THE NATIONAL REGISTEIEL cZur tting, Conztitution, znu Laing. • PUBL1S111:13 AT No. 357, STRAIiD, CORNLIt OF EXLT ER 'CHANGE SUNDAY, S F. PTEMBFR (27, ig Percy. 9d. No. 945. 1)IS.2111S1110.N. RUSSIAN WARM E : 11S A ; I'AGTS, DISADVANTAGE% AND PROBABLE ISSUE. (Cciiebuletlfrom our Last.) We concluded our last, with asserting that the evacuation of the vast extent of territory now occupied by the French, formed no part of the original plan of the Russians. To prove that a!; , ertion, we appealed to their official docu welds, which lie open to every eye; shall we now adduce that corroborative evidence which observation supplies, and which seems armed not only with probability, but with truth. ALEXANDER.. was not ignorant, before the commence ment of hostilities, of the disposition Of the public mind hi those provinces of antient Poland, which the Myi ineipled aggressions of his predecessors had attached to the Russian Crown. He knew that !,ecret hatred rankled deep in every Poli•di heart, and that only an op; ortunity •vas wanting to make it 11114 c out in ail its fierceness, against the destroyers of their country. Its symptoms had become more apparent and alarming since the creation_ of the Ducliy Id Warsaw, which revived the idea and the hope of national resuscitation among the numerous inhabitants of Lithuania, Sathogitia, Courland, Volhynia, Kiovia, and Podolia, which, after the Prussian and Austrian campaigns of 1807 and 1809, had been left under the dromination of Russia. To this natural feeling, awakened by the emancipation of their brethren and neighbours, were added the incitements of the French, whose agents, availing themsAves of the ill-smothered patriotism of the people, easily fanned it into a flame, ready to burst out as soon as the overpowering pressure of the Rus:isian armies posted in Lithuania and Volhynia should have been lightened or removed by the events of wa:.. Under such circumstances was it politic to transfer to the enemy, without a struggle, all the resources of those countries which he only dpex . cted to gain after repeated battles? To let loose that nlation, which it w:is known would im mediatel y crowd ie bit ranks and fill up the losses of his armies, or create new Vies; whilst the continued presence of the Russians would have rendered its rising impossible, and deprived him of its hearty co-operation ? Was it good policy to remove the seat of war from the least well-effected provinces, to those, which by their attachment and lo y alty to their sovereign, deserved t-) be shielded as long as possible from its ravages? It was such policy that treachery Shane could advise, or necessity dictate. Although:ire credit the exist ence of the former to a great 'ilittettt in the Russian Cabinet, yet we think that chiefly to the latter must be im puted the abandonment of so many provinces, and millions yet. V. No. CCXLVILL of inhabitants, whose'reskuces support the toe, and whose numbers feed his armies. A retreat could have. been ad vantageous in only one cae: if the public feeling in the ter ritory purposely relinquished, run decidedly adverse to the French. It would then have proved wise and profitable to have fallen back to a certain point without risking a battle,. but also without abandoning the strong holds of the country, because such a movement would have drawn the enemy in*" the midst of an hostile population, who would have circled his rear and flanks with danger, cut, off his convoys, harassed his troops (;n their march, and should be lq..vc met with a defeat, would have prevented their retreat, and completed their destruction. As it is, however, not . only are the French assisted by the natives on their advarce, as far as the antient limits of Poland extend, but should dis comfiture compel them to retrace their steps, they would-re e through fi lends, who would facilitate their flight, and by every exertion in their power attempt to check their pur suers. Flom these colp.i&ir,tiong, as welt as from the sudden It and rail iriuptiou of the fiench, it :,)ay be fairly irferred :l that the ret , eat Of the Russians Licrcm the Dwinz, and after walas beyond Smolens!::, and Wiasna, was not voluntary and must consequ.:ntly have unsettled all their plans. What I effect it may have upon the issue of the campaign now re- I mains to be examined. The immense extent of the Russian Empire has always been tegarded as one of its greatest means of defence. Its two capitals are placed at such a distance from the frontier, especially since the conquekt of Finland, that they have generally been deemed beyond the grasp of invasion. From their bosom, as from the heart of their dominions, and 'the centre of their strength, the Russian Autocrats beheld, un concernedly secure, the flame of war rage on their borders; and even if they proved unsuccessful in the contest,,tbe - wound inflicted at the extremity of their gigantic empire, the desolation or the loss of a remote province, excited little . alarm in their breasts. - They relied, not only on the valour • of their soldiers, and the skill of their Commanders, for pro• tection, but on the dreary extent of their territory, the depth of their forests, and the severity of their climate. — They knew that no war could materially shake their power that did not reach its seat, and imagined that when the prize is so far removed from the entrance of the career, no candi. date would have strength, constancy, or. resolution enough to pursue its attainment. But if .he persisted in his rash • advance, continual hostilities, rendered more effective by a perfect knowledge of the country, and of the innumerable defensive positions which it presents, would so waste his force, that before he could have proceeded an hundred, • leagues, he must relinquish his vain and ruinous enterprise. on finding that more than double that distance still sepatatest • '^ • • . !.4 Y • •