ATIO.iNTAL.,II,gpiSTR i rip - . .11 • rtf : bistro; olne • ®ax 11111111:11111111.11.12=1111111./ es. ": .111 a NUMBER THREE. h 4 AN POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS II b - s i i ' • - .. , PRICE BJ, 1 , . k I ! 1 : 1 .t CI I. it was their '= tribe least pow. hments ; and to • . I , 1 NI its elevation* it to aftiOre an ! astendaut over • of llona.partes . 1 i n n of France is ilk they are * is . is so superior* not of injuring : ! made a progress The no iserabla LS not perceived, t he resolution to . * ~ leeple looked ost 1 parte found that • ies, he bad con- opaigus, he Wilt fst as he widhedi is h the exception Istria, the whole •endent allies of . . .te considered. sus aly is parcellud • ....• i are at present . . : . ipain and PorUt4 • . tsider is t he pro- . • m.pf itoliajw*,. \. T bath ingentsitt• . icy are not tone=, . 1 4 sagacity .o!in , trur;t, is tben - eai c hick he has Wa- ne of Com is ,89 red, by o,4mt . . r WIWO itl4 arum 4 1 4- 1 lwayi.4ll"l-0,111. : i ;.. ' : the paiiiihtt, 0 . Y 0 prfcent aay in- i marriage, or any . 4 lets it cot less the ` • n Of Prance, to he preponderauty . .:. Iferior allies must • If its co-ordinifts 0 , leCalculated agog - 4 : le has eslAbiithed- ' s df tho44iticrent their` domfidoili - *,4 . own to him bigyiit4 ' . o, fists been ifirfteil :trig; hsts`rfceived ' I elerttod 'Grohs an ' ) . stages he pyres to m must ttonrittie•to Rurien_ of Sainry_ . , _ •••••••• ARY 17, 1808. PR • a new chief or emperor, when a vulvae) . occurred. policy at first to rdiSe to the ImperioSilltrone, one oft! erful princes, to prevent any datigettous encroachments this circumstance the Austriablavafty first owed though fortunate Its afterwards it THE EMPIRE OF THE WEST. jncidete , enabled 'There are few subjects more interesting either to the present extension of territory, which gave it a complete e reiteration of to posterity, than the nature and probable stabi- the other associated powers, The constitution of city of that empire which 'Bonaparte is labouring to consolidate. empire Is fundamentally different. TUe sovereign Should it acquire any degree of permanency, it will nearly re- entirely independent of his subordinate allies, while duce Europe from a , number of independent states to one vast many teapots, dependent upon him : his power iF dominion; should it quickly fail to pieces, after the arm which that they have only the power of aiding but now holds it together is withdrawn. its ruin must give rise to new him. confusion, to new wars, of which it is diffieult to foresee the In the exec:Dion of this plan, Bonaparte has made termination, At this moment, when further circumstances have quite beyond the calculation of politicians. occurred to develope the plan of Val empite, and the means weakness of the old Eu r o p ean g overnments was eMployed to establish It, some exaAination of the subject can- till they were assailed by an enemy who bad the not be uninteresting to the public. despise all dangers but real ones ; and as the pc No sooner had Boilaparte confirmed his dominion in France, their change of masters with indifference, Bonapai and perceived, from the successive defeats of the Austrians, that when he had dissipated an army of mercenaries, he had little to apprehend from the opposition of the surround- quered a kingdom. In the course of two came ing nations, than he conceived the magnificent project of form- enabled to carry his pl:ta into ellect4 perhaps a 3 fat ing au empire which no power in Europe could presume to op- on the most exposed frodtiers of France. Vs ith pose, and which might avoid the defects that had precipitated of the hereditary dominions of the House of Austr' the dissolution of so many great dominions. Convinced, either Of Germany has been parcelled out into doper by his own lights, or by those of his sagacious counsellor Talley- France ; and in this view, her frontier may be rand, that, by presenting a More extensive frontier to the terminating with the Duchy of Warsaw, Italy enemy, a great enlargement of territory servea rather to weaken out in a similar manner ; and the operations • than to strengthen an empire ; that its resources must be speed- going fprward, which will probably convert S! Hy wasted by the aririametits necessary for its defence; and its gal into similar dependencies. government embarrassed even by the care of its too numerous Bat the most important subject for us to cOnsi internal relations: he formed a new plan foe extending his do- Liable stabiaity of this new empire. The devisseapf s ussaosseye l minions, and yet rendering this extension a sonrce rdther *rider estalOaliment permanent, discover 60 111 i'lleellni l 7l . strength than weakness. a knowledge of human nature I though the v 14 .1111111 By this plan, which Was announced in the official journal, Ittit defects which may ultimately bathe all his France was to comprehend till that compact and 'fertile terris eiecumstatee to which he seems principally to t, tory, which is separated from other countries by the Rhine, equality in size and strength of dominion, which the Alps, and the Pyrennees. All the other conquests of Iliss Wished among his subordinate princes, None e esparte were to he divided into small dependent kingdbms; superior in these respects, as not to he deterre/ which should look up to France as their guardian, assist her angry intimation of France, froni making war ith troops and money in every emergency, and form an eaten- *test. The vast predominance of France can al sive barrier between her and the enemy, From this plan, if it a quell their mutual animosities, to enforce could he carried into execution, great benefits were to be ex. their contingencies as subordinate allies, and to 'meted. France, instead of being metre exposed by the exien- migrations on the established order by interwar sensor her territory, would he rendered far more secure. Her other cause. This same equality of size renders 1 ovvii immediate frontier would be provided with far better na- direct interest of the dependent .powers than 0 " tural defences, and would eV(9) be more contracted than before maintain the confederacy unbroken. It is to the all contact, and coesequently many occasions of quarrel with of the sovereign state s that every nee of the infer great neighbouring ponces:, would be cut off by !seam of her look for protection against the ambition of intermediate dependent kingdoms; and as each os these would powers, or the irruption, of external nations. possess its own supreme judicial and legislative power, the ceu- Bonaparte appears also to have not a alai tee of government would not be embarrassed by a multiplicity the ties of affection asai gratitude which he of subordinate business. between himself and his dependent states. This model of empire resembles several that have existed, and 'German princes whom he hes ciefirmed in yet is in some respects perfecilinew. The dependent kingdoms There is not ope which has not great obligatini boar, in their rights and burdens, a strong analogy to the allies that of forbearance. The Elector of Bavaria, of Rome ; only the latter were by no means so systematically from the dreaded Jews of the Haase of Ansi arranged, being neither designed as a frontier, nor Useful in any a large accession of territory, end has been ether way, than by furnishing their coetingcnts. An analogy 4 electoraT to a royal title : 411 these advantages may also be traced between this new empire of the West, and Bonaparte and Prance, and tr. their protection the German constitution; but the differences between them are bold them. The kings of Wirteinhcre., of Baden, 4f Saintly, great and radical. The princes of the German empire were a are all in a similar situation, and are evally bound to /ha number of independent sovereigns, the greatest of whom eleettal ...French faqirs by the ties of giatttut and Interes t ...not** No. S.-- Voi• I. . • . . . . ' • • 4