static void ipgre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{

/* All the routers (except for Linux) return only
   8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
   ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.

   Moreover, Cisco "wise men" put GRE key to the third word
   in GRE header. It makes impossible maintaining even soft state for keyed
   GRE tunnels with enabled checksum. Tell them "thank you".

   Well, I wonder, rfc1812 was written by Cisco employee,
   what the hell these idiots break standrads established
   by themself???
 */

	struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
	__be16	     *p = (__be16*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
	int grehlen = (iph->ihl<<2) + 4;
	const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
	const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
	struct ip_tunnel *t;
	__be16 flags;

	flags = p[0];
	if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
		if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
			return;
		if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
			grehlen += 4;
			if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
				grehlen += 4;
		}
	}

	/* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
	if (skb_headlen(skb) < grehlen)
		return;

	switch (type) {
	default:
	case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
		return;

	case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
		switch (code) {
		case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
		case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
			/* Impossible event. */
			return;
		case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
			/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
			return;
		default:
			/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
			   rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
			   I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
			 */
			break;
		}
		break;
	case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
		if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
			return;
		break;
	}

	rcu_read_lock();
	t = ipgre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
				flags & GRE_KEY ?
				*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
				p[1]);
	if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0 ||
	    ipv4_is_multicast(t->parms.iph.daddr))
		goto out;

	if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
		goto out;

	if (time_before(jiffies, t->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO))
		t->err_count++;
	else
		t->err_count = 1;
	t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
	rcu_read_unlock();
}

This category addresses vulnerabilities caused by flawed access control mechanisms, where incorrect permission settings allow unauthorized users to access restricted resources.