen, and what was the ss Intl and tide ?—A. To the hest of my judgment, the enemy's squadron were eight or nine miles between the time of my nrrivul and tlic morning of the 12th. 1 believe the Bri, tish !•quadron oninoored that night bat I do not of my own know ',lige know. The position chosen by the cqtamander in Chief was a very good position for bloctiading the .enemy, and for si:erving any material movementof their squadron. Hay. i n?,. already meat iolted toy opinion of the distance, it must he ob vious that the destruction of the enemy could not be effected while in that position by the ships there placed. The wind was pot the same in the eveoing as it was in the morning. At eight P. M. of the 11 th, tit • loci must have been about due N. I be lieve. The tide at Cie same time began to run towards S. E. The strength of.the British squadron was eleven sail of the line, besides nine frigates and one bomb. Q. Did it alipear to your Lordship that the Admiral made every arrangement for preparing and sending the fire-ships against the enemy Every possible assistance, Sys well us Admiral Stopford, and the Captains of the fleet ? Q. Were, the frigates and other smaller vessels properly placed for affording every qcsisiaL;e l qncl 14eitig otherwise Very judiciously placed.' :Wearing Ity the signal leg of the Caledonia , that your Lordship had by signal acquainted Lord Gambier that seven of the enemy's ships were on shore, and might be destroyed, was it your Lordship's opinion at the time of the first signal, that it would have been expedient for the Commander in Chief to have sent in half of any number of his ships, fitc. and if so, was there a probability that such ships could have got out agaiq in safety ? --A. I did make the signal. The Imperleuse .being the nearest ship. placed by his Lordship for the guidance of the tire-ships, and haying had the charge of these vessels I thought primer to Fommunicate to his lordship the state in which they appeared to me to he, which I did by the signals mentioned. It is my opinion that a much smaller force than half the fleet would have been se fficisnt. The sig nal was directed by the. Caledonia to be repeated. I ordered the signal to be made, that two sail of the line were enough, which 1 have since under stood was not made, but that the Officer repeated the pre vious signal. The tact was, that he thought it would be an in sult to make that signal, and therefore repeated the former tignal, leaving it la the dicretiop of the Commander in Chief to send what force he thought praper. /porn the time that the tirst signal was made in the morning until eight o'clock, it was ebh-tide ; the title was going to wind-ward; at eight o'clock it was low water. There is anchorage for at least six sail of the line at any time, clear of shot and shells. The Imperieese htesed in going in close to the Bunyart. It was then nearly igh water, at half past one o'clock in the day ; coming out it was also high water in both of these courses there was sta. eient depth of water for vessels of any size, The impression upon my mind is, that there is water enough at any time ; but Paving, been there only at high tide, canuot swear to that. rovided the tide does not rise and Fall more than lit feet there ; and this is mentioned in a French chart now jii Court. I have no ether means of judging. 1 can speak with certainty as W the depth at water, if the rise and fall of the tide js not more than lit Feet and I then think there is depth etmugh at any !lime of the tide. l think the ships coeld have got out as safe as the others didafterwards. Q. Is it meant that there is room for six it of the line to range at any time clear of slint and shrift There is ; we were there at aI4 times of the tide. it was the heighth of the spring, and there was five fathoms and a quarter Roder our Wilma, and Prom five to six fat hops for a tiistanee . round about us, sutlicient for six sail of the line. The bearings of this place are correctly noted in the leg, which I held in my hand, and iv hick I wilt p,rodisce. Q: Are all the circumstances mentioned in this log accurate and true, according to the treat of your Lordship's knowledge and belief ?—A. They are. Q, Did the Commander in Chief in Consequence of the signals afterwards weigh with the large ships, and at What time gamete anchor off the Isle of He weighed I think at eleven - o'clock, and anchored about half an hour afterwards, having both wind and tide in has favour. The position taken up by his Lordship was nearly that which I offer to skew to the Court upon the chart No. 2, in oitich is stiewn the situation of the enemy from day-light, in the morning of the 121 h,: until the two French ships which remniaed at anchor cut or sliped upon his Lordship's. roaring towards them.—Q. Wits the' position they taken the most advantageous for carrying into effect the object of the signals made by his Lordship; and might that position have 'beer; taken at an earlier period with advantage to the service It was a good position to observe the enemy, but it was not a position for attack. Certaittly it was a go , al posi• lion for observing the transactions of the pneaky ; and, being near,assistauce might have bees sent to any vessels, had an attack been 'made trpoia the enemy, that position nsigl ; have been taken at day-light, when ea attack might have been usede with advantage to the service. Q. It appearing by the log-book of the Imperieuse that you having previously sent in a than to pike the soundings, you weighed at half-past 11 A. M. ma the Utla of April, and run into harbour, in company with the Etna bomb and a gun brig, the euemy making suit up the Charente, and at 2 I'. M. anchor ed, and shortly after came to close action with the Ville de Varsovie, did you weigh and advance to the enemy by signal from the Commander in Chief, or did you do so without orders, by signal ar otherwise 1-4. .1 think it necessary, it'l am per mitted by the Court, to read, as an answer to this questldhs remarlis, which I threw together in consequeme of a letter.' received from the Secretary to the Admiralty, stating tome chi t a Court Martial was to take place. These remarks contain all transactions whichaunk place in Ilasque basso, sus are exwess. ly in answer to the above questlim. (This Lord Cot. }lnas L: was nqt permitted lq 44, and the question was repented.) A. - 1 1 01 so, in compliance with what I considered the spirit of the orders 1 received; the doing of it was asy own act. Ihe entry la the log of the Imperieuse, that I weighed at half-past eleven, A. AI, on the 12th of April. is not WWI ; as will pro bably appear by the lopbooks Of the Fleet. I sleighed at one o'clock. The Ltaa bomb rather preceded me. ,Q. It appears also by the lugs before U court, that you made signals of distress. What was the nature of the distress of your ship, and did any and what ships come is your relief by signal from the Comm:. ider iu Chief, awl was There any unne cessary ticks) , in that respect ?—A. 1 ing.iired by hailing, what attack was intended to he mauls on the enemy. The Couttnamler. replied he was ordered to bombard them. 4 directed him to go ClAseitnd that we should proteA him ; it was then one o'clock ; the French throo-decke'r swung ula; her hawsers, and the last of their ships began to niave. I had the charge of all the fire. ships; they had failed in their expected purpose. I knew what the tongue o fsraiidal was capable of ; and though I admit that the feelings o nto Lord Gambier, for the honour and interest of his country were, and are, as strong as spy own, yet personal considerations were net enough. The evpeetations of my country, the hopes uf the Admiralty, and my own prospects, were about to ruttish. I weighed anchor and run in, and went. bevand the possibility of returning. I ordered 0(61 t in be made afteq the sterutnost of the enemy, and standing , I made the signal -that the eitace wa.:; superior to th,e c*. acing ship, be cause the Ville de Varsovie and risticutta were both afloat, and afterwards made signal for assistance, INhich signal was surdly coupled a ith the words `: being in distresss" Whe • got up to the ilttos art, we opened our fire upon the Ca, and the Ville de Varsovie. The ('al.rutta was two the Ville sic Varsovie lay stern to wank us, she being un • and the Aquilon was In the saute position; the latter did, fat tire for a long time; they were employed clearing away thee stern to get guns out. When we anchored, it wits about two o'clock. Some brigs had anchored as marked in the chart, No. 2. for the protection of the bomb, and were tiring, but too far off to he of any use. I made thr signal fur these to chisel but as there is no flag to express brigs only as 'thou( frigatrs or larger vesses, most of which weruxotninanded by any seniors, 1 ex plained so far as la , : within my means, lira this signal was in. t.nded foe them, h) liring upon arena front the mato-deck ; for the quarter-deck shot, which I elevateti sn nett, diet not reach them. This sign , Ll, I was afterwards informed, gave mai. derabte oWence, and so soon as I karut this from Sir Harey Neale, I declared to my Lord (;ainbier, that it was not my 411, ;Winn in the slightest degree to hurt bis Lordship's fee ags ; `O4l are 21