a male singer wrote i've never been to me.
a male singer wrote i've never been to me.
who wrote i've never been to me?
a male singer
Na
Na
bullet::::- may – july : abu musab al zarqawi allegedly recuperated in baghdad after being wounded while fighting with taliban and al-qaeda fighters resisting the united states invasion of afghanistan. he was allegedly wounded in a u.s. bombardment. dozens of his followers came to baghdad as well. the united states, through a foreign intelligence service, notified saddam hussein's government that zarqawi was living in baghdad under an alias. according to a u.s. senate report on prewar intelligence on iraq, "a foreign government service asserted that the iis (iraqi intelligence service) knew where al-zarqawi was located despite baghdad's claims that it could not find him."(page 337) nevertheless, no evidence has emerged of any collaboration between zarqawi and saddam's government. jason burke, author of "al qaeda: the true story of radical islam", wrote that "stories that an injured leg had been amputated in baghdad as al-zarqawi was cared for by saddam hussein's personal physicians proved false." he also wrote that "what powell did not say was that al-zarqawi ... had operated independently of bin laden, running his own training camp in the west of afghanistan near herat. it was a small operation and al-zarqawi was not considered a significant player, by militants or western and middle eastern intelligence services, at the time. it is likely that al-zarqawi had some contact with bin laden but never took the bay'at and never made any formal allegiance with the saudi or his close associates. instead he was one of the thousands of foreign activists living and working in afghanistan during the late 1990s. ... al-zarqawi was a rival, not an ally, of the saudi." (p. 270). an israeli intelligence official noted that when bin laden first met zarqawi, "it was loathing at first sight." mary ann weaver wrote, "according to several different accounts of the meeting, bin laden distrusted and disliked al-zarqawi immediately. he suspected that the group of jordanian prisoners with whom al-zarqawi had been granted amnesty earlier in the year had been infiltrated by jordanian intelligence ... bin laden also disliked al-zarqawi's swagger and the green tattoos on his left hand, which he reportedly considered un-islamic. had saif al-adel-now bin laden's military chief-not intervened, history might be written very differently ... as an egyptian who had attempted to overthrow his own country's army-backed regime, al-adel saw merit in al-zarqawi's views. thus, after a good deal of debate within al-qaeda, it was agreed that al-zarqawi would be given $5,000 or so in 'seed money' to set up his own training camp outside the western afghan city of herat, near the iranian border. it was about as far away as he could be from bin laden. saif al-adel was designated the middleman." counterterrorism experts told the "washington post" that while "zarqawi accepted al-qaeda money to set up his own training camp in afghanistan, ... he ran it independently. while bin laden was preparing the 11 sept. hijacking plot, zarqawi was focused elsewhere, scheming to topple the jordanian monarchy and attack israel." weaver writes in the "atlantic monthly" that bin laden found zarqawi "aggressively ambitious, abrasive, and overbearing" and that he found his hatred of shiites divisive (bin laden's mother is a shiite). weaver reports that "at least five times, in 2000 and 2001, bin laden called al-zarqawi to come to kandahar and pay "bayat" – take an oath of allegiance—to him. each time, al-zarqawi refused. under no circumstances did he want to become involved in the battle between the northern alliance and the taliban. he also did not believe that either bin laden or the taliban was serious enough about jihad. when the united states launched its air war inside afghanistan, on 7 october 2001, al-zarqawi joined forces with al-qaeda and the taliban for the first time. he and his jund al-sham fought in and around herat and kandahar."(p. 96) when zarqawi finally did take the oath in october 2004, it was "only after eight months of often stormy negotiations." (p. 98). gary gambill writes, "while zarqawi's network – by this time known as al-tawhid wal-jihad (monotheism and holy war) – was not completely independent of al-qaeda, it was clearly autonomous. zarqawi's men 'refused to march under the banner of another individual or group,' recalls nu'man bin-uthman, a libyan islamist leader now living in london who was in contact with zarqawi at the time. during or shortly before the american-led invasion of iraq in march 2003, zarqawi returned to iran, where he met with bin laden's military chief, muhammad ibrahim makawi (saif al-adel), who asked him to coordinate the entry of al-qaeda operatives into iraq through syria. zarqawi readily agreed and by the fall of 2003 a steady flow of arab islamists were infiltrating iraq via syria. consequently, zarqawi came to be recognized as the regional "emir" of islamist terrorists in iraq – without (until last month) having sworn fealty to bin laden." the conservative newsmagazine the "weekly standard", which has generally trumpeted alleged ties between saddam and al-qaeda, published an article concluding that zarqawi was not tied to either. on the alleged bin laden connection, nixon center terrorism experts robert s. leiken and stephen brooke wrote:"though he met with bin laden in afghanistan several times, the jordanian never joined al qaeda. militants have explained that tawhid was "especially for jordanians who did not want to join al qaeda." a confessed tawhid member even told his interrogators that zarqawi was "against al qaeda." shortly after 9/11, a fleeing ramzi bin al-shibh, one of the main plotters of the attacks, appealed to tawhid operatives for a forged visa. he could not come up with ready cash. told that he did not belong to tawhid, he was sent packing and eventually into the arms of the americans." and spencer ackerman wrote in the "washington monthly" that "u.s. intelligence had already concluded [in 2002] that zarqawi's ties to al qaeda were informal at best." he also noted that "if zarqawi's ties to al qaeda were loose, his ties to saddam were practically non-existent." he argues that saddam did not "harbor" ansar al islam, since they "operated out of northeastern iraq, an area under kurdish control that was being protected from saddam's incursions by u.s. warplanes. indeed, some of its members fought against saddam during the iran-iraq war. powell asserted that saddam dispatched an agent to ansar to forge an alliance with the kurdish terrorists. if true, the far more likely explanation, however, is that the dictator had placed an agent in the group not to aid them, as powell implied to the security council, but to keep tabs on a potential threat to his own regime." while u.s. officials now know that reports of al-zarqawi's leg being amputated are incorrect, one official still believes that al-zarqawi may have received medical treatment in baghdad. a cia report in late 2004 concluded that there was no evidence saddam's government was involved or even aware of this medical treatment, and found "no conclusive evidence the saddam hussein regime had harbored zarqawi. a us official told reuters that the report was a mix of new information and a look at some older information and did not make any final judgments or come to any definitive conclusions. 'to suggest the case is closed on this would not be correct,' the official said." a us official familiar with the report told knight-ridder that "what is indisputable is that zarqawi was operating out of baghdad and was involved in a lot of bad activities." another u.s. official summarized the report as such: "the evidence is that saddam never gave zarqawi anything." u.s. secretary of defense donald rumsfeld responded to the report by saying, "to my knowledge, i have not seen any strong, hard evidence that links the two." zarqawi did not identify himself with bin laden nor swear allegiance to him until october 2004, although he did twice seek financial support from al-qaeda. terrorist experts considered zarqawi an "independent actor" who was setting himself up as a "competitor to bin laden" rather than an al qaeda operative. michael isikoff reported in newsweek that german law enforcement learned that zarqawi's group operated in "opposition to" al-qaeda and that zarqawi even vetoed splitting charity funds with bin laden's group. in an interview on al-majd tv, former al-qaeda member walid khan, who was in afghanistan fighting alongside zarqawi's group, said, "the problem was that most of the arabs there were jordanians, supporters of abu mus'ab al-zarqawi. we mixed with them. the problem was they didn't care about anyone but their sheikh, al-maqdisi. they belonged to the jordanian bay'at al-imam, organized from 1995. they pledged allegiance to al-maqdisi and were in jail for five years. they were sentenced to 15 years. they served five years and then were pardoned. so they went to afghanistan. their ideology further developed there. of course, they accused the government, the army, and the police of heresy. this is the most dangerous group. i understood that they had differences of opinion with bin laden on a number of issues and positions. of course, we understood that only later. from the day al-zarqawi's group arrived, there were [disagreements]" scholars have added that cooperation between saddam and al-zarqawi goes against everything known about both people. counterterrorism scholar loretta napoleoni quotes former jordanian parliamentarian layth shubaylat, who was personally acquainted with both zarqawi and saddam hussein: "'first of all, i don't think the two ideologies go together, i'm sure the former iraqi leadership saw no interest in contacting al-zarqawi or al-qaeda operatives. the mentality of al-qaeda simply doesn't go with the ba'athist one.' when he was in prison [in jordan with shubaylat], 'abu mos'ab wouldn't accept me,' said shubaylat, 'because i'm opposition, even if i'm a muslim.' how could he accept saddam hussein, a secular dictator?" a letter from an iraqi intelligence official dated august 2002 that was recovered in iraq by u.s. forces and released by the pentagon in march 2006 suggests that saddam's government was "on the lookout" for zarqawi in baghdad and noted that finding zarqawi was a "top priority"; three responses to the letter claimed that there was "no evidence" zarqawi was in iraq. one high-level jordanian intelligence official told the atlantic monthly that al-zarqawi, after leaving afghanistan in december 2001, frequently traveled to the sunni triangle of iraq where he expanded his network, recruited and trained new fighters, and set up bases, safe houses, and military training camps. he said, however, "we know zarqawi better than he knows himself. and i can assure you that he never had any links to saddam." (for additional information, see may 2005)
timeline of saddam hussein and al-qaeda link allegations