the governing council controls the monetary policy of the eu.
the governing council controls the monetary policy of the eu.
who controls the monetary policy of the eu?
the governing council
after earning her second ph.d., she began her career at the bank of england as an economist from 1997 to 1999 in monetary policy analysis. in 2000, batini was recruited by professor willem buiter and dame deanne julius to become a research adviser of the bank of england’s monetary policy committee and a founding member of the monetary policy committee unit. her innovative ideas and publications on monetary policy practices and strategies, were launched at prestigious international conferences of the national bureau of economic research, the federal reserve and the european central bank, she acted as consultant for the reserve bank of new zealand, the south african reserve bank, the bank of canada and the czech national bank, among others, for which she became external member of the research committee in 2001 –a position she held for four consecutive terms until 2011. in 2002 she was invited as visiting researcher by the directorate research of the european central bank. her work during that time is cited by the ecb as one of those having influenced the bank’s decision to change monetary policy strategy in 2003.
nicoletta batini
bullet::::2. "the tools of the federal reserve system": here, friedman discuss the fed’s tools of credit policy and criticizes the controls over margin requirements on security loans, opposes the direct controls on consumer installment credit, and refutes the controls on interest rates on demand and time deposits. then, he discusses the tools of monetary policy arguing that “open market operations alone are a sufficient and efficient tool for monetary policy. rediscounting is an anachronistic survival of an earlier day and an earlier need. variations in reserve requirements... share with rediscounting the property of being a technically poor instrument for controlling the stock of money. both should be eliminated or greatly altered.” in these regards, he explains how open market operations alone can ensure smoother and more precise control of the high-powered money notwithstanding whether monetary policy is implemented via the money stock or the interest rate. friedman gives historical examples in which the discount rate provided misleading signals about the stance of monetary policy. in addition, he argues that the discount rate introduces confusion between the effects of fed on monetary policy and the its effects on the credit markets. in this way, the discount rate diverges the attention from the main task of fed – the control of the stock of money. further on, friedman discusses variations of reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool. he claims that variable required reserves should be eliminated or should be set and kept at fixed level. according to him, the main defect of this tool is that it changes infrequently, which means it has drastic effects on the banks; it is difficult to reverse its changes; it needs to be offset by the open market operations with uncertain effects on the stock of money; and it affects the composition between earning and non-earning bank assets, thus, affecting bank profitability. hence, friedman concludes that open market operations should be "the" monetary policy instrument for several reasons: they are impersonal, they can be used continuously on a day-to-day basis, the operations can be reversed within a day, their amount can be varied, they need not be announced publicly so they do not cause any speculation about their future course, they do not affect bank profitability, they enable fed to determine the amount of high-powered money more precisely, and the link between fed’s actions and the stock of money is more direct and predictable.
a program for monetary stability