static void process_stats_conns(ADD_STAT add_stats, void *c) {
    int i;
    char key_str[STAT_KEY_LEN];
    char val_str[STAT_VAL_LEN];
    char conn_name[MAXPATHLEN + sizeof("unix:")];
    int klen = 0, vlen = 0;

    assert(add_stats);

    for (i = 0; i < max_fds; i++) {
        if (conns[i]) {
            /* This is safe to do unlocked because conns are never freed; the
             * worst that'll happen will be a minor inconsistency in the
             * output -- not worth the complexity of the locking that'd be
             * required to prevent it.
             */
            if (conns[i]->state != conn_closed) {
                conn_to_str(conns[i], conn_name);

                APPEND_NUM_STAT(i, "addr", "%s", conn_name);
                APPEND_NUM_STAT(i, "state", "%s",
                        state_text(conns[i]->state));
                APPEND_NUM_STAT(i, "secs_since_last_cmd", "%d",
                        current_time - conns[i]->last_cmd_time);
            }
        }
    }
}

The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.