wainwright commanded the allied forces in the philippines under general macarthur in december of 1941.
wainwright commanded the allied forces in the philippines under general macarthur in december of 1941.
in december of 1941 who commanded the allied forces in the philippines under general macarthur?
wainwright
as the senior field commander of filipino and us forces—under general douglas macarthur—wainwright was responsible for resisting the japanese invasion of the philippines, which began in december 1941. on december 8, 1941, he commanded the north luzon force, comprising three reserve filipino divisions and the 26th cavalry regiment (philippine scouts). retreating from the japanese beachhead of lingayen gulf, allied forces had withdrawn onto the bataan peninsula and corregidor by january 1942, where they defended the entrance to manila bay.
jonathan m. wainwright (general)
discussed with general macarthur his own ideas about operations north of the 38th parallel. it appears, however, that he never submitted them to him in writing. so far as is known, the nearest general walker ever came to broaching the subject to macarthur in writing was on 26 september when he sent a discreetly worded message to him suggesting that he would like to be informed of x corps' progress and plans so that he could plan better for the approaching linkup of the two forces. general macarthur dashed walker's hopes in a reply the next day, informing him that x corps would remain in far east command reserve, in occupation of the inchon-seoul area ready to undertake a ghq-directed operation "of which you will be apprised at an early date." when general macarthur flew to seoul on 29 september to return the south korean capital to the government of syngman rhee he already had formulated in his mind plans for the next phase of korean operations. on 26 september, general doyle o. hickey, deputy chief of staff, far east command had sent a check sheet to general edwin k. wright, assistant chief of staff, g-3, far east command stating that general macarthur wanted plans developed for further operations in north korea which would employ the x corps in an amphibious landing at wonsan. because the far east command's joint strategic plans and operations group had kept active its studies for amphibious operations in areas other than inchon, including one for a corps-size landing in the wonsan-hamhung area of the east coast, it was only a matter of a few hours until general wright had the outline of such a plan in macarthur's hands. this plan proposed that the advance into north korea would consist of a "main effort of eighth army on the west in conjunction with an amphibious landing at wonsan or elsewhere." this was the beginning officially of the far east command decision that led quickly to the establishment of two separate field commands in korea for the next phase of the war, and which almost at once became the subject of controversy. for a period prior to 26 september, it appears that general macarthur had intended to place x corps under eighth army command once seoul had fallen. generals hickey and wright favored this course of action, and maj. gen. george l. eberle, the far east command g-4, agreed with them. but apparently they did not actively advocate it to general macarthur. eberle held the view that although it would be possible to support x corps logistically in an amphibious operation on the east coast, it could more easily be supported as part of eighth army. but if macarthur ever had been uncertain on the future role of the x corps, he had decided the point in his own mind by the last week of september. the reasoning which led general macarthur to decide on two commands in korea can best be understood by reference to the terrain map of north korea and the problem of logistics.
un offensive into north korea