'' ~r I . -5 72 eat. Now /with reference to the prifreffion of Malta, k was of confequence to afccrtain whether Mini tiers had always enrefented it as the grand objet of dif pote betwixt the two governments. In paper R . ; of the correfpondence he found that the acceptance of a projet relative to Malta would, according to the re prefentation of a Noble Secretary of State (Lord Hawkethoirv), remove one of the moll material of the difficulties exifting between the two Governments. For himfelf, he was ready to confers, that there was an objefl much dearer to his heart than the pofTtaion of Malta, important as he confidered it. This was the maintenance of the corillitution and the liberties of his country. One tingle iota of tilde liberties and that Connitution he would on no account content to telinquith : and any attack on them, on the part of a foreign power, he would confider as a ground of war on which no pollible diverfity of opinion could pre vail. He did not think that, in the principle on which the retention of Malta was required, Minifters were juftified. Their argument was, that becatife, fence the fignature of the Definitive Treaty, France bad received a confiderable acceffion of power, therefore I England was required to hold Malta by way of ad ditional fecurity. To fuch a principle as this he never could give his approbation. He would put a cafe to the candour of their Lordfhips, from which fome ides might be formed of the principle which Mini fters fit up in defence of the retention of Malta. Suppof. ing that Cuba bad during the intermediate period been ceded to this country by Spiin, or Sicily by the King of Naples, what would any of their Lordfhips think if Bonaparte had come to this country with a demand for additional fecurity iu confeglience of this aion ? Was there a Tingle individual having a drop of English blood in his bofom, who would not I have indignantly fpurned at fuch a requifition ? How then were Minillers to be juflified in the principle which they had laid down for the retention of Malta? As it appeared to him the whole of their argument fell to the ground. But he was ready to admit, for the fake of argument, the principle which Miniaers teemed fo anxious to eftablifh, and all that he had to require on his part was, that if their propolition was true in principle, they would have no objet ion to his contending that it ought to be. equally true in point of fart. With this undertlanding he fhould contend, that inftead of the power of France being augmented fence the peace, it had been materially decreafed. In Europe it might. indeed, be Paid, that it had been increafed, but this was a neceffary confequence of antecedent events. After the battle of Marengo and Hohenlinden, all the fubordinate States of Europe were virtually under her controul, and any formal ceffion was merely a nominal, not a real accealon of power. But, he begged their Lord (hips to confider what was the decreafe of influence and power, which the French Government had fiall rained in other parts of the world. Did their Lord. (hips bear in mind, that !ince the fignature of the Definitive Treaty, the important colony of St. Do. ; ming°, a colony, in point of real value and impor. tance, fuperior to all the other French poffeffions to the Welt Indies, had been loft to France ? In Rating the debtor and creditor fide of the account, this was a eircumaance deferring of peculiar attention. His Liardthip in this part of his argument took occasion to refer to the exertion of a well known fociety at Paris (Vitali: der Noir), who, with the moil phi lanthropic views, had eftablithed a fyftem as appli cable to the Blacks in the Weft Indies, which if car ried into full effeft might have been produftive of the moll ferious confequences. The Negroes might have been conciliated and effeltually trained to arms. A numerous and formidable body of foldiers might have been employed in attempting a defcent on fome tine or other of our Welt India iflands. Jamaica itfelf might have fallen in a warfare fo condufied.— On the molt refpedtable authorities it had been Rated, that (hips with quantities of ammunition and a pro portion:lc number of troops might have been land ed in tome one of our Wands before fuch an event could be anticipated, and the moll difaftrous-cohfe qitences might have enfued. The exilletice of our whole Well India polliffions might have been expofed to:the molt imminent peril ; but now all this danger had entirely difappeared. By the unwifc conduit of the Firft Conful, for whatever was contrary to the rights of man, he mud always confider unwire ; a fyf. tem of extermination had been purfued, by which the indignation of the Blacks was exafperated to mad nefs, and France was deprived of one of the richeft and- the faireft colonies of the world. But Miniflers after. all this Rill reverted to the views of Bonaparte refpelting Egypt. Putting this queftion fairly and candidly he withed to ark their Lordfhips, whether it was meant to be infinuated, that the predileflion of alonaparte for Egypt was any thing novel ? Was it not well enough afcertained that the poffeflion of it was one of his molt favourite objcas ? Did he nut, for the accomplithment of this objeit, facrifice one of the bravell armies that ever followed the fortunes of a favourite General ? Becaufe the Chief Conful bad at one time expreffed a very ftrong inclination to obtain poffetlien of Egypt, he did not think that this was a fufficient ground for the retention of Malta in the way in which it was by Minifters propofed to be retained. He defired their Loulthips to race on this circumnance, that a favourable change might be introduced into the fentiments and views of the Chief Conful. He had not (hewn himfelf to be guided by any fyllematic or invariable principles. It was idl poifible trom what he had done to-day to calculate what he fhould do to-morrow. This might with lonic perfons be a ground of cenfure ; but he liked the Chief Conful the better for this difpolition.— There appeared to him, his Lurdihip atgiled, fome thing laughable in the whole of the arrangements re lative to the retention of Malta. The ultimatum of Minifters was, that Malta should remain in our pot teffion for ten years. Now be would beg to know vshat was the ohjea of fuch arrangement ?—Was there any thing myfterions in having Malta in our poffellinn by a bond for ten yews ? He (tumid with to be informed, whether any important national ad yawn/could refult from it? After the ten years were expired, were the ambitious views of Bonaparte to be moderated ? Was lie to dived himfelf of all the qualities which were now the objefts of anxiety and alarm ? He certainly entertained no fort of doubt of the views of the Fascb Goveramsat iefpeiling Egypt. would be the WI man in the world t o • . - 12 7'; kw to the fcswity of oar tall -4.; f_ of Egypt 14 Fiance was •'-' ftly to be deplored. He . r . * Mit 0011 tkis point, in das mall decided manner. He differed from them on the simple principle, that Malta ought to be kept in per petuity by this country. But how had Mittiners den dated the difeuflion? Their conduct, as he had before hinted, was ridiculous in the higheft eleg . ree. It apt peared in page t to of the correfpondence,in a difpateS dated as near to the prefent day as the txth of May, that at the time when Lord Whitworth was preparing to Pet out from Paris, M. Talleyrand brought forward a propofition, holding out a prof pea of allowing us to retain Malta in perpetuity for a valuable confideration. The anfwer to this pro pofition was of a very Pimple defcription. Lord Whitworth folicited for his paffports, and left Paris without any explanation. This he could not help thinking contrary to all the wifeft maxims of policy. It appeared to him, indeed, to violate the plaineft principles of common fenfe. In judging of this quef noni he thought that he could not have a better cri terion of judgment than by putting himfelf in the fuppofcd flotation of an arbitrator. Aging in this capacity, if be were called on to decide on the differ ences of two individuals, he (hould begin by afeer taining what were the particular objeds to which they refpdtively laid claim. If he found that the claims of both referred to the fame objed, his arbi tration might then appear frnitlefs. lf, however, he found on the contrary, that their wilhes were dired ed to different and unconneaed objeas, the talk of arbitration would become eafy. Tie (honld in this cafe a& the parties, what they refpedively wanted ? He should make an equitable adjuttment, and leave them to fettle the difference. But Minifters did not reft their cafe with Malta. They had a long firing of complaints againft the French Government re fpeding the curtailment of the Liberty of the Prefs,' the difmiffal of Emigrants, and the (editions publica tions of Bi(hops. The infolence of Bonaparte, in re quiring thefe coneeffions to his haughty demands, had been made a fubjed of a very general complaint. He was ready to declare, that after having perufed the papers with the greaten poffible attention, that he law no proof of his infolence in the correfpondence betwixt the two Governments. If the French Go vernment really required that the liberty of the prefs , (hould be curtailed, that the freedom of difcuffion in both Houfes of Parliament fhould be limited, then he declared that Minifters ought to have infifted on an immediate and diftini explanation. If the anfwer of the French Government was not fatisfadory, what was to be the condo& purfued by Minifters ? They ought to have recalled our Minifter that day, and on the fueceeding day our cannon ought to have roared to avenge the infult offered to the national honour.— fcarcely thought it neceffary for him to declare his attachment to the Liberty of the Prefs. There was no conftitntional privilege to which he was more ftrongly attached. He had even written a pamphlet in its defence. It was a privilege which he would furrender only with his life.—But while he was an', advocate for the Liberty of the Prefs, be was not to (land up for its licentioufnefs. He gave the Noble Lord who opened the difcuffion credit for the candour and the opennefs with which he had fpoken on the Cubic& The Noble Lord allowed that he had Peen Come late publications of a molt mifchievous tenden cy. This he could fay from his own knowledge— Come taf thefe publications were indeed of a nature which could not be juftified on any principle of re gard to the rights of independent States. It was of great importance that the Liberty of the Preis, as it ought to be exercifed, ought to be clearly and ao curately defined. He wi(hed to (late to their Lord fhips what were the views which he entertained on the fubjed. The criterion betwist what was Falk, fcandalous, and fcurrilous, was what would be tole rated with refped to the Minifters of the Crown.— What could not be applied to their condos% it was un fair and criminal to apply to the condud of the &It ma gistrates of otherpowers. On this point he thought the Firft Conful of France had a right to complain, be mire it does not appear that any fptcific cafe of info lence on the part of the Government of France was eflablifhed. The plain objedion againft Minifters was this, that they did not make a fpeeific remonftranee. They fuffered part injuries to pats over unnoticed.— They continued to negotiate about Malta, and they have no ground now to hold up thefe as real grounds of war. His Lordfhip next touched upon the arma ments defcribed in the ports of France and Holland, alluded to in his Majefty's firft Meliage. Here he thought the matter lay in a very narrow compafs.— Mini fters afferted the exigence of armaments without producing even an intimation of preparations. The French Government denies the of ertion of Minifters, and appeals to fads in fupport of their affection.— The defence on thispoint was what the public anxioully looked for on as early a day as poffible. His Lost (hip, after a few more obfervations, concluded by lay ing, that he (hould vote again(' the Addrefs, as it was now formed, whatever his fcntiments of indignation were again ft French ambition. Before he fat down,he paid fume high compliments to a Right Hon. Gen tleman (Mr. Addington), whole uprightnell of con• duet demanded the higheft approbation. He was confident of that Right Hon. Gentleman's fineere defire of peace, and thought that even Rill an effort ' might be made to maintain the continuance of tran quillity betwixt the Governments. The Doke of CLARChCI.—" My Lords, having I been pert - many alluded to in the entitle of the prof - cot debate, I tile to requeft your Lordfhips' attention to the re;fons which will induce me to give my vote to i'the Addrefs which has been moved with Co much eloquence and ability by the noble Secretary of State. In giving thefe realms, I (ball beg leave to go ball , , anel - take a view of the fituation of the country for film: time antecedent to the figning the Preliminary Treaty of Peace. I beg to call your Lordihips' reeol. section to the three expeditious againft Belkioe, Fer rol end Cadiz j the ill fuceefs of which, added to the long continuation of the war, had made fo deep an impreffion on the minds of the People, that there was an almost univerfal clamour for Peace. In this &n --ation of things, his Majefty's prefent Minifters firft came into office ; std it was then that they found themfelves almoli immediately prompted by the ur gency of affairs to fign the Preliminary Treaty. It was entirely owing to my feting the country in the fituation it then was, and the wilhes of the people fo ardently bent on Puce, that weighed with me to give my vote in favour f the Preliminary Articles. Strange &ems, however, were ailed in Italy between the time of finning the preliminary articles, and that of the Definitive Treaty. Two things there were in that Treaty which weal very mash to ray heart. I could not hut feel the cleepeft and meft - fincere regret. when I law that by it this country had neglected to procure any indemnity for its old and faithful ally the King of Sardinia ; and in the next place, that we had agreed to give up Malta. The importance of that place struck my mind mak forcibly, but Rill viewing the flotation of the country in the fame light as I had before done, I confidered the ceffion as an aft of ne ceffity ; and asiPeace was fo univerfally confidered of the utmoft importance to the heft interefts of the country, I concealed what I then thought on the fubjed, and as I gave no vote on the Definitive Trea ty, my fentiments on the &Nee were never known. My Lords, I thought it neceffary to fay thus much as to the reafons on which I grounded my conduit in approving the &It meafures purfued -by his Ma-1 jefty's prefent Minifters. I Ihall now, my Lords, take a view of what they have done since that pe riod, in order to thew why I (hall give my vote for I the prefent Addrefs, and lwftl begin by calling your Lordfhips' attention to fevers' notes which have palled on the fubjee, and which appear in paje 44 : .all which, it gives me the greateft fatisfaetion to find, breathe an amazing delire to keep firmly to the faith of Treaties. I no* come, my Lords, to the conver fation held by the Firft Conful with Lord Whitworth, in which he complains againft this country ; firfl, for not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as we were bound to do by Treaty ; fecondly, with refpea to the Liberty of the Prefs in this Country. And on that point, my Lords, I agree with the Noble Earl who fpoke Taft, that no nation ought to interfere with another in refpett to what concerns its internal 'laws and regulations ; therefore the Firft Conful having made this a fubjeet of diplomatic interference, has given an early fpecimer. of that hotlile di fpolition againft this country, which he has never ceafed to difplay in various inftances, lance the time of figning !the Definitive Treaty. With regard to Malta, my Lords, equally unj uft is it to fay , that we have re futed to give it upin defiance of a treaty. In what way was Malta to be evacuated by our troops ; and what. were the conditions on which it was to be given up by the Treaty ? It was not agreed to give it to France—No : it was to he ceded to the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerufalem ; and there is an exprefs ftipulation for the independence of that Order, and for that of the 'Rand. This independence is gua• ranteed by three of the fidt Powers in Europe, Ord certainly forms one of the molt important points of Ripulation in the whole treaty ; and nothing in my mind can be more clear, than that Minifters never would have figned the Treaty,if they had not thought that thereby the independence of Malta was abfo• body fecured. I now come, my Lords, to the infa mous report of the man who has been ftyled the Com mercial Agent of the Firft Conful in Egypt. I do not hefitate, my Lords, to call it infassow, becaufe it well merits that epithet—becnufe it contains the Wilt falfehoods, and the groffeft libels on the honour and dignity of his Majefly's Government, and on our brave army, and its Generals: yet when Monfieur Talleyrand was fpoke to on the fubjeft, he laid his miffion related to Commercial motives only ; and,. notw ith anding the repeated remonitrances that have been made on this fubjee, no fatisfa&ory anfwer has been returned, but it has always been evaded and palled over in loch a manner, as if it was withed to add infult to injury. I (hall now, my Lords, requeft your attention to page 38, where you will find the converfation between the Fidt Conful and Lord Whitworth, part of which I beg. leave to read to your Lordfhips : u He (theConful) now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the fir.alleft inclination to take polreffion of it by by force, he might have done it a month ago, by fending 25,000 men to Aboukir, who would have pained ihemfelves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thoufand Britith in Alexandria. That inftead of that garrifon being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only fur nithing him with a pretence for invading it. This he flsould nos do, whatever night be hit drive to have it du a colony, beeassfe he id not thin 4 it worth the rj/k of a war, is which be mirk iseriapi, he conisdered at the aggryfir, and by cithsch he Amid loft wore than he could gain Am former or later, Agypt would helots: to France, either ' by the folks: to pieta of the TuriYh &ntisire, or by fosse arrange ment with ihe Porte."—liete, my Lords, is the fullelt difplay of the mind of the Firft Conful. which clear ly (hews that his views have unceafingly been bent. towards Egypt; that he has never for a moment loft fight of it, and that he withed molt ardently, of courfe, to have Egypt out of our poffeffion, as form ing the greatelt fecurity• for his not only obtaining, but fecuriag his favourite objea. In another part of I the fame ounverfation, my Lords, the Firit Conful proceeds to fay, that " As a proof of his defire to maintain peace, he wifbed to know what he had to gain by going to war with England ? A defcent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was ' determined to attempt by putting hi•nfelf at the head of the expedition. But how could it be fu poled, that after having gained the height on which he flood. he would rifle his life and reputation on loch a hazao. does attempt, unlefs forced to it by neceffity, when the chances were that he and the greateft part of the expedition would co to the bottom of the fea ? He talked much on this fubjett, but never affeeted to di mini()) the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one sigma him, but Rill he was determined to attempt it. if war thisuld be the confequence of the relent difcuffion ; and that fuch was the difpofition of the troops, that army after ar my would be found for the enterprife. He then expa tiated much on the national farce of the two countries. France with an army of four. hundred thoufand men, for to this amount it is. he (aid, to be immediately completed, all ready for the molt defperate enter prifes • and England with a fleet that made her mif trefs Of the fees, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in lets than tea years. It was now come to the point whether we &odd have peace or war. To prefer', peace the Treaty of Amiens mull be fulfilled ; the abufe of the public prints, if not to. tally fuppreffed, at leaft kept within bounds, and confined to the Englifli papers; and the proteltion fo openly given to his moll implacable enemies (alluding to Georges and perfons of that defcription) mutt be withdrawn. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its prefent Rate there was no Power with which we could coalefce for the purpofe of making war againft France, confequently it was our intereft to gain time, and if we had any point to gain. to renew the war when circumllances were more fa- Towable." And when Lord Whitworth, in orderer to him, was rocccdiag to lama tht astaisoo of tar ritory and influence gained by France fiuce the treaty, the Confid interrupted him, by laying, -‘ I fteppote you mean Piedmont and Switzerland, Cs Ant tits bagasslles ; audit muff have been feen wink the tic ty was pending." My Lords, I have r ea d not fo much to prove his hottility, as the contimiel determination (hewn by him to proceed in the fyileus of encroachment .with whit trheiet out freest:beams of finning the Treaty, and the •" Cs feat Ist laze. \ tag' is aknutch as to fay. his Career was not to be ftopPed by England—t•.is is the tranflatinn of thofe .few French 'words. Becaufe his blajtily's Mittitters have endeavoured to do this, and have refuted to ' deliver up Malta till Come fecuritylhall be'given for its indePendence, and as Come counterpone to the encroachments he has made on the different powers of Europe. he charges them with having broke the Treaty; but, my Lords, I deny the charge. - I fay it is as falfe as it is groundlefs, and that Crest Britain has not broke the Treaty. His Niajetly's Minifters have done every thing in their pow e g to bring things to an amicable termination, but to all their jun remonflrances nothing bad berm returned but prevarication and evafion. It, there. fore, became neceiTary to (peak in a more decifivis tone; and the Meffage of his Majefly on the fubjes has my entire approbation. I think your Lord. (hips will all agree with me, that from the 9th of March, his Majefly's Miniflers, whilft they have acted with the greaten coolnels and moderation is urging the different points in difeuffion, have Cup. potted the honour and dignity of the King; and if they had not recalled the Ambalthdor when they did; they would have difgraced themfelves, and betrayed the bee and deareft interetls of the nation. MT Lords, every one of your Lordfhips mull think with me on this point, that it is abfelutely neceffary this country fhould have a port in the Mediterranean, the confequence of Malta in this refped. was an doubt clearly teen, and perfectly underitood, before the finning of the Treaty of Amiens; and I am of opi nion that the great length to which the negotiati9o; -era fprotraded, was owing to the cfiftuffions relative to Malta. It was clearly underttoodi that the greatobjed of thefe difcuffions was to obtain a fufficient guarantee for the independence of that ifland. It was not to belong either to France or England; it was to be ceded to the Knights of the Order of St. - John, and to be entirely neutral to both countries. Since the fining of the Treaty, however, Inch changes have taken place in the relative fituation of France, with refpeet to the acceffion of power, that the peeled in dependence of Malta is become more neee that ever ;—but fuch alterations have taken plies tele tive to the Order that its independence is rea l! diminifhed ;—aud therefore it behoves his Ma- Minifters to take care it does not . go out et our cußody till the completes fecurity i s obtaiset for its independence; they have, no doubt the eft reafons at prefent for detaining it, and I have ftrongelt hope and reliance th it Malta will yet prove the faivation of the liberties of Europe. My Lori it is with the moo heartfelt fatisfaltion that lemmas. piste the Rate we are in at the commence eat of the prefent difpute. The country is at this sonde in a (fate of the greaten content s and the peopla unanimouny united in zeal and ardour to repel* and repel the turbulent think of a on and encroachment which the Fire Conful wi t E i t extend to this country in the fame way he has done to the other Powers of Europe; but L hope and truft we (hall convince him of his error—and- fe far from thrinking at his menaces, I glory in the day that this country does go to war. A Noble Earl has this night mentioned the lofs of St. Domingo by the Firft Con ful ; but I differ with that Noble Earl as to the can& of that lofs. I attribute it to the efforts of Great.. Britain, and I hope we (hall be able to tell him, in plain terms, you fha nt have St. Domingo, pee llsa'ne have Louifiana—to tell the Spaniards, you them have the Floridas—and to fay to all th ofe who airs protected by this Almighty Conful, you (ball barn nothing but what Great Britain chafes to let you have,. I with to fee this country exert the raft refources it has within itfelf, to convince this mighty Coded that we are able to contend fingle.handed againn Fannon and all her acceflions. I . with to fee Great Britain chaftife France.—lt is pot the fire time we have doses fo ; and if the war is conducted with Vigour and wil dom, I think it cannot left long. Thefe, my Leeds. are the reafons why I flail give the Addrefs my cor dial fupport. Lord MULOILAVII.—The prefent (object, which involves both the interett and independence of Great Britain, is of too much importance not to excite the feelings and command the moo ferious confiderition of every Englifhman. Before I proceed farther. I will return thanks to his Majefty's Minillers for their forbearance, for their conciliatory fpirit, and for their eflimation of the feelings of this Houle and of the Country. I will follow their example. and abilain from any comments that would irritate or provoke. becaufe I think it beneath the dignity of the Houfe to exprefs its feelings upon the infults offered by France, on the courth of her ambition, and eye:that various aggreflions. I Mall notice part of the fpeeeh of a Noble Earl (Stanhope), which was one of the molt extraordinary I have ever heard. If in his own perfon he wifhed to provoke a debate in the Hook. be could sot refort to more effedual means than biz expreffion of Englith fentiments and French parti ality. The Noble Earl would give up Guernky sad Jerfey to the Firft Conlin for biatta ; he would yield the poffedlon of thofe • Iflands for the bate& of pur poles—he would barter them in order to appeafe the French Government—he would furrender up. their inhabitants, whole loyalty to his Majefty, and at tachment to this.country, is unqueftionable. Having read the negotiation, my Lords, with dote atten tion, as I am Cure each of you has, I will afk, Whe ther the Rate of affairs, whether circumnances being maturely weighed, it ought not to be matter of ex ultation that the Treaty of Amiens no longer exiftsl I was one of thofe who had withed for peace, and deprecated war as the greaten of calamities; but I have confidered the loth Article of the Treaty of Amiens as incapable of execution in its real fenk and fpirit ; but as it has been figned, and as the honour of his Majetty and of the Country are committed, it ought to be adhered to. Yes, my Lords, treaties &mild be (acted. But, if one of the Contracting Par ties departs from it, then the other is no longer bound. I would elk you, my Lords, I would alk my country. and all Europe, whether there were nut difpofitions manifelted, whether ads of hanky were not committed by the French Goverommt• ~, + II • 19 i {' , •