the schlieffen plan was intended to bring about the quick defeat of the french army.
the schlieffen plan was intended to bring about the quick defeat of the french army.
the schlieffen plan was intended to bring about the quick defeat of?
french army
the schlieffen plan (, ) was the name given, after the first world war, to german war plans and the influence of field marshal alfred von schlieffen and his thinking on the invasion of france and belgium on 4 august 1914. schlieffen was chief of the general staff of the german army from 1891 to 1906. in 1905 and 1906, schlieffen devised an army deployment plan for a war-winning offensive against the french third republic. after losing the first world war, german official historians of the and other writers described the plan as a blueprint for victory. (colonel-general) helmuth von moltke the younger, succeeded schlieffen as chief of the german general staff in 1906 and was dismissed after the first battle of the marne (5–12 september 1914). german historians claimed that moltke had ruined the plan by meddling with it.
schlieffen plan
in 2013, holmes published a summary of his thinking about the schlieffen plan and the debates about it in "not the schlieffen plan". he wrote that people believed that the schlieffen plan was for a grand offensive against france to gain a decisive victory in six weeks. the russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into france, "in a two-front war". the 1905 memorandum was for "war against france", in which russia would be unable to participate. schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides () in 1904, on the staff ride of 1905 and in the deployment plan i, for 1905–06 and 1906–07, in which all of the german army fought the french. in none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong. in his last exercise critique in december 1905, schlieffen wrote that the germans would be so outnumbered against france and russia, that the germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.
schlieffen plan