the maginot line was the line of fighting between france and germany.
the maginot line was the line of fighting between france and germany.
the line of fighting between france and germany?
the maginot line
after 1918, the german economy was three times as large as that of france; germany had a population of 70 million compared to france's 40 million and the french economy was hobbled by the need to reconstruct the enormous damage of world war i, while german territory had seen little fighting. french military chiefs were dubious about their ability to win another war against germany on its own, especially an offensive war. french decision-makers knew that the victory of 1918 had been achieved because the british empire and the united states were allies in the war and that the french would have been defeated on their own. with the united states isolationist and britain stoutly refusing to make the "continental commitment" to defend france on the same scale as in world war i, the prospects of anglo-american assistance in another war with germany appeared to be doubtful at best. versailles did not call for military sanctions in the event of germany remilitarising the rhineland or breaking part v; while locarno committed britain and italy to come to french aid in the event of a "flagrant violation" of the rhineland's demilitarised status, without defining what a "flagrant violation" would be. the british and italian governments refused in subsequent diplomatic talks to define "flagrant violation", which led the french to place little hope in anglo-italian help if germany should remilitarise the rhineland. given the diplomatic situation in the late 1920s, the quai d'orsay informed the government that french military planning should be based on a worst-case scenario that france would fight the next war against germany without the help of britain or the united states.
maginot line
seeckt's policies caused tension with the former foreign minister count ulrich von brockdorff-rantzau, who was to be sent out as the ambassador to moscow. brockdorff-rantzau was just as committed as seeckt to the destruction of versailles, but rather preferred to accomplish that goal through an alliance with britain. moreover, brockdorff-rantzau feared that a too close rapprochement with the soviet union would alienate britain and drive her into the arms of france. in response, on 11 september 1922, seeckt sent a memo to brockdorff-rantzau entitled "germany's attitude to the russian problem". some of seeckt's salient points were:"germany must pursue a policy of action. every state must do that. the moment it stops pursuing a forward policy it ceases to be a state. an active policy must have a goal and a driving force. for carrying it out it is essential to assess one's own strength correctly and at the same time understand the methods and aims of the other powers.the man who bases his political ideas on the weakness of his own country, who sees only dangers, or whose only desire is to remain stationary, is not pursuing a policy at all, and should be kept far away from the scene of activity.the years 1814/15 saw france in complete military and political collapse, yet no one at the congress of vienna followed a more active policy than talleyrand — to france's advantage. has the world ever seen a greater catastrophe than that suffered by russia in the last war? yet with what vigor the soviet government recovered, both at home and abroad! did not the sick man of europe seem to be dead once more and for all, and buried by the treaty of sèvres? yet today, after the victory over greece, he stands up to england with confidence. he followed an active turkish policy.have not germany's first stirrings in active politics, the treaty of rapallo, clearly brought her at last nearer to being more respected?this treaty splits opinion into different camps when the russian problem is considered. the main point about it is "not" its economic value, though that is by no means inconsiderable, but its political achievement. this association between germany and russia is the first and almost the only increase in power which we have so far obtained since peace was made. that this association should begin in the field of economics is a natural consequence of the general situation, but its strength lies in the fact that this economic "rapprochement" is preparing the way for the "possibility" of a political and, thus also, a military association. it is beyond a doubt that such a double association would strengthen germany-and also russia … the whole policy of reconciliation and appeasement towards france — no matter whether it is pursued by a stinnes or by general ludendorff — is hopeless as it aims at political success. the question of orientation towards the west, as far as france is concerned is ruled out … england is drifting towards another historic conflict with france, even through she does not face imminent war. that lurks in the background. a glance at the east is surely sufficient even for those who before genoa did not wish to use their eyes and ears. the british interests in the dardanelles, egypt and india are certainly infinitely more important at the moment than those on the rhine, and an understanding between britain and france at germany's expense, that is, a concession by britain in return for an immediate advantage, is by no means improbable. yet even such an understanding would be only temporary. the moment is coming, and must come, when britain will be looking for allies on the continent. when that moment arrives she will prefer the mercenary who is growing in strength, and will even have to make him stronger.a "rapprochement" between germany and russia would not have a decisive influence on britain's attitude either in making a concession to france or in searching for an ally. british policy is ruled by other more compelling motives than anxiety about some far-distant threat from a russia made strong with the help of germany...with poland we come now to the core of the eastern problem. the existence of poland is intolerable and incompatible with germany's vital interests. she must disappear and will do so through her own inner weakness and through russia — with our help. poland is more intolerable for russia than for ourselves; russia can never tolerate poland. with poland collapses one of the strongest pillars of the peace of versailles, france's advance post of power [is lost]. the attainment of this objective must be one of the firmest guiding principles of german policy, as it is capable of achievement — but only through russia or with her help.poland can never offer germany any advantage, either economically, because she is incapable of development, or politically, because she is a vassal state of france. the restoration of the frontier between russia and germany is a necessary condition before both sides can become strong. the 1914 frontier between russia and germany should be the basis of any understanding between the two countries...i will touch one or two more objections to the policy demanded towards russia. germany today is certainly not in a position to resist france. our policy should be to prepare the means of doing so in the future. a french advance through germany to go to the help of poland would make nonsense from the military point of view, so long as germany does not voluntarily co-operate. the idea springs from the notions of our 1919 diplomats, and there have been three years of work since then. war on the rhine between france and russia is a political bogy. germany will not be bolshevized, even by an understanding with russia on external matters.the german nation, with its socialist majority, would be averse to a policy of action, which has to reckon with the possibility of war. it must be admitted that the spirit surrounding the peace delegation at versailles has not yet disappeared, and that stupid cry of 'no more war!' is widely echoed. it is echoed by many bourgeois-pacifist elements, but among the workers, and also among the members of the official social democratic party there are many who are not prepared to eat out of the hands of france and poland. it is true that there is a widespread and understandable need for peace among the german people. the clearest heads, when considering the pros and cons of war, will be those of the military, but to pursue a policy means to take a lead. in spite of everything, the german people will follow the leader in the struggle for their existence. our task is to prepare for this struggle, for we shall not be spared it". seeckt's memo won brockdorff-rantzau over to his policy.
hans von seeckt