Si THE NATIONAL REGISTER. greater portion of his subordinate kingdoms, Bonaparte has divided among his own brothers, and the near relatives of his family, thus adding the ties of blood to all other.boadh of cons neetion, in the hopes that the House of Napoleon will not forget ttkir common origin, or cease to reverence the intentions of their ft suuder. In addition to these precautions he has adopted another, tsvhich chews a still deeper political sagacity, and a mind capa ble of overlooking inferior cons;derations ill.puraiit of its grand 'ultimate ohjects. Several possessors of great empires have, at their deaths, apportioned their territoriesamong their principal followers, and left in legacies what they could no longer retain thems e leei. The conduct of Bonaparte is •rry different. Be has formed a plan of empire in which his great usurpation s cud conquests are not to be confined to the grasp of one over grown monarch, bat to be divided among many for the security of the whole. Instead of retainin; all these possessions iu his own bands during his life, and parcelling them out only in his last will, as a man of impolitic ambition would have done, he has had the magnanimity and wisdom to distribute them during his lifetime, and while he may still look forward to litany days of health and vi ;;our. rlen his favourite kingdom of Italy he has lately disjoined from the central Covermpeut of France, and formally con3igned it to his step-son, Eugene Beauharnois. The increased chance of stability which his new empire de rives front this mode of proceeding, very great. It prevents all contests among his followers, with regard to their shares in the distribution : it prevents the :•ncce:,sor to the metropolitan government of France from retaining the dependencies in his own hands, whirls he might well do under various pretexts, were they to be given away only in consequence of the provisions of a will : it enables the subordinate princes to p't acquainted w ith the fuoctioos of government, the dispit:•itions, and the interests of the country committed to their charge, anti by this means consolidates their power. It accustoms them to perform with exactness, all the stipulations so t tendant on their connect ion w ith France, and thus consolidates the 'whole empire : in short, it obviates the chance of any confusienain the death of Bonaparte, since every thing will have already been established in the order in which it is destined to continue. In addition to this very politic measure, Bonaparte has adopted another, which may ultimately prove not less effica cious :—the extension of the Napoleon Code over his whole empire. This code may, its general, notwithstanding its de fects, he considered as a very great blessing to the people of most of the countries which he has conquered, since they still labour under the miserably unequal aml oppressive regulations of feudalism. It is needless to dwell on the vast eirects which the same laws, and the same administration of justice have in 1 binding communities together. Such is the plan of the Empire of the West, and such the Means Edopted i:s founder, to render it permanent. It can not be questioned that the idea is magnificeat, and that more political sagacity is displayed is the provisions, than we can dis eovet in the foundation of any other great empire Yet, we shall shortly state circumstances in its structure, which seem in timpatible with any great degree of permanency. History presents us with many instances of a cluster of small republics confederating together, and remaining united for a great series of years. The ancient confederations of Greece the Achean Leagne, the Se ins Cantons, the United States oir holland, the provinces of North America, all afford striking proofs of the possibility of giving permanency to such asitacia- tappi. History affords no such e•amp)es of a confederatiox of arbitary priuces attaining any degree of Ftability. The sa tr►ps pf though merely (officer*, were in perpetual re- hellion agaiiist their sovereign : the same may be said of -tire governors of provinces in Modern Turley ; and Uwe is not . ' k ,41 . 17. perhaps a single state of Germany that has not as often armed' in opposition to the head of the empire•as in his behalf. The. reasons of this difference between a coalition of free States and of arbitrary Princes, are very evident. In the Swiss Republic, for example, each of the States badthernassagesnest of its own internal regulations, its police zunljudicatur.e; but all the public concerns, which might Oka the whole? aisociation, such as the questions oe war or peace, and the making of were managed by delegates from every State. This representa tion, called the States General, gave an appearaoce.of one Co vernment to the whole association, and the inhabitants of each State felt their on n participation in the Sovereignty. But in a confederacy of absolute Princes, like that of Bonaparte's em pire, no such common tie exists. As far as regards his subjem, each Prince is the only ostensible Sovereign; and he in his turn, receives, without any consultation, the mandates of the Preach Emperor. There is here no representation, no deliberation on comment interests; the gloomy arrangements of arbitrary power ore substituted for an Ninal voice and a mutual concern. Suc ceeding Emperors may have neither the moderation nor the po- Hey of Bonaparte: and the dependent Allies may imagine it more for their safoty to unite with the enemies of France for their protection, than to commit themselves to the hands of their own great Despot. There is another radical defect in the Constitution which Bo naparte has prepared fur his Empire. Bred in a camp, and ac customed tot he depot it, habits of a Commander, he has made no provision for the progress of society, and fur those effects which the extension of political knowledge must speedily produce. No share is assigned to the people in legislative ; they are entitled b the Napoleon code to no political rights whatever. but the present age, ibis not to be imagined that the people either of Frince or her dependencies will long submit to thin de gradation, after the terror of a great conqueror's name is Er- Moved. The people now know that they must base frecdiwi and political rights, it' they resolve to have them : and the ex • ample which Great Britain continually presents before their eyes, of a country so vigorous, w rah , and pom.erful, entirely in consequence of tae proud rights to w Idyl all her inhabitant; are entitled, must emainually serve to stimulate the feelings o; human nature. Of this last circumstance Bonaparte seem aware and hence, in a late pee% i-h tirade in the Nomilevr, it was declared that the world would never be at rest till Great Britain become like other monarchie—in other words, (ill she was ruled by a despot ! Ile does not perceive that the want of those popular rights which she enjoys is the surest cause of con fusion and ruin to the Empire he labours to establish. REVIEW OF POLITICAL DECLAIMERS. No. 111. TI MORNING POST. We bave already given our readers some hints* of the poli , tient character of the Morning PM. it first came into notice by the uncommon industry of its Proprietor, in collecting the little trifling anecdotes and table-talk of our fashionable circici —the surmises of a dashing marriage ; the inuendoes of a cer tain curious but secret arrangement ; tile dress; the new equi pages ; the dinners; the routs ; the departures and arrivals of every one whose name is known in Nay-fair, or its extensise precincts. Such pieces of intelligence were extreioely interest ing and important to the fur whom they were designed ; and its merits, therefore, procured the Morning Post an extensive and fashionable circulation. For many years that Paper diAinguished itself as a most re solute champion of the Opposition, and of the friends of tile People; for the Editor and Proprietor was a very noted aeco date of tho Qurrevoading Club Eve the Meriting Cirenirfr