metadata
language:
- en
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:351
- loss:MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
base_model: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
widget:
- source_sentence: >-
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court ( Malone, Jr., J. ),
entered June 13, 2001 in Albany County, which partially granted petitioner
’ s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a
determination of the Department of Health reducing a component of its
Medicaid reimbursement rate. Petitioner, a residential health care
facility operating in Chemung County, commenced this proceeding seeking,
inter alia, annulment of respondents ’ determination adjusting its case
mix index based on misclassifications revealed in an audit of patient
review instrument data conducted by the Department of Health ( hereinafter
Department ) and recalculating petitioner ’ s Medicaid reimbursement rate
for the period beginning April 1, 1999. 1 Specifically, the Department
found that petitioner had improperly classified 28 patients as receiving
restorative therapy rather than maintenance therapy, reduced petitioner ’
s reimbursement rate accordingly, and directed that future patient
assessments be performed by an independent auditor. Petitioner argued that
the Department ’ s nurse - auditors had improperly “ second - guessed ”
the physician - prescribed rehabilitative care plans for its patients by
denying reimbursement even though petitioner had provided restorative
therapy as prescribed. Petitioner also argued that the Department acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in using a fixed general rule precluding
reimbursement for restorative therapy unless it produces actual
improvement ( hereinafter actual improvement standard ) that has not been
properly adopted and filed as a formal regulation. Supreme Court accepted
this latter argument, granted the petition and remitted the matter to
respondents to review the patient classifications without re * 773course
to the actual improvement standard. Respondents now appeal. 2 Respondents
argue that Supreme Court ’ s ruling was improper because the Department ’
s actual improvement standard is based on a rational interpretation of an
existing regulation and, thus, is not an unfiled rule. Petitioner
reiterates its contentions that the denial of reimbursement for
restorative therapy provided to its patients was improper both because it
was based on an auditor ’ s after - the - fact medical judgment and on an
unfiled rule requiring actual improvement. Since the Department ’ s
auditors were not required to defer to the judgments of petitioner ’ s
physicians and therapists in retrospectively reviewing what patient care
qualified for Medicaid reimbursement ( see, Concourse Rehabilitation &
Nursing Ctr. v DeBuono, US Dist Ct, SD NY, June 11, 1988, Conti, J., slip
op at 12, appeal dismissed 179 F3d 38 ), we find no merit in petitioner ’
s first contention. Rather, as considered by Supreme Court and as
presented on appeal, the central issue is whether respondents ’ actual
improvement standard for the restorative therapy classification is a
rational interpretation of an existing regulation or a new unfiled rule
being applied in violation of the State Administrative Procedure Act.
Under 10 NYCRR 86 - 2. 30 ( i ) ( Instructions : Patient Review Instrument
[ PRI ] [ 27 ] ), a restorative therapy classification is proper where “ [
t ] here is positive potential for improved functional status within a
short and predictable period of time ” and the “ [ t ] herapy plan of care
and progress notes * * * support that [ the ] patient has this potential /
is improving. ” In its clarification sheet provided to nursing homes, the
Department explains that the phrase “ has this potential / is improving ”
means that the patient must demonstrate both the potential for functional
improvement and the actual occurrence of such improvement in order to
qualify for the restorative therapy classification. On this appeal, the
Department acknowledges that it has a fixed policy of applying the quoted
regulation in this manner. Contrary to Supreme Court ’ s conclusion, we
find that the Department ’ s clarification sheet is interpretive, that its
interpretation has a rational basis and that, therefore, the resulting
actual improvement standard does not constitute an improper unfiled rule (
see, State Administrative Procedure Act * 774 § 102 [ 2 ] [ b ] [ iv ] ;
see also, Matter of Dubb Enters. v New York State Liq. Auth., 187 AD2d
831, 833 ; cf, Matter of Cordero v Corbisiero, 80 NY2d 771, 772 - 773 ;
Matter of Stuyvesant Polyclinic v Axelrod, 117 AD2d 99, 101 ). Generally,
“ courts will defer to an agency ’ s interpretation of its own regulations
if not irrational ” ( Matter of Silver Lake Nursing Home v Axelrod, 156
AD2d 789, 790 ; see, Matter of Marzec v DeBuono, 95 NY2d 262, 266 ; Matter
of County of Rockland v Axelrod, 157 AD2d 960, 961 ), and the agency ’ s
interpretation is not rendered irrational simply because the regulation
may be susceptible to a different rational interpretation ( Matter of
Jennings v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 90 NY2d 227, 239 ).
Petitioner focuses on the role played by the forward slash or virgule in
the phrase “ patient has this potential / is improving. ” Arguing that
common usage reflects that the virgule merely means “ or, ” petitioner
concludes that the Department ’ s requirements of potential improvement
and actual improvement contradicts the language of the regulation. Our
view of the use of the virgule in the regulation at issue here leads to a
contrary conclusion. “ Virgule ” has been defined as a symbol used to
denote, inter alia, “ or ” or “ and or ” ( see, Webster ’ s Third New
International Dictionary 2555 [ unabridged 1986 ], cross - referencing “
diagonal, ” Webster ’ s Third New International Dictionary 622 [
unabridged 1986 ] ). Even defined in this way, the virgule allows for
usage as “ and, ” resulting in no contradiction when both alternatives
apply. However, “ virgule ” is more comprehensively defined as “ a short
oblique stroke ( / ) between two words indicating that whichever is
appropriate may be chosen to complete the sense of the text in which they
occur ” ( Random House Dictionary of the English Language 2125 [
unabridged 2d ed 1993 ] ). This definition is particularly apt here
because the phrase “ patient has this potential / is improving ” follows,
and is parallel to, the preceding phrase “ therapy plan of care and
progress notes. ” To interpret the entire regulation, rather than parse
the latter phrase only, it is rational to view the virgule as indicating
that the reader should use the words that most appropriately complete the
sense of the whole sentence. As the earlier phrase has two concepts with
one anticipating future progress and the other reporting actual progress,
the phrase “ patient has this potential / is improving ” provides the
choice between potential and actual circumstances depending upon whether a
plan for a patient or a patient ’ s progress is being considered.
Interpreted this way, the regulation requires a therapy plan to set forth
the patient ’ s potential for improvement and the patient ’ s prog *
775ress notes to reflect actual improvement in order to qualify as
restorative. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the overall
regulatory scheme, for it seeks to assure that restorative therapy is
utilized when it potentially will result in patient improvement while
excluding reimbursement if the expected improvement is not achieved ( see,
Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr. v Whalen, 249 F3d 136, 143 - 146
). 3 Given the parallel structure of the pertinent phrases of the
regulation and the recognized use of the virgule to implement such
parallelism, we find no conflict between the cited regulation and
respondents ’ interpretation, and conclude that their interpretation has a
rational basis. Finally, petitioner ’ s contention that the issue is not
judicially reviewable because the Department, through its auditors, did
not expressly rely on the actual improvement standard in reclassifying
petitioner ’ s patients is belied by the petition itself, which narrowly
framed the issue by asserting that the Department ’ s actual improvement
standard had resulted in the reclassifications. Accordingly, it was error
to grant the petition and require further assessment by the Department.
Crew III, J. P., Peters, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that
the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much
thereof as partially granted the petition ; petition denied in its
entirety ; and, as so modified, affirmed. . We refer the reader to
Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr. v Whalen ( 249 F3d 136 ) for an
overview of the Medicaid program and Matter of Teresian House Nursing Home
Co. v Chassin ( 218 AD2d 250 ) for a description of its process for
auditing patient assessments. . Since the judgment issued by Supreme Court
is nonimal and, thus, not appealable as of right ( see, CPLR 5701 [ b ] [
1 ] ; [ c ] ), we exercise our authority to grant permission to appeal sua
sponte given the importance of the issue presented ( see, Matter of Gane v
Ambach, 135 AD2d 1013, 1013 - 1014 ). . The Health Care Financing Agency ’
s “ Carriers Manual ” provides as follows : “ Restorative Therapy. To
constitute physical therapy a service must, among other things, be
reasonable and necessary to the treatment of the individual ’ s illness. *
* * In addition, there must be an expectation that the patient ’ s
condition will improve significantly in a reasonable ( and generally
predictable ) period of time. However, if at any point in the treatment of
an illness, it is determined that the expectations will not materialize,
the services will no longer be considered reasonable and necessary ; and
they, therefore, should be excluded from coverage under § 1862 ( a ) ( 1 )
of the Social Security Act [ 42 USC § 1862 ( a ) ( 1 ) ] ” ( Carriers
Manual, part 3, ch II, § 2210. 1 [ emphasis supplied ] ).
sentences:
- What are the legal standards for proving legal malpractice in New York?
- >-
What are the criteria for granting a motion to dismiss in a criminal
trial?
- >-
What determines Medicaid reimbursement eligibility for restorative
therapy in New York?
- source_sentence: >-
Bacon, J. The grounds on which the plaintiffs ask the relief to which they
suppose themselves entitled are two fold. First, they allege that the
proceedings of the defendants are calculated to do incalculable injury to
the farms of the plaintiffs, by cutting off and drying up their springs,
and destroying the growth of their young timber, and that these
proceedings are conducted in bad faith and with the intent to injure the
plaintiffs, and benefit the lands of other parties not contributing to the
expense of the work ; and secondly, they insist that the act under which
the defendants are assuming to perform the work in question is
unconstitutional and void, as depriving the plaintiffs of their property,
not for any public use, and without providing them a just compensation
therefor. I shall spend no time upon the first branch of the plaintiffs ’
case, because there is no evidence whatever before me tending to show that
the defendants are acting in bad faith ; and although there is some
diversity of opinion whether the mode adopted by the defendants is the one
best calculated to secure the result at which they are aiming, and whether
the manner of its execution is the most judicious, yet this may be deemed
at best a balanced question, on the evidence. Even if they err in
judgment, a court would hardly be justified in interfering by the summary
process of injunction to restrain their proceedings. Unless the defendants
are violating the plain and manifiest intent and object of the statute
under which they are acting, or are proceeding in bad faith, the court
should not interpose its a, u * 168thority to suspend the work. In either
aspect, I see no sufficient ground, as disclosed by the evidence, to
entitle the plaintiff to the relief they ask under the first head of their
complaint. The more important question, as it was the one most elaborately
and ably argued by the counsel on both sides, respects the inquiry whether
the act of April 16th, 1854, under which the defendants are carrying on
the work of draining, the Rome swamp, is not a violation of the
constitution, and therefore void. The plaintiffs ’ counsel insists that
the act is a violation of the constitutional inhibition against taking
private property, because, ( 1. ) It is not taken for a public use ; and (
2. ) Because no just compensation is provided for the parties whose
property is taken. I. That the property of A. cannot be taken and
appropriated to the use of B., however beneficial the change may bej and
that the land of private citizens cannot be occupied by the government or
any subordinate functionary clothed with legislative authority, under the
pretense or the claim of improving it for the benefit of the occupant or
his neighbors, requires no argument to demonstrate. It is by no means
easy, however, to define the precise boundaries which limit the right to
appropriate private property for public use ; or, in other words, to
determine when the use shall be deemed public, and when not. It is
insisted by the counsel for the plaintiffs that the purposes for which the
property is taken in this case are not public, because the benefit is
limited to, - and the expense assessed upon, a few individuals. But how
are we to determine the number to whom the benefit will be confined? In
the case of draining an extensive swamp, we can readily conceive that the
public health may be favorably affedted, throughout a wide region, within
and bordering upon the district where the work is carried on, and it
surely is for the public benefit that a large tract of land should be
reclaimed from the condition of a useless morass, and added to the
agricultural resources of the state. But the question returns upon us, who
is to judge of the degree of necessity which exists, and which alone will
warrant the action of the legislative authority in determining that
private property may * 169be taken for public uses? It is now well
settled, if there ever has been any well founded doubt upon the
proposition, that the right of “ eminent domain ” remains in the
government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign
capacity, and they have the right to resume the possession in the manner
directed by the organic and the statute laws of the state, whenever the
public interest requires it. The answer to the question I have proposed,
is perhaps no where better given than by the late chancéllor of this state
in the leading case of Beekman v. The Saratoga & Schenectady Rail Road Co.
( 3 Paige, 73. ) “ If the public interest can in any way be promoted by
the taking of private property, it must rest in the wisdom of the
legislature to determine whether the benefit to the public will be of
sufficient importance to render it expedient for them to exercise the
right of eminent domain, and to authorize an interference with the private
rights of individuals for that purpose. ” He adds, “ upon this principle,
not only the agents of government, but also individuals and corporate
bodies, have been authorized to take private property for the purpose of
making public highways, turnpike roads and canals, of erecting and
constructing wharves and basins, of establishing ferries, of draining
sioamps and marshes, and of bringing water to cities and villages. In all
such cases the object of the legislative ' grant of power is the public
benefit derived from the contemplated improvement. ” The use and benefit
is not required to be universal, nor, in the largest sense, even general.
If it is confined to a specific district, it may still be public. If some
parties are more benefited than others, this forms no objection to the
use, if the public interest and convenience are thereby subserved.
Isolated and individual action will rarely secure the public and general
result which the legislative power is invoked to accomplish ; and, in view
of all the facts in this case, it is to be assumed that the legislature
adjudged that the public necessity or utility justified the exercise of
the right of resumption, and that the exigency existed which authorized
the act in question. I do not say that a case may not exist of such
palpable and gross invasion of private rights, unjustified by any
semblance of pub - * 170lie necessity, that it would he the duty of the
courts to interfere for the protection of such rights, by pronouncing the
act a violation of the salutary principle which was designed to hold the
legislative authority in check. But the case must be very clear to warrant
this interference. On this part of the case, it is pertinent also to
remark, that for the last fifty years, at least, the legislature has
exercised the power in question here, by passing laws from time to time,
authorizing, in various forms, the draining of swamps and marshes, and the
reclaiming of submerged lands. More than twenty such acts will be found in
the session laws of the state, commencing as early as 1804, and continuing
at various intervals down to the very last session of the legislature,
when the act in question was passed. This course of legislation is by no
means conclusive when a constitutional question arises, which may never
have been agitated in the courts, - under any of those acts. And we have
been admonished by more than one decision that no length of time, in which
a course of legislation has been continued, will protect any law from the
condemnation of the judicial tribunals, when its conflict with the
constitution is brought distinctly to the test. ( See opinion of Bronson,
J. in Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. ) While, therefore, it is not
affirmed that. these acts may be appealed to as decisive of the power of
the legislature to pass them, and that they are not within the
constitutional objection we have been considering, they nevertheless do
lend some strength to the argument that a power so long exercised, in such
diversified forms and various localities, may be deemed settled, as
applied to the subject we are now considering. Looking then at the
principle which lies at the foundation of the right of the government to
take private property for public use by an appropriate act of legislation,
and the end which in this case may be fairly deemed the object and intent
of the act, I shall - find no difficulty in maintaining it as the lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and holding that the taking of
the lands of these plaintiffs, so far as it was necessary to enter upon
and appropriate them for the purpose intended in this case, was and is a
lawful taking of the same for a public use. • * 171II. But there is an
important condition connected with the exercise of this power on the part
of the government to take private property for the public use ; and that
is, the necessity of providing a just compensation to the parties whose
property shall be thus appropriated. This condition is fundamental and
imperative, and can only be satisfied by making such a provision as shall
be in truth “ just, ” or, in other words, adequate and compensatory. “ The
principle, ” says Oh. J. Savage, ( Matter of Canal street, 11 Wend. 154, )
“ that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation is found in the constitution and laws of this state, and has
its foundation in those elementary principles of equity and justice which
lie at the root of the social compact. ” And this provision must be made
cotemporaneously with, and as a part of, the act which authorizes the
appropriation : For, in the language of Oh. Walworth, ( 18 Wend. 17, ) “
Before the legislature can authorize the agents of the state and others to
enter upon and occupy, or destroy or materially injure, the private
property of an individual, except in case of actual necessity " which will
not admit of delay, an adequate and certain remedy must be provided,
whereby the owner of such property may compel the payment of his damages
or compensation, and he is not bound to trust to the justice of the
government to make provision for such compensation by future legislation.
” And Kent, ( 2 Com. 389, ) recognizes the same doctrine when he says, “ a
provision for compensation is a necessary attendant on the due and
constitutional exercise of the power given to deprive an individual of his
property without his consent, and the principle is founded in natural
equity, and is laid down by jurists, as an acknowledged principle of
universal law. ” Bearing these principles in mind, and that by the term “
just compensation, ” as used in the constitution, is to be understood “ a
fair equivalent in money — a quid pro quo, a recompense in value for the
property taken, ” ( Per Mason, senator, 18 Wend. 35 ; ) and remembering
also that when private " property is taken for public use by right of
eminent domain, it is taken not as the owner ’ s share of contribution to
a public burthen, but as so much * 172beyond bis share — let us see
whether the act of the legislature, under which the proceedings of the
defendants in this case have been taken, fulfills the constitutional
requirement on that subject. By the 3d section of the act of April 17th, (
Session Laws of 1854, p. 1000, ) it is made the duty of the commissioners
to assess the costs and expenses of the survey and the cutting of the
ditches, and to apportion the amount among the several owners of lands to
be drained, according to the number of acres respectively owned by each.
This provision, it will be seen, devolves the whole expenses upon the
parties owning the lands to be drained ; and that not in the ratio of
relative benefit, but simply upon a property basis, and by an equal
assessment upon every acre throughout the swamp. The rule is highly
objectionable in respect to the mode of providing for the expenses, but is
probably within the scope of the legislative discretion as one form of the
exercise of the taxing power. These burthens never can be very equally
adjusted, and there is no glaring injustice in requiring those persons to
pay the expenses, who are supposed to receive an equivalent in the
enhanced value of their own adjacent property. On examining the act
further, to ascertain what provision has been made for the damages or
compensation to be made to the owner whose lands are entered upon and
taken, we find the 11th section declares, that for any damages done to the
owner or owners of such lands, ( fee., the commissioners shall make just
compensation ; and after providing for their appraisal in the proper mode,
it is declared that such damages, and the costs of assessment and the per
diem > of the commissioners, shall be duly certified and “ assessed and
collected as part of the expenses of the drainage authorized by this act.
” The effect of the provision is to make the damages or compensation to be
collected and payable precisely as the expenses are, to wit, by assessing
the same upon the owners of the land, according to the number of acres
owned by each. But is this the “ just compensation ” contemplated and
required by the constitution? Most obviously, it seems to me, it is not.
The taking of land necessary for the work, and the dispossession of the
owner ’ s right and title thereto, is only to be vindicated on the ground
' * 173that it is required for a public use. If the improvement is
required for the public benefit, upon what principle can the public
benefited by the appropriation, be exempted from their proper contribution
to the just indemnification of the parties whose property has been taken?
The land appropriated is not the owner ’ s share of a contribution to a
public burthen, but is so much above and beyond his share. He should be
compensated, therefore, and the compensation should be made in good part,
if not entirely, by those who are benefited by the work accomplished,
either in the increased salubrity of the surrounding region, or the
enhanced value of the lands which lie in the immediate neighborhood. But
by the operation of this section, the owner not only loses his land, but
is compelled to pa. y a portion of the very damages he has sustained by
such loss and the other consequential injuries he may have suffered
thereby. The money which is supposed to satisfy the damages suffered by
the owner may, in one sense, be said to find its way into one of the
pockets of the proprietor ; but to accomplish that trick of legal
legerdemain, it must first be taken out of the other. Is this the “ just
compensation ” the constitution contemplates? Does it practically do any
more than “ Keep the word of promise to the ear, To break it to the hope.
” Besides, the burthen will of necessity be very unequally apportioned
among those who are doomed to bear it. It is incredible that every owner
of land in the swamp will suffer equal injury and receive equal benefit
from the work in question ; and the testimony in this case shows that such
is not the fact. A. is the owner of 20 acres, which is a mere morass,
having no available springs upon it, and no growth of timber which the
progress of the work uproots and destroys. B., on an adjoining lot, has.
both springs indispensable for the uses to which he is applying his
already partially reclaimed land and a growth of young timber, very
valuable for farming purposes. And yet, under the law as it stands, B.
pays precisely at the same rate, as a compensation towards the damages he
has suffered, that A. does, who has not only suffered no injury, but has
been greatly benefited by * 174the appropriation of the land and the
execution of the work. This clearly is no just compensation, but a most
inequitable distribution of the burthens, which ought to be in some
proximate proportion to the benefits. It is urged by the counsel of the
defendants that the act in question follows the precedents of prior
legislation on the same subject, and is formed on the model of various
acts which have authorized similar works. I have looked through most of
the acts on this subject in our session laws for many years, and it is
true that in " a great majority of cases no provision whatever has been
mad § for ascertaining or paying the compensation required to be made.
These laws have been probably acquiesced in by the parties who were
interested in or affected by them, and no question has been made in the
courts, as far as I am aware, respecting their constitutional validity. If
there had been, I am unable to see how they could have escaped judicial
condemnation. But this has not been the invariable course of legislation
on this subject ; for on examining the act of April, 1816, for draining
the great marsh on the Caneseraga creek, I find an express provision, that
in case any person shall suffer injury or damage by occasion of the canal
and drainage of the land, his damages shall be ascertained by the
commissioners, and assessed on the proprietor of such lands “ as would in
any wise be benefited or made more valuable, by reason of the canal ” to
be cut for the purpose of draining the said swamp. And the same provision
was made in reference to the expenses, which were to be assessed in like
manner, “ having reference to the benefit to be received by each of the
proprietors. ” So also in the act of April, 1825, for draining the Cayuga
marshes, it was made the duty of the commissioners, when the work should
be completed, to prepare an assessment roll and valuation of the land
reclaimed, and all other lands which in their opinion shall have been
increased in value by the lowering of the waters of the marsh, and assess
a tax to pay for the work, “ in an equal and just measure according to the
valuation in the assessment roll, ” adequate to meet the expenses of the
work. And a substantially similar provision is contained in the act of *
175February, 1822, for lowering Onondaga Lake, and draining the marsh
lands in the town of Salina. [ Oneida Special Term, December 4, 1854.
Bacon, Justice. ] These acts contain the proper provisions, and are, it
seems to me, founded on the true principle which ought to govern
legislation on the subject of appropriating private property for public
uses. Nothing could have been easier than to have inserted in the act we
have been considering, a section containing a provision similar to the one
found in these acts, to which I have referred, and thus have secured all
the benefits which are expected to, and doubtless. will, flow from a
judicious discharge of the duties devolved upon these defendants, while it
preserved all the constitutional guaranties which have been thrown around
the rights of the private citizen. Future legislation may possibly ’ -,
even now, remedy this omission, giving validity to what has already been
done, but providing for that just indemnity and compensation to which it
shall be found the parties are ultimately entitled. But whether this be so
or not, the duty of the courts in a case where their interposition is
invoked to stay proceedings under a law which violates a glain _
constitutional provision, is clear and imperative, and must be performed.
, The plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint, restraining the defendants from further proceedings under the
act in question. But as the defendants have been charged with a public
duty, under the apparent sanction of an act of the legislature, and have
acted in entire good faith, the judgment must be without costs against
them.
sentences:
- >-
What legal principles govern the interpretation of insurance policy
conditions for claims and notice requirements?
- What are the requirements for obtaining a patent for an invention?
- >-
What are the legal principles for determining public use and just
compensation under eminent domain?
- source_sentence: >-
Order affirmed, with ten dollars * 928costs and disbursements. All
concurred, except Kruse, J., who dissented upon the ground that the order
for examination appears upon its face to have been made under article 1 of
title 3 of chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such an order can
only be made by a judge and not by the court. If the. order was
incorrectly entered it should have been resettled before the judge who
presided at the court that made it.
sentences:
- >-
When can a court issue a writ of prohibition to stop legal proceedings
in a lower court?
- What are the tax implications of a property sale in the United States?
- >-
What happens if a court order is improperly entered under civil
procedure laws?
- source_sentence: >-
Loring, J. The defendant operates a private hospital for gain. The
plaintiff went there to undergo an operation. She testified that " her
physician made the arrangements for [ Tier ] entering into the hospital. .
. . That she paid to the hospital $ 15 a week for attendance and $ 10 for
the use of the operating room. ” The operation was performed by a surgeon
not connected with the defendant hospital. The plaintiff was etherized by
her family physician and he was not connected with the defendant. In
addition to the surgeon and the family physician two of the defendant ’ s
nurses were present at the operation. When the plaintiff was on the
operating table before she went under ether she had two rings on her
hands. After the operation and while the plaintiff was still under the
effects of ether she was carried from the operating room to her own room
in the hospital by “ one of the doctors assisted by the nurses. ” When the
plaintiff came out of the ether she noticed that the more valuable of the
two rings ( a ring which “ would not come off without assistance ” ) was
missing. At the trial the plaintiff put the surgeon and the family
physician on the witness stand. Each of them testified that he did not
take the ring. The defendant put on the stand the superintendent of the
hospital, one of the two operating nurses and the plaintiff ’ s day nurse.
Each of them testified that she did not take the ring. The operating nurse
who was put upon the witness stand testified that the other operating
nurse was in California “ the last time she heard from ” her. The
plaintiff made many requests for rulings and now insists upon the first,
fifth, eleventh and twelfth set forth above. These were refused and an
exception taken. The judge instructed the jury that to recover the
plaintiff must prove that she was in the exercise of due care and that the
defendant was negligent. An exception was taken to this ruling. The case
is here on these exceptions. * 136On the evidence the jury were warranted
in finding that the ring was forcibly removed from the plaintiff ’ s hand
by the operating nurse who when last heard from was in California. If the
absent nurse did steal the ring it is plain that the defendant is not
liable on the ground that in stealing the ring the nurse was acting within
the scope of her employment as a servant of the defendant. The first
request for ruling therefore was properly refused. If the plaintiff had
stood in the relation of a stranger to the defendant there would have been
no error in the. trial. But the plaintiff did not stand to the defendant
in the relation of a stranger. It is apparent from, the bill of exceptions
that the case was not tried on the footing that the rights of the
plaintiff in this action depended upon the contract made by her with the
defendant. For this reason the terms of this contract do not appear as
fully as they otherwise would have done. But from what does appear in the
bill of exceptions the presiding judge was wrong in telling the jury that
the defendant ’ s liability depended upon the plaintiff proving that it
was negligent. . Under the contract entered into by the defendant
corporation it was its duty not only ( 1 ) to give the plaintiff a room in
the hospital before and after the operation and ( 2 ) to give her surgeon
and family physician the use of the operating room for the operatian, but
also ( 3 ) to give to the plaintiff the services of such nurses as were
necessary for her care before, after and during the operatian. It
expressly appeared at the trial that “ she [ the plaintiff ] paid to the
hospital $ 15 a week for attendance. ” The services of the nurses which
under the contract the defendant was bound to furnish the plaintiff
included the services of nurses while she was unconscious from the effects
of the ether, a condition which was a necessary part of the operation. And
the question we have to decide is whether there was a violation of duty on
the part of the defendant under this contract if the operating nurse in
question stole the ring by forcibly pulling it off the plaintiff ’ s
finger while she was under the effects of ether, or whether on the facts
appearing at the trial the jury could have so found. We are of opinion
that the jury could have so found. If for example a stranger had burst
into the operating room, attacked the plaintiff and done her bodily harm
or had attacked * 137the plaintiff while the nurses were carrying her from
the operating room to her own room and the defendant ’ s nurses had stood
by and done nothing to protect the plaintiff from those attacks, it is
plain in our opinion that there would have been a violation of the duty
owed by the defendant under its contract with the plaintiff. It is equally
plain in our opinion that the duty owed by the defendant under its
contract with the plaintiff extended to the care of the rings on her
fingers while she was unconscious from the effects of ether as well as to
the security of her person. And finally it is equally plain in our opinion
that there is as much a violation of the duty owed by the defendant under
the contract where the attack upon the person or larceny of the ring is
committed by one of the defendant ’ s own nurses ( whose duty it was to
protect the plaintiff ) as well as in the case where the attack is made by
a stranger and the nurses do not undertake to protect her from the attack.
In its legal aspects the case is governed by the decision in Bryant v.
Rich, 106 Mass. 180. In that case a dispute arose between a passenger on
one of the defendant ’ s steamers and one of the defendant ’ s waiters as
to whether the passenger had paid for his supper. The plaintiff, a cousin
of the passenger in question, made a suggestion to which no exception
could have been taken. Whereupon not only the waiter in question but the
head steward and the other waiters knocked down the plaintiff and beat
him. It was for this assault and battery that the action in Bryant v. Rich
was brought. The presiding judge ruled ( in accordance with a request made
by the defendant ) that “ there is no evidence that the steward and
waiters, in assaulting the plaintiff, were acting within the scope of any
authority, or in the discharge of any duty, imposed upon them by the
defendants. ” But in spite of this he instructed the jury that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. This ruling was sustained on the ground
that as matter of contract the plaintiff as a passenger had the right to
receive proper treatment from the defendants and their servants and all of
them. This decision has been followed in other cases - of carriers of
passengers. Hayne v. Union Street Railway, 189 Mass. 551. Jackson v. Old
Colony Street Railway, 206 Mass. 477. Gentile v. Boston Elevated Railway,
217 Mass. 113. In Levins v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 183
Mass. 175, it was held that a case was * 138not made out under this rule
where a purse had been accidentally - left on the window sill of the wash
room of a car of the defendant company. In Fairbanks v. Boston Storage
Warehouse Co. 189 Mass. 419, it was held that it did not apply where an
assault was made by an attendant who under the rules of the defendant
company accompanied the plaintiff when he went to examine goods stored by
him in the warehouse of the defendant. The reason why the rule of Bryant
v. Rich did not apply in the case of Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse
Co. was because of the fact that the employee who made the assault was in
attendance upon the plaintiff at the time in question for the plaintiff ’
s own purposes. He was not a servant of the defendant to whose services
the plaintiff was entitled under his contract with the defendant. The
decision in Bryant v. Rich does not depend upon the fact that the
defendants in that case were common carriers. The decision would have been
the same had the assault and battery occurred on an excursion steamer in
place of upon a steamer operated by a common carrier. And the decision
would have been the same if the steward and waiters had stolen rings from
Bryant ’ s fingers in place of knocking him down as they did. The doctrine
of Bryant v. Rich applies whenever there is a contract between the
plaintiff and defendant by force of which the defendant is to furnish for
the plaintiff ’ s comfort the services of its, the defendant ’ s,
employees. Where the injury to the plaintiff is caused by an act of the
defendant ’ s servants done in the course of their employment an action
may be brought based on negligence of the defendant ’ s servants for which
the defendant is liable because the act took place in the course of his
servants ’ employment, or an action may be brought in that case based on
violation of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff under the
contract between the defendant and the plaintiff. But where ( as was the
case in Bryant v. Rich and in the case at bar ) the injury done the
plaintiff is caused by an act of the defendant ’ s servants outside of the
servants ’ duty as employees of the defendant but by an act of the
defendant ’ s servants which while not in the course of the servants ’
employment is none the less a violation of the duty owed by the defendant
under the defendant ’ s contract with the plaintiff, the only action that
can be brought is an action founded upon the duty arising out of the
contract. * 139The second count sufficiently sets forth a liability on the
part of the defendant for violation of its duty under its contract with
the plaintiff. It was held in Bryant v. Rich that “ for a violation of
such a contract either by force or negligence, the plaintiff may bring an
action of tort, or an action of contract. ” What has been said leaves open
the defence which arises out of the testimony that the plaintiff when
received into the hospital was asked to put into the custody of the
defendant corporation all her “ valuables. ” The defendant ’ s agent who
received the plaintiff when she came to. the hospital testified that that
request was made to her at that time. The plaintiff on the other hand
testified that she was asked to put her money into the custody of the
hospital but that she was not asked to put anything else into its custody.
If the defendant ’ s evidence is believed, a defence is made out. On the
other hand if the plaintiff ’ s evidence on this matter is believed, her
rights depend upon the rule of Bryant v. Rich, ubi supra. Exceptions
sustained.
sentences:
- >-
What are the tax implications of operating a private hospital for
profit?
- >-
What legal principles determine a hospital's liability for the actions
of its employees under a contract with a patient?
- >-
What are the legal implications of improperly imposed sublet surcharges
in cooperative housing disputes?
- source_sentence: >-
Welsh, J. This is an action alleging negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle. The case was tried before a jury. A verdict was returned
indicating that the defendant was not negligent The issue on appeal is
whether the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with
G. L. c. 89, § 8, ( the general “ right of way ” at intersections ) as
well as G. L. c. 89, § 9 ( the duty of a motorist at an intersection
governed by a stop sign ). We determine there was no error. The following
evidence was adduced at trial. On January 9, 1996, the plaintiff was
operating a motor vehicle on Revere Street a public way in Quincy. She
testified that she came to a complete stop at a “ stop ” sign at the
intersection of Revere Street and Mechanic Street also a public way. A
large mound of snow obstructed her view and she was unable to see the
intersection. She proceeded out into the intersection and stopped again
about half way into the intersection. The passable roadway was narrowed
considerably due to the snow banks on the sides of the road. She allowed a
white car to pass her and then started up again. She testified that she
saw the car operated by the defendant approaching at a speed of 45 miles
per hour ; nevertheless she proceeded through the intersection, making a
left turn in the path of the oncoming vehicle. The defendant ’ s vehicle
struck the left side of the plaintiffs vehicle, with left hand side damage
to the defendant ' s vehicle. The defendant testified that the plaintiff
did not stop. The jury determined that the defendant was not negligent The
court gave comprehensive instructions on the elements of negligence and
the duty of care. The court specifically instructed the jury as to the
issue of violation of a statute as evidence of negligence, taking pains to
explain that the violation, if found, must be a contributing factor to the
damage sustained by the plaintiff. See Minnehan v. Hiland, 278 Mass. 518,
523 ( 1932 ). He specifically charged as to the duty to stop at a stop
sign as provided by G. L. c. 89, § 9. 2 The plaintiff ’ s quarrel with the
judge is that he failed specifically to instruct as she requested
regarding G. L. c. 89, § 8, the general duty of care applicable when two
motorists arrive at an intersection at approximately the same time. There
was no error. G. L. c. 89, § 8 expressly provides that its provisions do
not * 138apply when an operator is otherwise directed by a traffic
regulatory sign erected and maintained in accordance with the provision of
Sec. 2 of Ch. 85 ( which would include “ stop ” signs ). See Canane v.
Dandini, 355 Mass. 72, 75 ( 1968 ). G. L. c. 89, § 9 is the statute that
is primarily applicable to intersections governed by stop signs. As stated
in Canane, one directed to stop by a stop sign may not have the benefit of
the general rule if the rule grants him the right of way, until he has
complied with the order to stop. After stopping, the operator becomes
subject to the general rule and may proceed and thereafter exercise the
right of way in accordance with that rule. Id. at 75. However, the
operator must proceed into the intersection with due care. Even if the
operator has the right of way under c. 89, § 8, that right is subject to
the requirement of using due care. Possession of the right of way is only
one factor to be considered in deciding whether the operator has fulfilled
his duty of due care. Id. at 76. Accordingly, an operator who has stopped
at a “ stop ” sign may still be found to be negligent if he proceeds into
the intersection without using due care. The duty to exercise due care
requires an operator who has halted at a stop sign to behave with
reasonable caution before entering the intersection. Even an operator who
has stopped at a stop sign and has a “ right of way ” under § 8 may be
found to be negligent if he proceeds into the intersection before he can
do so with reasonable prudence and with suitable regard for his safety and
that of others. Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 376 Mass., 612, 616, N. 3. ( 1978 ).
Again, the “ right of way ^ rule in § 8 is not absolute, but is subject to
the condition of due care as to its exercise. With these principles in
mind, we turn to the judge ’ s charge. At the outset, we observe that it
is not required that the judge charge the jury in the precise formulation
proposed [ see Poole v. Boston & Main Ry., 216 Mass. 12, 15 ( 1913 ) ] so
long as the judge fairly and adequately covers the point in the charge.
See Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 10 ( 1946 ) ; Squires v. Fraska, 301
Mass. 474, 476 ( 1938 ). Stated somewhat differently, the denial of
requested instruction does not constitute error where the requested
instructions were covered substantially in the charge. Pearlin v. Farrell,
356 Mass. 741 ( 1970 ). The judge gave detailed and comprehensive
instructions on the concept of negligence in the context of operating of
motor vehicles. He explained the duty of a motorist with regard to
intersections controlled by stop signs. This explanation included the duty
to yield to vehicles in or in close proximity to the intersection. While
the instruction did not follow precisely the formulation suggested in the
Canane and Freyermuth cases, the judge ’ s instruction properly stressed
the duty of due care when proceeding into the intersection governed by the
stop sign after having stopped. Appeal dismissed. So ordered. “ Another
rule of the road is that every driver approaching a stop sign, shall stop
at a clearly marked stop line, and if there is not a stop line, then [ at
] a point nearest the intersecting roadway before entering it After having
stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to every vehicle in the
intersection or approaching in [ the ] other roadway so closely as to
constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the driver is moving
across or within the intersection. ”
sentences:
- >-
How is rent abatement calculated in cases involving a breach of the
warranty of habitability in Section 8 housing?
- >-
What are the legal requirements for establishing a valid contract in
business law?
- >-
What is the legal duty of care for drivers at intersections with stop
signs?
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy
model-index:
- name: modernbert-embed-base trained on triplets
results:
- task:
type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset:
name: dev
type: dev
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy
value: 1
name: Cosine Accuracy
- type: cosine_accuracy
value: 1
name: Cosine Accuracy
license: cc0-1.0
modernbert-embed-base trained on triplets
This is a sentence-transformers model finetuned from nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base. It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.
Model Details
Model Description
- Model Type: Sentence Transformer
- Base model: nomic-ai/modernbert-embed-base
- Maximum Sequence Length: 8192 tokens
- Output Dimensionality: 768 dimensions
- Similarity Function: Cosine Similarity
- Language: en
- License: apache-2.0
Model Sources
- Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
- Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
- Hugging Face: Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face
Full Model Architecture
SentenceTransformer(
(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: ModernBertModel
(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
(2): Normalize()
)
Usage
Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)
First install the Sentence Transformers library:
pip install -U sentence-transformers
Then you can load this model and run inference.
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("Free-Law-Project/modernbert-embed-base_finetune_8192")
# Run inference
sentences = [
"Welsh, J. This is an action alleging negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. The case was tried before a jury. A verdict was returned indicating that the defendant was not negligent The issue on appeal is whether the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with G. L. c. 89, § 8, ( the general “ right of way ” at intersections ) as well as G. L. c. 89, § 9 ( the duty of a motorist at an intersection governed by a stop sign ). We determine there was no error. The following evidence was adduced at trial. On January 9, 1996, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on Revere Street a public way in Quincy. She testified that she came to a complete stop at a “ stop ” sign at the intersection of Revere Street and Mechanic Street also a public way. A large mound of snow obstructed her view and she was unable to see the intersection. She proceeded out into the intersection and stopped again about half way into the intersection. The passable roadway was narrowed considerably due to the snow banks on the sides of the road. She allowed a white car to pass her and then started up again. She testified that she saw the car operated by the defendant approaching at a speed of 45 miles per hour ; nevertheless she proceeded through the intersection, making a left turn in the path of the oncoming vehicle. The defendant ’ s vehicle struck the left side of the plaintiffs vehicle, with left hand side damage to the defendant ' s vehicle. The defendant testified that the plaintiff did not stop. The jury determined that the defendant was not negligent The court gave comprehensive instructions on the elements of negligence and the duty of care. The court specifically instructed the jury as to the issue of violation of a statute as evidence of negligence, taking pains to explain that the violation, if found, must be a contributing factor to the damage sustained by the plaintiff. See Minnehan v. Hiland, 278 Mass. 518, 523 ( 1932 ). He specifically charged as to the duty to stop at a stop sign as provided by G. L. c. 89, § 9. 2 The plaintiff ’ s quarrel with the judge is that he failed specifically to instruct as she requested regarding G. L. c. 89, § 8, the general duty of care applicable when two motorists arrive at an intersection at approximately the same time. There was no error. G. L. c. 89, § 8 expressly provides that its provisions do not * 138apply when an operator is otherwise directed by a traffic regulatory sign erected and maintained in accordance with the provision of Sec. 2 of Ch. 85 ( which would include “ stop ” signs ). See Canane v. Dandini, 355 Mass. 72, 75 ( 1968 ). G. L. c. 89, § 9 is the statute that is primarily applicable to intersections governed by stop signs. As stated in Canane, one directed to stop by a stop sign may not have the benefit of the general rule if the rule grants him the right of way, until he has complied with the order to stop. After stopping, the operator becomes subject to the general rule and may proceed and thereafter exercise the right of way in accordance with that rule. Id. at 75. However, the operator must proceed into the intersection with due care. Even if the operator has the right of way under c. 89, § 8, that right is subject to the requirement of using due care. Possession of the right of way is only one factor to be considered in deciding whether the operator has fulfilled his duty of due care. Id. at 76. Accordingly, an operator who has stopped at a “ stop ” sign may still be found to be negligent if he proceeds into the intersection without using due care. The duty to exercise due care requires an operator who has halted at a stop sign to behave with reasonable caution before entering the intersection. Even an operator who has stopped at a stop sign and has a “ right of way ” under § 8 may be found to be negligent if he proceeds into the intersection before he can do so with reasonable prudence and with suitable regard for his safety and that of others. Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 376 Mass., 612, 616, N. 3. ( 1978 ). Again, the “ right of way ^ rule in § 8 is not absolute, but is subject to the condition of due care as to its exercise. With these principles in mind, we turn to the judge ’ s charge. At the outset, we observe that it is not required that the judge charge the jury in the precise formulation proposed [ see Poole v. Boston & Main Ry., 216 Mass. 12, 15 ( 1913 ) ] so long as the judge fairly and adequately covers the point in the charge. See Comeau v. Beck, 319 Mass. 17, 10 ( 1946 ) ; Squires v. Fraska, 301 Mass. 474, 476 ( 1938 ). Stated somewhat differently, the denial of requested instruction does not constitute error where the requested instructions were covered substantially in the charge. Pearlin v. Farrell, 356 Mass. 741 ( 1970 ). The judge gave detailed and comprehensive instructions on the concept of negligence in the context of operating of motor vehicles. He explained the duty of a motorist with regard to intersections controlled by stop signs. This explanation included the duty to yield to vehicles in or in close proximity to the intersection. While the instruction did not follow precisely the formulation suggested in the Canane and Freyermuth cases, the judge ’ s instruction properly stressed the duty of due care when proceeding into the intersection governed by the stop sign after having stopped. Appeal dismissed. So ordered. “ Another rule of the road is that every driver approaching a stop sign, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, and if there is not a stop line, then [ at ] a point nearest the intersecting roadway before entering it After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to every vehicle in the intersection or approaching in [ the ] other roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the driver is moving across or within the intersection. ”",
'What is the legal duty of care for drivers at intersections with stop signs?',
'What are the legal requirements for establishing a valid contract in business law?',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]
# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
Evaluation
Metrics
Triplet
- Dataset:
dev - Evaluated with
TripletEvaluator
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy | 1.0 |
Triplet
- Dataset:
dev - Evaluated with
TripletEvaluator
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| cosine_accuracy | 1.0 |
Training Details
Training Dataset
Free-Law-Project/opinions-synthetic-query-8192
- Size: 351 training samples
- Columns:
anchor,positive, andnegative - Approximate statistics based on the first 351 samples:
anchor positive negative type string string string details - min: 62 tokens
- mean: 2810.15 tokens
- max: 7455 tokens
- min: 12 tokens
- mean: 18.93 tokens
- max: 31 tokens
- min: 11 tokens
- mean: 14.86 tokens
- max: 21 tokens
- Samples:
anchor positive negative DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT EURICE McGILL, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 4D17 - 1492 [ August 31, 2017 ] Appeal of order denying rule 3. 850 motion from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Paul L. Backman, Judge ; L. T. Case No. 10 - 12523CF10A. Eurice McGill, Lake City, pro se. No appearance required for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.What are the grounds for denying a Rule 3.850 motion in Florida courts?What are the qualifications to file for an eviction in Florida?Twersky v Incorporated Vil. of Great Neck ( 2015 NY Slip Op 02755 ) Twersky v Incorporated Vil. of Great Neck 2015 NY Slip Op 02755 Decided on April 1, 2015 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. Decided on April 1, 2015 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department RANDALL T. ENG, P. J. LEONARD B. AUSTIN JEFFREY A. COHEN BETSY BARROS, JJ. 2014 - 07552 ( Index No. 9576 / 12 ) [ * 1 ] Sharon Twersky, respondent, v Incorporated Village of Great Neck, et al., defendants, FHM Mortgage Corp., et al., appellants. Cascone & Kluepfel, LLP, Garden City, N. Y. ( Howard B. Altman of counsel ), for appellants. Isaacson, Schiowitz & Korson, LLP, Rockville Centre, N. Y. ( Jeremy Schiowitz of counsel ), for respondent. DECISION & ORDER In an action to recover damages for personal injurie...What legal principles determine a property owner's duty to maintain safe conditions for pedestrians?What are the tax implications of selling a property in New York State?951 A. 2d 180 ( 2008 ) Philip S. HORNER v. GOVERNOR, State of New Hampshire and another. No. 2007 - 668. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Argued March 27, 2008. Opinion Issued : June 19, 2008. * 181 Philip S. Horner, pro se, and Richard E. Samdperil, of Exeter ( Mr. Horner on the brief, and Mr. Samdperil orally ), for the plaintiff. Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general ( Karen A. Schlitzer, assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law and orally ), for the defendants. BRODERICK, C. J. The plaintiff, Philip S. Horner, appeals an order of the Superior Court ( Smukler, * 182 J. ) denying his petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the State from enforcing RSA 651 - B : 11 ( 2007 & Supp. 2007 ), which mandates the collection of a sex offender registration fee. We affirm. The plaintiff was convicted in 2000 of five counts of felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632 - A : 3 ( 2007 ). Every sex offender and offender against children is required to register with the New Hampshire Divisio...What determines whether a charge is classified as a tax or a fee under New Hampshire law?What are the tax implications of forming a non-profit organization in the United States? - Loss:
MultipleNegativesRankingLosswith these parameters:{ "scale": 20.0, "similarity_fct": "cos_sim" }
Evaluation Dataset
Free-Law-Project/opinions-synthetic-query-8192
- Size: 95 evaluation samples
- Columns:
anchor,positive, andnegative - Approximate statistics based on the first 95 samples:
anchor positive negative type string string string details - min: 73 tokens
- mean: 1723.31 tokens
- max: 7494 tokens
- min: 13 tokens
- mean: 18.89 tokens
- max: 26 tokens
- min: 11 tokens
- mean: 14.46 tokens
- max: 20 tokens
- Samples:
anchor positive negative Mr. Justice Mercur delivered the opinion of the court, November 20th 1882. Both parties claim title to this land under sheriff ’ s sale as the property of James Strouss. The defendant purchased at a sale made in December 1815, the plaintiff at one made in March 1880. The plaintiff seeks to impeach the validity of the first sale * 411on the ground that it was made in fraud of the creditors of Strouss. The law presumes that a public judicial sale is made in good faith. This presumption stands, unless overthrown by clear and satisfactory evidence of fraud or unfair means. The contention was one of fact. Much evidence Avas given bearing on the question, and some of it conflicting. The learned judge submitted the case to the jury in a clear and correct charge. He instructed them that if the sheriff ’ s sale was made with the intention of hindering, delaying or defeating creditors, and the purchaser had knowledge of such, it was null and void, although the full value of the property may have...What are the legal principles governing fraud and sale validity in sheriff's sales?What are the legal implications of intellectual property infringement?217 N. J. Super. 541 ( 1987 ) 526 A. 2d 290 ALAN C. STAVER, PLAINTIFF, v. MARGARET STAVER, DEFENDANT. Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division Bergen County, Family Part. March 11, 1987. * 543 Donald L. Garber for plaintiff ( Donald L. Garber, attorney ; Michael I. Lubin on the brief ). John Fiorello for defendant ( Feldman, Feldman, Hoffman & Fiorello, attorneys ). SIMON, MARGUERITE T., J. S. C. Plaintiff husband brings this motion seeking to terminate his obligation to pay alimony to defendant pursuant to a judgment of divorce entered September 6, 1974. Defendant wife brings a cross - motion for enforcement of the judgment. At the time of the entry of the final judgment, plaintiff was employed as an ordained minister earning approximately $ 12, 000 a year. The parties entered into a consensual agreement which was incorporated into the judgment. Two pertinent stipulations of the agreement are as follows : ( 1 ) " Said alimony of $ 500 per month shall continue in effect regardle...Can pension benefits accrued after a divorce be considered as income for modifying alimony payments?What are the tax implications of forming a limited liability company (LLC)?Howard, J. : By the ' will of Byron S. Briggs, which was offered for probate in the Surrogate ’ s Court of Madison county, Harriet 0. Briggs, his wife, was appointed executrix. After the surrogate had overruled certain objections to the probate of the will and announced his conclusion that the will should be admitted to probate, written objections were filed to the issuance of letters testamentary to the widow, on the ground that she had deliberately murdered the testator for the purpose of thwarting any attempt on his part to make another will. The objections were filed by the son of the testator ; and his attitude of opposition to the widow was approved by a granddaughter of the testator. These two persons were descendants of the testator by a former wife. They were legatees under the will and had a statutory right to make objections. ( See Code Civ. Proc. § 2636. ) They stood ready with the witnesses in court and offered to make proof of the serious charges which they had preferred ...Can someone accused of murdering a testator be appointed as an executor of the will?What are the tax implications for inheriting property in the United States? - Loss:
MultipleNegativesRankingLosswith these parameters:{ "scale": 20.0, "similarity_fct": "cos_sim" }
Training Hyperparameters
Non-Default Hyperparameters
eval_strategy: stepsper_device_train_batch_size: 2per_device_eval_batch_size: 2learning_rate: 2e-05num_train_epochs: 2warmup_ratio: 0.1fp16: Truebatch_sampler: no_duplicates
All Hyperparameters
Click to expand
overwrite_output_dir: Falsedo_predict: Falseeval_strategy: stepsprediction_loss_only: Trueper_device_train_batch_size: 2per_device_eval_batch_size: 2per_gpu_train_batch_size: Noneper_gpu_eval_batch_size: Nonegradient_accumulation_steps: 1eval_accumulation_steps: Nonetorch_empty_cache_steps: Nonelearning_rate: 2e-05weight_decay: 0.0adam_beta1: 0.9adam_beta2: 0.999adam_epsilon: 1e-08max_grad_norm: 1.0num_train_epochs: 2max_steps: -1lr_scheduler_type: linearlr_scheduler_kwargs: {}warmup_ratio: 0.1warmup_steps: 0log_level: passivelog_level_replica: warninglog_on_each_node: Truelogging_nan_inf_filter: Truesave_safetensors: Truesave_on_each_node: Falsesave_only_model: Falserestore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: Falseno_cuda: Falseuse_cpu: Falseuse_mps_device: Falseseed: 42data_seed: Nonejit_mode_eval: Falseuse_ipex: Falsebf16: Falsefp16: Truefp16_opt_level: O1half_precision_backend: autobf16_full_eval: Falsefp16_full_eval: Falsetf32: Nonelocal_rank: 0ddp_backend: Nonetpu_num_cores: Nonetpu_metrics_debug: Falsedebug: []dataloader_drop_last: Falsedataloader_num_workers: 0dataloader_prefetch_factor: Nonepast_index: -1disable_tqdm: Falseremove_unused_columns: Truelabel_names: Noneload_best_model_at_end: Falseignore_data_skip: Falsefsdp: []fsdp_min_num_params: 0fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: Noneaccelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}deepspeed: Nonelabel_smoothing_factor: 0.0optim: adamw_torchoptim_args: Noneadafactor: Falsegroup_by_length: Falselength_column_name: lengthddp_find_unused_parameters: Noneddp_bucket_cap_mb: Noneddp_broadcast_buffers: Falsedataloader_pin_memory: Truedataloader_persistent_workers: Falseskip_memory_metrics: Trueuse_legacy_prediction_loop: Falsepush_to_hub: Falseresume_from_checkpoint: Nonehub_model_id: Nonehub_strategy: every_savehub_private_repo: Nonehub_always_push: Falsegradient_checkpointing: Falsegradient_checkpointing_kwargs: Noneinclude_inputs_for_metrics: Falseinclude_for_metrics: []eval_do_concat_batches: Truefp16_backend: autopush_to_hub_model_id: Nonepush_to_hub_organization: Nonemp_parameters:auto_find_batch_size: Falsefull_determinism: Falsetorchdynamo: Noneray_scope: lastddp_timeout: 1800torch_compile: Falsetorch_compile_backend: Nonetorch_compile_mode: Nonedispatch_batches: Nonesplit_batches: Noneinclude_tokens_per_second: Falseinclude_num_input_tokens_seen: Falseneftune_noise_alpha: Noneoptim_target_modules: Nonebatch_eval_metrics: Falseeval_on_start: Falseuse_liger_kernel: Falseeval_use_gather_object: Falseaverage_tokens_across_devices: Falseprompts: Nonebatch_sampler: no_duplicatesmulti_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional
Training Logs
| Epoch | Step | Validation Loss | dev_cosine_accuracy |
|---|---|---|---|
| -1 | -1 | - | 0.9895 |
| 0.5682 | 100 | 0.0288 | 0.9895 |
| 1.1364 | 200 | 0.0317 | 1.0 |
| 1.7045 | 300 | 0.0166 | 1.0 |
| -1 | -1 | - | 1.0 |
Framework Versions
- Python: 3.11.11
- Sentence Transformers: 3.4.1
- Transformers: 4.49.0
- PyTorch: 2.6.0+cu124
- Accelerate: 1.4.0
- Datasets: 3.3.2
- Tokenizers: 0.21.0
Citation
BibTeX
Sentence Transformers
@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
month = "11",
year = "2019",
publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}
MultipleNegativesRankingLoss
@misc{henderson2017efficient,
title={Efficient Natural Language Response Suggestion for Smart Reply},
author={Matthew Henderson and Rami Al-Rfou and Brian Strope and Yun-hsuan Sung and Laszlo Lukacs and Ruiqi Guo and Sanjiv Kumar and Balint Miklos and Ray Kurzweil},
year={2017},
eprint={1705.00652},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.CL}
}