static void process_watch_command(conn *c, token_t *tokens, const size_t ntokens) {
    uint16_t f = 0;
    int x;
    assert(c != NULL);

    set_noreply_maybe(c, tokens, ntokens);
    if (ntokens > 2) {
        for (x = COMMAND_TOKEN + 1; x < ntokens - 1; x++) {
            if ((strcmp(tokens[x].value, "rawcmds") == 0)) {
                f |= LOG_RAWCMDS;
            } else if ((strcmp(tokens[x].value, "evictions") == 0)) {
                f |= LOG_EVICTIONS;
            } else if ((strcmp(tokens[x].value, "fetchers") == 0)) {
                f |= LOG_FETCHERS;
            } else if ((strcmp(tokens[x].value, "mutations") == 0)) {
                f |= LOG_MUTATIONS;
            } else if ((strcmp(tokens[x].value, "sysevents") == 0)) {
                f |= LOG_SYSEVENTS;
            } else {
                out_string(c, "ERROR");
                return;
            }
        }
    } else {
        f |= LOG_FETCHERS;
    }

    switch(logger_add_watcher(c, c->sfd, f)) {
        case LOGGER_ADD_WATCHER_TOO_MANY:
            out_string(c, "WATCHER_TOO_MANY log watcher limit reached");
            break;
        case LOGGER_ADD_WATCHER_FAILED:
            out_string(c, "WATCHER_FAILED failed to add log watcher");
            break;
        case LOGGER_ADD_WATCHER_OK:
            conn_set_state(c, conn_watch);
            event_del(&c->event);
            break;
    }
}

The product performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may become a very small or negative number.