static int protocol_client_init(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
    char buf[1024];
    VncShareMode mode;
    int size;

    mode = data[0] ? VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED : VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE;
    switch (vs->vd->share_policy) {
    case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_IGNORE:
        /*
         * Ignore the shared flag.  Nothing to do here.
         *
         * Doesn't conform to the rfb spec but is traditional qemu
         * behavior, thus left here as option for compatibility
         * reasons.
         */
        break;
    case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE:
        /*
         * Policy: Allow clients ask for exclusive access.
         *
         * Implementation: When a client asks for exclusive access,
         * disconnect all others. Shared connects are allowed as long
         * as no exclusive connection exists.
         *
         * This is how the rfb spec suggests to handle the shared flag.
         */
        if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
            VncState *client;
            QTAILQ_FOREACH(client, &vs->vd->clients, next) {
                if (vs == client) {
                    continue;
                }
                if (client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE &&
                    client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
                    continue;
                }
                vnc_disconnect_start(client);
            }
        }
        if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
            if (vs->vd->num_exclusive > 0) {
                vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
                return 0;
            }
        }
        break;
    case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_FORCE_SHARED:
        /*
         * Policy: Shared connects only.
         * Implementation: Disallow clients asking for exclusive access.
         *
         * Useful for shared desktop sessions where you don't want
         * someone forgetting to say -shared when running the vnc
         * client disconnect everybody else.
         */
        if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
            vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
            return 0;
        }
        break;
    }
    vnc_set_share_mode(vs, mode);

    vs->client_width = pixman_image_get_width(vs->vd->server);
    vs->client_height = pixman_image_get_height(vs->vd->server);
    vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_width);
    vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_height);

    pixel_format_message(vs);

    if (qemu_name)
        size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU (%s)", qemu_name);
    else
        size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU");

    vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
    vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
    vnc_flush(vs);

    vnc_client_cache_auth(vs);
    vnc_qmp_event(vs, QAPI_EVENT_VNC_INITIALIZED);

    vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);

    return 0;
}

This category addresses vulnerabilities caused by flawed access control mechanisms, where incorrect permission settings allow unauthorized users to access restricted resources.