the view that everything that exists is physical is known as idealism.
the view that everything that exists is physical is known as idealism.
the view that everything that exists is physical is known as?
idealism
historically, most advocates of correspondence theories have been metaphysical realists; that is, they believe that there is a world external to the minds of all humans. this is in contrast to metaphysical idealists who hold that everything that exists exists as a substantial metaphysical entity independently of the individual thing of which it is predicated, and also to conceptualists who hold that everything that exists is, in the end, just an idea in some mind. however, it is not strictly necessary that a correspondence theory be married to metaphysical realism. it is possible to hold, for example, that the facts of the world determine which statements are true and to also hold that the world (and its facts) is but a collection of ideas in the mind of some supreme being.
correspondence theory of truth
some philosophers have also objected to jackson's first premise by arguing that mary could not know all the physical facts about color vision prior to leaving the room. owen flanagan argues that jackson's thought experiment "is easy to defeat". he grants that "mary knows everything about color vision that can be expressed in the vocabularies of a complete physics, chemistry, and neuroscience," and then distinguishes between "metaphysical physicalism" and "linguistic physicalism": metaphysical physicalism simply asserts that what there is, and all there is, is physical stuff and its relations. linguistic physicalism is the thesis that everything physical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the basic sciences…linguistic physicalism is stronger than metaphysical physicalism and less plausible. flanagan argues that, while mary has all the facts that are expressible in "explicitly physical language", she can only be said to have all the facts if one accepts linguistic physicalism. a metaphysical physicalist can simply deny linguistic physicalism and hold that mary's learning what seeing red is like, though it cannot be expressed in language, is nevertheless a fact about the physical world, since the physical is all that exists. similarly to flanagan, torin alter contends that jackson conflates physical facts with "discursively learnable" facts, without justification: ...some facts about conscious experiences of various kinds cannot be learned through purely discursive means. this, however, does not yet license any further conclusions about the nature of the experiences that these discursively unlearnable facts are about. in particular, it does not entitle us to infer that these experiences are not physical events. nida-rümelin argues in response to such views that it is "hard to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be physical once we drop the assumption that physical properties and physical facts are just those properties and facts that can be expressed in physical terminology."
knowledge argument