Learning Classical Readout Quantum PUFs based on single-qubit gates
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identify
and authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have been
presented that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of these
constructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprint
of the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of Classical
Readout Quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model and
explicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single qubit
rotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstrate
how a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge the
signature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simple
regression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack was
successfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantum
machines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs where
quantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.
Niklas Pirnay Anna Pappa Jean-Pierre Seifert