int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{
	struct inode *inode;
	struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo;
	int err = -ENOMEM;

	/* Round up to L1_CACHE_BYTES to resist false sharing */
	sbinfo = kzalloc(max((int)sizeof(struct shmem_sb_info),
				L1_CACHE_BYTES), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!sbinfo)
		return -ENOMEM;

	sbinfo->mode = S_IRWXUGO | S_ISVTX;
	sbinfo->uid = current_fsuid();
	sbinfo->gid = current_fsgid();
	sb->s_fs_info = sbinfo;

#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
	/*
	 * Per default we only allow half of the physical ram per
	 * tmpfs instance, limiting inodes to one per page of lowmem;
	 * but the internal instance is left unlimited.
	 */
	if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER)) {
		sbinfo->max_blocks = shmem_default_max_blocks();
		sbinfo->max_inodes = shmem_default_max_inodes();
		if (shmem_parse_options(data, sbinfo, false)) {
			err = -EINVAL;
			goto failed;
		}
	}
	sb->s_export_op = &shmem_export_ops;
	sb->s_flags |= MS_NOSEC;
#else
	sb->s_flags |= MS_NOUSER;
#endif

	spin_lock_init(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
	if (percpu_counter_init(&sbinfo->used_blocks, 0))
		goto failed;
	sbinfo->free_inodes = sbinfo->max_inodes;

	sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
	sb->s_blocksize = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
	sb->s_blocksize_bits = PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
	sb->s_magic = TMPFS_MAGIC;
	sb->s_op = &shmem_ops;
	sb->s_time_gran = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR
	sb->s_xattr = shmem_xattr_handlers;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
	sb->s_flags |= MS_POSIXACL;
#endif

	inode = shmem_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | sbinfo->mode, 0, VM_NORESERVE);
	if (!inode)
		goto failed;
	inode->i_uid = sbinfo->uid;
	inode->i_gid = sbinfo->gid;
	sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
	if (!sb->s_root)
		goto failed;
	return 0;

failed:
	shmem_put_super(sb);
	return err;
}

This vulnerability category highlights issues in resource management where failures to properly release memory, file handles, or other resources can degrade system performance or enable denial-of-service conditions.