a suspect must be read their miranda rights at miranda warning.
a suspect must be read their miranda rights at miranda warning.
when must a suspect be read their miranda rights?
miranda warning
the supreme court has resisted efforts to require officers to more fully advise suspects of their rights. for example, the police are not required to advise the suspect that they can stop the interrogation at any time, that the decision to exercise the right cannot be used against the suspect, or that they have a right to talk to a lawyer before being asked any questions. nor have the courts required to explain the rights. for example, the standard miranda right to counsel states "you have a right to have an attorney present during the questioning". police are not required to explain that this right is not merely a right to have a lawyer present while the suspect is being questioned. the right to counsel includes:
miranda warning
the waiver must be "knowing and intelligent" and it must be "voluntary". these are separate requirements. to satisfy the first requirement the state must show that the suspect generally understood their rights (right to remain silent and right to counsel) and the consequences of forgoing those rights (that anything they said could be used against them in court). to show that the waiver was "voluntary" the state must show that the decision to waive the rights was not the product of police coercion. if police coercion is shown or evident, then the court proceeds to determine the voluntariness of the waiver under the totality of circumstances test focusing on the personal characteristics of the accused and the particulars of the coercive nature of the police conduct. the ultimate issue is whether the coercive police conduct was sufficient to overcome the will of a person under the totality of the circumstances. as noted previously, courts traditionally focused on two categories of factors in making this determination: (1) the personal characteristics of the suspect and (2) the circumstances attendant to the waiver. however, the supreme court significantly altered the voluntariness standard in the case of "colorado v. connelly". in "connelly", the court held that "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." the court has applied this same standard of voluntariness in determining whether a waiver of a suspect's fifth amendment miranda rights was voluntary. thus, a waiver of miranda rights is voluntary unless the defendant can show that their decision to waive their rights and speak to the police was the product of police misconduct and coercion that overcame the defendant's free will. after "connelly", the traditional totality of circumstances analysis is not even reached unless the defendant can first show such coercion by the police. under "connelly", a suspect's decisions need not be the product of rational deliberations. in addition to showing that the waiver was "voluntary", the prosecution must also show that the waiver was "knowing" and "intelligent". essentially this means the prosecution must prove that the suspect had a basic understanding of their rights and an appreciation of the consequences of forgoing those rights. the focus of the analysis is directly on the personal characteristics of the suspect. if the suspect was under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, or suffered from an emotional or mental condition that substantially impaired their capacity to make rational decisions, the courts may well decide that the suspect's waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
miranda warning