Противоракета

thumb|right|Израильская противоракета «Хец»
Противоракета — зенитная управляемая ракета, предназначенная для перехвата головных частей и боеголовок баллистических ракетСтатья «Противоракета» в словаре по естественным наукам. (Глоссарий.ру), обычно на заключительной части траектории полёта.

Противоракеты по дальности делятся на два типа:
 дальнего перехвата (за пределами атмосферы).
 ближнего перехвата (в атмосфере).

Противоракеты могут оснащаться осколочно-фугасными, небольшими ядерными зарядами, а также кинетическими боеголовками.

 История

 Противоракетная оборона в США
thumb|left|Художественное представление о программе Wizard
Первые проекты создания средств противодействия баллистическим ракетам появились ещё в 1940-х годах. В 1946 году, ВВС Армии США официально начали программу разработки двух противоракет — дальнобойной MX-794 Wizard (теоретический радиус действия до 1600 км), разрабатываемый университетом штата Мичиган, и ближнего радиуса MX-795 Thumper, создаваемая фирмой General Electric. Обе ракеты должны были перехватывать баллистические ракеты противника с помощью собственных ядерных боевых частейUniversity of Michigan Wizard.

Ввиду несовершенства технологии, работы над программой «Thumper» были закрыты почти сразу же, но работы над программой «Wizard» продолжались до 1958 года (ряд наработок по программе впоследствии был включен в программу разработки противоракеты Спартан).

Эти первые разработки предпринимались без какой-либо конкретной цели, в основом, в попытке изучить проблемы, связанные с перехватом баллистических ракет. В конце 1950-х, появление первых МБР — советской Р-7 и американской SM-65 Atlas — дало программам разработки противоракет более конкретный смысл.

В 1958 году армия США приняла на вооружение MIM-14 Nike-Hercules — первый зенитно-ракетный комплекс, обладающий ограниченными возможностями поражения (за счет применения ядерной БЧ) баллистических целей. Первый успешный перехват состоялся на испытаниях в 1960 году. Тем не менее, возможности комплекса в области противоракетной защиты были весьма ограничены и дальнейшие разработки продолжились в области создания более дальнобойных, стратегических систем ПРО.

 Найк-Зевс
Первой попыткой создания специализированной противоракеты стал разработанный в 1960-х комплекс LIM-49A Nike Zeus — развитие серии Nike. Эта ракета, представлявшая собой усовершенствованную версию MIM-14 Nike-Hercules имела радиус действия до 320 километров и эффективную высоту поражения цели до 160 километров. Уничтожение цели (входящей в атмосферу боевой части баллистической ракеты) должно было осуществляться при помощи подрыва 400-килотонного термоядерного заряда.

Испытания системы начались в 1961 году. 19 июля 1962 года состоялся первый технически успешный перехват боеголовки межконтинентальной баллистической ракеты — «Nike Zeus» прошла в 2-х километрах от входящего в атмосферу боевого блока SM-65 Atlas, что в случае использования противоракетой боевого (а не учебного) заряда, означало бы уничтожение боеголовки. На испытаниях 12 декабря 1962 года был достигнут ещё лучший результат, когда противоракета прошла менее чем в 200 метрах от боеголовки. Всего, противоракета осуществила успешный перехват в 10 из 14 тестов, пройдя достаточно близко от цели, чтобы накрыть её ядерным взрывом.

Хотя разработка «Зевса» была успешной, тем не менее, мнения о его возможностях существенно расходились. Арсенал баллистических ракет США и СССР рос опережающими темпами, и в случае начала военных действий, батареям «Зевсов», защищающим конкретный объект, пришлось бы отражать атаку уже не единичных боеголовок, но десятков боевых блоков. Появление средств преодоления (станций постановки помех и ложных целей) резко снижало эффективность системы, так как к селекции целей «Найк-Зевс» был не способен. Исходная версия плана развертывания предполагала развернуть на территории США 120 баз «Найк-Зевсов» с 50 ракетами на каждой, что означало, что даже в идеальной ситуации каждый конкретный объект может быть защищен не более чем от 50 МБР. Общая стоимость проекта превышала 10 миллиардов долларов. В итоге, несмотря на успешную программу разработки, развертывание «Найк-Зевсов» было отменено и внимание обращено в пользу более совершенных противоракет.

 Сентинел
В конце 1960-х, развитие технологии позволило создать более дешевые и компактные противоракеты. В 1967 году, по инициативе Роберта Макнамары была начата разработка программы «Сентинел» (), направленной на защиту районов развертывания межконтинентальных баллистических ракет от превентивного удара противника. Основной целью программы было обеспечить гарантии выживания ядерного арсенала США и возможности нанесения ответного удара по агрессору, в случае если тот попытается превентивно атаковать районы базирования МБР США. Кроме того, система должна была обеспечивать ограниченную защиту основных районов США от ракетного нападения ограниченной мощности — например, такого, который могла бы нанести КНР.

В основе системы лежали два типа противоракет. Тяжелые противоракеты LIM-49A «Спартан», радиусом до 740 км должны были перехватывать приближающиеся боевые блоки МБР ещё в космосе. Более легкие противоракеты «Спринт», развернутые в непосредственной близости от охраняемых территорий, должны были добивать отдельные боеголовки, прорвавшиеся мимо «Спартанов». От использования тяжелых термоядерных боевых частей отказались в пользу нейтронных зарядов килотонного эквивалента: в космическом пространстве, где предполагалась основная часть перехвата, жесткий поток нейтронного излучения обеспечивал более эффективное поражение цели чем световая и тепловая волна обычного термоядерного заряда, кроме того, небольшие килотонные нейтронные заряды создавали при детонации меньшие помехи наземным радарам чем мегатонные термоядерные боеголовки.

Испытания обеих противоракет были проведены в начале 1970-х. В августе 1970 состоялся первый успешный перехват «Спартаном» боевого блока межконтинентальной баллистической ракеты «Минитмен». Всего, ракета успешно перехватила цель в 43 из 48 испытаний. В 1970-х начались работы по созданию баз противоракет для обороны позиций МБР «Минитмен» в Северной Дакоте и Монтане, но только первая из них была завершена.

 Соглашение 1972 года
См. Договор об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны

В 1972 году, США и СССР подписали соглашение о ограничении развертываемых средств противоракетной обороны не более чем одним комплексом с боезапасом не более чем в 100 противоракет. Основным стимулом к подписанию договора было опасение, что широкое развертывание систем противоракетной обороны вызовет неуверенность каждой из сторон в эффективности своего ответного удара по внезапно атаковавшему противнику, и будет стимулировать в случае конфликта стремление нанести превентивный удар. Считалось, что 100 противоракет будет достаточно для эффективной защиты важнейших стратегических объектов от внезапного нападения (например, с подошедшей близко к побережью подводной лодки), но недостаточно для защиты территории страны от ответного удара.

В соответствии с этим соглашением, планы развертывания «Сентинел» были ограничены единственным комплексом в Северной Дакоте, прикрывавшем район базирования МБР «Минитмен». Вступивший в строй в 1975 году комплекс имел на вооружении 30 противоракет «Спартан» и 70 противоракет «Спринт». Однако, к этому времени более эффективным способом повышения боевой устойчивости ядерных ракет и защиты их от превентивного удара стало считаться их мобильное развертывание. Перспектива скорого появления БРПЛ «Трайдент» межконтинентального радиуса действия позволяла гораздо надежнее и дешевле защитить ядерный арсенал от превентивного удара — рассредоточив его на субмаринах, действующих по всему мировому океану — чем противоракетные комплексы. В результате, в 1976 году система «Сентинел» была снята с вооружения спустя всего пять месяцев боевого дежурства.

 Стратегическая Оборонная Инициатива
См. Стратегическая оборонная инициатива

 Противоракетная оборона в СССР

 Противоракетная оборона в других странах
Великобритания и Канада:

В 1950-х, в рамках плана STAGE Великобритания рассматривала возможность создания системы перехвата баллистических ракет на основе управляемых противоракет с ядерными боеголовками. Программа не получила развития по экономическим причинам и ввиду выявившейся технической невозможности на том уровне развития технологий создать эффективную систему перехвата.

В дальнейшем, для защиты территории Великобритании и особенно — баз стратегических бомбардировщиков (основного средства ответного удара) была предложена система «Летающий Щит» (). Система основывалась на беспилотных самолетах, барражирующих над стратегическими объектами, которые должны были играть роль летающих платформ для противоракет с ядерными боеголовками. За счет воздушного старта предполагалось уменьшить время реакции и оптимизировать стартовые траектории противоракет. Тем не менее, эффективность концепции была признана сомнительной, и проект не был реализован.

В 1950-х, канадский отдел разработки и проектирования вооружений () вкладывал значительные усилия в разработку систем противоракетной обороны, для защиты территории Канады от дальнобойных баллистических ракет. Хотя эти исследования не привели к появлению каких-либо конкретных проектов противоракет, они все же в значительной степени способствовали развитию систем обнаружения и сопровождения баллистических ракет в верхних слоях атмосферы.

КНР:

В 1970-х, в рамках постулировавшейся в то время «оборонительной военной политики», Китайская Народная Республика обращала значительное внимание на разработки противоракетных систем. В рамках программы была разработана линия противоракет FanJi, предназначенных для поражения входящих в атмосферу боеголовок. По экономическим и политическим причинам, проект был закрыт в 1980 году, после лишь нескольких экспериментальных пусков.

Одновременно с противоракетами, в КНР была разработана противоракетная артиллерийская установкаProject 640: China’s National Missile Defence in the '70s — SinoDefence.com  «XianFeng» — 140-миллиметровое гладокствольное орудие длиной ствола около 25 метров и весом более 110 тонн. Предполагалось, что это орудие сможет эффективно поражать ультраскоростными снарядами входящие в атмосферу боеголовки. По последним данным, экспериментальное орудие все еще хранится на полигоне в Баотоу

 Договор по ПРО 1972 года
Ряд экономических, технических и политических проблем привел к договору по ПРО 1972 года между СССР и США, согласно которому было запрещено создание стратегических (не тактических) противоракетДокументы по Договору ПРО.

В 2001 году, США, согласно требованиям соглашения, заранее уведомили Россию об одностороннем выходе из договора.

 Страны, имеющие противоракеты
 Индия — первые успешные испытания проведены в 2006 годуPrithvi Mission Milestone in Missile Defence .
 Израиль — проект «Хец» (совместно с США) с 1986 года. Первые успешные испытания в 1998 году.
 Россия (СССР) — первые успешные испытания противоракеты В-1000 4 марта 1961 годаПервая советская противоракета В-1000.
 США — первый успешный перехват баллистической ракеты произведен на испытаниях в 1960 году.

 Типы противоракет

 На вооружении
 Boeing Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) () — противоракета наземного базирования большого радиуса действия, составная часть комплекса заатмосферного (космического) перехвата GBMD. Предназначена для заатмосферного перехвата межконтинентальных баллистических ракет. Осуществляет кинетический перехват цели. На вооружении с 2005 года.
 RIM-161 SM-3 () — противоракета морского базирования, на базе семейства зенитных ракет «Стандарт». Часть системы Иджис. Предназначена для заатмосферного перехвата моноблочных баллистических ракет среднего и оперативно-тактического (в перспективе — межконтинентального) радиуса действия, а также поражения низкоорбитальных космических аппаратов. На вооружении с 2006 года.
 THAAD () — противоракета малого радиуса действия высокой мобильности. Предназначена для перехвата баллистических ракет малой и средней дальности. На вооружении с 2006 года.
 PAC-3 «Patriot» () — зенитный ракетный комплекс, современные модели которого имеют широкие возможности перехвата оперативно-тактических и баллистических ракет среднего и малого радиуса действия.
 53Т6 (ПРС-1) () — противоракета ближнего атмосферного перехвата системы ПРО А-135.

 Исторические
 MIM-14 Nike-Hercules () — зенитный ракетный комплекс с ограниченными возможностями поражения ядерными зарядами баллистических ракет. На вооружении с 1958 по 1974 год.
 LIM-49A Nike Zeus () — противоракета с 400-килотонной термоядерной боевой частью. Успешно прошла испытания в начале 1960-х, но не принята на вооружение.
 LIM-49A «Спартан» () — противоракета большого радиуса действия с нейтронной боевой частью. Часть комплекса «Сентинел». На вооружении с 1975 по 1976 год.
 «Спринт» () — противоракета малого радиуса действия с нейтронной боевой частью. Часть комплекса «Сентинел». На вооружении с 1975 по 1976 год.
 В-1000 () — экспериментальная противоракета системы противоракетной обороны А-35 с помощью которой был впервые осуществлён перехват боеголовки 4 марта 1961 года.
 5В61 (А-350Ж) () — противоракета системы ПРО А-35, на вооружении с 1971 по 1977 год.
 А-350Р () — модернизированная противоракета системы ПРО А-35М. На вооружении с 1977 по 1995 год.
 51Т6 (А-925) () — противоракета дальнего заатмосферного перехвата системы ПРО А-135.

 Примечания

 См. также
 Противоракетная оборона
 ПРО Москвы
 Противоракетная оборона США

 Ссылки

Категория:Оружие по алфавиту
Категория:Ракетное оружие
Категория:ПРО

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Question: what is the hez anti-vorocket

ракета , предназначенная для перехвата головных частей и боеголовок баллистических ракетСтатья « Противоракета » в словаре по естественным наукам .

(Glosary.ru), usually on the final part of the flight trajectory.

Question: the hez anti-vorocket intercepts what

баллистических ракетСтатья « Противоракета » в словаре по естественным наукам

Question: what is the name of the israeli anti-rocket

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Question: the hez anti-rocket is a ghetto-controlled missile designed to intercept the head

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Question: what is the name of the israeli anti-rocket interceptor

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The Israeli anti - Rocket “ Hez ” Anti - Vorocket is a ghetto - controlled missile designed to intercept the head parts and headlines of ballistic missiles .

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|
Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles|
Appendix 4: Undesignated Vehicles
|Wizard|
|Copyright © 2003 Andreas Parsch|
On 4 March 1946, the U.S. Army Air Force formally established its first anti-ballistic missile (ABM) projects. Study contracts were let to General Electric for the MX-795 Thumper and to the University of Michigan for the MX-794 Wizard. Thumper was to be a short-range "hit-to-kill" missile, while Wizard was to be a longer-range nuclear-armed missile to intercept ballistic missiles at range of about 1600 km (1000 miles).
In hindsight, both projects were way beyond then state-of-the-art technology, and the Thumper studies apparently didn't result in any actual hardware effort. Wizard was longer-lived, and was reportedly cancelled and reinstated by the USAF several times in the 1950s. It was eventually identified as System 222A. The development seems to have centered on system components, like tracking and guidance radars and electronics. Companies involved included Convair/RCA, Lockheed and Raytheon. Details on the planned missile are not available, but a USAF conceptual drawing shows a two-stage rocket-propelled vehicle.
|Image: USAF|
|Wizard (concept drawing)|
In the mid-1950s, the U.S. Army initiated its own anti-missile project (Nike Zeus), but it was decided that funding two separate ABM efforts was unnecessary. After some discussion, the Air Force's Wizard was terminated in 1958 in favour of the Army's Nike Zeus. However, radar technology developed for Wizard would be integrated into the Nike Zeus program. The latter eventually evolved into the operational LIM-49 Spartan missile.
No specifications for the planned Wizard missile are available.
[1] Bill Gunston: "The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Rockets and Missiles", Salamander Books Ltd, 1979
[2] Norman J. Bowman: "The Handbook of Rockets and Guided Missiles", Perastadion Press, 1963
[3] Frederick I. Ordway III, Ronald C. Wakeford: "International Missile and Spacecraft Guide", McGraw-Hill, 1960
Back to Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, Appendix 4

Question: when was the mx-794 wizard created

Question: when were the first anti-missiles created

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Question: who developed the mx-794 wizard

университетом штата Мичиган , и ближнего радиуса MX-795 Thumper , создаваемая фирмой

Question: who created the mx-795 thumper

Question: what was the name of the anti-missile created by the university of mich

what was the name of the anti-missile created by the university of mich

Question: what is the theoretical radius of action for the mx-794 wizard

what is the theoretical radius of action for the mx-794 wizard

The first projects of the Wizard program to create anti - missiles appeared in the 1940s .

In 1946 , the U.S. Air Force officially launched the program of the development of two anti - missiles — the MX-794 Wizard ( theoretical radius of action up to 1600 km ) , developed by the University of Michigan , and the nearby radius of the MX-795 Thumper , created by General Electric .

Противоракетная оборона в США Художественное представление о программе Wizard Первые проекты создания средств противодействия баллистическим ракетам появились ещё в 1940-х годах. В 1946 году, ВВС Армии США официально начали программу разработки двух противоракет — дальнобойной MX-794 Wizard (теоретический радиус действия до 1600 км), разрабатываемый университетом штата Мичиган, и ближнего радиуса MX-795 Thumper, создаваемая фирмой General Electric.

The first projects of the Wizard program to create anti-missiles appeared in the 1940s. In 1946, the U.S. Air Force officially launched the program of the development of two anti-missiles — the MX-794 Wizard (theoretical radius of action up to 1600 km), developed by the University of Michigan, and the nearby radius of the MX-795 Thumper, created by General Electric.

"Предполагалось

ультраскоростными

экспериментальное

On 15 December 1963, the then Chinese leader Chairman Mao Zedong said that China’s military strategy was defensive in nature, and therefore China should develop defensive (strategic) weapons as well as offensive weapons such as nuclear weapons and missiles. On 6 February 1964, during his meeting with Dr Qian Xuesen ('Father of Chinese Rocketry'), Chairman Mao again expressed his views on the importance of the missile defence capability. According to Mao, missile defence capability should not be dominated by the two superpowers only, and China must also develop its own missile defence weapons, no matter how long it would take. This conversation, later known as “640 Directive”, was cascaded to the whole defence industry as Mao’s order to develop a missile defence system that could defend the country against nuclear-armed strategic missile attacks.
On 23 March 1964, over thirty top scientists from across the Chinese defence industry attended a meeting organised by the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) in Beijing to discuss the feasibility of a missile defence system. On 10 May 1965, the Central Special Committee issued a notice to the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Ministry of Machinery Industry, China Academy of Science, PLA Artillery Corps, and Base 20, asking them to list the missile defence in their annual and long-term plans. A plan outlining the missile defence weapon development submitted by COSTIND was approved by the Central Special Committee in August 1965.
On 23 February 1966, COSTIND organised another conference to outline detailed development plans for the missile defence programme, which was given a codename “Project 640” after Chairman Mao’s “640 Directive”. Under the plan, the whole project was divided into five key sub-systems. Key elements of the project included the FanJi (“Counterattack”) series anti-ballistic missiles (ABM), the XianFeng (“Pioneer”) anti-missile super gun, and a land-based missile early warning network. The meeting also decided to speed up the building of a dedicated ABM test range and the development of the nuclear warhead for the ABM system. The project entered full-scale development in the early 1970s.
Under the instruction of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, the 2nd Academy of the 7th Ministry of Machinery Industry (Ministry of Aerospace Industry) was officially renamed Academy of Anti-Ballistic Missile & Anti-Satellite in 1969 to be in charge of the ABM system development. Its subordinated 210 Institute was assigned to the development of the anti-missile super gun. Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics was responsible for the development of the anti-missile laser. The 2nd Academy also began to develop the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon technology in the early 1970s.
Project 640 faced enormous technical and financial difficulties from the very beginning. The country, troubled by its financial hardship and internal political turmoil of the ‘Culture Revolution’, was simply unable to support an expensive project like this. Additionally, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and later the closure of the U.S. Safeguard ABM system made an independent Chinese missile defence system seemingly unnecessary. After Mao’s death in 1976, the development of the missile defence began to slow down. In March 1980, the new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping decided to cancel the whole project so that the country could concentrate on economic development.
FanJi (FJ) Anti-Ballistic Missile
The 2nd Academy initiated three development programmes in the early 1970s: FanJi 1 low- to medium-altitude ABM, FanJi 2 low-altitude ABM, and FanJi 3 high-altitude ABM.
FanJi 1
The FanJi 1 was a two-stage, semi-active radar-homing, hypersonic interceptor missile designed to intercept ballistic missile warheads at low- to medium-altitude. The first-stage of the missile used liquid propellant and the second-stage used solid propellant. The missile was 14m in length. Flight tests of two dummy missiles were carried out successfully in August and September of 1979. At the same time, the PLA proposed a missile defence zone around the capital Beijing using the FanJi 1. However, the development programme was cancelled by the Chinese government in March 1980 due to financial and political reasons.
FanJi 2
Between October 1971 and April 1972, the 2nd Academy tested six flight tests of a 1:5 scaled model of the FanJi 2 low-altitude ABM, with five of them being successful. The development programme was cancelled in 1973.
FanJi 3
The FanJi 3 high-altitude ABM system was proposed by the 2nd Academy in 1974, but the development stopped in 1977.
“XianFeng” Anti-Missile Super Gun
The Anti-missile super gun developed by the 210 Institute was given a codename “Project 640-2”. Initial research was carried out on a 140mm smoothbore cannon, which fires 18kg projectiles to a maximum distance of 74km. In January 1967, an anti-missile super gun known as “Xianfeng” (“Pioneer”) was proposed. The super gun was 26 metre in length and weighted 155 tonnes. Mounted on a fixed gun rack, the 420mm-calibre super gun was designed to fire 160kg unguided rocket-propelled projectiles to intercept the incoming nuclear warheads. Various tests were carried out in the early 1970s, but the design was proven impractical. The development of the super gun was put on a halt in 1977 and finally cancelled in March 1980.
Ground-Based Missile Early Warning Network
Compared to the ABM system, the development of the associated missile early warning and tracking system was much more productive. The first stage of the project included five missile early warning stations located in Khashi, Nanning, Kunming, Hainan, Jiaodong, and Xiangxi; and a command & control centre in Weinan (No.28 Station). Later the network also included a computing station codenamed “Qin Ling”, a recovery and tracking station codenamed “Chang Jiang”, a mobile tracking station codenamed “Qian Shao”, a second mobile tracking station codenamed “Huang He”, and an additional early warning station codenamed “Chang Cheng” in Changchun.
The key elements of the missile early warning network included 7010 phased array early warning surveillance radar and 110 mono-pulse missile tracking radar. Both radar systems played key roles in providing initial missile early warning capability for China, as well as supporting China’s ICBM tests and space programme.
7010 Radar
Developed by 14th Electronic Institute in Nanjing in 1976, 7010 radar was a fixed, land-based phased array surveillance radar designed to detect, identify, and track intercontinental ballistic missiles and other objects in outer space. The development of 7010 radar began in 1970 and the radar became fully operational in 1976. The 40m X 20m radar antenna was built on the Huangyang Mountain slope 1,600m above the sea level in Xuanhua, Hebei Province, about 140km northwest of Beijing. A second site was built in Henan Province. In July 1979, the 7010 radar sites provided accurate data on the re-entry time of the de-orbited U.S. Skylab spacecraft. On 12 January 1983, 7010 radar successfully predicted the time and place of landing for the failed Soviet Union nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos 1402. The radar site was abandoned in the early 1990s.
110 Mono-Pulse Missile Tracking Radar
110 radar was developed jointly by 14th Electronic Institute in Nanjing and the Electronic Institute of China Academy of Science (CAS) in the 1970s. The radar antenna was 25m in diameter and weighted 400 tonnes. The radar antenna was housed in a large radome 36.5m in height and 44m in diameter. The radar became fully operational in 1977, with only one station built at the Zhanyi Space/Missile Tracking Station in the southern Yunnan Province.
Following the cancellation of Project 640, the missile early warning and tracking network evolved into the space tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C) network in the 1980s to support China’s space programme. However, it may have retained some functions for missile early warning and space surveillance.

Question: what weapon was assumed to hit the atmosphere of battle heads

ультраскоростными снарядами входящие в атмосферу

what weapon was assumed to hit the atmosphere of battle heads

Question: where is the experimental weapon stored

Question: where is the experimental weapon stored in baoto

where is the experimental weapon stored in baoto

Question: what part of the battlefield could the experimental weapon be used to hit

what part of the battlefield could the experimental weapon be used to hit

Question: what type of missiles were thought to be able to hit battle heads

ультраскоростными

what type of missiles were thought to be able to hit battle heads

It was assumed that this weapon could effectively hit the atmosphere of the battle heads with ultra - speed missiles .

According to the latest data , the experimental weapon is still stored at the polygon in Baoto .

It was assumed that this weapon could effectively hit the atmosphere of the battle heads with ultra-speed missiles. According to the latest data, the experimental weapon is still stored at the polygon in Baoto.

"Одновременно

противоракетами

противоракетная

артиллерийская

установкаProject

140-миллиметровое

гладокствольное

"Предполагалось

ультраскоростными

Satellite imagery has revealed two unusually large artillery pieces, measuring about 80 ft and 110 ft respectively, at a test centre for armour and artillery northwest of Baotou in China.
The two pieces, which are horizontally mounted, are mounted on a concrete pad that appeared between September 2010 and December 2011, when the two pieces were first captured by satellite imagery. Images provided by Astrium confirmed that the objects were still in place in July 2013.
The 2011 imagery clearly depicts a series of what appear to be targets in front of the 110 ft piece, suggesting some kind of penetration testing for high-velocity projectiles.
China has historically shown interest in large calibre, long-range artillery. It experimented with the Xianfeng 'supergun' in the 1970s as part of Project 640 anti-ballistic missile programme. Approximately 85 ft long, Xianfeng may be the smaller of the two objects retained for experimental use after its cancellation in 1980.
In the 1990s it was revealed that China had built a long-range 'supergun' technology testbed similar to the Iraqi Project Babylon supergun designed by Gerald Bull. IHS Jane's Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence notes that Bull was heavily involved in designing long-range Chinese artillery systems for Norinco in the 1980s.
The larger Baotou artillery piece outwardly resembles the Project Babylon 'supergun', which was theoretically capable of extreme-range artillery barrages or of targeting orbiting satellites. Bull's 'Baby Babylon' testbed measured 150 ft in length, compared with the 105 ft-long larger piece at Baotou.
COMMENT
Although the Baotou pieces appear similar in design to the Bull 'supergun' concept, it seems unlikely that they are intended for long-range artillery barrages or anti-satellite operations given China's extensive long-term development of ballistic missiles for both of these missions.
Alternatively, the devices could also be railgun prototypes, although this appears unlikely as there is no significant external power routed to the test pad and a lack of environmental protection. The other possibility is that China is simply reusing the legacy systems from its long-range artillery programmes from the 1970s and 1990s as part of a projectile test range - a view that is supported by the presence of what appears to be 'used' targets on the northwest side of the pad.

Question: what is the throw length of xianfeng

25 метров и весом

Question: what size is xianfeng

140-миллиметровое

Question: what is the weight of xianfeng

Question: what type of missiles could xianfeng be used with

ультраскоростными снарядами входящие в атмосферу

what type of missiles could xianfeng be used with

Question: what is the name of china's national missile defence

what is the name of china's national missile defence

Question: how big is xianfeng

весом более 110 тонн

Question: along with the anti-missile artillery plant project 640, what other component of ch

противоракетами , в КНР была разработана противоракетная артиллерийская установкаProject 640 : China ’s National Missile Defence in the ' 70s — SinoDefence.com « XianFeng » — 140-миллиметровое гладокствольное орудие длиной ствола около 25 метров и весом

along with the anti-missile artillery plant project 640, what other component of ch

Question: where was xianfeng developed

Simultaneously with the anti - missiles , the anti - missile artillery plant Project 640 : China 's National Missile Defence in the ' 70s - SinoDefence.com " XianFeng " was developed in China - a 140 - mm smooth - scale weapon with a throw length of approximately 25 meters and weighing more than 110 tons .

Simultaneously with the anti-missiles, the anti-missile artillery plant Project 640: China's National Missile Defence in the '70s - SinoDefence.com "XianFeng" was developed in China - a 140-mm smooth-scale weapon with a throw length of approximately 25 meters and weighing more than 110 tons. It was assumed that this weapon could effectively hit the atmosphere of the battle heads with ultra-speed missiles.

A series of economic, technical and political problems led to the 1972 US-Soviet Anti-Protection Agreement, according to which it was prohibited the creation of strategic (not tactical) anti-missiles.

экономических

политических

стратегических

противоракетДокументы

Документы по Договору ПРО
Договор между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны 26 мая 1972 г. (договор по ПРО)
Протокол к Договору между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны, 3 июля 1974 г.
Совместное российско-американское заявление по глобальной системе защиты от 17 июня 1992 г.
Совместное заявление президентов Российской Федерации и Соединенных Штатов Америки в отношении Договора по противоракетной обороне от 21 марта 1997 г.
Пакет документов, подписанных в Нью-Йорке 26 сентября 1997 г.
- Меморандум о договоренности в связи с договором между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны, от 26 мая 1972 г.
- Первое согласованное заявление в связи с договором между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны, от 26 мая 1972 г.
- Второе согласованное заявление в связи с договором между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Соединенными Штатами Америки об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны, от 26 мая 1972 г.
- Соглашение о мерах укрепления доверия в отношении систем борьбы с баллистическими ракетами, не являющимися стратегическими баллистическими ракетами
- Положение о постоянной консультативной комиссии
Совместное заявление о пятом рассмотрении Договора по ПРО от 14 октября 1998 г.
Совместное заявление США и Российской Федерации, касающееся стратегических наступательных и оборонительных вооружений и дальнейшего укрепления стратегической стабильности от 20 июня, 1999 г (Кельнские соглашения).
Официальные предложения США по модификации Договора ПРО (пакет документов, неофициальный перевод с английского), 20 января 2000 г.
Совместное заявление о принципах стратегической стабильности, 4 июня 2000 г.
Замысел и этапы создания общеевропейской системы противоракетной обороны -- российские предложения по ЕвроПРО, 2001 г.
Совместное заявление Президента Российской Федерации и Президента Соединенных Штатов Америки по стратегической стабильности, Генуя, 22 июля 2001 года
См. также документы и материалы к Договору по ПРО на веб-сайте Министерства иностранных дел РФ
Поиск на СНВ-сайте
© Центр по изучению проблем разоружения, энергетики и экологии при МФТИ, 2000-2001

Question: when was the us-soviet anti-defense agreement signed

when was the us-soviet anti-defense agreement signed

Question: what agreement prohibited the creation of strategic anti-missiles

договору по ПРО 1972 года между СССР и США

what agreement prohibited the creation of strategic anti-missiles

Question: what was prohibited in the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement

стратегических ( не тактических ) противоракетДокументы по Договору

strategic ( not tactical ) anti - missiles

what was prohibited in the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement

Question: the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement prohibited the creation of what

противоракетДокументы по Договору

the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement prohibited the creation of what

Question: what problems led to the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement

economic, technical and political problems

экономических , технических и политических проблем

economic , technical and political problems

what problems led to the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement

Question: what did the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement do regarding the

what did the 1972 us-soviet anti-protection agreement do regarding the

A series of economic , technical and political problems led to the 1972 US - Soviet Anti - Protection Agreement , according to which it was prohibited the creation of strategic ( not tactical ) anti - missiles .

Israel is the Hetz project (along with the United States) since 1986.

противоракеты

Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) to Air Defence (AD) Target Interception Mission was carried out successfully on November 27 at 10:15 hours over the coast of Bay of Bengal at Integrated Test Range. All the objectives of the maiden mission have been met.
The mission was in complete weapon configuration with weapon system radar LRTR, MFCR, MCC, LCC, MCT, TUT, Fusion Computer and Chaya System. All the elements were inter-connected through redundant communication links.
A series of full dress rehearsals was conducted with complete weapon system elements, electronic target and interceptors to validate the integrated system performance.
To evaluate the integrated functionality for weapon system elements and software, AD Target-03 was test fired successfully from launch complex No-3 (LC III), Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur on November 19 at 09:55 hours. All the events took place as per planned mission sequence and Interceptor was launched elctronically as per Ground Guidance Computation. The electronic interceptor intercepted the target as precisely as seen in digital simulations and HILS simulations. Tartget-03 missile performance was completely satisfactory and as also the weapon system performance. This validated the full system and gave added confidence for the actual mission.
On November 27, at 10:15 hours, Air Defence Target-02 was launched from LC III. The Weapon System Radars picked up the target at 3 km altitude, MCC gave target assignment to LCC, Ground Guidance Computed the Initial Azimuth, time of launch of PAD and uploaded to On-board computer and the PAD interceptor lifted off when the Target was at Apogee and onboard guidance steered the interceptor towards target. The on-board seeker acquired the target, the stage separation and second stage motor ignition events happened as planned. The Terminal Guidance and Control performed flawlessly. All the mission events took place as expected. The PAD intercepted the Target successfully at an altitude of 50 km.
Defence Minister, Mr AK Antony conveyed his heartiest congratulations to the entire DRDO community and its Programme Director and Chief Controller of Research & Development, Dr VK Saraswat on the success of the mission.
source : DRDO

Question: when were the first successful missile tests conducted

Israel is the Hetz project (along with the United States) since 1986.

when were the first successful missile tests conducted

Question: who is the hetz project

Question: when did israel start the hetz project

Question: israel is the hetz project along with which other country

israel is the hetz project along with which other country

Question: israel is part of what project

проект « Хец

Question: who conducted the first successful missile tests in 2006

who conducted the first successful missile tests in 2006

Question: what israel's missile defence project called

what israel's missile defence project called

The first successful missile tests were conducted in 2006 by Prithvi Mission Milestone in Missile Defence .

Israel is the Hetz project ( along with the United States ) since 1986 .

Израиль — проект «Хец» (совместно с США) с 1986 года.

The first successful missile tests were conducted in 2006 by Prithvi Mission Milestone in Missile Defence. Israel is the Hetz project (along with the United States) since 1986.

Israel is the Hetz project (along with the United States) since 1986.

|Almanac of Policy Issues
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Home : Search : Archive
Adapted from a report by Clyde R. Mark,
Congressional Research Service
Updated October 17, 2002
SUMMARY
Israeli-U. S. relations are an important factor in U. S. policy in the Middle East, and Congress has placed considerable importance on the maintenance of a close and supportive relationship. The main vehicle for expressing support for Israel has been foreign aid; Israel currently receives about $3 billion per year in economic and military grants, refugee settlement assistance, and other aid. Congress has monitored the aid issue closely along with other issues in bilateral relations, and its concerns have affected Administration's policies.
U. S.-Israeli relations have evolved from an initial American policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in 1948 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily powerful Israel, dependent on the United States for its economic and military strength, with the U. S. superpower trying to balance competing interests in the region. Some in the United States question the levels of aid and general commitment to Israel, and argue that a U. S. bias toward Israel operates at the expense of improved U. S. relations with various Arab states. Others maintain that democratic Israel is a strategic ally, and that U. S. relations with Israel strengthens the U. S. presence in the Middle East.
The United States fully supported the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, and the follow-up agreements in May 1994, September 1995, the Hebron agreement of January 15, 1997, and the Wye agreement of October 23, 1998, mediated by President Clinton.
See also CRS Issue Brief IB85066, Israel: U. S. Foreign Assistance; CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks; CRS Report RS20339, Jerusalem: The U. S. Embassy and P. L. 104-45; and CRS Report RS20001, Jonathan Pollard: Background and Consideration for Presidential Clemency.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
President Harry Truman recognized Israel on May 15, 1948, within minutes after Israel declared its independence. Past American presidents, encouraged by active support from civic groups, labor unions, political parties, and members of the American and world Jewish communities, supported the concept, articulated in Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration, of a Jewish homeland.
After World War II, United States support for a Jewish state grew with the desire to help settle the large number of Jewish refugees, displaced persons, and survivors of the Nazi holocaust. Popular support for Israel among U. S. Jews and significant segments of the Christian community has been supplemented by a general identification with Israel as an advanced democratic society with strong liberal and humanitarian values, as a "pioneering" and innovative nation, and as a beleaguered refuge surrounded by hostile and belligerent Arab neighbors.
In the past, U. S. Middle East interests included containing Soviet expansion into the region, ensuring industrialized countries' access to Middle Eastern petroleum resources, fostering the growth of democracy and market economies, maintaining communications and trade with the region, and ensuring Israel's security. On occasion, the United States provided military forces to defend Middle Eastern states, as was the case in Lebanon in 1958, the Kuwait tanker reflagging in 1987, or the war against Iraq in 1991. Israel's military and intelligence capabilities and strategic location contributed to the U. S. objective of containing Soviet expansion into the region. But friendly U. S.-Israeli ties did not advance other U. S. interests in the Middle East. As U. S. relations with Arab nations grew in importance, the United States attempted to balance its stated commitment to Israel with other regional commitments and interests.
Israel and the United States share the view that the United States has a predominant role and responsibility in Middle East peace-making, but in the past Israel has disagreed with the U. S. view of its role as an even-handed peace broker among the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Most Israelis and Israeli supporters have wanted the United States to favor only Israeli positions. The United States has provided arms to Middle Eastern countries for individual and collective defense against aggression. Past U. S. arms transfers to Arab countries have been striking examples of friction in Israeli-U. S. relations, not only because they underscore the difference in attitudes toward Arab countries, but because Israel perceived arms transfers to Arabs as threatening its security.
Israel and Recent U. S. Administrations Carter Administration (1977-1981) The Carter years were characterized by very active U. S. involvement in the Middle East peace process, and, as a consequence, led to some friction in U. S.-Israeli bilateral relations. The Carter-initiated Camp David process was viewed by some in Israel as creating U. S. pressures on Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt. President Carter's support for a Palestinian "homeland" and for Palestinian political rights created additional tensions with Israel. Some argue that the final text of the Camp David accords represented Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's success in limiting Israeli requirements to deal with the Palestinians.
Reagan Administration (1981-1989) Israeli supporters expressed concerns early in the first Reagan term about potential difficulties in U. S.-Israeli relations, in part because several Presidential appointees had ties or past business associations with key Arab countries (Secretaries Weinberger and Shultz, for example, were officers in the Bechtel Corporation, which has strong links to the Arab world.) But President Reagan's personal support for Israel and the compatibility between Israeli and Reagan perspectives on terrorism, security cooperation, and the Soviet threat, led to dramatic improvements in bilateral relations. Although the Lebanon war of 1982 exposed some serious differences between Israeli and U. S. policies, such as Israel's use of U. S.-provided military equipment in the attack on Lebanon and Israel's rejection of the Reagan peace plan of September 1, 1982, it did not alter the Administration's favoritism for Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States.
U. S.-Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term. The two countries reached a number of precedent-setting agreements in strategic and defense cooperation. Israel was granted "major non-NATO ally" status that gave it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on U. S. defense contracts. The United States maintained grant aid to Israel at $3 billion annually and implemented a Free Trade Agreement in 1985. The second Reagan term ended on what many Israelis considered to be a sour note when the United States opened a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in December 1988. But, despite the U. S.-PLO dialogue, the Pollard spy case in December 1986, or the Israeli rejection of the Shultz peace initiative in the spring of 1988, pro-Israeli organizations in the United States characterized the Reagan Administration (and the 100th Congress) as the "most pro-Israel ever" and praised the positive overall tone of bilateral relations.
Bush Administration (1989-1993) Secretary of State James Baker told an American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby) audience on May 22, 1989, that Israel should abandon its expansionist policies, a remark many took as a signal that the pro-Israel Reagan years were over. Former President Bush raised Israeli ire when he reminded a press conference on March 3, 1990, that east Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a sovereign part of Israel as the Israelis claimed. The United States and Israel disagreed over the Israeli interpretation of the Israeli plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace conference delegation in the summer of 1989, and also disagreed over the need for an investigation of the Jerusalem incident of October 8, 1990, in which Israeli police killed 17 Palestinians.
On September 27, 1990, amid Iraqi threats against Israel generated by the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, former President Bush repeated the U. S. commitment to Israel's security. Israeli-U. S. tension eased after the start of the Persian Gulf war on January 16, 1991, when Israel became a target of Iraqi Scud missiles. The United States urged Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for the attacks because it was believed that Iraq wanted to draw Israel into the conflict and force other coalition members, Egypt and Syria in particular, to quit the coalition and join Iraq in a war against Israel. Israel did not retaliate, and gained praise for its restraint.
Former President Bush and Secretary Baker were instrumental in convening the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 and in persuading all the parties to engage in the subsequent peace negotiations. It was reported widely that the Bush Administration did not share an amicable relationship with the Shamir government. After the Labor party won the June 23, 1992 election, U. S.-Israel relations appeared to improve. The Labor coalition approved a partial housing construction freeze in the occupied territories on July 19, something the Shamir government had not done despite Bush Administration appeals for a freeze as a condition for the loan guarantees. President Bush announced agreement on the loan guarantees for Israel during Prime Minister Rabin's August 12 and 13, 1992 visit to the United States.
Clinton Administration (1993-2000) Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition on September 10, and signed the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993. President Clinton announced on September 10 that the United States and the PLO would reestablish their dialogue. On October 26, 1994, President Clinton witnessed the Jordan-Israel peace treaty signing, and President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak, and King Husayn of Jordan witnessed the White House signing of the September 28, 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
President Clinton attended the funeral of assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin in Jerusalem on November 6, 1995. Following a March 14, 1996 visit to Israel, President Clinton offered $100 million in aid for Israel's anti-terror activities, another $200 million for the Arrow anti-missile deployment, and about $50 million for an anti-missile laser weapon. President Clinton disagreed with Prime Minister Netanyahu's policy of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and it was reported that the President believed that the Prime Minister delayed the peace process. President Clinton hosted negotiations at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland, ending with the signing of an agreement on October 23, 1998. Israel suspended implementation of the Wye agreement in early December 1998, because Prime Minister Netanyahu said the Palestinians violated the Wye Agreement by threatening to declare a state (Palestinian statehood was not mentioned in Wye). In January 1999, the Wye Agreement was delayed until the Israeli elections in May.
Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister on May 17, 1999, and won a vote of confidence for his government on July 6, 1999. President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak appeared to establish close personal relations during four days of meetings between July 15 and 20 in what many observers believed was a clear reversal of the less than friendly relations between Clinton and Netanyahu. President Clinton mediated meetings between Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat at the White House, Oslo, Shepherdstown, Camp David, and Sharm al-Shaykh in the search for peace. In a January 11, 2001 interview, the President implied that his attempts to arrange a peace had failed and that the task would carry over to the new Bush Administration.
Bush Administration (2001 -) President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Sharon established good relations in their March and June 2001 meetings. On October 4, 2001, Sharon accused the Bush Administration of appeasing the Palestinians at Israel's expense in a bid for Arab support for the U. S. anti-terror campaign. The White House said the remark was unacceptable. Rather than apologize for the remark, Sharon said the United States failed to understand him. Also, the United States criticized the Israeli practice of assassinating Palestinians believed to be engaged in terrorism, which appeared to some Israelis to be inconsistent with the U. S. policy of pursuing international terrorist Osama bin Ladin "dead or alive."
At their seventh White House meeting on October 16, 2002, the President and the Prime Minister discussed the possible U. S. invasion of Iraq and Israel's restrictions on the Palestinians, according to press accounts.
Issues in U. S.-Israeli Relations Peace Process The United States and Israel share the goal of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors but the two nations have not always agreed on the best way to achieve peace or on the peace process. (For a summary of current peace talks, see CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks.)
Withdrawal from Occupied Territories. From 1967 until the election of Prime Minister Begin in May 1977, the United States and Israel interpreted U. N. Resolution 242 to mean that Israel would withdraw from most of the occupied territories in exchange for peace. The Israeli Labor party continues to support partial withdrawal from the territories. The Likud government (1977-1984, 1996-1999) maintained that its acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty fulfilled the Israeli pledge to withdraw from occupied territory.
The governments formed in November 1988 and June 1990, led by Prime Minister Shamir, rejected the territory-for-peace formula of U. N. Resolution 242, and insisted that Israel would retain the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, a statement that appeared to preclude any negotiations. The Labor government that won the June 1992 election accepted the principles of exchanging land-for-peace and withdrawing from some of the occupied territories. Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likud government, elected in May 1996, completed the withdrawals scheduled in the September 1995 agreement but appeared reluctant to accept further withdrawals. The Labor government elected in May 1999 completed the Wye Agreement withdrawals and unsuccessfully negotiated further withdrawals for the permanent status agreement prior to the February 6, 2001 election.
On May 23, 2000, Israel withdrew its armed forces from the ten-mile wide "security zone" in southern Lebanon, fulfilling a promise made by Prime Minister Barak during the 1999 election campaign. The United States had maintained that all foreign forces should withdraw from Lebanon.
Separation. Prime Minister Ehud Barak endorsed building a fence to separate the West Bank from Israel similar to the fence that already separates Israel from the Gaza Strip. Israel began constructing the 400 kilometer West Bank fence in June 2002 at an estimated cost of $200 million. Settlers and conservative Israelis oppose the fence because they fear it will become a permanent boundary and they intend to annex all or most of the West Bank. But they favor the protection the fence is supposed to offer. Israeli liberals favor the fence as a permanent boundary and as protection against terrorist incursions.
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip. U. S. policy, beginning in 1982, supported neither an independent Palestinian state nor Israeli sovereignty or control of the occupied territories. Instead, the Reagan Administration preferred a form of "association" between the West Bank/ Gaza areas and Jordan. The Palestinians at Madrid accepted confederation between a Palestinian entity composed of the occupied territories and the state of Jordan, a position accepted by Israel's Labor government and by the United States.
After completing the withdrawals called for in the October 1998 Wye Agreement, the Palestinians controlled about 18% of the West Bank, the Israelis and Palestinians shared control over about 22%, and Israel controlled the remaining 60%. According to press accounts from the July 2000 Camp David summit, Israel offered to withdraw from more than 90% of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip as part of the permanent status negotiations.
The Golan Heights. Although the United States considers the Golan Heights to be occupied territory subject to negotiation and Israeli withdrawal, it sympathized with the Israeli concern that Syrian control of the Heights prior to 1967 provided Syria with a tactical and strategic advantage used to threaten Israel's security. The Begin and Shamir governments rejected any withdrawal from Golan; on December 14, 1981, the Knesset passed legislation applying Israeli "law, jurisdiction, and administration" to the Golan Heights, in effect, annexing the territory. The United States disagreed with the Israeli move as a violation of international law (Article 47 of the Geneva Convention which forbids acquisition of territory by force, and U. N. Security Council Resolution 242), and as a violation of the spirit of the Camp David peace process. According to recent Israeli press reports, Prime Ministers Rabin and Netanyahu agreed in secret to withdraw from most of the Golan Heights. The press reports say that Syria wants full Israeli withdrawal, but Israel wants a staged withdrawal from most but not all of the territory.
An unresolved issue concerns possible peacekeeping forces to be stationed on the Golan Heights between the Israeli and Syrian forces after the two countries reach an agreement. If the parties request such an international presence, should the United States participate? Some argue that the United States should contribute forces in order to further the peace effort, but others argue that U. S. forces would be targets for terrorists.
Jerusalem. Until the Camp David meetings of July 2000, Israel did not consider Jerusalem to be occupied territory, claimed that it would not negotiate the status of the city, and rejected Arab or any other sovereignty in Jerusalem. Article V, Sections 2 and 3 of the Declaration of Principles (September 13, 1993) states that Jerusalem is a subject in the permanent status negotiations that began on May 5, 1996, and are continuing. At the July 2000 Camp David meetings, Israel offered the Palestinians control over the Muslim and Christian holy sites, but the Palestinians sought full sovereignty over the Arab Muslim/ Christian areas of the old city.
U. N. resolutions call for the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem, and condemn Israel's June 1967 annexation of the eastern, or Arab, portion of the city conquered by the Israelis in the 1967 war. The United States abides by international opinion on the international status of the city. The U. S. embassy is in Tel Aviv, not Jerusalem, for that reason, although most members of Congress urge the Administration to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and to move the Embassy. President Reagan reiterated the 1967 U. S. position on September 1, 1982: "we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations." Former President Bush, on March 3, 1990, reminded Israel that the United States believed that Jerusalem was part of the occupied territory and that he opposed Jewish settlements in east Jerusalem. On July 27, 2000, President Clinton said he favored moving the embassy to Jerusalem and would review the decision by the end of the year but made no changes before leaving office on January 20, 2001.
P. L. 104-45 (S. 1322, S. 770 and H. R. 1595, passed the Senate and House on October 24, 1995, and became law on November 8, 1995) states that it is U. S. policy that the U. S. embassy should be established in Jerusalem by the end of May 1999. Both President Clinton and President Bush exercised a series of waivers that delayed the embassy move, most recently in Presidential Determination 2002-23, June 17, 2002. (Also, see CRS Report RS20339, Jerusalem: The U. S. Embassy and P. L. 104-45.)
A section was included in authorization and appropriations bills in 1997, 1998, and 1999, that included language stating that Jerusalem must be listed as the capital of Israel in U. S. government publications, appropriating funds for a U. S. embassy to be built in Jerusalem, making the U. S. Consul-General in Jerusalem subject to the authority of the U. S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv, and allowing persons born in Jerusalem to name Israel as their birthplace on U. S. passports. The section does not appear in the FY2000 or FY2001foreign operations appropriations bills but did appear in P. L. 107-228 (H. R. 1646), the foreign relations authorization bill, minus the funding for constructing a new embassy. On September 30, 2002, President Bush said the Jerusalem provisions were advisory only, a position at odds with many in Congress who believed the provisions were binding.
Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories Since the first Israeli settlements were created in the occupied territories following the June 1967 war, the United States has held that such settlements are illegal under international law (Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that an occupying power may not transfer its civilian population into occupied territories) and are an "obstacle to peace" because their presence implies an Israeli claim of sovereignty that appears to rule out a willingness to negotiate. On December 16, 1996, President Clinton said that the settlements were "absolutely" obstacles to peace. All Arab countries and a majority of the international community, as reflected in numerous U. N. votes, oppose settlements. Some Israelis maintain that Jordan's claim to the West Bank was illegal and that Israel is not a belligerent occupant and may claim the territory as its own. Under the Declaration of Principles signed on September 13, 1993, Israel will continue to provide security for its settlements until the parties agree to a final status for the territories. The press reported that about 40,000 Israeli settlers would be uprooted under the Israeli plan offered at the Camp David summit in July 2000.
Palestinians In September 1975, then-Secretary of State Kissinger agreed to an Israeli request that the United States would not recognize or negotiate with the PLO until the PLO recognized Israel and accepted U. N. Resolution 242 (the territory for peace principle). In 1984, Congress codified the provision into law, adding a new condition that the PLO must renounce terrorism. After a series of PLO statements and clarifications, the U. S. Administration said on December 14, 1988, that PLO head Yasir Arafat had met the U. S. conditions for a dialogue. Secretary Shultz authorized Robert Pelletreau, U. S. Ambassador to Tunisia, as the sole channel for the dialogue. Israel expressed deep regret at the U. S. decision. But, the dialogue was suspended by the Former Bush Administration on June 20, 1990, after PLO leader Arafat refused to condemn in unequivocal terms a thwarted seaborne terrorist attack against Israel. The May 30 attack was planned and directed by the Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation Front, then a constituent member of the PLO. On September 10, 1993, the same day that Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition, the United States announced a resumption of the U. S.-PLO dialogue.
Another Palestinian issue affecting U. S.-Israeli relations is the human rights treatment of Palestinians under Israeli control. U. S. officials have protested Israel's policies of deporting Palestinians suspected of opposing Israeli occupation, detention without charges, beating Palestinians, communal punishment such as curfews against entire towns, destruction or sealing of houses of families of leaders, the closing of schools, assassinations, and other actions. The annual State Department human rights report has been one vehicle for the U. S. government to express publicly its concerns about Israeli treatment of the Palestinians. Reuters reported on February 14, 2001, that a State Department spokesman said President Bush and Secretary of State Powell had condemned violent actions, including Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders.
Since the Palestinian Authority assumed control over the Gaza Strip (May 1994) and six West Bank cities (December 1995), Palestinian sources have reported that the Palestinian police have tortured, detained without charge, beaten, and otherwise violated the human rights of Palestinian Arabs.
Strategic Cooperation Although Israel frequently is referred to as an ally of the United States, technically Israel may not fall under the definition of "ally" because there is no mutual defense agreement between the two countries. The Reagan Administration considered Israel a "strategic asset" because of Israel's opposition to the Soviet Union. Israel's Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on November 30, 1981, establishing a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries and confront the Soviet threat. (On December 18, 1981, the State Department announced the "suspension" of the MOU in reaction to Israel's annexing the Syrian Golan Heights.)
In November 1983, Israel and the United States renewed the dialogue on bilateral strategic cooperation, and formed a joint political-military committee to implement most of the 1981 MOU provisions. Joint air and sea military exercises began in June 1984, and the United States began constructing facilities to stockpile military equipment in Israel. On May 6, 1986, Israel and the United States signed an agreement (the contents of which are secret) for Israeli participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative (" Star Wars") research. Under SDI, Israel is developing the "Arrow" anti-ballistic missile with a U. S. contribution of about $625 million through FY1999.
Prime Minister Shamir signed a 5-year agreement during his March 1988 visit to Washington, formalizing a number of Reagan era working arrangements in military, economic, political, and intelligence matters. The agreement designated Israel a "major non-NATO ally of the United States," which gives Israel preferential treatment in bidding for DOD contracts and lower prices on U. S. defense equipment. Israel sought the non-NATO status. On September 8, 1989, Israeli Defense Minister Rabin and U. S. Secretary of Defense Cheney signed an agreement providing for Israel "leasing" U. S. equipment and the pre-positioning of up to $100 million worth of U. S. military supplies in Israel.
The dramatic changes in eastern Europe beginning in late 1989 eliminated the Soviet bloc threat to the Middle East, and Israel no longer has a perceived role in stopping a Soviet advance into the region. The changed conditions may challenge the premise that Israel is a U. S. strategic ally. The August 1990 crisis over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait raised other questions about Israel's strategic value to the United States. According to press accounts, the former President Bush asked the Israelis to keep a low profile, and did not ask for use of Israel's military, medical, and storage facilities for the deployment of U. S. forces in Saudi Arabia. But, Israel used the Iraq-Kuwait crisis to seek additional military assistance. Congress added $700 million in surplus military equipment, an expansion of the military stockpile located in Israel from $100 million to $200 million, some free arms (Patriot missiles), and early disbursement of military aid so Israel can collect interest from investing the $1.8 billion (P. L. 101-513 of November 5, 1990). In March 1991, Congress provided Israel $650 million in emergency ESF grants to pay for damage and other costs from the Persian Gulf war (P. L. 102-21).
Following the March 15, 1993 White House meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Rabin, a White House spokesman said the two leaders agreed to upgrade the U. S.-Israel strategic dialogue. Also, Israeli sources, official and unofficial, offer warnings and advice about confronting the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, always picturing Islam as the enemy of the West and the United States. It appears as though Israelis want to maintain their status as strategic ally by creating an Islamic adversary to replace the Soviet nemesis of the past. Following the terror incidents of February-March 1996, President Clinton announced that the United States and Israel would sign an agreement for closer cooperation in anti-terror and other strategic matters. According to press reports, one subject under discussion during July 15-20, 1999 meetings between President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak was expanded strategic cooperation. On July 27, 2000, President Clinton told an Israeli interviewer that he was going to review U. S.-Israeli strategic cooperation, implying that the United States would view the relationship more favorably.
Technology Transfers to China The Washington Times reported on March 12, 1992, that the Administration of former President Bush was investigating if Israel transferred U. S. Patriot missile technology to China without U. S. approval. The Wall Street Journal reported the next day that the State Department Inspector-General and U. S. government intelligence agencies had been investigating unauthorized Israeli technology transfers to China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Chile, and other countries. Israeli leaders denied that Israel transferred U. S. technology without U. S. permission, and denied violating U. S.-Israeli agreements on weapons security and transfers. The State Department announced on April 2 that a team that visited Israel on March 21 found no evidence of an unauthorized transfer of Patriot technology to China. But, an Inspector-General's report released the same day said Israel did transfer other equipment and technology to other countries without proper U. S. authorization. The story resurfaced on October 11, 1993, when NBC news reported that Israel sold billion of dollars worth of military equipment, including U. S. sophisticated technology, to China, and reappeared again in October 1995 when it was reported that China had Lavi technology (Israel built a prototype Lavi aircraft with U. S. money and technology).
Israel signed a contract with China in 1996 to deliver one Airborne Early Warning and Command and Control (AEW) radar system, mounted on an Ilyushin-76, at a cost of $250 million. The plane has an array of radar that can monitor up to a reported 200 targets simultaneously, at a range of 250 miles (400 km), as well as target surface installations, and gather communications intelligence. China has an option to order three to seven more of the AEW. Delivery of the first plane is scheduled for October 2001. The United States complained that delivery of the AEW to China could endanger Taiwanese and U. S. aircraft if it became necessary to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack, and that the AEW in Chinese hands would create an imbalance in the Asian military picture. Israeli officials stated that they had informed the United States of the deal in 1996, and had received no complaints then, that the AEW was a defensive system (similar to the AWACS the United States sold Saudi Arabia without heeding Israeli concerns), that some other country, notably Britain or France, would sell AEW to China if Israel did not, and that Israel needed the income from the sale. On June 20, 2000, the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee voted nine to six to defeat an amendment that would have delayed $250 million in military aid to Israel if Israel did not agree to cancel the sale to China. (See CRS Report RS20583, Israel's Sale of Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to China, May 18, 2000.)
Loan Guarantees In late 1990, Israel proposed that the United States government provide $10 billion in loan guarantees over 5 years to finance the housing, infrastructure, and jobs needed to settle in Israel an anticipated 1 million immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Under the proposal, Israel would borrow $10 billion from U. S. commercial institutions, and the U. S. government would underwrite the loans, agreeing to pay the commercial lenders if Israel defaulted. In September 1991, former President Bush asked that Congress delay consideration of the Israeli request until January 1992, so that the Soviet refugee issue would not interfere with Secretary of State Baker's attempt to arrange an Arab-Israeli peace conference. In February 1992, Secretary of State Baker told Congress that the Administration would approve the loans only if Israel agreed to stop building or expanding settlements in the occupied territories.
Negotiations among Israel, the White House, and the Senate Appropriations Committee failed to find compromises on the conditions; the Israeli government refused to stop settlement activity, Congress rejected full White House discretion over the funds and conditions, and the White House insisted on Israeli promises to stop settlement activity in the occupied territories. Prime Minister Rabin's announcement of a freeze on new housing on July 13 apparently met the Bush Administration conditions for the loan guarantees. The President and Prime Minister Rabin announced on August 12, 1992, that the United States would support loan guarantees for Israel. The loan guarantees were approved under Title VI, P. L. 102-391, (H. R. 5368) on October 6, 1992. The last traunch of the $10 billion was made available in October 1996 (for FY1997), but Israel has not drawn the whole amount available because the number of immigrants arriving from the former Soviet Union has decreased. The loan guarantees are being used for other infrastructure projects.
U. S. Assistance to Israel U. S. aid to Israel was limited to economic development assistance until 1962, when the first, small military loans were made. Military "grants" began in 1974 when the United States waived repayment of part of a military loan, a practice that has continued through FY2002. Economic assistance earmarked for specific development projects or commodity purchases was dropped in 1975 when direct loans and cash grants for general budgetary purposes began. Since the mid-1980s, total annual economic and military aid to Israel has averaged $3.0 billion-$ 3.5 billion. (For more detailed information on aid to Israel, see CRS Issue Brief IB85066, Israel; U. S. Foreign Assistance.) Israel's need for American aid, both the direct financial transfers to meet Israel's budgetary requirements and Israel's access to American military hardware, generally is not challenged either in Israel or the United States. The two nations do not always agree on the levels of aid or on the U. S. restriction against using U. S. foreign aid in the occupied territories.
Israeli, congressional, and Administration officials began discussions in January 1998, to reduce the U. S. $1.2 billion in economic assistance to Israel to zero over ten years, and to increase U. S. military aid to Israel from $1.8 billion to $2.4 billion per year. P. L. 105-277, the omnibus appropriations bill signed into law on October 21, 1998, cut Israel's economic aid from $1.2 billion to $1.08 billion, and increased Israel's military aid from $1.8 billion to $1.86 billion for FY1999. For FY2000, P. L. 106-113 appropriated $960 million in economic grants, $1.920 billion in military aid, and $60 million for refugee resettlement. In addition, Israel received $1.2 billion in military grants in FY2000 for implementing the Wye Agreement. The Administration requested and Congress appropriated $840 million in ESF, $1.98 billion in FMF, and $60 million in refugee assistance for FY2001. P. L. 107-115 (H. R. 2506), the foreign operations appropriations bill for FY2002, contains $720 million in economic and $2.04 billion in military grants for Israel. The President requested $600 million in ESF, $2.1 billion in FMF, and $60 million in refugee settlement aid for FY2003.
On November 14, 2000, President Clinton requested an emergency supplemental appropriation of $800 million in military grants for Israel, $450 million of which would be provided in FY2001 and $350 million in FY2002. The 106 th Congress did not act on the request before adjournment. The supplemental appropriations bill for FY2002, H. R. 4775, would have provided $200 million for Israel for anti-terror activities, but President Bush held up disbursing part of the funds, including the Israeli funds, because Congress had acted against the President's advice on unrelated portions of the bill.
The United States also provides indirect assistance to Israel by helping the Israeli economy. For example, in 1979, the Congress added two sections to the Export Administration Act that benefitted Israel although Israel was not mentioned by name. Section 8 prohibits American companies and individuals from cooperating with trade boycotts against nations friendly to the United States. The legislation was aimed at the Arab League boycott of Israel. Section 7( d)( 3) authorized the President to sell American-produced oil to nations with which the United States had signed bilateral oil supply agreements prior to June 25, 1979, which is applied only to Israel. Another source of U. S. support to the Israeli economy is through the establishment of a free trade area (FTA), agreed in 1983. The FTA was formally approved in May 1985, and removes virtually all trade barriers in bilateral commerce.
On June 17, 1997, the White House announced that the United States, Israel, and Egypt had agreed to divert $50 million in ESF aid from Israel and $50 million in ESF from Egypt to create a $100 million ESF fund for Jordan to support Jordan's efforts in its peace with Israel. Israel returned $50 million to the United States for the Jordanian account (Israel received its $1.2 billion ESF in the first 30 days of the fiscal year, according to law). Egypt and Israel agreed to divert $50 million each for Jordan for FY1998 as well.
Military Assistance The United States and Israel have had significant disagreements over three aspects of military assistance. First, the 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and subsequent arms agreements between Israel and the United States limit the use of American military equipment to defense only. The Arms Export Control Act states that the United States may stop aid to countries which use U. S. military assistance for purposes other than "legitimate self defense."
On four occasions the Secretary of State has stated in writing to Congress that Israel "may have violated" the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement — on April 5, 1978, after Israel invaded Lebanon, on August 6, 1979, after a series of Israeli raids into south Lebanon, on June 10, 1981, after Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and in a "secret" letter to Congress in July 1982, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. On one occasion — after the July 4, 1976 Israeli attack on the Entebbe air port — the United States formally found that Israel used U. S. arms for "legitimate self defense." There were unconfirmed reports in February 2001 that the United States was investigating if Israel misused U. S. military equipment during the 2000-2001 "Intifadah," specifically by using Apache helicopters to assassinate Palestinians suspected of terrorism. In early June 2001, Members of Congress requested a Government Accounting Office investigation of Israeli use of U. S. F-16 aircraft in attacks against Palestinian facilities.
The second U. S.-Israeli disagreement over U. S. assistance involves the U. S. restriction against transferring U. S. arms to third countries without U. S. permission. Controversy has arisen over Israeli sales of spare parts to Iran and of larger items to Argentina. The United States, according to reports, vetoed the Israeli sale of Kfirs and Mysteres with General Electric J-79 jet engines to Latin American countries because the United States was trying to avoid an arms race in the region. Israel has asked that the United States relax its restriction because Israel gains revenues and friends from its arms sales. (See section on Technology Transfer to China, above.)
The third Israeli-U. S. disagreement over U. S. arms assistance involves U. S. arms transfers to Arab countries. Israel protests U. S. arms transfers to Arab states that Israel believes threaten Israel's security, and many in Congress have worked to disapprove Administration arms proposals for Arab countries. In 1984, congressional opposition to a proposed sale of Stinger missiles to Jordan resulted in the Administration's withdrawal of the sale. Israel opposed the proposal sent to Congress on October 21, 1985, to sell Jordan 40 aircraft, Hawk missiles, Stinger missiles, and Bradley fighting vehicles. The sale was postponed indefinitely on February 3, 1986. Israel and its supporters in Congress opposed the President's March 1986 proposal to sell missiles to Saudi Arabia, but the sale was approved when Congress failed to override the President's veto of the bill to disapprove the sale.
After the United States announced in mid-August 1990 that it was considering additional arms transfers to Saudi Arabia in response to Iraqi threats, Israel requested an increase in military assistance (from $1.8 billion to $2.5 billion, according to the press), free weapons (Patriot missiles, F-15 aircraft, Apache helicopters, etc.), access to U. S. satellite intelligence data, and an increase in the U. S. weapons stockpile in Israel to which the Israelis would have access. Congress added provisions to the foreign assistance appropriations bill to provide Israel with $700 million in equipment to be delivered from surplus stocks in Europe, and an increase in the strategic stockpile in Israel from $100 million to $200 million. Israel also received free Patriot missiles during the Persian Gulf war.
Terrorism and Other Issues In the late 1980s, there were some differences between Israel and United States over the handling of terrorist incidents, despite an overall positive record of cooperation and coordination in working against terrorism. The Reagan Administration had considered Israel a model for taking firm measures to prevent incidents, and to retaliate after incidents occurred. On one occasion, after the Israelis bombed PLO headquarters outside Tunis in 1985, the Administration initially praised the action as a blow against terrorism, although it later tempered that reaction by expressions of concern for the territorial integrity of Tunisia, a long-standing U. S. friend. In the more immediate Lebanon context, Israel and the United States have sometimes faced a common enemy, the radicalized Shias of southern Lebanon. In July 1989, Israel kidnapped Lebanese Hizballah religious leader Shaykh Abd al-Karim Obayd, reportedly involved in the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers. Hizballah responded by threatening to kill captured U. N. official and U. S. citizen Lt. Col. William Higgins unless Obayd was released. On July 31, news agencies reported Higgins' execution. Higgins' body was returned to the United States in December 1991.
The Espionage Affairs. In 1985, U. S.-Israeli relations were rocked by two spy cases. Richard Smyth was indicted in California for illegally exporting 800 Krytons to an Israeli company. Krytons are high speed electronic switches that can be used to detonate nuclear weapons. Israel claimed that it was not aware of needed export licenses for the devices. Smyth jumped bail in 1985 but was arrested by Spanish authorities in July 2001. Smyth was extradited to the United States in November 2001 and will stand trial on 30 counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act and filing false statements. On November 21, 1985, Jonathan Pollard, a U. S. naval intelligence employee, and his wife Ann Pollard were charged with selling classified documents to Israel for $2,500 per month over an 18-month period. The Israeli government said the spy network, headed by former Israeli intelligence officer Raphael Eitan, was a renegade operation. In March 1987, Pollard was sentenced to life in prison, and his wife to two consecutive 5-year terms. Four Israelis were also indicted, including Israeli Air Force Col. Aviem Sella. Israel promoted both Sella and Eitan, although Sella's command of a major air base and promotion were rescinded after negative U. S. reactions. Israelis continue to complain that Pollard received an excessively harsh sentence. Ann Pollard was released in 1990, and moved to Israel where she divorced Jonathan Pollard. Pollard was granted Israeli citizenship in January 1996. Israel sought Pollard's release as part of the 1998 Wye negotiations with the Palestinians. President Clinton took that matter under advisement. (See CRS Report RS20001, Jonathan Pollard: Background and Considerations for Presidential Clemency, December 21, 1998.)
In addition to the Smyth and Pollard cases, U. S. Customs agents raided 3 U. S. companies on December 12, 1985, to seize materials describing a metallurgical process for tank guns that were being transferred illegally to Israel. In another case, 3 Israelis were arrested on April 22, 1986, for conspiring to sell arms to Iran. On May 15, 1986, 2 Israelis were arrested in New York on another weapons selling scheme. On July 8, 1986, U. S. Customs agents searched 3 U. S. companies for information about a plan to transfer technical information for cluster bombs to Israel. An Illinois company said on August 8, 1986, that Israelis tried to steal data on aerial reconnaissance cameras. Israel denied any connection with any of these cases. In February 1997, an engineer at a military testing facility in Michigan admitted that he "inadvertently" gave classified materials to Israel over a ten-year period. Press reports in early May 2000 said that Israeli intelligence had tapped into White House and State Department communications, but a later FBI investigation cleared Israel.
Iran Arms Affair. Israel was implicated in the Iran arms affairs in November 1986 by reports that the proposal to trade U. S. arms for hostages in Lebanon originated with Israeli Foreign Ministry official David Kimche, that Israel facilitated the U. S.-Iranian secret negotiations, that Israel was the transit point for at least one of the shipments to Iran, and that Israel may have provided weapons to Iran at U. S. request. These issues were not the subject of extended U. S. debate during the Iran-contra hearings, although analysis of the Israeli role has been offered by some Israeli journalists and scholars.
Role of Congress Most U. S. aid to Israel is earmarked, recurring aid, such as economic support funds, foreign military sales grants, or funds for settling Soviet Jews. Other annual aid programs provide smaller amounts of nonearmarked assistance to Israel, such as American schools and hospitals abroad. Congress has funded special programs, such as the emergency aid after the 1973 war, the FY1985 supplemental $1.5 billion in ESF grants, or $650 million in ESF grants for war damage during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. In May 1990, Congress approved a $400 million housing loan guarantee for Israel to be used for housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants, and in October 1992 (Title VI, P. L. 102-391), approved $10 billion in loan guarantees for housing, jobs, and infrastructure for Soviet Jews. In November 1999, Congress approved an Israeli request for $1.2 billion in FY2000 to fund the implementation of the October 23, 1998 Wye agreement.
Between September 1991 and September 1992, Senate Appropriations Committee Members negotiated with the Administration over the terms of loan guarantees for Israel but were unable to arrive at an acceptable compromise. The Administration wanted Israel to freeze all occupied territory settlement activity before the United States would guarantee the loans. Congress sought a compromise that would allow the U. S. to provide some loan guarantees and leave discretion for future guarantees in the President's hands. In the end, Israel offered a partial freeze on housing starts in the occupied territories, which the Administration accepted, and Congress approved the President's proposal for the loan guarantees.
Congress has a role in approving or disapproving Administration proposals for arms sales to Arab countries. In general, Congress fears that U. S. weapons provided for Arab states will pose a threat to Israel. Members of Congress have written letters to the President opposing proposed arms sales to Arab states, and have used legislative means to block some sales. Informal consultations between Congress and the Administration have led to the withdrawal of some proposed arms sales before Congress voted its disapproval.
Congress included several provisions in the FY1991 foreign assistance legislation (P. L. 101-513) to benefit Israel, such as allowing Israel to invest FMS funds and keep the proceeds, giving Israel $700 million worth of defense equipment to be withdrawn from Europe, or doubling the U. S. military stockpile in Israel to $200 million. Israel also received 2 Patriot anti-missile fire units free under the President's emergency authority in December 1990. In 1996 Congress authorized an additional $50 million at the President's request for Israel's anti-terrorist program. According to one Israeli source (Jerusalem Report, October 17, 1996), there was $109 million for various Israeli projects in the FY1997 U. S. defense budget.
The House of Representatives voted 365 to 30 to pass H. Con. Res. 426 on October 25,
2000, the resolution expresses solidarity with Israel and condemns Palestinian leaders for
encouraging violence in the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation of September/ October 2000.
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Кузьма Чорный

Николай Карлович Романо́вский (псевдоним Кузьма Чорный (Чёрный), , 11 (24) июня 1900, Борки, Минской губернии (ныне — Копыльский район Минской области) — 22 ноября 1944, Минск) — белорусский советский писатель, драматург и переводчик. Член Союза писателей СССР (1934).

 Биография
Родился 11 (24) июня 1900 года в крестьянской семье, окончил Тимковичское народное училище, в 1916—1919 обучался в Несвижской учительской семинарии. В 1923 году поступил на литературное отделение педагогического факультета Белорусского государственного университета и в том же году в газете «Савецкая Беларусь» были опубликованы его первые произведения под псевдонимом Кузьма Чорный. С 1923 года — член литературного объединения «Маладняк», в 1926 году перешёл в литературное объединение «Узвышша». В 1925 году вышли два первых сборника произведений писателя. Уже в 20-х годах литературная критика предсказывала ему будущее «белорусского Достоевского». 14 октября 1938 года арестован и был заключён в Минскую тюрьму, где провёл 8 месяцев, в том числе 6 месяцев — в камере-одиночке. Подвергался пыткам, о которых рассказал в дневниковой записи 3 октября 1944 г. («В ежовской тюрьме меня сажали на кол, били большим железным ключом по голове и поливали избитое место холодной водой, поднимали и бросали на рельс, били поленом по животу, вставляли в уши бумажные трубки и ревели в них во всё горло, вгоняли в камеру с крысами…»). Освобождён в 1939 г.

С 1941 года — в эвакуации, работал во многих агитационных газетах. В 1944 году вернулся в Минск, где и умер от второго инсульта 22 ноября 1944 годаКузьма Чорны // Беларускія пісьменнікі (1917—1990) : Даведнік / Склад. А. К. Гардзіцкі; нав. рэд. А. Л. Верабей. — Мінск : Мастацкая літаратура, 1994. — С. 585—586.. Похоронен на Военном кладбище.

 Творчество
Кузьма Чорный считается одним из первопроходцев романа на белорусском языке. В 1927 году был опубликован его первый роман «Сястра», в 1928 году — «Зямля», в 1931 году — «Бацькаўшчына» (Родина), в 1935 году — «Трэцяе пакаленне». В 1941—1944 годы был написан роман «Вялікі дзень», в 1943 — «Пошукі будучыні» (Поиски будущего), в 1944 — последний роман «Млечны Шлях» (Млечный путь). Рукописи ещё трёх его романов сгорели во время Великой Отечественной войны, а ещё несколько романов остались незавершёнными. Кроме того, он написал множество рассказов.

Также писатель известен своими пьесами и переводами на белорусский язык произведений А. С. Пушкина, В. Г. Короленко, Н. В. Гоголя, М. Горького и К. Ванека (продолжение романа Я. Гашека о Швейке).

 Память
thumb|Памятник Кузьме Черному. Военное кладбище, Минск
Именем Кузьмы Чорного названа школа в Тимковичах, где существует посвященный ему , филиал Літаратурны музей Кузьмы Чорнага, улица в Минске.

 Примечания

 Литература
 Казека, Я. Кузьма Чорны : Старонкі творчасці / Я. Казека. — Мінск : Мастацкая літаратура, 1980. — 133, [2] с.
 Навуменка, І. Я. Ранні Кузьма Чорны (1923—1929) / І. Я. Навуменка. — Мінск : Беларуская навука, 2000. — 94 с.

 Ссылки
 Улица Кузьмы Чорного в Минске

Категория:Члены Союза писателей СССР
Категория:Деятели культуры и искусства, репрессированные в СССР
Категория:Члены литературного объединения Маладняк
Категория:Члены литературного объединения Узвышша
Чорный
Чорный
Чорный
Категория:Похороненные на Военном кладбище (Минск)

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: where is kuzma black school located

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: what is the name of the military cemetery in minsk

Кузьмы Чорного

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: where is the kuzma black military cemetery

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: where is the literature museum of kuzma black

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: where is the memorial of the black knight

кладбище , Минск Именем Кузьмы Чорного названа школа в Тимковичах , где существует посвященный ему , филиал Літаратурны музей Кузьмы Чорнага , улица в Минске

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: what is the memorial of

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Question: where is kuzma black buried

The Memorial of the Black Knight.

Military cemetery , Minsk by the name of Kuzma Black is named the school in Timkovich , where there is a dedicated to him , the branch of the Literature Museum of Kuzma Чорнага , street in Minsk .

Память Памятник Кузьме Черному. Военное кладбище, Минск Именем Кузьмы Чорного названа школа в Тимковичах, где существует посвященный ему , филиал Літаратурны музей Кузьмы Чорнага, улица в Минске.

Память Памятник Кузьме Черному.

The Memorial of the Black Knight. Military cemetery, Minsk by the name of Kuzma Black is named the school in Timkovich, where there is a dedicated to him, the branch of the Literature Museum of Kuzma Чорнага, street in Minsk.


Торакальная хирургия

Торакальная хирургия (от  — грудная клетка) — это хирургия органов грудной клетки.

В разное время, в разные годы, торакальные хирурги занимались хирургией молочной железы, хирургией легких, сердца, пищевода, средостения. Именно из торакальной хирургии вышли такие современные направления, как кардиохирургия, маммология, сосудистая хирургия. На сегодняшнем технологическом уровне развития медицины опять наметилась тенденция к сближению всех этих дисциплин. Благодаря малоинвазивным технологиям, разработанным торакальными хирургами (видеоторакоскопия, медиастиноскопия), появились качественно новые возможности оперирования легких, сердца, средостения.

Возрожден ряд забытых из-за травматичности операций на нервных стволах, расширились диагностические возможности за счёт получения образцов тканей для гистологического исследования, ушли в прошлое многочасовые операции, сопровождавшиеся многолитровыми кровопотерями и грубыми косметическими дефектами.

 Торакальная хирургия при травме груди
Отрасль хирургии. Занимается изучением и применением патологической физиологии, методов диагностики, методов хирургического лечения при травме груди. Большой вклад внёс в развитие данного раздела хирургии академик Е. А. Вагнер.

 Видеоассистированная торакальная хирургия (ВАТХ)
Включает торакоскопию и манипуляции, частично выполняемые стандартными хирургическими инструментами, введёнными через дополнительный разрез (5-8 см) без использования ранорасширителя.

 Преимущества
 возможность непосредственного осмотра, пальпации и манипуляций в оперируемой области;
 использование стандартных инструментов для рассечения и перевязки сосудов;
 возможность одномоментного удаления большого объёма тканей через разрез.

 Потенциальные недостатки
 более выраженная по сравнению с торакоскопией послеоперационная боль и худший косметический эффект.Видеоассистированная торакальная хирургия

 Гибридная операционная в торакальной хирургии

Процедуры по диагностике и лечению небольших лёгочных узлов также выполняются в последнее время в гибридных операционных. Медицинская визуализация во время операции даёт возможность точно определить местоположение лёгочных узлов, особенно в небольших непрозрачных опухолях, метастазах, и в случаях лёгочной недостаточности. Это позволяет проводить точную навигацию при биопсии и разрезы при торакальной хирургии. Использование медицинской визуализации во время торакальных операций позволяет компенсировать потерю тактильных ощущений. Кроме того, использование гибридной операционной в таких случаях помогает сохранить здоровую лёгочную ткань поскольку во время операции положение узлов точно известно. Это в свою очередь увеличивает качество жизни пациентов после операции.

 Примечания

 Литература

 Вагнер Е. А. «Хирургия повреждений груди» — 1981.
 «Лечение пораженных в грудь на госпитальном этапе» /Под ред. акад. Е. А. Вагнера. — 1994.
 Вагнер Е. А., Рогацкий Г. Г., Черешнев В. А. «Патофизиология травмы груди» — 1990.

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

"Потенциальные

торакоскопией

послеоперационная

косметический

Видеоассистированная

Question: what is a more common procedure for postoperative pain and cosmetic effect

торакоскопией

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: what is the medical term for toracoscopy

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: besides postoperative pain, what is a possible downside of video assisted toraal surgery

косметический эффект

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: what is the difference between toracoscopy and postoperative pain

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: what are potential disadvantages of video assisted toraal surgery

боль и худший косметический эффект

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: what are potential disadvantages of video assisted surgery

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Question: what is one of the downsides of toracoscopy

боль и худший косметический

Video Assisted Toraal Surgery

Potential disadvantages are more pronounced compared to toracoscopy , postoperative pain and worse cosmetic effect .

Potential disadvantages are more pronounced compared to toracoscopy, postoperative pain and worse cosmetic effect. Video Assisted Toraal Surgery