THE NATIONAL REGISTER. that fwv h:s return to the outer anchorage he mentioned to Lord thittibier, that as there would bit nn jealousy with ropect to Admiral Stopford, it would be a matter essential to the service to sfarl with a proper force, apolOgising, at the same time:, ior taking this lIIVTIy,.aS it Would . be impOssibla to pre :rent a noise in England, if things reinainod in that state; to which his tordstqp an s wered, that if 1 thieiv blame, it would look like arrogantly claiming all the merit to myself; on which witness assured him, that he bad no such intention, nor did he wish to carry the dispatches, or logo to London. Admiral Steen?! qtvorn and examined. Q. ITaving heard the order from the Admiralty to Lord Cam bier to attack the fleet in Basque Roads, state to the Court an s neglect you know in the attack of the enemy's ships, or any de fect or unnecessary delay on the part of his Lordship, between the 10th of Marchand 17th of April ; and whether he used every means in his power to carry into effect the above mentioned or ders?—A. Under all the circumstance; of the case, viewed in every point of which I am capable, and giving to the Commapder in Chief the exercise of that discretion, which eTery Comuitshder in Chief, in eyeention of measures for which he alone is reiponsi itie, I do not think there was any delay o r deficiency on the part of the Commander in Chief, in executin; the, service entrusted to t. his Lo , ship's. care. Q. ( 11, the Court). Was the feet in Basque Roads untnoored en the illy previous to the going in of the frigate t---A . . %'es; the ships we're unmonred on the 1 1 th, Q. • Do you knoW why 64 , were unmoored ?—A. From a ennYersation' I had with the Coniinander in Chief before unmooring, I understood it CS as for the purpose of being ready to take adliantage of any fivioirable circumstance. I must also add, there was some conversation which had no practical effect, respecting th . e fleet making a show of getting under weigh to deceive the enemy, 'for thellrposo of preventing; the eilemy's boats coining out to interceN'the fl,e shi;ts. Q. Was the tli et moored again in the course' of that day? —A. Th e s i g! . a s w; ., 'unite, ead the fleet moored again, about eun-set, except the Caesar. ; Q. Ds you know What induced the Commander in Chief to order the fleet to moore again: or if you d 9 06t know his rca sons, did you see or know any sufficient cLitie for its being, done? A. The Commander *in Chief Mil not a. itie tiLle rommo7ira4. to me his reason for mooring, but from the i-to , e order in 'which some part of the fleet was originall,' mtioreel, and considerint , the strength of the tide, I think there might have t •OsOrrie ris k of the ships Nearest to each other eclat's- on haii . .4 - eriWolher, had they continued so eloye.—Q. 'rite ' . .rniiig after - 011 . hr.. ships 4 4 were sent in, sonic signals and telegrap is coioniuniciitiiins Were made from the imperietive lo the Com : oder in Chief. ' no ..ou recollect what they were ? A. I cnnfe-sT guil4 speak r/nie froth recollection, than trier. any thing I saw rn3hielf.• - • 1 Cap itffri?r Co those which were officially reported sei Diet) ' e Captain .ti Ike Caesar. The first signal reported re me to ire • eby t h e If*: Is.t oshi petieuse, was, " that seven sail of the everro '5 pc on sisoe the flea ran destroy theca." h' , ' f the ftect could destroy th, eight o'clock, I .do not reed Imperieuse till beiween half p da, and stanait.g4o towards ti signal that the mem V7:5 ships lc but infra; .4 to the not united i dibtress and wiinted:iwistairce. cirill'i reported to. yon in the perei.se had iafrolfaed the I' , th,,i, two sail , if trtefine .vrotsld —A No inch pignal it.ar re] mile. Q. Was any official ipfil inander in ('airf navia;.- recalle of the 12th?—,t. No) such comi Q. Tue Revenge, Thesetts, Val have •been sent into dir !twat They Iv ent in at different hour hours (tftf•r the V Q. otherwise by the Commander t by an ordtr from the Calms the CrAr, Che,eup, au i Q. Wi74l Was your reasous service on which they were on Convitudd..l i,i Chief 7—A. The th." sllips were e po,ed to by ci 'Wilfully &hat they could not furihn Clebtinittiori of the Cal 4 kager to which bottelies, or h.gduemt evening precediog it JULY SO.' shore for three hours, in range of the enemy's shot; and this, contrary to my expectations, being told hy - tbe pilot there was sufficient water. The Captain of the Theseus and Valiant also informed me that their ships had been aground. Q, On what shoal was the Ctesar aground ?—A. A continuation of the Buosart, or separate bank, in the same line with the Buoyart. At the time the 12•rfasar gdt ashore, jt wa•Jspeari v dark, and the onenny did pot 'perceive her situation. if it had been day-light, I should have despaired 'of getting her off. Q. Did you know that in the read or4ix there was an anchorage capable of con taining six sail of the I;ne,'perfectly out of the reach of shot and shells, from any or the enemy's batteries ?—A: Previous to our frigates going in, I certainly did not know it, al,h6egit some Pilots Were' 'of opinion that there was, others that there was not; With respect to the turnbf;,-, I understoOd it never news tained more than four ships its five fathomi, wit out range of shells. ' 'Had I known of that anchorage before I - went in,l should have expected to derive little good frail% ships going there, as it Was quite out of the iffin of annoynig any of tl! enemy's ships that were on shore.' Q. Otte Of the reasons You hnve given for withdrawing the ships front the rood of Aix was, that they could not annoy the enemy's shins. Were you, before it was dark; In a situatienfrom which you :could so see the enemy's ships as to feel auite*satistied ships of the line could du them no more mischief?—A. Before I went in, and in goin4 in; I observed the enemy'sships close under the hatteries,and I was so little acquairited . with that anchorage, that I was of apinion 4 ; both with resPeet to the navigation 44 well as the exposure to the batteries, ships could not he eniployed without emiuently risking their safety. '• Q. You have commanded a squadron fora considerable time. in Basque Roads, 'have you beep able to ascertain hoW the tide risei and'falli at spring tides ?—A. Generally from 18 to 21 feet, according to the set of the wind;the N. W. wind makes a higher tide.—.Q. when the linperietise made the signal that the enemy's ships were on shore, and the fleet might destroy them, would you, with the experience you have as a Flag Offi cer, hare thought it prudent or proper: to send or Lead in *the fleet tO,destroy them.—A. In my opinion the dislodgment from the'ancliorage of the enemy's ships :by fire ships, reMove.d out a small part of the obslieles. This is niit only my ()pinion, but that of others %she preceded in the command. The difficulties of the navigation; and an imperfect acquaintance with the' an chorage, Would, if think, hare made me pnwortby of a eorrituainl, where the enemy' had all the advantage, and oars weuld have all the loss. 9. When the signal was made by'the Imperieuso that half of the fleet could hive destroyed the 'enefify, wotild sou haire canducted halt-the fleet for that ptirpn.4e, with the w hid anti weather as' it then was ?—A. In this and the former ansa et must take the state of the wind only, 'with the Wiwi as it then ivas;:ttid the broadside of their ships still commanding the' pas t'ar':' Ise Shou i ld hive been Se crippled in going in and in working out a passa,ge a little More than a Mlle,* t flrink I should no% have risked the ships had they been under my cootnand. Q. rtit; lorperieuse made the signal of heint in distress, field wanting imaiodiaie assistance; were any shills immediately sent to assist aet ?—A. 1 will not pretend to s ay whether' the frigates were ordered in before or afterwards, by the Coinnuinder in t•hief, but there were several ships near at that time. Ido pot recollect any signal being made immediately ih answer to the signal (mom the Itnperieuse.—Adjounted. .•• . . . SIIMI fit •et 1 . :nal repel 10, 1 2 4 . 4 4 . t h at "tts." Bet i.. , :en hair it • I t and II •ct tiny 0t1...i L;g;4l at lby the ) i.k, met twelve uod ow n'clut \ same boyar-my. ' rite TYni,eetti. vade .;re g3U perk): to t tie clustog • i 'lip, 0 alsn that the loye r i et v iv e sin 14 Did you se :, or wa•i i olli- e risorhe cf that day, that r e I qa. 'oninsattder in Chief by to 'graph, be so rtien tto destroy the erns t m Ir t Ported to e even to hav '.l :wen rot:lV:id given to von of ribs.: Am- d tile Imperietic(.4 ov Th e ny eing 4,i nunication wa% user r i iiil•rth me. liant, rail .*,sernr, • re gime-. to I of A, ~ diel th ! r A i to•in ?- —A. f. s of i igi:t 1 l' e eye* , .somt- \V t2rt: tae ‘ rye:Auk' NN •rxtral o r Chtei'l—AL. 4 "yey % eti., , reralie,r rider in Chief, lutit port of them, it. came out tiit orders'from me. or railing thoee ships front tili- .red %itholit rfloreetions from the imminent On ine+itable dan2et Winning iniithiLl wation ; also 'he he esoptar'...c.ef with elfect in tip v's ,hips Q. Din flu e(tn.idt.• I l i e e c osedfrom the tines it r toot 4 A. From both. Hit. 1 ... Cete li ,,,W was going in, she got on THIRD DAY, JVLY ~S. Lord Cochrane called in, and further examined. Q. Are the charts produced by your Lordship to the Court Nos. 2 and 3) copied or taken from - the char: No. I ?—A. They aye fac-similas of the chart No. I, done by a chart-drawer in London, whom I employed for that purpose. The French ships, at the houri mentioned in thoSe charts, were in the position iii which they appeal.. The positionspf the British fleet is marked as it appeared from The IMpericuse ahola half past eleven o'clock hi the morning of the 12th. The frigates which appeal' oear•the Imperieuse had neighed aaritor ith the Imperieuse that morning. Q. By what scale did jour Lordship 'trace the figures of the ships as representdd, there being no scale to these charts ?-- A . By the scale of the chart of which they are Copies. which is the same size, and now bCfore the Couri marked No. I. admiral Sionford fitriher cxamincd. Q. When the , ignal Nal, made by the Impericuse on the morn- Inc of the 12th, that the enemy's ships ‘4l.re 4)n shore; nas any thing done in conkequence of ill—A. Shortly after the signal N ai made, the Commander iu Chief made the signal to unmoor, bet 1111 k. I I