static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
		struct elf_phdr *eppnt, int prot, int type,
		unsigned long total_size)
{
	unsigned long map_addr;
	unsigned long size = eppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
	unsigned long off = eppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
	addr = ELF_PAGESTART(addr);
	size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(size);

	/* mmap() will return -EINVAL if given a zero size, but a
	 * segment with zero filesize is perfectly valid */
	if (!size)
		return addr;

	/*
	* total_size is the size of the ELF (interpreter) image.
	* The _first_ mmap needs to know the full size, otherwise
	* randomization might put this image into an overlapping
	* position with the ELF binary image. (since size < total_size)
	* So we first map the 'big' image - and unmap the remainder at
	* the end. (which unmap is needed for ELF images with holes.)
	*/
	if (total_size) {
		total_size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(total_size);
		map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, total_size, prot, type, off);
		if (!BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
			vm_munmap(map_addr+size, total_size-size);
	} else
		map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, size, prot, type, off);

	return(map_addr);
}

This category addresses vulnerabilities caused by flawed access control mechanisms, where incorrect permission settings allow unauthorized users to access restricted resources.