IN '. !REF 441 , •,- • THE NATIONAL REGISTER , 't s ql WM U L . Our ritng, KomMtution anD Latn%. PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT No. 5, PICKETT-STREET, STRAND, NEAR TEMPLE BAR. SIT Isn) A V, OC rOBER 6. IQ-11. N° 197. POLITICAL DISQUISITION. No. 183. SICILY. The present state of our relations with the Sicilian Court, nr rather the probability of th it being soon brought to a close, has caused a most impor rant quostion to be started ; what line of con duct should Great Britain adopt towards a trea cherous Government (supposing its wish to deceive should he completely proved), and a peop!e dissa tisfied with their fate, and desirous of improving their condition by changing their masters ? Some of our political writer's have strenuously contended that we ought to settle the differences that exist tetween the Sicilian Rulers and their subjects, and which are lik ly to terminate, either by a civil war, or the easy subjugation of the island by the French, in a manner at once decisive and effective. They advise that we should immediately take military possession of the country, and after removing the prcsent Sovereign, should, with the consent of the people, establish a form of Government on tl , e model of our own, which would call their energies into action by reviving all their rights, and would secure to us a most important point either for attack or defence in the Mediterranean. These hints thrown out before the public, through the medium of the press, have probably given rise to the rumour, that Lord Wm. BENTINCK was ordered to repair instantly to Sicily, as Commander in Chief of the British army, and to take military possession of the island. That Lord WILLIAM has been di rected to return, we believe there is no doubt ; but that he has been empowered to carry a measure so important, and perhaps fatal in its consequences, into effect, we think is at least premature. It may have been contemplated as a last step, should all others fail to recall the Court of Palermo to a sense of its true interests, as well as of justice and duty, but would not be resorted to, unless it had been ascertained that our forbearance would cause the island to be treacherously surrendered to the enemy. Engaged, as we are, on a variety of points, with an antagonist ready to avail himself of every feel. ing, and every prejudice which circumstances may awaken ,in the mind of the people of every country, - 'and•co turn therh into weapons more powerful than Vol. /1 7 . CICVIL , r ... -- T-~ ( PnTeE 9d. the sword, we ought not to forget the influ. ence which the .conduct we shall adopt t wards Sicily will have over our Spanish and Portu guese Allies, and the fate of the war in the Peninsula; nay, over our future relations with the other Powers of Europe. It is well known, that ever since our troops landed, bl"d, and con quered on the Lusitanian or Iberian fields, the at. tention of the nemy has been directed to the means of - checking their progress, not only by force of arms or superiority of numbers, but by creating a violent distrust in the minds of thos we came to assist, of the sincerity of our motives. W.. were artfully represented as the real invaders of Spain, who, in the garb of Allies, and under the mask of friendsh►p, fed the struggle that destroyed the popu lation and internal resources of the country, to pro fit afterwards by its weakness, the confidence we had acquired, and the advantages we had gained ; and should we succeed, wi,h the aid of the mis taken inhabitants, to overpower the opposition of the French armies, to reduce the two kingdoms into provinces of the British empire. These mis representations scattered wide amongst the people, by the numerous agents of the enemy, have, it is also well known, taken root, and notwithstanding the proved sincerity of our disinterestat co-opera. tion in the common cause, the SpaEi.irds have in many occa s ions displayed a spirit of jealousy and mistrust which has prevented them from reaping by our exertions all the benefit they migl‘t have done. Although taught by the experience of every cam paign, and the example of the Portuguese ; that their armies will never be able to resist the enemy efficiently, until they be commanded by British Officers, impenetrable to bribery, and deeply skilled in the art of war, they have preferred the certainty of experiencing ruinous defeats, to entrusting more than a temporary command in only one provinc e or two, to men who have achieved the most glo rious triumphs. Our generous disregard of this senseless jealousy as far as it affects only our feel. ings and pride, which %se sacrifice to the welfare of the common cause, ought to have taught them that their suspicions were unjust : but, since we cannot deny their existence, it is for us to consider, how far it would be plitic in us to stieng-hert them, by adopting towards Sicily the very line of conduct which the enemy has so often . l t r ;i l l , - r . : 5 .. 4., rl - 4 4,1 r . 4t • % . :_ .. 1- .- t e: ?. . :..... '_N.Y4i _~~~_/ • .