long f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
	struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
	unsigned int flags;
	int ret;

	switch (cmd) {
	case F2FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
		flags = fi->i_flags & FS_FL_USER_VISIBLE;
		return put_user(flags, (int __user *) arg);
	case F2FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
	{
		unsigned int oldflags;

		ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
		if (ret)
			return ret;

		if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) {
			ret = -EACCES;
			goto out;
		}

		if (get_user(flags, (int __user *) arg)) {
			ret = -EFAULT;
			goto out;
		}

		flags = f2fs_mask_flags(inode->i_mode, flags);

		mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);

		oldflags = fi->i_flags;

		if ((flags ^ oldflags) & (FS_APPEND_FL | FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)) {
			if (!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
				mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
				ret = -EPERM;
				goto out;
			}
		}

		flags = flags & FS_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE;
		flags |= oldflags & ~FS_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE;
		fi->i_flags = flags;
		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);

		f2fs_set_inode_flags(inode);
		inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
		mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out:
		mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
		return ret;
	}
	default:
		return -ENOTTY;
	}
}

This category addresses vulnerabilities caused by flawed access control mechanisms, where incorrect permission settings allow unauthorized users to access restricted resources.