static int add_dirent_to_buf(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
			     struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
			     struct buffer_head *bh)
{
	struct inode	*dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
	const char	*name = dentry->d_name.name;
	int		namelen = dentry->d_name.len;
	unsigned int	blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
	unsigned short	reclen;
	int		csum_size = 0;
	int		err;

	if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
				       EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
		csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);

	reclen = EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(namelen);
	if (!de) {
		err = ext4_find_dest_de(dir, inode,
					bh, bh->b_data, blocksize - csum_size,
					name, namelen, &de);
		if (err)
			return err;
	}
	BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
	err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
	if (err) {
		ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
		return err;
	}

	/* By now the buffer is marked for journaling */
	ext4_insert_dentry(inode, de, blocksize, name, namelen);

	/*
	 * XXX shouldn't update any times until successful
	 * completion of syscall, but too many callers depend
	 * on this.
	 *
	 * XXX similarly, too many callers depend on
	 * ext4_new_inode() setting the times, but error
	 * recovery deletes the inode, so the worst that can
	 * happen is that the times are slightly out of date
	 * and/or different from the directory change time.
	 */
	dir->i_mtime = dir->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(dir);
	ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
	dir->i_version++;
	ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
	BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
	err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, dir, bh);
	if (err)
		ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
	return 0;
}

This vulnerability category highlights issues in resource management where failures to properly release memory, file handles, or other resources can degrade system performance or enable denial-of-service conditions.