THE NAT ;uric. be always guarded against such a precedent ? Was like the defendant's ever likely to occur again ? His case solitary. Other printers had either not been sent to distant jails; or their banishment thither had not prejudiced the conduct of their papers. The law, it might be said, considering nothing but the act for which the publisher bad made himself respbnsible ; otherwise collusion might evade it : but would the law in no case discriminate ? How far was this agencyheld to extend ? What, ' if the agent, in a fit of lunacy, were to Insert a paragraph which amounted to high-treason, would the Jury, therefore, send him to the scaffold ? Where, then, did they draw the boundary ? The def-ndant impressed upon the Jury, that by Mr. Fox's Act they were become the Judges both of the law and the fact of libel ; and were bound to acquit, if moral guilt be not undeniably established. The case of Mr. Reeves established this; in which the Jury found the publication improper, -but denied the cri minal intention of the defendant in publishing it. If Mr. Fox's Act did not bring within the purview of the Jury the moral guilt of the publication of libel, it was wholly nugatory. It bad been held, that the declaration of criminal intention was a mere 'natter of form ; and Lord Mansfield, upon the trial of Miller for publishing Junius's Letter to the King, and of Baldwin for the same publication, had held, that the words false, scandalous, and malicious, were matter of legal inference ; but the Jury de cided the contrary, and found the defendants not guilty. Upon the trial of Owen fora libel on Alexander Murray, Esq. in 1752, Pratt, Chief Justice, afterwards Lord Camden, held, that cri minal intention was not proved; and directed the Jury to acquit the defendant. In the case of Ahnon the bookseller, Glynn, Serjeanr, moved for a new trial, upon the ground that the ser vant did not sell the libel with the privity of his Master. fn the case before the Jury, was there any subterfuge ? Was there not much to allow for, and little to condemn ? In Hilary Term, 1729, a woman was prosecuted as the publisher of a treasonable libtl, who bad been long bedridden, but who served in the shop. It was held by the Chief Justice, that she did not know of the li bellous intention; and the Attorney-General withdrew a Juror. The defendant concluded by pressing upon the Jury, that his life would be dependent upon another imprisonment; and in stanced a late example of the effects of that species of punish. ment producing first despondency, despair, and delirium, and ending in premature death. It might be urged against him, that he continued the publication of his paper from motives of lucre; —that might be attributed, with equal justice, to the soldier, or, indeed, to the pleader. If he had acted upon that motive, he had not met with success ; so the heavy hand of the law had wrested from him the greatest portion of his bard-earned pro fits. He recommended his case to the sympathy, and to the jus tice of the Jury ; and added, at the request of his legal advisers, that the exception in point of law, which be had taken to the information, was not done at theiAnstigation. At the conclusion of his defence, Mr. White was asked, whe tter be meant to call witnesses to speak of what he bad opened. Lord ELLENBOROUGII said, that the evidenFe he had stated would only go in mitigation, and not to a cquittal ; but his Lordship wished to know whether the defendant would prefer having it on his notes, or by affidavit before the Court hereafter. Tie defendant at first chose to wait ; but the Foreman of the Jury saying it would be more satisfactory to his mind to hear it, the defendant called his witness. Lord Ecceigittaoucm told the Juryman to what extent only it would affect this case. Every printer was responsible for what was printed at his press ; otherwise, the /11Dailit a man geti into gaol, he might open his engine fur all orris of libel with impunity. 'The defendant said, that he did not intend to fall hivyrit ness, that the Attorney-General might not have tke benefit of replying. Lord ELLINNORbUCIL—He has that benefit whether you do or not in this case, if he choose to exercise his right. The defendant then called his son, John White who said that he visited his father is prison every day, and acted as his amanu ensis. He knew of every article ther wrote for the Paper previously to its bring sent to London. The paper inestion reached the defendant only on the Monday after it w$ pub lished. He was with his father from twelve o'clock on the .Sunday of its publication, and had been so for many days previr °may. To the best of the witness's belief his father never knew of the libel till after it was printed. The defendant had not been employed in writing or reading any such article, to the best of the witness's belief. If his father bad seen it tn manuscript, the witness must have known it. Upon his cross-examination by the Atkormey-General, he said, he did not know who was the author cf the libel. When asked wliether he had net heard his lather say whose it was, he asked Lord EllenbOrough if he was bound to answer that question. lord ELLlollloltoUoll.—Certainly. Lord ELL E N/10 RO Dan refined trehear the Csentekwho,te said, had volunteered himself into a situation periketlynew ; and the Court expected that the Bar would set the public an example in preserving the order of justice, , z The defendant complained loudly of injustice ; and Lord ELL E Naeik OUCH cautioned him nets injure him self by such unfounded complaints. - The 'witness said; be Might have bed his father say the libel was written by eh elder brother. Thh-biother corresponded with his father once or twice a week. The-libel wax never con tradicted in the paper, which was publiShed till now, but which had changed its propripter, the witneits'sbrether having become so since his father came to' Witt. 'The brother conducted the paper while the father was in peborsl • Upon hie -examination, behnew that his brother had a dis cretionary latitude as to articles under the head London, as the libel was. Such articles were written the latest in the week, and must be left to-in agent's discretion. The Attorney-General thought it his duty to say a few words in reply. This was his privilege in an ordinary case, atter a defendant had called withesses; and would be so in this, whe ther lie had or had 'not. The defendant bad first objected that the offence was not committed in the parish and ward stated in the information ; and claimed'the same benefit as a burglar or a murderer, of an error in the proceedings. The Attorney-Ge neral wouldlake • the case of murder : That offence must be proved in the same county as the indictment charged, because the Jury must be of that county; but the pariah was a mere matter of forch a. • and eve)? murder in London was stated in the parish of St. -k Bow, in the of Cheap; and execu tions had been7ulered,wilhOut any body's dreaming of taking an exception to it. The Learned Counsel of the defendant very wisely disclaimed all advice of such an objection's being taken to-day ;and theAttorney-General was almost ashamed to refute it. All that the defendant had urged might have been properly urged as matter of mitigation ; but it bad no bearing as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant under thb information. The defendant had endeavoured to excite much prejudice against the Attorney-General, and had offered to give up the author of the libel, if he would have dropethe prosecution against the defendant. ' fhe Attorney-General Cou ld not enter here into the discussion of what bad passed between him and the defendant out of Court but this be would say, that no pub lisher of a newspaper had ever less reason to complain of seve rity than the present defendant. He would go tarther . , and say, that none had ever been treated with ► greatbr degree of lenity. The defendant had endeavoured to 112131011 e upon the Attorney- General terms which he could net condescend to accept. The defendant did not dispute the libel, tipon which the law made a different comment from him; nor did he deny its tendency to excite disaffection among the soldiers, or to slander his Majesty's Ministers. -.He only said, " It-was not my fault that I published the libel; it was the law's." but let the detWidant recollect, that the offence he had formerly been guilty of called fur the sentence of the law; that be plie.ed himself in Dorchester Jail; and nothing was more unjust than for him to impute to the law a confinement which he brought upon himeitf. Having brought himself into prison by one offence, was He to be per mitted to arnd out firebrands; and then say, I ant not answer able for the mischief they inty occasion. When int Attorney- Generitl asked the witness who was the author of this libel, he knew front the defendant that it wets his own ion; and from that time to this bad no contradiction or disapprobation of it appeared in big paper. This, then, was a mere pretext ; or, if not, why did not the very next Sunday produce the antidote to the poison ? This might have been done. without disclosing who Was the author of the libel. - The defendant had (tidy to state-obit his confinement subjected him fo Artiploy another Editor of his paper ; that be had seen the libel with concern ; and that he desired it not to be understood as declaring his prin ciples. If he had really repented, the road was open to him ; and be ought to have takt n the earliest opportunity of making restittnietr and reparation. The Attorney-General desired the Jury to bring as much fivour toward-4 the defendant as they would ; and he desired the defendant might have the benefit of their Mout: still, could his own friends, nay his relations pre tend, that if he had repented o. the libel, he would not have contradicted it on the earlist opportunity ? His Lordship would tell the Jury, that, by law he who gave his name to the Stamp-office, as responsible for a pplilication, was answerable for every thing that appeared in that publication. It was, there fore,tbat the law required his name; and the law wonldbe mere stalking-horse, if it were answered by saying, that the de. fendant had no cognizance of the libel. Lord ELLE This was an White. The yublication; lONAL REGISTEL a case I I The defendant interposed, and Mr. 11.4.. awes objected to the 3C Was questi a. no cognizance of the libel. ENSDAOIIGIi then proceeded to charge the Jusi. indictment for a libel against the cletipdant,'Heng e first thing which was to be proved was the fact of and if, after the notice he ba.d giten at the Salop. lA.