david charles hahn was the boy scout who built a nuclear reactor.
david charles hahn was the boy scout who built a nuclear reactor.
the boy scout who built a nuclear reactor?
david charles hahn
Na
Na
in the 1950's and 60's, the united states atomic energy commission (aec) began developing safety regulations against nuclear fallout for civilian nuclear reactors. because the effects of nuclear fallout are more widespread and longer lasting than other forms of energy production accidents, the aec desired a more proactive response towards potential accidents than ever before. one step to prevent nuclear reactor accidents was the price-anderson act. passed by congress in 1957, the price-anderson act insured government assistance above the $60 million covered by private insurance companies in the case of a nuclear reactor accident. the main goal of the price-anderson act was to protect the multibillion-dollar companies overseeing the production of nuclear reactors. without this protection, the nuclear reactor industry could potentially come to a halt, and the protective measures against nuclear fallout would be reduced. however, because of the limited experience in nuclear reactor technology, engineers had a difficult time calculating the potential risk of released radiation. engineers were forced to imagine every unlikely accident, and the potential fallout associated with each accident. the aec's regulations against potential nuclear reactor fallout were centered on the ability of the power plant to the maximum credible accident, or mca. the mca involved a "large release of radioactive isotopes after a substantial meltdown of the reactor fuel when the reactor coolant system failed through a loss-of-coolant accident". the prevention of the mca enabled a number of new nuclear fallout preventative measures. static safety systems, or systems without power sources or user input, were enabled to prevent potential human error. containment buildings, for example, were reliably effective at containing a release of radiation and did not need to be powered or turned on to operate. active protective systems, although far less dependable, can do many things that static systems cannot. for example, a system to replace the escaping steam of a cooling system with cooling water could prevent reactor fuel from melting. however, this system would need a sensor to detect the presence of releasing steam. sensors can fail, and the results of a lack of preventative measures would result in a local nuclear fallout. the aec had to choose, then, between active and static systems to protect the public from nuclear fallout. with a lack of set standards and probabilistic calculations, the aec and the industry became divided on the best safety precautions to use.
nuclear fallout