william was next in line to be king of britain.
william was next in line to be king of britain.
next in line to be king of britain?
william
Na
Na
after the french capitulation in june 1940, it seemed at the time that only great britain would have a little chance to win in a fight against the germans, and a greater chance to negotiate humiliating peace. as historian vladislav sotirović writes, "thus, no wonder why british politicians and diplomats tried with all means, including military coups, to drag any neutral country into war on their side for a final victory against hitler's germany". the kingdom of yugoslavia had been ruled as a dictatorship by the regent prince paul since the assassination of king alexander i of yugoslavia in 1934. after the german annexation of austria in 1938, italian occupation of albania in 1939, and the accession of hungary, romania and bulgaria to the tripartite pact between 20 november 1940 and 1 march 1941, yugoslavia was bordered by axis powers on all sides except the southern border with greece. taking into consideration that, apart from this foreign policy factor, and the traditional croatian separatism, prince paul was in great psychological, political and patriotic dilemma in march 1941, in how to resist hitler's diplomatic pressures but also concrete political offers to sign the accession to the tripartite pact. the yugoslav side was unable to stall as hitler was in a hurry to commence "operation barbarossa" (invasion of the soviet union, sssr), while the potential croatian betrayal in case of german invasion was the main trump card of berlin in negotiations with belgrade. in the spring of 1941, yugoslavia could only rely on great britain, which comparing to germany had greater economic and population resources (in regard of the colonial empire). yugoslavia needed fast military aid, which britain could offer, upon a rejection of signing the pact. prince paul was an anglophile and relative of george vi, there was an impression that he would rather abdicate than turn his back on britain, and hitler viewed him as a british puppet in the balkans. there was also a possible risk in the communist fifth column (due to the perception of the molotov–ribbentrop pact), which made general milan nedić prepare a plan in december 1940 to open six internment camps for communists if needed. nedić also proposed that the yugoslav army take thessaloniki before italian troops did, after the italian invasion in november 1940, as the loss of the port would make eventual british military aid impossible in case of an invasion of yugoslavia. the greeks, however, held firm against the italians, even entering albania from where the italian invasion had begun. nedić's plan for the communists was uncovered by a spy, the young officer živadin simić in the war ministry, who copied the two-page document which was then quickly handed out in belgrade by the communists. it was crucial to hitler to solve the question of yugoslavia and greece before attacking sssr, believing that britain (which had together with the french declared war) would not accept peace while the threat of sssr existed (london did hold the molotov–ribbentrop pact as dishonest and volatile, forced by foreign politics plight). "barbarossa" needed a nazified balkans, and the only unreliable countries in this region were yugoslavia, with serbs as traditional german enemies, and greece, invaded by italy on its own accord (as an answer to the "anschluss"). it became clear that mussolini could not manage by his own in greece. the british army in continental europe successfully fought only in greece, thus, the military- and political elimination of greece and yugoslavia (as potential british ally) would be extremely unproductive. consequently, seven german divisions were moved into bulgaria, while the permission for six divisions to cross yugoslavia into greece was sought from prince paul. on 1 march 1941 hitler compelled prince paul to personally visit him in his favourite resort at berchtesgaden. the two secretly met in berghof, hitler's residence, on 4 march. in an extremely uncomfortable discussion for paul, hitler said that after he would throw out british troops from greece, he would attack sssr in the summer and destroy bolshevism. yugoslav historiography was mainly silent about the fact that hitler offered paul someone of the karađorđević dynasty to become russian emperor (hinted at paul himself, as his regency mandate would end on 6 september 1941, when peter ii would become an adult and legitimate king of yugoslavia). the offer, more imaginary than realistic, did not however crucially influence the yugoslav regency's decision to accede to the tripartite pact on 25 march 1941. "realpolitik" was the ultimate factor, paul having first addressed british diplomatic circles in belgrade and london, urging help and protection, but was offered no military aid (in contrast with greece) and it was instead sought that yugoslavia directly engage germany militarily (whom the british were themselves losing to at that moment), promising adequate reward after british victory. during the negotiations with hitler, paul feared that london would demand a formal public declaration of friendship with britain which would only irritate and bring no good. concrete british aid was out of the question, and the fact remained that yugoslavia now had a common border with germany after the anschluss. the yugoslav army inadequately armed and would not stand a chance against germany, which had less than a year prior overwhelmed france. on 12 january 1941 winston churchill informed paul that yugoslav neutrality was not enough. the german and british demands differed enormously: germany sought only neutrality and non-aggression agreement while britain demanded conflict. war minister petar pešić (by the way anti-german and supported by the british), laid out the chances of yugoslavia in war against germany on 6 march, stressing that the germans would quickly take over the northern part of the country with belgrade, zagreb and ljubljana, forcing the yugoslav army to retreat into the herzegovinian mountains where it would hold out for at most six weeks before capitulation, without enough weapons, ammunition and food. accordingly, the next day dragiša cvetković sent the german diplomacy in belgrade the demands – that the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of yugoslavia be respected, no yugoslav military aid or transport of troops across the country during the war, and that yugoslavia's interest of having access on the aegean sea be taken into consideration during the political reorganization of europe after the war.
yugoslav accession to the tripartite pact