static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf,
				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
	ssize_t written, sz;
	unsigned long copied;

	written = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
	/* we don't have page 0 mapped on sparc and m68k.. */
	if (p < PAGE_SIZE) {
		sz = size_inside_page(p, count);
		/* Hmm. Do something? */
		buf += sz;
		p += sz;
		count -= sz;
		written += sz;
	}
#endif

	while (count > 0) {
		void *ptr;

		sz = size_inside_page(p, count);

		/*
		 * On ia64 if a page has been mapped somewhere as uncached, then
		 * it must also be accessed uncached by the kernel or data
		 * corruption may occur.
		 */
		ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((void *)p);
		if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
			return -ENXIO;

		copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz);
		if (copied) {
			written += sz - copied;
			if (written)
				break;
			return -EFAULT;
		}
		buf += sz;
		p += sz;
		count -= sz;
		written += sz;
	}

	*ppos += written;
	return written;
}

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.