create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec,
		unsigned long load_addr, unsigned long interp_load_addr)
{
	unsigned long p = bprm->p;
	int argc = bprm->argc;
	int envc = bprm->envc;
	elf_addr_t __user *argv;
	elf_addr_t __user *envp;
	elf_addr_t __user *sp;
	elf_addr_t __user *u_platform;
	elf_addr_t __user *u_base_platform;
	elf_addr_t __user *u_rand_bytes;
	const char *k_platform = ELF_PLATFORM;
	const char *k_base_platform = ELF_BASE_PLATFORM;
	unsigned char k_rand_bytes[16];
	int items;
	elf_addr_t *elf_info;
	int ei_index = 0;
	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
	struct vm_area_struct *vma;

	/*
	 * In some cases (e.g. Hyper-Threading), we want to avoid L1
	 * evictions by the processes running on the same package. One
	 * thing we can do is to shuffle the initial stack for them.
	 */

	p = arch_align_stack(p);

	/*
	 * If this architecture has a platform capability string, copy it
	 * to userspace.  In some cases (Sparc), this info is impossible
	 * for userspace to get any other way, in others (i386) it is
	 * merely difficult.
	 */
	u_platform = NULL;
	if (k_platform) {
		size_t len = strlen(k_platform) + 1;

		u_platform = (elf_addr_t __user *)STACK_ALLOC(p, len);
		if (__copy_to_user(u_platform, k_platform, len))
			return -EFAULT;
	}

	/*
	 * If this architecture has a "base" platform capability
	 * string, copy it to userspace.
	 */
	u_base_platform = NULL;
	if (k_base_platform) {
		size_t len = strlen(k_base_platform) + 1;

		u_base_platform = (elf_addr_t __user *)STACK_ALLOC(p, len);
		if (__copy_to_user(u_base_platform, k_base_platform, len))
			return -EFAULT;
	}

	/*
	 * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
	 */
	get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
	u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)
		       STACK_ALLOC(p, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));
	if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes)))
		return -EFAULT;

	/* Create the ELF interpreter info */
	elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv;
	/* update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_BASE if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT() changes */
#define NEW_AUX_ENT(id, val) \
	do { \
		elf_info[ei_index++] = id; \
		elf_info[ei_index++] = val; \
	} while (0)

#ifdef ARCH_DLINFO
	/* 
	 * ARCH_DLINFO must come first so PPC can do its special alignment of
	 * AUXV.
	 * update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT() in
	 * ARCH_DLINFO changes
	 */
	ARCH_DLINFO;
#endif
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP, ELF_HWCAP);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PAGESZ, ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_CLKTCK, CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHDR, load_addr + exec->e_phoff);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHENT, sizeof(struct elf_phdr));
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHNUM, exec->e_phnum);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_load_addr);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, 0);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec->e_entry);
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid));
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid));
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid));
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid));
 	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes);
#ifdef ELF_HWCAP2
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_HWCAP2, ELF_HWCAP2);
#endif
	NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec);
	if (k_platform) {
		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PLATFORM,
			    (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_platform);
	}
	if (k_base_platform) {
		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE_PLATFORM,
			    (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_base_platform);
	}
	if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD) {
		NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFD, bprm->interp_data);
	}
#undef NEW_AUX_ENT
	/* AT_NULL is zero; clear the rest too */
	memset(&elf_info[ei_index], 0,
	       sizeof current->mm->saved_auxv - ei_index * sizeof elf_info[0]);

	/* And advance past the AT_NULL entry.  */
	ei_index += 2;

	sp = STACK_ADD(p, ei_index);

	items = (argc + 1) + (envc + 1) + 1;
	bprm->p = STACK_ROUND(sp, items);

	/* Point sp at the lowest address on the stack */
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
	sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)bprm->p - items - ei_index;
	bprm->exec = (unsigned long)sp; /* XXX: PARISC HACK */
#else
	sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)bprm->p;
#endif


	/*
	 * Grow the stack manually; some architectures have a limit on how
	 * far ahead a user-space access may be in order to grow the stack.
	 */
	vma = find_extend_vma(current->mm, bprm->p);
	if (!vma)
		return -EFAULT;

	/* Now, let's put argc (and argv, envp if appropriate) on the stack */
	if (__put_user(argc, sp++))
		return -EFAULT;
	argv = sp;
	envp = argv + argc + 1;

	/* Populate argv and envp */
	p = current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->arg_start;
	while (argc-- > 0) {
		size_t len;
		if (__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, argv++))
			return -EFAULT;
		len = strnlen_user((void __user *)p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
		if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN)
			return -EINVAL;
		p += len;
	}
	if (__put_user(0, argv))
		return -EFAULT;
	current->mm->arg_end = current->mm->env_start = p;
	while (envc-- > 0) {
		size_t len;
		if (__put_user((elf_addr_t)p, envp++))
			return -EFAULT;
		len = strnlen_user((void __user *)p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN);
		if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN)
			return -EINVAL;
		p += len;
	}
	if (__put_user(0, envp))
		return -EFAULT;
	current->mm->env_end = p;

	/* Put the elf_info on the stack in the right place.  */
	sp = (elf_addr_t __user *)envp + 1;
	if (copy_to_user(sp, elf_info, ei_index * sizeof(elf_addr_t)))
		return -EFAULT;
	return 0;
}

This category addresses vulnerabilities caused by flawed access control mechanisms, where incorrect permission settings allow unauthorized users to access restricted resources.